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COBBETT'S

# POLITICAL REGISTER.

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VOL. VI.

FROM JULY TO DECEMBER,

1804.

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1804.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

IN presenting this Volume to the Public, I have only to express a hope, that its contents will not be found inferior to those of any former Volume of the Work —A trifling alteration has been made in the running-title. The mottos occupied the place at first allotted to an abridged table of contents. Such a table appeared awkward, when the volume came to be bound up; and, its purpose is completely answered now by the describing the different subjects in the running title.—This Volume, like the last, contains *thirty-three* sheets; and, as this will be the number of sheets in every future Volume, the fixed cost of the work, for the whole year, is, as was before stated, £2. 15. 0.—The Parliamentary Debates, which formed a large part of the 2d, 3d, and 4th Volumes, are now become a separate work.—The very first object of this Work is, to collect together all Public Papers, and other Official Documents, to whatever nation relating; and, in this respect, I am persuaded it will be found far more complete than any other publication in this country or in Europe.

*Duke Street, Dec. 29, 1804.*

WM. COBBETT.

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# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. VI. No. 1.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 7, 1804.

PRICE 10D

"When I saw, that anger and violence prevailed every day more and more, and that things were hastening towards an incurable alienation of our colonies, I felt this as one of those few moments in which decorum yields to a higher duty. Public calamity is a mighty leveler; and there are occasions when any, even the slightest, chance of doing good, must be laid hold on, even by the most inconsiderable person."—BURKE'S Speech in the House of Commons, March 22, 1775.

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TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS KINGDOM, AND  
ESPECIALLY TO THE MEMBERS OF BOTH  
HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,

Are submitted the following observations on the distresses and disputes which have arisen, and on the consequences which it is to be feared may ultimately arise, from the laws and regulations which have, of late years, been adopted with respect to our West India Colonies and Colonists in general, and particularly those of

## THE ISLAND OF JAMAICA.

To nations as well as to individuals it frequently happens, when threatened with great and immediate dangers, to overlook, and of course to neglect to provide against, others not so near at hand and of slower approach, but, perhaps, not of less magnitude, and much more certain as to their arrival. Of the truth of this remark the present state of this kingdom and the conduct of its government furnish unquestionable proof. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," appears always to have been the maxim of Mr. Addington as well as of the minister whom he succeeded, and who has now again succeeded him. But, as the acting upon this maxim is utterly incompatible with any attempt at *prevention*, we have troubles and dangers of great magnitude constantly falling in upon us, like unexpected demands upon an improvident and embarrassed man in trade. Hence it is that the far greater part of our public measures consists of *remedies*, or attempts to remedy: they are generally brought forward upon the spur of the occasion: many of them obtain the sanction of Parliament upon no other ground than that of necessity; and we often hear the persons by whom measures are brought forward tell the House, that it is *too late* to talk about the cause from which such necessity has arisen. How often this has been, and is likely to be, the case need not be pointed out to those who have paid the least attention to the acts that have been passed, relative to almost every branch of our public affairs, within

the last twenty years. One measure of necessity hastily conceived and proposed, and not less hastily adopted, creates another and another and another measure of necessity of false and of temporary, of accidental, and, sometimes, of fatal effect. Thus we live along by shifts and expedients; always in a state of uncertainty if not of danger; gradually wearing away the resources of the country, the confidence of the people and of foreign nations, and the very foundations of the monarchy.

These reflections apply with peculiar justice to the conduct of government with regard to our West India Colonies and Colonists in general, and particularly those of Jamaica, where the planters, in consequence of a series of harsh, or at least, unadvised, measures, especially measures of taxation, have, at last, been reduced to a situation, which, it is, has not impaired those sentiments of attachment to the mother country, hitherto so conspicuous in all their actions, does certainly threaten to produce that effect. With a sincere and most anxious desire to contribute towards the preventing of the evils which would but too surely result from such a cause, I have, after long waiting in hopes of seeing the subject in abler hands, ventured to take up the pen, first dismissing from my mind, as the reader certainly will from his, every consideration of a private or party complexion.

In order to come at a full and fair view of the merits of the case, it will be necessary to go back to the origin of the present complaints. We shall, indeed, trace every fibre back to that "root of all evil," *money*: the want of money, on the part of the minister, and the unwillingness or inability (generally the latter) to pay, on the part of the colonists: this is, in fact, now, as it was in the former fatal quarrel between Great Britain and her colonies, the chief and the only source of disagreement; for, though the providing of a maintenance for the troops necessary to the defence of the Island appears, for a long time, to have been the main subject of contention; yet it will, at

last, become evident, that the extortion of money on the one side, and the preventing of such extortion on the other, has constituted and does still constitute the struggle between his Majesty's ministers and the legislature and people of Jamaica.

The colonists of this Island have ever asserted their unqualified right to protection, internal as well as external, in common with the rest of his Majesty's subjects; and, without entering here into the arguments that have been used upon this point, we may ask, why those colonists should not have a right to such protection, as well as the colonists of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Canada? Till this question be answered by the producing of some special provision or agreement, making an exception with respect to Jamaica, the right asserted by that island must be admitted. And, indeed, though the planters in Jamaica, like the citizens of Dublin, have, from the first establishment of a military force amongst them, provided, by their colonial grants, an island-subsistence for the King's troops, in addition to their pay, yet such island-subsistence never ought to have been considered in any other light than that of a free donation, which the colonial legislature was, at any time, at perfect liberty to withhold, or to discontinue altogether. About thirty years ago the Council and assembly, in a joint address to the King, pledged themselves to continue this allowance to any number of men that might be sent to them, not exceeding 3000, and to provide for such men barracks, hospitals, and other conveniences; all which the colony has most punctually and liberally performed, and, the Assembly has even made recently an addition to the former allowances. When the troubles in Saint Domingo first began to wear a serious and menacing aspect; application was made for an augmentation of the military force. The 20th dragoons and three regiments of foot were sent them, but accompanied with the condition that the island should defray all the additional expense which should, by a consent to this request, be made to the peace establishment of the kingdom. That it was not very generous, to say nothing about justice, thus to take advantage of the dangers and apprehensions of the colonists, no man will, I think, deny; especially when he considers, that the application was made at a time when the mother country was in the full enjoyment of all the advantages of peace and of uncommon prosperity, to which later the colony of Jamaica largely contributed. The principle, too, upon which

these niggardly conditions were founded, was perfectly novel. Jamaica was to defray the expense of this additional military force, because it was demanded *in time of peace!* Because that part of the empire was, from its local situation, placed in a state resembling that of war, it was not to receive aid from the mother country, as a colony, as a part of the empire, but as a foreign country, to whom Great-Britain might, while she remained at peace herself, think it politic to hire troops! Nevertheless, so great and imminent were the dangers, to which the colony was exposed, that the House of Assembly yielded to the conditions; but, as they themselves declared at the time, this whole measure was to be considered merely as an experiment resorted in a moment of danger and for a temporary purpose; and, while they expressly stated, that the augmentation of the troops at their expense was not to be considered as a permanent establishment, they strongly remonstrated against the principle upon which the ministers had made the exaction, still asserting, in an address to his Majesty, their title to equal protection with the rest of his subjects.

In the year 1797 a further augmentation to the force in Jamaica became necessary. The mother country was now *at war*: the ground on which the former demand had been made upon the particular purse of the colony was, of course, removed: it could not again be proposed to send the British troops as *mercenaries*; and yet it was very desirable to make the colony pay the whole expense of this further augmentation of force, employed for *its* defence, certainly, but not more for its defence than for the defence of the navigation, manufactures, and revenue of Great-Britain. To get over this difficulty; to save a few thousand pounds here, in order to add them to the millions that were expending in sieges and battles for colonies which, if taken, were to be barely surrendered without an equivalent, an expedient was resorted to that reflects very little honour either on the head or the heart of the persons by whom it was conceived. The people of Jamaica were informed, that regiments of black slaves would be raised in, or sent to, the island. More alarmed at this *threat* (for it could be considered as nothing else) than at all the other dangers by which they were menaced; foreseeing the ruinous and horrible consequences that must ensue from the eradicating of those opinions and the subverting of that local policy, on which the authority of the white inhabitants was founded, and had always been supported

much more than by superior physical force, the Assembly submitted, as to an imperious necessity, to a deviation from the constitutional principle which they had constantly asserted, and they proposed, as a substitute for these armed slaves, to give out of the purse of the colony British pay to 2,000 European troops. But this arrangement included a plan for augmenting the white population of the island, and "for compensating," to use the words of the Assembly, "the immediate expenditure, by adding to the future security of the country." And, it must not be forgotten, that, even with this prospect before them, the consent of the Assembly was not given, until representations and remonstrances against the obtrusion of the blacks had been tried in vain, and until they obtained a positive promise, that no black military establishment should be raised in, or sent to, the island. Notwithstanding this promise, however, the project of sending black troops to Jamaica was resumed previous to the resignation of Mr. Pitt, and, agreeably to a letter, written by Mr. Dundas to the colonial agent declaring in the strongest terms the resolution of government to persevere in its intention, the 2d West-India regiment was actually landed in Jamaica previous to the peace, in direct violation of the condition entered into by the ministers themselves.

The preliminaries of *peace* were communicated to the people of Jamaica in company with a requisition from the mother country, that they would take upon them the whole expense of maintaining 5,000 European troops! The Assembly was told by the Governor, that the black regiment should immediately be removed out of the island, and that, in future, no corps of that description should be sent thither, without the concurrence of the House; that the colonists should be relieved from the expense of maintaining the 20th regiment of dragoons as a permanent establishment; that the proposed establishment of 5,000 men would probably be reduced at a future period by the restoration of good order, and subordination in the French islands. And that, seeing that the Assembly had, on a former occasion, pledged itself to pay 2,000 white troops, the present proposition could not be regarded as unreasonable. He reminded them, at the same time, of the advantages which the colony would derive from the establishment of barracks in the interior parts of it; nor did he forget the "great prospect of a much more ready and extensive sale for the produce of the colony, from new markets being opened to its

"commerce by the blessings of peace."

In answer to the message containing these requests and suggestions the Assembly re-asserted their unqualified right to protection as British subjects: they refused to give British pay to any troops at all, and expressed their astonishment that an attempt should have been made to load them with the whole expense of an establishment of 5,000 regulars, in addition to that of their expensive colonial militia: they concluded their answer by stating, that, notwithstanding the distresses of the planters, and the difficulty of supporting any additional burdens however light, they would consent, in case an augmentation, raising the establishment to 5,000, was made, to provide for the whole 5,000 that sort of subsistence and accommodation which they were already pledged to provide for 3,000 men. In consequence of this refusal the regiment of slaves, for the embarkation of which the Governor informed the Assembly he *had given directions*, was retained in the island, while the 20th regiment of dragoons were soon after removed from it.

An account of these transactions having been communicated by the Governor to Mr. Addington and his colleagues, they seem to have sought, with great care and assiduity, for precedents amongst those official proceedings by which the continent of North America was lopped off from the empire of that sovereign, of whom it was their constant boast, that they were the "*confidential* servants." The letter of Lord Hobart, which appears to be the result of such an inquiry, and which was written in September, 1802, was not communicated to the House of Assembly till the month of November last, and it is sincerely to be wished that the nation may not have to mourn over the circumstance of its ever having been communicated at all. His Lordship sets out, as was the uniform practice with those sages who managed the affairs of the American colonies, just before they ceased to own allegiance to Great Britain, that is, with expressing his Majesty's *approbation of the zeal of the Governor*, an expression by no means called for, especially as the paper communicated to the Assembly purports to be "*an extract of a letter from Lord Hobart.*" To approve of one party in a dispute is to disapprove of the other party; therefore it was, in this case, not only unnecessary, but mischievous, to express the King's approbation of the conduct of the governor. After using a little flippancy upon the subject of the "*utterly untenable*" ground taken by the Assembly, and expres-

sing, with a sort of sneer, "a confident hope" that their time will be more taken up with devising the means of providing the supply than with endeavouring to find arguments to justify their want of liberality; after this extract proceeds to produce, as grounds of the present application, the bargain that was driven by the government in 1791, which bargain, as was before observed, was totally destitute not only of generosity but of justice also. It next refers to the bargain of 1797, and, upon the subject of the subsequent employment of slave regiments in Jamaica, it denies that the government violated its engagement, because the ministers, in sending those armed slaves, did not insist upon the colony's continuing to pay the 2,000 European troops! The words of the letter are these: "The measure was adopted under an express declaration on the part of his Majesty's ministers that they considered the Assembly as no longer bound to their engagement for the pay of the two thousand men, and from that period the provision for this service has been made from Great Britain, thereby *dissolving* the compact that had been entered into, and *not violating* it, as has been inadvertently stated by the Assembly." The Assembly, in answer to this part of the letter, so insulting to common sense, observe, that, "from an anxious disposition to cultivate harmony with the parent state, the House forbear to comment on the doctrine of *dissolving* a compact at the pleasure of *one* of the contracting parties, although destructive of all public confidence, and most alarming to the weaker side." This certainly is a doctrine that was never before heard of in the world; and who would not accuse the Assembly of a want of fidelity to their trust, if they were again to vote away the money of their constituents upon the faith of a similar compact entered into with the same party? The Assembly did not agree to pay the 2,000 European troops, upon condition that no slave regiments should be raised in, or sent to their colony, only while they continued to pay those troops; but upon condition that their alarm, on this account, should be entirely removed, that is, upon condition that, at no future time, slave regiments should be sent amongst them. They very well knew, they must have known, that a time was likely to arrive, when the 2,000 men, in addition to the former establishment and the militia, would not be wanted in Jamaica; when no longer wanted, they would, of course, be no longer continued; but, can it be supposed, that, if they ceased from this cause to pay

the 2,000 men, they expected, after the above-mentioned compact, to be liable to receive slave regiments into their colony? No: the sending of the slave regiment to Jamaica was a breach of public faith which nothing can palliate, and it requires no small share of self-confidence in the ministry to expect that it will speedily be forgotten. The governor assured the Assembly, in his message of June, 1802, that the black regiment "should be immediately removed," and announced to them "the consent of his Majesty to the wishes of the Assembly, that, in future, no corps of that description should be sent thither, without the concurrence of the House." Lord Hobart, in case the Assembly consent to the proposition of maintaining the European troops, repeats this assurance; but, what reliance can the Assembly place on such promises, especially when they come through ministers who hold the doctrine, that a compact may be "*dissolved*" at pleasure by the will of *one* of the contracting parties? Now, indeed, the Assembly will find a change in the ministry; but, whether their confidence is likely to be much increased thereby, is a question that will require but little consideration amongst those who recollect who it was that *violated* the former compact. In coming to the remaining parts of the letter of Lord Hobart, we find its tone begin to soften. The ministers sink in their demands; and the governor is directed to apply to the Assembly for pay and subsistence for *three* thousand men instead of *five* thousand men. It is added, too, that it is not intended to limit the military defence of the Island to this force; but the governor is "to express his Majesty's pleasure, that, upon a full consideration of all circumstances, the Island shall not be called upon for a larger contribution than that which has been stated." It was a maxim with a very cunning and famous man of the other side of the Atlantic, never to give a *reason* for any thing that he said or did. Well would it have been for Lord Hobart and his colleagues, if they had heard of and steadily pursued the advice of this cautious philosopher! The governor, in his message to the Assembly in June, 1802, states the great probability of the 5,000 being reduced in number, at a future period, *by the restoration of good order and subordination in the French islands*: then in the month of September following comes his principal, my Lord Hobart, and states to this same Assembly, that the numbers are already reduced from five to three thousand men; because—what, do you think? Because, "the French army in Saint Domingo has

"been greatly reduced," and because "the French naval force has returned from that station to Europe"!!! On the 17th of June the governor told the Assembly, that the restoration of order in the French islands would enable him to make a reduction in the number of their troops; on the 6th of the next September, Lord Hobart, with the governor's message upon the table before him, sets down and tells them, that the number of troops wanted has been reduced from five thousand to three thousand by circumstances which render it utterly improbable, and almost impossible, that the *hoped for* restoration of order should take place for several years to come! Does any man believe that the Assembly did not see through and despise this paltry device? That they did not clearly perceive it to have been invented by the ministry as an excuse for sinking in their demands, without an appearance of yielding to the Assembly? And, did Mr. Addington and Lord Hobart imagine, that the members of the Assembly of Jamaica had not pride as well as they? Did they think, that, by reducing the demand to three-fifths of its original amount, they should induce those members to abandon the great principle, for which they and their predecessors had so long contended? Did they in good truth believe that those members consisted in great part of "live-stock?" It would appear so, and that they did not regard them as the best kind even of such stock; for, after having endeavoured to wheedle them with this reduction in the amount of the demand, the letter concludes with expressing a full persuasion that the concurrence of the Assembly will be obtained to the extent now proposed, in which case, their wishes respecting the black slave regiment are to be acceded to; "but," says Lord Hobart to the Governor, "if, contrary to the reasonable expectations of his Majesty's government, the Assembly should not concur even to that extent, *the intention of removing the black troops must be laid aside!*" Upon this part of the letter the Assembly express themselves with becoming indignation: "The House lament," say they, "that their duty compels them to express their surprise and concern, that his Majesty's present ministers, whose moderation and respect for the constitution have been the subject of deserved eulogy, should direct to be submitted to the loyal inhabitants of this island, a proposition of the highest importance to their constituents and their posterity, not to be discussed on its own merits, not to be rejected or acceded to after

"weighing its effects and consequences on our constitution, and in our actual situation, but accompanied by a threat, that, if the deliberate and unbiassed voice of this house declared it inadmissible, we must expect that a body of regimented slaves, introduced in opposition to the unanimous opinion of the inhabitants, and the collected voice of all who are interested in the welfare of this island, shall be continued in its bosom, the object of universal abhorrence; a singular monument of pertinacity in speculative opinions in opposition to practical and sober experience; a body, contemptible as the means of protection, formidable only in the danger of its example, and as an instance of an armed force kept up in the colony, after it has been declared dangerous and unconstitutional by the representatives of the people." To the distance at which the Assembly of Jamaica is, and to their consequent inability to detect the falsehoods of the *hired* eulogists of Mr. Addington's administration, must be attributed their opinion, that the eulogy which had been bestowed on it was "deserved;" for, whenever the acts of that administration shall undergo a full and impartial review (not written by a Doctor *half promised the next vacant bishoprick*), it will appear, that, during no administration that this country has known for at least a hundred years past, was there ever shown less real moderation, and certainly never less respect for the constitution. Of the truth of this, little, one would think, could be required to convince those to whom the above-mentioned letter of Lord Hobart had been communicated; for, assuredly, a communication more daringly disrespectful to every principle of the constitution of England could not possibly have been made. The use which both ministries seem to have intended the slave regiment for, is, not to contribute to the defence of Jamaica so much as to extort other means of defence from the purse of the colony: just as, in a conquered city, you send a company at free quarter into the house of him who refuses his contribution. With regard to Mr. Addington's ministry, there can be no doubt at all as to the motive, and very little, it is to be feared, as to that of their predecessors, who are now again their successors, those of them, indeed, who are not the same identical persons. If, however, Mr Dundas's intention was not to extort a compromise, not to make the Assembly defray the expense of white troops far beyond the number of 2,000 men, but to compel the colony to submit to a permanent establishment of armed

slaves, what have the Assembly and their constituents *now* to expect?

Thus far we have heard of no complaints, of no subjects of dispute, except those relative to troops; and we see, that the object of government constantly has been to quash the claim to protection maintained by the Assembly, and to throw the whole burden of the military establishment of the island upon the island itself; treating it, as to matters of protection, like a foreign state, while as to matters of trade and commerce, it is held in the tightest bonds of allegiance, not to use the harsher term of subjection. It is by no means certain, that no part of the grievances of Jamaica have arisen from that haughtiness, self-sufficiency, and impatience of contradiction, which, in many instances, have been but too visible in the conduct of those having the power to produce such grievances; but, an effect far too extensive has certainly been attributed to this cause, which, in my opinion must be considered almost as nothing, when compared to the *financial distresses* of the mother country. This is the primary cause of all the grounds of colonial complaint. The minister never knows which way to turn him for money: any measure is welcome whereby money is to be raised, or the payment of money is to be avoided; provided always, that the said measure is in no wise connected with political and especially party views. The mind not only of the minister, but of the whole ministry, and indeed of the whole country, is kept constantly upon the stretch after objects of taxation on the one hand, and after the means of reducing our expenses on the other. Nor is this at all to be wondered at, when such is the state of our affairs, that the duration of our existence, as an independent nation, is calculated not by days and months and years, but by hundreds and thousands and millions of pounds. Hence it is that colonies are now estimated solely as sources of revenue, and not at all as outlets for our enterprising population, as the places of strength, as out-works to the kingdom, and as nurseries for the navy.

The first thing the colonists of Jamaica heard of the mother country after the return of a peace, which was to give abundance and ease to all his Majesty's subjects, was, an additional demand upon their purse, additional taxes upon their already impoverished estates in the island, at the same time that additional duties were here imposed upon the produce of those estates. They were reminded, exactly as the people of America were, of the vast expenses which the mother country had been at during the long war that

had just terminated, and of the enormous load of debt that she had contracted. They answered, that they observed with regret, that whilst measures were adopted to relieve the inhabitants of the mother country from the pressure of the heaviest of their taxes (alluding to the income tax), his Majesty's loyal subjects of Jamaica, in place of participating in the general blessings of peace, were to be called on for augmented and unusual contributions, grievous in their amount and oppressive in their principle. They objected to the principle; they again asserted their unqualified right to equal protection; but as to the burden it was now beyond their *ability* to bear it. In adverting to the arrangement respecting the payment of the 2,000 European troops, which arrangement was concluded in 1798, they stated that to have been a season of great prosperity, when all their staples were selling at a very high price, and when the Assembly might flatter themselves with being able to raise the necessary funds without inconvenience. But now, from causes chiefly arising from the fiscal laws and regulations of the mother country, the planters are in circumstances the very reverse of those which existed in 1791 and 1798, and are scarcely able to raise the taxes necessary for the common contingencies of their internal government, as evidently appears from the amount of their public debt, from the nature of the taxes they have had recourse to, as well as from the difficulty with which those taxes are collected, and from the great defalcations in the collections.

The origin of this distress is dated from the year 1799, when the minister conceived, and attempted to execute, the project of making the *foreign* consumer of West-India produce pay duties thereon into the Exchequer of Great-Britain. Previous to this most impolitic measure, West-India produce brought into British ports,\* whither, indeed, it was all obliged to be brought, was allowed to be exported to foreign countries, and, in case of such exportation, was allowed a drawback and bounty. By the new regulation these encouragements to exportation were withdrawn, upon the erroneous notion, that, as we had made a monopoly of West-India produce, and as foreigners would have the produce, they *must* have it from us, cost what it would, and that the amount of the former drawback and bounty would, at last, fall upon them. The error was not long in becoming apparent. A sudden stagnation of the trade ensued. The consumption and demand in Great-Britain bore no proportion to the quantity imported; and, the conse-

quent depression of the price threatened the planters with utter ruin. The measure was, indeed, soon abandoned; but short as was the time of its existence, its effects have been durable. The minister was right in supposing that foreigners would still have West-India produce, but he was egregiously deceived as to the concluding part of his proposition; for it required but a very little time to demonstrate, that they were not compelled to have it from us loaded with British duties. They received it through other channels; other colonies and other carriers obtained a preference, undersold us in all the markets of the Continent, and the effect of the diversion is severely felt to this day. The change which was expected, when the evil was admitted and the remedy applied, was slow and fluctuating: the Assembly state, in their last answer to the Governor, that their agriculture and commerce have never recovered from the shock; and they aver, "that in place of contributing only a *share* of the general expenses of the empire, in the proportion of their net revenue, the sugar planters of this island have, for the last four years, had nearly their whole income torn from them, by duties which cannot even be alleged to fall upon the consumer, when nothing is left to the grower for labour or capital."

As if, however, the West India colonies and colonists were in too flourishing a state; as if there had been in the market an alarming scarcity of their produce; and as if we had entertained serious apprehensions that our mercantile marine and our seamen would become too numerous; as if evils and fears of this sort had assailed us, the minister eagerly adopted the suggestions of those speculative or interested persons, who recommended measures calculated to encourage the transfer of British capital for the cultivation of sugar in the East-Indies, thereby depriving, as far as in him lay, the West-India planters of all prospect of any favourable change; for supposing an addition to the quantity of produce to have been wanted, he left them no fair competition with the East-India planters, who are free from almost all the numerous shackles by which the operations of the West-Indian are checked, and particularly from the compulsory and inflexible regulation as to the destination of his produce, the planters in the East-Indies being at perfect liberty to ship theirs to any market in the world, and that, too, in the vessels of any nation.

In the mean-time the British duties upon West-India produce, speaking particularly of the two principal articles *sugar* and *rum*,

have grown to such a magnitude, have been in some respects so injudiciously imposed, at the same time that the commodities have been so cruelly deprived of the preference and protection which the law formerly afforded them in the markets of the mother country, that the planters are threatened with nothing short of absolute ruin. The answer given, in Parliament, by Mr. Addington, to those who remonstrated against these erroneous duties, was, that all duties finally fell upon the consumer. Where duties amount to a prohibition, they certainly do not thus fall: they are, in that case, never collected, and they evidently injure the grower without benefiting any body. Where the duties do not amount to a prohibition, but diminish the consumption, they injure the grower in proportion to the quantity of the diminution. That a very considerable diminution in the consumption, both foreign and domestic, has taken place, in the articles of West-India produce, is clearly established by facts; but, such facts are not necessary to prove, that the present duties are of a ruinous tendency to the planter, who may be completely beggared by them, without their producing any diminution whatever in the quantity of produce consumed, and though the full amount of them should finally fall upon the consumer, as will evidently appear from facts which will hereafter be stated, and which cannot be denied.

But, previous to the making this statement, it is necessary to hear that of the planters themselves. Before the year 1803, the duty upon West-India sugar was 20s. per cwt. In that year Mr. Addington laid on an additional duty of 4s. per cwt. with a proportionate addition to the duty upon rum. On that occasion there was a meeting of the West-India planters and merchants, held on the 24th of June, 1803, at which meeting the following resolutions were agreed to, and were afterwards printed and circulated.

"I. That experience has proved that a duty of 20s. per cwt. upon all British plantation sugar, however productive and enduring under the circumstances of high prices, adequate drawbacks and bounties, and an uninterrupted communication with the continental markets, is yet, under a glutted market and an impeded access to the Continent, greatly disproportionate to the price of that article, falling, in such times, with its enormous weight, entirely upon the growers, who are utterly unable to bear it.—II. That under the present prospect of an impeded intercourse with the European markets, an addition of 4s.

per cwt. to the disproportionate tax of 20s. per cwt. already laid upon sugar, must be productive to the revenue only in that degree in which it may add to the burthen, already too heavy, upon the planter; but is moreover likely to defeat, in many instances, its own purpose, by causing an absolute abandonment of the article, which at great expense and labour has been produced, rather than incur the additional expenses of freight, duty, and charges, upon it.—III. That this must more particularly apply to the lower qualities of sugar, the inevitable production of certain soils, the nature of which cannot be changed by the labour and skill of the cultivator, and which, consistently with the colonial system of Great Britain, must be shipped to Europe, from the plantations, without being refined, but which are almost wholly dependent for consumption upon foreign markets, by re-shipment from hence either in their raw or refined state.—That a tax of 24s. per cwt. upon sugar of this description (unaccompanied with a free access to the Continent for the vent both of raw and refined sugar) is, in the strictest sense of the word, a prohibition of the import of that which forms the staple article of a great part of the British West India colonies.—IV. That, on this ground, it having been recommended to his Majesty's ministers to levy any additional tax upon an *ad valorem* principle, as applied to the respective qualities of sugar, since its burthen might so fall the less heavy upon that description of the article which is already suffering by the mode of levying the existing duty, this meeting is concerned to find that *official obstacles*, (the validity of which has not been demonstrated, and the reasonable foundation for which may be doubted since the mode of sampling and selling sugars at the out-ports has been also adopted at the port of London,) have been considered by his Majesty's ministers as sufficient to prevent the adoption, in this particular instance, of a principle, the justice of which they have never questioned.—V. That, notwithstanding this meeting has, on various occasions, and after deliberate discussion of the subject, expressed in decided terms the sense they entertained of the unjustifiable mode of levying large, and continually increasing, duties on sugar *in ratio of its quantity, and without regard to its quality or price*, they feel themselves now called upon to repeat and to confirm their former resolutions on this subject,

and to render public their opinion, that the application of a heavy tax to the weight and quantity of an article widely differing in quality and price, (though of the same general denomination,) is unjust and destructive of that equality which is an essential principle in all taxation.—VI. That the proposed increase of duty of 12½ per cent. on the customs, and 50 per cent. upon the excise, on another staple commodity of the West-India colonies, rum, adds, at this crisis, to the alarm of those who depend for their whole support upon returns from the British colonies; and, will, most likely, prove eventually as destructive of its object, and as detrimental to the revenue, as it has, in the first instance, turned out to be oppressive on the price, and injurious to the regular demand for that article.—VII. That the proprietors of estates in the West-India colonies, whose attachment to the mother-country and to his Majesty's person and government, has been, upon many occasions, zealously demonstrated; who are ever ready to contribute their fair proportion to the exigencies of government, and who feel particularly the propriety of doing so at this crisis; *have actually cultivated their estates to a loss, for several years past*, owing to the pressure of those taxes which have been levied on their produce, and to the great additional expense they have sustained in every article needful for their use and sustenance, which they have been obliged to purchase from this country.—VIII. That, under these circumstances, the West-India planters and merchants will feel themselves compelled to submit to the British Parliament their whole case; trusting that the Legislature will not treat with indifference the certain prospect of the decay of those possessions which, from their insular situation, are most securely attached to the fortunes of this country, which take from her all they consume, and return all their acquisitions into her bosom, and to which Britain more peculiarly owes her maritime pre-eminence, the safeguard of all her wealth, power, and independence."

The statements in these resolutions are far from being exaggerated. They are a fair representation of the state of the West-India planters at the time when the 4s. additional duty on sugar, indiscriminately, was imposed. By referring to the Register, Vol. V. p. 539, the reader will find a very able arithmetical statement proving, beyond all contradiction, that the complaints of the

Assembly of Jamaica and of the planters in London are well founded, as far, at least, as those complaints relate to the amount and effect of duties. Nevertheless, when new taxes came to be imposed again *this year*, *sugar* and *rum* seem to have been the first objects that presented themselves to the minister. The representations of the planters, and, which was more, their evident decay, had produced no effect. He again told the Parliament, that the addition now proposed would *fall upon the consumer*, and that, too, at the very moment when his partisans were eulogizing him for "his tenderness towards *the people* in the selection of his new *"taxes,"* which, they added, would "fall almost exclusively upon the rich." When these further additional duties were proposed, a committee of West-India planters and merchants drew up and printed the following resolutions, dated May 3, 1804. In presenting documents of this sort to the public, I am aware that it will be said of them, that they are the representations of one party only, and that party deeply interested. But the same may be said of all petitions, remonstrances, and of complaints whatever form they may assume. Though they do come from one party only, and a deeply interested party, we are bound to give credit to them, unless they are, after a reasonable time, contradicted by the other party. It will be said, perhaps, that the ministers have something else to do than to enter into a dispute with committees of West-India planters. They have, indeed, enough upon their hands; but, were it in their power to refute the statements of the West-India planters, they would certainly lose no time in doing it; for the complaints of these people are by no means to be stifled; they are steadily urging their way forward; and they *must*, at a time not very distant, come before the legislature, where, if some redress be not previously afforded, it will be impossible for the minister to justify his conduct. The resolutions above-mentioned were as follows: "I. That the proposed addition of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on customs generally, implying an addition of 3s. per cwt. to the already enormous duty of 24s. per cwt. upon sugar, and also increasing the duty on rum, which has already risen to a height that has very considerably impeded its sale, are calculated to fill with alarm those whose existence depends upon the producing of those articles.—II. That recent experience will sufficiently prove, that the usual provisions of drawbacks and bounties do not secure to the planters in the British colo-

nies a market for that part of their produce which is not consumed in Great-Britain and Ireland, which surplus produce they are compelled by law to send to Great-Britain and Ireland, and therefore they are not enabled to raise from the consumer the taxes which are from time to time imposed upon their produce.—III. That at the time when the heavy additional duties of last year were imposed upon sugar and rum, the current prices of those articles at the British market were far short of such as are barely sufficient to enable the British planters to meet the expenses, which in every point of their intercourse with the mother country have necessarily accumulated upon them, notwithstanding which the average prices of the past year, calculated on the quantities sold, instead of bearing some proportion to the new and considerable war charges which have recently occurred, have not even been increased in proportion to those taxes, which it is evident, therefore, have fallen on the shoulders of those who are already too heavily burthened, and not upon the consumer.—IV. That to increase this burthen at the present time, with no prospect that the result will turn out otherwise than it has done in the preceding year, is to impress upon the West-India planters a conviction that they are condemned to persist in a cultivation, which instead of affording a reasonable compensation for their labours entails on them from year to year a heavy additional loss.—V. That the accounts produced to Parliament plainly indicate that the British consumption of sugar has decreased rather than increased under the late prices of that article, which, although swelled by the amount of duties, freight, and charges, have still left to the growers of the produce an inadequate return. That to persist, therefore, in adding to that amount of charges by a new duty on that article, must eventually be found as unproductive in point of revenue, as it will be destructive of the capital embarked in the British colonies, and of the great advantages which in respect of commerce and navigation, they are calculated to confer upon the mother country.—VI. That the chairman do communicate these resolutions to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and request that a conference on the subject thereof, may be granted to a deputation from this committee previous to the taxes (so far as they are proposed to af-

“fect the articles of sugar and rum,) being “finally adopted.”

That these resolutions were communicated to Mr. Addington there can be no doubt: what were the remarks, if any, made thereon by that statesman and financier educated in the profound school of Mr. Pitt, we have no means of ascertaining; but, one thing we know, and that is, that the representations of the planters had no practical effect, the proposed additional duty being immediately afterwards imposed; nor is it by any means improbable, that, in the next year's budget, *sugar and rum* may again make a conspicuous figure, Mr. Pitt having, since his return to power, sufficiently demonstrated his intention to persevere in his former measures, those measures from the adoption of which the West India planters date the commencement of their ruin. The language of exaggeration is but too often employed in the description of distress; but, that there is *much* truth in the description which the planters have given of their situation every one must believe. In the first place there is a sort of pride which prevents bodies of men as well as individuals from beginning to complain of their poverty. The planters of Jamaica have not uniformly complained of the duties laid upon their produce: when they do complain, therefore, and so grievously too, who can doubt that they severely feel the hardships of which they complain? Besides, the complaint comes not merely from a body of planters and merchants, but from the Legislative Assembly of the Island of Jamaica; and it is not for a moment to be supposed, that any representation, which was not substantially founded in fact, could issue from such a quarter. A very material circumstance, too, is, that no refutation has ever been attempted. The ministry at home, if they declined the task themselves, have pens enough at their command, and are usually sufficiently eager to employ them. The pen of that prince of tax-gatherers, Mr. Lowndes, who writes you a thick octavo volume by way of “exposition” to a single tax-bill, it might, indeed, not have been very wise to put in motion against the pithy productions of the West India complainants; but, there were pens in plenty of another description, and the not having employed any one of them upon the subject must be regarded as strong circumstantial proof that the statements of the planters were unanswerable. The governor of Jamaica was upon the spot: he had the materials for contradiction, if they existed at all, before his eyes: if we could, for a moment, believe it likely for the Assembly, in their answer to him, to make a

solemn appeal to the notoriety of distresses which did not exist, is it not utterly incredible that he, who was so zealous in the cause of the ministry, should have passed over that appeal in total silence? The pecuniary distresses of the colony, that is to say of the planters, arising in great part from the heavy duties imposed upon their produce, were, we must remember, urged as amongst the principal reasons for the Assembly's not yielding to the request of the ministry, made through the governor: and, if those pecuniary distresses had not been real and even visible and notorious; nay, had it not, moreover, been a well-known and an acknowledged fact, that they had arisen from the very causes assigned by the Assembly, can it possibly be imagined, that no reply whatever would have been made by the governor to those reasons? Governors of colonies are not, upon such occasions, much disposed, either by the nature of their offices or their future prospects, to desist from the adducing of any fact or argument that may favour the views of the ministry at home. They have always at their command the talents of lawyers generally animated by a spirit in perfect unison with their own. And, as in the case of diplomatic agents treating with an hostile, or, at least, rival power, their merit is usually measured by the concessions and advantages they succeed in obtaining. It is, therefore, I repeat it, utterly incredible, that the governor of Jamaica should not have attempted a refutation of the statements on which the complaints of the colonists were founded, if those statements had not been such as to have admitted of no refutation. But, indeed, reasoning upon this subject is rendered unnecessary by facts which are but too well known in this country, amongst all those who have any knowledge of the state of the West India trade. Reference has already been made to an authentic paper showing the amount of the losses now and of late years sustained by those whose produce consists of sugar: that those who are the owners of rum are in no better, but even in a much worse situation, will appear from a very concise description of the state of that other chief article of West India produce. The amount of the present duty upon rum per gallon is rather more than 12s. I will not speak of a penny, but I venture to state it at 12s. 4d. per gallon. This rum now sells, and has sold for some time back, at not more than 13s. 6d. and, upon an average, perhaps, at not more than 13s. The *difference*, then, is the whole value of the gallon of rum, after the duties upon it are paid! “Impossible!” exclaim

the reader. That it is impossible for such a trade to continue, for any length of time, is certain enough; but, that such is the state of it now is not only possible, but strictly true. The rum sells, it is even now selling, in the port of London, and in several other ports, at the price above-mentioned. The planter who has it in the storehouses, where it lies as a pledge to the government for the payment of the duties, sells it for 6d. or at most 1s. 2d. per gallon, leaving the duties to be paid by the purchaser, who takes out the commodity and pays the duties as his occasions require. The planter has to pay upon every gallon of rum *after it leaves the still*, about 4s. under the heads of freight, insurance, and other charges attending the shipment and landing of the commodity. These four shillings are, observe, *exclusive of duties*; so that, supposing him, in every instance, to sell his rum at 1s. 2d. exclusive of duties, he sustains a *loss* upon each gallon of 2s. 10d. Is it not, then, with perfect truth, that the Assembly of Jamaica state, that they have “*nearly* their whole income “*torn from them by duties which cannot “even be alleged to fall upon the consumer, “when nothing is left to the grower for labour or capital?”* It is, when we add the duties that have been laid on since the Assembly made this statement, still worse than they described it, as far as relates to the article of rum. Not only has the planter nothing left for labour or capital; not only are his industry, his stock, and his estate rendered, by these enormous duties, totally useless to him: they are worse than useless: they occasion him an annual loss in direct proportion to the quantity of his produce: they make an annual addition to his debts, and cause an annual augmentation to the mortgage on his estate. And these are the people upon whom government are calling to double the amount of their colonial taxes! To take upon themselves the expense of defending their island, as if they and their exattes contributed nothing to the general wealth and strength of the empire! “The consumer,” says Messrs. Addington and Pitt, “the consumer pays “all at last.” This is not true even in their own sense of the words; for they make the planters pay duty upon a certain portion of their produce which is never reckoned to the buyer. But, as was before observed, though the consumer pays dear enough for West-India produce, a fact which no such consumer will deny; though the rum drinker pays from 21s. to 25s. a gallon (it may be more for aught I know), before the liquor reaches his lips, he does not there-

by compensate the planter for his losses; he does not thereby prevent a diminution in the demand for the commodity. “The consumer pays all at last.” Yes, all but the planter, between whom and the consumer the government has, by its merciless exactions, cut off all connexion, the former having sustained an irretrievable loss long before his produce gets into the hands of the latter.

The consequences of a perseverance in the indiscreet measures which have produced this state of things, which have given rise to these bitter complaints and recriminations, is a topic into which I should now enter somewhat at length, were I not, for want of room, compelled to confine myself to a few detached observations.

In the several occasions, when the governor has, of late years, made an application to the Assembly for an addition to their contribution towards the expenses of defending the island, and, having failed in his object, has, in no very indirect terms, reproached them with niggardliness, they have, in the course of their answer, complained of the injurious restrictions laid on their intercourse with the United States of America, whence only they say (and they say it truly) they can obtain a supply of several articles indispensably necessary to their very existence in the colony. Assuredly this restriction is to them a great disadvantage, merely as planters of Jamaica; but, there remains no doubt in my mind, that the navigation laws may be strictly adhered to, as to their spirit and utility, without leaving the Jamaica or other West India planters any ground of complaint. But then, the duties imposed upon their produce consumed in the mother-country must be lightened, and its channel to the markets of the continent must be rendered more free; for, to compel them to bring their produce here, to tax it when it comes here in such a way as to leave them nothing for their labour and use of their capital, and at the same time to oblige them to pay, not in produce, but *in specie*, for the necessities of life which they receive from America is, in fact, coolly and deliberately to pass on them a sentence of ruin; a sentence to which most assuredly no men will submit, if they can by any means come at the power of resistance. The West India planters, those of Jamaica I mean, have lived and flourished under the navigation laws, for nearly a century and a half, without ever, till of late years, making any thing like a serious complaint. But, they did not complain, because they flourished; and they flourished because their produce was not overloaded

with imposts; because the custom house of England did not add in any considerable degree, to the disadvantages arising from the laws of navigation; because the justice and the wisdom of the mother country taught her not to restrain her colonies by navigation laws with one hand in order to obtain from their trade sailors for her navy, while, as a mere object of revenue, she squeezed them, as it were in a wine press, with the other; because the statesmen of England had not yet conceived the brilliant idea of a public debt, the interest of which should absorb the total of the annual revenue, with a view of preserving the state by the baseness instead of the patriotism and loyalty of the people; and because this debt had not created a necessity for a system of taxation as universal in its touch as the air that we breathe. The planters of Jamaica have no enmity to the navigation laws; no desire to weaken the ties that have hitherto bound them, heart and hand, to the mother country; but, they cannot bear these duties and the navigation laws too. Their present state is not bearable; they must and will complain; and, if you reproach them with niggardliness, shall they not show the causes that disable them from acceding to your demands? I am not one of those who think that the West-India Islands are, for centuries to come, at least, if ever, destined to be colonies to North America, notwithstanding their dependence upon it for all the articles of first necessity. But, I do think that there is great danger of a total subversion of these colonies, succeeded by a sort of beggarly independence; the islands inhabited here by blacks and there by whites; having in one place a government of one sort, in another a government of another sort, and in another no government at all. This dreadful revolution, which we may be assured would be aided by France, by America, and which would be viewed with pleasure by most of the nations of Europe, would go very far indeed towards the destruction of the maritime force of Great-Britain; and, to produce such a revolution nothing would contribute more than the ruin of the planters of Jamaica. Men will not love those by whom they are ruined, nor will they die merely to remove the apprehensions of their oppressors. Some one tells a story of a French minister, who having reproached a lampoonist with his conduct, and having received for answer, "Eh, Monseigneur, il faut que je vive," replied, "ma foi je n'en vois pas la nécessité." This might be a very good answer from a French minister to a lampoonist, but for an

English minister to tell the planters of Jamaica, that, "if they cannot live by making sugar they may make something else," is not quite so good. They can make nothing else; they must live or starve by sugar-making, and as we may be certain that they will not starve if they can find the means of avoiding it, we should be very careful how we goad them on to the seeking of those means.

WM. COBBETT.

#### DODDRIDGE ON PARLIAMENTS.

SIR,—In consequence of a letter dated from Gray's Inn, and inserted in the last number of your Register, I have been induced to look into Mr. Justice Doddridge's Essay on Parliaments among Hearne's Discourses; and I shall be happy if I can throw any light on the subject of your correspondent's inquiries, certainly a point very interesting and important in the consideration of our mixed constitution.—It seems to me, that all the latter part of the paper, for nearly two pages preceding the signature is, in fact, a short abstract made with the usual care, perspicuity and judgment of Mr. Justice Doddridge, from a manuscript treatise very famous in that day, under the title of *Modus tenendi Parliamentum*. This little work had been first brought into notice about ten years before, by my Lord Coke, when he was Speaker of the House of Commons; and it was always believed by him really to have been of that high antiquity to which he supposed it to pretend; that is, the time of Edward the Confessor, or, at least, of William the Conqueror. But in truth the writer, whoever he was, is more modest; for the very title states it to be no more than a description of the mode of proceeding in Parliament used "not only by the founder of the Norman line," but "of his successors, Kings of England." And he does not profess to tell where he discovered, or whence he derived his original document, neither, indeed, does he distinctly assert, that he had any such before him. Sir Robert Cotton, no mean judge, calls it a "reverend monument not far from that grave man (Glanville's) time," or the reign of Henry the Second. The learned Selden in his Titles of Honour says, that he had seen divers copies of it, but never any which exceeded the age of Edward the Third, to which period he attributes it. Prynne, however, brings it still lower. He supposes it to have been drawn up towards the end of Henry the Sixth.—But not to trouble you or your readers with a discussion to settle the fact, the very latest date is old

enough to satisfy any reasonable inquirer, if otherwise the treatise is of any authority. Now, Sir Robert Cotton quotes it without scruple; Selden admits, "divers things in" that *Modus* (and among them some that "differ much from the present and later" ages) to have been agreeable to the ancient Parliaments; and the proof which Prynne offers, consists in a great measure of references to parliamentary records in the time of Richard the Second, and the three Princes of the House of Lancaster, whence he supposes some portion of the materials to have been drawn.—The passage in question Mr. Justice Doddridge appears to have taken from the fourteenth section of the *Modus*. Now this is one of the passages which Prynne selects as founded upon our Parliamentary History in the time of Richard the Second; and it is the very part which Sir Robert Cotton quotes in his argument, "that the Sovereign's person is required in" the great councils." He adduces the original words:—"Rex tenetur omni modo personaliter interesse Parlamento, nisi per corporalem ægritudinem detineatur." THEN (adds he, abstracting the sense still more shortly than Mr. Justice Doddridge) TO ACQUAINT THE PARLIAMENT OF EITHER HOUSE OF SUCH OCCASION. And he subjoins the reason assigned for this, to wit, because there used to be a murmur and an outcry (we have certainly better-behaved Parliaments now) about the King's absence, as mischievous and dangerous to the whole commonalty of Parliament and the realm:—"Causa est, quod solebat CLAMOR ET MURMUR esse pro absentia Regis, quia res damnosa et periculosa est toti communitati Parlamento et Regni, cum Rex a Parlamento absens fuerit."—Your readers, Mr. Cobbett, will probably be tired by this time of this dry subject; and I have now fully answered your correspondent. But I can assure him and them, that many more, and the gravest authorities, could, if necessary, be accumulated, to shew with what jealousy our ancestors watched over every interruption to the *personal* intercourse between the King and his Parliament. *The very twelve persons have been actually sent to satisfy the House of the cause of the King's absence, when he was prevented by sickness from meeting his Parliament.* Happily, however, we are now assured by the public papers of his Majesty's perfect recovery, and it is impossible to doubt the fact, since six weeks ago we gave solemn thanks in all our temples on this joyful occasion.—I am, &c. &c.—T. M.—Middle Temple, July 3, 1804.

## BANK DOLLAR BILL.

SIR,—It is reported, that, in the course of the debate in the House of Commons on the 2d instant, on the bill to prevent the counterfeiting Bank dollars, Mr. Pitt declared, that these dollars were to be issued merely as *tokens*, without any reference at all to their intrinsic value. It does not appear that any observation was made on this assertion of that gentleman. It seems to me, however, to be so extraordinary an one, that it has induced me to trouble you with a few words upon the subject.—If the assertion alluded to was actually made. I should be glad to inquire, if Mr. Pitt believes, or thinks that he can make other persons believe, it to be the fact, that these dollars so issued by the Bank can be made to bear *any* value, which the Bank chooses to affix to them. "They are to be considered," says he, "merely as tokens, as *silver notes*." Are they so? A paper note, which is intrinsically worth nothing at all, can be made to be worth 1 pound, or 10 pounds, or 500 pounds, according to the mark which is affixed to it; and if the dollars are merely silver notes, they must be capable, at the will of the Bank, to assume different values in the same way. But is this the case? Does Mr. Pitt think, that if the Bank was to put an advertisement in the paper, saying they were issued at 5 l. and would be taken again at that price, does he think they would be current as 5 l. notes? Does he think they could be made to pass as 1 l. notes? Nay, does he think, that they could pass as 6s. 6d. notes? Most assuredly they could not at present. They are intrinsically worth about 5 shillings, according to the present state of the paper, as 5 shillings they will be taken, but not at one farthing more; which is, I think, pretty good proof that they have a reference to their intrinsic value, and that they are not merely tokens or silver notes. It appears to me, Mr. Cobbett, pretty plain, why these dollars are to be wrapped up in this bill of mystery, and are to be issued in this doubtful character; nobody knowing whether they are to be looked upon as coin or as notes. That they are not merely notes, I have already shown; that they are not the King's coin is apparent; for though they bear the King's image on the one side, on the other they are impressed with the arms of the Bank. The reason is this: the dollar in sterling money, is worth only 4s. 6d. at most, its present current value is 5s. or thereabouts? Is the dollar risen in value? No: then the other alternative of necessity must be confessed,

that the 4s. 6d. have sunk. This, as you have before observed, amounts to absolute proof of the depreciation of our money. The dollars thus issued then, if looked upon as coin, would contain that proof, and if they are issued as a coin of 5s. that is, as worth 5s. sterling, a fraud would be committed on the public; they would then be forced to be taken in exchange for crown pieces, which contain 6d. more silver than they do. Again, if 5s. notes had been issued by the Bank, then came all the objections to such small notes, and we should be exposed to all the calamities under which Ireland is now groaning in consequence of her issues of silver notes. How then are the two rocks to be avoided, and how is that done? It is done by giving to the dollars this double doubtful character; by issuing them as notes; and letting them assume the appearance of coin and pass as such. Do you object to silver notes? You are immediately shown the King's head on the dollar; and asked whether that is not something more than a note. Do you assert that they are issued for more than their sterling value, and that a fraud is thus committed? The reverse is then presented to you, and you see the arms of the Bank, with the inscription "Bank Dollar;" and you are then told, this is no coin; it is merely a token note; only a silver note instead of a paper one. If so, why was not paper used? If paper was bad, why was not lead or tin? Such notes would have been cheaper to the Bank, and full as convenient for the public.—I have run on with greater length than I intended. I will not therefore stop now to compare the above assertion of Mr. Pitt, with the fact, as is demonstrated in the different denomination of the value of the dollars in England and Ireland? The dollar, which is called Dollar in England, is worth 5s. In Ireland it is called a Token, and passes for 6s. (5s. 6d. English money) and after that Mr. Pitt gravely tells the House of Commons, "these dollars are mere tokens, they are silver notes, their intrinsic value is nothing to the purpose." Leaving you and your readers to reconcile these differences if they are able. I remain, Sir, your, &c. ANNIBAL.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Note from Francis Drake, Esq. English Minister at Munich to Baron de Montgelas, the Bavarian Minister of State, dated Munich, 30th of March, 1804.*

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary from his Britannic Majesty, has been informed, that his Electoral Highness has been

pleased, at the requisition of the French Government, to give a hint to all noblemen, who quitted France during the revolution, and may now be found in his dominions, to leave the same within 10 days, without excepting those who are dependent on the British government. Although this account appears to be tolerably authentic, the undersigned cannot give any credit to it, without receiving a confirmation thereof from his Excellency Baron Montgelas, as he is too well convinced of the just and generous sentiments of his Electoral Highness, to believe that his Highness could have consented to such a demand from a power, which has formally declared, by the 4th article of its own constitution, that there are not any relations left existing between it and the persons against whom that measure is supposed to be taken: this deprivation of the right to assume any authority with respect to them; a principle which your Excellency owned yourself, at a time when it was in agitation to prohibit in this country the decorations of the French monarchy. The undersigned is the more justified in his supposition, that he must have been misinformed on this subject, as knowing how sorely the feeling heart of his Electoral Highness must be afflicted, if obliged to exercise any rigour towards persons, against whom no cause of reproach can be alleged; unless it be a reproach, that they have shewn themselves so firmly devoted to their duties, and to that sovereign house with which his Electoral Highness formerly stood connected, in so many respects.—The undersigned is moreover convinced, that it could not escape the enlightened wisdom of his Electoral Highness, that a similar exercise of rigour, against those respectable, and already so very unfortunate persons, would form a useful example of the fate awaiting those who, in a moment of danger, are inclined to remain true to their lawful Sovereign; and which example may induce them to swerve from their duty at the very moment when a Sovereign stands most in need of the efforts and actual proofs of their attachment.—The undersigned has, therefore, the honour to request Baron Von Montgelas to clear up his doubts on this subject, and to inform him, whether the measure in question will extend to the officers of the late Condéan army, who are attached to the British government, that he may be enabled to acquaint his Court thereof, and to await the commands of his Sovereign accordingly.—The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to request Baron Von Montgelas to accept the assurances of his most particular regard, &c.

*Note from the same to the same. dated, Munich, 31st of March, 1804.*

I have just received a notice of so very extraordinary a nature, but which is so important of itself, and for the consequences which may result from it, that though I am very far from crediting it, I think it a duty I owe to my Sovereign, to whom my person and services belong, as well as to his highness the Elector himself, immediately to inform your Excellency thereof. The said notice is in substance to the following purport: that a seizure of the British ministry at Munich is in agitation, in the manner of that which took place with respect to his highness the Duke of Enghien, at Ettenheim, in the territory of the Elector of Baden, but with this difference, that the second seizure will not be effected by a body of troops, but by men secretly sent to Munich, and its neighbourhood, by different roads. With respect to the moment and particulars of the execution, I have no detailed accounts; and I own to your Excellency, that the difficulties of the enterprize appeared to me from the first too great, the project itself too extravagant, and at the same time too dreadful, to be fully convinced of its existence: on the other hand, it cannot be concealed, that the example of events which have very recently occurred, as it were, under our eyes, are little calculated to inspire confidence. However this may be, and little as this notice has affected me personally, yet it appears to me, that I should be transgressing the duties which my post, as a public minister, require, if I neglected informing your Excellency thereof forthwith, that you may be enabled to take in time such measures as the case may require, and to avert, by proper acts of precaution, the unpleasant result which might arise, even from the attempt to execute a design of this nature. I beg your Excellency to accept the assurance, &c.

*Note presented to the French Min. of Foreign Affairs, by the Russian Chargé d'Affairs, MR. OUBRIEL; relative to the Occurrences at Ettenheim, where the Duke D'Enghien was seized. Dated Paris, April 20, 1804.*

According to the orders which the undersigned Chargé-d'Affairs of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has received from his Court, he hastens to inform the Minister of the French Republic, that his illustrious Master has learned, with equal astonishment and concern, the event that has taken place at Ettenheim, the circumstances that have attended it, and its melancholy result. The concern of the Em-

peror on this occasion is the more lively as he can by no means reconcile the violation of the territory of the Elector of Baden to those principles of justice and propriety which are held sacred among nations, and are the bulwark of their reciprocal relations. His Imperial Majesty finds in this act a violation of the rights of nations, and of a neutral territory, which, at least, was as arbitrary as it was public; a violation, the consequences of which are difficult to estimate, and which, if considered as admissible, must entirely annihilate the security and independence of sovereign states. If the German Empire, after the misfortunes it has suffered, which have made it sensibly feel the necessity of tranquillity and repose, must still be in fear for the integrity of its territory, could it have been expected that this should have originated on the part of a government which has laboured to secure to it peace, and imposed on itself the duty of guaranteeing its continuance. All these considerations have not permitted the Emperor to pass over in silence this unexpected event, which has spread consternation through all Germany.—His Imperial Majesty has held it to be his duty, as guarantee and mediator of the peace, to notify to the States of the Empire, the manner in which he views an action which endangers their security and independence. The Russian Resident at Ratisbon has, in consequence received orders to deliver in a note to the Diet, and to represent to it, and to the Head of the Empire, the necessity of remonstrating to the French Government against this violation of the German territory.—His Imperial Majesty holds it in like manner to be his duty to notify his sentiments directly to the French Government, by the undersigned, as his Majesty is assured, that the First Consul will hasten to attend to the just remonstrances of the German political body, and feel the pressing necessity of taking the most active measures to relieve all the Governments of Europe from the alarm he must have occasioned to them, and put an end to an order of things too dangerous to their safety and future independence.—The undersigned hereby fulfils the commands of his illustrious Master, and avails himself of this opportunity to communicate to the Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs, the assurance of his high esteem.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Translation of an Imperial Ukase, issued by the Emperor of Russia at St. Petersburg, the 7th of May, 1804, relative to the Admission of Foreigners into his Imperial Ma-*

*jest's Dominions. Signed by the EMPEROR, and countersigned by COUNT V. Kachuly.*

I. To enter our frontiers all persons, except in the undermentioned cases, are to be provided with passports from our ministers or other agents residing in foreign countries. Particular instruction will be sent to our ministers and consuls as to the manner in which such passports are to be granted, so as to cause the least inconvenience to trade or general intercourse.—II. Persons coming from cities or places where we have neither missions nor consuls, must produce passports at the frontiers from the governors or chief officers there. Passports from inferior officers, from country justices or commissioners, or from the magistrates, will not be acknowledged. The governors of our frontier provinces will receive instructions in what manner they are to communicate with the governors of provinces belonging to another power relative to this point, and directions will be given at the barriers where passports are to be acknowledged.—III. Russian subjects, traders, and other persons usually residing in Russia, having passports to go abroad for a limited term, will be permitted to return with the same passport.—IV. Persons owing allegiance to two powers (*subjects mixte*) must, from our side, be provided with a passport for a year from the regency of that government in which their property lies, with which, during that term, they may pass out and in without interruption.—V. All persons must produce their passports at the frontiers; and, if conformable to these regulations, they will be allowed to pass without molestation, except such as may be particularly ordered to be stopped.—VI. These regulations are to extend to all sea ports, in so far as regards passengers arriving there. Ship masters and persons serving on board of ships, are to be regulated upon the former existing regulations.—VII. All these regulations shall be enforced for the nearer parts of Europe within two months, and for the more distant, namely, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, within four months, reckoning from the date of this ordinance (*Ukase*) which shall be published in the newspapers of both our capitals.—VIII. The daily communications of persons residing on the frontiers will remain on the former footing.—IX. The intercourse with various Asiatic nations on the frontiers of the Cuban, on the lines of the Caucasus and Orenburg, and also with the Turkish subjects in general, is to remain on the former

footing.—X. Passports will be granted to persons going out of the country as formerly.

*Orders issued by Dessalines, as Governor General of St. Domingo, dated April 9, 1804.*

All proprietors that have produce to sell shall previously pay a fourth part as a territorial imposition. The power of selling produce of the 11th year shall only belong to proprietors who belonged to the indigenous army in the 11th year. Persons who since that period have resided with the French are not to have the benefit of that year's produce; their property being confiscated for the use of the indigenous army. Mules, horses, and other animals belonging to the habitations sequestered, are to be given up to the administrators of domains, who are to give an account of the same to the general commanding the department, who will place them in the most advantageous manner on the sequestered estates, to be employed in cultivation. It is expressly forbidden, that any officer shall intermeddle with the cultivation of the estates. All sugar manufactories previously given to chief of corps, shall be returned to the administrators of domains. All proprietors resident with the French to the time of the Indigenous army taking possession of a place, shall forfeit all the produce of their estates during the 11th year. The generals commanding departments shall cause generals of brigade to execute the fortifications ordered to be erected in the high mountains of the interior; and the generals of brigade shall from time to time make reports of their proceedings, and their works. All sales, or gifts of moveables or immoveables, made by emigrants, in favour of persons residing in the island, are annulled; it being understood when so made after the indigenous army had taken up arms to expel the French from Hayti.

The Summary of Politics is unavoidably deferred till the next sheet.—This being the first Number of Vol. VI, of the Register, it may not be unnecessary to acquaint those gentlemen who happen to be deficient in the sheets of the preceding volume, that there are but very few of the sheets of that volume remaining, and that, unless they apply to the publisher without delay, it will be quite impossible for them ever to complete their volumes.—N. B. Sets of the Register, or any particular volume, may be had by applying to any of the Newsmen, or Booksellers.

"By the Lord, now, and I sheant get out! I shall stay where I am, Mister DEPUTY BULL; for if you don't know when you have got a good shavvent, I know when I've got a good place."—LOONY MACTOULTER, in the Ways of Windsor.

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[34

MR. PITT.

SIR,—As it appears from the speech which Mr. Pitt made in the House of Commons on the 18th of last month, and from the language used by his partisans and pamphleteers, that he means to impute inconsistency to those who some time ago expressed their eager wishes to see him return to power, and who now that he has returned are in opposition to his ministry, I think it may be of importance to bestow upon this point a little examination.—I confess for one, that I never did participate in the wishes to which I allude. Not entertaining such an opinion of Mr. Pitt as could authorize the use of any, the simplest compliment, I certainly could not agree in the propriety of using one of the very highest degree. And, Sir, it has always appeared to me, that the compliment here referred to would have sounded better from the mouth of Mr. Caning, or Mr. S. Bourne, or Mr. C. Long, or other such adherents. But, laying this point aside, let us come to the use which Mr. Pitt and his partisans are endeavouring to make of these (which I should call) *lapsus lingue*.—I would premise, that Mr. P. and myself are not agreed on the very expressions of the compliment. For he asserts, that it was said, that he, he alone, and he only, could save the state. This interpretation I deny. But allowing that this was the sense of the words used, I would observe: 1. That the same words have different forces and almost different meanings according to the purposes for which they are used; that you must not always understand language precisely as you find it explained in a dictionary, but as it is used in common life for the purpose of expressing the idea which is wished to be expressed; that though, in interpreting a statute, or a piece of argument, every word is to be taken in its strictest and literal sense, yet that greater latitude is allowed to other compositions; such, as in the familiar intercourse by letter, in conversation, &c. but most of all is latitude allowed in congratulatory or complimentary addresses, such as those, Mr. Pitt's comment on which has now induced me to take up the pen.

—If Mr. Pitt was ever in love with a lady, he may have used the expressions of "angel," or "divine creature," to the object of his love: yet, I suspect, he would have been much surprised as well as alarmed at an attempt to bind him down to a line of conduct and action corresponding with the literal meaning of his complimentary expressions.—2. I would suggest to Mr. Pitt, that if compliments were to be interpreted literally by any one, certainly they ought not to be so interpreted by the person to whom they are addressed, and that, if that person has forfeited the attention which suggested the compliment by a fault of his own, it is foolish to remind the other of it; if by the fault of the other, at best it is ungenerous. A new mistress might say, I will not believe your expressions of compliment; they are false, and will make no impression; but, if the old one, who experienced this inconstancy were to reproach her lover with his former sighs and vows, this would be but a bad way to reclaim him; and if this inconstancy arose from good cause of anger proved on her part, from the discovery of infidelity or of profligacy, to recall to him the expressions of his former love would be the excess of folly and presumption—it might convict him of blindness and infatuation, but it would, at the same time, convict her of such excessive vice, that even blindness and infatuation were not proof against it.—3. I would remind Mr. Pitt, that it is very possible to change an opinion, without being fairly chargeable with inconsistency. Where is the man who will say, that an opinion may not be honestly and conscientiously changed? Where is the man who thought well of Mr. Pitt, not only when these compliments were uttered, but six months ago only, who will not admit this? Least of all, I presume, will Mr. Pitt deny this position, seeing his own conduct on the subject of Parliamentary Reform, the Catholic Question, &c. &c. But if he does not admit it, I think, considering their present near connexion he will soon be argued into it by that able arguer and discreet actor my Lord Castlereagh.—4. But supposing the very reverse of the propositions main-

tained under these three heads to be the fact; suppose it be right to interpret compliments strictly; suppose the person to whom they are addressed with all becoming modesty is the fittest person to put that strict interpretation upon them, and to apply them to himself; and suppose, lastly, that an opinion in favour of Mr. Pitt can never be honestly changed; admitting all this, I still would hint to Mr. Pitt not to recede to the world these expressions of compliment; which, however fair on the outside seem to me to contain within the most cutting sarcasm. I think this will appear upon a review of the circumstances in which they were used. They were these: the affairs of the country were under the direction of a ministry, whose every act appeared to some persons acts of folly, weakness, and imbecility. Such were the persons who used the expressions of compliment. The person of whom it was used, had, up to that time, not only abstained from expressing any disapprobation of the measures of that ministry, but had actually given them his unqualified and entire approbation. I suppose no one will deny, that Lords Grenville and Temple, and Mr. Grenville were sincere in their opposition to the measures of that ministry. It is not to be supposed, that persons would expose themselves to all the obloquy, and abuse, and unpopularity to which the opposers of the peace and the peace-makers were exposed, without being sincere at least, especially as Lord Melville (then Mr. Dundas's) ingenious surmise of its being a "conspiracy for place" is now proved to have been erroneous. [I should like to ask any impartial man now, which seems the most zealous conspirator for place, Lord Grenville or Lord Melville?] If they were sincere then in opposing the peace, they were likewise sincere in opposing the views of policy, which made Mr. Pitt support and approve it. Under these circumstances it was the compliments were paid. Does it not follow then, of course, from the preceding data, that if the persons paying these compliments wished to see Mr. Pitt turn to power, they wished to see him acting upon views of policy which they thought would be advantageous to the country, and not those which they thought ruinous upon their views and not his own? Or in other words, does it not appear evident, that they thought that Mr. Pitt if in office, and if responsible, would be unwilling and ashamed to perform such acts as these, which out of office and irresponsible he was not ashamed to support with all his eloquence, and his most powerful support? Does it not appear,

that though, if the compliments are to be taken literally, they thought him the most able men in the country; yet that it, of necessity, follows, that they thought him as insincere in his heart as exalted in his views; as full of duplicity as of ability.—— Leaving him to settle these questions, and only assuring him, that in my opinion he deserves all the bad which may be said or thought of him hereafter, without any of the good that has been said heretofore.—— I remain, &c. &c.—ANNIBAL.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Correspondence between MR. FRERE, English Minister to the Court of Spain, and the PRINCE OF PEACE. Prime Minister of his Most Catholic Majesty: preceded by the article in the French paper, the Moniteur, by which the correspondence was occasioned.*

*Moniteur, No. 184.*—"Madrid, March 10, 1804.—Mr. Frere, the English minister at this place, seems to be much affected by the news which have arrived from Paris. A few days before he forgot himself so far as to assert, in a conversation which he had with the Prince of Peace, that assassination and murder are lawful, in the present state of things, to save England from the extraordinary situation in which it is placed. The Prince of Peace bluntly replied, "But, Sir, " "should France adopt the same principle, nations would carry on war by " "the medium of assassins, instead of " "fighting with fleets and armies. I cannot help declaring that this morality " "would excite horror in the mind of his " "Catholic Majesty. For my part I can " "only tell you, that the example of all " "ages prove that crimes, in the end, always fall on the heads of those who order, or are the instruments of them."

—Then comes the following note by the Editor of the *Moniteur*.—"The observation of the Prince of Peace has been verified; and at the moment when England was employing the Count d'Artois as an assassin, one of the individuals of his family perished, as an atonement for the crime, under the sword of justice. Infamous ci-devant Bishop of Arras, such is the result of your counsels!"

*Madrid, April 7, 1804.*—SIR, Your Excellency has undoubtedly read the conversation ascribed to us by the French Official Gazetteer, concerning the late events in Paris. As I flatter myself that my colleagues, and the enlightened persons of the Court, will not be apt to credit stories so ridiculous and so diametrically opposite to the princi-

ples which they know me to profess, I might perhaps have dispensed with noticing a calumny which must reflect upon its authors; and should merely have invited Y. E. to estimate the accuracy of other accounts, proceeding from the same source, by this of which you are at once the judge, and witness. And yet, as it appears that the writer of that article presumes to ground his statement on the testimony of Y. E. it appears to me that I should, in some manner, be wanting to my own justification, and to the representation with which I am entrusted, were I to neglect appealing to that very testimony myself. Besides, the official character of that accusation seems to demand an equally formal and authentic contradiction. These considerations induce me to apply to Y. E. and to request that you will declare whether any such conversation did really pass between us, in which I asserted the principle imputed to me by the Official Gazetteer, and above all, as maintained by him, before the Paris news arrived; in short, whether Y. E. acknowledges the answer ascribed to you, and which concludes by a very intelligible threat of assassination.—(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

*Madrid, April 8, 1804.*—I have actually seen, that in the Madrid article, inserted in No. 184 of the Gazette, an account is given of a conversation between us, and I was waiting, Sir, for your application to remove, by my answer, the unfavourable opinions you might have formed.—But, as in this kind of business the degree of probability entirely depends upon opinion, and our conferences have taken place without either witnesses or hearers, and as it is impossible, therefore, that they should have been transmitted to the Gazetteer with truth or accuracy, I deem the justification you require from me perfectly useless, since it will be indifferent to the Editor of the Gazetteer whether he publish a contrary statement tomorrow, the value set upon those accounts being relative to the truth they contain. Such has been my opinion when I have seen my character blackened in still darker colours; and he, who should endeavour to restrain the actions of men, whom fortune has placed out of his power, would obtain no other end than that of giving himself constant uneasiness.—(Signed) THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

*Madrid, April 10, 1804.*—SIR, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note, and you will see, by the date of this, that I have well reflected before I determined to renew so unpleasant a subject; but, in truth, the longer I weigh the expressions of your Excellency's note,

the less I find that they answer the purpose for which it was dictated, namely, to remove the unfavourable opinions I might have formed. Y. E. does me the honour to observe, that you expected me to take such a step; it was not, therefore, quite superfluous in itself. And indeed, since I was to make application to Y. E. I do not see how it was possible for me to prefer a demand more moderate, or how I could now desist from it, without obtaining, some way or other, a satisfactory answer. I am fully aware how delicate and difficult the present circumstances are; but, if Y. E. did not think it proper directly to oppose the official Gazetteer's assertions, it would, at least, have been possible, by stripping his statement of all authority, to reduce it to that vague and conjectural character which you yourself have ascribed to it; for this purpose nothing more was required than that Y. E. should assure me you never had divulged any particulars of our conversation, since it is evident that the Moniteur did not mean to cite furtive and clandestine witnesses, but the very person of your Excellency. Y. E. might likewise have given a very plain and very natural testimony in my favour, namely, that the only time I spoke with you upon the subject, I expressed an opinion precisely the reverse of that which the Gazetteer pretended to cite.—(Signed) J. H. FRERE.

*Aranjuez, April 13, 1804.*—The Editor of the French Gazette supposing, in his No. 184, that a conversation had taken place between you, Sir, and me, has been wanting in the consideration due to my character, by believing me capable of entering upon subjects unworthy of the greatness of soul which adorns me. I do not complain of his offence, and you cannot calm the perturbation of your mind at being implicated in it. How shall I be able to persuade you? I have nothing to add to the reflections contained in my preceding note; may this answer to yours of the 10th prove more satisfactory, and let vague opinions circulate in arbitrary prints.—(Signed)—THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

*Madrid, April 17, 1804.*—SIR, It had appeared to me that my personal honour, as well as my Sovereign's, in fine, that the value I ought to set upon the good opinion of the Spanish nation, equally impelled me to take the step I have towards your Excellency; and though that greatness of soul Y. E. had so just a title to claim, had lessened the importance of these considerations in your eyes, I should still have flattered myself, that you would shew some indulgence

for the weakness of those, who, on being conscious of those distinguished qualities which raise people above calumny, think that there are instances in which a man, without being wanting to his own dignity, is called upon to shew some respect for public opinion. But, if our notions upon the subject be greatly different, the situation we are in is no less so. On my part I am charged with having maintained an atrocious principle; while they put in the mouth of Y. E. sentiments worthy of your character, and such as all who are not strangers to your loyalty must know that you yourself could have wished to have had ascribed to you, had I been capable of holding the language attributed to me. I cannot, therefore, conceal that in the denial of Y. E. to disavow that conversation, I look in vain for that greatness of soul which you invite me to imitate, when silence, on our part, costs you nothing but the sacrifice of my reputation, inasmuch, at least, as it depends upon your suffrage. Seeing myself deprived of this advantage, there still remains for me the satisfaction to think that I can desist from farther importuning Y. E. upon the subject, and that I am able to await, without that perturbation of mind you ascribe to me, the decision of the public, the opinion of my colleagues, and that of the enlightened persons in this court. They have hitherto been pretty decidedly in my favour, and I flatter myself they will prove sufficient to protect me, not only against the aspersions of the *Gazetteer*, but likewise against the conjectures which may be built upon the silence of Y. E.—(Signed)—J. H. FRERE.

*Madrid, April 19, 1804.*—SIR, I cannot avoid returning an answer to your note of the 17th inst. as, although its contents do not vary from the former one concerning the opinions entertained in France upon your character, and mine, I see that you touch other points of greater importance, such as the dignity of your Sovereign, and the public opinion. This question is too serious, and ought not, therefore, to be blended with private interests. I will never believe that the King of England gives his ministers directions derogatory from his majesty and dignity; I respect his high rank as I should, and will not consent, Sir, to your making a court business of what is merely personal. You know, Sir, that whenever you have called to converse with me, I have answered, that political affairs were not within my province, and that the King, my Master, had his Secretary of State, through whose medium the demands of foreign courts were to be transmitted to him. To the other Ambassadors and Ministers I made the same

observation; so that I have received their visits as mere acts of goodness and civility from them. Under such circumstances, therefore, causes ought not to be confounded with subsequent events, nor ought what depends upon the private conduct of subjects to be imputed to edicts of the government. My sincerity has more than once prompted me to caution you, Sir, that some individuals about you could do you neither honour nor credit, since their reputation being blasted in other courts, no great opinion could be entertained of their morals in this. And do you know, Sir, whether or not these people may be the authors of the story published by the *Paris Gazetteer*? I have likewise mentioned several other things to you; and it was, perhaps, owing to my advices that you avoided their consequences, as, for instance, General Bournonville's affair, when you wanted to make yourself master of his papers. Let your Excellency call to mind my former conduct, and entertain a proper regard for the sincerity you have experienced from your affectionate servant.—(Signed)—THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

If you chuse, Sir, I will give an account of what has taken place to the King, my Master, that it may be forwarded to the minister of H. B. M. through the channel of his Ambassador in London; and your Excellency may, from the moderation and terms of my note, form an idea of the high respect I bear H. B. M. since, if it were not for this just consideration, I should not have answered your last note.

*Madrid, April 20, 1804.*—I yesterday received the note of Y. E. which I have read with all the attention it merits. There is a very plain consideration which directly occurs to one's mind, namely, that Y. E. might have spared yourself the unpleasant task of continuing a painful correspondence. Y. E. does me the honour to tell me, that, being no Minister, your correspondence cannot be drawn to any political consequence; and yet you propose to transmit it to the Minister of his Catholic Majesty in London, for the purpose of shewing your respect for his Britannic Majesty.—Y. E. adds, that without such motive you would not have thought yourself bound to answer my note. Upon this I must observe, that expressions of personal respect from a private individual to a Sovereign, do not appear to me to be customary; and that, viewing the note of Y. E. in this light, I would not undertake to lay it officially before his Majesty. And yet, as it contains certain allusions to my conduct, I thought it my duty to transmit it to the Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty, with proper explana-

tions. If I return no direct answer to Y. E. concerning those allusions, it is because I think them foreign to the subject upon which we began to correspond, and absolutely without an object, since Y. E. has declared that you would not be looked upon as a Minister. Moreover, nobody being present when the conversation in question took place, the discussion would prove endless, and be of no other use than that of presenting to the public the indecent spectacle of two persons, each of whom has some claim to their respect, mutually contradicting one another in the face of the whole world.—(Signed)—J. H. FRERE.

*Madrid, April 23, 1804.*—I persuade myself that Y. E. will not be surprised at the course I take, and which is, in my opinion, the only rational one. Since I desisted in my note of the 17th, from the demand of a disavowal, our correspondence could no longer have any object. From the moment that Y. E. declared that you would not be considered a minister, I became sensible that farther discussions would only produce a personal altercation. This was the motive why I avoided discussing various points contained in the last note of Y. E. and it is also the motive which influences me at present. When Y. E. has taken into consideration the situation you place me in, by stripping me, as well as yourself, of our ministerial characters, I am convinced you will not ascribe to a want of regard, that which is, in reality, the result of the most serious reflection.—(Signed)—J. H. FRERE.

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**BANK DOLLARS AND TOKENS.**—The bill for inflicting punishment on those who may counterfeit or utter the Bank dollars, on which bill some pertinent remarks were made by a correspondent in the preceding sheet, is now, perhaps, become a law; and, indeed, as was before observed, if unhappily we are driven to the absolute necessity of adopting a currency of this sort, something must be done to prevent its being counterfeited, or else that which is already greatly injurious to the public would be much more injurious. The bill provides for the punishment of those who shall counterfeit this currency: the kind and degree of the punishment are of little consequence: the principle is all. The bill, when passed, will have given the sanction of the Parliament to a measure which transfers to the banks of England and Ireland a right hitherto exercised solely by the King, *the right of coining money*, or, at least, it will admit those bodies, composed of individuals utterly unknown to the constitution of this monarchy,

to a co equality in the exercise of that ancient, high, and important right.—Perceiving the force of this objection to the whole of the transaction, it was said by Mr. Pitt, in the debate of the 2d instant, that the Bank dollars were not to be regarded as the current coin of the country. He “begged” the House clearly to bear in mind, that “there never was the smallest idea of these” dollars being viewed as the current coin “of the country. They were designed” only to answer the purpose of small paper “money, and differed so far only as in the” one case the pledge was a small bit of silver, and, in the other, a little note of paper.” “In fact,” says he, “if I may use” the expression, they are silver bank notes; “and, having been found necessary in the” particular emergency of the country, the “House is called upon to prevent the expedient from becoming dangerous.” But, then, if there never was the smallest idea of making these dollars the current coin of the country, how comes the head of his Majesty to be imprinted upon them? “Whose image” and superscription is this? It is the *King’s*. And will not the dollars, therefore, be regarded as the *King’s coin*?—On the *reverse*, indeed, poor Britannia is accompanied by a bee-hive instead of a man of war, and (oh! “to what vile uses may we come Horatio!”) by the arms and name of the Bank. Nevertheless, it must have been known to those who were the inventors of this scheme as well as to those by whom it is now prosecuted, that the impression of the King’s head would inevitably convey the idea of current coin, and that the dollars thus impressed would be regarded as such by nine-tenths of the people. Nay, can there, from the title and preamble of the bill itself, remain, in the mind of any man, much doubt that the ministry themselves intended that that the dollars should pass for coin? It is called “a bill to prevent the counterfeiting of silver *coin* issued by the governor “and company of the Bank of England, “called dollars, and silver *coin* which may “be issued by the governor and company of “the Bank of Ireland, called tokens.” In the preamble it is stated, that the Bank has caused a large quantity of silver dollars to be *coined* or stamped; and the word stamped is inserted only for the purpose of preventing counterfeiters from availing themselves of any objection that might be raised upon the circumstance of the dollars not having been made by the same process as is pursued at the mint. That the minister, should, therefore, stand up in his place in the House, and declare that there never was the *smallest* idea of these dollars being received as the

current coin of the country, cannot but be matter of astonishment.—The truth is, that, from every thing that passed during the debate alluded to, no opposition, objection, or observation, seems to have been expected by the ministry. Mr. Sturges, who is one of the new Secretaries of the Treasury, and who moved the House upon the subject, seemed not to have been armed with even the common place ministerial remarks upon the respectability and integrity of that patriotic and loyal body, the directors of the Bank; much less was he prepared with any argument in reply to those who objected to the bill as sanctioning an invasion of the royal rights of his Majesty. Mr. Pitt was evidently aware of no objection to the measure, and had only just time to perceive, that he must rub off the word *coin*, or his opponents would compel him to proclaim a *depreciation* of his bank paper. To the objection of stamping the King's head upon the dollars he could find no answer; and, indeed, it was impossible to find a satisfactory one; for, if the dollars were regarded by their inventors as nothing more than "*silver bank notes*," how came they to think of imprinting on them the title and image of the Sovereign, seeing that this never had been, and is not now, done with respect to the *paper* bank notes? In his hurry, however, Mr. Pitt quite overlooked a circumstance that stood in great need of clear explanation before he sat down as if contented with having warded off the fatal charge of depreciation. This same bill, which, in its preamble, declares that the dollar issued by the Bank of England is to pass for 5s. declares that the dollar issued by the Bank of Ireland is to pass for 6s. that is, for 5s. 6d. English money, that is to say, for ten per centum more than the dollar of the Bank of England. It will hardly be pretended, that the word *token* instead of dollar gives any additional value to the piece; and, indeed, it would be perfectly ridiculous to ascribe this difference in the nominal value of pieces of metal of the same nature and weight to any other cause than that of the difference in the value of the paper in company of which they circulate in the two countries respectively. This act of parliament does, then, establish, beyond all dispute, the fact of depreciation, as far as relates to the paper money of Ireland, without at all impairing the arguments that have been urged in support of a real though not a nominal depreciation in the paper money of England; for still they pass in England at 6d., and indeed at more than sixpence sterling above their intrinsic value. The describing of them as "*silver notes*;" as "*small bits of silver used in lieu of little*

"notes of paper" cannot deceive any one who bestows the least reflection upon the subject. This is, in truth, a palpable fallacy; for, they are not "*small bits of silver*," but on the contrary very *large* bits of silver. Had they been no bigger than a six pence, or had they been even bigger than half a crown, but evidently bearing a nominal value beyond their intrinsic value as compared with the paper, then indeed, they might with some degree of plausibility have been regarded as mere notes, though even in that case one might reasonably have wondered: that the bank directors, supposing their credit to be still unshaken, should think it necessary to imprint their promises on such expensive materials. But, now that we see the promise to pay 5s. printed on so large a piece of silver, it is impossible to believe that the nominal has, as in the case of paper notes, no reference whatever to the intrinsic value. It was mentioned by Mr. Sturges, as a circumstance in favour of the measure, that "*nobody was compelled to take these 'dollars and tokens in payment.'*" That gentleman is not very profound, or he would have perceived that this was a most potent argument against the bill that he was pressing upon the House; for, if the dollars had really been considered as mere notes, why were they not made a legal tender as well as the other notes of the bank? And, ought it not to have been an insurmountable objection to them, that they bore the King's title and image, that they went forth clothed with royal authority, *without being lawful money of the realm*? These are the persons, too, who affect to regard themselves as the supporters of the King's prerogative and dignity! There is room for a bare possibility that they may wish to do it, but assuredly they pursue not the means of effecting that object.—Mr. Dent took occasion to observe, that the issuing of the dollars, by the two banks in question, had been, and would be, productive of great public convenience; and, that previous to their being issued there was hardly any such thing as obtaining the change necessary for the affairs of trade. These observations, the former of which was corroborated by Mr. Pitt, were very true; lamentably true; but they in nowise contributed towards furnishing an answer to the objections that were stated to the measure: they tended to convince no one that the dollars were not too high priced, unless the paper was allowed to be depreciated; and still less were they calculated to remove an objection to the imprinting of the marks of Majesty upon mere notes of the bank, upon money that no man was obliged to take in payment. Mr. Dent's support was built

upon the old plea, *necessity*. Milton has called this "the tyrant's plea." It frequently is so, perhaps. But in this country it is constantly the plea of political blindness, indecision, and procrastination, which, as to the subject before us, created a want of confidence in the government and a consequent growing distrust in the solidity of the bank, which institution is now clearly perceived to have a close connexion with and dependence upon the political power of the state.—This closing remark suggests the propriety of adding here a few observations to those formerly made as to the different stages through which we have passed to this connexion between the government and the bank. When one considers the vast convenience that the bank offers to a minister of this country, whose chief difficulty almost always lies in getting money, it is not at all surprising, that, ever since the establishment of that corporation, it has been an object of desire with the minister of the day. But the Parliament, who seem, till of late years, to have watched with great vigilance over every attempt made by the minister to come at money without their express consent, repealed, in 1793, the act of William and Mary, prohibiting the bank to advance money to government, except in consequence of Parliamentary authority previously obtained. This salutary check being removed, a connexion of a new, and, as it has proved to be, most dangerous kind, was immediately formed between the minister and the bank. It is obvious what a vast accession of power this measure must have given to the minister, who could now defer applying to Parliament to an opportunity when political circumstances facilitated the success of the application; and, it was at all times in his power to hide the expenses of his measures from the eyes of the people, until he had committed the national honour for the discharge of the debts contracted in consequence of those expenses. Of these facilities the minister of that day (and indeed of this day too) did not fail to avail himself. Always short-sighted; always hoping for relief that failed him; always putting off the evil hour; he freely had recourse to the bank, insomuch that it is stated by Mr. Howison (whose excellent "*Investigation*" contains the substance of much of these observations) that, in the course of three years most, the bank actually advanced to the government about fifteen millions of money. This connexion has subsisted ever since, and is, of course, becoming every day closer and closer. The solidity of all bank paper must consist in the certainty of obtaining payment in specie at the will of the holder;

and, though the specie should be in the coffers of the bank, that circumstance would add nothing to the security of the holder of the paper, unless there was somewhere a power to compel the bank to pay him in specie. When, therefore, the government becomes the banker, or an associate with the banker, all security to the individual is gone. From this cause it is, that no government paper currency was ever long supported; and, in the exact proportion that the government becomes connected with a bank; in the exact proportion that their interests, their credit, and their pecuniary fate became interwoven with one another; in that proportion will their paper money, allowing for the effect of different circumstances of permanency and of habit, become suspected and depreciated; because it is well known that in the first place the government will be continually calling upon the bankers for fresh issues of their paper, and that it has afterwards the power of protecting them from fulfilling their engagements towards the holders of such paper. This has been the progress with us: the minister borrowed from the bank, till the bank could no longer pay in specie, and then a law was obtained from Parliament to shelter the bank against the just demands of its creditors, who, when we consider all the difficulties and expenses of seeking redress through courts of justice, may assuredly be said to have no means of redress left; and that, in fact, the paper of the bank of England, and, through its means, all the provincial paper in the country, is become a *legal tender*. Still, however, there wanted one thing to consummate the connexion between the government and the bank; and that was the measure which has led to these observations; a measure which implants upon the precious metal the proof of a degradation of the bank paper, at the same time that it conveys to the minds of even the most uninformed the idea of a perfect community of interests between their Sovereign and that bank.

*IRISH SMALL NOTES.*—When intelligence was, sometime ago, received from Ireland of the want of small coin as circulating medium, and when the people of Dublin had been informed, that dollars or other coin would be procured to supply the wants of the country, it was stated in this work that such promise could never be kept; but that small bank notes must be resorted to; for, that the precious metal could not, for any length of time, be kept in circulation, at a nominal nearly so low as their real value, in company with a paper so degraded as that of Ireland. This prediction, which indeed it required no conjuror to make, is now am-

ply fulfilled. Private notes have been made; but, as it is evident they cannot long stand without some aid from government, a bill is now before Parliament, the object of which is to authorize what are called the "registered bankers" to issue small promissory notes, which are not to be payable except in notes of the Bank of Ireland. If a bundle of these notes are offered for payment, and change is wanted, the person who demands payment of them must tender the change along with them; so that not a single sixpence of silver ever can be extracted through their means from the person by whom they have been issued. These notes are to be stamped, and, of course, they are to pay a stamp duty; and here a provision occurs at which one cannot help smiling; it is forbidden to issue them "by the sheet!" Towards the close of the financial farce in America, notes were paid away by the *quire*, and at last of all, even by the *ream*. How long it will be before the Irish paper will arrive at this point, it would be difficult to say; because the event will, in a great measure, depend upon extraneous circumstances; but, supposing us to continue in our present warlike and political career; supposing the next three years to lead us downward as rapidly as the three last have, there is very little probability that these notes will have much real value at the end of that time.—Why, it may be asked, were not the small bank notes issued in England instead of dollars? And, indeed, if the dollars were to be reckoned as mere notes of the bank; if they were intended to have no more value with the people than if they were paper; if no degree of confidence was expected to be inspired by their intrinsic value; if this were the case, it is quite impossible to give any reason for small paper notes not having been adopted. But, clearly, this was not the case: it was expected and was known, that confidence would be given to their intrinsic worth; that they would obtain circulation in consequence of that worth, which aided by the habitual reverence for the royal title and image, would give a prop to the credit of the bank, which, had the country continued much longer under the difficulty of procuring change for a one pound note, would have sunk so low as to have brought the note to an open discount. The same effect would have been produced by issuing small bank notes, such as those now to be issued in Ireland; and, if the bank of Ireland possessed the means, we may be certain that they would issue dollars enough to preclude the necessity of notes so small that it is apprehended they may go forth by the sheet. But the bank paper of Ireland is at an open

discount: nothing can retrieve it, or palliate its disgrace: sentence of death is passed upon it, and the few six shilling dollars, or tokens, that are to be issued will only serve to eke out, and that too for a very little while, perhaps, its miserable existence. — Those who are so terrified at the prospect of a fall of the bank paper, and who ask "where are we to look for a circulating medium in the room of it" may be referred to the present state of Ireland for a very satisfactory solution of the question. In the North of Ireland there is no paper money in circulation. There, says Mr. Parnell, in his very able publication, which every one should at this time read, "the currency of specie has been maintained pure and uncorrupted, whilst, in every other part of Ireland, the introduction of excessive quantities of paper has been productive of the greatest abuses and the most serious consequences." There is no truth more clearly established, than, that if currency be unchecked by law, it will find its proper level. Every country will have as much as it wants of it, and no more. But, as long as a connexion of a pecuniary nature exists between a government and a bank; as long as there is paper forced into circulation; so long the precious metals will continue to fly from it. In proportion as the quantity of paper increases, that of gold and silver diminishes, and *vice versa*. If, therefore, the paper were all withdrawn, there would be gold and silver to supply its place, and that instantly too: the latter would come forth as rapidly as the former disappeared. Not that it is to be supposed that there are thirty millions of guineas hidden in the country, as Lord Hawkesbury imagined; but, with regard to currency, all the world is but one nation, and whatever part of that nation has the least share of currency, in proportion to the value of its commodities, will be the point towards which currency will flow from every other part, till all have their due quantity.—Having referred to the pamphlet of Mr. Parnell, it is proper here to acknowledge the error which he has noticed in the Register, Vol. V. p. 281, where reference is made to a speech of Sir John Newport, and where, as it now appears, too great a degree of effect in producing the difference of exchange between England and Ireland was ascribed to the remittances to England in interest of loans and in payments to absentees. It was, however, there expressly stated that, "a considerable share" of the loss arising from the difference of exchange was attributable to the depreciation of the Irish paper. Mr. Parnell maintains, and he clearly establishes

his position, that the *whole* of the loss on account of exchange arises at present from the depreciation of the Irish paper money. Upon this part of his subject he refers to facts which are very curious, and cannot leave a doubt in the mind of any man. Indeed the whole passage is so interesting and valuable that it is impossible to resist the temptation to quote it entire. "One most extraordinary circumstance has arisen from the peculiar state of the northern circulation, namely, an established rate of exchange between Belfast and Dublin; not merely a rate which possibly might be the consequence of dealings upon bills of long credit, or of partial variations in the extent of their commercial intercourse, but steadily settled, even as high in some instances as  $11\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. This circumstance, together with the practice of fixing a paper price and a cash price on all goods for sale in the North, amply corroborates every argument already made use of to prove the depreciation of paper, and also the effect of this depreciation upon the rates of exchange between Dublin and London. It is easy to estimate some of the most striking consequences attending a currency of specie, of paper convertible into specie, or of paper issued to an excess not convertible into specie. For instance, if a landlord in the North, previous to the restriction of cash payments, let 100 acres of land for 100 guineas per annum, and if a landlord in the South did the same at that period, both of them would have received equal benefit, and exactly the same sum of money, because they both received their rents in specie, or what was of equal value, paper convertible into specie. The state of the case is now materially different; the landlord of the North receives 100 guineas in specie, the landlord of the South receives 100 guineas in bank notes. If guineas bear a premium of 10 for every 100, the landlord of the South does not receive from his 100 acres so much by 10 guineas, as is received from the 100 acres in the North.—If both landlords sent their rents to Dublin, to purchase government stock, the landlord receiving specie for his rents, would be able to buy stock to the amount of 10 guineas in each 100 guineas of rent, more than the landlord could buy with his rents paid in bank paper. As the currency of the North may therefore be considered as supporting the former arguments made use of to demonstrate the degraded state of the paper currency; so does it also most clearly corroborate the position which has been laid down and proved, that this degradation is

"the cause and measure of the rates of exchange. For when the exchange from Dublin on London is  $10\frac{3}{4}$  per cent, that of Belfast on London has been  $5\frac{1}{4}$ , and of Belfast on Dublin  $11\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. These were the exact rates, in December, 1803, as will appear by the following statement; and they are the usual rates now existing:

" June 1, 1803.	Belfast on London	$8\frac{3}{4}$ to 9
	Dublin	$5\frac{3}{4}$
" July 1,	London	$8\frac{3}{4}$
	Dublin	6
" Aug. 1,	London	$8\frac{1}{4}$
	Dublin	7
" Sep. 1,	London	7
	Dublin	$11\frac{1}{2}$
" Oct. 1,	London	$7\frac{1}{2}$
	Dublin	$8\frac{1}{2}$
" Nov. 1,	London	$5\frac{1}{2}$
	Dublin	$11\frac{1}{4}$
" Dec.	London	$5\frac{1}{2}$
	Dublin	$11\frac{1}{2}$

"We have therefore direct evidence of the rates of exchange of Belfast on Dublin, and on London, and of Dublin on London being so adjusted by the operations of currency, as exactly to maintain in favour of Belfast the superior value of a currency of specie, over the degraded currency of Dublin. In the South of Ireland, where bank notes are current, there exists a very unfavourable rate of exchange. In the North of Ireland, where such notes are not current, this unfavourable rate of exchange entirely ceases."

—These simple and obvious facts do, as the author observes, exhibit in one view the whole theory which his work has endeavoured to maintain, because it renders it incontrovertibly true, that the bank notes of Ireland are depreciated, that this depreciation is at this time the sole cause of the unfavourable state of exchange, and that the degree of depreciation is not less than ten per centum, as compared with English guineas within Great Britain and Ireland. To persons who may happen to be strangers to the subject, it will not be unnecessary to observe, that the difference between English and Irish money is  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per centum, and that, of course, when the exchange between England and Ireland is  $8\frac{1}{2}$  it is in fact *at par*. But, at this time, and for a considerable time back, the exchange between London and Dublin has been above 16 per centum, while, as we have seen above, that between London and Belfast is no more than  $5\frac{1}{4}$ ; so that, the exchange with London is about 8 per centum *against* Dublin at the same moment that it is about 3 per centum *favour* of Belfast, making a difference of 11 per

centum, which accordingly we find to be the actual rate of exchange with Belfast against Dublin.—Agreeing with Mr. Parnell as to the fact of depreciation, the reader will also agree with him as to the immediate cause thereof, namely, an excessive issue of bank paper, which excess is clearly traced to the measure of what, in the financial cant of the day, is called “bank restriction,” but which ought to be called, *sheltering the bank from the legal and just demands of its creditors*; and this fatal measure, which in its consequences threatens the total and speedy overthrow of our mighty fabric of commercial credit, has already been traced back to the act of 1793, in which the Parliament yielded to the minister’s proposition to remove those salutary checks which had been at first devised, and which had so long been preserved for the purpose of preventing a secret connexion and mutual connivance between the government and the bank. But, *necessity*, the standing plea; the “*emergency of the moment*,” the “*existing circumstances*,” the “*imperious necessity*” of the case; this is, at last, the ground on which all these measures are justified. Were it worth while the plea might, in almost every instance, be set aside; for, it would be easy to show, that every one of the measures might either have been entirely avoided or rendered much less mischievous. But, admitting the plea; allowing the necessity to exist in a degree sufficient to justify the measures, where shall we find a justification for the system of politics and political economy, the pursuing of which produced that necessity? Yet, it is to this same system that we are still bidden to look as to the rock of our financial salvation! Even now; yea, this very evening (Tuesday), we bear to be reminded, and that too without any mark of indignation, of “the *powerful and salutary* operation of the Sinking Fund!” What! the powerful and salutary operation of that system under which we have arrived at our present state! That system which has reduced us to the necessity of bank restriction, and silver notes; that has produced an income tax and has banished the precious metals from the land! Is this the system on the operation of which we can still suffer ourselves to be congratulated? But, it is no matter: the day of indignation will come. This system has, indeed, a *powerful* operation; and in no way does it operate more powerfully than in blinding the eyes and sealing the lips of the people. Few, comparatively speaking, yet see to the bottom of the abyss, and, of those few, scarcely any one will venture openly to declare what he thinks, there

being hardly a man of property in the community whose apparent interests do not, either directly or indirectly, induce him, if not to favour, or, at least, connive at the delusion. Thus, it is greatly to be feared, we shall be led along till it will be utterly impossible to escape the political consequences of a financial revolution.

STAMP DUTIES.—The very great addition about to be imposed upon duties of this description has occasioned a good deal of opposition to the bill which is now before the House of Commons making such imposition. That stamp duties should be raised at a time when all other duties and taxes are raised is by no means surprising; and, considered merely as a burden, it appears grossly inconsistent to complain of the augmentation of the duty on stamps, while the income tax is silently submitted to. The opposition above alluded to has, however, chiefly been confined to the augmenting of the duty upon those stamps which relate to law proceedings; and, in the course of the debates upon the subject, it has been clearly shown, that the stamps on such proceedings have already tended to shut the door of justice against a very numerous class of the community. Of course to add to the amount of the stamps is to increase this evil, which is at the same time a very great disgrace to the country.—This subject will in all probability occupy a place in some future sheet of the Register, but it would not be right here to omit stating the substance of an observation made by a young gentleman of the name of Dickenson by way of reply to Mr. Serjeant Best. The latter, during a most able speech, had asserted and had proved, that, in many cases, the stamp duties with the proposed augmentation would amount to a prohibition; and that thus those who could not purchase justice would not obtain it. At this statement Mr. Dickenson expressed his astonishment, and observed, that if the learned Serjeant had taken time to reflect, he would certainly have made no such statement, seeing that there was a very considerable part of the administration of justice in this country which was totally unfettered by stamp duties, namely, all that valuable part which was left in the hands of the *justices of the peace*! As no attempt was made to weaken the force of this observation, such an attempt was, without doubt, regarded as hopeless; and if such was the light in which it was viewed by Mr. Windham, who spoke afterwards on the other side, it would be presumption to make the attempt here. It may not be amiss, however, just to ask Mr. Dickenson what are the papers, used in the

administration of justice by the inferior magistrates, which he could possibly tax, and which are not already taxed?—Mr. Addington, who came forward to take his full share of whatever blame might be attached to the proposition before the House, the proposition having, in substance, originated with himself, acknowledged that there was much weight in the objections which had been urged against particular parts of the measure, by several persons, but especially by Dr. Laurence. He said, that he could, from the beginning, have wished *not* to impose any additional burden upon law proceedings, and that “*necessity and necessity alone* induced him to include in his proposition the stamps relative to such proceedings.” This was the best defence of the measure itself; but, as in other cases of the same kind, who will furnish a defence of those by whom this fatal necessity has been created? What must be that system, what must be that series of measures, which have produced a plea of absolute necessity for the imposition of a duty which is acknowledged to be fairly liable to objections of such a nature? Mr. Pitt, indeed, acknowledged neither the force of the objections nor the extreme necessity of the tax; but none of his arguments showed the objections to be groundless, and as to his not expressly acknowledging the absolute necessity of the tax, he had evident reasons, which could not operate so strongly with his predecessor.

FORMATION OF THE MINISTRY.—Upon this subject there were certain observations made by Mr. Pitt, in his speech of the 18th ultimo, that ought, long ago, to have been noticed in the Register. On the occasion alluded to, Mr. Canning, who, for reasons that it would not, perhaps, be very difficult to explain, chose to make a party matter of the bill for raising a permanent additional military force, brought a reply from Mr. Sheridan, who, in the course of that reply, observed, that the minister would probably take the hint given him in the recent divisions, and, in imitation of the example of his modest predecessor, resign the reins of power into other hands. “Glad of a quarrel” upon this score; rejoicing at an opportunity of giving a personal turn to a debate in which he was evidently appearing to great disadvantage, Mr. Pitt took up the far greater part of the time, occupied by his answer to Mr. Sheridan, with matter having no connexion with the bill before the House, and this he did under the pretext, that the persons opposed to the bill had “made a measure directed to the public defence a rallying point to display sentiments and exert efforts dictated by motives wholly different

“*from the merits or demerits of the question.*”

So; one of his own party, one of his very dependents, first gives to the discussion a personal turn; first he accuses Mr. Addington of having commenced “a systematic opposition,” because he now opposed a measure which was the exactly reverse of one which he himself had proposed to the House; then accuses Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham of making an opposition to the men rather than to the measure, though neither of them had ever expressed their approbation of any such scheme; and, because he is replied to, because the conduct of Mr. Addington is compared to Mr. Pitt, because, in short, a party speech of Mr. Canning draws forth a party speech from Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Pitt gets up and affects to regard *all* the opposition that has been made to his measure as arising merely from party and personal motives! “Is it,” said he, pursuing this notion, “reconcilable with any ideas of constitutional principle and public duty, that, when a ministry has been changed, their successors should be obstructed in their very first operations by any combination founded upon any circumstances connected with the recent exercise of his Majesty’s prerogative. The Hon. Gentleman admits the real object of the extraordinary zeal, with which this bill has been contested, and I am sanguine enough to hope, that this object *being now avowed*, the bill will make its way through the House with increased concurrence.” This was after the manner of Mr. Pitt, than whom no man is more artful and dextrous in debate. But, how did this representation agree with the fact? for that is certainly a question of some importance to us, the people, at least. The fact was, that the gentleman to whom Mr. Pitt was answering, had made no such admission as that ascribed to him. He had not avowed, either directly or indirectly, that the real object of the opposition to the bill was at all “connected with the recent exercise of his Majesty’s prerogative” in choosing a ministry. This admission and this avowal were, therefore, (to use the most gentle phrase that the case will admit of) assumed by Mr. Pitt, without the least foundation, and for a purpose too obvious and too strongly-marked to stand in need of being either pointed out or characterized. Let any one refer to the report of the debate: he will there see, that the question was, by all those who took any considerable share in the discussion of it, discussed entirely upon its own merits, and that, by these persons, not even an allusion had, previous to Mr. Canning’s assault, been made to the change in the ministry, or to any one

circumstance at all connected, even in the most distant degree, with the recent exercise of any prerogative of his Majesty. Look at the speeches which Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Fox had made during the debates. Not a word will be found foreign to the legitimate subject of debate: scarcely any passage can be called digression: nothing of a party nature. And, it should be observed, too, that the objections urged by Mr. Windham to the principle of the bill, were objections, which, on several occasions, he had before urged. It will be found, further, that, even out of the House, the observations upon the bill were kept entirely distinct from all matters of a different nature; and that, from first to last, no measure ever was more fairly tried upon its own intrinsic merits or demerits. Nor should it be forgotten, that the persons who were opposed to the measure consisted almost entirely of members of that part of the kingdom where alone the bill was to operate, and that amongst them were about two-thirds of the county members of England. Were all these persons actuated by party motives? Were they all acting upon considerations “*wholly* different from the merits or demerits of the question?” Or, was this imputation a mere device to turn the attention of the House and the public from those merits or demerits?—As to the question of prerogative, the first thing to be asked is, *how long* Mr. Pitt has been the champion of this part of the royal rights, or, indeed, of any of the essential rights of his Majesty? “*I* trust,” said he, “that the gentlemen on the other side will not feel themselves under the necessity of questioning the King’s right to choose his own ministers.” He might safely have said this, without any insinuation to the contrary; for no one did question the King’s right in this respect; no one attempted to do it; but every one maintained, or, if called upon, would have maintained, the right of Parliament to endeavour, either by direct or indirect measures, to prevail upon his Majesty to change his ministers, which in other words, is to drive ministers from their place. Yet this doctrine Mr. Pitt seemed to deny by describing, as unconstitutional, an attempt to turn him out through the means of a discussion on a bill relating to the defence of the country. Why not through the means of that discussion as well as through the means of any other discussion? When he spoke in the debate of Mr. Fox’s motion, of the 23d of April, he did not seem to think that there was any such distinction to be observed. The whole of his speech upon that occasion was evidently designed to drive the ministers from

their places. That such was the intention and such the tendency of it will not be denied by the Attorney General at least, who asserted it, and with perfect truth. “If the question be carried this night,” said he, “in favour of the motion, and especially upon the arguments of the right hon. gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt), there can be no question of its being followed by the resignation of his Majesty’s ministers. But I will ask the right hon. gent. if this is the specie of conduct I am to expect from his candour? Is it on a motion of this sort” [on a motion relating to the defence of the country] “that I am to expect a decision in which is involved the question, whether or not the ministers shall any longer retain the confidence of this House, or continue to fill their present situations? Could I have expected it from him, to choose such a mode or such a subject, to collect every stray vote and every stray opinion?” If this charge was not true, let Mr. Pitt demand a recantation from the gentleman by whom it was made, which he can the more conveniently do, because that gentleman now sits upon the same bench with him. It was true, as far as related to the object of the speech; but those who hold that the object was legitimate will, of course, think nothing of the charge. It is a charge against him only, who now finds it convenient to adopt the very principle upon which the charge was founded by the Attorney General; and, it is curious enough to see Mr. Pitt supported in urging this charge by the gentleman, who had before so resolutely urged it against himself. The tenderness shown by Mr. Pitt towards the prerogative of the crown, upon the subject of choosing its ministers, is extremely well delineated by Lord Archibald Hamilton in his “Thoughts on the Formation of the present Ministry,” where he completely exposes and refutes the apology made for Mr. Pitt’s conduct upon the ground that it would have been unconstitutional to force a ministry upon the King. “If the word *force*,” says he, “is to be applied at all, and if a tenderness towards the crown” (on the part of Parliament) “in this respect be recognized as sound doctrine, and a salutary principle, still it is evident; that Mr. Pitt’s opposition to Mr. Addington, and subsequent acceptance of power upon the basis of exclusion, cannot be justified upon any such ground; as it certainly has evinced no such tenderness. It appears, upon a view of the whole transaction, that his Majesty has been forced, (in that sense of the word, which, in behalf of Mr. Pitt, has been disclaimed) to relinquish Mr. Addington,

“ though not to accede to the wishes of the House of Commons and the public—that his Majesty has been *forced*, far enough to remove a ministry agreeable to himself, but not enjoying the confidence of the House, though not far enough, to establish such a one as was expected and desired, by the public, at the risk of being not wholly unobjectionable to himself. His Majesty has been *forced*, far enough to disgust himself, but not far enough, to satisfy the country. He has been *forced*, far enough to place Mr. Pitt on the Treasury Bench, but not far enough, to place the government in the hands of a comprehensive and efficient administration. His Majesty has been *forced*, far enough to establish the constitutional precedent, but not far enough, to secure the constitutional benefit in view. Does this conduct exhibit any tenderness to the crown? It is strange and unaccountable, that any man should approve and execute this harsh system of *force*, just to the degree that should *force* himself into office, to the exclusion of those whom, it had been the common object of all parties, as well as of himself, to introduce. Nor is it less strange and unaccountable, that Mr. Pitt should not have foreseen the possibility of some such objection, as that alluded to in these remarks, and been prepared to meet it—or, if not so prepared, that his mind, having been engaged a week or two in this course of lenient opposition to the crown, should not have, at once, resolved, after having incurred the guilt of *force*, not to sacrifice the object. But it is above measure strange and unaccountable, if, from having accurately and scrupulously adjusted the degree of *force* that it was constitutional and decorous to exert, he submitted to incur this guilt, which his friends disclaim for him, without securing the end, which they insist, he had in view, that he should not have resolved, at least, for the sake of character, and to avoid injurious imputations, not to be, at once, and without consultation with any one, the only person of all who had co-operated in this system of *forcing*, to be benefited by its partial success.” This was very strange indeed. Yet, it will appear less so, when we look back to the intrigue for place in the spring of 1803, and the subsequent conduct of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville when the motions for censure were brought forward by Col. Patten and Lord Fitzwilliam. Lord Melville objected to the motion, because it might drive out ministers, “ *before there were any persons prepared to take their places.*” Indeed the whole of their con-

duct, from their resignation in 1801 to the present day, shows that they have had no other object in view than that of coming into power again, unchecked with the association of any men of talents, character and influence, and to retain that power as long as possible. Being out, they could use every possible exertion to drive the late ministers from their places; but, being in, they cry out upon a bare suspicion of a similar attempt against themselves; and, in resolving to cling to their power, in defiance of the wishes and the votes of Parliament, they affect to regard themselves as *the champions of the royal prerogative!* The pretext will avail them little: few persons will be deceived by it: whatever Mr. Pitt may think: whatever his dependents may tell him, he may rest assured, that the resolution which he expressed, that the Parliament “ might get rid of the bill but should not get rid of him,” will, by every just and sensible man in the country, be attributed to selfish ambition, to infatuation, to despair, or to any thing rather than to a tender regard for the prerogative or the feelings of the King. “ My right honourable friend (Mr. Pitt,)” said Mr. Canning in his speech of December 8, 1802, “ is incapable of playing so dishonourable a game as that attributed to him” [that of undermining the minister, whom he himself had recommended, in order to thrust him out and take his place] “ No man was ever less likely to furnish by his conduct any grounds for such an imputation. Never did young ambition labour so much to attach popularity and power as my right hon. friend has laboured to detach them. He has laboured not for fame but for obscurity.” When, therefore, Mr. Canning heard this very same right hon. friend express the resolution above mentioned; when he saw him flying up from Kent to meet his northern associate, who was approaching the scene of action with a flight as strong and as swift as that of a Turkey Buzzard, which is said to scent a dying horse from New England to Carolina; when he saw him, after assisting at debates and counting in divisions, with the clearly understood object of obtaining for the country a comprehensive and powerful administration, an object loudly proclaimed by Mr. Canning himself; when he saw him immediately after this, eagerly grasping at place in company with six out of ten of those very ministers whom he had openly accused of being unfit to be entrusted with the affairs of the nation, and on whom he had bestowed, even to prodigality, marks of censure and contempt; when Mr. Canning saw this, and when he afterwards heard his right honour-

able friend, at a moment that, from every part of the nation, and from every description of persons, from the court, the parliament, the country, and the city, "get out!" was echoed in his ears, coolly answer, with Loony Mactoulter in the farce: "By the Lard, now, and I sheant get out! I shall stay where I am, Mister DEPUTY BULL; for if you don't know when you have got a good sharvent, I know when I've got a good place." When Mr. Canning heard this, with what mortification he must have reflected on the description, which, with sublimity and pathos almost poetic, he had drawn of the disinterested, the modest, the lowly views of his right honourable friend!

—This part of his conduct was, however, much more excusable than some other parts, particularly his reproaching the members of the Grenville family with being now in opposition against him after having, on a former occasion, called for him as the only man capable of retrieving the affairs of the country. I will say nothing of the lowness of this reproach. I will not attempt to describe the state to which it would induce us to suppose the person having recourse to it was sunk; because I hope, and I believe, that it arose from the suggestion of some of those mean persons, with too many of whom, unfortunately, Mr. Pitt is always surrounded. I will confine myself to a few remarks chiefly as to matter of fact. The mark of approbation I believe to have been sincerely bestowed. There is no reason to suppose, that Lord Grenville and his noble relations did not think what they said upon the subject; but, on the other hand, if they thought Mr. Pitt the *only* man capable of retrieving the affairs of the country, will any one say that they meant, or could mean, that Mr. Pitt was able to effect this object *alone*, or, which is the same thing, or rather worse, in company with persons, whom he as well as they had declared to be utterly unfit to be entrusted with power? It is evident they never meant any such thing, but only that, in order to bring about the wished for alteration, it was necessary for him to be again at the head of affairs, he being the person in whom the nation had most confidence. Nor must the time when this opinion was expressed be forgotten. It was in the month of November, 1802. And will any one undertake to show, that, since that time, Mr. Pitt's conduct had been such as could furnish them with no reason for changing their opinion? "My noble relation [Lord Temple] expresses his disapprobation of the present ministry," said Mr. Pitt, "because there are joined with me in it so many of the late administration. But, does my noble

"relation think, that, on this account I have forfeited the confidence of him and his friends? There was a time, *not very distant*, when, both in this and another place, a noble lord and his friends were so partial to me, that they declared, that my admission to power would remove the dangers of the country. I hope I have not, by concurring very frequently and acting very cordially with them and their friends, forfeited the good opinion they were then so partial as to express of me. I confess my surprize too, that after such public declarations concerning me, they so soon found themselves compelled to withhold their services from the public, on account of the exclusion of an hon. gent. (Mr. Fox), with whom they had, at least till lately, been so little accustomed to think or act in unison." To reproach them with thinking and acting in unison with Mr. Fox, at the very moment when his own justification with the public rested entirely upon the truth of the assertion, that he had used his utmost endeavours with the King to admit Mr. Fox into the cabinet, was certainly an instance of boldness that has seldom been surpassed, or even equalled, in an English House of Parliament. But, not to dwell upon this point; I answer, as to the other; no: you did not forfeit their good opinion by concurring very frequently and acting very cordially with them and their friends after the time when they expressed their approbation of you: by no means; but, was there nothing else, Sir, that you did, and that you left undone, after that time and before the time when you reproached them with inconsistency? Had they, think you, completely forgotten the intrigue for place in the months of March and April, 1803; could they have forgotten the subsequent speeches and votes upon Mr. Patten's motion, and upon other occasions? And had they not seen a specimen of your measures in your new character as a projector of means of defence? In short, had they not seen and heard quite enough to justify even a radical change of opinion? You have changed your opinion of persons, with whom you had previously been acquainted all your life, upon much slighter grounds. Lord Hawkesbury, indeed, is now restored to his former place in your estimation, but Mr. Addington seems to be banished for ever. Nor was the time so *little distant* as you would appear to infer. The time when the members of the Grenville family expressed their confidence in you, was in November, 1802, eighteen months before the date of your reproach, a longer time, give me leave to remind you, than elapsed

between the pompous eulogy and recommendation which you passed upon Mr. Addington and his colleagues in March, 1801, and the vote which you gave to keep censure if not impeachment hanging over their heads in June, 1802, embracing a space of less than fifteen months. Unless, therefore, Sir, you can push your system of exclusion so far as to include the right of changing opinions, as well as of being minister, your conduct, if you can justify it, will alone serve as an ample justification for that on account of which you thought proper to reproach your noble relations. But, there is another circumstance that seems to have been entirely overlooked. You not only reproach them with no longer thinking you the *only* man capable of restoring vigour to the proceedings of government, but also with having formed a political connexion with Mr. Fox and his friends, as if the implied inconsistency was palpably augmented by this latter circumstance. Why, Sir, this might have been the reason, at least, it was a very good one, for the change in their opinion as to this point. While there was little or no prospect of a junction with Mr. Fox and his party; while the House of Commons was split into so many divisions; while there was no hope (and in November, 1802, there was not the most distant hope) of a coalition comprising a considerable portion of all the great talents and character in the country, then they might think you the only man to whom the nation could look for assistance. But, after that state of things was completely done away, and that, too, without any co-operation on your part, for you did not begin to co-operate till it was evident to all the world that the object would be finally effected without your aid, if that aid was much longer withheld, many of your friends having already joined the opposition; after this your noble relations, however partial to you, and very partial they certainly were, though not more partial than sincere, might well change their opinion as to your being the only man capable of retrieving the affairs of the nation, there being now *other* men to whom they could look with hope and with confidence.—Mr. Pitt's defence of his six colleagues who made part of the last ministry, remains to be noticed. "With respect," said he in his speech of the 18th of June, "with respect to any differences of opinion which I may have had with the late administration, it will not, I think, be insisted, that they were of such a nature as to prevent us from acting together in the most cordial and satisfactory manner upon affairs in general. Of these my right hon. and no-

ble friends I uniformly spoke with the "greatest private friendship and private good opinion. It is still said, however, that there has not been a sufficient change in the ministry. But, surely, the right hon. gentleman below (Mr. Addington) must be satisfied that the change is sufficient, and that the present is really a new administration. Two Secretaries of State have been changed, Lord Melville had succeeded Lord St. Vincent at the Admiralty; and though I agree in every panegyric on Lord St. Vincent as a sea-man, I am convinced that Lord Melville will make a much more useful President at the Admiralty Board; and though it may not be fit to speak of myself, it surely will not be considered that it is *no* change that the office of First Lord of the Treasury, reckoned that which has a leading influence in the executive government, is now *held by me*. Few will doubt that a *very real* change has taken place." As Mr. Canning was present at this display of his right hon. friend's modesty and lowliness, one wonders not to have heard of his sinking into the earth, or, at least of some striking proof of his mortification and shame. But, to conclude the remarks of Mr. Pitt. "Much complaint," said he, "has been made of the *inefficiency* of these ministers; but, will it be asserted, that they are not equal to the duties of the stations they fill?" Now, for an answer to this question, I will not refer to the assertions of Mr. Pitt's friends and closest adherents; I will not appeal to the pamphlet in which Mr. Long, speaking from under the dictation of Mr. Pitt, characterized the late ministry and every part of it as destitute of talent and of energy; I will not cite the speeches of Mr. Canning, who, at the close of a description, loading, nay overcharging with marks of contempt those persons with whom he is now sitting on the Treasury Bench, cried out, as it were in a political phrensy: "away the measures and give us the men!" I will not attempt to make Mr. Pitt answerable for the expressions and opinions of his adherents with regard to the persons with whom he is now associated in power, I will appeal only to himself. Of his "*private* feelings or expressions" we can, of course, know nothing; but of his public declarations, as to the *utter incapacity* of those colleagues whose capacity he now defends, no one, who remembers his memorable speech upon Mr. Fox's motion of the 23d of April, can possibly be ignorant. "Will it," said he on the 18th of June, "be asserted that they are unequal to the duties of the stations they fill?" Let us,

by referring to the speech of the 23d of April, extract the answer from his own lips.

"After 12 months of war, preceded by a peace which, by the confession of ministers themselves, was a mere notice of that war, and a war in which they themselves have been exhausted in their skill; and yet, in the course of the whole 12 months, they have brought forward nothing in which there has not been a variety of *contradictions in the plans, repugnancies in the measures, and imbecility in the execution*. Nothing in which every step has not been marked by unnecessary delay; and at last the measure adopted amounting to a retraction of the principle upon which it was founded. . . . Is it upon the wisdom, the vigilance, the energy of these ministers that we are to rely, when we have seen that no one measure for the public service can they be truly said to have originated, while several they have retarded and enfeebled. . . .

"It is true that ministers, on this, as on former occasions, have given us a pompous enumeration of the force of the country" [enumerations always made by Lord Castlereagh]. "That spirit and exertion, however, belong to the country, and are *not* to be ascribed to the direction or the energy of the government. Indeed, if there be any men in this country who ought, upon this score, to separate national pride from any feeling of personal merit, it is the present ministers, who have had so little share in the national energy. No one good measure can they claim as *their own*; no one measure have they *improved or perfected*; very many they have *weakened* by their delays, and destroyed by their *incongruities*. Whatever, then, the spirit and zeal of a free and brave people may have been, ought fairly to be separated from the *tardiness, languor, and imbecility* of ministers in *every thing* of which they have assumed the direction." There were ten of these tardy, languid, inconsistent, imbecile gentlemen, six of whom are now in the cabinet with Mr. Pitt, and, it is with respect to these very persons that he now asks, who "will say that they are not equal to the duties of the stations they fill!"

To comment on such palpable tergiversation would be a waste of the small portion of room I have left; but I cannot refrain from asking, as to the "very obvious *change*," where we are to look for any marks of it? "It surely," says Mr. Pitt,

"will not be considered as *no change* that the office, lately held by the right hon. gent. is now held *by me*. Few will doubt, that a *very real change* has taken place here." And still fewer will have any doubt as to the feelings which language like this must have excited in the House of Commons. But, as to *measures*, what change can we discern? Mr. A. had given notice of his intention to augment the stamp duty to the amount of 800,000 l. Mr. Pitt contents himself with an estimate of 750,000 l. Mr. Pitt is to have *three* lotteries in the year: Mr. A. would probably have had only *two*. Mr. A. authorised the bank by an order of council to send forth dollars with the King's head on them; Mr. Pitt sanctions the measure by a law. Under Mr. A. small promissory notes were issued in Ireland instead of silver: Mr. Pitt extends and legalises such issues. Where, in all this, do we discern any effect of that *change*, which we are taught to regard as so important and striking? Had we seen public credit revive, indeed; had guineas returned to circulation; then we could have borne, with some degree of patience, to be reminded of the change. In the affair of the loyalty loan, a change has really taken place. Mr. A. had determined to proceed agreeably to the decision of the law-officers of the crown; whereas Mr. Pitt has determined to pass an act directly contrary to that opinion; which act is to be brought into Parliament by those very identical law-officers! There is one other measure in which the change is visible, and that is the military project bill; and this measure received the marked reprobation of a *great majority* of the members of Parliament of the country in which it was to operate. A project which, in every part of the country, has been received with disgust; a project containing much more of the vexatious, inefficient, and ludicrous than any thing proposed by the ministers whom the projector characterised by almost every phrase expressive of ignorance and imbecility.

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\* \* \* Several communications having, during the last week, been made to the Editor, upon the subject of the complaints of the JAMAICA PLANTERS, he thinks it right to notify, that some of them will be published in the next sheet of the Register; and that particular attention will be paid to a *correspondence with the Treasury*, which one gentleman has had the goodness to communicate.

"Then you filled the minds of the colonists with new jealousy and all sorts of apprehensions; then it was that they quarrelled with the old taxes as well as with the new; then it was, and not till then, that they questioned all the parts of your legislative power; and by the battery of such questions have shaken the solid structure of this empire to its deepest foundations."—BURKE'S Speech in the House of Commons, April 19, 1774.

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CORRESPONDENCE

WITH THE  
TREASURY,

RELATIVE TO THE DUTIES ON JAMAICA  
PRODUCE.

It will be seen that the following documents are principally from the pen of COLONEL HENDERSON, who is well known as a Jamaica planter. My former publication respecting the complaints of the Planters and the disputes between the Governor and the Legislative Assembly (see present Volume, p. 1), has induced several persons to communicate to me important matter upon those subjects. That part of these communications which I now lay before the public claim a preference on several accounts; but principally because it fully confirms, in substance, the statement which I thought it my duty to make relating to the intolerable hardship at this time experienced by the importers of rum.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT, HIS  
MAJESTY'S CHANCELLOR OF THE EX-  
CHEQUER, &c. &c. &c. *the Memorial of*  
COL. JOHN HENDERSON, *humbly sheweth:*

That your Memorialist humbly submits for your perusal the copies, or nearly so, of Letters No. 1, 2, 3, and 4, by your Memorialist, and also a copy of Resolutions, &c. by the West-India Committee of Planters and Merchants, as the same were submitted to your predecessor, [*These resolutions will be found in the Register, present volume, p. 17. It is very necessary to refer to them.*] the Right Hon. Henry Addington, &c. &c. upon the subject of West-India produce.—That upon a perusal of these papers, your penetrating eye, Sir, cannot pass unnoticed the distressing situation to which the West-India planters are reduced; and, you must forcibly see, that the real interest of this parent state, of which you are again the principal guardian, calls aloud for relief, and an exercise of due justice and tenderness to the planters of her valuable West-India colonies.—That your Memorialist's case individually is hard indeed.—The bond upon his rum, as stated in his letters, being nearly expired,

no demand, no chance of sales, but by submitting to the hard fate of being brought considerably in debt for the duty and expenses, are facts which he is ready to prove.

—That instead of obtaining even a temporary relief, as might have been expected by Mr. Addington's statement to the West-India Committee, respecting the use of rum by the navy and army, the price is worse and worse.—Your Memorialist, therefore, earnestly prays, that you would be pleased to signify, as to you shall seem meet, that his rum may be purchased at a fair price for the use of the navy and army; or, that the execution of the bond upon it may be suspended till relief can be obtained in some shape or other. And your Memorialist; as in duty bound, shall ever pray, &c. &c. &c.

—*Dated 9th June, 1804.*  
(No. I.) *To the Right Hon. Henry Addington,*  
*&c. &c. &c. Dated Dec. 9, 1803; and*  
*signed JOHN HENDERSON.*

SIR,—Though I class myself only amongst the inferior sugar planters of Jamaica, and feel very inadequate in point of abilities to elucidate the following subject respecting West-India produce, yet I feel not less interested in the issue which may result from it, for seeing no other immediate prospect of relief, I think it a duty I owe to myself, to my country, and to his Majesty's minister, to come forward on this particular occasion with a plain statement of facts, which it is imagined are incontrovertible, and notwithstanding, however, ineffectual the application of an individual may ultimately prove, the facts themselves must shew the absolute necessity there is for a very considerable reduction of the duties on rum, or an additional duty on other spirits, and the importance of a full investigation of this subject, which it is hoped may be taken up anew, and, that in a very serious manner by his Majesty's minister.—The charges and deductions on rum, per gallon, to which the planter is subjected, after completing the work of distillation, (exclusive of the capital which he has engaged, and the annual contingencies thereon, which are now enormous) amount

fully to what it will now sell for at the British market.—The British merchant can attest, that with a great many of the planters, the nett proceeds of their sugar and rum, since the late excessive duties have taken place, scarcely pay the amount of annual necessary supplies sent from England, exclusive of what must also be had in Jamaica, consequently many of them are daily sinking their capital, and are now driven to extreme distress, neither able to pay debts, interest, or even obtain a scanty support from their property.—I am impelled to stand forward as an individual, having myself at this time about one hundred puncheons of prime rum bonded at Leith, where the port charges are very moderate, and the market in general not inferior to any in this country.—This rum was insured at 20l. sterling per puncheon by my merchants, Messrs. Wm. Sibbald and Co. who considered that sum to be only a reasonable value under the various high contingencies upon the estate, and it now appears, from the merchant's letter, which I have ready to produce, that the rum will not sell for the duty and expense from the distillery, which are nearly as follows, viz.

Customs and excise per gallon	£0 11 1½
Freight	0 1 0
Insurance	0 0 4
Cooperage, land charges, and cellar rent	0 0 1½
Commissions	0 0 2
	<hr/>
	0 12 9

Puncheons, for which no allowance is made in Britain, wainage, wharfage, storage, cooperage, &c.

	0 1 0
Wastage and interest	0 0 9

\* £0 14 0

I think there is also an island duty.—In addition to these calculations there are casualties, viz. First: That a loss often happens which does not amount to a sum recoverable against the underwriters, on an

average of 10 per cent.—Secondly: That rum being adulterated and rendered under proof before it is lodged in the bonded warehouse (which sometimes happens, yet cannot be proved against the offender) the selling price is thereby reduced, whilst the

in a puncheon when it is sent from the estate *full proof*.

The late duty per gallon	0 11 1½
Add new duty 12 per cent. on the above	0 1 4½
War freight per gallon	0 1 0
Do. insurance, about	0 0 4
Cooperage, landing charges, and cellar rent, about	0 0 1½
Insurance against fire when bonded, and subject to all charges, about	0 0 0½
Brokerage in London, do.	0 0 0½
Commissions on gross sales 2½ per cent. subject to the duty, being paid by the purchaser, about	0 0 2½
Puncheons, for which no allowance is made in Britain, wainage, wharfage, storage, cooperage, &c. upon a moderate calculation of average, from the still to the shipment, which the planter must pay in Jamaica	0 1 0
Common wastage from the estate to the landing in Britain, and loss of interest to the planter, who must pay the merchant interest for his common advances, exclusive of loans, till he receives the nett proceeds, if any there be, at least	0 0 9
Sundry casualties, as mentioned in my letter, No. 1, exclusive of these calculations, at least	0 1 6

The duty and charges, &c. per gallon from the still only to the period of sale, when bonded, is at least

£0 16 6

100 puncheons of rum of 100 gallons each, at 10s. 6d. per gallon, to which the planter may be subjected before he obtains a sale for his rum, after completing the work of distillation, is 8,250l. —From this sum of 8,250l. for duties and charges, government receives for duties only 6,250l. —The charges from the still to the British market is 2,000l. —Credit by late sales at Liverpool, subject to the payment of duty only from 1s. to 1s. 6d. per gallon Jamaica rum,

\* Revision of calculations comprehending duties imposed since the above calculations were made.—In making a fair statement of the present duties, charges, and evident losses on rum, per gallon, after the work of distillation is complete, you must calculate upon a given sum to the planter, as a part of the expected return for his immense capital, and his present very high annual contingencies, say 20l. for every 100 gallons, which is commonly considered as being rather under the average quantity contained

duty and all other charges, except the commission, remain the same. Thirdly: That the rum being bonded, in the hope of obtaining a saving price, there is a further loss of wastage, storage, interest, and the duties which are charged upon the full quantity first lodged in the King's stores, though that quantity is frequently very considerably reduced before it is sold; and if the bond has expired before the sale, or when re-gauged, it becomes a heavy loss upon the planter. Insurance against fire, &c. during that time ought also to be calculated. Fourthly: When the rum is above hydrometer proof it pays 10s. 4½d. per gallon duty for every gallon of strength over proof, and though under proof from causes before mentioned, yet it pays full duty. Fifthly: British spirits, say "good whiskey," at "strength 10 per cent. under hydrometer proof," sells now at 6s. per gallon, which "clearly proves that the duty, &c. on British spirits bear no proportion to that on "rum." How the British distillers can afford to sell at this price may be a matter of surprise, but such is the fact, that they do sell for about one-third of what rum can be sold at, upon a fair calculation.—I cannot omit observing also, that the additional duty upon sugars of inferior quality, equal to those of the first quality is severely felt; but as I understand that his Majesty's minister has been pleased to signify that he would take that grievance under consideration, I think it unnecessary to enlarge upon it.—It is also felt as a very great hardship to pay duty on 15 lb. of sugar per cask more than can be charged to the purchaser; this arises by the 7 lb. of draught which is withdrawn by the late act, and 8 lb. for wastage, which has always been the practice to allow the purchaser, and cannot be withdrawn from him, because even with these allowances, the sugar, nine times out of ten, falls short very much indeed of the nett weight on which duties are paid.—This grievance must have been overlooked,

say 1s. 6d. upon 100 puncheons reduced to 100 gallons each, 750l.—Balance for which the planter remains in debt, 1250l.—Add the planter's loss of the given sum 20l. per puncheon of 110 gallons, 2,000l.—Total loss to the planter, 3,250l. It has been observed, that the rum market in London is from 3s. to 3s. 9d. per gallon. Be it so, and that would only reduce the loss in part, *but there is no demand*; and, as the bonds become due, the planter *must* submit to a similar fate with his neighbour at Liverpool.

as his Majesty's minister could never have meant that such an injustice should have been introduced into his system of finance, and upon that ground I am clearly of opinion, that the planter's real situation in many respects has either been misrepresented, or not clearly stated to his Majesty's minister, because the ruinous inference to be drawn from these plain facts are too obvious to be erased.—To these grievances allow me to add the losses to which the planter is subjected by frequent decrease of negroes and cattle, from complaints incident to the island, and by various other casualties, the wasteful visitation of hurricanes, &c. &c. Then let it be inquired how the planter can possibly maintain his credit, or carry on the culture of his estate.—If, instead of paying the charges of his estate by nett proceeds on his rum, which is always calculated upon, he is brought in debt by the sales of this article after it arrives in Britain, is it any wonder that the planter should find himself deeply aggrieved? Burdened with excessive duties, which actually precludes him not only from profit, but from the means of keeping up his estate without waste; pressed by his creditors for advances on which many cannot pay the interest, consequently refused new loans, though his interest is actually nearly connected with that of the British merchants, who amongst other things are justly alarmed by the example of independence in a neighbouring island. How hard is his situation? Frightful as this picture of the planter's situation may appear (though I admit of exceptions amongst the very wealthy) it is a faithful one, and unless their grievances meets with some effectual redress, the consequence must appear to the least discerning eye, ruinous to the colonies and highly injurious to the real interests of this country.—There is an ultimate point, beyond which nothing can be carried, and it is absolutely necessary that the planter, after so much patience and long sufferings, should now claim redress from the load under which he at present groans, and that in the most unequivocal manner; justice, sound policy, and the real interest of Great Britain, call aloud for the ear of his Majesty's minister; and if that should be withheld, necessity will compel the planter to seek for some new mode of relief, in which case I think it incumbent upon me to point out a measure which may necessarily ensue; a measure which I earnestly pray that the attention of his Majesty's minister, and lenity of the British merchant, may prevent. Were unanimity to prevail, the planters might determine not

to ship any produce on their own account, but dispose of it on the spot to the agents of the British merchants whose ships must be employed, and who themselves, aided by the consumers, may and can fight the battle of excessive duties, when it comes within the reach of the Navigation Act, as it is alleged, but erroneously so, the consumer pays all.—By this mode, and putting only a very moderate value on their produce, it would soon find its level; the planters would, in course, as usual, take their supplies of British manufactures in part of payment; apply part in discharge of British and other debts, and receive a part in money, or bills of exchange, for their own support.

—Such a plan might be carried into effect without breaking faith, more than what the planters' unfortunate situation would compel them to, with the mercantile interest of this country, to whom, under the present system, the planters cannot do justice in discharging their debts; and also, without diminishing a strict adherence to the real interests of our country, and our valuable constitution, or that loyalty and attachment which I do, and I trust every other planter does, unfeignedly bear for the best of Sovereigns.

#### Memorandum.

Mr. Addington was pleased to acknowledge the receipt of this, my first letter, which was afterwards sent to Mr. Vansittart of the Treasury, to whom I was referred, with whom I had some meetings, and remarks were made apparently not unfavourable to the planter, which I communicated to our agent, Edm. P. Lyon, Esq. &c. But as a general application from the planters and merchants to a similar, and I trusted, to a more forcible effect, did not take place, as was expected, I felt myself compelled to persevere individually, and to explain in manner and form, as will appear by the copies of my letters No. 2 and 3.

(No. II.) *To Mr. Vansittart, Esq. Treasury.*

Dated March 1, 1804, and signed JOHN HENDERSON.

SIR,—In consequence of what passed when I was favoured by a meeting on the subject of my letter respecting West-India produce, I beg leave to submit a few additional observations for your consideration.

—I admit, that upon the first view the difference between 8s. 6d. per gallon duty on English spirits, and 11s. 1 d. per gallon duty on rum, as you observed, does not appear enormous: but the point in difference by no means rests upon that statement only, as will appear by the following remarks.

—1st. Because the capital engaged in making rum is not only much more propor-

tionally extensive, but also much more hazardous than that which is required for distilling British spirits. 2d. When British spirits are once from the still, they are immediately, and upon a trifling expense, at market; whereas rum brought to the British market is, upon a fair and full calculation, attended with an additional expense, and loss, equal to about 4s. per gallon, which makes a difference of about 6s. 6d. per gallon against rum, including duty and charges from the still only; this, I trust, will be a fair matter for consideration when the question of duty shall be fully considered. 3d. Here I do not pledge myself, but if I have been rightly informed, "the profits on British spirits, and the demand, have, of late years, been so great, that many have taken up the business very extensively indeed, perhaps, even to exceed the consumption;" partly from that cause, and partly from the great temptation for smuggling both British and Foreign spirits, together with the force of habit, (as the Spaniards prefer rancid butter in the West-Indies, where we *prefer it sweet*,) the use of rum, owing to the difference of price, by high duty and other unavoidable charges, is almost given up, and inferior spirits preferred. In answer,—I cannot hazard an opinion respecting a fair line to be drawn between the English and Scotch distilleries, however, I am inclined to think, that the landed interest, say the Scotch farmer, with whom I have had more particular opportunities of being acquainted, does not benefit more, if so much, as the English, by reason of the great consumption of grain used, and by the great extent to which British spirits are distilled and used. The middle man and smuggler seem to reap the benefit, *and not the landed interest*.—That the use of malt liquor, upon a full and fair investigation, would be found preferable not only to increase the revenue eventually, but also be found beneficial in every other point of view, I think, can be clearly demonstrated. The distillation of British spirits, I understand, is by no means confined to malted grain; government is defrauded by the vast number of private stills which are daily at work; in short, smuggling is carried on to such an extent, that it will require a very exemplary punishment before it can be checked or abolished.—As to the 15lb. of sugar which I mentioned in my letter, I can only add, that trifling as it may appear, it will always be conceived to be an act of injustice to pay duty on that which we have not to sell, and which, I am fully persuaded, was not originally so intended, and as you, Sir, no doubt

mean that your system of finance should be founded upon justice, I fully hope, that trifling as it may seem, you will not only remove that evil, but also direct that a proper allowance should hereafter be made at weighing, as it is a well known fact, that even the best of sugar, upon lying a moderate time for sale, after the movement and weighing immediately at landing, must suffer a considerable diminution of weight, by draining, before it can be sold.—I am sorry to add, that in course of conversation I have found several of the gentlemen interested in this business, who admit the facts in my statements on this subject, and who allow, that without a redress of these grievances, unavoidable ruin must attend many, yet they seem hopeless as to the effect of even a general application to his Majesty's minister; because, say they, our applications of late upon that subject have had no serious attention paid to them. However, Sir, though a general application would be much more desirable, because it would undoubtedly have more force, yet such reasoning shall not deter me, because I am of opinion that his Majesty's present minister will *listen to facts* and redress *real grievances*, whether the application comes from a body collectively, or from an individual, and I flatter myself with the hope, that my opinion in this instance will soon be verified to the world.—I wrote to the gentleman whom I mentioned, respecting a plan for adopting the *ad valorem* duty, &c. and I have received for answer, that as he will have occasion to wait on you very soon upon other business, he will take the same opportunity of entering upon that business.

(No. III.) *To N. Vansittart, Esq. Treasury,*  
*Dated April 26, 1804, and signed* JOHN  
 HENDERSON.

SIR,—In consequence of what passed when I was last favoured with an audience, and having been unfortunate in not seeing you on my late calls at the Treasury, I beg leave through you, Sir, again to solicit the attention of his Majesty's minister upon the subject of West India produce.—That the motives by which I have been actuated thus to trouble you individually, may be clearly understood, I beg leave to observe, that my first letter upon that subject, was submitted at a period when there was no prospect of an early meeting of the West India planters and merchants; at a period when there was no agent for the Island of Jamaica to consult with, or to bring the business forward with that force and ability which the magnitude of the grievance required; at a period calculated to give full time for inquiry, touch-

ing the facts complained of; before the system of finance for this year could have been decided upon; and at a period when my own particular case loudly called for redress, having then had a quantity of rum on the point of being sold; which, under the pressure of duties, would have brought me in debt, instead of yielding about the sum of 2000*l.* as an adequate return for my capital, and actually for my support. Thus circumstanced I stopped the sale, in hopes that through my representations I should obtain relief; but now, as the bond is nearly expired, and no relief is signified to be granted, the same cause of grievance still exists, and the same reasons operate for my again addressing you.—I have had communications respecting a further remonstrance from the North, upon the subject of rum and British spirits, and the result is, that "I still find that a great proportion of the inhabitants are supplied so amply and so exceedingly cheap by spirits from the smuggled stills, that the use of rum is almost suspended, and meant so to be, whilst that mode of supply in part, and also the supply from entered distilleries can be obtained upon the present low terms, compared with the unavoidable high price of rum, in consequence of the high duties upon it." As to the question of *ad valorem* duties, I understand that the gentleman whom I mentioned has by this time submitted his plan for your consideration; however, I find that he does not seem inclined to have the plan adopted at which you hinted, for selling sugars by public auction, because, as he observes, that the present mode is in fact a public sale. I am aware, I may be told, that if the grievances of which I complain are of magnitude, an application would have been made long ago by a general meeting of the West India planters and merchants. To this I answer, that many meetings for this, and similar causes have been held, particularly one on the 24th of June, 1803, when their resolutions clearly evinced the necessity for adopting the *ad valorem* principle, and also, exhibited the consequences that must ultimately follow from excessive duties on rum; but these representations on this question having slept at the Treasury ever since that period, it appears to be considered by many as a proof that the planters' distress, by whatever mode it may be represented, seems not to attract the attention of his Majesty's minister, and many are of opinion, that farther similar applications will not produce relief. However, Sir, as I observed in a former letter, such reasoning must not prevent my statement of the facts;

and, if I am, by the act of his Majesty's minister to be reduced to beggary, or a state of starvation, as I cannot yet suppose it to be an intentional act, I am determined it shall not be owing to want of my giving him previous information with regard to this matter. —As to the reduction of duties, I am aware of the existing idea that these are not times for reducing them, or by any means lessening the revenue. In answer, I freely admit that these are times when the planter, in conformity with other subjects, ought to contribute freely and largely to support the exigencies of government. Yet, Sir, as I formerly hinted, there is an ultimate point beyond which the planter's grievance cannot patiently be endured. It is a stubborn fact, that the planter's *all* is now at stake, and if his Majesty's ministers shall determine against every mode of relief, is it to be wondered at if despair should ensue, and consequences follow thereupon highly injurious to the real interest of this country? If I am rightly informed, there are gentlemen in office who do not hesitate to declare, "that the West India colonies (say Jamaica) does not fairly contribute to the general expense of government, and therefore, is not entitled to an equally free protection with this country, or to that effect." The consequence is, that such observations from gentlemen high in power, has an improper influence on the minds of many, who erroneously suppose that the planters are rolling in riches, and cannot be loaded too heavily with taxes and duties. Now, Sir, fairly to meet such declarations involves two great questions, which seem not to be fully understood. —The first is, whether or not the planters of Jamaica, (the produce of whose industry, whose wealth and riches, whatever they may be, being ultimately lodged in the bosom of this country) are or are not entitled to an equally free and full protection with British-born subjects in this country? I answer, that they are entitled to an equally free and full protection, in terms of what must be deemed the modern *magna charta* of Jamaica. —That his Majesty, King Charles the Second, by his Royal Proclamation for encouraging planters in Jamaica and the West Indies, given at Whitehall the 14th December in the thirteenth year of his reign, did publish and declare, "that all children of his Majesty's free born subjects of England, to be born in Jamaica, shall, from their respective births, be reputed to be, and shall be free denizens of England, and shall have the same privileges, to all intents and purposes, as his

" Majesty's free-born subjects of England." —The settlers in Jamaica do thereupon apprehend, that the laws of England are their birth right, and that they have just the same legal right to the protection of their freeholds as the people of England have to theirs, and to the framing their internal laws by a governor, council, and assembly, exactly in imitation of the King, Lords, and Commons. That the revenue act, which was passed in the year 1728, having been wisely, voluntarily, and for a valuable consideration ratified by the Crown, doth amount to a fair, honest, and mutual contract between the King and People, in virtue of which, all the privileges, immunities, freeholds, and possessions of the people of Jamaica, and all the incidents of every of the said immunities, freeholds, and possessions, were of new declared, and by his Majesty ratified and expressly confirmed, and for him, his heirs, and successors for ever, and to all intents and purposes made perpetual. —This being an act for granting a growing revenue to his Majesty, his heirs, and successors, and for reviving and perpetuating the acts and laws of that island, is, in truth, the modern *magna charta* of Jamaica. It is a charter of confirmation which is not subject to the same or the like exceptions as were taken to the *magna charta* of England, when it was suggested that the old charter could be vacated upon the heads of infancy and duress. (See Lord Coke's Proem to the second Part of his Institutes.) Whereas the Jamaica charter is grounded on a plenary consent, proceeding from a valuable and growing consideration, and was voluntarily confirmed by his Majesty in the maturity of his judgment, as well as in the ripeness of his years; it was neither extorted by force or obtained by fraud, and therefore, all their liberties, immunities, privileges, and possessions enjoyed under that charter are possessed *juxta causâ precedente*. In short, it is very plain and clear from the laws of our mother country, and the confirmed laws of Jamaica, that all the old and valuable laws in England are truly the birth-right of the people of that island; and it hath been adjudged in Westminster Hall, that those brave Britons, who made the conquest of Jamaica, can never be supposed to have forfeited the concessions of the Crown, or the benefit of the laws of their own country, by adding a valuable jewel to the former, and by opening a new fountain of trade and riches to the latter. —The second is, whether or not the planters of Jamaica, under the circumstances of a colony, do or do not, by various ways, contribute a full pro-

portion of their income, towards the general support of government? I answer, that the planters of Jamaica do contribute more than a full proportion of their income to the general expense of the empire. This is a position that will admit of easy proof, for many of the planters, so far from even deriving a scanty support from their estates, are by excessive duties, &c. daily sinking their capital, and this is unfortunately for them too palpable a truth to require demonstration.—If these facts are unknown to the administrative government, as they seem to be, and if my statements can make no impression, or if they can have but little weight, let the question be brought fairly to issue, and then the planters will have an opportunity of producing such evidence in support of their assertions, as will carry conviction to every unprejudiced mind. I have also heard that it has been observed, “the planters have not the means of obtaining relief, but by the act of his Majesty’s ministers, in which case, be their bed hard or soft, they must lie thereupon.” In answer, I freely admit the fact, yet, I shall be bold to remark, that neither their condition, the general tenor of their conduct, nor the pressure of the times, can justify an exercise of such severity against them. I remember well the American war; I remember when ideas were afloat, and industriously circulated, tending to show that North and South America, and the West India Islands united, would form a government of great strength, possessing great wealth, and would furnish immense resources for trade with all the world; I remember being one of those who contributed to suppress such circulating ideas, and with the honest loyal planters and inhabitants, spurned and rejected them; I remember the period when the inhabitants of South America were ripe for shaking off their yoke, and had our expedition for the Lake Nicaragua at that time been well digested, as government meant to assist them, it would have been carried into effect.—It is with all due loyalty and respect, that I submit these facts for consideration, which I do, for the good of this my native country; for the good of my brother planters in the West Indies, and that of my own interest *united with both*; because, I clearly foresee what must eventually take place, unless relief be obtained in some shape or other.—My case is only similar to that of many other unfortunate but loyal planters, who are anxiously looking up to his Majesty’s ministers for speedy relief, at a moment when Spain stares those of them in the face who are attached to their mother country, and to his

Majesty’s person and government, and which they have on many occasions zealously demonstrated. They have been ever ready to contribute their proportion to the exigencies of government, feeling equally entitled with British-born subjects to every privilege and protection; and they are daily, by their hard earned means, producing a growing and immense revenue to his Majesty’s government.—I earnestly solicit the favour of an answer, whether in favour of, or against relief, that I may the better prepare my family for their reduced situation.

*Memorandum by Col. Henderson.*

I am informed, since writing the above, that about 300 puncheons of rum were lately sold at Liverpool, subject to the payment of the duty only, at from 1s. to 1s. 6d. per gallon, Jamaica, and 6d. per gallon for Leeward Island rum; so that by my former calculation, which stands uncontroverted, the unfortunate owners in addition to the loss of the whole return expected from rum for their capital, and annual contingencies, they will suffer also a loss of about 2s. 6d. per gallon, to make up the charges from the still only. I did not see the proceedings of the Assembly in Jamaica for 1803, respecting the French prisoners, &c. nor the pointed calculations of Simon Taylor, Esq. till this 1st day of May, 1804; and on the same day, I observed by the proceedings of the House of Commons, that the duty on rum would now be 12s. 6d. per gallon, and on sugar 27s. per cwt. The old argument is erroneously kept up; that the consumer pays all notwithstanding that rum is scarcely used, and the consumption of sugar from the old British Islands in this country, for last year, I am informed, is but little more than half of what it was in 1801.

(No. IV.) *Copy of a Letter from Edmund P. Lyon, Esq. Agent for the Island of Jamaica, to Col. Henderson, dated May 29 1804.*

DEAR SIR, —I received your letter yesterday evening, and now enclose, for your perusal, my copy of the resolutions of the standing committee on the subject of the late additional duties on sugar. When the committee waited on Mr. Addington, he expressed his conviction that the tax would fall on the consumer, and seemed to adhere to that notion, though we adduced reasons to the contrary. He told us that the additional duties would continue to compose part of the taxes which it was necessary to impose, and promised that he would, individually, as a member of Parliament, endeavour, by proper regulations, to encourage the exportation of the surplus of sugar beyond the

home consumption. As to rum, he informed us that government had endeavoured to promote the consumption of it, by directing, in certain instances to which he alluded, that it should be used by the army and the navy. I shall be extremely happy to hear that any thing is likely to be done by which the planter shall be relieved.

(No. V.) *Answer to Memorial, dated Treasury Chambers, June 23, 1804, and signed by W. STURGES POURNE.*

SIR,—Having laid before the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, your memorial of the 9th inst. praying that your rum may be purchased at a fair price for the use of the navy or army. Or that the execution of the bond upon it may be suspended till relief can be obtained. I am commanded by their lordships to acquaint you, that upon consideration of all the circumstances stated in your application, my lords cannot comply with your request.

(No. VI.) *Memorandum by Col. Henderson.*

Col. Henderson having been informed that applications for relief, upon the subject of duties on West India produce, had also been made from Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow, he waited on Mr. Bourne at the Treasury, on the 27th June, 1804, and begged to know if these applications had met with the same fate as his memorial. Answer. "They did. Your memorial was laid before the Lords of Council for Trade; and also, the Lords of the Treasury, who were of opinion that they had not power for granting relief." Col. Henderson then asked, if hope might be entertained, that his Majesty's ministers had in contemplation any plan for bringing about relief.—Answer.—"I have not heard of any such plan being in contemplation." Or words to that effect.

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

*Extract from the Minutes of the Assembly of Jamaica, Dec. 17, 1803, relative to the French Prisoners brought thither from St. Domingo.*

*Message brought by the Governor's Secretary.*—Mr. Speaker, I am commanded by his Honour the Lieutenant Governor to inform the House, that he has communicated with Sir Thomas Duckworth, on the subject of the number of prisoners of war now in this Island; and, as his Honour finds that the Admiral's instructions strictly enjoin him not to hire vessels for the purpose of sending prisoners to Europe, but to avail himself from time to time of the opportunities which may offer, in vessels employed in the service

of government, or in his Majesty's ships of war. His Honour is induced to submit to the most serious considerations of the House, the propriety of their adopting some means of relieving the Island from its present state of alarm.—His Honour has the satisfaction to add, that the Admiral has expressed his readiness to afford any facility in his power, by employing his Majesty's artificers in caulking and preparing the vessels for sea, and furnishing provisions and water at the expense of his Majesty's government.—The probable expense of shipping for three thousand prisoners of war in carts to France, is estimated at 50,000*l.* sterling; but, should the House be of opinion, that it would be more eligible to send off all the commissioned officers, a measure which his Honour cannot too strongly recommend, as the Admiral's instructions restrict him from permitting them to return to France; the expense of providing accommodations for the officers is estimated at 40,000*l.* sterling.

*Ordered.* That the above report and two messages be referred to the committee of the whole House, to inquire into, and take further into consideration the state of the Island.

*Resolution, Dec. 21, 1803.*—To send a message to his Honour the Lieutenant Governor, acquainting him, that although there is great cause for apprehension and alarm, in having a very large body of prisoners in the Island, yet the House cannot undertake, for any part of the expense of sending prisoners of war off the Island; and, the House beg leave to request that his Honour will use all means that may be in his power for the speedy removal from the Island of all prisoners of war now here.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**JAMAICA COMPLAINTS.**—The former part of this sheet the reader will find occupied with a correspondence relative to this subject. That the statements in this correspondence are correct few persons can doubt, and, admitting them to be so, no one, it is to be supposed, will deny that the particular case complained of is very hard. Indeed it is evident some redress become absolutely necessary. The system of taxation has in this respect been carried beyond all endurance: the bow has been strained till it must break if not speedily relaxed. For other reasons, however, to be the opinion of government. Not only do they appear to be resolved to persist in the enormous custom-house impositions, but also to burden the colony with the expenses necessary to its security. If there wanted any proof

of this their intention it would be found in the recent attempt to make the Assembly furnish the means of sending to Europe the French prisoners lately carried into Jamaica from St. Domingo, than which a request more contrary to justice and to reason cannot be conceived.—After the reader has perused the minute of the Assembly, which he will find in a preceding page of this sheet, and which contains the Governor's message and the Assembly's answer, he should be informed, that the number of prisoners was soon after doubled; so that, if the Assembly had consented to the request made to them, the Island would have been put to an expense of at least 100,000*l.* according to the estimate of the Governor himself; and who is there that does not know how far such estimates always fall short of the final amount. It is probable the expense would have amounted to nearly, if not quite, 200,000*l.* and this the people of Jamaica were to pay as a sort of fee for the favour of having imminent danger removed from them; danger in the producing of which neither they nor their representatives had had any concern. The prisoners amounted, at last, to about *eight or nine thousand*, at a moment when the British troops in the Island were considerably short of *four thousand*. If the Admiral knew that he could not depart from his orders; if he dared not take upon himself to engage vessels for the purpose of sending home these prisoners, why did he take them from St. Domingo? That, in assisting to re-establish "the hideous black empire," he should imagine he was doing a service acceptable to Mr. Addington and his colleagues must be wonderful to all those who recollect the grounds on which those gentlemen justified the permission they gave the Consul to send out his fleet and army; but, at any rate, if the Admiral thought it right to co-operate with Dessalines and his comrades, there could be no reason why the people of Jamaica should pay for it; there could be no reason why they should be called upon exclusively to defray the expense of an expedition undertaken for the general interest of the empire. The unreasonableness of such a demand upon them was evident; but it was thought, perhaps, as in the case of the black slave regiments in 1793, that terror would supply the place of reason and of justice. Had the coffers of the Assembly been full, it is probable they would have given way; but, if they had been willing, they were, as they assert, unable.—Whether ships have been sent out to bring the prisoners to Europe, or not, is not certain.

The public have, however, been recently informed of a conspiracy having been detected, from which it appeared, that a rising of the prisoners was to have taken place, and that they were to have been aided by other French and some Spaniards who were to come over from Cuba. This intelligence may have been premature, but it is by no means improbable; and, if any unfortunate strokes should fall upon Jamaica from the cause here spoken of, the nation will find but a poor compensation in any punishment that can be inflicted upon those, to whose folly or wickedness the calamity must be attributed.\*

**CORN LAWS.**—Another of these laws is now passing, or has just passed. It were sincerely and devoutly to be wished, that conjugal love always burnt with as steady a flame as the love of law-giving! About three or four years ago law upon law came forth to prevent the exportation and to lower the price of bread corn; and now we have begun to make laws to encourage what we then prohibited. If no law had ever been passed upon the subject, and if courts of justice had never meddled with the matter, the scarcity would not have been nearly so severely felt as it was; and the plenty would not now have been swelled to a superabundance, not so alarming, indeed, to the country, as the scarcity was, but injurious to it, and, eventually may be productive of very bad consequences. The restriction as to exportation is taken off, too, at a wrong time. There is no telling, as yet, what will be the produce of the next harvest. We have had four dry summers successively; five successively have not been known in this country, within the memory of the oldest man living; and if we should now have a harvest like that of 1799, the quartern loaf may yet sell for a shilling before Christmas. If that should happen to be the case, will it not be said with truth, that Mr. Addington is the luckiest of mortals! Just as the reins of power were put into his feeble hands, plenty began to return: the next harvest favoured by the seasons as well as by the extraordinary exertions in agriculture occasioned by the high prices, was the most abundant ever known in England. The

\* It may be necessary to refer here to the several parts of the Register, where the documents and observations relating to the disputes between the Government and the Assembly of Jamaica are to be found; to wit; Vol. II. p. 254, 265, 313, and 328. Vol. V. p. 397, 403, 771, and 796. Vol. VI. p. 1 and 65.

produce of this harvest began to come to market, just as his measure of peace was concluded. *He* it was, therefore, that gave the country "peace and plenty;" and thus this most dangerous fallacy got possession of the minds of the people. Plenty seems now to have increased till it ought to go no farther; till, in fact, it is, in the opinion of the legislature become an evil; and, in order to lessen it, we are to pay, out of the taxes raised upon us, a bounty for sending corn out of the country. This seems, therefore, to be a proper time to look back upon the progress of this plenty, and to see how it has been affected by the opposite states of *peace* and *war*, as exhibited in the price of the quartern loaf.

1802. 1st January.... 1s. Old.

February..... 1 0

March..... 10 1

April..... 11 1

May..... 9 1

June..... 10

July..... 10

August..... 10 1

September..... 10

October..... 10

November..... 10

December..... 9 1

PEACE.

1803.

January..... 9 1

February..... 9 1

March..... 9

April..... 9 1

May..... 9

June..... 9 1

July..... 9 1

August..... 9 1

September..... 10

October..... 10

November..... 10

December..... 9 1

WAR.

1804.

January..... 9 1

February..... 9

March..... 8 1

April..... 8 1

May..... 8 1

June..... 8 1

July..... 5 1

How silly, then, how stupid, was the cry of "*peace and a large loaf!*" And how scanty must have been the sense, or how abundant the baseness, of those persons, who, calling themselves gentlemen, encouraged that cry! It was indeed the lowest of all political tricks: the most shameful means of sheltering themselves from public indignation: an appeal to prejudice, to ignorance, to selfishness, to laziness, and to gluttony, wherever they were to be found.

FOSTER ON PAPER CURRENCY.—The subject of Irish paper currency was treated

of in the preceding sheet, p. 46, where some quotations were made from an excellent work of Mr. Parnell. The same subject has been ably discussed in a still more recent publication entitled "An Essay on Commercial Exchanges, &c. &c." by Mr. J. L. Foster, a nephew, it appears, of the present Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer. This, as far as I am able to judge is, as to the far greater part of it, a very valuable addition to the works relating to the science of which it treats. Like the work of Mr. Parnell, it discovers great profundity of thought as well as a very extensive acquaintance with facts. If Ireland be doomed to ruin from financial errors, it will not be for want of knowledge amongst Irishmen.—From the title of Mr. Foster's work it will naturally be concluded, that it does not confine itself to the circumstances relating to the exchange between Great Britain and Ireland; but, the only part of it that I think it necessary particularly to notice upon this occasion is that which comes to the support of what has, at different times, been advanced upon that subject in the Register, earnestly recommending the whole work to the perusal of the reader.—In noticing the facts stated by Mr. Parnell (see Register, p. 50) relative to the exchange between Dublin and Belfast, between London and Belfast, and between London and Dublin, I should have applied them to establish the fact of *a real depreciation of the English bank paper* as well as the Irish. This Mr. Foster has done. Having previously proved that the real exchange, that is to say the exchange independent of all considerations as to the present value of paper in either country, is in favour of Ireland, he proceeds, in a subsequent part of his book, as follows. "It is evident that if the Bank of England notes have suffered no depreciation, and that the real exchange between England and Ireland is at par, the premium paid for guineas in Dublin must equal the unfavourableness of the nominal exchange. "But if the Bank of England notes are depreciated and the real exchange is at par, the premium paid for guineas in Dublin must equal the unfavourableness of the nominal exchange *plus* the depreciation of English paper; for it must be recollected that the exchange of England against Dublin is not of Irish paper against gold, but against English paper." He then inserts a table showing the amount of premiums paid for gold in Dublin, from January, 1803 to March last; as also the rate of the nominal exchange (that is of English against Irish bank notes) during the same period; and, in a third column, he shows

the exchange between English bank notes and Irish gold. "From this table," says he, "it will appear, that the depreciation of English bank notes first produced a sensible effect about the month of September last; for, adding the premium on gold to the real exchange and subtracting the nominal exchange  $8 \div 1 = 6\frac{1}{2} = 2\frac{1}{2}$ , the depreciation of English paper. If such a result had appeared only in that month, we might seek for some other cause of the sudden fluctuation; but it has, on the contrary, continued permanent since that time: a permanent effect must be referred to a permanent cause." The progress of the depreciation of English paper is stated to be as follows. 1803, Sep.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , Oct.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , Nov.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , Dec.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ ; 1804, Jan.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , Feb.  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , March  $3\frac{1}{2}$ . It is remarkable that the result of this calculation agrees with the fact mentioned by Mr. Burrowes before the select committee on Irish exchange, that  $2\frac{1}{2}$  is now paid in London to procure gold in exchange for Bank of England notes. It agrees also with the excess of the market price above the mint price of gold, which gives a depreciation of somewhat less than three per centum. "Thus also," continues Mr. Foster, "it will be easy to account for the exchange of London having been of late so much in favour of Belfast, sometimes even 3 per centum; for this was an exchange of gold against bank of England paper; and the reader will observe, that in October, 1803 (that is the month after the depreciation of English paper first appears to have been sensibly felt), the exchange became suddenly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per centum in favour of Belfast; and it is remarkable, that it has since continued in favour of Belfast, nearly to the same amount that the English paper appears to have been depreciated."—Leaving this statement to produce the conviction which can scarcely fail to follow a perusal of it, I beg leave to remind those who have long been my readers, of the censure and abuse that have been heaped upon me by the hirelings of government, for having insisted, that the work of depreciation had begun upon English bank paper. This assertion is now openly and unequivocally made by Mr. Foster. It has recently been half made by others; but this gentleman makes it in so many words; and I shall be much deceived if any Treasury pen will be drawn forth for the purpose of contradicting him.—The fact of depreciation being asserted by Mr. Foster, let people now apply to him to know, "how the paper can possibly be depreciated while a one pound note and a shilling will buy as much bread

"as a guinea, and will indeed exchange for a guinea." This mystery I endeavoured to explain in the Register Vol. V. p. 572: perhaps he will be more successful. The truth is, however, that they are, upon this subject, to be instructed only by their feelings. They must suffer as the people in Ireland have, and yet do, before they will learn to despise the jugglers by whose tricks they are now deceived and amused: clowns never form a just opinion of the mountebank till they are half killed by the poisonous operation of his drugs. Thus I should say, that the nation is not yet sick enough: it must be much sicker before it will be well. Precisely how much longer it will require to bring our paper to the same state as that of Ireland is in it would be difficult to say. Much will depend upon the events of the war. But, it would be foolish not to recollect, that the premium paid for gold in Dublin has, since January, 1803, risen from 3 to 10 per centum. It is not much more than a year and a half since the work of open depreciation began in Ireland. It started with a premium of 3 per centum for gold; and, let it be remembered, that it is a fact proved before a committee of the House of Commons, that a premium of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per centum is already given for gold in England! It would be very silly not to keep these things in our minds, though I by no means imagine that English depreciation will make such rapid advances as that of Ireland has made; unless an invasion should take place, or be seriously regarded as being very near at hand. In that case indeed the fall of the paper may be very sudden, and great wisdom as well as energy will be required to provide against the evils that may arise from that fall. A bold project "for paying off the whole of the national debt;" or for any other purpose of a dashing nature, would have nearly a similar effect upon the paper. The state of things is so ticklish, the fabric is so very frail, that it would be madness to calculate upon its resisting a serious shock of any kind. All but fools and gambling speculators will, therefore, be somewhat upon their guard: they will, as fast as they can, convert their property into things of a more solid nature; and, as to those who take no such precaution, it is very little matter whether they have any property or not.—Before I dismiss this topic I cannot but indulge my vanity so far as to notice the flattering distinction which Mr. Foster has made between me and others, who have written upon the subject of paper currency, and whose opinions and words he has occasionally cited or referred to. Mr. Thornton, Lord King, and

several others, not omitting even the Edinburgh Reviewers, he has carefully named at the bottom of the page; but from me he takes whole passages, and indeed the very foundation of his doctrine of depreciation,

Register, Vol. V. p. 758.

"It is not [said a correspondent] as a dollar that it now appears at 5s. but as a *token* which the bank has engaged to repay at that price, or in other words as a *promissory note of the bank*." Well, if this be the case, the bank might have affixed any nominal value to the dollar; and, indeed, this C. B. asserts. "By using the same means," says he, "the bank could if it pleased, have established a nominal price of six, seven, or *fifteen shillings*, or any price whatever." Aye? Why then it is the stamp and not the metal that gives the value to the bank dollar? But, if this were the case, why put the stamp upon dollars? *Why not choose a cheaper metal?* Tin would have borne a stamp full as well, and would have been much lighter. Does C. B. in good earnest believe, that the bankers could, by means of a stamp, induce us to take a four and sixpenny dollar at 13s. or at any price whatever?

Whoever has read the Register here quoted need not be reminded, that the high nominal value of the dollar was there stated to be a proof of the depreciation of the bank paper. Indeed the readers of the Register must well recollect, that this point was insisted on so long as six months ago. I might point out several other parts of Mr. Foster's work, where he has conferred on me the honour of a similar distinction. He thinks it necessary not only to name other writers but their works also, and in some instances to characterise them; but from me he takes as it were with a consciousness that all the world is acquainted with the source, just as men quote from the Scripture. Had I time I would take this opportunity of acknowledging similar favours from several writers, amongst whom I should certainly not forget Lord Sheffield.

THE WAR.—Within these few days it has been rumoured, that the King of Sweden refuses to acknowledge Buonaparté as Emperor of the French. If this be true, the inference that Russia is resolved on war with France appears natural enough. But still without Austria, without British money and a British army, there will be no efficient combination against France; and whether Mr. Pitt will be able to send either guineas or soldiers is a question upon which there

without seeming to know that the same thoughts have ever before entered into the mind of man. Let us take a small specimen.

Mr. Foster, p. 84.

The Spanish dollars issued by the bank, at 5s., contain no more pure silver than 4s. 6d. English ought to contain; they are therefore called, not five shillings, but *tokens* for five shillings. It has been contended, that this is no proof of the depreciation of bank paper, for that they are only promissory notes, and that the bank might have called them *fifteen shillings* as well as five; but a promissory note should either have intrinsic value itself, or else be merely the representative of it: if it is issued as the value itself; it can be no more valuable than the silver it contains; if issued merely as the representative of value, *why go to the expense of having it of such precious materials?* If it is to be considered merely as a bank note, why not make it of paper?

can be very little difference of opinion. — We are, in some of the London newspapers, told of the spirited remonstrances of the Emperor of Russia relative to the affair of the Duke d'Enghien. The conduct of his Imperial Majesty in this respect is compared with that of "the cowardly states of Germany." But, the persons who draw this comparison, seem to forget the vast difference in the circumstances of the parties respectively; the difference in the rank, and the power, of the Emperor of Russia and the Prince of Baden, and, what is by no means of small importance, the difference in the distance at which those two Sovereigns are placed from the empire of France and from the armies of Buonaparté. The answer, which it is confidently said the French government gave to the remonstrance of Russia, it would not, with all our liberty of the press, be very safe to put in print, however guarded with qualifications and comments; but, if such an answer was given, there can exist in the mind of Buonaparté and his counsellors not the least fear of the anger and resentment of Russia, or of the powers that she is able to bring to her assistance. In truth, after the affair of the "indemnities," as they were called; after the parcelling out of Germany; taking from one Sovereign Prince his territories to give to another;

after a perfect co-operation of Russia and France in almost deposing some Sovereigns and elevating others by the mere effect of their will and power, and without any consultation for that purpose with the Emperor of Germany, the lawful head of that very empire the members of which they were cutting up and distributing at their pleasure; after this, one might be allowed to express some astonishment at hearing either of the distributing parties complain of a breach of the laws of neutrality, and of an invasion of the rights of independent principalities.

—The hope of exhausting the pecuniary resources of France is still a topic with some of the ministerial writers; and it would not be very surprising if we were, at the next meeting of Parliament to hear the same hope expressed within the walls of St. Stephen's. Incredible as it may appear to men of sense, such a hope is really entertained. But on what it is now built it would be utterly impossible to conceive. Some time ago we heard of enormous taxes being levied upon the people; but why such taxes should be levied no one can tell; for as to the war, it can occasion but very little, if any, extraordinary expense to France: not nearly so much as she draws, in consequence of it, directly from Spain, Portugal, and Hanover; of which latter country she is absolutely selling the fee-simple as fast as she can find purchasers; and, what is worthy of remark, the people remaining in the Electorate seem, if we are to believe the reports from the Continent, not much displeased at the change. A revolution, a change of property and of power, is operating in that country without making the least noise in the world. Never did a Sovereign lose his dominions in so short a space of time; never was any loss so complete; and, if one were to judge from the favour retained by those to whom the loss was attributable, never were dominions lost with so little regret. To talk of exhausting the pecuniary resources of France by war, and especially such a war as we are now carrying on, and while we have not, and cannot have, an army capable of being sent abroad, is perfect madness. The boats for the flotilla must cost something, but not half so much as our small craft, to say nothing of our navy and army, our no-army and all our other most monstrous expenses, which, if they continue for a very few years must augment the annual interest of the debt to a sum greater in amount than the annual revenue. What the daily increasing effect of this must be upon our paper system Buonaparté's counselors well know, and they will not, therefore, be disposed to relieve us from all the chances

which such a state of things gives them against us. When Mr. Addington, in his budget speech at the commencement of the war, told the House of Commons that the sacrifices which he called upon the nation to make, were intended to convince the nations of Europe of the solidity of our pecuniary means, the *Moniteur* copied his speech and sent it over the world with only this short comment: "Pay your bank notes in specie, and then the nations of Europe will believe you, without your making either speeches or war." The man who wrote that comment knew our situation; and, indeed, it is ridiculous to suppose, that the government of France, with so much talent at its command, should not have been able to foresee wherein our chief danger would consist. —The means which our ministers, the last as well as the present, have resorted to in order to deceive the world are almost too low and ridiculous to be described. Two foreigners, Sir Francis D'Ivernois, Knight, and another, seem to have been doing little or nothing else for several years last past. With the weight of Sir Francis's arguments the trunk-makers' porters are pretty well acquainted, and for the ruinous tendency of them more than one bookseller can be brought to vouch. The other writer to whom I allude has prudently kept his name from the title-page of his work, which he calls "*Observations sur le compte rendu de l'administration des finances de la France, pour l'an X. 1801, 1802,*" and wherein, though there can be little doubt of the work having been paid for out of the Treasury, I will take upon me to say, there is more nonsense than in any other work extant of the same bulk. The apparent object of it is, to show, that, in case of a new war, Buonaparté will be compelled to yield to his adversary, unless he can make loans, things which the author seems to regard as absolutely necessary to the existence of a nation in time of war. Having settled this point, it only remains for him to make it appear, which I dare say he does to the perfect satisfaction and great comfort of his employers, that it is impossible for Buonaparté or any of his successors ever to make loans again! Thus, then, there is nothing necessary but to go to war with Buonaparté to overset him and his government. This work appears to have been written early in 1803. Buonaparté has not made any loans it is true, but it is because he has stood in no need of any: if he had, he would have made loans as well as his neighbours; for where is the credit so desperate that speculators will not try it? I do not say that his loans would have been made.

on very good terms; but, what need he have cared, so that he got the money? If, however, we take the funds as a criterion, the credit of France is not at a very low ebb. Before this war began the French three per cents (as may be seen in Vol. 5. p. 1020) were at 53, and since the war began they have risen to 57. Neither wars nor rumours of wars shake them. I know not their positive value; but, I know that their relative value has arisen four per centum while the relative value of the English funds has fallen about sixteen per centum, a difference of twenty per centum. But, Buonaparté wants to make no loans: his revenue is equal to his expenditure; and, as I said before, the present war will augment that expenditure but in a very trifling degree. I am the more anxious in wishing the public to be guarded against this error, as I am fully persuaded it is one of the most fatal errors they can possibly imbibe. Any hopes of relief from the internal disorders of France, whether of a financial or political nature, are now no more: the meddling, bungling ministry of Mr. Addington, sanctioned and sheltered by Mr. Pitt, have, at last, placed Buonaparté in a situation that nothing but beating him in open war will ever shake his power. When and how, then, are we to have peace, and upon what terms? Mr. Pitt is pledged not only to "repress the ambition" but to "chastise the insolence" of Buonaparté. That neither of these objects have been accomplished as yet, is certain; nor does it appear very likely that they ever will by an army of 400,000 men, who have "volunteered" to stay at home. Lord Melville said, that he rejoiced at the rupture of the peace, because it enabled us to retain Malta. "Malta, and Malta alone, I would make war for, if there were no other object, no other provocation." Whether his Lordship is still of the same opinion one can scarcely guess; but, if he be, Buonaparté's hirelings (for he has his hired writers too) tell us, through the pages of the *Moniteur*, that "peace must then be conquered in the fields of Great Britain and Ireland." I suspect, however, that both his Lordship and Mr. Pitt would relax a little, if required. Aye marry would they! If Buonaparté were to insist upon their performing a pilgrimage to Malmaison to kiss his jack-boots, I do not say, nor do I think that they would comply; but it would hurt my feelings very much to be compelled to say how far I think they would descend, at the end of another year, in order to obtain peace. That is to say, if the present financial and military systems continue to be pursued. Had the minister the ability and the resolution to make a pro-

per change in these, there would be no necessity for his crouching at the feet of the enemy. But, to make this change is, I fear, quite impossible for Mr. Pitt, who stands so committed to his systems, whose reputation is so indissolubly attached to them, that to attempt their destruction would be an act of suicide of that sort which men shrink from with the greatest abhorrence. It is, however, very hard that the nation should sink in order to save the reputation of one man, let that man be who he may.—And, supposing that peace were obtained upon terms such as might be the result of a pilgrimage to the jack-boots; what would be the consequence? We could not disarm. Our peace establishment must be nearly what it is now; all we are now doing is to watch the French armies upon their coast, which armies would certainly remain pretty near the spot where they are. The French spies and stock-jobbers would again set to work: the funds would rise and fall just as it suited the French Treasury: we should pass another year of feverish repose, when we should be again compelled to declare war; for such would be our state, that we must arm again, or at once yield our necks to the yoke; whereas the enemy need only stand and look at us; and thus would throw the blame of the war upon us.—In short, if the present systems are persevered in, it is hard to say what sort of death we shall die: that appears to be entirely a matter of choice with the enemy, who seems at this moment to be looking at us and considering at the same time, whether he shall knock our brains out at once, or whether he shall hunt us, or tease us, or starve us to death. Buonaparté and his counsellors must see the present state of our paper money, and, when they consider the inevitable effect of war and loans and taxes upon that money, they must know that a continuation of the war for a very few years will produce the total discredit of the paper. That this is their opinion, indeed, we know, because we see it proclaimed through their official journal; and besides, it is perfect nonsense to suppose, that they are not well-informed upon subjects that are here discussed in books and pamphlets and parliamentary speeches and reports of committees. Having made up their mind as to the certain effect of war upon the bank paper, they will next consider what effect the total discredit of the paper will produce in the country, on the people and on the government; and, upon the way in which they shall determine this question it will depend (if our present systems continue), whether they will grant us peace or not, even upon terms to us the most disgraceful that

can be conceived. To baffle all their calculations and to blast their hopes, then, upon this score, should be a principal object with our minister; but, here again we meet the ever recurring obstacle: scarcely any measure can be attempted for this purpose without a clearly implied condemnation of the systems of the minister himself. It is, however, a lamentable consideration, that the country *may* perish, because, to save it, the minister *must* confess his errors! In spite of this truth the minister will, till the very hour of ruin approaches, meet with support quite sufficient to divide, distract, and enfeeble the nation. Many men, and very good men too, will remain attached to him for no other reason than because they have long been attached to him: many will cling to him from interested motives: some from fear, and some from friendship: the very wreck of a twenty year's administration is formidable. It must finally sink, but it may chance to drag the monarchy down along with it. This is the evil to be dreaded, and, if possible to be prevented.

PERMANENT-DUTY MEN.—It was my intention to attempt, in the present sheet, to make a review of all our military measures since the peace of Amiens was concluded; but finding my matter swell beyond my room, I thought it best to defer the subject to my next. Upon the effect of one of the measures relative to the volunteers I cannot, however, forbear to say a few words in this place. Since the passing of what is called the Volunteer Consolidation Bill, the Volunteers, that is to say the men who have volunteered *to stay at home*, have been sent (in cases where they would *consent* to be sent) upon what is ludicrously termed *permanent-duty*: that is to say, to march ten or a dozen miles from home, there to remain, billeted for three weeks, including the marching and countermarching days, and to receive for this “permanent service” a guinea *bounty* besides a shilling a day in the shape of pay; that is two shillings a day, while soldiers of the regular army receive a shilling a day.—Amongst the evils that might be expected from this project, was mentioned, at the time, the terrible example which would be given to the regular army by these men in soldiers' clothes and not under martial law and receiving double pay into the bargain. Their disorderly behaviour, their drunken quarrels, their disbanding themselves in certain instances, were anticipated, and, in every part of the country, the expectations of those who thought thus have been realised. In the northern parts of the kingdom where wages are low, men have gone upon this “perma-

nent duty” for the sake of the money; but in England, particularly in the southern part of it, those who have thus “volunteered,” those who have made this second effort of patriotism have been, generally, men who either went for the sake of a frolic, or who, being idle fellows, regarded the pay, bounty and free lodgings as means of getting a solid drunk without any risk of their lives or their liberty. The consequences have been such as might have been foreseen by the minister, and as were foreseen by those who opposed his project: idleness, drunkenness, and quarrelling have followed the footsteps of these permanent-duty men wherever they have gone. I would produce proof upon proof of what is here stated, but shall, at present confine myself to the quarrels of a corps who have *printed* their proceedings.—Camberwell Volunteers. Head Quarters, the 30th of June, 1804. At a court “of inquiry, duly constituted and convened “for investigating the conduct of several “members of the fifth company of this “corps, Lieutenant Colonel Smith in the “chair:—RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY, That “it appears from the report made to this “Court, and confirmed by the admission of “commissioned officers of the fifth company, that the conduct of certain members of that company, has been *of the most “disorderly and mutinous nature*, and destructive of all military discipline; there- “by subjecting such members to the pains “and penalties of the articles of war, as “provided by the Act of the 44th Geo. III. “c. 54. s. 23.—RESOLVED UNANIMOUS- “LY, That it appears to this Court, by the “examination of the officers of the fifth “company, and other evidence, that a “meeting of several members of the said “company was held, *with their concurrence*, “and in their presence, at the Rosemary “Branch Public House, on Thursday evening the 28th instant, at which meeting “a *written agreement was entered into*, and “signed by the majority of the members of “the said company then present; destructive of all military subordination; and, as “it also appears that the said agreement has “been suppressed, by which means the “names of the delinquents are withheld “from this court, and sundry arms and accoutrements have been left, at Serjeant “Howard's house, in the most disorderly manner, RESOLVED, THEREFORE UN- “ANIMOUSLY, that it be recommended to “the commanding officer *to dismiss such of “the said company, as may have delivered “up their arms and accoutrements, as afore- “said*: and to permit the remainder of the “non commissioned officers and privates,

" who shall have manifested an orderly conduct, and proper sense of the *glorious cause* in which they are engaged, to join the other companies of the battalion, provided it be done forthwith.

" **RESOLVED UNANIMOUSLY**, that the resolutions be read to the officers of the fifth company immediately, and a copy delivered to every member of the corps.—" By order of the court: signed, George Owen, Secretary."—This is the sort of troops on which we are desired to depend for the safety of the country! Now, only a few days ago Mr. Pitt expressed his conviction, that our situation was become *much more secure* in consequence of the "permanent duty" which had been performed, and which was then performing by the volunteers, of whom there were no less than 180,000, who had been, or were still, out upon such duty! It is really alarming to hear such sentiments from the man who holds all the means of the nation in his hands! It is an unhappy thing for this country that Mr. has never married. He would then, probably, have had something besides projects whereon to fix his affections, and the poor nation would not have been teased and tormented to death in order to furnish objects of magnitude enough to satisfy his capacious soul. With him a project of the day seems to be a necessary of life. He will rather another man's project rather than be without one, especially if it be *quite new*, and of a nature to afford ample room for *explanation*; unbounded latitude for talking about it. How many, many millions has this nation paid; how much disgrace and spreading has she suffered, and does she yet suffer, from this cause! Of her six hundred millions of debt, three hundred may be fairly ascribed to Mr. Pitt's love of showy projects, and this can be proved as clearly as that two and two make four. But, of all his projects the *military* ones are by far the most dangerous. His financial schemes contain a remedy within themselves: his fictitious money may return to its pristine rage, leaving us still under the guardianship of our own benignant monarchy, a free and happy people; but, what may be the ultimate effect of his volunteer and small bounty and permanent duty and parochial-recruiting projects no man living can even guess. That they cannot come to good is certain; and all that can be matter of doubt, is, the kind and the quantity of the evil.

The appointment of Lord Levison Gower as ambassador to the court of Russia, is a

step of some consequence, and one indeed which, without any inquiry into the talents of the person appointed, has more apparent *sense and reason* in it than the last appointment had. It was said at the time, that because Buonaparté's ambassadors were all generals, Mr. Addington resolved to match him with admirals. Nor does there appear to have been any better reason than this for sending Sir J. B. Warrar on an embassy. To the appointment of Lord Gower there can be no objection on the score of rank. It were to be wished that men famous for talents, men whose public reputation should have run before them; it certainly were to be wished that such men should fill the leading posts in our diplomatic corps; but, if we are not to have talents of this description, we ought at least to have rank; for, without either rank or talent, what can we expect from a minister at any foreign court. The Russians will not ask *who* and *what* the new English minister is. Such questions are very awkward; especially when they become so minute as to touch upon a man's former profession, or trade.—The *Protest*, which has been published in the name of Louis XVIII. and which seems to have made its first appearance in the *Moniteur*, is now said to have been fabricated at Paris. Time will settle this point; but it is difficult to see what advantage the new emperor could promise himself from such a device.—It appears that Napoleon insists upon the Pope's coming to France in order to perform the ceremony of coronation. His Holiness has endeavoured to turn the cup aside, but there is good reason to believe that he must swallow it, in spite of his appeal to the Emperor of Germany, who most assuredly will have nothing to do with the matter.—Moreau has set out in consequence of his sentence of banishment. He goes to Spain, it seems, and thence to America, but it is very improbable that he should go to the United States. If the French did not evidently despise colonies, and if they were not certain, that by holding Canada, as we now hold it, we are doing ourselves infinite mischief, one would be tempted to suspect that Moreau is gone as an ambassador and a general, rather than as a banished man.—It was proposed to Georges, some time before his execution, to implore the pardon of the emperor, with an assurance that there was great probability of his prayer being heard. He rejected the proposal; and died as he had lived, a brave and loyal man.

"I cannot help observing, that, if we persevere in this system of defensive force, and deprive ourselves of the means of striking a preventive blow, we are inviting the enemy to our own shores, attracting the war to the very heart of the empire, and thereby, either hastening our subjugation or rendering the war interminable.—MR. ELLIOT'S Speech on the Army of Reserve Bill, June 23, 1803.

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[98

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
CHANCELLOR OF HIS MAJESTY'S EXCHE-  
QUER, &c. &c.

SIR,—When I shall have the honour (an honour I have long promised myself) of addressing to you a series of observations on several subjects connected with the great public station which you fill, and by the measures emanating from which we are all so materially affected, it may be found necessary to trouble you, with respect to general motives and objects, with some preliminary statement, a trespass upon your time, for which, when my purpose is to beseech your attention to a single point of finance, I should find myself utterly at a loss to frame an apology.—The point to which I allude, Sir, has presented itself to me in the Resolutions, which, upon your motion, were adopted by the House of Commons, on the 24th instant. Nearly the whole of those resolutions afford matter for comment; but, for the present, I shall confine myself to the 13th; that which exhibits a statement of the produce of the permanent taxes in the several years since January 1793, and which is expressed in the following terms:—"That the nett produce of the "permanent taxes existing previous to January 1793, was, in the year ended

" on 5 January 1793	£14,284,000;
" on 5 January 1794	- 13,941,000;
" on 5 January 1795	- 13,858,000;
" on 5 January 1796	- 13,557,000;
" on 5 January 1797	- 14,292,000;
" on 5 January 1798	- 13,332,000;
" on 5 January 1799	- 14,275,000;
" on 5 January 1800	- 15,743,100;
" on 5 January 1801	- 14,194,539;
" on 5 January 1802	- 14,497,226;
" on 5 January 1803	- 15,425,000;
" and on 5 January 1804	- 14,901,000;

"which last sum exceeds the nett produce of the permanent taxes on the 5th of January 1793, by 617,000l. and exclusive of a large increase of arrears outstanding."—Now, Sir, what inference is it intended that we should draw from this statement? Obviously this: that, notwith-

standing the weight of debt and taxes that has accumulated since the year 1792, the taxes which were in existence at that time, and which have continued in existence to this day, still produce as much, nay more, than they produced then. But, is this inference correct? I am convinced it is not; and shall state to you the reasons whence that conviction has arisen.—When you say, that the produce of the year ending 5th Jan. 1804, that is to say, the year 1803, "exceeds the produce of the year ending 5th Jan. 1793," that is to say the year 1792, you may mean, that the produce of the former exceeds that of the latter in more nominal amount; and to that proposition I have nothing to object. But, if such were your meaning, it should have been explained; for, certain I am, that of the ten thousand persons, who will probably read this letter, not one will be found, who would not, from the Resolution above quoted, have concluded, that the taxes there spoken of produced more in worth in 1803 than they did in 1792. Indeed, such a conclusion is the object evidently aimed at by the statement; and, to show that it is a very erroneous conclusion will, I am persuaded, require but very little pains.—Were any one to state to us, that the value of money has not depreciated during the last eleven years, we should instantly contradict him. I am not here speaking of the depreciation of the paper currency; I am not speaking of the state of public credit; I wish, on this occasion, to keep clear of any question relating to the cause or causes of the depreciation of money, being desirous merely to establish the fact. But, can any thing be wanting from me for this purpose? Is it not a fact already completely established? Has not money, exclusive of the effect of recent most powerfully accelerating causes, been gradually depreciating for centuries? Have not all the writers on finance, when comparing the amount of the revenue in different years, taken care to make allowance for the gradual and constant depreciation of money? Has not Mr. Wheatley in

his admirable treatise, published last year, stated, that, even upon the principle of Sir George Schuckburgh's calculations, the revenue of 1790, amounting to 15,500,000*l.* was equal to 17,500,000*l.* of the revenue of 1800? And, will it then be pretended, that a pound sterling of the revenue of 1803 is equal in value to a pound sterling of the revenue of 1792? Yet, as I before observed, this is the conclusion which is evidently intended to be drawn from the statement that I have quoted from the financial Resolutions.—Enough has been said, and, indeed, much more than enough, as to the principle and the fact of depreciation: it remains only to fix correctly the *degree*, in order to show the amount of the *defalcation*, instead of the increase, which has taken place in the produce of the old permanent taxes. The price of bread has been said to be a standard frequently very incorrect; and it may be so. But, we well know, indeed Parliament has most solemnly declared, that bread is now *too cheap*; if, therefore, I take the average price of bread from this time back as far as the month of January, 1802, embracing a period in which came to market three of the most abundant harvests that England ever knew; and, if I compare this average price with that of a like space of time previous to the month of January, 1793, I am certain that no one will accuse me of a want of fairness. I have sought these averages; and, I find that of the last mentioned period to be 6*d.*  $\frac{1}{2}$  for the quartern loaf, while that of the first mentioned period is 9*d.*  $\frac{3}{4}$ . It follows, of course, that money has, in this country (no matter from what cause) depreciated in value in the amount of *one third*, since the year 1792. I am sure, Sir, that you will not deny this conclusion; but, lest other persons should, I think it necessary to call to my aid authorities, against whom I am certain they will not think of contending: I mean, Mr. Rose and yourself. Mr. Rose, in his "Considerations on the Debt of the Civil List," published in 1802, after the scarcity was over, says: "in the Lord Steward's department, 'the prices of many kinds of provisions are more than double, and, on the whole, at least 70 per centum *higher than in 1786.*'" As to yourself, Sir, you stated to the House of Commons, in the debate upon the civil list, no longer ago than the 2*d* instant, that the advance in prices since the year 1786 was at least 60 per centum, "and of this 'fact,' said you, 'every gentleman must 'be perfectly satisfied.' Your estimate is below that of Mr. Rose, but I will take it as my rule of proportion, because it was made

at the very time when the Parliament had just declared corn to be too cheap. If, then, Sir, prices have risen, or money has fallen (for they are only different words to express the same thing), 60 per centum since 1786, it must have fallen 37 per centum since 1792, that is, more than *one-third*, and this, if your statement upon the civil list was correct, fully corroborates and establishes the conclusion drawn from the comparative prices of the quartern loaf.—Thus, then, Sir, the degree of depreciation is *one-third at least*; whence it follows, of course, that as there is very little difference in the *nominal* amount of the old taxes of 1792 and that of the same taxes in 1803, the defalcation in the *real* amount has been as 1 to 3: and, that, the produce of those taxes in 1803, to make it *equal* to their produce in 1792, should have amounted to about 19,500,000*l.* instead of 14,900,000*l.*—I am, Sir, &c. &c. &c. WM. COBBETT.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

REVIEW OF THE MEASURES RELATING TO THE ARMY.—How or when is this war to be brought to an end? When are our fatigues and expenses to be diminished? When shall we be relieved from the ever-returning alarms and terrors of invasion? When, oh when! shall we get rid of our dangers and our disgrace?—Such are the questions which every thinking man puts to his neighbour, or, at least to himself; and, though to give a satisfactory answer might be difficult; though to say what may or can be done is, perhaps, impossible; yet, it is easy to perceive, as to one point, what cannot be done; it is easy to perceive, that, with a species of force, whose operations are by law confined within the kingdom, no preventive blow can be struck, no diversion can be made, no dread of our power can exist in the mind of the enemy. That enemy, as far as he is disposed to act upon the Continent, may safely consider Great Britain as not having a single soldier at her command. He is in a situation to harass us by his threats; to keep us in almost constant alarm, and to swell our expenses far beyond those of former wars while his own people live in perfect tranquility, making a jest of our fears, and while he spends out of his own treasury very little, if any, more than he would expend, were he not at war. In his commerce and his colonies, that part of his resources and dominion upon which he appears to set no value, he has suffered all the loss that we can make him suffer. His internal authority we have not been able to shake by intrigue: a low and bungling at-

tempt at it has only tended to accelerate the consummation of his glory : and the nations of Europe seem to vie with each other for the precedence in bowing down before him. In short, so great does he appear, so powerful do we feel him to be when compared with us, that the comfort of many really seems to arise from the hope, that we shall remain unconquered, because he will regard us as being beneath his notice ! Base as this hope is, however, it is not more base than fallacious ; for, though he should esteem us a degraded people, he knows that we inhabit a rich and fertile country ; and he also knows, that the more degraded men are, the more likely they are to make excellent slaves.—To rescue us from this state of intolerable disgrace would require great and wise measures in all the departments of government ; but more particularly in that, to which is committed the care of providing an efficient military force, of which force we are, at this moment, most shamefully and alarmingly destitute. Many and loud have been the complaints and remonstrances, which, on different occasions, have, through the pages of the Register, been made upon this subject. But, repetition, though very irksome to the writer, and still more so to the reader, is, unfortunately, necessary, in order to obtain even a chance of producing the desired effect. All exertion may be useless, but one must be quite certain of the inability before it can be pleaded in justification of failing to persevere. The present moment is, too, rather favourable than otherwise : Parliament is about to adjourn after having passed several laws upon the subject of our military defence ; every scheme that ministers have thought proper to adopt has now been tried, or is under trial : this, therefore, seems to be precisely the time to take a review of the measures relating to the army, and to exhibit to the public that train of errors, which have deprived us of an efficient military force, and which, until they are corrected, will continue that deprivation.—This exposition must begin with a statement of the troops discharged or disbanded at the conclusion of the peace of Amiens ; that peace, which, as Mr. Pitt observed, the ministers who made it regarded as “ the notice of a new war ;” that peace whoever believed in the duration of which was set down as “ the fool of nature ;” that peace which, in the words of his Majesty’s declaration, had been, on the part of the enemy “ one continued series of “ hostility.” At the conclusion of such a peace, one would think that ministers ought to have been slow in disbanding the force of the country : as it was “ a peace of

“ experiment,” one would think they should have tried the experiment before they threw aside the implements of war ; [especially when it is well known, that, even between the definitive and the preliminary treaty, the enemy with whom we were negotiating was making conquests more rapidly than he had made them in war, and that, while Lord Cornwallis was at Amiens higgling for the cession of Ceylon and Trinidad, Buonaparté was at Lyons receiving the oaths of allegiance from the greater and the better part of Italy, having already added the important is and of Elba to the territory of France. Under such circumstances it might reasonably have been expected to see ministers proceed with great caution in disbanding the army ; yet, according to their own acknowledgments, made by the mouth of Mr. Secretary Yorke, they instantly reduced the army, including militia and fencibles, from 250,000 to 126,000 men, of which 126,000, it would, probably, be difficult for them to prove the existence at this day. Mr. Yorke’s speech has been quoted before ; but, on this occasion, it is necessary again to refer to it. He stated, that 71,000 militia had been disembodied, because it was the custom to disembody the militia at the conclusion of peace. To have rendered this reason valid, it should have been shown, that it was also customary to make a peace of experiment, a peace being merely the notice of a new war. Upon the same principle 20,679 men of the fencible regiments were immediately disbanded. Invalids to the amount of, 5,172 men were reduced, in order, he told the House, to form them into a more effective corps ; but they were not so formed ; no step was taken towards such formation ; the men were scattered all over the kingdom, and were not, till the signal of war was given, called together again, to their very great inconvenience and injury, which must also have made a considerable reduction in their numbers. There were 7,025 men discharged, of whom no description was given ; but allowing them to have been entitled to their discharge, we still find 19,438 men belonging to the cavalry and to foreign corps, who neither were entitled to their discharge nor wished to have it. The militia and fencibles might, and should, have been kept embodied for several months, at least, after the conclusion of a peace which was nothing but the notice of a new war ; but, upon this description of force one is not inclined to lay much stress ; it is the disbanding of the cavalry and the foreign corps that we have to regret, and that we have to pay for too. Mr. Yorke’s statement of the reasons for this

measure is curious and interesting in the extreme. "The cavalry," said he, "amounted to 25,000 men; a force *not thought necessary*, and, for *that* reason, as well as "because it was the most expensive sort of force, the reduction commenced with it; and, 10,493 men of that description were "reduced." Observe that this force was not thought necessary by the ministers who regarded the peace merely as the notice of a new war; and then observe, that, when the new war took place, in about eight or nine months after the reduction of the cavalry was made, one of the first of the military measures of these same ministers, was, to *augment the cavalry* in nearly the same proportion, as far as their ability to raise men would go, that this very cavalry had been reduced! Either the ministers are now guilty of great insincerity in pretending that they did not expect the peace to last, or it becomes them to show that they were innocent of a much more serious offence in making so large a reduction of the cavalry. "The expense!" This was the most expensive sort of force. True; but, allowing that the peace was expected to last, this sort of force might have been kept up, at least, till the experiment of peace had been tried, at an expense very little greater than that attending the support of an equal number of infantry. The horses might have been sold, and the dismounted men quartered in barracks, or elsewhere, in the same manner as if they had been infantry. The wisdom of keeping them dismounted for years may admit of dispute; but for a year or eighteen months, with an intimation that they should either be discharged, or mounted again, at the expiration of that time, they might very conveniently have been retained. And who does not lament; who that reflects upon the expense and trouble which we have had to get men into the regular army through the army of reserve; who that has observed the torment and miseries of the ballot and of all the various means and measures which have occupied the nation for this year past; what man that looks at the state of our military force at this moment, does not sorely lament that we have not now these 10,493 regular disciplined soldiers, especially when he is informed, that this number is nearly equal to all the effective recruits that have been raised for the regular army since the commencement of the war, notwithstanding measures so extraordinary have been resorted to for that purpose? "The foreign corps," says Mr. Yorke, "to the number of 8,945 men, were reduced, because this was a force which we were glad to spare, and

"which, when a reduction was necessary, we thought it most politic to reduce; for, when British troops were disbanded, who would think of retaining foreigners?" Nobody; but, because it is allowed, that, when British troops are disbanded, it would not be advisable to retain foreign troops; and because it is also allowed, that, when a reduction is necessary, it should begin with foreigners next after the men whose term of service has expired; because this is allowed it does not for that reason follow, that the disbanding of the foreign corps, in the present instance, was either politic or justifiable; for the necessity of the reduction of the British troops is denied; it was denied at the time; the ministers were exhorted not to disband any of the regular army, but rather to augment it; and, if we yet wanted any thing to convince us of the folly of their measures in this respect, the act of parliament which has just been past for raising foreign corps might, one would think, be quite sufficient for the purpose. The expense of raising a number of foreigners equal to the number disbanded, including contingencies, cannot fall much short of thirty pounds a man, making, in the whole, 268,350*l*. This is a decent little sum which the nation has to pay by way of smart-money for having fallen in love with a ministry of well-meaning men, taken, according to the advice of Mr. Wilberforce, from amongst "the middling classes of society," and of whom, by the bye, more than one half of the present cabinet, or, of the "roses," at least, of the present cabinet, consists. But, the pecuniary loss, considerable as it is in itself, sinks out of sight when compared with the national injury which has arisen from the want of an efficient army; of which army the corps here spoken of would, in a war like the present, have formed a most valuable part. How long it will require to raise foreign troops in number equal to those disbanded there is at hand no means of ascertaining; nor, indeed, would it be easy to guess at the number likely to be raised in the whole; but, it must be evident to every one, that if we had already collected another 8,945 foreigners together in regiments, it would take a long while to render them equal in point of discipline to those whom our ministers disbanded. And, as to the effect of these new foreign corps upon the mind of the enemy, very different indeed will it be from that which was, and which must have continued to be, produced by the existence of the old foreign corps, which chiefly consisted of exactly that description of men of whose exertions the enemy had

most reason to be afraid.—The cavalry and the foreign troops together amounted to 19,438 men, to replace whom, at the rate of 30*l.* a man, which is a very low calculation, if we consider the price which has been paid for substitutes in the army of reserve, will stand the nation in 583,140*l.* more than half a million of money, as a little beginning of the expenses of the peace of Amiens; that peace which, according to Mr. Addington, was to produce a *saving* of 25,000,000*l.* a year! Those who objected to the peace stated, as the foundation of their objection, that such a peace would not permit the nation to disarm with safety; and, that, therefore, either the safety of the nation must be hazarded, or we must continue to support all the expenses, unaccompanied with any one of the advantages of war. There were others who approved of the peace, because they thought, from the then declarations of ministers, that we might safely reduce our establishments, and, of course, our expenses. This was, on both sides, matter of opinion. The former description of persons were consistent in exhorting the ministers not to disband the army and dismantle the fleet; the latter were equally consistent in calling upon them to disarm, and thereby to reduce the amount of our expenses. But, what shall be said for Mr. Addington and his colleagues, the greater part of whom are now the colleagues of Mr. Pitt? They who were in possession of all the proofs of the enemy's hostility; they who disbanded the army and dismantled the fleet while they regarded the peace as merely the notice of a new war, and who have since advised their Sovereign to make a solemn declaration to the world, that the whole interval of peace was occupied, on the part of the enemy, by a series of aggressions and insults? It would be curious to see, by and bye, an accurate enumeration of all the *expenses*, instead of the savings of the peace of Amiens: such a calculation might furnish the money-loving people of this country with a pretty satisfactory proof of the truth which Mr. Windham endeavoured to impress upon their minds: that true œconomy consisted in judiciously applying the resources of the nation to the means of preserving its honour, its power, and its consequence in the world. He endeavoured in vain: the cry of, "capital, credit and confidence," within doors, and that of "peace and plenty," without, stifled the sound of his voice. Had not the country been stripped of its army and its fleet; had they been kept in tolerable trim for a year, not only the expenses of recruiting to fill the place of men discharged, and most of the

other extraordinary expenses that have arisen out of this war, might have been avoided: but who shall say that we might not have avoided the war itself, at least for another year or two? There is, indeed, I tle reason to suppose, that we could have rested long in peace without effecting some alteration in the then state of things; but, if any thing could have afforded us a chance of a duration of peace and of living in safety at the same time, it would have been the keeping our army, our regular army, up to its full establishment, making thereto a little augmentation, which augmentation might, at a trifling expense, have been made out of the flower of the militia. And, if, thus prepared, we had failed in our efforts to preserve peace and our honour, will any one say, that the war would have commenced under such disadvantages as it did commence? The knowledge that you have an army always has its weight with your enemy. If Buonaparté had seen us capable of sending twenty or thirty thousand men up the Elbe, he would have hesitated before he dispatched his army to take possession of Hanover; and, if he had finally resolved on the enterprize, that army might have been met by the Hanoverian army, aided by ten or fifteen thousand men from Great Britain, who might have been reinforced as occasion required. Instead of this, Great Britain, destitute of an army, could think of nothing but providing for her own defence; and so unwise and completely inefficient have the measures of ministers been, that her capability to ensure even that object yet appears doubtful.—Having reduced the regular army at home to one half of the amount of its strength during the late war, when the new war came upon us there was no time to raise any thing but militia and other troops for home service only: at least, want of time was pleaded for this defensive military system. But, previous to the war, great pains had been taken to augment the establishment of the Scotch militia, or at least to provide for its augmentation in case of war. When the bill for this purpose was before the House of Commons, the evil tendency of it was pointed out: the ministers were told, that the establishment was too large, that it would destroy the recruiting service for the regular army in that most fertile field for recruits; and, Mr. Elliot particularly dwelt upon the mischiefs which would, in this respect, be experienced from the measure at the breaking out of a new war. The ministers persevered: the establishment was extended: the consequences have been just such as were foretold: Scotland, which used

to afford recruits by the usands, has, during this war, sent forth only her hundreds. The numbers of the English militia were fixed equally high in proportion. A new code, occupying a hundred pages of the Statute Book, was enacted with a view of correcting all the errors and incongruities which had crept into the system during the war. At the head of these stood the officering of the militia by persons unqualified in point of property; but, the moment the war began; nay, before it actually began, a bill was introduced, by the very same person who had drawn up and brought forward the new code, for officering the militia by persons not qualified agreeably to that code. Having thus obtained laws for shutting up 73,000 men in the home service of Great Britain, it was time to think about Ireland, where the bounty for the regular army being 5 guineas, it was thought necessary, lest men should run too fast into that service and thereby rob the precious militia, to offer, and to give too, 4 guineas as a bounty for militiamen! Thus was the regular army in Ireland put upon a fair footing with that in Great Britain; that is to say, cut off from the possibility of obtaining a recruit. For the Irish must be even greater brutes than some persons appear to think them, if they did not perceive, that there was more than a guinea difference between service for five years or during the war and service for life, especially when, in the former, they could not be compelled to quit Ireland, while, in the latter, they might be sent to any part of the world. Ireland could afford, and did immediately afford 18,000 men. So that we had, by the month of May, 1803, past laws the great purpose of which appeared to be to prevent 91,000 of the ablest bodied men in the kingdom from being liable to quit it, on any account whatever. This being happily accomplished, the ministers seemed disposed to look about them, as it were to see if the enemy was coming; but, by this time Mr. Pitt had determined to come forth from his retirement, and that he came with a *project* will be remembered in this country till the Army of Reserve shall be forgotten, which will not be very soon. When that measure, of which he was the real author, was proposed to the Parliament, he, of course stood forth its champion; but of this there will be an occasion to speak hereafter. The army of reserve was decreed; but, as if its inventors had been afraid that the amendments which had been introduced into the plan at the instance of Mr. Windham, and without which it would have proved almost entirely abortive; as if they had been jealous of the

success of their own plan thus amended, they set up a system of volunteering, which so widely extended the exemptions from the ballot of the army of reserve, that more than about two thirds of the numbers to be raised have not been raised, and the law has, in that degree, been as useless as one of the chapters of Sir Francis D'Ivernois's books. It could not be enforced farther. There were no more materials for it to work upon; and it would absolutely have died for want of food, if Mr. Pitt, its father and its guardian, had not come to its assistance. Mr. Addington and his colleagues had, at last, discovered, that there were not, even with the aid of the army of reserve, any men left to go into the regular army; and, as all the other bodies were full, as we had raised 91,000 militia men, 25,000 sea fencibles, and 400,000 volunteers; as we had locked up more than half a million of men fit to bear arms, it was high time to look about us for the rest to make real soldiers of them; for, amidst all our vaunting about "the irresistible phalanxes of citizens armed in defence of their property, their families, and "all that is dear to man," we still felt a little monitor in our bosom, who taught us to pray to God that our liberties and lives might, in the hour of danger, not be left *entirely* to the prowess and discipline of those phalanxes. In short, we all of us, ministers and all, began to see the necessity of providing a force sufficient to defend ourselves and our phalanxes into the bargain. Thus impressed the ministers proposed to suspend the operation of the army of reserve law, and once more to have recourse to the raising of men for rank, for which purpose several agreements were entered into, which agreements will probably never be fulfilled for want of the men sufficient to establish the claim to the proposed rank. Mr. Pitt, seeing his army of reserve project, which, though a good deal disfigured, he still recognized as his own, about to be annihilated, rushed forward to protect and preserve it, with all the courage and anxiety of a father who sees a darling child upon the point of perishing under the hands of an ignorant or merciless operator. Numerous as is the progeny of projects that call this gentleman father, some persons are astonished at his ardour for the army of reserve, upon which his whole undivided affection seems to have been fixed. But those persons have not observed, that this affection is rather of an instinctive nature than otherwise; that it abandons its objects one after another as the lioness leaves her whelps, retaining very little apparent remembrance of any but the last. It is

the present object: the object of "existing circumstances:" *le projet du jour*: this it is that you ever find occupying the mind and soul of Mr. Pitt. When, therefore, he perceived the design of the late ministry to put an end to the army of reserve project, he resolved to assault them. He was told that it could live no longer; that it must die for want of food; that the ballot would produce no more men in spite of the most active exertions of the parish officers and thieftakers from one end of the kingdom to the other. This was sad intelligence; and, as there seemed to be no doubt of the fact, any man but him of whom we are speaking would have resigned himself to what was evidently the will of fate. Not so Mr. Pitt, who, as his favourite project was perishing for want of sustenance determined to procure that sustenance, cost what it would. There were no more men. Seventy or eighty thousand had, in Great Britain alone, been swallowed up by the militia. He resolved at once to make the militia disgorge; or, at least, cut off its rations for the future; not to put it on a diminished allowance, but to pass on it a sentence of starvation. Here we have a striking instance of his instinctive attachment. The militia had been a favourite; he had swelled it to three times the numbers that it contained when it first came into his hands; but, in comparison with the *projet du jour*, the militia itself, the caressed, the flattered, the eulogized militia, becomes a mere worthless outcast. When the army of reserve project was first broached, the supplementary militia was not raised. It was decreed. It had a nominal existence; but, as yet it was not raised, nor, indeed, hardly begun to be raised, when the army of reserve bill made its appearance. Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham earnestly endeavoured to prevail upon the ministers either to abandon this new project, or to put a stop to the raising of the supplementary militia; for, that to raise both was utterly impossible, without precluding all hope of obtaining for the regular army even recruits enough to fill up the vacancies made by deaths, discharges, and desertions. "In addition," said Mr. Windham, "to 73,000 men, raising by ballot upon the population of Great Britain, and of 18 000 so raised in Ireland, we are now to have 10,000 more for Ireland and 40,000 for Great Britain, making in the whole the number of 141,000, of which 18,000 (the original militia in Ireland), are to be raised by bounty in the first instance, and the rest to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding

"a substitute. Does any man dream after this that it is possible for Great Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. The recruiting of the army has, every body knows, long stood still. An army not recruited must, by degrees, waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some persons may indulge, of transferring men hereafter by new bounties, the army must unavoidably stand still for the present, and, one may venture to say, that, under the influence of such a system, it is not likely to be again put in motion." Has not this opinion been fully verified? And would it not have been well for the country if Mr. Windham's advice had been listened to? Mr. Elliot objected to the measure for reasons similar to those stated by Mr. Windham. He noticed a former declaration of Mr. Pitt, that "even 100,000 men might be raised in Great Britain by ballot, without in the least degree injuring the recruiting service;" upon which he observed, that, if the men who were balloted were also compelled to serve in person, he did not know but they might be raised without materially affecting the regular army; "but," said he, "I aver that even one-fourth part of the number, procured by the exorbitant bounty to which a system of substitution gives rise, would for a time totally extinguish the recruiting service." Mr. Elliot took great pains to press upon the ministers the necessity of suspending the Supplementary Militia, at any rate, it being impossible to raise that force and the army of reserve too. He insisted, that, not only would the regular recruiting for the army be totally extinguished, but that, if the raising of the Supplementary Militia was persevered in, the army of reserve according to the proposed numbers could not be raised in any reasonable time, and, of course, that the regular army would be very late in receiving aid through that channel. The army of reserve has not been raised. It could not be raised. And now, in order to afford a chance of obtaining men under the new bill of Mr. Pitt, the supplementary militia has been obliged to be abandoned. Mr. Addington and Mr. Yonke are consistent. They contended, that the establishment of militia was not too large, and that it did not operate injuriously to the recruiting of the army; but, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Castlereagh, Lord Hawkesbury; the whole of the six famous "Noses" contended for the same point, and how can they, unless they plead their transformation, justify the advice they have now given to his Majesty to

make such an immense reduction in the militia, with a view of enabling the country to afford recruits for the regular army? They insisted, particularly Lord Castlereagh, on whom the task of detail generally fell; they constantly insisted, and their various measures of balloting and volunteering had not tended, and would not tend, to increase the difficulties of raising men for general service. Where is the reader who does not recollect their repeated asseverations to this effect; their dashing statements of the number of men procured per month; and their insinuations as to the motives of those who were so hard-hearted as not to believe above one-half of what they said? Nor were these notions and assertions confined to the Noses: they were adopted by, if they did not proceed from, the very head to which those Noses are now attached, and which compels them to snuffle forth a different language. Mr. Pitt, as is stated in the speech of Mr. Elliot, declared that 100,000 men might be raised by ballot in Great-Britain alone, without any injury to the recruiting service of the regular army. "If said he" (in the debate of June 6, 1803, and in alluding to a speech of Mr. Windham): "If I had to state here my objection, it would not be that the militia was too much: I think that a militia to this extent" (including the supplementary militia, making for Great-Britain 73,000) "we can bear. We know that we have raised 100,000 men by ballot. To the militia may, too, I should think be added another force for home service, or we shall not be in a state of security.\*" That he did not mean the men balloted to be compelled to serve in person is evident, and we now know, that, long before Great-Britain had raised one-half of the number of the 73,000 militia men, the recruiting service for the regulars was at a stand. In the debate of the 23d of June, Mr. Pitt followed immediately after Mr. Elliot. He approved of the army of reserve project; and, as he himself observed in the opening of his speech, "it was rather unfortunate that he approved of it for precisely those reasons which Mr. Elliot had stated as the grounds of his objection." He took infinite pains to disfigure rather than to combat the opinions and arguments of Mr. Elliot. "Our first object," said he, "ought to be that of defending ourselves, before we concur in the plans of those honourable gentlemen for inflicting vengeance for the ag-

gressions and insults we have sustained. If we are so *romantic* as to say, that the obtaining of a defensive force, which will be sufficient to disappoint the proud expectations of the enemy, is a consideration below our notice; if to insure our safety against an enemy who has conquered, terrified, and oppressed one-half of Europe, be a task too humble for us to stoop to; if it is thought that we had better add to the list of his victims than stop short of any thing less than being enrolled as his conquerors; if gentlemen carried their heroism to that extent, they would certainly be justified in opposing this bill; but, I confess, such are not my sentiments.\*" It would have done the reader's heart good to have seen what delight this tirade of stately wit excited in the breasts of the stock-jobbers, who listen to it (I mean from the gallery), and who could scarcely refrain from chucking out loud. But, to men of common discernment and of any recollection it was evident that the whole tirade was inapplicable; for, when did either Mr. Windham or Mr. Elliot talk of "*inflicting vengeance* for the aggressions and insults we had sustained?" Never. They never saw any measure likely to enable the country to attempt such an enterprise. Mr. Pitt, indeed, began his speeches in favour of the war by a loud cry for vengeance. One would have thought he had in view an immediate march to Paris. It is useless to refer to his speech, for every one must remember it, where he calls upon the nation to "repress the ambition and chastise the insolence of the foe." Mr. Windham and Mr. Elliot had never thus broken out in untimely gasconade; nor had they, I repeat it, in any one instance, expressed sentiments bearing the least resemblance to those imputed to them by Mr. Pitt. When had either of them said, that to provide a force sufficient to secure us against the proud expectations of the enemy was "*an object beneath our notice*?" When had they given utterance to any idea which could lead their hearers to suppose that they would be content with nothing short of seeing the country "*enrolled as the conqueror of the enemy*?" They uniformly stated their object to be *security*; but they insisted, that to provide for that security an efficient regular army was necessary, which army they said we could not have if we did not diminish the militia; and now, after an immense useless expense, and a loss of time still

\* See speech, Parl. Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1793.

\* Parl. Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1835.

more important, Mr. Pitt, by his measures, confesses the correctness of their opinions, though he very carefully avoids making any such confession with his tongue. Upon the occasion here spoken of he defended and eulogised the militia system, and maintained, as in his former speech of June 6, that the 73,000 men in that service were not too many for Great-Britain, though the ministers, with his concurrence, and, indeed, at his instigation, were about to add thereto 40,000 balloted men under the name of army of reserve. "I am," said he, "not a little surprised, when I hear it gravely asserted, that the existence of a large militia force" (the very force which he has now found it necessary to reduce in the proportion of one-third) "is incompatible with the existence of a large military force, and destructive to the military spirit of the country. It is admitted even by those gentlemen" (Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham) "that this is a question of degree; and, if it be admitted, that the militia to the extent of 30,000 men was good in its kind, and if that force was considered as necessary forty years ago, those honourable gentlemen must admit, that a much larger force is wanted now." Not to throw away time in commenting upon this curious logic I shall only beg the reader to remember that this speech was made after both the old and supplementary militia had been ordered to be raised, and at the time when the Parliament was about to pass a law, at the instigation of Mr. Pitt himself, for the purpose of adding 40,000 to the number of the balloted men already raised and intended to be raised. Yet this same gentleman, who was now so sarcastic upon those who feared that the militia was swelled beyond due bounds, comes to the Parliament, in less than a year after, and not only makes a proposition for reducing the militia by one-third part of its strength, but for abolishing the ballot altogether, and his reason is, that, with so large a balloted force, it is impossible to obtain recruits for the regular army; a truth which had been stated to him and to the Parliament a hundred times, and which he had, as often as he heard it uttered, positively denied. It is true, that, for the sake of the *projet du jour*, he seems to have abandoned his errors relative not only to the quantity but to the principle of the militia; but, the people have paid pretty dearly, both in their purses and their persons, for his long adherence to those errors. The expense to the parishes and to individuals has been enormous; and, who can pretend to justify the waste, the

sport, that has been made of the zeal and exertions of the people of all ranks and degrees in providing the supplementary militia? In some cases the supplementary men have been added to the establishment, making but one battalion for the county. Here the mortification and listlessness of the officers and the consequent indiscipline of the men may not be so great; but, where the supplementary men are formed into separate battalions, as is the case with Wiltshire, Surrey, and several other counties, and where those battalions are, by the law recently past, condemned to waste away till they have no longer any men belonging to them; in such cases the indifference of the officers must be so great as to render the corps, in a very little time, perfectly useless. The men of these corps will, doubtless, when they come to be very much reduced in numbers, be drafted into the first battalions of their respective counties. But, are the officers to be dismissed? Those belonging to the regular army may return to half-pay, indeed; but, what an ungrateful return is dismissal, in the midst of war, to those country gentlemen who have come forward in the service of the country? To sacrifice money foolishly is blameable, especially at a time like the present; but to lavish thus, to throw away, the zeal and the spirit of the country, in a species of prodigality which it is hardly possible to condemn in terms of adequate severity. And, what, I would be glad to know, is to be done with the non-commissioned officers belonging to these mouldering corps? They must be kept up. They cannot be reduced merely because it has come athwart the mind of the minister to sentence their corps to a lingering death. They will, towards the last, have very few men to take care of; but, still they cannot, without the most flagrant injustice, be reduced in number, in any other way than by discharging them, a measure which will hardly be thought expedient. They must, then, go with the remains of their men, as supernumeraries, into the first battalions, which they will find already over-stocked. What confusion is here! What wild, what crazy work, projects produce when conceived in the mind of a minister! Providence, in mercy to man, has generally made poverty a check upon projecting. When the latter happens to meet with opulence in a private individual it seldom fails to be productive of considerable mischief; what, then, must be its effect when preponderating, when always uppermost, in the mind of a minister of state, and especially a minister who has thirty millions a year passing through his hands,

a minister of whom one half of the nation are the tenants and the other half the annuitants? An answer to this question will be readily given by any one who has observed the progress of our military measures for the last twelve months, and who contemplates our present situation when compared with the sacrifices and exertions that have been made by the people of every class and description. —The threat of an invasion of this kingdom, on the part of the French, and the expectation of it, on our part, have been in constant existence for more than a year. We have been all that time endeavouring to prepare for an effectual resistance, and for an attack upon the enemy, in case an opportunity should offer. What, then, have we done? What progress have we made in this work, absolutely necessary to our existence? We have not, by all the various means that have been employed; by all the numerous projects that have been, and that yet are on foot; we have not added to our army so many men as were taken from it by the reduction at the conclusion of the peace; we have not since the month of March, 1803, that is to say since the signal of war was given, and the militia was called out, we have not raised nearly 20,000 regular soldiers, which is about the number of cavalry and foreign troops that were disbanded in the year 1802, and some of them but a very few months previous to the time when we found it necessary again to begin the work of augmentation. At the end of fifteen months of military projects, we have in Great Britain about 30,000. I say *thirty thousand*, and no more, effective rank and file of the regular army, exclusive of Guards, Artillery, and Cavalry. From the field of battle estimate the Guards ought to be excluded; for, if they are employed there, other regular soldiers should be found to supply their place. Our Artillery are, proportionally, numerous, well appointed, and excellent in every respect; and, unless I am misinformed, great praise is due, in this respect, to Lord Chatlam. But artillery, though they frequently begin, and have sometimes greatly contributed towards the deciding of a battle, are, without infantry, and without a due proportion of infantry too, nothing at all. The same may be said of horse. Without infantry there can, against an army of infantry, be no battle at all; and, accordingly, the first care of every general, and of every wise government, is, to provide a sufficiency of troops of this sort, in proportion to the numbers of whom the strength of an army is always computed. Allowing the Guards to form part of the army for the field, and that their

place will be supplied by militia, we have about 40,000 regular infantry in Great Britain, and 20,000 in Ireland, while the recruiting for general service yields not more than 400 or 500 a month, which number, added to the men enlisted for general service out of the army of reserve, may, probably, amount to about 1,200 a month; and this supply, which is to be shared by the regiments in the East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, and all other parts abroad, will not be found more than half sufficient, perhaps, to fill up the vacancies occasioned by death, desertion, and discharges, many of which latter must take place every year, in spite of all regulation, because many men will annually become unfit for service. Let it be recollected, too, that I am stating the force as effective upon paper; and if my readers do not know the difference between a force upon paper and a force in the field, the Emperor Napoleon does. An army which consists of 40,000 of what are called effectives, seldom contains more than 35,000 fighting men. Admitting, however, that we have an army of 40,000 regular soldiers in Great Britain ready to take the field, what is it, when we consider the extent of coast that we have to defend? It must be obvious to every one, that, if they are separated but a little, there will not be a handful in any one place. Next, then, comes the consideration of what degree of reliance can be reasonably placed in the militia. I should hope that, by this time, the militia were in a state of discipline to render them worthy of being relied on for a stout resistance. Still, however, they are not nearly equal to regular soldiers, and this will be denied by no one, who knows any thing of the matter, and who is not under the influence of selfishness or fear. They are not, and they never can be, equal to regular soldiers; and, however we may deceive ourselves with respect to them, we may rest assured, that we shall produce no deception in the mind of the enemy. Of the volunteers, "that other great feature in our national defence," I would fain have said nothing, especially as the national utility of that body, regulated as it now is, has met with so full and able an exposition from the pen of a correspondent in page 128, to which I beg leave to refer the reader; but, a letter just received from Yorkshire contains matter, which it is my duty to make known to the public, and more especially to the minister, who, I trust, will lose no time in taking measures of precaution against the dangers, which, in my opinion, wear a more serious aspect in this quarter than in any other. The reader

need not be told, that a bill was lately brought into parliament to continue a law which had been passed in the last session, to suspend an old law, inflicting penalties on persons who should follow the clothing trade without having duly served an apprenticeship to it. This suspension bill was disapproved of by the apprenticed clothiers, who made great exertions to prevent its being renewed in this session, and presented a petition for that purpose to the House of Commons. Nobody spoke in favour of the petition; the bill passed; and because Mr. Lascelles did not speak against the bill, he has incurred the marked displeasure of some, and those not inconsiderable in number, of the volunteers of Yorkshire, of which county, or rather, "little kingdom," as Mr. Wilberforce called it, he is one of the representatives, his colleague being Mr. Wilberforce himself. The circumstances are thus stated by my correspondent. "The volunteers in most, if not all, of the manufacturing villages in the neighbourhood of Leeds, hung Mr. Lascelles in effigy, dragged him about, and concluded by shooting him! With those very arms that were given them to protect the constitution, did these gallant volunteers, these patriot heroes, violate one of the chief privileges, the freedom of debate. If an armed mob, Sir, be allowed to express their opinion of the propriety or impropriety of a member's conduct, and to shew their disapprobation by shooting him in effigy, we are not far from the eve of a revolution. From shooting in effigy the transition is not great to shooting in person, which was actually threatened in the present case." This scandalous scene is said to have taken place very soon after these volunteers had returned from the performance of "permanent duty!" I do not pledge myself for the truth of this statement: it comes to me in a letter by post; but, I have myself not the least doubt of the truth of it. It behoves the minister (I speak in the singular number because I "do not count noses") to obtain correct information upon this subject; and, if he finds it to be correct, to cause a striking example to be made of the offenders. Let him never forget the words of Paley: "to me it appears doubtful whether any government can be long secure, where the people are accustomed to the use of arms, and accustomed to resort to them. Every faction will find itself at the head of an army; every disgust will excite commotion, and every commotion become a civil war." We are not got to this state yet; God forbid we

ever should; but, of all our dangers, this, I continue to say, this is by far the greatest. And, I am particularly anxious to guard the minister and the country against the consequences of the volunteer system, if scarcity like that of 1800 and 1801 should again come upon us. It will be useless for us to wring our hands and tear our hair when the calamity arrives. We ought, or rather the government ought, even at this time, to be devising precautions against the probable consequences of such a state of things. Mr. Wilberforce tells us to rely upon Providence, but Providence bids us make use of the means and the talents which it has bestowed upon us; and if we, through indolence or fear, disobey the command, what have we to expect but the fate of the sluggard and the coward? — Such is the present state of our military means of defence; such the result of the measures which, since the peace of Amiens, government has adopted relative to the army. The object of these remarks, is, by shewing the people their dangers, particularly the danger arising from the want of a sufficient regular army, to induce them to use, every one according to his means, the utmost exertion, wherever they have it in their power, to favour the recruiting of that army. The present project of the minister must be excessively expensive to the country, as well as vexatious and oppressive to individuals; and, after all, I fear, it will prove lamentably inefficient; but, be this as it may, it is our duty strictly to obey the law that has enjoined the execution of that project; and not only to obey the law, but to give it all the aid in our power, and thus, by our loyalty, patriotism, zeal and activity, to make up, as far as we are able, for the negligence, the incapacity or the obstinacy of the ministers.

MR. LIVINGSTONE.—The readers of the Register will recollect, that an opportunity was taken to disapprove of the conduct of Mr. Livingstone in the part he took relative to the correspondence of Mr. Drake; and, as was then expected, the most respectable part of his countrymen, those not slavishly devoted to France, have unequivocally joined in this disapprobation, as will appear from the following extracts made from the New York Evening Post of the 28th of May and 1st of June last. These extracts may, too, serve as an answer to a person who, in the Morning Chronicle, took up the defence of Mr. Livingstone some weeks ago. We have here a specimen of the sentiments entertained towards Mr. Livingstone in his native state and city, where, if any where, men will,

most probably, have made a just estimate of his talents and character. That his adulation of Buonaparté should create great disgust in America is no wonder at all; but, the observations made by the American Editor, relative to the conduct and character of the British government, breathe a spirit of justice and of candour which does great honour to the person from whom the observations proceed, and which cannot fail to meet with the applause of every real friend of England and America.—“ Mr. Livingston’s letter.—It is impossible to refrain from making a few observations on the very singular letter of Mr. Chancellor Livingston to Talleyrand, as published in this evening’s paper. We mean not to advance any sort of palliation for the conduct of Mr. Drake, the British Minister at Munich, allowing it to be correctly stated: but we think an ordinary share of discretion would have prevented the American ambassador, the minister of a neutral nation, from taking the part in this affair he has done. He undertakes to judge between the parties, although he has only heard one side, and to decide that the charge brought against the English minister, of having engaged in a plot to assassinate the First Consul, has been proved upon him. But it appears from Talleyrand’s letter itself, that Mr. Livingston had only seen printed copies of the letters of Mr. Drake; he therefore has not had even the possibility of detecting a forgery, if one has been committed. Perhaps his veneration and uncommon attachment to the First Consul, may have been so great as to render it impossible to entertain a suspicion of this sort, and yet his recollection might, without any very great difficulty, have supplied him with cases shewing the possibility of such a thing at no very great distance of time past. But allowing the papers of Mr. Drake to be genuine, what do they disclose? On this subject it is certainly difficult for us, who have not seen them, to speak with confidence; but we will say, that from the character which we have heard of this gentleman, and from the character of his government, without whose knowledge and approbation he cannot be supposed to have acted, that when those papers shall be laid before the world, they will not be found to contain that unequivocal evidence of the facts charged, which might justify an impartial man in deciding upon the case and publishing his opinion without hesitation. But at any

rate, we have no difficulty in saying that they will not, cannot, warrant Mr. Livingston in the lengths he has gone. That Courts may employ ministers or agents to reside on the borders of an enemy in time of war, that those agents may employ spies to give information of what is going on in the enemy’s country, and in short communicate to them every thing that can be of service, is a practice sanctioned by long usage; but that such agents should engage in a plot to assassinate the first Magistrate *de facto*, whatever or whoever he may be, will not admit of a justification; and therefore we repeat it, we cannot give credit to this charge brought against Mr. Drake by Talleyrand. But whether true or not, Mr. Livingston should have remembered that he represented a nation at peace with England as well as with France, and that propriety, good sense, and the laws of nations, required of him the strictest neutrality. That his letter is not neutral, but is a very wide departure from it, appears not only in the precipitate condemnation pronounced against the English minister, but in a still more explicit and exceptionable manner in the close of his letter.—It is not necessary that we should here enter into the merits of the controversy between France and England: it is sufficient for our present purpose to state, that on the part of the English nation it is said that Buonaparté has entertained the project of universal empire, and that it is in the great cause of mankind that she contends single-handed against his mad and destructive ambition. ‘We think,’ (say they) ‘the situation of England a proud one, contending single-handed, for the liberty of the world against an ambitious usurper, who knows no law but conquest.’ Now although as a nation we cannot know the First Consul to be an usurper, but in our intercourse with him, are warranted by the law of nations, in regarding him, while in possession of power, as being in the lawful possession, yet surely we are not at liberty to take the other side and congratulate him upon his ‘noble labours in the field and in the cabinet.’ Besides, if Mr. Livingston has any ground for his apprehensions, that by his ‘loss’ the fate of the country may be materially affected, ought not common prudence to have suggested a different language than what he has employed? Suppose what he apprehends should happen, that Buonaparté

"should be taken away and the Bourbon line be re-established, in what a situation would America stand, after having thus joined openly to espouse the cause of the present government? — No; in every point of view Mr. Livingston's conduct must be regarded as indiscreet, improper and unwarranted by precedent. For ourselves we see in this business a deep laid snare of policy, into which the American minister has blundered headlong.—We confess we think he would have shewn more diplomatic skill had he, like Mr. Fauchet, 'drawn 'himself out of the affair by some common place remarks.' Whether 'his actions are to be attributed to the government he represents and his conduct 'to be identified with it,' is a question we leave to be settled between him and Mr. Jefferson."—In the same print of the 1st of June is the following passage: "Diplomatic Correspondence.—We now furnish our readers with the letters of some of the other ministers for whom Citizen Talleyrand set his gull trap. They follow this article in their order.—The first, from the ambassador of the Italian Republic is precisely such an one as might have been expected from the representative of a conquered, abject republic, over which the First Consul holds an absolute sway. The other three letters, though from the ministers of sovereigns who by no means stand in an independent or enviable situation in relation to Buonaparté, yet are all of them written with more caution and discretion than that from the ambassador of the United States, who proudly boast of their independence. If we are not extremely mistaken, Mr. Livingston will rue the day when he wrote that letter to Talleyrand."

IRISH CURRENCY.—In referring the reader to a very interesting paper upon the currency of Ireland, in the following sheet, page 137, I cannot refrain from declaring my disagreement with the writer, as to the blame which he imputes, in this respect, to the persons composing the administration in that country, to whom, most assuredly, no part of the blame can fairly be attributed. Does he think, that any set of ministers, however well they might "understand the principles of good government," could have prevented the depreciation of the Bank of Ireland paper? If not, how could they have prevented the debasement of the coin? And, if they could not have prevented the

debasement of the coin, how could they have prevented a refusal to take it in exchange for valuable commodities? "The public offices began the refusal." He acknowledges that the shillings were, at last, made of metal no better than pewter; and I am sure he will not pretend, that this sort of coin could have continued much longer to purchase bread. There might, as to some little matter of regulation, have been blame due to the government; but no regulation of theirs could have retarded the event of stoppage of circulation for the space of three days. The degradation of the coin, or rather bits of metal, had gone as far as it could go. It had arrived at its utmost point; and the decrees of Robespierre would not have supported it a week longer.—In like manner I think that, by all the writers upon Irish currency, the Irish bank directors have been handled much too severely. The depreciation of their paper is, by every body, traced as far back as the measure of bank-restriction. It was the minister and the Parliament of England who proposed and accomplished that measure; and, if any bank directors are blameable, it is the bank directors on this side of the water; those bank directors who first asked for the restriction, and not those who did not ask for it. That men should ask to be restrained from paying their promissory notes when presented was natural enough: no man, especially one who has had notes presented to him that he was unable to pay, can have the conscience to blame them; but, if we do not blame persons of this description in England, it seems very unfair to deal so hard with their brethren of Ireland, and to represent them, as some persons have, as being very little better than swindlers upon a broad scale. I very much doubt, and I should like to be better informed upon the subject, whether the bank company, in either country, does really derive any profit from the restriction, notwithstanding all that has been said about their *large dividends*. I may be mistaken, and I speak with great diffidence upon the subject; but, I have seen nothing to satisfy me, that banking is now a better trade than it was previous to the restriction. There is now nothing solid in it: it is become a game at hazard; and I sincerely believe, that, what is got with one hand is lost with the other. If my conjectures, for they are mere conjectures, have any foundation, men ought to reflect before they promulgate opinions that may, at a time not far distant, chance to be very destructive to the persons against whom those opinions may finally operate. We should be

very cautious how we excite a popular prejudice against any set of men; and I am sure the writers to whom I allude would lament that their labours should have any such tendency.—To ascribe the degradation of the paper to the measure of *bank-restriction*. [It mortifies one so to abuse the use of words, but habit will sanction any thing!] cannot be avoided; but, I do think that I perceive an uncommon, and, to me, an unaccountable, solicitude to avoid any topic that may lead to the *cause of that restriction*. You hear persons enough say, that the restriction was absolutely necessary at the time; but there they stop, saying not a word about the cause of the necessity. Some people have, indeed, talked about the rate of the exchange being, at that time, so much against England, that, if the bank had not been restrained from paying its notes in specie, all the hard money would have been drained out of the country. But, has the restriction kept the money in the country? And if so where is it? Lord Hawkesbury, to be sure, has lately told us, that there are, and that *there must be*, about *forty millions* of guineas now in the kingdom. Can we not bring him before a justice of the peace and make him prove his words? Well; but as to the rate of exchange, that objection to paying in specie continued after the conclusion of the peace, when Mr. Addington, in presenting a bill for a renewal of the restriction law for a *short space*, for only a few months, and liable to be repealed during the session, told the House of Commons, that the *cause* of his proposing the renewal was *the unfavourable state of the exchange with the continent*. The same reason was stated for a further renewal in the next session, till war arrived most opportunely and relieved his hearers from these tantalizing propositions and promises, by affording him a pretext for demanding a confirmation of the suspension till six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace with France. But, what will Mr. Addington, our late financier, say in answer to Mr. Foster, who states, and who *proves*, and that too in the most satisfactory manner, that the restriction is the *cause* of the unfavourable exchange, and that the exchange never can be favourable again, till the restriction is taken off, and, of course, till bank notes are, at the will of the holder, convertible into specie?—No: the rate of the exchange was the effect, and not the cause, from the very beginning of the decline of the paper. The progress, traced backwards, I take to be this: the scarcity of coin has been produced by the depreciation

of the paper; the depreciation of the paper by the excess of its quantity; that excess latterly, in a great degree, by the measure of bank restriction; and that measure by the increase of taxes together with the frequency of loans and advances growing out of the connexion between the Exchequer and the bank. If I am wrong in these opinions, I shall thank any body that will take the pains to put me right; but, until I hear something more conclusive than I have yet heard. I must beg leave to enter my protest against any clamour, in however soft accents it may be begun, against the directors of the bank either of England or Ireland, and more especially against the latter.

INTERNAL STATE OF JAMAICA.—This subject will be found very ably treated in the succeeding sheet, page 133; and I only wish to observe here, that there will, upon examination, appear to be a perfect agreement, substantially, in all the papers which have been published in the Register, relative to this important colony. In the enumeration of those papers, at the bottom of page 82, I forgot to mention a very valuable one, which will be found in vol IV, page 589. It is entitled, “Statements and observations on the sugar-trade between Great Britain and her Old West India colonies, printed for the use of the members of the assembly of Jamaica.” This paper should be carefully perused by all those who wish to obtain a competent degree of knowledge upon the subject of the present complaints of the Jamaica planters, whom my correspondent in page 133 describes, and, I believe, truly describes, as being in the very abyss of bankruptcy. The state of this island and its trade must, and that at no very distant day, become a subject of legislative inquiry, or, the remissness of the parliament must be great indeed. It should be recollected, that, with Jamaica, we lose our all in the West Indies; for, it is well known to naval men, that, in the ports of no other island can our fleet rendezvous in time of war, especially for the purpose of re-fitting; and, indeed, on every account, Jamaica is of so much importance, the rest of the islands are with respect to her so much like satellites, that they must follow her fate, be it what it may. The question, therefore, is nothing short of this: shall we, or shall we not, retain any colonies in the West Indies?

THE STATE OF ST. DOMINGO, is as wretched, and the deeds committed upon the whites as bloody, as any negro-lover could possibly wish. The fact as stated in the account of the massacre, in page 153, of

the negroes drinking the warm blood of those whom they had murdered is by no means improbable. They did it, in many instances, during their massacres of 1794 and 1795. It is pretended, that a justification is to be found for these blood-thirsty monsters in the treatment, which they so long endured from their masters. The same defence was set up for the September-brisers of Paris; and the same defence might be made for revolutionary cut-throats in any country. Indeed, the massacres of St. Domingo have been produced by doctrines such as those which produced the massacres of France, and in both instances the grounds of justification, or of palliation at least, were equally false. No monarchs were ever more mild than those of the House of Bourbon, and no masters were ever more merciful and kind than the planters of St. Domingo: it was, in both cases, the excess of lenity, or, perhaps, of indolence, in the governing powers, that first excited and afterwards encouraged and fostered the spirit of rebellion in the governed. And it is a shame to hear men, in this kingdom lamenting, or affecting to lament, the hardships and privations of the negroes, when so many objects of real compassion amongst their fellow subjects seem to attract but a very little share of their attention. The negroes are a bloody-minded race: they are made and marked for servitude and subjection: it is the purpose which they were obviously intended for; and of this fact every day affords us fresh proof. Suppose the islands were to be abandoned. What would be the consequence? Some years of blood would ensue. The negroes would murder one another; the lands would lie fallow; thousands upon thousands of Europeans would be ruined. But, things would not always remain in this state. The strongest amongst the European powers would again seize upon those fertile domains; more negroes would be brought to cultivate them; and philanthropy would, at the end of twenty years, have accomplished no other end than that of causing great ruin amongst Europeans and the spilling of rivers of African blood. To Great-Britain the abandonment would be peculiarly injurious. It would at once clip the wings of her maritime power; it would make a fearful defalcation in her commercial and pecuniary means; it would close up one of those outlets to her population which causes her to live beyond her own scanty limits, and though this might be a subject of joy with those persons, who, sighing, call the West-Indies "the

grave of Great-Britain," it would be a subject of deep regret with every man who is in the smallest degree acquainted with the principles according to which alone we can rightly judge of the causes of the rise and the fall of nations. Much, upon this subject, may be gathered from the wishes of our enemies. Nothing is so near their heart as the destruction of our colonies in the West Indies. They perceive, if we do not, that the consequences would be the reducing these islands to mere dependent states. They know that, confined within ourselves, we cannot long defend our country against them. They desire nothing so much as to plunge our valuable foreign possessions into confusion and bloodshed; and sorry I am to see, that so many persons amongst ourselves are pursuing objects which must inevitably tend to facilitate the consummation of that desire.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

##### IMPERIAL DECREES.

*Extract of the Minutes of the Secretary of State's Office.—Decree for taking the Oath and the Coronation of the Emperor, and the other Accessory Ceremonies.—Dated Palace of St. Cloud, July 9, 1804.*

NAPOLEON, by the Grace of God and the Constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French, having taken the advice of his Privy Council, decrees:—**FIRST SECTION.**—*The taking of the Oath, and the Coronation.*—Art. 1. The taking of the Oath and the Coronation of the Emperor, shall take place on the 18th Brumaire next, (Nov. 9).—2. A proclamation shall announce this solemnity to the whole Empire, and shall summon those who are to assist at it, as specified in the Senatus Consultum of the 28th of last Floreal, to appear at Paris before the 10th Brumaire.—3. Particular letters shall also be addressed to them on the part of his Majesty.—4. The Public Functionaries who are summoned, shall make known their arrival to the Principal Master of the Ceremonies, who will indicate the place appointed for them at the ceremony.—5. The solemnity of taking the Oath, and the Coronation, will take place in presence of the Empress, the Princes, Princesses, High Dignitaries, and all the Public Functionaries, described by the Senatus Consultum of the 28th Floreal, in the Chapel of the Invalids.

**SECOND SECTION.**—*Of the Ceremony which will take place in the Champ de Mars.*—6. After the solemnity of the taking the Oath and the Coronation, his Majesty the

Emperor will proceed to the Champ de Mars.—7. The national guards of every department of the Empire, will send to Paris a detachment of 16 men, with colours for each detachment, one half of which shall be fusileers or grenadiers, one-fourth officers, and one-fourth non-commissioned officers.—8. The maritime departments, squadrons, flotillas, and armed vessels of the Empire, shall send 50 detachments of 10 men, with a flag to each detachment.—9. Every corps of horse, of all the different descriptions throughout the army, shall send a deputation of 16 men, the half of which shall be grenadiers, fusileers, soldiers, dragoons, light horse, one-fourth officers, and one-fourth non-commissioned officers, with the colours, standard, or guidon.—10. The preceding article is applicable to the regiments of marine artillery.—11. The engineers shall send three deputations of 16 men each.—12. The 26 legions of the *gens-d'armes* shall each send a deputation of 4 men and a guidon.—13. The invalids of the Hotel at Paris, and those of Louvain and Avignon, shall send three deputations, whose composition shall be regulated according to the instruction of the War Minister.—14. All these deputations shall successively take the oath of fidelity and obedience to his Majesty the Emperor.—15. The deputations of the national guards, those of the maritime circles, and such of the corps who have colours, guidons, or standards, shall afterwards receive from his Majesty, for their department or regiments, a pair of colours for each department, a flag for each detachment of marine, and a guidon or standard for each battalion or squadron.—16. The colours of the departments shall remain in the most conspicuous place of the Hotel of the Prefectory, under the guard already settled for the Prefects. They shall never be taken from thence but by an officer named by the Emperor; and shall be unfurled and shewn to the people on all solemn occasions.—17. The flags shall be distributed among the maritime circles, and deposited at the Marine Hotel, under a guard of honour, in the principal place of the Seven Circles in which Antwerp is comprised, in order to be given to the squadrons, naval armies, flotillas, or other armaments and expeditions, according to the orders of the Emperor.—On their return, these flags shall be carried to the Marine Hotel, where they shall be

kept in the Council Chamber, for some succeeding expedition.—18. The colours, standards, and guidons of the corps, shall be returned to each battalion or squadron. Those who, by the events of war, shall lose them, shall not receive others of the same kind, but by a direct order from his Majesty, after it has been proved that they were not lost by any fault of the regiment. Those who shall lose them from their own fault, shall not receive any others from the Emperor.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

#### SCOTCH SMALL-BOUNTY MEN.

SIR,—Amid the variety of crude and imperfect projects which have been hitherto submitted to the attention of Parliament, it is pleasing to discern, in the abolition of the ballot, something like an approximation to a more rational plan of acting. Whether, indeed, we consider the balloting system on its own merits, or whether we view it with a reference to the other parts of our defence, whether we consider it theoretically or practically, we shall find that it is totally inadequate to its object, and most vexatiously oppressive; in short, that it combines all possible evil with as little good as the nature of things will allow. The army of reserve, to which it gave birth, is a measure which it would be difficult to describe in adequate terms of reprobation. It certainly did astonish the generality of thinking men, that a bill should pass the House of Commons, which imposed a *direct* tax chiefly on that class of the community who ought to be exempted from all *direct* taxation, and to be touched upon very lightly by any sort of import. This ill-contrived project did, however, meet with the support of Mr. Pitt, who seems not till very lately to have opened his eyes to the flagrant injustice and ruinous effects of the balloting system. Surely he might have known, had he been at any pains to explore those sources of information which are open to all mankind, that the army of reserve is composed chiefly of substitutes; and it did not certainly require very deep thought to discover, that a bill, by which the burden of defending the country was chiefly thrown upon the poor, was partial and unjust. All the information on which his new bill is grounded, and which has induced him to change his former sentiments, he might certainly have obtained at a much earlier period; and, it is peculiarly hard, that though

the pernicious effects of bad measures, are felt and acknowledged by all, yet they must continue in force until it shall please our statesmen to awaken from their dreams. In order, therefore, to anticipate the slow progress of Mr. Pitt's experience, by which he seems disposed ultimately to profit, however slowly it operates on his mind, I shall trouble you with a few observations on a regulation respecting the volunteers, which seems to have derived its origin from his influence, and which appears to me to be both inadequate to its object, expensive to government, and most vexatious to private industry. I allude to that clause in the volunteer act, by which all volunteers, by entering on "permanent duty" for three weeks, are entitled to a bounty of one guinea besides their pay, and the same allowances to their wives and children as are made to those of the militia. You pointed out the inconveniencies of this measure when it was first proposed. But those inconveniencies are infinitely aggravated in those parts of the country where the rate of wages is low. In Scotland, where the weekly rate of wages is from nine to ten shillings, and where by volunteering for three weeks, men may gain from sixteen to twenty-five shillings per week, the temptation is irresistible. Accordingly, in several parts of this country this measure has been executed with unmitigated rigour. The volunteers of Dundee, Fetterar, Montrose, and Arbroath have been respectively interchanged. They were ordered to march with only the previous warning of three days, and so strictly was their order enforced, that no exceptions were granted even in cases of the most peculiar and pressing necessity. Every species of industry was most completely at a stand; even in manufactures of perishable commodities, the same severity overbore all considerations of private loss. The shortness of the warning rendered it quite impossible to ward off the blow by any expedient, or even in the smallest degree to alleviate the evil; if a longer time had been allowed, the exertions of private ingenuity might have devised some palliative; persons concerned might have been enabled to make proper arrangements with a view to the expected event, and when it did take place, to have managed the wretched remains of their industry with the best possible effect. But conducted as this plan has been, it is peculiarly calculated to bring ruin upon individuals. The positive loss to individuals in the towns which I have mentioned, cannot be estimated at less than £5000, a heavy tax, even if it had been raised by a general and impartial assessment, but beyond all

comparison more weighty, when, to the partiality with which it presses upon a particular class of individuals, is added all the variety of mischief, all the random destruction which must result from the execution of this inconsiderate project. We are told that this eventful crisis calls for heavy sacrifices, and renders it necessary to impose heavy burdens. But, I would be glad to know how we are to bear heavy burdens if we are deprived of the means of subsistence, and certainly if this experiment be frequently repeated, it will tend more effectually than the heaviest taxes to ruin the pecuniary resources of the country, and to dry up the very source of revenue. Surely the advantages resulting from this plan ought to have been demonstrated in a very satisfactory manner before it had been adopted. But, so far from thinking that any benefit can be derived from it, in any respect equal to the evil with which it is attended, I do not even think that it is worth the bounty and permanent pay allowed by government. There are, in the first place, to be deducted from the 21 days, three Sundays on which the troops are not drilled; two to march to their respective stations, and two to return; allow for rainy weather four days, in all, eleven days to be deducted from the twenty-one, which leaves a remainder of ten days. Allowing, therefore, the perfection of military discipline to consist in that mechanical precision, in which the volunteers are chiefly instructed, if they are allowed to remain at home, and drilled in the same manner as at the places to which they are marched; if they perform the same evolutions, and bestow the same attention, I cannot help thinking that the same effects will result; with this difference, that in the one case, in the intervals between drilling, and in bad weather, they might employ themselves in their ordinary occupations; whereas, in the other, they loiter about in idleness, and are liable to be corrupted by all those vices of which idleness is a powerful predisposing cause. But if, as you observe, and I think you perfectly correct, the essence of the military character consists in a rooted habit of obedience to command, and not in a punctilious attention to contemptible minutiae, the scheme of permanent duty is of all others the most puerile and ridiculous. To create dispositions and to fix habits in mankind requires a long and laborious process; it is indeed, the nature of all moral habitudes, even after the seminal principles have been strewed in the mind, to grow to maturity by very slow degrees; they require the most patient attention, and they must be fostered

by a variety of collateral causes. In this view, a scrupulous regard to all the minutiae of discipline, though despicable to the last degree in the military mimicry of the volunteers, promotes in the economy of the regular army a very important end; it brings the man *constantly under the eye of his officer; it renders him perpetually conversant with authority, WHICH ADMITS OF NO DISPUTE*; by these means the artificial principles, cherished in his mind, preponderate at last over those on which they were originally engrafted, and the man is gradually tutored to that degree of instinctive obedience, which constitutes the radical distinction between undisciplined and veteran troops. In our present establishment of internal defence, we have brought together all the constituent elements, but we want the cementing principle to give them coherence and solidity. We have realised the fable of Prometheus. We have formed and combined all the different members of the body according to the rules of just proportion; we have constructed a piece of correct mechanism, and given to it all the external graces of which mere matter is susceptible; but we still want the principle of life, to warm and animate the senseless image; we want a soul to inform the lifeless clay. It is evident that the very fundamental principles on which the volunteers are constituted, are completely hostile to the establishment of strict discipline. How can any thing like a system of vigorous discipline be established among men who have the unqualified power of resigning, and thus at once, on a moment's notice, and for reasons wholly arbitrary, of dissolving all connexion between them and their officers, and of absolving themselves from all the obligations of military duty, whenever they shall prove in the least degree burdensome or disagreeable. In whatever view, therefore, the military character be considered, whether as depending on the attainment of a mechanical precision in certain motions, or whether its essential principles lie deeper in the human mind, the project of three weeks' service appears to be altogether nugatory. In the one case the volunteers may evidently be drilled with more advantage at home, and in the other, surely nothing can be more wild and visionary than to imagine, that under the control of feeble and imperfect discipline, and with inexperienced officers, such a short period of duty can stamp a different character on the relation between them and their officers. Such an expectation can only arise from a blind and obstinate attachment to this incongruous system. Reasoning, therefore, on the principles of the projectors of

the measure, it appears to be potent only to oppress and destroy, but totally inefficient to any good purpose. Its present effects, in the loss of productive industry, and in the havoc made in all the most important relations of civil society, are destructive in the extreme; but, the evil of its remoter operation may not be less fatal in many respects, one of which is, in creating among the great body of the people a disinclination to a service *comparatively* so poorly rewarded as that of the regular army. All our plans of defence are too much adapted to extreme cases; they are rather the result of rashness and terror, than of deliberate wisdom. Our ministers (and nobody seems to be more actuated by this spirit than Mr. Pitt) seem to think, that in providing for our security, no sacrifice can possibly be too great, that the utter derangement of industry ought not to weigh a feather in the scale of their deliberations, nor even ought to be stated as any objection to the execution of their military projects. They appear to be scared far beyond the bounds of sobriety and reason by the terror of invasion, and if we were to judge by their idle declamation, we should naturally conclude that there was a destroying enemy already in the heart of the country. With them measures of caution have no limit, they pursue them in opposition to every other consideration. Their conduct is somewhat similar to that of a gentleman, whose reigning disturbance was a dread of housebreakers, and who was for nine years unceasingly occupied in improving upon the common methods of security against their attacks. "He had at last, by the daily superaddition of new expedients, contrived a door which could never be forced; for one bar was secured by another with such intricacy of subordination, that he was himself not always able to disengage them in their proper method. He was happy in this fortification, till being asked how he would escape if threatened by fire, he discovered that with all his care and expense he had only been assisting his own destruction." Although it must be confessed that our apprehensions are founded on more solid grounds than the fears of this visionary, yet many of our plans appear to have been conceived in the same spirit of irrational terror, and if we persist in obstinately adhering to our present system, in rendering the national defence an adequate apology for every destructive project; if we continue to squander away the resources of the nation in tempting the labouring classes of society from their natural occupations, we shall undoubtedly find, that in protecting ourselves against one

evil, we have laid ourselves open to another; and that, while we have been vainly endeavouring to heap security upon security, and to guard against the remotest possibility of danger from foreign attack, we have been, by our ignorant and precipitate counsels, if not materially assisting in our own destruction, at least inflicting a wound upon our country, which it will require many years of prosperous tranquillity to heal. The story to which I have alluded, applies also, to us in this respect, that the object of all our contrivances, the great purpose for which all our cumbrous machinery is erected, is the attainment of *mere safety*. All our instruments of defence, like bolts and bars, are in their own nature totally inert, and capable only of a negative operation. We possess indeed, resources within ourselves, both physical and moral; which, if they had been consolidated under the direction of a vigorous and comprehensive mind, might have been rendered formidable; but which are "by their very essence and constitution, disabled from defending us by any one preventive stroke, or any operation of active hostility." They are, indeed, imprisoned and pent up in our own island, and are only fit to be exhibited by Mr. Pitt in a harmless array of figures, for the purpose of dazzling our enemies by a splendid picture of our internal power. When the ardent feelings of patriotism begin to languish under this system of feebleness and mismanagement, when a free people, hitherto accustomed to identify their existence with their glory, feel their proud spirit broken, and their pride humbled, by being taught to lurk for safety in the dirt and mire of a base and cowardly policy, ministers dress up the spectre of invasion, and send it abroad to keep the people in alarm, and by thus acting on their fears, to reanimate their drooping energies, and to excite, for a time, that enthusiasm which results from the prospect of immediate peril. They have muzzled the British lion, and cooped him in a cage; they have broken his spirit, and nearly extinguished that generous ardour which nature kindled in his heart, and now they clatter round his cage, and poke him with a stick, and practise all the other low tricks of itinerant jugglers, to make him growl and grin, and to draw forth from the noble animal the faint radiations of his former fire. B.

#### INTERNAL STATE OF JAMAICA.

SIR,—After reading in the Register of the 7th instant, (p. 1.) the observations on Jamaica, which are for the most part drawn from the facts of public statements, I offer

you, for any purpose you may think them useful, the following more particularly referring to the internal condition of that colony. As an eye witness I may claim credibility; and when it is recollected that evils such as you have represented do exist, it must be inferred that remove as well as immediate causes have arisen to complete their calamity. The consequences of the high duties on colonial produce, as proved in your Register to have commenced some years back, were a destruction of credit to the planters both here and in Jamaica. Bills of exchange were sent back innumerable, there succeeded between merchants and planters a distressing course of suits at law, the one to protract the loss or independence of their estates, the other to force immediate payment, or to obtain greater security for their unpaid debts. From this the island has progressively been sinking under the blow, the major part of the estates are in the possession of mortgagees, or of the proprietors on sufferance of creditors. Chancery suits are still impending and still renewing; and it may be asserted, that a few years more will reduce Jamaica to a state of beggary. But, the merchants creditors of estates delay the last exertion of law which may transfer the possession and fee simple to themselves, because, even at the reduced price, at which the estates would be forced into their hands, the merchants conceive they would lose, or be injured. So that, while the estates are in the permissive possession of planters, or held by merchants as trustees or mortgagees in possession, or as chancery receivers, there is, strictly speaking, no sound proprietor. Another effect results, that the merchant has what is termed the factorage of the estates, and freight for his ships; he has the consignment of the sugar; he takes to himself compound interest for his debt, and has the whole power of possession without the inconvenience. Government receives the duties, the insurer his quota, and, perhaps, out of the wreck of the fee-simple, the planter, or his devisee, may enjoy an annuity. The estates in Jamaica remains in the *statu quo* of debt: in many instances in annual accumulation: so that, for the greater part, it may be said, that no clear rental goes into any one's pocket; but that it is well if the estate in the action and reaction of necessary charges, and of annual profits to pay them, does not suffer defalcation in the account current. In the political situation of Jamaica, the cause that ruined the planter deters the merchant from wishing to take the property in his own name. The war

has again begun, new taxes are laid on plantation imports; the deterioration of West-India property will be aggravated; and, it may be added, that St. Domingo is a malignant cloud, the fore-runner of civil hurricanes. Tenfold then will be the conviction of the insecurity of West-India possessions. As if the mischief here stated were not enough, the slave abolition is again introduced, and, between the pledges the ministry has made of his humanity, and his consciousness of the result of abolition on the trade and revenue, he will be pushed to contrive expedients of compromise. It must not be presumed that there are *no* independent proprietors of Jamaica: there are many, not of successful speculations of late years, but of times previous to the date you affix to the origin of Jamaica's bad fortune. Yet they are at a loss to secure their estates from submitting to the debtor side; and feel, in the comparative diminution of means in this country, the diminution of the value of their lands and effects. Even many of them have of late years been chained to the oars of mortgaging. Besides the severity of ministry in laying such duties, another wound to the interest of the planter is the high rate of freight, which is imposed on account of the enormous expense of sailing merchant ships. The Navigation Act, as you observe, is now another grievance, for North America is the life and soul of Jamaica. Sugar is to be shipped there only in British bottoms, which the American government takes care to burden with charges of entry to almost a prohibition. Rum and molasses are allowed to be carried by the Americans. So far from rum being an article of advantage, I have heard that New York spirits have been smuggled to Jamaica for the sake of the profit arising. Jamaica was raised on the foundation of what is termed the forced trade: that is a contraband intercourse allowed by the government with the West-India Spaniards. This is a subject of commercial lamentation: this trade, that once filled Port Royal of earthquake memory, with gold and silver, that raised Kingston to affluence, and diffused plenty over the face of the country, is tottering towards ruin, and the benefit of the Spaniards. Instead of millions of coin, they now bring only thousands, and supply the planter with cattle, mules, and horses, for which instead of taking British goods, they demand much of their own doubloons and dollars back; going to cheaper markets for such commodities. So far from the complaints alluded to in your Register being exaggerated, if these asseverations are bottomed, woe unto Cromwell's

Island! and, that they are truth, the events now existing may imply, and the preceding events of a few years will lay bare. Why, Sir, the whole colony is in a state of civil hostility in the courts of law and chancery; the collectors of taxes are compelled to exert the cruelty of law to enforce payment of taxes; and the resident land owners of small estates are most of them confined to their dwelling houses in a state of siege against the writs of creditors, who again are hunted by the agents of merchants in England for non-payment of loans. And this is the *el dorado* of ministers! the elysium of five thousand of her warriors! What infatuation, what wilful blindness! "*quos Deus vult perdere, prius deditat!*" It cannot have been attempted to look into the state of the colony before proposing such measures. The despair of hungry sharks drove one side to extort, the despair of death drove the other to refuse. From what precedent was the black regiment inflicted on the colony? From the arming of blacks in St. Domingo, by the contending whites and mulattoes, which, more than the proclamation of the convention, produced the Dessalines of this day? Was it the arming of the seapoys? But where is the parallel between the slaves and the East-Indians, in any one quality or respect whatever? Great oversights are never committed with impunity. Without something in place of prevention (the moment for which is past) Jamaica is in the agonies of death, as to national ability.

Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops

Nec sitim potuit nisi causa morbi

Fugit venas et aquoribus albo.

Corpore languet.

Many more local observations might be urged to substantiate the opinion of Jamaica's decline. Nothing would better answer the purpose, than if a table of the proceedings of an estate were arithmetically laid before the public; both in relation to Jamaica, and to England. Not merely a delineation of charges in gross, but with a specific account of the debts of an estate, its accidental relations, and its necessary payments in Jamaica, which would be a proper appendage to the statement, inserted in a former Register. The amount of the *debt* with which Jamaica is loaded commercially should be known by ministers; and the circumstances of the contraband trade should be examined. Even with all due diligence, I fear the day of happy reformation is gone. I think it impossible, that existing evils can be amended. So open to the consequence of war, the enormous private debts, increasing public debts, destruction of internal cre-

dit, and agitation of credit with English merchants; the change in the Spanish trade, the costs of shipping, the power of the Navigation Act, and the neighbourhood of St. Domingo, together with the condition of the sugar market in England, and the impositions of duty: add to all this the slave trade now in discussion, by the passing of which through the Commons we plead guilty to a self-created verdict of public and private infamy against the prescription of ages; but to whatever branch of trade or intercourse we turn, in which Jamaica bears a part, we find not one that is not leafless in its own decay, or stript by the fury of its own dragon, its pretended guardian! So much for Jamaica. Perhaps our military contractor of serjeant and parish-officer may hope to restore the latent fire of war in our breasts, and tell us to be great within the European islands. Be it so. Without Scotland or Ireland, Bacon, I believe it is, holds up little England as, in itself, the champion of belligerent nations. Yet it might have been thought of, some few years back, to have put a stop to the immense drain of British blood, and especially British gold on Jamaica investments, of purchases and loans, now irretrievable.—C.

#### STATE OF IRISH CURRENCY.

SIR,—The unfeigned thanks of every Irishman are due to you, Mr. Cobbett, for your liberal and zealous attention to every circumstance connected with their interests. It is only necessary to know, that there is not an Editor of any newspaper published in Ireland, who dares, or, who will, at least, state facts as they occur, or express the sentiments of any correspondent; it is only necessary to know this, in order to be able fully to appreciate the value of your weekly publication, which is now read throughout the sister kingdom. Your insertions on the subject of Irish currency have been of the greatest service, and as an opportunity has occurred to me of witnessing in person the events which have attended the debasement of the silver currency, I shall endeavour to give you a clear idea of the causes which produced it, and of the effects which have flowed from it; and notwithstanding Mr. Corry declared in the House of Commons, that measures were resorted to by the Irish government, which *had remedied the evil*, I shall, I trust, be able to *prove*, that no remedy has yet been applied.—The ratio of gold to silver according to the regulation of the mint is as 1 to 15 $\frac{2}{3}$ : the true proportion, according to the market prices, is nearly as 1 to 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ . Twenty-one mint shil-

lings will, therefore, be worth a mint guinea and one shilling, as is perfectly evident by the fact of a pound troy of standard gold being coined into 44 $\frac{1}{2}$  guineas, and a pound troy of silver into 62 shillings (Lord King, 2d Edit. p. 138). It follows, therefore, that, when guineas were in circulation in Ireland, there must have been an existing temptation to melt all mint shillings, or those which were any thing heavier than what was necessary to give to 21 shillings more value than the value of a guinea. This circumstance being established, and also the certainty of a depreciation of Bank paper of at least 10 per cent., twenty one shillings of such a weight as would have been left in circulation, when guineas were current, would now be increased in value 10 per centum; or, in other words, they would buy a guinea Bank note and about  $\frac{2}{10}$  of a note. The depreciation, therefore, of paper has been the real cause of the debasement of the silver coin, and the progress of it has regularly coincided with the progress of the depreciation, until no such thing remained in circulation as a real silver representative of a shilling. It is not a matter of surprise, that the silver coin should have been thus permitted by the government of Ireland to die without the benefit of a doctor, when, in the first instance, they so coolly observed the whole currency depreciated 10 per cent. and have so sagaciously discovered, that the malady is past recovery, and that there was no need of a doctor to prescribe to such hale and thrifty characters as those who preside over the measures of the Bank. The government acting upon that principle of physic, which dictates the leaving of nature to herself, have left the guarantee of the value of the currency to the laudable nature of a body of merchants to consult their own interests in preference to that of the public, and the existence of silver specie to the natural propensity of coiners to make more profit by the melting pot, than these ingenious persons were enabled to make by sending back into circulation whatever portion of it they received by walking in the paths of honest industry. For what did the government of Ireland do, when at least two years ago every one began to complain of the silver coin? They did nothing: they left every thing to nature. They even forgot the control they possessed over the receipts at the public offices, and in the collection of the taxes, the receipts of this base coin was permitted at the public offices.—*After* the work of debasement had been completed, and shillings actually had been passable made of pewter, the public

offices were the first to refuse payment in the base coin, and by this refusal produced the sudden stoppage of all trading operations throughout the whole city of Dublin! The distress which arose from this cause admits not of adequate description. The poor women who had brought their eggs or fowls to market from the vicinity of the metropolis, and who depended upon the usual demand for them for the means of purchasing the bread which was to feed their families for the ensuing day or two, were obliged to return with their commodities which could command no value, and without bread. The roads leading from the markets were, in the evening, crowded with wretched creatures, loudly deploring their misfortunes, and unable to calculate upon any certain method of giving sustenance to their craving children. The inhabitants of Dublin could not be supplied with bread and meat, because the baker and the butchers could not receive in payment what the flour factors and graziers would not receive from them, and thus the people were deprived of the power of procuring the necessaries of life, in the midst of plenty and abundance. But these were not the only grievances which were experienced. The time which has since elapsed, and the experience that has since been derived, were necessary to be able to attain a due knowledge of the baneful effects resulting from the debasement of silver coin. The industrious journeyman or labourer, who had received his week's wages, instead of 12s. or 16s. or 21s. which he had fairly earned, was obliged to seek some value for them from those persons, who undertook to give the fair value for the portion of silver contained in each bad shilling; and thus many of the persons who had in the first instance derived a profit by making them, derived a second profit by buying them up and giving to the ignorant and suffering indigent 2d. 3d. or 4d. for that shilling which represented many hours of hard labour.—This was not all, for notwithstanding a certain small quantity of good shillings have come forth into circulation, which had been hoarded up, and some paper notes are issued, and some dollars, and even an efficient remedy applied, according to Mr. Corry, there has not been, and there is not one-fourth part of the amount of the circulation necessary for Dublin, with all these quackeries, yet acquired. The consequence is, that almost all retail trade is at a stand. Though all want to buy, and many want to sell, little or nothing is either bought or sold. The retail traders will, many of them, necessarily be-

come bankrupts. The loss of their demand will necessarily occasion bankruptcies amongst the wholesale merchants; and in this manner general failure, discontent, and ruin may attend the mild administration of Lord Hardwicke.—So much, Mr. Cobbett, for the effects of a deficient circulation of silver in Dublin. Let us now look to the interior of the country. The outcry against bad silver spread as fast throughout the whole of it as the intelligence of what had happened in Dublin could be communicated, and every poor man lost, in one moment, to an amount exactly in proportion to the degree of industry with which he had laboured to collect the scanty recompense of days of severe toil. Not knowing what to do with pieces of metal that no one would take in payment, it was not uncommon to see them throwing them away, tacitly venting their indignation against the government. But, as silver notes were in general circulation throughout the interior, and the dealings and payments are more of a wholesale nature, the want of sufficient circulation was not so materially felt as in Dublin; we cannot, however, consider this circumstance as cause of much satisfaction, when we look forward to the operation of the immense augmented issues of paper, which must now inevitably take place throughout all Ireland. Though they will not in the first instance produce any bad effect, if they only meet the net demand for circulation, yet it is too probable that the bankers will take advantage of the state of things, and contrive to issue much more than will be really wanting; thus advance prices, and create a demand for that portion of their paper, which would be excessive, and returned back to them.—It is most earnestly to be hoped, now that a change in administration has taken place, that the state of Ireland may become an object of the assiduous attention of the new minister; that men may be employed who thoroughly understand the principles of good government, or who, at least, have some qualifications for directing the affairs of so important a portion of the empire.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. J. T.

## LETTER FROM SIR R. MUSGRAVE.

SIR,—As the veracity of my history of the Irish Rebellion was impeached in your Political Register of May the 12th, by an anonymous writer, under the signature of Verax, I request you will publish the following observations in its defence. The materials for that history were collected with the greatest assiduity, the most scrupulous inquiry and discrimination, and the

strictest regard to truth; and, as it was written for the purpose of giving the British Cabinet and Parliament, at present, and posterity hereafter, an accurate narration of the late rebellion, and a fair representation of the state of Ireland many years previous to that dreadful event. Three editions of that work, consisting of no less than 3850 copies have been circulated in England, Ireland, and Scotland; and anxious for the establishment of truth, I made the following appeal in the preface of each: "Though the author has made truth his polar star in the course of this work, it is possible that some errors might have occurred in it, he hopes, therefore, that if the reader should discover any such, he will be kind enough to communicate them to him, and he will amend them in the next edition."

I hope the public will consider the following declaration a full and sufficient answer to the persons who have impeached it: "That no person whatsoever has succeeded in invalidating the authenticity of my history in any one occurrence related in it; and, I defy any person to do so." On the contrary, I have received the most flattering assurances from the officers who campaigned in the late rebellion, that the military transactions have been faithfully described; and I have had the same testimony from the civil magistrates, and from those who were competent to decide upon the other events; and, to them I appeal again. To the few feeble attempts which have been made to question my veracity in some trifling points, I have written an answer, which has been published by John Stockdale, Piccadilly. I am still open to conviction, and should any person come forward, and prove to me coolly and dispassionately that I have committed any one error, I will immediately acknowledge and correct it.—That writer states, that, "the Marquis Cornwallis ordered me to leave out the dedication to him, which I had taken the liberty to usher the work into the world with." I had his Lordship's permission to dedicate it to him, and he very kindly gave me permission to examine such papers and documents relative to the rebellion as were in the possession of government; but his Lordship did not in the most distant manner insinuate, that any part of my history was unfounded. It is much to be lamented, that the mildness of his government, and the strong proofs of his merciful disposition, which the Irish rebels experienced, did not in the smallest degree abate their disaffection, or assuage their ferocity; for, on the landing of one thousand French

at Killaloe, in the county of Sligo, the multitude in two counties rose and joined them; and the inhabitants of two provinces were on the tiptoe of insurrection. Some parts of the province of Leinster, particularly the county of Kildare, were dreadfully disturbed in the year 1799, and barbarous outrages, disgraceful to human nature, were perpetrated in them. That year another rebellion was organised in the province of Munster, and was on the point of exploding. It is well known that the Earl of Hardwicke has used unabated exertions to conciliate the Irish, and to attach them to the state; but neither those, nor his well known beneficent virtues, could prevent the insurrection which took place on the 23d of July, 1803. Is it right that the real cause of those treasonable fermentations in Ireland should be made known to the British government? I believe, and I sincerely lament, that they are radically ignorant of it; but can it be otherwise, when certain persons, whom I avoid naming, are constantly making assertions on this subject, tending to mislead? I am convinced that no loyal person will censure the motives which led me to write a history of the rebellion.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, RICHARD MUSGRAVE. *Dated, Dublin, 17th July, 1804.*

#### ON THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE.

SIR,—When the learning, science, and spirit of research of this age are considered, we might naturally expect to find every point of theory on the subject of general government, and every point of practice on particular constitutions settled and established. In our own country, especially, it could not be unreasonable to expect an universal agreement and consent with respect to all great and leading constitutional doctrines. Yet, strange as it may appear, it does so happen, that, in this country, where the learning, science, and spirit of research are pushed as forward as perseverance, ability, and talent can push them; where, too, they have been especially directed to this particular object, many of the first and material principles of the constitution remain matter of doubt, dispute and controversy. The point to which I wish now to direct the public attention, is, the right of the crown to nominate and appoint the ministers. That the right itself exists, no one denies; but the limits of that right are, by different persons, placed at such different points, that scarcely less controversy is occasioned than if the right itself were positively denied. On the one hand we find it argued, that, as the crown has the

unlimited right of selecting such ministers as it thinks fit, it is consequently bound to consult no will but its own, and is entitled to expect, on the part of the parliament and of the country, an immediate and entire acquiescence in its choice: on the other hand it is argued, with no less zeal, and I dare say with equal sincerity, that the crown, though it has the right, is bound to consult the inclinations and the wishes of the parliament in the use and exercise of it; and to select and appoint such persons only, as the parliament confides in, and of whom it entertains a favourable opinion. In conformity with these doctrines, we see, that while, on the one hand, some persons assert and lay it down as the rule of their conduct, that they support ministers because they are ministers, because they are the persons selected by the crown; so, on the other hand, we find others resisting ministers so chosen, not because they are unfit, not because they have acted improperly and unconstitutionally, but because they are not persons whom they would have advised his Majesty to select, in whom they place their confidence, and who are their favourites. Now, I confess, I think these two doctrines both equally foreign from the real spirit of the constitution, and from the true principles of sound sense. As I conceive, these errors arise from a confusion of the *legal rights* with the *moral duties* of the crown and of the parliament respectively; and it appears to me that this confusion has been the natural result of the circumstances of the last hundred years. During that period, unlike any former ages of our history, this country has enjoyed a degree of internal happiness and tranquillity unexampled in the history of the world. The principles of the constitution being settled and ascertained at the revolution; the sceptre having, from that time, been invariably held by monarchs, whose sole object seems to have been to consult the wishes, to promote the happiness, and to forward the independence of the people, we have fondly imagined, that, as no violent and open attacks were made upon it, so time itself, whose progress is marked on the very front and forehead of every other fabric, institution, and being, whether of the physical or the moral world, would leave this alone sacred and unimpaired. But this has not been the case. Perhaps at some other period I may attempt to describe the devastation it has made, to trace the furrows which this ruthless enemy has made on its fair face; to point out the cracks and settlements, in order that some more able mason may, while yet

there be time, be induced to strengthen the decayed parts of this venerable fabric. Suffice it at present to remark, that periods of tranquillity and quiet, such as I have described the last century to have seen, while they are most favourable to the comforts of a people, are likewise often most dangerous to their *rights*: especially in a country like this, where the rights of every class depend, not on the agreement of interests in the different parties, but on their opposition to each other; not on their union and close connexion, but on the maintenance of a balance between them: where the entire rights of sovereignty are enjoyed not by one party alone, nor by all together; but where they are divided and parcelled out to different orders and different classes; whence it follows, that what is acquired by one is lost to the other. Quiet and ease lull that jealousy and constant watchfulness, which are necessary to keep up the opposition and to turn the balance; and as this spirit, when pushed too far, may lead to revolution, and then, by open violence, to subvert all order; so, when from any cause it sinks too low, it leaves it to the more active and constant workings of the executive government by less violent, but yet more certain means, to destroy the equilibrium and to establish something not unlike despotic sway. Whence it appears, that, though times of tumult and disturbance are to be dreaded and avoided, yet that, if liberty is valuable, it must be purchased at a certain rate, at the price of that perfect complacency of ease and tranquillity, which a well-regulated despotism, or an absolute tyranny under a perfect tyrant (I mean perfect, not in point of power only, but in point of virtue, justice, mercy and power; a thing inconsistent with human nature) is alone capable of producing. —I will now concisely state what I conceive to be the real principles of the constitution, on the subject of the appointment of ministers; adding, perhaps, one or two reasons on which that opinion is founded; and noticing the advantages attendant on the adoption of those principles.—1. I should assert, that, legally speaking, the right of the crown to choose its own ministers is a clear, unlimited, entire right to select whom it will without any reference to the wishes, affections, or partialities of any other person whatsoever. So of the parliament I should say, that it has a right no less clear, express and unlimited to approve or disapprove of, to confide in or to refuse confidence to, the ministers whom the crown should appoint.—2. Morally speaking, I should say, that the crown is bound in honour and in conscience

in making its choice to select, not those whom favouritism or partiality might point out, but those whose talents are such as may give an assurance, that its affairs can safely be trusted to their hands, whose truth is such, as naturally entitles them to the privilege of approaching near to, and conversing familiarly with the royal person; and whose character is such that the parliament and the country cannot justly refuse to repose confidence in them. On the other hand I should assert, that the parliament is bound in conscience and in honour, *prima facie*, to suppose the ministers selected by the crown fit and proper persons, merely because they are so selected; such selection being in itself an honour and a dignity conferred by the person, who really and constitutionally has the right to confer it, and is consequently bound to support such ministers, not only when they perform some act which merits such support, but also to support them as a matter of course, till they do some act to forfeit that confidence, or bring forward some measure that is unwise or objectionable.—

3. Politically speaking; that is, speaking for the good and convenience of all parties, I should say, that the crown is bound (perhaps to say is bound, is too strong a word)—that the crown, acting prudently, would always select for its ministers, not merely those with whom the parliament is acquainted, but those whom it is likely to approve and to support; and on the other hand, that in no case is the parliament justified in withholding confidence from persons merely because they are ministers, or, in other words, to act upon that absurd, and (I hope) obsolete cry of a perpetual jealousy of, and opposition to ministers.—These being the principles on which I conceive that it is right for the crown on the one hand, and for the parliament on the other, to act in such cases. I proceed now to give my reasons for that opinion. As to the legal right of the crown to nominate the ministers, it is, I believe, undisputed on all hands; if it were not so, I need only here appeal to the fact; for we all know that, in fact, its *ipse dixit* is and must be sufficient. As to the moral duty which in exercising this right it has to perform, I shall merely say, that in every department of every state, I might say, in every situation of life, where a legal right is vested, a correspondent moral duty exists. The king has a right to choose his ministers; his correspondent moral duty is to choose a fit one. A man has a right to turn away his servant, he is bound in morality not to do so unjustly. A man has a right to torture his beast, he is morally bound to have mercy on it and not

to torment it. And lastly, on the point of convenience no one, I presume, will deny, that the convenience of all parties would be consulted by selecting a person agreeable to all parties, rather than by selecting one agreeable to one party and displeasing to all the rest.—So much as to the rights and duties of the crown; now for those of the parliament. The right to refuse confidence to ministers is proved by the power to do so: and who will deny the power of the parliament to say *no* to any proposition submitted to it? But here again there exists the correspondent moral duty not to say *no* vexatiously or captiously, but only on a fair and honest conviction of the unfitness of the *aye*. It is not a sufficient reason for opposing a minister that his complexion is disagreeable, or “the cut of his beard” displeasing; there must be a real, honest dislike to the measure proposed, not to the man proposing. And here let me digress for a moment to allude to that doctrine, which some months ago was a good deal canvassed; I mean the doctrine of “measures and not men.” To me the solution is easy and evident. When confidence is claimed, then you must look to the men; you must consider their character and their talents; for the confidence you are to repose, is in the men, not in the measures, of which by the very call for confidence you are supposed to know nothing. On the other hand, when a measure is brought forward, then you are to canvass the measure, and not the character of the men, for the measure is the same whoever brings it forward. Even in this case, however, some attention, it may be thought, ought to be paid to the men to whom the execution is to be entrusted. I confess I think not; for the execution is a matter which affects not the original measure, which is entrusted to ministers on their responsibility, and which may be scrutinized afterwards. But to return.—I come now to the third part of my subject, viz. the advantages resulting from the rights and duties of the crown and parliament respectively, being on the footing above stated. These I conceive to be no less than the preservation of the rights of the people on the one hand, and the dignity and independence of the crown on the other. If, as it is asserted by some, the very fact of a minister being the choice of the crown is sufficient title to the confidence and constant support of the parliament; then the controlling power of parliament is a nullity; its deliberations a farce; and the government of the country a pure and absolute despotism. If, on the other hand, the crown has no

right of selection, but is bound to follow the caprices of the parliament, we are laid open to all the dangers and disorders of a popular government. In the one case, the crown would be the slave of the parliament; in the other, the parliament would be the slave of the crown. But if the rights and duties of these two bodies respectively be as I have stated, then I think they are both sufficiently independent of each other, at the same time that the people have ample security that their liberties will not be attacked; for while the crown is thus unfettered in its choice, it is still ultimately, as it ought to be, under the control of parliament, whose confidence is necessary to the support of the government; so that though it may be able to resist and oppose the short sallies of popular prejudice, it can never stand against the continued exertions of an opposition, arising from the experience of its imbecillity, wickedness, or folly. And this I conceive to be the real advantage of the British constitution; that while it makes the measures of government depend on the real opinions and wishes of the people, it is not liable to be disturbed or interrupted by the sudden and occasional sallies to which they are subject. For it is to be remarked, that while nothing is so subject to hasty, headstrong, and erroneous opinions as a popular assembly, yet that the confirmed, sedate, and deliberate opinion of the same assembly is wise, correct, and just. And in this sense it is, and in this sense only, that "*vox populi est vox Dei*." — Connected with this subject is a doctrine on which I will now say a word or two. We have at times in this country heard a great deal of "secret advisers." By "secret advisers" I believe is meant persons unknown and irresponsible, who are supposed to possess the royal ear, to enjoy the royal confidence, and to influence the royal actions. Lord A. Hamilton, in his lately published pamphlet, very truly observes, that secret advisers are unknown to the constitution. They are unknown to the constitution most indubitably; they are also, I should believe, imaginary beings in point of fact. At best, of this I am sure, that if the minister be a man of common honesty, common prudence, and common spirit, such persons cannot exist. Every action of the government must be performed by some person; whose regular official duty it is to do it, and for which he is responsible. The king can do no wrong; he is not responsible for any thing; but he can do nothing of himself. His every order must pass through the official channel, must be countersigned by the proper officer,

or is of no force whatsoever. This being the case, I ask whether any man possessed of the common feelings of self-love, or of confidence in his own integrity and talents, will bear to be responsible for acts which he does not advise and which he does not approve. If his vanity would permit this degradation, surely his prudence could not suffer him to run the hazard? I say, which he does not approve, for if he do approve of them, it is much the same as if they were suggested by himself. But after all, to the constitution these secret advisers are in no ways interesting. It is really of no consequence whether they exist or not. The minister is undeniably responsible for every act of his official administration, and every act of the crown (save one) must be the act of the official administration of some one or other. If a minister chooses to be responsible for acts not originating with him, and not approved of by him, that is solely, his affair; to the country and to the parliament it is a matter of total indifference. All that is material to them is, to have some one, to whom responsibility attaches, and whom they may punish, if they think fit. The official minister is that person; indisputably he is so; and for him to allege, when called to account, that the measure did not originate with him, would diminish nought of his responsibility, and would expose his meanness and his folly; but there is an act, I say, which is purely and entirely the King's own; for which no minister is responsible. Secret advisers may be had recourse to in that case. Granted; but what does that signify? The objection to secret advisers is, that they are irresponsible ministers; true, but if in this case, the King has recourse to no adviser; to his own opinion alone; does there attach any responsibility? Most assuredly not. No responsibility is then lost; and as it is the loss of responsibility, that injures the country, no injury is then sustained. Now what is this act to which I allude? It is the act of appointing the confidential servants of the Crown; and for that act, the appointing them, I say, no responsibility attaches anywhere. How so? The King can do no wrong; because he is irresponsible. Who has the legal right to appoint the ministers? Who but the King. He may, therefore, select whom he pleases, and no responsibility will attach anywhere. Is this denied? Then, I ask, where the responsibility does attach? To those who advise.—True. But who is to advise? If there is a necessity for advice; there must exist somewhere an obligation to advise? Otherwise, there would be advice without an

adviser, which is absurd. Where then does this obligation lie? Is it in the minister, whose removal occasions the vacancy? That cannot be; for, in the first place, the vacancy may be occasioned by his death, and then he could not advise; or, secondly, his removal may by him be thought unjust and unmerited; and he may know of no one qualified in his opinion to fill the situation but himself.—Must he then recommend himself? That would be absurd.—Must he recommend some one whom he thinks less fit? That would be dishonest.—Is such a feeling impossible? Is it unnatural? It may be foolish, it may be full of vanity; but it is neither inconsistent with honesty or with probability. It appears, then, it is not the business of the old minister to recommend his successor.—Is it the business of the new one? That is impossible; for, it would imply that he acted before he existed, which is absurd.—Is it then, the act of the King himself, for which, he of course is irresponsible, and for which, no one can be responsible, because it is no one's act but his? I answer, yes;—and he who denies this proposition, he it is who establishes of necessity the existence of secret advisers. Thus, then, I maintain, the appointing a minister is an act of the King's own, for which no one is responsible. But it will be said, the King may then appoint the most unfit and incapable person to be his minister. He certainly may; but, besides that, the parliament have the power, the right, and have it as a duty, to resist and prevent the first proof of unfitness and incapacity; besides that; I say, that the person so appointed is highly responsible for accepting the offer, for suffering himself to be appointed. When the King offered the seals of the Exchequer to the Doctor, was he responsible? No; but the Doctor was amply responsible to the country for accepting them, without abilities to perform the duties of the office.—When the King presented the same keys to Mr. Pitt, avowing at the same time the principle of exclusion, was he responsible then? Equally not; but Mr. Pitt was amply responsible for accepting office on the principle of exclusion at a time, when he professed himself, as it was evident to all, that the country stood in need of the co-operation of *all* the talents, *all* the influence, *all* the strength, which *all* parties and *all* public men united could bring together. Thus then, even in this case, the country is secure of responsibility somewhere in point of fact, though perhaps not in point of theory. The king is not responsible for the act he performs, but the minister ap-

pointed is responsible for suffering himself to be acted upon. The responsibility attaches itself to the patient, the agent being exempt. —There are one or two further observations, which I wish to make on the doctrines above maintained; and which I have thrown into a note, not to interrupt the mere theoretical argument of the text.—These further observations, point to the principle, that there is one act namely, the act of appointing ministers, which is really the act of the King himself, and not of any minister; and for which, of course, no man is responsible. This principle, I think, may possibly be denied by some people *in toto*; and by others to a certain degree. I conceive these latter persons, will say "true; "if no minister whatever exists, if all the "old ones are got rid of; if a new administration is to be formed altogether, then "I grant, that the act must come immediately and directly from the King; but, "if some one member of the old ministry "continues, then he becomes responsible "for advising the King to appoint the person selected to fill up the vacancy." I admit, there is some plausibility in this statement, especially in the case, when the head of the administration continued in office, and the person changed was merely the chief of some inferior department. But, I deny, that even in this case responsibility attaches any where for the appointment. In the first place, I deny, that the existence of a prime minister, or a head of the ministry is known to the constitution. From the convenience resulting from the fact, and from modern practice, such a person almost always exists; but, I assert, that necessarily and constitutionally, there is no such person. Every department is independent of the other; the Secretary of State for the Home Department, or for the Foreign Affairs, is as independent of the chief of every other department, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer or First Lord of the Treasury. I know no reason constitutionally for the existence of a Cabinet. I know some very good constitutional reasons against it. Thus I assert, that in theory it is possible, that the principal officer of each department of the state, may not only be totally independent of every other, but at open hostility with him. Whether affairs could easily or conveniently be managed in such a case, is a totally different question. I am talking here theoretically and constitutionally. But each of these officers is appointed directly by the King himself, who may or may not, as he pleases, consult his other ministers or his "secret advisers" on the appointment. We have no

right or interest to inquire whether the appointment be of his own making or not. Each case resolves itself directly into the case mentioned before. But, it will be said, "how far is this to extend, for if you assert that the appointment to offices rests solely with the King, then he can appoint to every office, and will thus really himself manage every department." To this objection, I answer, that I imagine in point of fact, that the appointment of inferior officers in each department, necessarily comes through the chief of that department. I do not actually know the fact, but I presume this to be the case; viz. that the appointment of an inferior officer to be valid, must be countersigned by the chief of the department to which that officer belongs; and then that chief becomes directly and evidently responsible for the appointment. But, even if this is not the case, if the King can of his own motion appoint the inferior officers, yet the responsibility can with great facility be traced directly to the chief of each department. Each such chief is responsible for every act done by every subordinate agent in that department. What? When he does not appoint these subordinate agents? Yes, truly; for though he does not appoint them, he is able to retire from his situation, if he cannot confide in those placed under him. He may withdraw himself from the responsibility by withdrawing from the place; or he may keep them both; they cannot be separated. My butler is answerable to me for the care of my plate; do I then leave it to him to choose the servant, who, under him, cleans and watches it? No; I choose that servant myself; and, if I choose a man in whom the butler does not confide, and on his representation do not like to part with him, the butler in common prudence withdraws from my service and the responsibility at once.—With respect to "secret advisers" as they are called; the doctrine concerning them I dislike in another view. For without being pushed by any means to extremes, it goes to prevent the man, whom chance has placed upon the throne, from having any thing like a private friend; and to deprive him of one of the greatest of human blessings. It goes to prevent him from holding familiar converse with either his queen, or his son, on public matters; for they would be equally, with any others, secret irresponsible advisers. This would be a cruelty not to be endured; it is a private persecution which, I think too well of the constitution, to believe it subjects any man to. But if my doctrine is true, then I say this difficulty is entirely got

rid of; and as much security and responsibility exists, as in any case can be wished for.—I have written upon this subject, much more than I intended when I first began. I believe I have stated the doctrines which I have alluded to correctly; and, I now send the result of my opinions to you, Mr. Cobbett, for insertion in your paper, if you think fit. If any person is inclined to controvert my doctrine, and to argue the point with me, I shall be very glad to see his arguments, and am really open to conviction if I am wrong. But, I beg to reserve to myself the right of replying, whether the answer be published in your paper, or sent to me privately. If they are published in any other paper, it is possible I may not see them. You will be kind enough to keep by you, to be called for, any letters directed to Censor, No. 15, Duke Street, Westminster; to which address, I beg all letters controverting my doctrine, and not meant for insertion, to be sent.—CENSOR.

#### THE KING NEVER DIES.

SIR,—Your learned correspondents of the Inns of Court have given you many extracts from Doddridge and others of great force and authority, which prove indisputably, that, if the King is ill, the Parliament ought to ascertain the state he may be in, clearly, and in a way to satisfy the country, and not to trust only to the reports of a secret committee of ministers and physicians. I beg leave to call your attention to an event which occurs in our history, (vide Hume), and which seems to me not unworthy of your notice. In 1454, Henry the Sixth fell into a distemper, which rendered him incapable of maintaining even the appearance of royalty. The Queen and Council appointed the Duke of York Lieutenant of the Kingdom, with powers to open and hold a session of Parliament. That assembly also taking into consideration the state of the Kingdom created him protector during pleasure. In 1456, Margaret produced her husband before the House of Lords, and he was re-instated in his sovereign authority. It does not appear, Sir, that when the King fell ill there was any delay in appointing a regent. The constitution suffers no suspension of the executive power; no pause, no interval in the government. Blackstone uses these words, "a third attribute of the King's Majesty is, PERPETUITY; the law ascribes to him in his political capacity an absolute immortality; the King never dies. Henry, Edward, or George may die, but the King survives them all." It is to this power, which cannot legally lie

dormant for a moment, to this constitutional King, that every loyal Englishman ought to be attached: but it seems, Sir, that there are in this country men (and among those too, who talk loudly of prerogative) who are only inclined to support the monarchical power, while the person, that suits their private interest is invested with it.—I am, Sir, &c. &c.—O. B.

#### MASSACRE IN SAINT DOMINGO.

The following statement is taken from the New York papers of the 4th of June last. The Proclamations of Dessalines, which follow, but too fully establish the correctness of the statement.—“We have received the melancholy intelligence of the massacre of all the white French inhabitants of St. Domingo. This bloody work commenced in Port-au-Prince about the middle of May. An account of it was soon received and published at the Cape, and immediately after about five and twenty hundred persons, men, women, and children, indiscriminately, were deliberately massacred there. It was general about the same time in every place which the blacks possess. It is evident, from the care with which they selected their victims, that the plan has been long formed, and deliberately matured.—None but French have suffered, and of them hardly one has escaped. Every care had been taken to prevent the white inhabitants from leaving the island; row boats were employed to board and examine every vessel going out of the harbour. A short time before the massacre took place thirty passengers were found in a schooner, which had got out of the harbour, bound to St. Thomas, and, with the crew, they were immediately put to death. At Port-au-Prince between five or six hundred persons fell under the bloody hatchet of the Haytiens, and *the warm stream of blood which ran from them, quenched the thirst of their murderers, who went on their knees to receive it.* Dessalines has published a proclamation, justifying the extermination of the French, and offering fifteen days to the Spaniards, who occupy the eastern part of St. Domingo, to determine either to submit to him, or share the fate of the French; he has sixty thousand men ready to march against them, and is determined that no European shall hold an office of power on the island. “Toussaint,” says he, “did his work by halves; but I will complete it.”

*Proclamation by Dessalines, as Gov. Gen. of the Island, dated at the Cape, April 28, 1804; first Year of Independence.*

Crimes, the most atrocious, such as were until then unheard of, and would cause nature to shudder, have been perpetrated. The measure was overheaped. At length the hour of vengeance has arrived, and the implacable enemies of the rights of man have suffered the punishment due to their crimes — — My arm, raised over their heads, has too long delayed to strike. At that signal, which the justice of God has urged, your hands, righteously armed, have brought the axe upon the ancient tree of slavery and prejudices. In vain had time, and more especially the infernal politics of Europeans, surrounded it with triple brass; you have stripped it of its armour; you have placed it upon your heart, that you may become (like your natural enemies) cruel and merciless. Like an overflowing mighty torrent, that tears down all opposition, your vengeful fury has carried away every thing in its impetuous course. Thus perish all tyrants over innocence, all oppressors of mankind! — — What then? Bent for many ages under an iron yoke: the sport of the passions of men, or their injustice, and of the caprices of fortune; mutilated victims of the cupidity of white Frenchmen; after having fattened with our toils these insatiate blood suckers, with a patience and resignation unexampled, we should again have seen that sacrilegious horde make an attempt upon our destruction, without any distinction of sex or age; and we, men without energy, of no virtue, of no delicate sensibility, should not we have plunged in their breast the dagger of desperation? Where is that vile Haytian, so unworthy of his regeneration, who thinks he has not accomplished the decrees of the Eternal, by exterminating these blood-thirsty tygers? If there be one, let him fly; indignant nature discards him from our bosom; let him hide his shame far from hence: the air we breathe is not suited to his gross organs; it is the pure air of liberty, august and triumphant. — — Yes, we have rendered to these true cannibals war for war, crime for crime, outrage for outrage: yes, I have saved my country; I have avenged America. The avowal I make of it, in the face of earth and heaven, constitutes my pride and my glory. Of what consequence to me is the opinion which contemporary and future generations will pronounce upon my conduct? I have performed my duty; I enjoy my own approbation; for me that is sufficient. But what do I say? The preservation of my unfortunate brothers, the testimony of my own conscience, are not my only recompense: I have seen two

classes of men, born to cherish, assist, and succour one another—mixed in a world, and blended together—crying for vengeance, and disputing the honour of the first blow.—Blacks and yellows, whom the refined duplicity of Europeans has for a long time endeavoured to divide; you, who are now consolidated, and make but one family; without doubt it was necessary that our perfect reconciliation should be sealed with the blood of your butchers. Similar calamities have hung over your proscribed heads: a similar ardour to strike your enemies has signalised you: the like fate is reserved for you: and the like interests must therefore render you for ever one, indivisible and inseparable. Maintain that precious concord, that happy harmony amongst yourselves: it is the pledge of your happiness, your salvation, and your success: it is the secret of being invincible.—Is it necessary, in order to strengthen these ties, to recall to your remembrance the catalogue of atrocities committed against our species; the massacre of the entire population of this island, meditated in the silence and *sang-froid* of the cabinet; the execution of that abominable project, to me unblushingly proposed, and already begun by the French, with the calmness and serenity of a countenance accustomed to similar crimes. Guadeloupe, pillaged and destroyed; its ruins still reeking with the blood of the children, women, and old men put to the sword; Pelage (himself the victim of their craftiness), after having basely betrayed his country and his brothers; the brave and immortal Delgresse, blown into the air with the fort which he defended, rather than accept their offered chains. Magnanimous warrior! that noble death, far from enfeebling our courage, serves only to rouse within us the determination of avenging or of following thee. Shall I again recall to your memory the plots lately framed at Jeremie? the terrible explosion which was to be the result, notwithstanding the generous pardon granted to these incorrigible beings at the expulsion of the French army? The deplorable fate of our departed brothers in Europe? and (dread harbinger of death) the frightful despotism exercised at Martinique? Unfortunate people of Martinique, could I but fly to your assistance, and break your fetters! Alas! an insurmountable barrier separates us. Perhaps a spark from the same fire which enflames us, will alight into your bosoms: perhaps, at the sound of this commotion, suddenly awakened from your lethargy, with arms in your hands, you will reclaim your sacred and imprescriptible rights.—After the ter-

rrible example which I have just given, that, sooner or later, Divine Justice will unchain on earth some mighty minds, above the weakness of the vulgar, for the destruction and terror of the wicked; tremble, tyrants, usurpers, scourges of the new world! our daggers are sharpened; your punishment is ready! sixty thousand men, equipped, inured to war, obedient to my orders, burn to offer a new sacrifice to the names of their assassinated brothers. Let that nation come, who may be mad and daring enough to attack me. Already at its approach, the irritated genius of Hayti, arising out of the bosom of the ocean, appears; his menacing aspect throws the waves into commotion, excites tempests, and with his mighty hand disperses ships, or dashes them in pieces; to his formidable voice the laws of nature pay obedience; diseases, plague, famine, conflagration, poison, are his constant attendants. But why calculate on the assistance of the climate and of the elements? Have I forgot that I commanded a people of no common cast, brought up in adversity, whose audacious daring frowns at obstacles and increases by dangers? Let them come, then, these homicidal cohorts! I wait for them with firmness and with a steady eye. I abandon to them freely the sea shore, and the places where cities have existed; but woe to those who may approach too near the mountains! It were better for them that the sea received them into its profound abyss, than to be devoured by the anger of the children of Hayti.—“War to death to tyrants!” this is my motto; “liberty! independence!” this is our rallying cry.—Generals, officers, soldiers, a little unlike him who has preceded me, the ex-general Toussaint Louverture, I have been faithful to the promise which I made to you when I took up arms against tyranny, and whilst the last spark of life remains in me I shall keep my oath—“Never again shall a colonist or an European set his foot upon this territory with the title of master or proprietor.” This resolution shall henceforward form the fundamental basis of our constitution.—Should other chiefs, after me, by pursuing a conduct diametrically opposite to mine, dig their own graves and those of their own species, you will have to accuse only the law of destiny, which shall have taken me away from the happiness and welfare of my fellow citizens. May my successors follow the path I shall have traced out for them! It is the system best adapted for consolidating their power; it is the highest homage they can render to my memory.—As it is derogatory to my charac-

ter and my dignity to punish the innocent for the crimes of the guilty, a handful of whites, commendable by the religion they have always professed, and who have besides taken the oath to live with us in the woods, have experienced my clemency. I order that the sword respect them, and that they be unmolested — I recommend anew and order to all the generals of departments, &c. to grant succours, encouragement, and protection to all neutral and friendly nations, who may wish to establish commercial relations with this island.

*Proclamation by Dessalines, dated at the Cap, Dec. 8, 1804; first Year of Independence.*

Has the French army been expelled, when I listened to acknowledge my authority by a free and spontaneous movement of your heart, you ranged yourselves under my subjection. More careful of the prosperity than the ruin of that part which you inhabit, I gave to this homage a favourable reception. From that moment I have considered you as my children, and my fidelity to you remains undiminished. As a proof of my paternal solicitude, without the places which have submitted to my power, I have proposed for chiefs none but men chosen from amongst yourselves. Jealous of counting you in the rank of my friends, that I might give you all the time necessary for recollection, and that I might assure myself of your fidelity, I have hitherto restrained the burning ardour of my soldiers. Already I congratulated myself on the success of my solicitude, which had for its object to prevent the effusion of blood; but at this time a fanatic priest had not kindled in your breasts the rage which predominates therein: the incensed Fearand had not yet instilled into you the poison of falsehood and calumny. Writings, originating in despair and weakness, have been circulated; and immediately some amongst you, seduced by perfidious insinuations, solicited the friendship and protection of the French; they dared to outrage my kindness, by coalescing with my cruel enemies. Spaniards, reflect! On the brink of the precipice which is dug under your feet, will that diabolical minister save you, when with fire and sword I shall have pursued you to your last entrenchments? Ah! without doubt, his prayers, his grimaces, his zelics, would be no impediment to my career. Vain as powerless, can he preserve you from my just anger, after I shall have buried him, and the collection of brigands he commands, under the ruins of your capital! Let them both recollect that it is

before my intrepid phalanxes that all the resources and the skill of Europeans have proved ineffectual: and that into my victorious bonds the destiny of the captain-general Rochambeau has been surrendered. To lure the Spaniards to their party, they propagate the report that vessels laden with troops have arrived at Santo Domingo. Why is it not the truth? They little imagine that, in delaying to attack them until this time, my principal object has been to suffer them to increase the mass of our resources, and the number of our victims. To spread distrust and terror, they incessantly dwell upon the fate which the French have just experienced: but have I had reason to treat them so? The wrongs of the French, do they appertain to Spaniards? and must I visit on the latter the crimes which the former have conceived, ordered, and executed upon our species? They have the effrontery to say, that, reduced to seek safety in flight, I am gone to conceal my defeat in the southern part of the island. Well then! Let them learn that I am ready; that the thunderbolt is going to fall on their heads. Let them know that my soldiers are impatiently waiting for the signal to go and reconquer the boundaries which nature and the elements have assigned to us. A few moments more, and I shall crush the remnant of the French under the weight of mighty power. Spaniards! you, to whom I address myself, solely because I wish to save you; you who, for having been guilty of evasion, shall speedily preserve your existence only so far as my clemency may deign to spare you; it is yet time; abjure an error which may be fatal to you; and break off all connections with my enemy, if you wish your blood may not be confounded with his. Name to me, without delay, that part of your territory on which my first blow is to be struck, or inform me whether I must strike on all points without discrimination. I give you fifteen days, from the date of this notification, to forward your last intentions, and to rally under my banners. You are not ignorant that all the roads of St. Domingo in every direction are familiar to us; that more than once we have seen your dispersed bands fly before us. In a word, you know what I can do, and what I dare; think of your preservation. Receive here the sacred promise which I make, not to do any thing against your personal safety or your interest, if you seize upon this occasion to shew yourselves worthy of being admitted amongst the children of Hayti.

*Remarks of the American Editor.*—In consequence of the first of these proclamations,

an indiscriminate massacre of the whites commenced, on the 19th of April, and continued till the 14th of May. Letters, as well as the verbal accounts of the passengers agree in representing it as being horrible beyond description. On the 14th of May, when the informant left the Cape, the infuriated negroes had sacrificed to their unrelenting policy not less than 2500 human beings. The work of destruction then ceased from necessity, for no more victims remained.—The details we have received of these transactions are shocking to the ear. Indeed, no language of which we are capable, can describe with accuracy the horrors of the carnage, which had no respect to the infirmity of age, or the innocence of childhood; but involved in one common ruin, and frequently with the same sword, the infant sucking at the breast, and the unoffending mother from whom it derived its nourishment.—On the last mentioned day, Dessalines left the Cape by way of Port-de-Paix and Gonaives, for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the second proclamation, which he had caused to be issued in that part of the Island of St. Domingo inhabited by the Spaniards. He also ordered that the occupiers of houses should remove, with all possible speed, to a ditch at the side of the mountain, the dead bodies of the murdered which remained in the streets, that they might not be either devoured by the dogs, or be suffered to produce a pestilence.—The quantity of silver plate, jewellery, gold articles, &c. plundered from the dead, and brought in by the negroes, was immense, and frequently offered for sale, at half its value.—On the 22d April, Fort Dauphin was pillaged, a part of the town destroyed, and the whites massacred to the number of from 85 to 90.—A few days afterwards, the French inhabitants of St. Jago, and other parts of the interior, were escorted to the Cape, under a strong guard, and there butchered.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Convention concluded between his Majesty the Emperor of the French and the reigning Count of Bentheim Steinfurth. Dated Paris, May 12, 1804; and signed by C. M. Talleyrand and Louis, reigning Count of Bentheim.*

Art. 1st.—His Excellency the reigning Count of Bentheim shall, with all the proper and customary forms usual in Germany, be put in possession of the county of Ben-

them immediately on paying into the Hanoverian treasury the sum of 800,000 livres, which, without the deductions, which the French Government resigns, is the original sum for which the county was pledged.—Art. 2d.—The French Government guarantees to the Count Bentheim Steinfurth the maintenance and full force of this Convention, whatever may be the future fate of the Hanoverian territory.

*Ratification.*—His Majesty, the Emperor, approves and ratifies the above Convention, which was signed and ratified on the 22d of Floreal, of the year 12, by Charles Maurice Talleyrand, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided with full powers for that purpose, and Count Louis, reigning Count of Bentheim.—Given at St. Cloud, the 2d Prairial (22d May).—(Signed)—NAPOLEON.

*Note lately delivered to the Dict of Ratisbon, by the King of Great-Britain's Electoral Envoy, BARON VON REDIN, relative to the County of Bentheim.*

His Britannic Majesty and Electoral Highness of Brunswick Lunenburgh, having learned that the Count of Bentheim Steinfurth, has in the course of the preceding summer, attempted to avail himself of the unexampled invasion by the French, of the territory belonging to the German Empire, and appertaining to his Britannic Majesty, as Elector of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, in order, unjustly, to appropriate to himself the County of Bentheim, which, as is well known, is possessed by his Majesty as a security. Not being able to succeed in the attempt, Count Bentheim Steinfurth, according to every appearance, is now engaged in a negotiation with the French Government, to obtain for himself, in the most shameless and unjust manner, the above-mentioned security, which was made with the full consent and concurrence of the House of Bentheim Steinfurth, and the validity of which was never disputed by the present Count.—His Britannic Majesty might have left this injurious transaction to its own nullity and invalidity; but he has rather chosen explicitly to declare, as he has already publicly made known his determination with respect to all loans of money, that he will not acknowledge any negotiations or treaties that may be entered into without his consent, relative to the County of Bentheim, but will assert his just claims and rights against the Count of Bentheim Steinfurth.

"It is thus" [by the increase of paper and consequent depreciation of money] "that the public revenue is materially injured in all its branches; that the property of the public creditor is diminished; and that the private rents and annuities of individuals are in reality reduced, though they consist of the same nominal sum. The general power of the revenue is diminished by the very means that are taken for its increase, as the effect of taxation, in augmenting the price of produce and causing an increase of currency, necessarily depresses the value of money." — WHEATLEY on Currency and Commerce, 1803.

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TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
CHANCELLOR OF H.M.'S EXCHEQUER, &c. &c.

SIR,—Circumstances arising out of the nature of this publication compelled me to break off somewhat abruptly the remarks which I took the liberty to address to you in the preceding Number, which it was absolutely necessary to commit to the press in a very few hours after your Financial Resolutions first attracted my attention. This must be my apology for now reviving the subject there treated of.—I think little doubt can remain in the mind of any one, that the inference which was obviously intended to be drawn from the 13th proposition, or resolution, adopted by the House of Commons on the 24th ultimo, was this, that the permanent taxes existing in the year 1792, having produced in that year 14,284,000*l.* and the same taxes having, in the year 1803, produced 14,901,000*l.* the produce of the latter year was *worth more* than the produce of the former year, especially as the proposition concludes thus: "which last sum *exceeds* the produce of the permanent taxes in 1792 by 617,000*l.*" At the first thought upon the matter, it appears incredible, that, in comparing the produce of taxes in years so far distant from each other, you should have overlooked a circumstance so very material as that of the depreciation of money; yet I am bound to believe the fact, because the other alternative; to wit, that you intended to deceive the Parliament, is what cannot for a moment be entertained. I am, besides, fully confirmed in this belief by a reference to the statements which have been, and the inferences which have been drawn, by all those persons, who have written in defence of your system of finance, and whose writings have fallen within the narrow sphere of my examination. Of these writers I shall, for the present, content myself with mentioning three: Mr. Chalmers, Lord Auckland, and Mr. Rose. The first of these gentlemen, in the new edition of his "ESTIMATE," from

which I am glad to perceive (without any inquiry about his motives) that he has excluded his unmannerly, not to say insolent, attack upon those noblemen and gentlemen who opposed the peace of Amiens; in this edition, page 346, et seq. he makes a statement precisely similar to that which is contained in your 13th Resolution, except that he brings down his years no later than 1801. After some remarks upon the list of sums which he has inserted, he says, "in the mean-time," that is, between 1792 and 1801, "there had been imposed the various taxes, which were necessary for the loans, and the expenses of the war; and which seem not to have lessened the produce of the previous revenue, as had happened during the distressful times of King William." Of either the meaning or the object of this statement there can be no doubt; and the statements of Lord Auckland and Mr. Rose will not appear, in any respect, more equivocal. The noble lord's statement is contained in a speech delivered in the House of Lords on the 8th of January, 1799, published in a pamphlet by his own authority and under his inspection. "It was highly encouraging," said he, "to that extension" [the extension of the system for raising great part of the supplies within the year] "to have observed, in the progress of the experiment, that the defalcations made from the incomes or capitals of individuals, had not occasioned any distress or embarrassment. On the contrary, there has been a general and progressive increase in the prosperity of the kingdom. Your lordships will find ample proofs of this assertion in the comparative statements of our trade; in the favourable course of exchange with the continent; in the nett produce of the permanent revenue; but, more especially in the nett produce of permanent taxes which existed antecedent to the war, which in the year ended 5th January, 1799, has exceeded by 118,000*l.* the most

"productive year of peace, I mean the year 1792." Having made this brilliant display, his lordship turned for a moment to the contrast exhibited by the enemy; "bankrupt in finance, ruined in manufactures, deprived of all commerce, baffled in all projects of invasion, disgraced and defeated in every attempt to injure this country." How dearly have we paid, Sir, for these delusions! His lordship, unintentionally without doubt, mis-stated the fact even as to the nominal amount of the old taxes; for, those taxes in the year 1798, that is the year ended 5th January 1799, did not produce so much in nominal amount as they produced in 1792, as will appear from the list contained in your propositions. But this is a trifle compared to his making no allowance for depreciation of money, in which respect, however, his example has been strictly followed by Mr. George Rose, late Secretary of the Treasury, and now one of the Paymasters of the Forces, as also Vice-President of the Board of Trade and Plantations!!! This gentleman published, in the year 1799, a pamphlet entitled, "A Brief Examination into the Increase of the Revenue, Commerce, and Manufactures of Great-Britain, from 1792 to 1799." In the course of this work the author makes several statements and assertions the truth of which is by no means of a doubtful cast, but which are only just noticed, at this time, merely to guard against a belief, that, because they are not contradicted, they are acquiesced in. One of the objects of Mr. Rose is to defend the plan of raising great part of the supplies within the year, particularly the plan of the income-tax, which had just then been imposed, and which Mr. Rose thought necessary to suggest would not lessen the produce of the permanent taxes, imposed prior to 1793. "Apprehensions, it is true," says he, "have been expressed, that the produce of the permanent taxes may be affected by a large sum being raised within the year; it must, however, afford great consolation to those who really entertain such fears, to see it ascertained, that, in the last year, when nearly seven millions were so raised, the old taxes existing before the war were almost a million higher than in the year preceding." In another place he gives a list of the years since 1792 inclusive, together with the produce of the old taxes in each year, which, he observes, "can hardly be contemplated without some degree of wonder and exultation, when it is considered that 7,500,000l. per annum has been imposed in new taxes." After this

he seeks an average of the produce of the old taxes during the seven last years of peace, in order to compare its amount with that of the produce of the same taxes during the seven years of war, and he makes the pleasing discovery, that "notwithstanding the imposition of new taxes, to the annual amount of 7,500,000l. the produce of the old taxes during war exceeds that during peace by the sum of 1,080,000l. per annum." The same principle pervades all his calculations, whether of revenue, commerce, or manufactures. The average of four years exports of British manufactures, for instance, he states thus:

" Four years from 1795 to	
" 1798 .....	£30,648,000
" Four years from 1789 to	
" 1792 .....	27,135,000
<hr/>	
" Balance in favour of 4 years	
" of war .....	£3,513,000
<hr/>	

But, if he had made due allowance for the depression of money; if he had not totally overlooked the principle which we shall find him taking for his guide when he comes to treat of the *civil list*, he would have perceived, and, perceiving, ought to have stated, that the real value of the pound sterling had diminished, between 1792 and 1798, in the degree of 20 per centum at least; that, therefore, the average of the four years ending with 1798, to make it equal in real value to the average of the four years ending with 1792, should have amounted to 32,562,000l. instead of 30,648,000l.; and, of course, that, reckoning in the money of 1798, the exports of that year actually fell short of the exports of 1792 by the sum of two millions, while Mr. Rose has contrived to find out a "balance in favour" of the four years ending with 1798! Through the whole of the statements, therefore, of all these gentlemen there appears to be not the most distant idea of a depreciation in the value of money having taken place.—But, when they have occasion to speak of the expenses of the Civil List, when they find it necessary to justify the demands made upon the country for an addition to the sum formerly fixed on as the proper amount of these expenses; then they take good care, and indeed they are very right in so doing, to insist upon a depreciation of money. Lord Auckland, who has not spoken, or, at least, has not published any thing upon the subject of the civil-list, may, probably, deny that money has undergone any depreciation; but this is not the case with Mr. Rose and Mr. Chalmers, the for-

mer of whom was quoted in my last letter, and shall be quoted a little more at length here. "The exceeding in the departments of the Lord Steward, Lord Chamberlain, and Master of the Horse, is to be explained in an expenditure, estimated at 116,000*l.* per annum, amounting in sixteen years to 1,856,000*l.*; equal to about 20 per cent. thereupon. (This increase must be thought extremely moderate, when it is known, that it appeared by accounts before the Committee of the House of Commons, that, in the Lord Steward's department, the prices of many kinds of provisions are more than double, and, on the whole, at *least* 70 per cent. higher than in 1786. It is also notorious that very great advances have taken place in the price of labour and articles for building, &c. &c. under the direction of the Lord Chamberlain; and in the price of provender, &c. for horses, under the control of the Master of the Horse." All this was very true, and it was no more than repeating the statement made by the Committee of the House of Commons: what I find fault of, is, that Mr. Rose, who had, in 1799, taken such pains to persuade the people, not only of England but of the whole world, that the produce of the old permanent taxes had not fallen off because it still kept up to its old nominal amount, did not acknowledge his error, when, in 1802, he discovered that those taxes, when applied to the payments of the civil-list, had sunk in value 70 per cent. You also, Sir, must expect to share in this blame; for, it is altogether improbable, that Mr. Rose should have published the pamphlets here referred to without your consent and approbation; especially the former pamphlet, several copies of which, it is well known, were transmitted to each of our ministers at foreign courts, for what purpose is too obvious to need pointing out. Mr. Chalmers, too, has his remarks on the effect which the depreciation of money has had with regard to the expenses of the civil-list, though, as we have just seen, he so stoutly contends that the old taxes have experienced no falling-off; and, he has, in point of boldness, an evident advantage over Mr. Rose, for the latter gentleman blows hot and cold with different publications made at three years distance from one another, whereas Mr. Chalmers performs this double operation in the very same book. He takes the table of Sir George Shuckburgh Evelyn, mentioned in my last letter, as the basis of his argument on the depreciation of money. He gives us a history of the civil-list ar-

range; and, concludes with the following remark upon the statement which Sir John Sinclair has made relative to the occasional grants in aid of the civil-list. "The learned Baronet," says he, "recapitulates the various sums, which, from time to time, have been paid in supplementary aid of the civil list, and, at length infers, that the total, during the space of twenty-eight years, amounts to 923,196*l.* per annum. But his sagacity seems not to have perceived, that the depreciation of money was out-running the annuity; and his algebra did not discover, by computation, that, 923,196*l.* in 1786 were not equal in power of purchase to 800,000*l.* the annuity fixed on in 1760. In fact, according to the table and the principles of Sir George Shuckburgh, an annuity of 800,000*l.* was equal in its energies during the year 1760 to an annuity of £1,478,947. 7*s.* 4*d.* in the year 1800." (A depreciation of almost cent. per cent.) "Now," adds he, "the mathematics cannot be out-faced by confidence, nor out-argued by declamation." Mr. Rose has a remark of the same sort; but, both these gentlemen must now confess, that what neither confidence nor declamation can do, they have attempted; and, I should be glad to ask Mr. Chalmers what becomes of his clumsy sarcasm on Sir John Sinclair's sagacity, when we find Mr. Chalmers himself not only totally omitting, in his estimate of the old taxes, any allusion to depreciation of money, but averring, that their produce had suffered *no diminution*, and exulting in the contrast between the present times and that of the "distressful times of King William?" But, it seems that Mr. Chalmers did not content himself with an application of this "important table" (for so he describes the table of Sir George Shuckburgh) to the expenses of the civil-list, having since pushed it into practice with regard to another annuity, which, without the slightest imputation to his loyalty, we may suppose to be still nearer and dearer to his heart. I allude to *his own salary* as Chief Clerk to the Board of Trade and Plantations, of which, for reasons which I dare say you could give, Mr. Rose, his rival in the science of political economy, is now become the Vice President. This salary, Sir, was 500*l.* a year, which, at the time when it was fixed, was certainly not too much, especially for a person so attentive, so laborious, and, in his way, so useful as Mr. Chalmers. When, therefore, he came to apply this 500*l.* of 1786 to the affairs of life in 1803, he dis-

covered, whether by the aid of that "moral arithmetic," which he so strenuously recommended to the use of the opposers of the peace, or by that of an arithmetic of a less refined sort, I know not, but discover he did, that, of his 500*l.* the "powers of purchase" were diminished in the degree of 60 per centum; and having made this discovery he lost no time in communicating it, accompanied with all the necessary vouchers, to your predecessor at the Treasury, praying that 300*l.* a year might be added to his depreciated salary. A conclusive answer to this prayer would have been found in a page or two of his own book; "here," might the Treasurer have said, "here, Sir, you positively assert, that there has been no defalcation in the produce of the old taxes; the nominal sum is the same, and you say that there has been no diminution in the produce. Well; then, take your salary from the tax-gatherers, and let me hear no more of your complaint." Would not the petitioner's lips have been sealed? Would not the public have been justly avenged for the deception contained in his book? Not thus; however, did the well-meaning personage above alluded to think proper to act: he saw, he felt, the reasonableness of Mr. Chalmers's prayer, and the salary was augmented to 800*l.* a year, though the person that received the augmentation had contended that 14,000,000*l.* in taxes of 1803 was worth as much as a like sum in taxes of 1786, and though it was evident, that, if the whole of the taxes had been paid away in salaries at the same augmented rate, the taxes of 1803, to have been equal in powers of payment to those of 1786, must have amounted to 22,400,000*l.*—Excuse me, Sir, if I presume, that nothing further need be said to prove, that the 13th resolution, upon which I have been induced to trouble you with these remarks, presents to the nation and the world an adventurous fallacy instead of an interesting fact; at the same time, however, I cannot refrain from expressing my sincere belief, that this fallacy was not an intentional one; and for this belief I have above, perhaps too much at length, given my reasons. But, from a letter, which I have received upon the subject, and which I shall here insert, I find, that one person at least did not understand the statement contained in the 13th resolution to aim at the object that I have attributed to it. The writer seems to imagine, that the inference intended to be drawn, was, not that the old taxes had preserved their former *intrinsic value*, but that they still bore

as great a proportion as ever to the value and nominal amount of the public debt. Previous to any observations upon this opinion, it will be best to insert my correspondent's letter, which is dated on the 30th of July. "In your letter to Mr. Pitt," says he, "contained in the last Register, you clearly show, that, though the old permanent taxes collected in 1803 exceeded in nominal amount the same taxes collected in 1792, yet there is a real diminution in *value* in the produce of the former year; but, Sir, you seem to me to have lost sight of the object Mr. Pitt had in view by drawing the comparison, for I apprehend, that, with reference to the *charge* upon the taxes in question, there is a real excess to the extent appearing by the difference of the nominal amount of the two years alluded to. In other words, the interest of the sum charged upon those taxes is permanent, and not variable, like the price of bread and other commodities, according to the value of money, consequently, *with reference to the debt*, there is a surplus, and that surplus is, of course, as valuable as any other balance in favour of income beyond expenditure. I consider Mr. Pitt's statement as proving, that the permanent taxes of 1792 do now yield, not a sum of money greater in value, but a larger sum for payment of the permanent charge thereon, than in the year 1792, by the amount of 617,000*l.* and, supposing the charge to have been exactly equal to the revenue of 1792, there is an overplus to that amount in the Exchequer applicable to the exigencies of the state." This gentleman's meaning, Sir, expressed in somewhat fewer words, is this: that you meant *not* to cause it to be believed, that, under all the weight of additional taxes since the year 1792, the old taxes still retained their real value as applied to expenditure in general; but that, as the interest of the debt, existing in 1792, had experienced the same degree of depreciation as the produce of the old taxes had, the produce of those taxes, though greatly depreciated, was yet sufficient and even more than sufficient for the payment of that interest.—Could this be the intention of the Resolution? Still I think not, because the same degree of care is taken to avoid, in every other part of your Resolutions, all allusion to the difference occasioned by the depreciation of money. In stating the "*real value*" of British manufactures exported in the years 1802 and 1803 comparatively, you make no allowance for the de-

preciation of the money in which the amount is stated. The excuse made by my correspondent cannot apply here; because it is impossible for you here to speak of the value of the goods with reference to any charge or debt. It is true, that you no where say that money has *not* depreciated: you do not say that a million's worth of goods exported in 1803 *was* equal in value to a million's worth of goods exported in 1802; but you do not say that it *was not* equal; and, as I have before remarked, the inference evidently intended to be drawn from every comparative statement, is, that, wherever there has been an increase in the *nominal*, there has also been an increase in the *real* amount.—If, however, this was not the intention of the proposition contained in the 13th Resolution, it should, I repeat it, have been so explained. But, that such an explanation would have been embarrassing in the extreme will soon appear, from the observations suggested by the subject having taken this new, and, to me at least, most unexpected turn.—To keep faith with the public creditor, to continue paying him honestly the whole of the interest due upon the annuity which he may have in the funds, is a duty, which, by you, it has been constantly asserted the government is bound to perform. Most people agree with you; and I myself dissent from the doctrine, only because I know, that the performance is absolutely impossible. I have been very harshly censured, not to say basely traduced; I have even been represented as the friend of our enemies, and, of course, as a traitor to my king, because I expressed my dislike, my abhorrence if you will, of the funding system, and because I bid the widow, the orphan, the guardian, the executor, the aged, and the infirm, to beware of its ruinous consequences. Yet, Sir, we are now told by those who defend that system, that, though certain taxes have greatly fallen off in real value, they are as good as if they had retained their full value *for the purpose of paying the interest of the national debt*, that is to say, the annuities of the persons who have deposited their property in the public funds! A declaration so bold that I hardly think you can approve of it. It is nevertheless very true; and I must, of course, be well pleased to have thus obtained an unlooked-for acknowledgement of the truth of my own doctrine. I say, that we cannot continue to pay the interest upon the debt; and, can we be said to pay the interest of an annuity purchased in 1786, when, according to your own statement, the money in which we pay it has already depreciated

00 per centum? Was I to blame in bidding the widow and the orphan beware of the effects of a system, which is thus swiftly, though silently, reducing them to beggary, if their property be placed in the public funds? Was I for this to be called an enemy to my country? "The most material sufferer," says Mr. Wheatley, whose treatise I beg leave, Sir, to recommend to your perusal, "by the depreciation of money is the public creditor, who has no power of renewing his contract at stated periods, and whose interest is paid in the same sum, whatever alteration be effected in the value of money. His capital suffers, the same diminution as his interest. The rise or fall of stocks is problematical, and cannot fairly be brought into the comparison, as it may be at any given moment as much against as in favour of the proprietor. From 1780 he has lost one-fourth of his principal and interest, without any possibility of recovery. The person, who, twenty years ago, invested his money in the funds, will find, if he had invested it in land, he would have possessed one-fourth more in income and capital, than he can now command. In the original contract between the government and the public creditor, it was stipulated that he should receive the same interest till the redemption of the debt; and, as that interest is continued to be paid in the same nominal sum, no actual breach of faith is committed, but the public faith is virtually violated, as that sum no longer retains the same real value as at the commencement of the contract. The property of the public creditor is frequently invested in the hands of trustees for a period of long duration. Should the depression proceed only in the same ratio for these next twenty years, in which it has advanced for the last twenty, the value of the pound sterling of 1780 will be diminished one half by 1820, three quarters by 1840, and, in 1860 its value will be no greater than that of a French livre of 1780. Every pound sterling which a creditor possessed in the funds in 1780 will be worth no more than a shilling in 1860." Was it not right, then, Sir, to caution fathers, mothers, guardians, and trustees against the effect of this depreciating system? Or, was it right, in the persons to whom I have alluded, to insinuate that the man who gave this caution was disaffected to his king and country?—Mr. Wheatley proceeds upon the calculations of Sir George Schuckburgh, but, it is clear that the learned baronet, whose table

of depreciation was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the year 1798, could not possibly have taken into view the accelerated progress of depreciation which has been produced by the stoppage of the Bank in 1797, and by the several laws which have, since that time, been passed to screen the Bank from paying its notes in specie, in virtue of which laws the Bank of England paper has become a legal tender. That the value of currency bears an inverse proportion to its quantity, compared to the quantity of commodities, is a principle that no one will dispute; and, when we consider, that, since Sir George Schuckburgh made his calculations, the notes of the Bank of England, to say nothing of the private bank paper, have increased in amount from twelve to eighteen millions, it will hardly be contended that the depreciation is not become much greater than what Mr. Wheatley has taken as the basis of his argument. You yourself, Sir, have declared that the depreciation has been in the degree of 60 per centum during the last eighteen years; and, I imagine that few persons will doubt, that the last six years have produced a greater degree of depreciation than the twelve preceding. Let this progress continue, then, for only eighteen years longer, and the stock-holder of the present day, though he may have a high-sounding fortune in the funds, will be reduced to beg in the streets. And, Sir, can you afford us any hope, that the depreciation will be arrested in its progress? Was there ever yet an instance of the kind in the world? Is there not, on the contrary, an ever-active cause, which impels it forward? Does not depreciation produce depreciation, as interest produces interest? "The progress in any considerable period, is what, at first view, would appear incredible. Great as have been the effects of this cause already, they must be greater in future; for its powers are augmented in proportion as they are exerted. It acts with a velocity continually accelerated, with a force continually increased."

"Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo."

And may not this eloquent description, which, in 1792, you applied to the faculties of the Sinking Fund, be with much more justice applied to those of depreciation? —But, Sir, what is called public credit will not long resist the powerful exertion of these faculties upon this scale of accelerated velocity. The gradual depreciation which money had been undergoing for centuries was not much felt, because during the whole of the reflecting part of a man's life it pro-

duced a falling off of no more, perhaps, than 30 per centum; but, of late years, and particularly since the protecting law has enabled the Bank to inundate the country with a fictitious currency, the fall has been so sensibly felt, that men have begun seriously to inquire into the cause, and to look forward to the ultimate consequences. Their apprehensions once awakened, the continual increase of prices will not fail to keep them so; and, you may be assured, Sir, that the last stage of public bankruptcy will come, long before bread will fetch a shilling a pound. — Men differ in opinion as to this latter point only because they have not settled amongst themselves the meaning of the words *national bankruptcy*. The vulgar notion is that no injury to the creditor will take place till the government or the bank shall stop payment all at once; that the stock-holders will then receive no more interest for their stock, and will, of course, be ruined. These good people do not seem to be at all aware, that, by the effects of an over-issue of paper, and a consequent accelerated depreciation, the government or the bank (for they are in this respect one and the same) has already stopped payment in part; that it has, since 1786, stopped, according to your calculation, at the rate of 60 per centum; that the stock-holders receive only a part of their former interest; and that, they are daily going on to ruin; that ruin which they dread like the grave, and which, like the grave, they flatter themselves is yet a distance far, very far, removed! Amongst private individuals bankruptcy means a complete stoppage of payment for a time, till the effects of the bankrupt can be sold and their proceeds applied to the discharge of his debts: then come the dividends. But, when a nation becomes bankrupt the stoppage is by degrees: like the private debtor, it pays a part of what it owes; but its dividends are before instead of after its final stoppage: in other words, its failure consists in its not being able to pay the interest of its loans in currency of the same value as that in which those loans were made; for, as to an abundance, and even a very great surplus, of currency of some kind or other, what nation ever need be without it, while it has paper and a printing-press at its command? We have yet before our eyes the bankruptcies of America and of France. Did they take place all at once? Did their money retain its original value till the moment when they finally stopped? No: their "public securities" (for so they too were called,) their Congress paper and their Assignats

lost their value by degrees; and when they had lost all their value, the bankruptcy was completed. In short, Sir, a nation cannot well forfeit its engagements with its creditors in any other way than by a depreciation in its currency. However empty its exchequer, however much drained its resources, and however great its debt, it cannot flatly refuse to pay its creditors. Its financiers, always desirous of avoiding the necessity of such refusal, have, therefore, recourse to payments in fictitious money, some of them, amongst whom I include yourself, being sincerely persuaded that such payments are not injurious to the creditor. At the out-set they are not, but very soon they are attacked by the canker-worm of depreciation, a worm that dies not but with the matter on which it feeds.——Many are the objects, the public and political objects, which present themselves when we come to contemplate the effects of this destructive principle, the ravages of which are already but too visible in the decay of the minor gentry, whose ancestors were so improvident as to exchange the state of land-holder for that of state-annuitant; in the decline of the land-holders themselves, whose rents being fixed for long terms sink the land-lord, in many instances, to a level with the tenant; in the daily and fearfully increasing poverty of the church and collegiate establishments, which, bound down, in most cases, by fixed rents or compositions, are utterly incapacitated for keeping pace, by renewals or fines, with the swift foot of depreciation in the currency, inasmuch that there are not wanting instances of livings which formerly afforded the incumbent a decent maintenance and which now scarcely yield him bread, and of charitable foundations where the members formerly were upon a footing, in point of clear income, with respectable farmers and tradesmen, and where they are now actually compelled to resort to *parish rates* in aid of their depreciated pittance. The pensioners of the crown are in a similar situation: the Royal munificence of former reigns, and even of the present reign, is become, in too many instances, hardly sufficient in amount to keep alive the remembrance of the donor; and the Sovereign and his family are, by the operation of this pernicious principle, compelled, year after year, to ask parliament, or, which is much worse, the minister for relief. Of one of the political consequences of this last mentioned effect, of the unmerited odium which it is calculated to bring upon those whom we ought most to love and venerate, I am sure I need not, at this time in particu-

lar, remind you; nor do you, I trust, need any observation of mine to make you lament, that the crown is thus become the ever-needy dependent of its own servants, while, in the eyes of the unthinking part of the people, it appears in the character either of a miser who hoards, or of a prodigal who spends, that which it obtains from the bounty of parliament, which in its turn, is accused of generously giving that which is not its own.——Such, Sir, are a few, and only a few of the evils of the depreciation of money and of the system by which it has been produced. It is not in the compass of a letter, or of a sheet, like this that a tenth part of those evils can be described, or even barely enumerated. They pervade every part of the empire; they affect every department of the state; they weigh down the spirit, they benumb all the better faculties of the nation; and, if a remedy be not found, and that speedily too, they will lay her prostrate at the feet of her enemy, thereby fulfilling the prediction of that profound politician, who, in his description of “the violent death of public credit,” has, I greatly fear, but too accurately described her fate.——With an anxious wish that you may seriously think of these things while there is yet time to save us from the horrors of revolution, and with a sincere expression of my conviction that you never apprehended the dangers which your measures have brought upon your Sovereign and your country, I remain, your, &c. &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

P. S. Below you will find, Sir, a letter from a second correspondent, remarking on my letter to you of the 23<sup>rd</sup> ultimo. It will serve to shew, that the object of your statement in the 13<sup>th</sup> resolution was understood in ways precisely different by different persons, and those persons its approvers. But, this is not the reason for which it is inserted, I am desirous that my readers should form correct opinions upon these most important subjects; and, am, therefore, resolved to lay before them the remarks of all my opponents, unless those remarks are, for some obvious reason, unfit for publication.

#### PRODUCE OF TAXES.

SIR,——The very high estimation in which I hold your writings, and the confidence which I feel in the excellence of the motives which prompt your public conduct, induce me to address a few lines to you, in consequence of your letter, in last Saturday's Register to Mr. Pitt. The inference intended by him to be drawn, from the statement in the 13<sup>th</sup> resolution of the House of Com-

matters on finance, still appears to me to be legitimate: and, I think your objection to it arises, from confounding the action of the depreciation of money on price, with its action on taxes. When the amount of the same taxes is advanced, as an evidence to the condition of the country, it should not be forgotten, that four-fifths at least of them, are taxes on *quantity*, and that only those taxes which are *ad valorem* are liable to the objection urged by you in your letter, and that in the entries at the Custom-House, prices have not advanced in any degree upon a par with the real prices at market. If, then, you were, (allowing for the argument, your estimate of one-third depreciation to be correct), to consider Custom-House depreciation at one-sixth, and cast this on the taxes gathered *ad valorem*, you would arrive at the full strength which can be allowed your objection. It would be a tedious calculation, (nor do I at present recollect any paper on the table of the House of Commons, that would enable me to frame one for 1803), to correctly cast out the proportion of *ad valorem* articles; they are, I know of very small amount, and are greatly over-rated at one-fifth; taking them, however, at this proportion, the permanent taxes for 1792 were 14,284,000, and those for 1803 casts thus were 14,404,300.—From this comparison the obvious conclusion is, that the consumption of the various articles which are subjected to duties, has not lessened in the last ten years, that on the contrary, it has rather increased, and that for once in the revenue arithmetic two and two do make four.—I am, Sir, with respect, your very devoted humble servant. D. W.

## BANK OF ENGLAND LAW.

SIR,——Perceiving no remarks in your Register, nor in any of the daily Journals upon the singular occurrence which took place on the 6th ultimo, at the Bank of England, and at the Mansion House; I beg to lay before your readers such particulars of the transaction as have come to my knowledge, together with some observations thereon. It appears, that a gentleman, wishing to obtain change for a large Bank of England note, applied for it at the Bank, and being desired to write his name and residence on the note, wrote, “Abraham Newland,\* Bank of England.” The clerk, conceiving his request to be trifled with, refused to change the note, and told the gentleman that the forms of office were not to be so lightly dealt with; but the gentleman

persisted that he had written his real name, and that having no fixed place of residence, he thought the place where he then was the fittest to be described as his residence. The clerk, however, not at all satisfied with this explanation, and supposing, or pretending to suppose, that the gentleman had possessed himself of the note in an improper manner, immediately ordered him into the custody of a constable, by whom he was taken to the Mansion House, where he was examined by the Lord Mayor, in the presence of the Bank Solicitor and others of their officers; but, still continuing to assert that he had written his real name, and making, as it is said, some ingenious observations with respect to his place and residence, he was discharged, and the money which had been taken from him restored. Thus ended the transaction.—That the above was, indeed, a curious occurrence, in more than one point of view, I believe none will deny, and more especially yourself, Mr. Editor. It was curious from the coincidence of names, and still more curious and important from the measures thought proper to be adopted on the occasion by the officers of the Bank of England. By perusing any one of the notes issued by the Bank, it will be seen, that they promise to pay to the bearer on demand the sum of money mentioned therein without any stipulation, condition, or reservation whatever. The words purport, as clearly as words can do, that, upon the presentation and giving up of the piece of paper on which they are written, the person so presenting and giving it up shall be entitled to receive, and shall receive, the value expressed in it in the current coin of the realm. But, though the words and their meaning still remain the same, it is known, that by various Acts of Parliament, to any of which it is quite unnecessary particularly to refer, the Bank of England is now authorized and required to pay the amount in its *own coin*, in such manner as the bearer shall require. These acts, however, interfere no further; their object was and is merely as I have stated it. It becomes, then, a question of importance to determine, by what right the officers of the Bank require the person who presents a note for payment to inform them of his name and place of abode? Is it not sufficient for them that the note is delivered into their hands previous to its being paid, and that they have a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether it has been *bona fide* issued or is forged? Can we for a moment suppose, that these officers are ignorant of the signs and marks by which their notes are identified? If they are not ignorant, of what con-

\* The name of the chief cashier in the Bank.

consequence is it to them by whom they are presented or to whom paid? It is impossible for them to sustain any injury, inasmuch as they receive a full equivalent for that which they give. And if they are ignorant, who is so proper to suffer as themselves? We shall be told, perhaps, that it is one of the rules of their office: but, I would ask, if it be indeed true that the Bank is vested with the power of making laws, and of enforcing their observance *by imprisonment and otherwise*? Whether this *imperium in imperio* be really acknowledged? All bankers, it is true, have some regulations by which their own private transactions are governed, but I have yet to learn an instance in which these regulations have been attempted to be set up as public laws. We are aware, for instance, that it is one of their customs not to receive money after a certain hour for the payment of a Bill of Exchange, or on any other account; but, we are also aware, that the law does not notice the hours of bankers, and that if money be duly tendered in payment of a Bill of Exchange, at any hour within the day the bill becomes due, such tender may be effectually pleaded in bar of any action brought for the non-payment of such bill. Perhaps, it may be well that such private regulations exist; and when applied in a proper manner they will experience no opposition or blame from me, but when they clasp with the rights of the subject, when it is endeavoured to make them public rules, then they call forth my unqualified reprobation, my most determined enmity. Viewing them in this light, and considering the Bank of England, in this respect, merely upon an equality with any other Bank, I cannot consider the case before stated without very considerable astonishment. Not knowing any real authority under which the Bank could so act, and believing that none does exist, yet satisfied that they have so acted, I feel that, either a very flagrant outrage has been committed, or that my opinions are strangely wrong. Either the officers of the Bank have acted agreeably to law, or not: if they have acted according to law, then all is well; but if they have not, then surely they are liable to some punishment; and ought to make some compensation to the injured person, and to the public for demanding of them as a right, that which they have no title to receive. Unless, indeed, they are justified in exercising “a vigour beyond the law,” because they are men of “ardent minds.” Clear it is that there was no just cause for the examination of this gentleman, inasmuch as he was discharged by the magistrate without either punishment or reprimand. For

myself, I have no doubt, that, in the whole of the transaction, they have been utterly wrong, and have acted rather with a view to the gratification of their pride, than a due regard to their own interest and the public good.—I have been induced to extend my observations further upon this subject than may, perhaps, be deemed necessary by some, but considering that the Bank in various respects, and particularly in respect of the late and present issue of dollars, has become very intimately blended with the legislative power of the realm, it seems to me necessary to know the real extent of its power, and my objects equally to obtain that information, and to call the public attention to the real acts of its officers. At present I refrain from saying anything further, and beg to subscribe myself, your most obedient servant,—  
SCOTLAND.

#### SLAVE TRADE.

SIR.—I have long perused your Weekly Register with an uncommon degree of attention and pleasure; and the more so, as your political opinions have almost invariably coincided with my own. It was, therefore, with extreme regret in the perusal of your stricture on the slave trade, as contained in page 933, &c. of the No. dated 16th June, 1804, that I observed our ideas of justice and humanity, did not tally in a similar manner. My regret was not so much excited by their discordance merely as relating to ourselves; for, it can scarce be expected that the sentiments of any two individuals should invariably agree: but, when I think of the immense influence your Register deservedly has over a very great number of the inhabitants in the civilized world, and that the opinions you have promulgated in the passage alluded to, have in all probability prejudiced many members of the Upper House against it, and finally accomplished its postponement, or in all likelihood its entire ejection; and may have thereby not a little contrived to prolong the duration of a most grievous slavery to many thousands of our fellow-creatures: I feel not only regret, but the most poignant grief. I should have troubled you with a few remarks on the subject, ere now; but from an expectation that some one better qualified to send home conviction than I am, would have undertaken the task. Since no one has, however, I hope you will accept that as a sufficient apology for my troubling you at present. You begin then, with a criticism on the preamble of the truly philanthropic Mr. Wilberforce's bill which states that, “the slave trade is contrary to the principles of justice and hu-

"manity." You observe, that it is very short and pithy! Doubtless it is, and I moreover, agree with you, in thinking Mr. W. would have done wiser in using a little more ceremony in his preamble. That I grant then, it being merely a matter of ceremony, for you do not seem to wish so much that the accusation had not been preferred, as that a little more ceremony had been used in so doing. But in regard to the substance of the preamble, I must confess myself at a loss to conceive on what grounds you could persuade yourself, that a traffic so unnatural does not violate every principle of justice and humanity. Does justice consist in catching them as you term it, for the express purpose of dooming their bodies to endless slavery on this side the grave? Shall he who hunts or shoots them as we in this country would do foxes and hares, be termed unjust and inhuman? Does justice consist in our purchasing African prisoners of war for slaves from their fellow countrymen, when we know that by doing so we clandestinely promote and encourage an eternal civil war amongst themselves? Is there either justice or humanity in the shameful manner in which they are huddled together, and their barbarous usage in the middle passage? a description of which would melt a heart of adamant. Does justice consist in selling them to West-Indian planters? In these planters overworking them; in whipping them for no cause whatever but the gratification of their own flagitious humour, and then starving them to the bargain; thereby rendering them obnoxious to the threefold pains of flagellation, hunger, and despair? Despair, I may well add, for they need never more expect (when they have once crossed the Atlantic,) to see and embrace their long lost parents, wife, or children in this world. Now, Mr. Cobbett, if such treatment as I have above so feebly attempted to describe, bear any sort of analogy to the common acceptance of the words justice and humanity, I will confess myself infinitely obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to explain to me the meaning of the words injustice and inhumanity. But, as you may not be disposed to take that trouble, permit me to bring the subject more home to your feelings, by a view of it through that simple, but never sufficiently to be admired precept of our blessed Saviour's, "Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you." Suppose yourself only for a moment instead of a subject of our happy Isle, to be an African Chieftain, happy in the enjoyment of the society of the dear partner of your joys and

cares, your aged parents, and your lovely progeny, that some fellow Chieftain allured by a thirst of gain, attacks, vanquishes, takes you and your family prisoners, tears you from their fond embraces, and sells you for a slave. Supposing, I say, all this to be your lot, would you then think the government which sanctioned this traffic, the sole source and cause of all these your undeserved misfortunes, was one that laid claims to civilization, and to be actuated by the pure principles of justice and humanity? If you can conscientiously answer me this in the affirmative, then I will think you have ground for asserting, that the slave trade is neither contrary to the principles of justice or humanity. Or what is the same thing, suppose only that Jamaica, and the other West India Islands were the property of the African Blacks, and governed by colonies of them, that their maritime power surpassed that of any other country under Heaven, that the African planters employed their countrymen at home, under the sanction of their government to sail to Britain, there to make such offers for slaves as would prove an inducement for British Chiefs to go to war with one another for the sole purpose of taking prisoners: that you and your family were taken by the Tinman Doctor and his partisans; who, denying you even a parting look of every one dear to you, hurried you on board a ship, crammed you among hundreds of your equally unhappy countrymen, and setting sail for the land of slavery, left you a prey to all the horrors of despair! What would your opinion then be of this said African government? None of the most favourable I dare presume. But laying all supposition aside, let us return to the reality, and hear what you have got to advance in favour of the said slave trade; and against its abolition. Perhaps, you will say, it would be a piece of more glaring injustice to deprive the West Indian planters of this generation of their lawful purchase in the persons of their slaves, than to curtail the vilest slavery not only on the present, but on many African generations yet unborn. Of the fallacy of this argument I could wish also to convince you, after I shall have previously shown that the services of the ci-devant slaves are still as secure to the planters as ever. If a planter, for instance, emancipates his slave, doubtless, that slave is free to leave him, and go seek another master, at whose hand, perhaps, he expects better treatment: but still to a master he must go; for having no other means of earning his subsistence but servitude, and no means of reaching his native home, he labours under that unavoid-

able necessity. If you say he may, perhaps, fall on some other method of procuring a livelihood, that may easily be prevented by an act of Assembly, prohibiting negroes from carrying on any sort of traffic whatever, and from begging. And as to their leaving the Island, that may also be prohibited by a similar edict. Now, in regard to indemnifying the planters, that might be effected by a donation from our government, and a British subscription, which I have no doubt would be very liberal; from the ardent wish millions of our countrymen have to see an end put to so infamous and detestable a traffic. As to the planters being obliged to give them wages, there is no necessity that they should be very high, from the Negroes being obliged to serve as I have shown above. They might, therefore, be very small; in which case, I am fully convinced, that whatever additional expense would fall on the master in consequence of his paying wages over and above what his slaves would have cost him as slaves, (which is all that can be reckoned) would be so very trifling, as to be more than defrayed by the saving arising from the planters being no longer obliged to purchase them from importers, nor to import them themselves. As I see no reason why Negroes, if used as British servants are, should not marry and propagate as they do; and thereby afford the requisite number of servants, and preserve the race undiminished. It may perhaps, be alleged, that it would be attended with extreme danger, granting so many thousand Negroes their liberty at once; as it might raise an insurrection among them, and they massacre the whites. But, surely this fear is ungrounded in the first place, what farther means of rising would they have? Cannot arms be kept from them as well as ever? Cannot they be hindered from clubbing seditiously as the British commonality are? And in the next place, would they not have far less occasion for doing so than at present? No longer would they have their liberty to fight for; no longer would they have the merciless whips of their overseers to fight against; while moreover, their lives would be endeared to them by enjoyment, their masters by gratitude, and they would be afraid to risk an insurrection; lest, faring like the infatuated Emmet, they should leave their wives and children a prey to indigence, and all its consequent evils. If it is said there are few or no negro women in our West-Indian colonies; let the slave trade be carried on for another 6 or 12 months, and none but women be imported, and that evil would be remedied. I could now launch

out, and take a more pleasant view of the subject, by enumerating the many happy consequent attendants on emancipation, both to our own country, and the unhappy victims of our avarice; such as wiping off the odium of the traffic in a great measure from ourselves, and calling down the blessings of Providence on our colonies, and on the parent states: two things unquestionably of very desirable import. And procuring to them liberty, with all its train of blessings; blessings, which like health and innocence, can never be sufficiently appreciated by any but those who have felt the want of them. But, on this (besides my want of room) I think it needless to enlarge, as every philanthropist must anticipate them, and you among others; I would now attempt convincing you that the blood of a British peasant's daughter is not contaminated by intermingling with that of a Sun burned African: but, as I have already trespassed on your patience, I shall bid adieu to the subject at present, in hopes you will honour this with a place in your valuable and patriotic Register, and oblige your most obedient servant, &c. AMICUS AD JUSTITIAM ET HUMANITATEM.

*Perth, July 23, 1804.*

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Protest of Louis XVIII. Dated Warsaw, June 6, 1804. Extracted from the French Official Paper, the Moniteur.*

In assuming the title of Emperor, and attempting to render it hereditary in his family, Buonaparté has put the seal to his usurpation. This new act of revolution, where every thing from its origin has been null and void, cannot weaken my rights; but being accountable for my conduct to all Sovereigns, whose rights are not less injured than mine, and whose thrones are shaken by the dangerous principles which the Senate of Paris has dared to publish—accountable to France, to my family, and to my own honour, I should consider myself as betraying the common cause, were I to keep silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after having renewed my protestations against all the illegal acts, which, from the opening of the States General of France, have led to the alarming crisis in which France and Europe are now involved—I declare, in the presence of all the Sovereigns, that, far from acknowledging the Imperial title that Buonaparté has received from a body which has not a legitimate existence, I protest as well against that title as all the subsequent acts to which it may give birth.

*Verbal Declaration of the Minister of the Elector of Baden, made at the Diet of Ratisbon, July 2, 1804.*

His Electoral Highness of Baden, while he honours the pure intentions of his Russian Imperial Majesty in the representation which he laid before the Diet of the Empire on the 6th of May, and is penetrated with the liveliest gratitude for the benevolent friendship which his Majesty has manifested for himself and his Electoral House, cannot suppress his profound grief that the occurrence in question, which took place in his territory, should be likely to produce disagreeable differences that may be productive of the most dangerous consequences to the peace of Germany.—This important consideration, added to a full confidence in the well-intentioned sentiments of the French Government and its exalted head, towards the whole German Empire, so lately evinced in the mediation of peace, and in the explanations, perfectly suitable to these sentiments, of the occurrence in question, his Electoral Highness cannot but most earnestly wish that the representations made to the Diet on the 6th and 14th of May, may have no farther consequences, and that thus the present anxiety may be dispelled, since otherwise the tranquillity and welfare of the German Empire, and probably indeed of all Europe, may be again disturbed and endangered.

*Verbal Declaration of the Deputy for the Electorate of Bohemia and Archduchy of Austria. Dated July 6, 1804.*

The Austrian Comital Legation at the time fixed for the consideration of the Imperial Russian Note, repeated the circular declaration of the 14th of May, in expectation of a satisfactory explanation on the occurrence in question, and will now immediately communicate to its high Court the wish of the Electorate of Baden, and the motives on which it is founded, in certain expectation that his Imperial Majesty will receive the proposition of his Electoral Highness of Baden, and the explanations of the French Government relative to the above-mentioned occurrence with all that attention which he constantly bestows on every event which may conduce to disturb the tranquillity, security, and welfare of the German Empire.

*Verbal Declaration of the Comital Legation of the Electorate of Brandenburg. Dated July 6, 1804.*

The Legation for Brandenburg will hasten to make report of the verbal declaration of the Deputy of the Electorate of

Baden, suitable to the importance of its contents and the subject to which it relates. In the mean-time it believes, from the known sentiments of his Prussian Majesty, that it may with certainty be expected, that his Majesty will find a consolation in the declaration of the Elector of Baden; relative to the explanations on the occurrence in question, as being such as are suitable to the sentiments of the French Government and its exalted head, towards the Empire of Germany, as evinced in the late mediation of peace; and that his Majesty will give his approbation to the wish of his Electoral Highness of Baden, and the motives on which it is founded.

*Note of Hanover in the Deliberations at the Diet of Ratisbon, relative to the Russian Note concerning the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien.—Dated Ratisbon, July 21, 1804.*

His Britannic Majesty and Electoral Highness of Brunswick Lunenburg, has observed with the most grateful approbation the part taken by his Imperial Russian Majesty for the maintenance of the rights of nations, the peace of Luneville, and the security of the German Empire, which have been violated in the most extraordinary and alarming manner, by the late proceedings of the French Government in the Territory of the Electorate of Baden; and the strong representation he has made on these occurrences to the Diet of the Empire, in the Note given in by his Legation at Ratisbon on the 6th of May, of the present year. As his Britannic Majesty and Electoral Highness of Brunswick Lunenburg, fully coincides in opinion on this subject with his Imperial Russian Majesty, he makes no delay to propose and support with all his votes, that his Imperial Russian Majesty may be requested by an act of the Diet, to take such measures as in his wisdom he may judge proper, to obtain for the German Empire from the French Government, satisfactory explanations with respect to the past, and sufficient security for the future. As, however, a much more important and more dangerous violation of the rights of nations, the treaty of Luneville, and the security of the German Empire, was committed by the hostile invasion, and still continued occupation and oppression of his Majesty's German States, by the French Government, in total disregard of the Germanic constitution and independence, his Majesty cannot but remind and refer his high co-estates to the declarations he has already caused to be

made on that subject by his comital legation on the 22d. of August of the preceding year, and on the 25th of last month.

### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Speeches of his Majesty and the Speaker of the House of Commons, on Tuesday 31, July, 1804, when the Parliament was prorogued to the 4th of September, 1804.*

**SPEAKER'S SPEECH.**—Most Gracious Sovereign,——We your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, approach the foot of your Majesty's Throne, with sentiments of unfeigned joy and reverence. The bill which I hold in my hand, completes the supplies for the present year. These, Sir, we have appropriated to the further support of your Majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of your Crown, to the naval and military defence of the realm, and to the various services of your extended empire. In providing for these grants, large in their amount, and commensurate with the extraordinary demands of the times in which we live, we have nevertheless steadily persevered in our former course by raising a large proportion of our supplies within the year; and we have now the proud satisfaction to see, that the permanent debt of the state is rapidly diminishing, at the same time that the growing prosperity of the country has strengthened and multiplied all its resources. Contemplating the war in which we are engaged, the character and the means of our enemy, and the possible duration of the contest, although we are fearless of its issue, we have nevertheless deemed it our indispensable duty to deliberate with unremitting solicitude upon the best system for our military defence: and the voluntary spirit of your people, seconding the views of Parliament, has at the same time animated all ranks of men with an active desire of attaining to such a state of discipline in arms as may enable them successfully to co-operate with your Majesty's regular and veteran forces. Thus formidably armed, and powerfully sustained, we trust that, with the blessing of God, we shall victoriously maintain your Majesty's Throne, and transmit unimpaired to our descendents the most perfect form of government which the world has ever experienced for the practical happiness of mankind; firmly persuaded, that this Empire will long outlast the storms which have overwhelmed the Continent of Europe; and earnestly hoping that other nations now

fallen, may witness the destruction of a tyranny founded on fraud and violence, and cemented with innocent blood, and again recover their ancient power and independence as the best guarantees for the future welfare and tranquillity of the civilized world. The bill which I have to present your Majesty, is intitled: "An Act for granting to his Majesty a certain sum of money, out of the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain, and for applying a certain Sum of Money, therein mentioned, for the service of Great Britain, for the year one thousand eight hundred and four, and for further appropriating the supplies granted in this session of Parliament." To which your Commons, with all humility, entreat your Majesty's Royal Assent." The Royal Assent having been given to this bill, his Majesty was pleased to make the following most gracious Speech from the Throne.—

**MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,**—Before I put an end to the present session of Parliament, I am desirous of expressing my entire approbation of the zeal and assiduity with which you have applied yourselves to the great objects of public concern which have come under your consideration. You have wisely continued to direct your attention to the encouragement and improvement of that respectable and powerful volunteer force, which the ardour and spirit of my subjects have enabled me to establish. to an extent hitherto unexampled. You have at the same time endeavoured to combine an additional establishment for our domestic defence, with the means of augmenting our regular army, and of maintaining it on such a scale as may be proportioned to the circumstances of the times, and to the rank which this country ought ever to hold among the powers of Europe.—**GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,**—You are entitled to my warmest acknowledgments for the fresh proof which you have given me of your constant and affectionate attachment to my person and family, and your regard to the honour and dignity of my Crown, by the liberal provision which you have made for the payment of the debt on my civil list revenues, and for furnishing me with the additional means of defraying the increase which has unavoidably taken place in different branches of my expenditure. I must also return you my warmest thanks for the extensive provision which you have made for the exigencies of the public service; and especially for the just and prudent attention which you have shewn to true economy, and

to the permanent credit and welfare of the country, by the great exertions you have made for preventing, as far as possible, the accumulation of debt, and for raising so large a proportion of the expenses of the war within the year.—MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,—I have now only to recommend to you to carry into your respective counties the same zeal for the public interest which has guided all your proceedings. It will be your particular duty to inculcate on the minds of all classes of my subjects, that the preservation of all that is most dear to them requires the continuance of their unremitting exertions for the national defence. The preparations which the enemy has long been forming, for the declared purpose of invading this kingdom, are daily augmented, and the attempt appears to have been delayed only with the view of procuring additional means for carrying it into execution. Relying on the skill, valour, and discipline of my naval and military force, aided by the voluntary zeal and native courage of my people, I look with confidence to the issue of this great conflict, and I doubt not that it will terminate, under the blessing of Providence, not only in repelling the danger of the moment, but in establishing, in the eyes of foreign nations, the security of this country, on a basis never to be shaken. In addition to this first and great object, I entertain the animating hope, that the benefit to be derived from our successful exertions will not be confined within ourselves—but that by their example and their consequences, they may lead to the re-establishment of such a system in Europe as may rescue it from the precarious state to which it is reduced, and may finally raise an effectual barrier against the unbounded schemes of aggrandizement and ambition which threaten every independent nation that yet remains on the Continent.

Then the Lord Chancellor, by his Majesty's command, said,—MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,—It is his Majesty's Royal will and pleasure, that this Parliament be prorogued to Tuesday the fourth day of September next, to be then here holden; and this Parliament is accordingly prorogued to Tuesday the fourth day of September next.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE CONTINENT, instead of affording any prospect of being "roused by our glorious example," admitting us to have given any such example, seems resolved not to stir. And, indeed, what should it stir for? For our preservation? Can we expect, we,

who, according to Mr. Wilberforce's declaration, are "*too honest* to have any alliance or connexion with the powers of the Continent;" is it for us to believe that the Continent will plunge itself into war merely for the sake of making a diversion in our favour? Russia holds a threatening, or, at least, an angry language, and propositions are made at the Diet of Ratisbon, aiming at a coalition against France; but, without Austria, there can be no coalition worth forming, and it is not a little curious to hear the speech express a hope of continental co-operation, while the minister and his predecessor, however they may disagree upon other subjects, most harmoniously join in their reproaches against the Emperor of Germany for not discharging his loan. The Vicar of Wakefield, when he wanted to get rid of the too-frequent visits of any importunate and disagreeable acquaintance, lent him an old great coat or pair of boots, in consequence of which he never heard of him more. Our minister seems to have imitated the act of Doctor Primrose, upon a very large scale indeed, without recollecting the Doctor's object, which was to alienate, and not to draw closer an alliance with the party to whom his loans were made. The loan to the Emperor of Germany is serving us in the same capacity as the debt of the Americans served us. We seemed to keep the demand alive for the purpose of favouring the views of France; and thus are we acting with regard to the Imperial loan, which will never be paid, till, at least, the depreciation of our money shall have rendered the payment a mere trifle, but which will, in the mean time, effectually prevent any approaches towards an alliance between us and that power with which of all others it is our interest to be allied.—The Emperor of Russia is said to have offered Louis XVIII. a splendid establishment in his dominions; and to have given orders for the raising of two legions, one to be called the legion de Bourbon, and the other the legion d'Enghien. This may be true, though it is not very likely; and, at any rate, Louis XVIII. must be destitute of all reflexion, if the offer excites much joy or hope in his breast. He cannot but recollect the past conduct of his pretended friends, the Emperor of Russia not excepted; he cannot but remember the treatment of the French royalists in the service of England during the last war and at the last peace; and thus remembering, he will have little reason to doubt that his claims will be supported just as far as suits the interest of his supporters, and

not one hair's breadth farther. A great and honourable coalition for the purpose of placing this prince upon the throne of his ancestors would merit the applause of the world; but, there is no man of generous sentiments, or even of common honesty, who will not reprobate any attempt to make a mere scarecrow, or at least an enfant-perdu, of the heir of a long race of kings.—The protest of Louis XVIII. which will be found in another part of this sheet, was, for some time, thought to be a forgery of the Editor of the *Moniteur*, or of some person having control over that paper, in which it made its first appearance in print; but, it is now known to be authentic, and the publication of it in the *Moniteur*, may serve to show, as its publishers intended it should, the degree of that apprehension which they entertain of its effects upon the people of France or upon the world in general.

THE INVASION has been again revived, and, for several days, it seemed to keep, in point of interest, nearly upon a level with the Middlesex election. Invasion has long been a state malady; appearing by fits and starts; sometimes assuming one character and sometimes another. At last, however, it seems to have settled into a sort of hemorrhage, the patients in Downing Street expectorating pale or red according to the state of their disease. For some weeks past the colour has been remarkably vivid; whether proceeding from the heat of the dog-days, or from the quarrelings and fightings and riotings amongst their volunteers, it would be hard to say; but, certain it is, that the symptoms have been of a very alarming complexion for nearly a month.—Buonaparté, in the mean-time, is visiting Boulogne, as it were to challenge the generalissimo of our four hundred thousand men; but this great commander has now retired from the field to the cabinet, where he is inventing projects, not for conducting an army, but for raising one, having made, at last, the wonderful discovery, that his four hundred thousand men are not sufficient to the defence of the country.—A removal of the French fleet, from the inner to the outer harbour of Brest, has fortunately afforded Lord Melville an opportunity to give us a specimen of his vigilance. All is bustle and noise and dust in his department. His expresses will kill more horses than his cannon will kill Frenchmen; and, we shall by and by find, perhaps, that, in the midst of all this show of vigilance and activity, the point the most material has been left entirely unguarded.—But, only think of the

state in which we are! The circumstance of a few ships in Brest harbour having shifted their births makes a stir in all our sea-ports, and will not cost, probably, a sum far short of a hundred thousand pounds. This will, indeed, tend to augment the quantity of paper, to accelerate the depreciation of money, to reduce the real value of the interest on the national debt, and thus help to "pay-off" that debt, in the way, in which, according to the notion of my Cornish opponent, the expenses of war does pay it off, and, therefore, some persons may think, perhaps, that the movement in Brest harbour is a thing to be rejoiced at.—If such things be good, there must be great comfort in knowing, that we are sure to have enough of them. The Emperor of the French is surrounded by men who are well able to decide upon the means of annoying us. They can distinguish, if Mr. Rose and his readers cannot, between the value of the taxes of 1792 and those of 1803: both the theory and the practice, as well as the consequences, of a depreciation of money, are familiar to them: they have seen a government, capable of resisting every other sort of attack, treating every other sort of attack with disdain, fall, almost without an effort, under the deadening influence of a depreciated paper-money, aided and abetted by a projecting minister. No: it is my decided opinion, that, while we discover a disposition to persist in our present course, we shall have no invasion; because, while we so persist, *time* is an enemy quite sufficient for us, and an attack on the part of the French might do them harm and us good. Why, therefore, should they run any risk to obtain that which, if we persevere in our present system, they are sure to obtain without any struggle at all? That they will finally invade us, however, I have no doubt; and, as no one can possibly be certain when the hour will come, every one should be prepared for the event, particularly every one capable of rendering assistance to his Majesty's forces by land or by sea. No folly, no negligence, no instances of wildness or of pertinacity in the minister will justify any want of exertion on the part of the people, who are not called upon to defend this or that minister, but the throne of their Sovereign and their own liberties, liberties, which, though in some respects abridged, perhaps, are yet such as are enjoyed by no other people upon the face of the earth.

THE KING'S SPEECH, which will be found in another part of this sheet, and which we must, of course, regard as a state paper written by the minister, says absolutely no-

thing as to our political or warlike prospects. The expressions relative to the state of public credit are less confident than usual, at which, indeed, no one can wonder, when we consider the financial situation of both Great Britain and Ireland, particularly the latter country, where the public creditor, who has had a sum of money in the funds ever since 1786, does not now receive, in real value, much more than half of his original interest.—Sterile and equivocal, however, as was the Speech itself, it was, perhaps that Speech which gave the greatest pleasure of any that has been delivered for many years, because its delivery exhibited an undeniable proof of his Majesty's perfect recovery.—He was accompanied to and from the Parliament House with loud and general demonstrations of joy on the part of the people, who seemed to greet him as a father restored to them from the verge of the grave.—His Majesty in reading the Speech, turned over two leaves at once, and thus omitted the paragraphs beginning with "*I must also return,*" and "*I have now only to recommend,*" which paragraphs were, however, afterwards read as part of the Speech and will so stand recorded, in the records of the proceedings of both Houses. It is proper unequivocally to state, that the omission in the King's delivery proceeded solely from the circumstance of turning over two leaves at once; and, that his Majesty's tone was as firm, and his manner as collected as at any period of his life.

The Volunteers of Manchester, who have thrown down their arms, because the government did not yield to their humour with respect to the gratifying of the vanity of their officers, would, if there were room, demand a paragraph or two of observation.—Those of Knaresborough also would merit still greater attention. I have frequently expressed my dread of the effects of the volunteer system upon the freedom of the next general election; but, it seems, that a general election was not wanted to furnish a proof that my apprehensions were but too well-founded. Yet, in the midst of all this his Majesty is advised to express his satisfaction at the *augmentation* of the number of volunteers!—What terrible infatuation is it that has seized upon the mind of Mr. Pitt? Again and again I beseech him to remember the words of Paley: "to me it appears doubtful whether any government can be long secure, where the people are ac-

quainted with the use of arms and accustomed to resort to them. Every faction will find itself at the head of an army; every disgust will excite commotion, and every commotion become a civil-war." These are the words of wisdom. A majority in the houses of parliament may, indeed, for a time, be preserved without listening to them; but the day must come when the nation will pay dearly for the folly of its ministers. Must not that man be politically blind, who does not already perceive public characters of very different descriptions *paying their court to the volunteers?* Does there not evidently exist a rivalry in their favour? And is Mr. Pitt weak enough, can he possibly be weak enough, to hope that *he* will be the object of that favour?—I may be deceived, and I wish it may prove so, but I am seriously of opinion, that the day on which the Volunteer System was sanctioned by the Parliament, was a day of woe to the Monarchy of Britain. There is yet time to prevent the work of destruction from proceeding further: but that time may be of very short duration.

✂ CORBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, VOL. II. will be completed in about 12 or 15 days' time. It will contain every Account of any importance laid before Parliament since the Easter Recess; the accounts presented previous to that time being all given in Vol. I. In the Second Volume great care has been taken to insert every useful account relating to Ireland, more especially if at all connected with the very interesting though little-understood subject of Irish Finance.—A correspondent, who has asked how it happens, that the *net produce* of taxes, as stated in the Account of the Income of Great Britain (Vol. I. p. 1103) surpasses in amount the *Gross Receipt*, stated in the same account, is requested to observe, that the Gross Receipt is only the Gross Receipt *within the year*, and that it may be surpassed, as in the instances alluded to, by the *Net Produce*, because to the *Net Produce* of the year is added the amount of the balances due upon the preceding year.

\*.\* As the early Volumes of the POLITICAL REGISTER have been reprinted, complete sets, uniformly half bound in Russia, may be had by applying to the respective publishers,

—“ *Be those juggling funds no more believ'd*  
*“ Who palter with us in a double sense ;*  
*“ Who keep the word of promise to our ear,*  
*“ And break it to our hope.”*—MACBETH.

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BANK DIRECTORS.

SIR,—Your tender anxiety for the reputation of the Bank directors seems to be a fancy quite new ; and those gentlemen may be pardoned for their surprize, when they find, that he who has laboured with so much diligence, and success, to prove the depreciation of Bank-paper is now unwilling that any clamour, in “ accents however gentle,” should be raised against them.—There is no question, I apprehend, between us, as to the facts, of a scarcity of coin, and the distress which it has every where (but particularly in Ireland) occasioned ; or as to the depreciation of English Bank-paper, and the fraud and injustice which must result from such depreciation. After all that has been written upon this subject, it would be an idle waste of time to prove that these evils flow from the Bank Restriction Bill, and if that fact be assumed, the directors will find it difficult to justify themselves from the charge of misconduct.—Without entering into the history of the circumstances which originally led to the bill, it will be sufficient to state, that it was passed at their request, and for their protection ; in short, to privilege them from paying their debts ; and though requested, at first, for a few months, it has been extended to seven years. During that long period have the directors made a single effort to re-establish the credit and character of the Bank ? or have they shewn the slightest inclination to satisfy the demands of their creditors ? Have they even condescended to give a reason for withholding those forty millions of guineas, which their friends assure us are in their coffers ; or why the performance of their contracts should be suspended for seven years, contrary to every principle of common honesty ? No : the directors have done no such thing ; they feel it to be a mighty snug thing not to be compelled to pay their debts, and are quite satisfied with their present situation ; and, truly, that is not to be wondered at. If, therefore, there were nothing more than this, still there would be just ground of complaint against the directors ; but, when we know, that the bank acquires considerable profits from that measure, which so much distresses the community, it

becomes almost criminal not to complain. But you, it seems, are not disposed to admit the fact of the increase of profits from the restriction bill. That the profits of the bank have from some cause, or other, greatly increased, since 1797, is beyond a question from the facts of its having declared several bonuses on its capital stock, and having paid the property tax without diminishing its dividends ; and Mr. Thornton the advocate of the Bank, has, I think, in his book, admitted (but I quote him from memory) that this increase, or a part of it, was effected by the restriction. I cannot trespass so much as to explain in detail the various modes, through which the Bank must derive from this measure great pecuniary advantages ; but there is one so obvious and satisfactory, that you must permit me to notice it. That part of the circulating medium, which consisted of gold, was furnished for the whole kingdom by the Bank of England. What the amount of it was I cannot pretend to say ; but it was stated before the Irish Exchange Committee, that even in Ireland it amounted to five millions. Now take it for the whole kingdom in that, or even a less proportion, at 15 or 20 millions, how great must be the profit of the Bank in providing to that amount in paper, instead of gold ? I forbear to mention the dollars. In a word, the directors are placed in such a situation, that they must be very much above the level of ordinary humanity, not to misconduct themselves. To them are intrusted the interests of the public and the separate interests of a trading company ; and whenever these interests clash, they must prefer the one, or the other. It is most clear which of the two they will and must prefer, the interest of their own particular order, they best understand ; their sympathies and partialities are all on that side ; they can tell it on their ten fingers ; and what is more to the purpose, they can be punished, if they neglect it. But who is to call them to account for neglecting the interest of the public ? and who ever dreamt of duty where there was no responsibility ? One word more and I have done. This system of forced paper circulation offers irresistible temptation to forgery ; and I doubt not but

that more Bank notes have been forged since 1797, than in any other period during the existence of the Bank. It is not in my power to give a list of those whom the Bank, since 1797, has hanged for this offence; but the aggregate number, through every part of the United Kingdom, must be immense; and if, to every individual who has been hanged we suppose five accomplices (a very moderate computation), we may have some faint idea of the moral tendencies of this measure of restriction; of the criminal habits which it has reared and nourished into vigorous and active being. A. R.

## FINANCE RESOLUTIONS.

SIR,—I think it ominous of good to the state when talents like your's are applied to the investigation of our finances; but though I admit, and I am sure you will feel it is not conceding a little, that you are competent to the subject, I cannot help again objecting to the mode in which you continue to treat Mr. Pitt's comparative statement of the permanent taxes of 1792 — Before I touch upon your remarks, I wish first to observe, that your correspondent D. W. does not understand the 13th resolution in a way "precisely different" from myself. We both agree with you, as indeed, I apprehend every body must, that money has depreciated in value since 1792, but he is at variance with you, and also with me, as to the amount of the depreciation affecting the revenue in question. I concur with you, if I am not mistaken, in thinking the value of money is the rule by which to judge of the value of the produce of taxes, except, however, as applied to the charge on them, or, in the Hudibrastic phrase, "that the worth of a thing is what it will bring," and I differ with D. W. only in being of opinion that the subject or mode of taxation is no criterion of the value of the amount raised.—You, in answer to my last letter, ask, "can we be said to pay the interest of an annuity purchased in 1786, when, according to Mr. Pitt's statement, the money in which we pay it has already depreciated 60 per centum?" I reply, in the affirmative, notwithstanding the argument you have quoted from Mr. Wheatley, which, if correct, would certainly be decisive in your favour. The annuitant or public creditor lent his money to the state with full knowledge that the interest was not to vary in amount with the value of money, and he must be presumed to have considered the facility of taking his security to market, and other

obvious circumstances, as more advantageous to himself than an investment in land: he has, therefore, no more reason to complain of the depreciation in the value of money, than any other subject of the state receiving a fixed income from a different source.—I do not dispute your right to caution fathers, mothers, &c. "against the effect of this depreciating system," though I think the warning will be unavailing to those who are now to be informed of such an effect: but I still contend, Sir, with deference to you, that Mr. Pitt was right in stating a surplus to the amount mentioned in his 13th resolution, and in the manner too, therein expressed, because it is clear there is that actual residue in favor of the public, after paying the charge for which the taxes were mortgaged, and because the value of such residue was not in question. I will not intrude upon you again on this subject, and beg leave to assure you, that I shall be much gratified to see a comprehensive review of the finances from your pen.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant, A. B.

## NAVIGATION WITH THE WEST-INDIES.

*To the Owners of British Ships, particularly those engaged in the West-India Trade.*

Gentlemen,—I take leave to recommend most earnestly to your serious attention and consideration, a pamphlet, lately published, entitled, "The Claims of the British West-India Colonists to the Right of obtaining necessary Supplies from America, and of employing the necessary Means of effectually obtaining those Supplies under a limited and duly regulated Intercourse, stated and vindicated in answer to Lord Sheffield's strictures."—As the object of this pamphlet is to endeavour to prevail on his Majesty's ministers to admit American vessels to trade to and from the British West-India colonies to America, and even from island to island, it behoves the owners of British shipping to associate together, and by their united exertions to oppose every obstacle in their power to such concessions being made by the King's Government. The publication of this work, at the present moment, is certainly, in some measure, ill-timed; and it is evident the author of it has not given the least attention to any of the numerous petitions which have been, during the present and the two preceding years, presented to Parliament respecting the depressed state of the shipping interest of this country\*, or to the many well-authenticated

\* See Cobbett's Political Register, &c.

documents published by order of "the Society of Ship owners of Great Britain."—If this work was analyzed, the interested views with which it is written would be apparent, notwithstanding the flimsy veil with which they are attempted to be covered, and the whole of the statements contained in it would appear as ill founded as the following passage, in particular, in page 93.—"The charge exhibited against ministers, of conducting the trade of this country under licences of the Privy Council, although coupled with that against the Governors of the Colonies on the same subject of licences, might be passed by, but the incorrect and uncandid manner in which these charges are stated must be noticed. You make a charge unfounded in terms, because it is general; and yet, under the generality of the charge, the whole objection is couched and implied: thus the occasional exercise of a power, with great propriety exercised by his Majesty in Council, is magnified into a general practice of conducting the trade of the country under licences. This enormity of charge, this extravagance of representation, this distortion of descriptive features, is exhibited by anamorphous reflection, intended to disfigure, and, by its own creations, to excite disgust and abhorrence." See page 93.—It is really much to be regretted, that the writer of this temperate and candid production, had not condescended to have taken the trouble either to make inquiry on the Royal Exchange, or at the Custom House, on this part of his subject, and he would have found the noble lord, to whom he has attributed many unbecoming and improper motives, was warranted by positive facts in the observations his lordship made on the impolitic system of granting licences to neutral vessels to trade to and from Great Britain and her colonies in breach of the navigation act.—The following is the passage referred to in page 55 of his lordship's Strictures:—"I must now protest, and I wish to do so in the strongest manner, against a most unbecoming practice which has prevailed, and lately been extended—that of conducting the trade of this country under licences granted by the Privy Council. The granting of these licences has been considered as a mere matter of form, and the licences themselves were to be obtained for about ten pounds. To all such proceedings, as it appears to me, there are invincible objections, and my wish is to prevent, particularly during peace, any suspension whatever of the navigation laws, and yet

more such extreme abuse of them as has prevailed in the West Indies through the licences granted there by the Governors for all shipping, particularly Americans, to enter," &c.—That Lord Sheffield was authorized in making these observations on the impolicy of granting licences, every day's experience confirms; and it is really surprising that the British West-India colonists should so far forget the advantages they have invariably derived from the protection of the mother country, and at a most enormous expense, as to attempt, at a moment of great depression, to injure her by facilitating the complete sacrifice and ruin of her shipping interest: they are not contented to permit the British ship owners to enjoy the little trade, which is now left them to employ the great but sinking capital they have embarked in British shipping, but they are anxious to lessen it, by the employment of American vessels in the trade of the British West-India colonies.—It is only necessary to refer to the following extracts from this work to shew its dangerous tendency; and that its object, if attained, will be attended with injurious consequences to the shipping interest of the mother country:—"The Colonists propose the employment of American vessels jointly with British, because British shipping alone, after twenty years trial, have not been able to carry on the intercourse beneficially in time of peace, adequately in time of calamity, or actually in time of war.—They claim this right as due by virtue of ancient establishment, use, and practice. They claim it as appurtenant to the property they possess, as essentially necessary to the complete perception of its profits, as materially attached to it, and always used with it. To this prescriptive right, unquestionably established, some respect is certainly due.—They propose the permanent employment of American vessels on the grounds of utility, as being better than the occasional and frequent admission, which cannot be subjected to regulation, upon which the planter cannot calculate with full assurance, and which is to be exercised under circumstances under which it ought not to exist.—The British West India colonists claim the constant admission into the American intercourse of American vessels jointly with British, upon the plea of necessity, and the failure of all other expedients to remedy that necessity.—There is not a fact at this day more completely and incontrovertibly established than this, that British shipping cannot at all times furnish the West India islands with suffi-

“cient supplies of the articles necessary for  
 “their profitable, comfortable, or actual ex-  
 “istence. — In the American intercourse  
 “with the islands, the only object and effect  
 “of excluding American vessels from the  
 “islands is to promote and encourage the  
 “domestic colonial shipping of the islands.  
 “All expectation of bringing any other Brit-  
 “ish shipping into the intercourse must  
 “now, after trial, be abandoned. Great-  
 “Britain claims the exclusive right of car-  
 “rying, in British ships, all colonial imports  
 “and exports. The colonies admit this  
 “right, excepting only from it the before-  
 “excepted articles of import and export.  
 “Upon this exception alone there arises a  
 “question, and that question respects the  
 “admission of American vessels, jointly with  
 “British, to carry the excepted and enu-  
 “merated articles of colonial import and ex-  
 “port between the islands and continent.  
 “Great Britain objects, that this admission  
 “is against the colonial principle of exclu-  
 “sion, that it will injure her marine, and  
 “that it will interfere with, and diminish  
 “her direct colonial and carrying trades.  
 “To the first objection the colonies reply,  
 “that they *cannot* adequately be supplied  
 “with the necessaries they require by means  
 “of British shipping alone.” Pp. 114, 115.  
 The *great concessions* already but too unhap-  
 pily made by Great-Britain to America  
 ought certainly to have restrained all farther  
 wishes in that respect; and the anxious en-  
 deavours of this writer to shew that the in-  
 terest of America and of the British colonists  
 are distinct and separate, are so weak that  
 they really require little comment, except  
 that he appears to be by no means so well  
 entitled to attention in his observations and  
 statements as Lord Sheffield, inasmuch as  
 his lordship's *Strictures* were published with  
 the most independent and disinterested views;  
 whereas it is evident from the designated  
 character of the writer in question, and the  
 parties he represents, that they are deeply in-  
 terested in the success of their endeavours to  
 obtain permission, by law, constantly and  
 permanently to employ American vessels in  
 the trade of the British West-India colonies.  
 —That the increase of American shipping  
 is great, and truly alarming to the maritime  
 feeling and interest of Great-Britain, is too  
 certain to be doubted, although it is attempt-  
 ed by this writer, to be made questionable;  
 for it appears by the *Census*,\* published by  
 the American Congress, in 1801, that Ame-  
 rican tonnage had increased between 1790  
 and 1800, no less than 489,000 tons; and

it also appears by the same document, that  
 this increase is not wholly attributable to the  
 European war then existing, but in a great  
 measure to the impolitic concessions made  
 by the English government to America, in  
 permitting the subjects of that country to  
 have a free trade to the British settlements  
 in India,\* and which was most pointedly  
 alluded to by that enlightened character, the  
 late Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in the cause of  
*Wilson v. Marryatt* in the Exchequer  
 Chamber. — In 1790 the duties on goods im-  
 ported into America for re-exportation was  
 only 2 millions of dollars, but in 1800 it  
 was 30 millions of dollars, being an increase  
 in favour of America of 28 millions of dol-  
 lars in ten years; and it may not be improper  
 to notice a pious fraud which is reported to  
 be frequently practised in the American  
 trade from India. By the treaty referred to,  
 and which is nearly expiring, I think, but I  
 state it from recollection only, it was stipu-  
 lated that the goods brought from the Bri-  
 tish settlements in India, in American bot-  
 toms, should be unloaded in America, to  
 admit of their being re-shipped and con-  
 signed to Europe; but it seems that this  
 stipulation is not adhered to, and that on the  
 arrival of an American vessel from the Bri-  
 tish settlements in India with goods, the  
 goods are not unloaded in America, accord-  
 ing to the treaty, and re-shipped, but the  
 vessel is suffered to take or touch the ground,  
 which is called landing, and upon which  
 the formal documents are made out, and the  
 duties paid on the goods as if in fact they  
 were *unloaded* and re-shipped, and the ship  
 is then allowed to sail again with her Indian  
 cargo. If this fact is so, but which I sin-  
 cerely hope is not the case, it is a most  
 shameful violation of the treaty in question;  
 and ought to be inquired into by government  
 previous to the *renewal*† of the treaty with  
 America. The circumstances of the times,  
 the relative situation of Great-Britain with  
 other maritime states, both in and out of  
 Europe, the alarming and rapid increase of  
 their shipping, and the improvement in  
 their management and navigation, and the  
 present depressed state of the shipping inter-  
 est of Great-Britain, imperatively demand  
 of the King's government, and of the legis-  
 lature, a strict and immediate inquiry into  
 the actual state of the shipping and naviga-  
 tion of this country, least farther inattention  
 or indifference to this first and most impor-  
 tant interest of the empire should lead to

\* See Barrow on the Cape of Good Hope, and other recent publications.

† See Cobbett's Political Register; also Barrow on the Cape of Good Hope.

\* See Cobbett's Political Register, et seq.

consequences the most ruinous and calamitous. The shipping interest of Great-Britain do not look for any advantages beyond those which they are entitled to by a strict adherence to the navigation act; and they trust that no circumstances whatever, whether temporary or otherwise, will hereafter induce the legislature to authorize the suspension of the provisions of that act, either by the means of licences or in any other manner.\* The small expense incurred in the building, equipment, and outfit of foreign vessels is so well known in the mercantile world, compared to the heavy expenses of building, equipment, outfit, and impost laid on British ships, and which give foreign vessels such great advantages over the latter, that it is not at this time necessary to enter into any detail on that branch of the subject; if, however, any parliamentary inquiry should take place, the great disadvantages under which British ships are now navigated will appear in nifest. The British ship owners anxiously court inquiry, and on the truth or fallacy of their statements they will stand or fall.—The immense capital employed in British shipping, and the peculiar and insulated situation of the persons who are really British ship owners (I do not mean merchants who have small shares in ships, and whose interests in shipping are considered secondary by them)—I mean those persons whose “all” is embarked in shipping, together with perhaps the whole of the property of their relatives—ought to influence and induce the present government to give an early attention to the representations which were so repeatedly made on this subject to the late administration, and renewed during present session to Parliament.—No parliamentary inquiry has been made into the state of the shipping and navigation of this country for nearly a century; and surely it is of much more consequence to the true interests of the empire, than all the subjects recently investigated by Parliament: the want of British seamen in the navy, and the great deficiency of sea-apprentices in the coasting and foreign trade of the country, constitute of themselves sufficient matter for legislative investigation, but when, added to these, we daily find that the capital employed in British shipping yields little or no profit, but from which, in too many instances, results great loss, the claim for na-

tional attention and consideration becomes greater and more imperative; and it is devoutly to be wished that his Majesty's present ministers will not fail early in the next session of Parliament to institute an inquiry on the subject: no ill effect can arise from it, for if the ship owners are not well founded in their complaints, the result of the inquiry will be gratifying to the country at large; but if they are confirmed in their statements, it is presumed the legislature will not hesitate to grant them such relief as will secure to them in future “a strict adherence to the provisions of the navigation act, and will afford them such facilities as will at least enable them to navigate their ships on an equal footing with foreigners.”—ALFRED.—*London*, 28th July, 1864.

#### EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

*Organic Senatus Consultum, conferring the Title of Emperor on the First Consul, and establishing the Imperial Dignity hereditary in his Family.* (Continued from Vol. V. p. 897.)

XL. The Arch Chancellor of the Empire performs the functions of Chancellor in promulgating *Senatus Consulta* and the laws. He likewise performs the functions of Chancellor of the Imperial Palace. He is present when the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, lays before the Emperor his annual report of the abuses which have crept into the administration of justice, both civil and criminal. He presides in the high Imperial Court, and also at the United Sections of the Council of State and Tribunal, conformably to Article 95, Title XI. He is present at the celebration of the marriages and births of the princes, and at the Coronation and funeral obsequies of the Emperor. He signs the procès verbal drawn up by the Secretary of State. He presents the titularies of the Grand Dignities of the Empire, the Ministers and Secretary of State, the Grand Civil Officers of the Crown, and the President of the Court of Cassation, when the oath is administered to them in the presence of the Emperor. He administers the oath to the members of the Court of Cassation, and to the Presidents and Attorneys General of the Courts of Appeal and also of the Criminal Courts. He presents the solemn deputations and the members of the Courts of Justice, when admitted to an audience of the Emperor. He signs and seals the commissions and appointments of the members of the Courts of Justice, and the ministerial officers; he seals the commissions and appointments of the civil and administrative functions, and of the other acts

\* Foreign vessels were admitted to entry at several of the ports in Great-Britain, contrary to the provisions of the navigation act, during the late administration, not only by orders of council and licences, under the King's sign Manual, but also by orders and instructions from the Treasury.

which will be designated in the regulation entitled "Organization of the Seal."—  
 XLI. The Arch Chancellor of State performs the functions of Chancellor, in promulgating treaties of peace, and in declaring war. He presents to the Emperor and signs the credentials and correspondence with the different courts of Europe, according to the forms of the Imperial Protocol, of which he is the keeper. He is present when the minister for exterior relations lays before the Emperor his annual report of the political situation of the state. He presents the ambassadors and ministers of the Emperor, when the oath is administered to them in the presence of his Imperial Majesty. He administers the oath to the residents, *chargés d'affaires*, secretaries of embassy and legation, commissaries general, and commissaries for commercial relations.—XLII. The Arch Treasurer is present when the ministers of finance and the public treasury lay before the Emperor the annual accounts of the receipts and expenses of the state, and make known to him their views with regard to the financial necessities of the empire. Before the accounts of the annual receipts and disbursements are laid before the Emperor, they must receive his signature. He presides at the United Sections of the Council of State and Tribunal, conformably to Article 95, Title XI. He receives, every three months, the report of the labours of the national accountants; and, once a year, he receives the general result and plans of reform and amelioration in the different offices of the public accounts, which he lays before the Emperor. He balances, every year, the great book of debt. He signs appointments and civil pensions. He administers the oath to the national accountants, the administrators of finance, and the principal agents of the public treasury. He presents the deputations from the national accountants and the administrators of finance, when admitted to an audience of the Emperor.—XLIII. The constable is present when the minister at war and the director of the war department lay before the Emperor the annual report of the dispositions to be taken for completing the defence of the frontiers, and the charge of keeping up, repairing and provisioning the fortified towns. He lays the first stone of every fortress about to be erected. He is governor of the military schools. When the Emperor does not present in person the colours of any regiment, they are presented in his name by the constable. In the absence of the Emperor, the constable reviews the imperial guard. When a general is suspected of a crime specified in

the penal military code, the constable may preside at the council of war. He presents the marshals of the empire, the colonels general, the inspectors general, and the officers general, when the oath is administered to them in the presence of the Emperor. He administers the oath to majors, captains, commodores, &c. He installs the marshals of the Empire.—He presents the generals, colonels, majors, &c. of the army, when admitted to an audience of the Emperor. He signs appointments in the army, and those of the military pensioners of the state.—XLIV. The grand admiral is present when the minister of marine lays before the Emperor the annual report of the state of the navy. He annually receives and presents to the Emperor, the accounts of the chest of marine invalids. When an admiral, vice-admiral, or rear admiral is suspected of a crime specified in the penal military code, the grand admiral may preside at the court martial. He presents the admirals, vice-admirals, rear-admirals, and captains, when the oath is administered to them in the presence of the Emperor. He administers the oath to the members of the council of prizes, and to captains of frigates. He presents the admirals, vice-admirals, rear-admirals, captains, and members of the council of prizes, when admitted to an audience of the Emperor. He signs appointments in the navy, and those of the marine pensioners of the state.—XLV. Each titular of the grand dignities of the empire presides over a departmental electoral college. The grand elector presides over the electoral college at Brussels. The arch-chancellor of the empire presides over the electoral college at Bourdeaux. The arch-chancellor of state presides over the electoral college at Nantz. The arch-treasurer of the empire presides over the electoral college at Lyons. The constable presides over the electoral college at Turin. The grand admiral presides over the electoral college at Marseilles.—XLVI. Each titular of the grand dignities of the empire receives annual, according to established usage, a third of the sum appropriated to the princes, conformably to the decree of the 21st of December, 1790.—XLVII. An imperial statute regulates the functions of the titulars of the grand dignities of the empire about the person of the Emperor, and determines the costume to be worn by them in grand ceremonies. The Emperors's successors cannot deviate from this statute but by a *senatus consultum*.

**TITLE VI. — OF THE GRAND OFFICERS OF THE EMPIRE. — XLVIII.** The grand officers of the empire are: first, marshals of the empire, chosen from among the most distinguished generals. Their number not to exceed sixteen; of which number the marshals of the empire who are also senators can not make a part. Secondly, eight inspectors of artillery and fortifications, troops of horse, and marine. Thirdly, grand civil officers of the crown, as they shall hereafter be appointed by statutes of the Emperor. — **XLIX.** The post of grand officer is perpetual. — **L.** Each of the grand officers of the empire presides over an electoral college, which is specially appointed to him at the moment of his nomination. — **LI.** If, by an order of the Emperor, or by any other cause whatever, a titular of a grand dignity of the empire or a grand officer relinquishes his functions, he nevertheless preserves his title, rank, privileges, and a moiety of the salary attached to his office. He can only forfeit them by a judgment of the high imperial court.

**TITLE VII. — OF OATHS. — LII.** In the course of the two years subsequent to his accession or majority, the Emperor accompanied by the titularies of the grand dignities of the empire, the ministers, the grand officers of the empire, takes the oath of fidelity to the French people upon the Evangelist, and in the presence of the senate, the counsel of state, the legislative body, the tribunate, the court of cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the grand officers of the legion of honour, the national accountants, the presidents of the courts of appeal, the presidents of the electoral colleges, the presidents of the cantonal assemblies, the presidents of the consistories, and the mayors of thirty-six principal towns of the empire. The secretary of state prepares the procès verbal of the ceremony. —

**LIII.** The oath taken by the Emperor is couched as follows: I swear to maintain “the integrity of the territory of the republic; to respect and to cause to be respected the laws of the concordat and the liberty of public worship; to respect and to cause to be respected, the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, the irrevocability of the sales of national domains; to levy no duty, to impose no tax but by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the legion of honour; and to have no view in governing, but the interest, the happiness and the glory of the French people.” — **LIV.** Before he enters upon the exercise of his functions, the regent accompanied by the

titularies of the grand dignities of the empire, the ministers, and the grand officers of the empire take the oath upon the Evangelist, and in the presence of the senate, the counsel of state, the president and questors of the legislative body, the president and questors of the tribunate, and the grand officers of the legion of honour. The secretary of state prepares the procès verbal of the ceremony. — **LV.** The oath taken by the regent is as follows:

“I swear to administer the affairs of the state, conformably to the constitutions of the empire, the senatus consults and the laws; to maintain, in all its integrity, the territory of the republic, the rights of the nation and those of the imperial dignity, and faithfully to deliver up to the Emperor, as soon as he attains his majority, the power which has been confided to me.” — **LVI.** The titularies of the grand dignities of the empire, the ministers and the secretary of state, the grand officers, the members of the senate, the legislative body, the tribunate, the electoral colleges and the cantonal assemblies take the following oath: “I swear obedience to the constitutions of the empire and fidelity to the Emperor.” The public functionaries, civil and judicial, the officers and soldiers of the army on land and sea, take the same oath.

**TITLE VIII. — OF THE SENATE. —**

**LVII.** The senate is composed, 1st Of the French princes who have attained their 18th year; 2dly, Of the titularies of the grand dignities of the empire; 3dly, Of the twenty-four members chosen by the Emperor from the lists delivered in by the departmental electoral colleges; 4thly, Of citizens whom the Emperor deems proper to raise to the dignity of senator. — **LVIII.** The president of the senate is named by the Emperor and chosen from the list of senators. His functions continue for twelve months. — **LIX.** He convokes the senate at the command of the Emperor, and at the requisition, 1st, Of the commissions hereafter spoken of in article LX and LXIV; 2dly, Of a senator, conformably to the provisions made in article LXX; 3dly, Of an officer for the interior concerns of the body. He lays before the Emperor an account of the several convocations made at the requisition of the commissions, &c. their object, and the result of the deliberations of the senate. — **LX.** A commission of seven members, named by the senate and chosen from the body, takes cognizance of arrests (conformably to article 40 of the constitution,) whenever the person arrested is not

brought before the tribunals in the space of ten days after the time of such arrest. This commission is called the Senatorial Commission for personal liberty.—LXI. Every arrested person not called to take his trial in ten days after his arrest, may immediately, appeal, by himself, his representatives, or by petition, to the senatorial commission for personal liberty.—LXII. When the said commission is of opinion that the interests of the state do not call for the detention of the arrested person beyond the period of ten days, it invites the minister who ordered the arrest to cause the person so detained to be either set at liberty, or sent before the ordinary tribunals.—LXIII. If after three successive invitations, renewed in the space of one month, the detained person is not set at liberty or sent before the ordinary tribunals, the commission demands an assembly of the senate, which is convoked by the president, and makes, if it so determines, the following declaration: "There are strong presumptions that N. is arbitrarily detained." It afterwards proceeds conformably to the provisions of article 92, title 13, of the high imperial court.—LXIV. A commission of seven members named by the senate and chosen from the body, is appointed to watch over the liberty of the press. Works printed and distributed by subscription and at stated periods do not come under its cognizance. This commission is called the Senatorial Commission for the Liberty of the Press.—LXV. Authors, printers, and booksellers, having reason to complain of injunctions being laid upon the printing or circulation of works, may apply personally or by petition to the senatorial commission for the liberty of the press.—LXVI. When the commission is of opinion that the interests of the state do not demand such injunction, it invites the minister who issued the order to revoke it.—LXVII. If after three successive invitations, renewed in the space of one month, the injunction still continues, the commission demands an assembly of the senate, which is convoked by the president, and makes, if it so determines, the following declaration: "There are strong presumptions that the liberty of the press has been violated." It afterwards proceeds conformably to the provisions of article 92, title 13, of the high imperial court.—LXVIII. The functions of a member of each of the senatorial commissions cease at the expiration of four months.—LXIX. The *projets de lois* decreed by the legislative body, are transmitted to the senate on the day of their adoption, and are deposited in the archives.—LXX. Every decree issued by the

legislative body may be denounced in the senate by any of the members thereof; 1. As tending to restore the feudal system; 2. As affecting the sale of national domains; 3. As having been issued contrary to the forms prescribed by the constitutions of the empire, &c.—LXXI. In the course of six days after the adoption of the *projet de loi*, the senate, after deliberating upon the report of a special commission, and hearing the decree read three times at three sittings held on separate days, may declare its opinion as to the propriety of promulgating the said law. The president lays the decision of the senate before the Emperor.—LXXII. The Emperor, after hearing the counsel of state, either declares by a decree his adherence to the deliberation of the senate, or causes the law to be promulgated.—LXXIII. Every such law not promulgated before the expiration of ten days, cannot be promulgated unless it has been again deliberated on, and adopted by, the legislative body.—LXXIV. The entire operations of an electoral college, as well as its partial operations relative to the presentation of candidates to the senate, the legislative body, or the tribunate, can only be annulled, on the ground of their being unconstitutional, by an express *sensus consultum*.

#### TITLE IX. OF THE COUNSEL OF STATE.

—LXXV. When the counsel of state is deliberating upon a *projet de loi*, &c two thirds of the members in ordinary service must be present. The number of members present can never be less than twenty-five.—LXXVI. The counsel of state is divided into six sections; viz. the section of legislation, the section of the interior, the section of finance, the section of war, the section of marine, and the section of commerce.—LXXVII. When a member of the counsel of state has been five years upon the list of members in ordinary service, he receives the rank of counselor of state for life. When he ceases to be on the list of the counsel of state in ordinary or extraordinary service, he is only entitled to one third of the salary attached to the office.

#### TITLE X. OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.

—LXXVIII. The members of the legislative body may be re-elected without interval.—LXXIX. Every *projet de loi* presented to the legislative body is returned to the three sections of the tribunate.—LXXX. The sittings of the legislative body are divided into ordinary sittings and general committees.—LXXXI. Ordinary sittings are composed of members of the legislative body, orators of the counsel of state, and orators of the three sections of the tribunate.

General committees are composed only of members of the legislative body. The president of the legislative body presides both at the ordinary sittings and general committees.—LXXXII. At an ordinary sitting, the legislative body hear the orators of the counsel of state, and also the orators of the three sections of the tribunate, and votes on the *projet de loi*. In a general committee, the members of the legislative body discuss amongst them the merits or demerits of the *projet de loi*.—LXXXIII. The legislative body resolves itself into a general committee; 1. At the invitation of the president for the interior affairs of the body; 2. At a demand made to the president, and signed by fifty of the members present. In both these cases, the general committee is a secret one, and its discussions can neither be printed nor divulged.—LXXXIV. When the discussion in a general committee is closed, the deliberation is adjourned to the ordinary sitting on the following day.—LXXXV. On the day appointed by the legislative body for voting on the *projet de loi*, the orators of the counsel of state are again heard.—LXXXVI. The deliberation on a *projet de loi*, can in no case be deferred for more than three days beyond the time fixed for closing the discussion.—LXXXVII. The sections of the tribunate constitute the sole commissions of the legislative body; which can create no other, but in the case pointed out in Article 113, Title 13, of the high Imperial Court.

TITLE XI. OF THE TRIBUNATE.—LXXXVIII. The functions of the members of the tribunate continue for ten years.—LXXXIX. A moiety of the tribunate is renewed every five years. The first renewal will take place in the session of the year 17, conformably to the organic senatus consultum of the 16th Thermidor, year 10.—XC. The president of the tribunate is named by the Emperor, on the presentation of three candidates chosen by the tribunate at the secret ballot.—XCI. The functions of the president of the tribunate continue for two years.—XCII. The tribunate has two questors. They are named by the Emperor, from a triple list of candidates chosen by the tribunate at a secret ballot. Their functions are the same as those assigned to the questors of the legislative body by articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the organic senatus consultum of the 24th Frimaire, year 12. One of the questors is renewed every year.—XCIII. The tribunate is divided into three sections; viz. the section of legislation, the section of the interior, and the section of finance.—

XCIV. Each section makes out a list of three of its members, from among whom the president of the tribunate chooses the president of section. The functions of president of section continue for one year.—XCV. When the respective sections of the counsel of state and tribunate, demand a conference, such conference takes place under the presidency of the arch-chancellor or arch-treasurer of the empire, according to the nature of the subject to be examined.—XCVI. Each section discusses separately, and in a sectional assembly, the several *projets de lois* transmitted to it by the legislative body. Two orators from each of the three sections, lay before the legislative body the wishes of their section.—XCVII. In no case can a *projet de loi* be discussed by a general assembly of the tribunate. But it may form itself into a general assembly, under the presidency of its president, for the exercise of its other privileges.

TITLE XII. OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGES.—XCVIII. As often as a departmental electoral college is assembled for the purpose of forming the list of candidates for the legislative body, a renewal of the list of candidates for the senate takes place.—Every such renewal annuls all anterior presentations.—XCIX. The grand officers, commandants and officers of the legion of honour are members of the departmental electoral college in which their possessions may be situated, or of one of the departments of the company to which they belong. The legionaries are members of the electoral college of their district. The members of the legion of honour are admitted to their electoral college on presenting a certificate given them for this purpose by the grand Elector.—C. The prefects and military commandants of departments cannot be elected candidates for the senate by the departmental electoral colleges in which they exercise their functions.

TITLE XIII.—OF THE HIGH IMPERIAL COURT.—CI. The high imperial court takes cognizance: 1st, Of crimes committed by members of the imperial family, by titularies of the grand dignities of the empire, by ministers and by the secretary of state, by grand officers, by senators, by counsellors of state; 2dly, Of outrages and plots against the internal and external security of the state, the person of the Emperor, and of the presumptive heir to the empire; 3dly, Of crimes of official responsibility committed by ministers and counsellors of state; 4thly, Of treachery and abuses of power, whether committed by captains general of colonies, or colonial prefects, and com-

mandants of foreign possessions; 5thly, Of generals, &c. acting contrary to instructions; 6thly, Of acts of extortion and dilapidation committed by prefects of the interior in the exercise of their functions; 7thly, Of denunciations occasioned by arbitrary detentions, and the violation of the liberty of the press.—CII. The seat of the high imperial court is in the senate.—CIII. The arch-chancellor of the empire is president. In case of illness or the necessary absence of the arch-chancellor, another titular of a grand dignity of the empire may preside for the time being.—CIV. The high imperial court is composed of the princes, the titularies of the grand dignities and grand officers of the empire, the grand judge, minister of justice, sixty senators, the six sectional presidents of the counsel of state, fourteen counsellors of state, and twenty members of the court of cassation. The senators, counsellors of state and members of the court of cassation, are chosen by seniority.—CV. An attorney general, nominated for life by the Emperor, assists in the high imperial court. He performs the duties of his office, assisted by three tribunes, chosen every year by the legislative body, and three magistrates nominated by the Emperor from the officers of the court of appeal and criminal justice.—CVI. The chief clerk of the high imperial court is nominated for life by the Emperor.—CVII. No exception can be made to the decision of the president of the high imperial court.—CVIII. The proceedings of the high imperial court can only originate with the government.—CX. Ministers or counsellors of state, acting contrary to the laws and constitutions of the empire, may be denounced by the legislative body.—CXI. Persons holding the situations of captains general of colonies, colonial prefects, commandants of foreign possessions, &c. suspected of abusing the power delegated to them, may be denounced by the legislative body; also generals disobeying their instructions, and prefects of the interior suspected of dilapidation and extortion. CXII. The legislative body likewise denounces ministers and agents of government suspected of arbitrary detentions, or a violation of the liberty of the press. (*To be continued.*)

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

*Copy of a Circular Letter from the Adjutant General to the General Officer commanding the Eastern District.—Dated Aug 6.*

SIR,—I have received the Commander-in-Chief's commands, to inform you that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint

the officers named in the margin\* to be employed on the staff, and that his Royal Highness has directed that they shall be placed under your orders; with the view of their being disposed of at your discretion, in the command and superintendence of the different brigades of the volunteer force of the Eastern District, as detailed in your letter to the Quarter Master General of the and its accompanying return. The provision which the government has thought proper to make for the superintendence and various arrangements relating to these corps, will suggest to you the importance which is attached to their services; and his Royal Highness desires that you will strongly impress on the general officers, as well as the other staff officers who are at this time, or may hereafter be attached to them, that it will in a very great degree depend on their individual exertions to insure that the expectations of the country on this material point are not disappointed. With this view it will be essentially necessary, that each general officer, or other officer, to whom a command of volunteers is entrusted, shall reside in a situation central and convenient to the corps under his orders, and make himself immediately acquainted with every particular relating to them, with the nature and extent of the service for which they are respectively engaged, with their effective strength, with the characters and the extent of military information of the commanders, with the state of the corps in regard to their internal economy, their horses, arms, ammunition, and every species of military equipment, and, above all, with the degree of forwardness they have attained in their discipline and field movements, and whether they are or are not competent to act with the troops of the line, of which he can only become a competent judge by frequent inspections, and by taking as many opportunities as possible of seeing them under arms. It will also be incumbent on the general officers, or others, commanding brigades, in concert with the commanding officers of corps, to fix the routes by which, in case of being called out, each corps is to arrive at the general place of rendezvous of the brigade, and to assure, by every previous precaution and preparation, that no obstacle shall occur to prevent the regularity and certainty of their movements at that critical moment; for which purpose it is highly material for him to ascertain that the arrangements for providing carts for the camp kettles

\* Cavalry—Maj.-gen. Money and Col. John Slade.—Infantry, Brigadier-generals D. Onslow and W. E. Bulwer, Cols. Hon. W. Stewart and J. F. H. Elwes.

tles, and waggons for the conveyance of the men, are carried into effect, in pursuance of the instructions of his Majesty's Secretary of State. — The Commander in Chief is aware that the duties hereby enjoined to the general officers employed with the volunteer force, cannot be discharged with advantage to the country without the utmost zeal and unremitting personal exertions on their part. In his expectation on this head, his Royal Highness is persuaded that he shall not be disappointed, but it is moreover equally essential that these officers should continually bear in mind that the corps under their command are composed of men unused to a military life, over whom they have not any direct control till placed on permanent duty, but who have voluntarily enrolled themselves with the generous purpose of sharing with the regular troops in the labours, difficulties, and honours, which are presented to those who are engaged in the defence of their country, by the arduous contest in which we are at this time engaged. — It is to be presumed that they will feel the force of these considerations, and will conduct their command on every occasion with all the urbanity, mildness, and indulgence, which is consistent with military discipline, without compromising or impeding the important primary object of rendering the corps effective and fit for actual service. To insure the efficiency of the corps, it is necessary that the commanders of brigades should constantly attend the inspections ordered by Act of Parliament, and require a strict account of all absentees. With respect to their discipline, it is the Commander in Chief's expectation, that they will offer their attendance to such commanding officers of corps (not placed upon permanent duty), as are desirous of receiving the advantage of their instructions. — I have the Commander in Chief's directions to request you will furnish each officer, who is placed in the command of a brigade of volunteers, with a copy of a letter I had the honour of addressing to you on the 22d of Sept. and the 7th of Jan. upon the subject of the duties of the inspectors of those corps, which his Royal Highness conceives may afford some useful information for their guidance, with respect to the returns to be made from time to time, and other particulars relating to the volunteer system: and his Royal Highness is of opinion, that the services of the inspecting field officers, already stationed in the Eastern District, may be continued with much advantage in aid of the officers commanding brigades. His Royal Highness likewise approves, in every instance, where you judge it

expedient, that the officers should receive the assistance of a brigade adjutant, to be selected from the experienced and well-informed officers on the half pay of the regular service (beneath the rank of field officer), or even from the volunteer corps themselves, if such officers are in every respect competent to the duty, and have been educated in the regular service, with the pay of adjutant of infantry, in addition to their half-pay, and forage for two horses; and I am to request that you will mention, for his Royal Highness's approbation, any officers you may wish to recommend as competent and eligible for these temporary employments. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HARRY CALVERT, Adj. General.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**BANK DIRECTORS.** — Previous to a few remarks which I intend to offer on the animadversions which a correspondent has made upon the conduct of these gentlemen, I cannot forbear saying a word or two respecting the tenor of the words written on their paper money. It is, indeed, consummately preposterous to continue to write the words "*promise to pay*" in a note, the drawer of which is not compelled by law to pay, except in another note of his own, and which other note he can draw at the expense of a half-penny, or penny at most. This is the mere apparition of public credit, stalking about while the body is in a languishing state, and giving awful signs of its approaching dissolution. The paper money makers in Ireland, or some of them, at least, seem to be, at last aware of the absurdity of this practice, and of the insult which it offers to the common sense of the people. Mr. Foster represents them as being a most active and adventurous race. Such is their desire to grasp, that he seems to think they will soon endeavour to find materials even cheaper than paper; though, one would hope, that when the trifling difference between the value of new rye-straw and that of old linen rags constitutes the sole object of economy, patriotism would so far get the better of private interest as to induce them to continue the use of the staple commodity of their country, especially as the demand is, and promises to be, so considerable as to make up for a part of the falling off which the war may occasion in the manufactories. Without, however, attempting to set bounds to either the ingenuity or the enterprize of these Irish money-makers, and refraining from any reflection upon the impolicy of the linen-weavers of the northern counties, who obstinately persist in taking nothing but

gold for their goods, to the manifest injury of their manufactories, I shall take the liberty to state a fact, which, I flatter myself, will fully prove, that the bankers in Ireland are more tenacious of their promises than persons of the same trade in another country, which, for reasons evident enough, need not, at present, be named.—Some gentleman, unknown to me, considering, perhaps, that I might, just at this time, possibly stand in need of pecuniary assistance, has, in the most handsome manner that can be conceived, presented me with an Irish bank-note. The sum is, as will be perceived, not very considerable; but, I take the will for the deed, and heartily thank him for furnishing me and my readers with a specimen of the most diminutive that I have yet seen of that species of currency which has been engendered by our renowned "Capital, Credit, and Confidence." As nearly as I can represent it with vulgar materials, this is its tenor and form.

 No. 1077. Coolnamuck.  
I owe the Bearer Sixpence British.

£. 0. 0. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ . July 1st, 1804.  
Charles Will. Wall.

Entd. W. N. . .

Mr. Wall has put his armorial bearings in the part of the note represented by the little square on the left. His motto is, AUT CÆSAR AUT NULLUS, which, freely interpreted, means, NECK OR NOTHING; and, his crest is a hand wielding a dagger, which seems to say, TAKE THIS NOTE, OR TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF.—Thus are bank notes given for a sum hardly sufficient to buy lights enough for a cat's dinner: in the winter time it will purchase in London just one apple, and at no time will it pay for more than a single mouthful in a pastry-cook's shop! But, it is not the amount which is the prominent characteristic of this note: it is the singular modesty and good faith of the drawer, who, though the sum be only sixpence British, will not venture to promise ever to repay it. "I owe the bear sixpence," says he; and there he stops. If all his fraternity, in all countries, had been as chary of their word, what innumerable woes, what rivers of blood, would have been spared! The phraseology of the American Congress-money I have forgotten. That of the French assignats was, "bon pour six sous, &c. &c." and this was very legible upon the paper that was printed long after every body knew that a note for six sous was of a real value much too low for language to afford it a denomination. Mr. Wall scorns all such deceiving tricks, and contents himself with

just saying that he owes the bearer sixpence. When the paper-money of America became little or nothing worth, people, in some parts, threaded it upon strong packthreads, which they strained across the road against the breasts of the horses of the Congressmen as these latter were going to or from that assembly. In France we know that the consequences were very different: and, have we not reason to fear, that, in this respect, Ireland, and even England, will, if great foresight and energy be not displayed by the government, resemble France rather than America?—Still, however, I cannot join those, who are disposed to throw so much odium; and, indeed, all the odium, upon the Bank Directors; or those who make bank notes: and my correspondent A. R. whose letter will be found in p. 193 (and which letter I beg leave to recommend to the perusal of the reader), must excuse me if I continue to entertain great doubts upon a point, with regard to which he appears to be so decided. His letter will be perceived to refer to the disapprobation, which was expressed in the present Volume, p. 122, of any attempt to raise a clamour against the bank directors of either England or Ireland; as being the authors of the depreciation of the paper-money. I, at the same time, expressed my doubts as to the reality of the apparent profits which the bank companies were said to derive from what is called restriction law; and, I gave it as my opinion, that the source of the evil of depreciation was not to be found without going much higher than the makers and venders of paper money.—This my correspondent has construed into a mark of "tender anxiety," on my part, for the reputation of the bank directors, at which he supposes those directors will be much surprised, seeing that I have so zealously laboured to prove the depreciation of their money. Why they should be surprised I know not; and I am still more at a loss to discover any inconsistency in disapproving of a clamour against the bank directors while I contend for the degradation of the paper which they issue; knowing, as I do, and insisting, as I constantly have, that the origin of the evil lies with the government, and not with the bank directors. "It would," says A. R. "be a waste of time to prove that the evils arise from the bank restriction bill." Indeed but it would not. I can speak for myself at least; and I should be very glad to see it proved, that the bank restriction bill was the source of the evils now so severely felt. "Without," says he, "entering into the history of the circumstances which originally led to the bill, it will be

"sufficient to state, that it was past at the request and for the protection of the bank-directors and their company." But, this is precisely what I object to. I want those who write upon this subject to *enter into that history*; and that is the very thing that they almost all avoid. If they were to enter into it they would soon find, that the bank directors have been, and are, the mere agents of the government; that, as to *their* having requested the bill to be passed for *their* protection, it was a request which they must have made in consequence of an understanding with the minister, who was convinced, that, if the bill was not passed, the whole paper fabrick would soon be blown to atoms; and, that, if the bill and its renewals have suspended, for the space of seven years, the contracts entered into by the bank, and if this suspension be "contrary to every principle of common honesty," it is the ministers and the parliament, and not the bank directors to whom the mischief and the disgrace should chiefly be imputed. But, my correspondent A. R., with most of the persons who have complained of the ruinous effects of a degraded paper-money, appear, for reasons best known to themselves, to be extremely desirous to keep the ministers and their measures entirely out of sight: just as if the bank directors could, of themselves, cause a law to be passed! If this were the case, then, indeed would our situation be deplorable! But, it is not. The ministry introduce bills, and cause them to be passed; and, if those bills militate against "every principle of common honesty," whose fault is it? The truth is, no one can be ignorant that the evil originated with the minister, but every one finds it safer to attack the Bank than the Treasury.—As to the profits which the Bank is said to derive from the restriction, from the issuing of dollars, and from being placed in a situation where they must betray either their own interests or those of the public, the blame rests not with the bank, but with those who placed it in such a situation. Upon this point, however, I must observe, that my correspondent has not dealt very candidly with me; for, he will remember, that I was far from speaking positively as to the profits of the bank. I did, indeed, express my doubts respecting the reality of those profits, and wished for more information upon the subject, but of this I must say my correspondent has afforded me but little. The fact of the bonuses and high dividends is by no means sufficient to convince me, that the trade of banking is more profitable now than formerly. It is a very great error to suppose, that the bank is now

separate from the government, and that its capital consists in specie, or in lands, houses, and goods. Its capital consists, for the far greater part, in three per cent. consolidated annuities; that is to say in government stock; that is to say in part of the national debt; that is to say in the interest paid quarterly upon about twelve millions of that debt. Now, supposing the bank company to have deposited these twelve millions in 1786: that the far greater part was deposited before that time every body knows; but supposing the whole to have been deposited then, the interest upon it, according to Mr. Pitt's own declaration, has depreciated in value 60 per centum; and, therefore, supposing the bank companies in both countries to divide 7<sup>1</sup> per centum per annum, their interest yet falls short of what it ought to be. They have, indeed, better fare than other public creditors; but, because others are in the high road to ruin, is that a reason why the bank companies should follow them, particularly when they have their choice? I may be mistaken here; I speak not positively as to either the principle or the degree; but, I repeat it, that I have yet seen nothing to convince me, that the depreciation of paper-money is, in its progress (to say nothing of its obvious ultimate effects), at all favourable to the interests of the bank directors or their constituents.—When my correspondent talks about the "forty millions of guineas" which the friends of the bank say they have in their coffers, he must be jesting. It was only Lord Hawkesbury (upon the authority of Mr. Rose) who said, that there were forty millions of guineas; and, to do him justice, he did not say, that they were in the coffers of the bank, but in the kingdom, a large space to be sure, but which does not at this time contain a million of guineas, those in the coffers of the bank included.—In lamenting the fatal consequences of the paper-money-system I sincerely join with A. R. They are dreadful in a hundred different ways, but in none more so than in the increase of criminal prosecutions and of sentences of death.

VOLUNTEERS OF MANCHESTER AND KNARESBOROUGH.—At the former of these places the officers of a great part of the persons embodied under the name of Volunteers have resigned their commissions, because the precedence was given by government to an officer of another corps; and, in consequence of that resignation, the men have also resigned, or, in the language of the army, have thrown down their arms. The grounds of this dispute are not worth stating; who was right or who was wrong

amongst Lord Hawkesbury and a parcel of empty coxcombs of manufacturers, whom the imbecility of government had dressed up in swords and red coats, is of no earthly consequence; but, it is of some consequence, that all the world (and our enemy amongst the rest) is now officially informed, that both the officers and men of those corps, on whom our Sovereign has been advised to place his principal reliance, can and will and do resign whenever they please, and that too in whole bodies, at a moment moreover when they are assured by the ministerial press, that "the grand attempt" is about to be made; and, if they do not believe the assurance it is strange, for this is about the hundredth time that it has been given them. Military officers resigning is a new idea. Soldiers, whether bearing commissions or not, are under the King's command. They cannot resign. They cannot quit the service till he gives them leave. Resigning too in the midst of war; and, they themselves believe, or pretend to believe, in a time of great public danger! The point of honour consists, with these citizen soldiers, of a new set of notions. Yet, I'll warrant, that there is not one of these pretended Lieutenant Colonels, who would not command a major in the regular army, a man who has, perhaps, been forty or fifty years in the service; who has been abroad ten or fifteen years at least, and who has lived not less than a year or two upon the sea! If it is not a shame and a scandal that such a man should be so commanded, that such a man should be compelled to pull off his hat and receive orders, orders on military matters, orders how to move his own regiment perhaps, from a hair dresser or a cotton weaver; why then there is neither shame nor scandal in the world!—At Knaresborough the citizen soldiers "our gallant defenders" (that's the phrase) have just given a gentle hint of what they are able to do in the way of electioneering. A brief account of the transaction having appeared in the public papers, it will, in order to avoid a charge of exaggeration, be best to copy it. It appears in the form of a letter, dated 30th July. "This morning was fixed for the Election of a Member of Parliament for this town, in the room of the Honourable W. Cavendish. About eleven o'clock the bailiffs, attended by Sir John Ingleby and two other magistrates, together with a number of constables, proceeded towards the Court Room, where the elections are held; and, on their arrival there, they found a very large mob of people assembled, who had taken possession of the stairs to the Court

Room, so that it was impossible for the bailiffs to get into the same. This mob was headed by an attorney, supported by an officer and several volunteers of the town, who insulted and pelted the magistrates and one of the returning officers, took the staves from the constables, knocked them down, and also several of the electors, and destroyed their cloaths. They dragged one of the constables to the waterside, and threatened to drown him. The bailiffs and magistrates finding it impossible to get into the Court Room returned home, and, we understand, have made a special return of those proceedings to the sheriff, which, I suppose, will be laid before Parliament and the courts of justice. A more flagrant violation of election was never witnessed. This borough, you know, is a borough tenure borough, in which the family of Cavendish have considerable interest; whose liberality to the poor has been frequently witnessed; and on raising the Volunteer Corps, the Duke of Devonshire very handsomely subscribed 200 l. and I am sorry to say, many of the volunteers were among the mob." What glorious feats we shall see performed, if "our gallant defenders" should remain embodied till a general election comes, or, which is rather more dangerous, till the quartern loaf rises again to eighteen pence! Then it is that we shall smart for the projects of Mr. Pitt; and, what will astonish him, the Volunteers will hate him more than any other man in the kingdom, his grand scheme therein producing a political effect precisely the contrary of that which he expects from it.—The letter from Yorkshire, quoted in the present Volume, p. 117, respecting the hanging and shooting of Mr. Lascelles in effigy, appears to have been perfectly correct. It is noticed in the Leeds newspaper of the 4th of August, the editor of which endeavours so to colour the transaction as to make my apprehensions appear groundless. They may be so, and I wish they may with all my heart; but I must acknowledge that they have not been lessened by his stating, that "only eight villages" were concerned in the outrage; and that, in many places, the arms consisted chiefly of pistols without locks and stable-door keys with home-spun touch-holes." The fact, as stated by me, neither is nor can be denied; and, the honest, "too honest" Yorkshiremen of Mr. Wilberforce may be assured, that their palliations will not prevent people from making the proper comment.—The affair at Chester was a trifle too. Every freak of the Volunteers is a trifle. Not that we

really think it so, but that we are afraid to say that it is otherwise. Impunity always renders men bold. It will not fail to have a similar effect on the volunteers, who, if great care is not taken, will go on from step to step till they become complete masters of the country. In the mean-while we shall have no increase to the regular army. The enlistments for that service will not suffice, nor nearly suffice, for the deficiencies made by deaths and desertion; and, as to Mr. Pitt's project bill, every body says it cannot be carried into effectual operation.

WARWICKSHIRE TREASON. — Some weeks ago people were congratulating themselves that they were not born on the other side of the Tweed, where the security of men's property and where their personal liberty appeared to depend, in a great degree, upon the workings of the "ardent mind" of a single person; but, this exultation will be considerably abated if what is related in the newspapers, respecting a recent trial at Warwick, be correct in all its parts. It is stated, in the report here referred to, that a Mr. Cooke, the son of a respectable gentleman of Warwickshire, himself a respectable gentleman of small independent fortune, brought an action of damages against the Earl of Warwick, the Lord Lieutenant of the county, for causing two trunks and a hamper to be taken from the Warwick carrier and to be conveyed to and opened in a guard-house of the Warwickshire militia. It appeared, that the Lord Lieutenant had caused the seizure to be made in consequence of suspicions of treasonable, or, at least, disaffected conduct, communicated to him by a Mr. Osborn, a miller and farmer of Hampton Lucy, a village near Warwick, where Mr. Cooke, the person suspected had taken a lodging sometime before. The jury gave a verdict in favour of the plaintiff, Mr. Cooke, but awarded him only a shilling damages, it being understood that such award would carry costs of suit, and he having actually received no damage in his property, the contents of the trunks and hamper being only the foul linen of Mrs. Cooke and the rest of the family. — The only circumstance that renders this transaction of any importance at all, in a political point of view, is, the ground upon which it is stated that Mr. Cooke became a suspected person, and this circumstance is very important indeed. I shall state it in the words attributed to Mr. Serjeant Vaughan, the counsel for the Earl of Warwick. "The plaintiff had come to Hampton Lucy, taken lodgings there at a Mr. Pritchard's, where his conduct had excited suspicion of his loyalty, from these

circumstances, that he would not allow his letters to be fetched from the Post Office, but went for them himself; that he refused to sign the paper which was delivered to him for the general defence of the country, assigning as a reason, that he had given in his name at London; these and some other circumstances were construed by a Mr. Osborn, a miller and farmer at that place, into symptoms of disaffection, or, at least, causes for that suspicion; in consequence of which he communicated the same to the Lord Lieutenant, and it was discovered that these packages were lying for him at Warwick. The defendant, upon this communication, wrote to Mr. Secretary Yorke, and received orders from government to act as appeared best to him for the safety of the State. Under this impression he had done no more than his duty; considering the precarious situation of affairs in this critical conjuncture, no blame could possibly attach to the noble lord." — With all my heart: No blame could, I think, attach to Lord Warwick; and one cannot help pitying his Lordship when one sees him in person tumbling amongst the hamper of dirty linen, like Falstaff in the buck-basket of Mrs. Ford. But, Mr. Osborn, the farmer and miller! I am not so readily disposed to acquit him of all blame. What! a gentleman become an object of suspicion; suspected of disaffection, and that too in the very centre of the kingdom, the very farthest point that he could possibly remove from the sea in any direction; thus suspected, in such a situation, because he would not trust the carrier to bring his letters, and really perhaps because the saving of the expense was an object to him, he besides having himself nothing to do, and being in the daily habit of going into the town! Suspected of disaffection for this! Disaffection towards the carrier, may be, who had very likely imposed upon him, or been insolent to him, or had delayed the delivery of his letters! A man's reputation, his peace, and even his life, hangs by a very slender thread, if such serious suspicions are to be indulged, and acted on, upon such slight ground as this. — But, there was another circumstance it seems: "He refused to sign the paper that was delivered to him for the general defence of the country, assigning as a reason that he had given in his name in London." What paper was this? I heard of no paper that the law enjoined men to sign. A paper for the general defence of the country! I suppose Mr. farmer Osborn must have meant the subscription paper for raising money to

rig out some corps of volunteers, of whom, perchance, Mr. Osborn was to be Captain, or Major Commandant. I know of no other paper that was handed about; and, if Mr. Osborn had happened to reside in the parish of St. Margaret Westminster, he would, probably, have denounced me; for I certainly "refused to sign the paper" that was delivered to me, though recommended to give my signature by persons whom I greatly respected, and though I had every reason to suppose that the money was collected with a view of rendering the country real service. I thought differently; and, therefore, I gave nothing, telling the gentlemen who called on me, that, as I should not subscribe, it would be a waste of their time to trouble them with my reasons. They did not denounce me. My wife's cloaths went to the bucking without being arrested by any search-warrants. But, Mr. Cooke gave a reason for not putting his name down, and a very good reason too: he had *already put it down in London*, where, probably, he had fallen under the terrific influence of the bullying address to the inhabitants of St. Giles's and St. George's Bloomsbury, in which even the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice were not very obscurely pointed at. And, was Mr. Cooke to put his name down at every remove, or be suspected of disaffection? Was he to give away all the little remnant of fortune that overgrown farmers and millers had left him in order that they might strut him out of countenance? Was he, reversing the maxim of *Seneca*, to exhaust all his substance and then to die for the purpose of furnishing decorations for beings of an inferior order? Thank God, these exactions are now put an end to; and, let it be recollected, that there is now a law prohibiting any further collections for the support of volunteers; so that Mr. Cooke may, if he will suffer the carrier to bring his letters in a way to please Mr. Osborn, now remain quietly, perhaps, at Hampton Lucy; but that it is a very hard case, that a gentleman, should be thus compelled to go to the enormous expense of a law-suit, or to lie under the imputation of being a person likely to commit treason, will be denied by no one, to whose mind injustice is not extremely familiar.—Before I dismiss this topic I cannot refrain from calling the reader's attention to the penetration displayed, upon this occasion, by the sages of Downing Street; and, he will not fail to observe, that if a very small portion of it had been bestowed in the conferences with Mon-

sieur Mchée de la Touche, the world never would have enjoyed at our expense the broad and endless laugh which has been excited by the correspondence of Mr. Drake.

#### NAVIGATION WITH THE WEST INDIES.

—A letter upon this subject will be found in another part of the present sheet. The pamphlet to which that letter refers I have not yet had an opportunity of reading, and therefore I cannot submit any opinion upon it. To preserve inviolate the spirit of the Navigation Act is a maxim not to be departed from without hazarding our all, our very existence as an independent nation; but, rigidly to enforce that act, and to squeeze the colonies in the merciless manner that they now are squeezed at the Custom-House is absolutely impossible. While the mother country acts like a mother her colonists will be the last of her children to wish to injure her navigation, because they know that it is the source of her power; but, if a minister tells them, that "if they cannot live by making sugar they may make something else," they will look out for themselves. They can make nothing but sugar; and if they cannot, as British subjects, live by making it, they will care very little for the connexion. The truth is, that the Custom-House is eating up the navigation. Taxes, taxes, taxes; this is the continual cry of the minister. Every other consideration gives way to that of revenue; and, the evil must continue to increase until the system is completely changed.

FINANCIAL RESOLUTIONS.—The correspondent, whose letter I inserted in my last, p. 168, has favoured me with a second letter upon the same subject, which will be found in a preceding page of this sheet. I have not time, at present, to pay that attention to it which it merits; but, it would not be right to present it to the public without stating explicitly, that I disagree with the writer as to his doctrine respecting the nature of the contract between the government and the public-creditor. The public creditor never understood that the value of his annuity was to diminish 60 per centum in eighteen years; it was impossible for him to foresee the bank-restriction, which was, to all intents and purposes, a violation of the contract. A. B. thinks the caution to fathers and mothers unavailing;—but, if I should succeed in making myself understood to any considerable portion of those who have property to leave to the helpless, I shall certainly flatter myself, that I have done a great deal of service to the country.

"The restriction as to exportation of corn is taken off, too, at a wrong time. There is no telling, as yet, what will be the produce of the next harvest. We have had four dry summers successively; five successively have not been known, in this country, within the memory of the oldest man living; and, if we should now have a harvest like that of 1799, the quarter loaf may yet sell for a shilling before Christmas."—POLITICAL REGISTER, present volume, p. 82.

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BIRMINGHAM DOLLARS.

SIR,—In your Register of the 21st inst, you bring forwards the arguments and opinions of Mr. Foster, in his work upon paper currency; and you seem to think them fully decisive, upon the question of a depreciation of English bank-paper. You inform us, too, with much self-complacency, of the assistance which he has derived from your own writings. Of the arguments in the particular passage which you have quoted from his book, I certainly agree with you, in thinking that they are originally yours; but I cannot agree with you in thinking that they are worth your claiming. You say, however, that those arguments "are the very foundation of Mr. Foster's doctrine of depreciation;" consequently, if these arguments are shewn to be false, with them his system of depreciation must fail. I esteem it fortunate, that you have allowed the question to be placed upon so simple a footing; more especially as it affords an opportunity of proving the fallacy both of your doctrine and Mr. Foster's at the same time. The question of depreciation seems to me to be reduced, by these admissions, simply to this: whether the bank dollars circulate as coin, or as promissory notes: whether the price of 5s., at which they circulate, is owing to their intrinsic value, as compared with English bank paper; or to the stamp put upon them by the bank, which thereby becomes liable to pay them again at 5s. I believe I have stated this accurately: yourself and Mr. Foster maintain that they circulate as coin, and owe their price to their intrinsic value; and the foundation of Mr. Foster's doctrine of depreciation rests upon the truth of this. Since this position was so essential to Mr. Foster's theory, it might have been expected, that he would have bestowed considerable attention, in establishing its truth; but he seems to have hastened to the superstructure of his building, and to have been but little solicitous about the soundness of its foundation. In support of this "very foundation" of his doctrine," he does not think it necessary to produce one single argument, but

contents himself with laying down his opinion, that it is impossible for dollars ever to circulate at any other than their intrinsic value. But it was incumbent upon him either to have proved that this was not possible, or otherwise admitting it to be possible, he ought to have shewn the reasons which induced him to think, that in the instance he was speaking of, it was not the case. Mr. Foster says "the bank dollars issued at 5s., contain no more silver than 4s. 6d. ought to contain; they are therefore called not 5s. but tokens for 5s. It has been contended that this is no proof of the depreciation of bank paper, for that they are only promissory notes, and that the bank might have called them 15s. as well as 5s.; but a promissory note should either have intrinsic value itself, or else be merely the representative of it." Now I would ask Mr. Foster, whence he derived his rule, "that a promissory note should either have intrinsic value itself, or else be merely the representative of it?" Why may not a promissory note possess at once intrinsic value in itself, and be at the same time the representative of so much higher value? Can Mr. Foster, upon mature consideration, maintain any thing so absurd as that this is impossible? Yet it is upon so palpable an absurdity that he has rested the "very foundation of his doctrine." Mr. Foster does indeed say farther respecting the bank dollars: "If issued merely as the representative of value, why go to the expense of having it of such precious materials?" There is no necessity for answering this question; the foundation of Mr. Foster's doctrine rests upon its being absolutely impossible to go to this expense. It is not the wisdom or folly of the directors of the bank that is the point in dispute; probably they have acted foolishly in going to this expense; yet it is also probable, that they may have been actuated by the consideration, that if the tokens they issued were made of a material possessing a considerable intrinsic value, they would be much less liable to be counterfeited, than if made of a material which

did not. If this be their motive, the directors of the bank of England have afforded an example of sacrificing private interests to the interests of humanity; which, it were to be wished, could be seen oftener imitated in the conduct of public men. But if it is possible for tokens or promissory notes at once to possess intrinsic value in themselves, and to circulate as representatives of some higher value; then ought Mr. Foster to have shewn that the dollars he was speaking of did not so circulate. He does not appear to have touched upon this point, but with your permission, I will supply the deficiency (as briefly as I can), and have no doubt, but I shall shew that the bank dollars do circulate at a value higher than their intrinsic value, reckoning their intrinsic value as compared with English bank notes. If the value of 5s., at which these dollars circulate as exchanged for bank paper, be not owing to the stamp upon them, then it must follow, that their exchangeable value would remain the same, though the stamp were defaced, and that it would have been the same though the stamp had never been affixed. If their value of 5s. be not owing to the stamp, the same value must remain though the stamp was taken away. Deface, therefore, the stamp from a bank dollar, or take a dollar of the same weight and fineness, before the stamp has been affixed, and try for how much bank paper it will exchange; not for 5s. but for 4s. 4d. only. A stamped dollar will exchange for 5s.; an unstamped dollar of the same weight and fineness will only exchange for 4s. 4d.; I cannot imagine any thing more conclusive than this. Nevertheless, in answer to a letter which I formerly wrote to you upon this subject, you were pleased to say, that it was not of the intrinsic value of the dollar that you were speaking, but of its circulating value. I then pointed out to you that there was no real difference in this distinction; but as you did not allow yourself to be convinced by my arguments, it may be necessary for me now to say, that the circulating value of the unstamped dollars is at this time only 4s. 4d.; and that there are a sufficient quantity of them in circulation, for the price to be ascertained.—You may recollect that in the letters I before wrote to you, it was observed, that it was not my intention to enter into the general question whether our paper currency was depreciated or not. You professed, in answer to this, that you could not conceive any object I could have if this were the case. My object was (and I thought it sufficiently obvious) to prove the fallacy

of those arguments upon which you had built your opinion respecting the depreciation of our currency. In reality there were at that time several circumstances (but totally unconnected with those which you produced) which tended to shew that a depreciation to a small extent might have taken place. One of these was the exceedingly high intrinsic price of dollars (taking them however, at 4s. 9d. and not at 5s.); and another was the premium of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per centum, which was then paid in London to exchange bank of England paper for gold. It then appeared to me probable that both these might be owing to accidental causes, unconnected with any lasting depreciation of paper; and if so, that they would be removed in a short time. It may be recollected I mentioned, that it was probable we should see dollars vary in price, before the expiration of twelve months, from 4s. 9d., the price they were then at, to perhaps 4s. 2d. or 4s. 4d. The alteration has taken place sooner than could have been looked for; and they are now at the price of 4s. 4d. An alteration in the price of guineas has at the same time taken place, and they are now to be procured in London, in exchange for bank paper, without any premium. The rise which the price of guineas then experienced, I take not to have been owing to any depreciation of paper, through an excessive circulation; but to the great demand for guineas which the fear of an immediate invasion had previously occasioned. It was not that an unnatural quantity of notes had been issued, but that almost every one who held them, was more desirous of holding gold; not that the circulation was excessive, but that the security was doubted. And upon this point I entirely agree with you in all you have said respecting the dangerous, and perhaps even fatal effects, which in the event of an actual invasion, the sudden and unavoidable depreciation of our paper currency would produce. It is to you only that the public owes its having been at all warned of this danger; which must fall heavier in proportion as it is little expected.—Mr. Foster, you inform us, has drawn his doctrine of depreciation from your arguments upon the subject; which arguments, if they prove a depreciation at all, certainly prove a depreciation to the extent of 10 per cent. Nevertheless, Mr. Foster, who gives a very exact account of the degree of depreciation which has taken place at different periods, makes it out that this depreciation has never exceeded  $2\frac{1}{2}$ s. per centum. It

would have rested with you to have reconciled this difference with Mr. Foster, but I imagine you may not now consider it worth your time. Mr. Foster, however, seems to have rested very much of his arguments upon the rates of exchange with Ireland. In truth, no proof of a depreciated currency can ever be drawn from the rates or balances of exchange. No doubt a depreciation of currency cannot take place in any country without affecting the rates of exchange with every other country it has transactions with. But the rates of exchange are liable to be affected by so many other causes, that it can never be more than a plausible conjecture, to attribute any variation to a depreciated currency; unless such depreciation has been previously proved from other sources.—Yourself and Mr. Foster seem sensible of this; the foundation of Mr. Foster's system relying upon the fact of depreciation, being previously proved from another source, viz. the price of bank dollars; and the arguments drawn from the variations in the Irish exchange seem to be considered merely as corroborative. I trust it will now be allowed to be sufficiently plain, that the arguments are fallacious, by which a depreciation of paper was attempted to be proved from the price of dollars; and that the variations in the exchange with Ireland, must be looked for in some other cause.—I remain, Sir, your very obedient servant, C. B.—*London, 23d July, 1804.*

#### FINANCE RESOLUTIONS.

SIR,—Confident that you seek only to establish your opinions, by the assistance of truth and reason, I do not hesitate to address you a second time, as your letter to Mr. Pitt of the 4th of this month, contains several specious arguments in favour of the conclusion which you drew in your first letter. I venture indeed to think entirely different from you, of your quotation from the speech of my Lord Auckland and the writings of Mr. Chalmers and Mr. Rose: not any one of whom appear to me to have instituted a comparison between different years, of the produce of the permanent taxes, with any idea that it would be supposed, that in the latter periods the produce was *worth more* than it was in the earlier ones. When Mr. Chalmers compares the result of his comparison with a similar one made in the *distressful times* of King William, does he not sufficiently shew, that the inference which he wished should be drawn from it was one relating to the state and condition of the people,

and not one relating to the riches or poverty of the treasury? When my Lord Auckland precedes his comparison with a reference to the state of trade, the course of exchange, and the general prosperity of the kingdom, does he not clearly mark the inference he intended should be drawn? The subsequent comparison of Mr. Rose of British manufactures exported, are in like manner an evidence to the purpose, for which he advances the amount of the permanent taxes. But, to my very great surprise, you extend your objections to the 13th resolution of the House of Commons on Finance, to this comparison of British manufactures exported. Permit me, however, Sir, to remind you, that the official value of imports and exports was fixed by the House of Lords so long back as 169, and that this rate has never since been varied.—Your objection I very readily grant is valid, against every comparison of which, in the official language of the Inspector General of imports and exports, is called the *real value*, but not against what he terms the *official value*.—The late Mr. Irving was the first who introduced this new estimate of our trade, and he was so pleased with the approbation which it procured him, that he wished to have substituted the *real* in place of the *official value*, until I observed to him, that the *official value* afforded the best evidence to the *quantity* of our trade, which was of more consequence than its fluctuating and relative value to the political economist. However, at the time I expressed my wish (and I rejoice that it has been gratified), that his new estimate of our trade should be continued, as thereby there was both the quantity and value of our commerce nearly ascertained, and a help afforded towards forming an estimate of the “depreciation of money” as Mr. Wheatley terms it, but of the “advance of prices” as I should term it, had I that gentleman's reputation. I am aware, that in the opinion of a great many, these terms are synonymous; but inasmuch as the one proceeds from very different causes to the other, and as the one will produce very different effects to the other, I think writers on these questions should very carefully distinguish between them. If I have an opportunity, I will obtrude upon you my opinion concerning this last most delicate and important subject, upon which I lament that I likewise am so unfortunate as to differ from you. Before, however, I close this letter, I cannot but remark that your correspondent of the 30th

of July, failed in making a very important distinction in his view of the "resolution" which has caused me to address you. He evidently views the resolution as inferring, that with reference to the debt, the permanent revenue has increased in *value*; but that gentleman should have distinguished between a charge was permanent, and, as to the amount from the permanent revenue at each period, should have cast out what percentage the increase of the latter period was upon the earlier period, and then in his and your present view of the subject we should have seen whether, compared with the advance of prices, or as you and Mr. Wheatley term it, the depreciation of money, a real augmentation had taken place in the *worth* amount of that part of the permanent revenue applicable to the fluctuating charge.

—The permanent charge upon the consolidated fund, including the sinking fund, was, in 1792, 11,430,000*l.*, and the produce of the permanent taxes for that year was 14,284,000*l.*, leaving a surplus of 2,854,000*l.* applicable to the fluctuating charge. Now an increase of 617,000*l.* upon this last sum is rather more than 21½ per cent., which increase is fully equal to the increased percentage of charge in the departments of the Lord Steward, Lord Chamberlain, and Master of the Horse, stated by Mr. Roebuck, indeed, at only 20 per cent.—The fact, however, is, that every other war than the last, in which this country has been engaged, during the last century, the permanent taxes existing at their commencement sunk in their amounts as each war advanced. In other words, every other war so exhausted the national resources and impoverished individuals, that consumption materially lessened, and the revenue suffered in proportion: whereas, during the last war, consumption was rather upon the increase.—I am, Sir, with respect, yours, &c. D. W.

#### SLAVE TRADE.

SIR,—The slave trade will, at the next meeting of Parliament, be decided upon for or against, it may be presumed. It is unbecoming the independence of Great Britain to disguise, or shun the encounter of this most weighty business; let then a final resolution be adjudged upon this proscribed subject of obloquy. No nation since the world began reposed its greatness with success on the supremacy of commercial politics. Trade is useful as a subordinate machine, to be guided by public good, so far as is consistent with itself, and the sound welfare of individuals. The story of Carthage

every body has read; the fate of Holland is before our eyes; in both of which states, money grabbing baseness turned its stings upon its own agents. With Great Britain, great in freedom and in men, commerce has been the handmaid of faith, and has followed her with steps of purity and obedience. The golden rule then is to repress the spirit of commerce, by the spirit of honour. Not that honour which is a bulwark against fortitude and piety, but the honour which esteems merit before riches. In number 53 of the Guardian is this paragraph: "Alas! what is there in all the gratifications of sense, the accommodations of vanity, or any thing that fortune can give to please a human soul, when they are put in competition with the interests of truth and liberty?" With this authority I proceed to the slave trade. The slavery of the West-Indies is *sui generis*, on account of the peculiarity of the negro complexion. If the Africans had been long-haired, doubtless, Guinea merchants would have abhorred the idea of trafficking with and for creatures like themselves. Is it to be a question of habit or of reason? Hume ridicules the convenient ignorance of men, whose conscience is at ease in the human market, by means of the skin deep difference of colour and woolly heads. All our chief writers in religion, morals, and politics, are of Hume's opinion. The advocates of slavery defend it from habit, as masters as merchants. The inquisition of Portugal, and the cannibalism of savages, are no arguments to justify habit. Public speakers and writers of the day admit the injustice of the trade, but dispute the policy of abolition, representing the licentious instinct of negroes, or rather habits, to be incompatible to the restraints of morality, and the discipline of freedom. An abolition, say they, would exterminate the innocent and the guilty, and the very objects of misguided charity would finally be destroyed in mutual butchery. The propriety of the slavery granted, it follows that the trade must not be discontinued. Suppose the trade at an end; the negroes decrease; for where there is neither marriage, nor strict polygamy, but promiscuous connexion, where is a sufficient succession to come from? It must be known, that the profligacy of the negroes is worse on account of the intercourse of the whites with them. This demeanour of the whites is not reckoned disgraceful, for they look upon the West-India colonies as temporary fairs of speculation, to leave after requiring wealth, and settle in Europe in domestic virtue, like courtizans who turn methodists. An abolition of the trade, and a persisting in

slavery, is a perversion of all experience. The negroes are the most prolific people in the world; yet that quality is counteracted by the spirit of a West-India colony in the confusion of blacks and whites, the absence of proprietors, and the relative dependance on the mother country, which superinduces all the unlicensed manners of temporary residence. The stream of supply being dried, the negroes will be overworked and tortured to desperation of existence, that may burst out into insurrection. The estates of a colony are managed by white servants transported from Great Britain, who endure the climate and the labour with a prospect of gain. This gain begins with the purchase of a few negroes: but the trade is at an end. No Europeans will be induced to hazard their lives and their health for nothing. The estates then must employ mulattoes and negroes as servants. This is giving power to the slaves; and the nature of slavery cannot endure concessions, but will use them for the last gift or conquest of emancipation. The complexion of the slaves is the obstacle to every redress; their complexion is suitable to the climate; that alone is a host against superior European discipline and knowledge. The inherent hatred of slavery against its masters is made inveterate by the distinction of colour. No temporizing subterfuges of change will do good. An instantaneous emancipation is as bad, or worse. It is a system that is incurable as mortality. The slightest innovation will spread like flames over the sun-burnt fields of a West-India island. The trade and the slavery must stand together, or the latter will fall. There must be no experiment of gradual prohibition of trade. The whites must keep up adequate numbers of themselves, of the strictest military discipline and headlong courage, with a constant watchfulness against arming the negroes, and above all, that every roving missionary be expelled from their conversation, and that they be immersed in illiterate stupidity. From this last opinion, it is plain that the writer of this looks upon the whole of the West India colonization as the hot-bed effervescence of European luxury, rather than the wholesome corn fields of European utility. Your's, &c.—A. B.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Circular Note of General Brune, French Ambassador at Constantinople, addressed to Baron Biefeld, Prussian Envoy at the same place.—Dated Constantinople, June 18, 1804.*

The undersigned ambassador from his

Majesty Napoleon, Emperor of the French, does himself the honour to notify hereby to Baron Biefeld, that a *Senatus Consultum* has definitively settled the organization of France, and firmly established for the future, the denomination, forms, and exercises of the sovereign power in France. These objects were hitherto the only ones in the organization of France, which were found not fully commensurate with the greatness and necessities of the state. His Majesty Napoleon, the Emperor of the French, is therefore by the laws of the state invested with the imperial dignity in such a manner, that this title and dignity shall descend to his posterity in the direct male line, or failing that, in the direct male line of their Imperial Highnesses the Princes Joseph and Louis, the brothers of the Emperor.—From the well known sentiments of the Prussian court, the undersigned cannot doubt of the Baron Biefeld, in this important and happy event; and therefore only avails himself of the present opportunity again to assure him of his high esteem. (Signed) BRUNE.

#### *The Answer of Baron Biefeld.*

The undersigned envoy from his Prussian Majesty considers himself as greatly honoured by the communication of the note of the 29th of Prairial, by which the French ambassador has notified to him what has been determined in France relative to the form and investigation of the supreme dignity. Much flattered by the above communication, he makes no delay to thank his excellency for the important communication, and entreats him to confide in his well known sentiments, and to be convinced that he shall always take a true and sincere participation in every thing which may promote the welfare of the French nation and its Government. The undersigned avails himself of the present opportunity to renew to the ambassador the assurance of his very special esteem. (Signed) BIEFELD.

*Note of his Majesty the King of Sweden, in the Deliberations at the Diet of Ratisbon, relative to the Imperial Russian Note of the 7th of May, concerning the seizure of the Duke d'Enghein.—Dated Ratisbon, July 27, 1804*

His Majesty the King of Sweden, as Duke of interior Pomerania, has charged his Envoy to insert the following vote in the protocol, on the subject of the declaration of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, read before the Diet on the 7th of May last.—His Majesty, who on so many occasions has

manifested how much he interests himself in the affairs of the German Empire, could not learn without the greatest anxiety and alarm, the events which took place in the electorate of Baden in the month of March last, events by which the territorial rights of the German Empire are flagrantly violated, and its future security exposed to the greatest danger. His Majesty, therefore, thinks it the duty of every member of the Empire not to conceal the wish that the French government may give full and satisfactory explanations to the Emperor and the Empire, relative to the said events, and such as may remove all fears for the future security of the Germanic territory. As a member of the Empire his Majesty thought it his duty to express these sentiments; though he has not judged it necessary to notice the occurrences alluded to in a more particular manner, in his capacity of Guarantee of the Peace of Westphalia and the Germanic Constitution; and the less so since his Majesty could not doubt that a power which had formerly shared with Sweden in the labour and glory of co-operating to the restoration of the laws, and of order and security in the Empire, would be convinced of the necessity of maintaining objects so important unimpaired and inviolate.

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**PRICE OF BREAD.**—In an article, published previous to the passing of the law for the exportation of corn, and for granting a bounty upon such exportation, an opinion was expressed, that every law of that kind was injurious to the community, every law restraining, or granting a premium upon, either the export or import of corn. The code of corn-laws and regulations present a mass of absurdities hardly to be equalled; and, what makes the matter worse, they are absurdities which are characteristic of a shallow brain. One would think they had resulted from the deliberations of an assembly of shop-keepers and handicraftsmen. The nation has already paid dearly for these laws, to which no small portion of its present disgrace and danger may be fairly attributed, but it is very likely, that we shall soon experience effects more fatal than have ever heretofore been experienced from this cause. We have had three years of abundance, especially with regard to bread; and, it seems very probable, that the next year, beginning with September, will prove a

year of what may, in this country, be called scarcity. The case pointed out in the passage which has been selected as the motto to this sheet appears to have happened; for, it is now the middle of August, and there has been scarcely a fine day since reaping began. The wheat is, besides, much blighted. It is stated to be so all over the kingdom, and that the statement is correct with regard to two counties I can take upon myself to aver. The effect of this has already appeared in the sudden and very considerable rise in the price of bread, the quartern loaf having, in the space of six weeks, risen from 8d. 4 to 10d. That every day's rain will add to the price is certain. Wheat, were the weather now to become fair, must continue to rise for some time: bread must also rise; and, it would be by no means hazardous to suppose, that, before March next, the quartern loaf may sell for eighteen-pence. It becomes us, therefore, to consider by times what may be the consequences of scarcity, especially now that those who will feel the pressure are amply provided with arms, and have just received discipline enough to render them formidable to the state, should they unhappily be misled either by evil-minded persons or by their own wants. Scarcity is always accompanied with discontent in proportion to the sufferings which it creates, and, at this time, scarcity would be productive of uncommon suffering, because the previous abundance was uncommonly great, and, which is another important circumstance, was preceded by scarcity uncommonly severe. The mass of the people will never perform any more labour than is sufficient to yield them support in a way according with the customs of the country. The high wages of 1800 and 1801 having been kept up, the years 1802, 1803, and 1804 thus far, have been years of comparative ease, not to say of idleness. A rise in the price of provisions, without another corresponding rise in the price of labour, which cannot take place all at once, will make work scarce, not because there will be less of it to perform, but because more must be performed by one man in order to procure him support. It is not that "hands have been scarce" for three years past, but that provisions have been plenty. In times of scarcity we never hear of a want of labourers, but in times of plenty this want is a subject of continual complaint. Scarcity will, then, compel people to work harder than they lately have done; and how this will suit them, just at a time when

other causes have contributed to confirm them in habits of idleness, it is not very difficult to foresee. They hate Buonaparté, and would, if put in the right way, defend their country against him; but, by the time that they have experienced half a dozen more premature alarms, the dangers of invasion will become an evil of magnitude much inferior to that of a scarcity of provisions. To talk to them philosophically upon the subject will be perfectly useless. Individual distress is but too frequently ascribed to the government, and when it becomes in any degree general, to expect that the government will not be looked to as the cause is to discover, but very little knowledge of mankind. Considering, therefore, the critical state of the nation, the Minister should have been cautious how he adopted any measure that might afford a plausible pretext for making the monarchy answerable for the effects of an unproductive season; he should have listened with great caution to the advice of contractors and corn-merchants, or to that other new race of beings who have sprung up from the dunghill of paper-money and who are called speculating-farmers; yes, he should have listened to these persons with great caution, and even with distrust, when their object was to obtain a law evidently for the sole purpose of advancing their own interests, though the well-being of the whole nation should thereby be hazarded. Were I to allow that corn-laws, as they are quaintly termed, are at all necessary; and were it possible for me still further to allow, that, in times of plenty, it is wise for the people to tax themselves in order to give premiums for the exporting of the produce of their labour, I should then certainly say, that last Christmas would have been not an improper time for the passing of a law to open the ports for exportation; but, to pass such a law upon the eve of the harvest, and of a harvest, too, respecting the produce of which no very favourable opinion was entertained, was an act which, for reasons that need not be mentioned, I shall forbear to characterize, and indeed justly to characterize it would be no easy matter. The bill, upon its unexpected return from the House of Lords, was arrested in its operation till the 15th of November. It, therefore, never will, probably, operate at all except in an indirect way upon the store of the speculator, and directly upon the minds of the people, who, though they see whole fields of wheat blackened with the blight; though they see the rain fall day after day rotting the crop upon the

ground, do still ascribe, and will continue to ascribe the rise of bread to the law lately passed by parliament at the instance of the minister. To an argument somewhat of this popular nature Mr. Pitt made a reply that showed him to be shockingly destitute of reflection upon the subject. During the few days that the bill lay before the Lords, wheat and bread had risen. This rise was attributed to the bill, by the gentlemen who opposed it, and it was fairly so attributed: it was a mere speculator's rise; the stock in hand assumed additional value the moment the bill had passed the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt replied, that there was an appearance that the harvest would be scanty, and that the rise ought to be attributed to that circumstance rather than to the bill before the House. But, if Mr. Pitt was sincere, how can we find an excuse for his persevering in the bill? While he asserted that corn was already "too low in price" and that it was necessary to prevent its sinking lower, though one could hardly approve of so crude and inconsiderate an assertion, one could not impeach his consistency; but, when he had discovered that the coming harvest was likely to be scanty, and when he contended that the price of wheat and bread had already begun to experience the effects of that cause, still to persist in passing a law, founded upon the existence of a supposed exactly opposite state of things, is what will, I am persuaded, meet with no apology except amongst the greedy speculators, whose purposes alone such law, passed under such circumstances, was calculated to serve. The law is not, it is true, to go into operation till the middle of November; but it has already done mischief; it has already assisted the blight and the rain in raising the price of bread; and, which is still of more importance, it has laid the foundation for popular complaint against the government; for, though a single sack of corn should never be exported in consequence of this law, the people will ascribe to it a part, at least, of their hardships, and, at this moment, it is a general opinion amongst the common people, that ships are lying in all our ports ready to take away the corn the moment the law begins to operate, and that the rise of bread is owing to the hoards that are forming preparatory to the 15th of November!—But the consequence the most dangerous of all, is that which may arise from the erroneous, though almost general opinion, that scarcity of provisions is inseparable from a state of war, an opinion that has been countenanced by far too

many of those who are, or who ought to be, able to discover its fallacy. After the Bishop of London had expressed his approbation of the peace, *because* the people had endured nine years of war and three of famine, it was not astonishing to hear the people themselves drown all your complaints against the terms of the peace by bawling in your ears "peace and a large loaf;" while sentiments like those of the Rt. Rev. Prelate were repeated even to satiety from the benches of parliament, as well as from the pulpit, it was no wonder that "peace and plenty" became inseparable in the minds of the people; that they became the subjects of their toasts, their songs, and their allegories; no wonder that we saw, particularly amongst the base and stupid shop-keepers of London and Westminster, Peace represented by a vulgar greasy-looking woman holding a huge loaf in one hand and a foaming pot of porter in the other. The Addingtons turned this vulgar error to excellent account: they kept their places two years by the help of it, and, were not the monarchy and the country exposed to danger, it would be well now to let it work with all its force against their selfish and juggling successors. It would, however, be but a miserable satisfaction to see them overturned amidst the general ruin, and, therefore, I shall endeavour to show, that, as far as relates to the article of bread, at least, peace is not any more than war inseparable from plenty. When I touched upon this subject last (see page 82), I confined myself to the late peace and the present war. I shall now go back to the distance of half a century, giving the average price of the quartern loaf, in London, in each year.

1750	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$ d.	} PEACE.
1751	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1752	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1753	- - -	6	
1754	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1755	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	} WAR.
1756	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1757	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1758	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1759	- - -	5	
1760	- - -	5	} PEACE.
1761	- - -	5	
1762	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1763	- - -	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1764	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1765	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	} PEACE.
1766	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1767	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1768	- - -	8	
1769	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	

1770	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	} PEACE.
1771	- - -	7	
1772	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1773	- - -	8	
1774	- - -	7 $\frac{3}{4}$	
1775	- - -	8	} WAR.
1776	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1777	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1778	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1779	- - -	6	
1780	- - -	6	} PEACE.
1781	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1782	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1783	- - -	8 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1784	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1785	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	} WAR.
1786	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1787	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1788	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1789	- - -	8	
1790	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	} PEACE.
1791	- - -	7	
1792	- - -	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1793	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1794	- - -	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	
1795	- - -	10 $\frac{1}{2}$	} WAR.
1796	- - -	10	
1797	- - -	8	
1798	- - -	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1799	- - -	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1800	- - -	15	} PEACE.
1801 up to end			
of Sept. -	1	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1801 to the end			
of Dec. -	11 $\frac{1}{2}$		
1802 - - -	10 $\frac{1}{2}$		} WAR.
1803 up to the			
end of April	9 $\frac{1}{4}$		
1803 to the end			
of Dec. -	9 $\frac{1}{2}$		
1804 up to July	8 $\frac{1}{4}$		

It is said, and with truth, that the price of bread is not always, and in all cases, a satisfactory standard whereby to measure the value of money; but it is quite sufficient for the present purpose; for, if bread be cheap, the poor-man's provision is not dear, and if bread be dear his provision cannot be cheap. In ancient times bread was emphatically styled the staff of life, and, though modern inventions have enabled men, in certain cases, to dispense with it; yet, to the mass of mankind, to those who may be called the people of every civilized nation, it still is the staff of life. From the foregoing list of prices it will be seen, then, that war has not even the slightest tendency to enhance the cost of this first article of the poor man's subsistence; for, during three of the four wars of the last half century, including the present war, the

average price of bread has been full as low, if not lower, than during the preceding peace, notwithstanding the constant depreciation of money. How senseless, then, is the cry of "peace and a large loaf!" How stupid or how base must those persons be who encourage that cry! And how anxious ought we to be to prevent the influence of such an error in the producing of another disgraceful peace? It will be perceived, that in about every six years there have been two years of scarcity, and we may reasonably suppose that two such years are now about to begin; at a most critical time they are indeed beginning, and if great wisdom be not displayed, on the part of those in power, the consequences may be fatal. It is not altogether certain, that a clamour for peace, and that an excuse for peace upon any terms, would be disagreeable to the minister; for, though it might be inconvenient for Mr. Pitt himself to make such a peace, he has shown us that he knows how to effect his purposes of that sort by proxy; and, those persons are very much mistaken who suppose, that the Doctor and his set, who are now acting just the same part that Mr. Pitt and his set acted during the year 1803, have so entirely broken with Mr. Pitt as to reject a reconciliation with the beneficent view of restoring peace and plenty to their country. In short, it appears by no means improbable, that, when the nation shall become heartily weary of this lingering war, and when to that weariness shall be added the discontent arising from the high price of provisions, we shall be transferred again to the care of the Addingtons, who, whatever may be thought to the contrary, will never be found in an opposition to the present ministry. Their pretexts for submitting to the enemy's terms would be, with very little variation, the same that they before made use of: it is far from certain that they would not regard an alarming scarcity as a very great blessing; and, therefore, it is necessary to forewarn the nation against the danger of again becoming their dupes; of again approving, from an erroneous notion as to the effects of war on the prices of provisions, of a peace that shall add to the load of infamy heaped on their country by the treaty of Amiens. Mr. Pitt would desire nothing better than to hear a clamour for peace on any terms. A cry for "peace and plenty" is, perhaps, the very signal he is waiting for. It was not he who declared war; and it will not have been Mr. Addington who conducted it to the end: so that either of them has a loop-hole: a very

narrow one indeed, but one that would serve their purpose extremely well, if they could once hear a clamour for peace upon any terms. This clamour, therefore, should be carefully avoided. Peace may be demanded at the hands of the minister; but, it should be demanded as an object which he ought to be able to obtain upon safe and honourable conditions, and the nation never should be inveigled to commit itself as to any concessions or sacrifices. The war is in the hands of the minister: it is for him, who has all our purses and our persons at his command, to end the war with honour to his Sovereign and to us: if he succeed, be his the applause due to a wise and upright statesman; but, if he fail, we shall not, I trust, again be satisfied with a childish representation of the "difficulties" he has "had to encounter," especially when we consider that they are difficulties, for the most part, of his own creating, and that such as are not of his own creating are amongst the common occurrences of life, and therefore ought not to be regarded as obstacles to the accomplishment of any object essential to the safety, honour, or dignity of the nation.—Here I should stop, but there are two or three topics, closely connected with the price of bread, which I think so important in their nature, and of which I am so anxious to draw forth a discussion, that I shall take this opportunity of introducing them, though at the evident hazard of exhausting the patience of the reader.—As a standard of the value of money, the price of bread at any particular time is not satisfactory, because, as we have lately experienced, bread may be in price disproportionate to meat and other articles of subsistence; but, taking the average of a series of years, the price of bread is a standard sufficiently accurate for any practical purpose. Let us, then, see what has, according to this standard, been the progress of the depreciation of money.

Average price of the quartern loaf

during the 10 years ending with s. d.	
1760 - - - - -	0 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
During the 10 years ending with 1770	0 6 $\frac{1}{2}$
During the 10 years ending with 1780	0 7
During the 10 years ending with 1790	0 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
During the 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ years ending in July,	
1804 - - - - -	1 0

The observation that struck one in barely casting one's eye over the list, was, that 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ , which was a price so low as to require the interference of Parliament and the offer of a bounty to export corn, was a price higher than ever was known, even in years of scarcity, previous to 1795! This being the

case it was clear that money had *lately* depreciated in a proportion much greater than formerly; and hence it became an object of inquiry to know where the new proportion of depreciation began. By embracing, in the last average, a period of thirteen years and a half, the plentiful years of 1802 and 1804, and the still more plentiful half of the present year are included in the calculation. This is giving too much advantage to the last stated average; but, it was best to bring the period down to the time when the minister declared that the price of corn was *too low*. The depreciation of money from 1750 to 1790 appears, according to this standard, to have been gradual; and, notwithstanding all that has been said about the inadequacy of the price of bread as a standard, I am persuaded, that the proportion of depreciation, exhibited in the above-stated averages, will be found to correspond with other standards by which the degree of the depreciation of money has been determined. The depreciation during the last thirteen years and a half has, it will be perceived, been more than twice as great as during the preceding forty years. Money is not worth half so much as it was fifty years ago; and, indeed, this is a truth of which no man who was alive fifty years ago needs to be reminded. But, the important point is, that the far greater part of this depreciation has taken place within a few years; since the year 1790; since the establishment of the Sinking Fund and since the consequent extension of the funding system together with the inevitable increase of paper-money; but, with double strides has the depreciation advanced since the Bank has been screened from the just demands of its creditors; since the paper-money, though disgraced, has been made a *legal tender*; since the reciprocal connivance between the minister and the Bank has become apparent to all the world. If the stockholder has a mind to know what he has lost by the depreciation of money, he has only to look at the above averages of the price of bread, and he will at once perceive, that each shilling which he now receives in his dividends is worth just seven pence half-penny of the money which he bought stock with in 1790. He will perceive, that his 100 pounds is in fact reduced to within a trifle of 60. and that, of course, he is in reality receiving no more than three pounds a year for every hundred pounds which he deposited in the funds thirteen years ago. Nor has the loss come to an end: it is going on; and, if the system were to last another thirteen years, his hundred pounds would be reduced to 20, or,

perhaps, to 10; for the depreciation proceeds, as we have seen, with an accelerated velocity. Is it not time then, for fathers, mothers, guardians, and trustees to reflect upon the consequences of placing in the funds the fortunes of children, who, by the time they come of age, may probably not receive a shilling in the pound? But, long before the next thirteen shall have expired, the whole system will be blown to atoms, even without any assistance whatever from extraneous causes. It contains within itself the seeds of its certain destruction: their growth may be quickened by war, or by any other circumstance, which, by adding to the taxes, adds to the quantity of paper-money; but grow they must, and their growth must produce the annihilation of the system, in spite of every measure that can be adopted by way of preventive. — Another topic which I could wish to see ably handled, is, the degree of effect which the increase of paper-money and the consequent facility of obtaining pecuniary accommodations, have in enhancing and keeping up the price of provisions, particularly bread, the materials for making which are of a nature to be held in hand for a long time, without damage and at little expense. Mr. Boyd and some others attributed, as Lord King observes, too powerful an effect to these causes. In 1801 I was of opinion that they had no effect at all of the sort attributed to them. But, I had just then left a country, which, though sufficiently stocked with paper-money, knew nothing of paper that was not, upon demand, convertible into specie, in which country, of course, pecuniary accommodation could not be extended to such a length as to enable the speculators to raise or to keep up the price of provisions. Mr. Howison and Mr. Foster have some good remarks upon this subject, but a more ample discussion of it would be very desirable. — In plunging and groping about after adequate causes for the late scarcity, the wisacres of the Board of Agriculture, with Lord Carrington at their head, fell upon two, which, *at their suggestion*, were moulded into the form of *Resolutions* by the Grand Juries of Yorkshire and other counties. These two were, the *want of a general enclosure bill*, and the *want of a fixed compensation to the clergy in lieu of tithes in kind*! It never entered into his Lordship's head, I'll warrant you, that the inundation of bank paper had produced any effect at all, though he was, or had been, himself a Banker and even a maker of paper-money! As to a general enclosure bill, the idea discovered, in the person by whom it was conceived, a total ignorance of the laws and

usages relative to landed property, whether public or private. Without a *revolution* as to property, the project was utterly impracticable; and in principle I am thoroughly convinced it was extremely impolitic, and still more unjust and oppressive. It would have swept a quarter of a million of people from the cottages to the poor-houses. The partial enclosure bills are frequently injurious enough in this way: the interests of the cottager are seldom thought of: the division is made according to the spiritual maxim impiously applied to the worst of temporal purposes; “to him who hath much more is given, and “to him who hath nothing is taken even “that which he hath;” and: thus, that which for ages has been regarded as a paradox, is, by the effects of modern ingenuity, rendered a practical proposition. To know what the effects of enclosures and other agricultural schemes are, we have only to look at the amount of the poor-rates and at the number of the poor, both which have increased with the increase of enclosures; and, in those counties where the agricultural improvements, as they are called, have been pushed to the greatest extent, the agricultural population has diminished most, not *relatively*, but *positively* diminished, while the population of the country has, upon the whole, been increasing. —These are experimental truths, and because they are, they will not be attended to. Mr. Pitt, not content with projecting himself; not satisfied with a swarm of individual projectors, must needs organize a certain portion of them into a Board of Agriculture. The reports and other publications of this board will hereafter be preserved by curious men, as specimens of solemn foolery; but there will be found amongst them some of a very mischievous tendency, especially those which relate to the proposed “*compensation*,” as it is called, for tithes in kind, which is neither more nor less than a proposition for seizing the revenues of the Church, and for making the Clergy stipendiaries of the state, or rather of the minister, just as the Constitutional Clergy in France were, during the short interval between the abolition of tithes and the total destruction of the monarchy. This was a pretty bold proposition for a “Board of Agriculture” to make; and when we consider who was at the head of the Board; when we further consider, that a proposition of the same kind was made by Sir Henry Mildmay in a speech early in 1801; and that Mr. Long, in his pamphlet upon the price of bread, points at the very same object as a remedy for the evil of scarcity; when we consider all this, it is impossible

not to believe, that the project of abolishing the tithes originated with, or was approved of by, Mr. Pitt. It is, indeed, asserted, that, early in 1800, he had actually prepared a bill for that purpose, and that, though it was decidedly disapproved of by the then Attorney General, as being a most dangerous innovation, he proceeded so far as to submit it to his Majesty, whose decided disapprobation it also met with. The Clergy are all of them acquainted with the history of this project, and therefore when I hear Clergymen loud in the praise of Mr. Pitt, I cannot help regarding them as being much more intent upon furthering their own particular interests than those of the Church and of religion. These persons seem, by their conduct, to say: “so that I get a good salary “for life what need I care who pays it me.” Such Clergymen, and I hope they are few in number, I would beg leave to remind of the fate of the Clergy in France. Mr. Burke told them that they never would receive above three years salary, and they did not receive above two, the last of which was paid in assignats that had undergone a depreciation of 50 per centum. Sir J. Sinclair has expressed his approbation of the project for “commuting the tithes for government “*securities*,” and has cited the opinion of a person, who has pointed out the *advantages* that the Clergy as well as the laity would derive from such an arrangement. But, after the above exposition relative to the depreciation of money, little, I imagine, will need be said to convince the Clergy, that the proposed commutation would soon reduce them to beggary, and would not be long in levelling the Church establishment with the dust, and therein completing the work which Mr. Pitt began when he procured a law to be passed for alienating Church property in order to redeem the land-tax, a law not less unfair in its operation than unconstitutional in its principle, and aiming directly at the subversion of the Church of England! And yet there are clergymen of that Church who boast of being Pittites! But, even amongst the chosen twelve there was one Judas.—I have digressed so frequently and so widely that the reader must, I am afraid, have entirely lost sight of the object that ought principally to have been kept in view; namely, the ignorance which was discovered by the Grand Juries, the Board of Agriculture, and their abettors, in ascribing so much virtue to a general enclosure bill and to a commutation of the tithes. Fortunately no general enclosure bill has been passed, and no commutation of the tithes has taken place; yet corn has be-

come cheap again, and not only has it become cheap, but *too* cheap, and so much too cheap that the parliament has passed a law to raise taxes upon the people to defray the expenses of sending it out of the country! Where, then, was the necessity of enclosing all the commons and of commuting the tithes with a view of growing *more* corn? To represent the tithes as an impediment to agriculture, when it is well known that they have existed almost ever since the land was first tilled, requires no small portion of assurance; but, laying this point aside for the present, we hear Mr. Pitt now calling upon the parliament to pass a law for giving the farmers money to export their corn, because the land, notwithstanding the tithes, has produced *too much*; and, of course, if the general enclosure and the commutation of tithes were to cause more corn to be produced, we should have more money to pay in premiums to get the super-abundance carried out of the country.—Nevertheless, if the quartern loaf should again rise to eighteen pence, I should not at all wonder to see a revival of these remedies, these state nostrums, especially the project of commuting the tithes, which would, I am afraid, be very popular; for the mened interest, which has ninety nine hundredths of the press at its command, has succeeded in making the mass of the people believe, that the nobility and clergy, particularly the clergy, are their oppressors. The clergy are represented as wallowing in wealth, while they have, in general, hardly enough to keep them alive. The paper money system has placed the farmers above them, and their poverty begets poverty by forcing them to submit to compositions upon terms dictated by their grasping parliameters. Their tithes are represented as worth “fifty millions sterling,” when it is well known that the whole of them together do not receive half a million annually, a sum far short of the aggregate annual income of ten loan-jobbers; and, what man of just sentiments can restrain his indignation, when he sees a minister making it a point of honour to keep faith with these loan-jobbers, while he can hardly withhold his clutches from plundering the clergy, *ten thousand* of whom have not so much to support them as the nation pays for the support of *ten* loan-jobbers! To maintain the more than Eastern magnificence of these leviathans of wealth seems, too, to be thought nothing of; nay, by the means of well-timed subscriptions, or some such device, they obtain applause and admiration for their generosity from the people to whom they thus throw back

hardly the fractional farthings upon the hundreds of thousands of pounds that they receive!

BANK DOLLARS.—Upon the subject of these articles of Birmingham manufacture, considered as a proof of the depreciation of the English paper-money, a letter from a correspondent will be found in the first page of the present sheet. The writer sets out with a misrepresentation of words made use of by me in p. 87, where, as it will be clearly perceived, I did not say, that the arguments *in the particular passage there quoted* from a former Register had served Mr. Foster as the foundation of his doctrine of depreciation; I said, that *from me*, Mr. Foster had taken “*whole passages*,” and indeed the very foundation of his “doctrine of depreciation.” I afterwards quote a passage by way of specimen; but without saying any thing that could lead to the supposition, that I meant Mr. Foster’s doctrine of depreciation to have been derived from the arguments *in this passage*. All the reasoning, therefore, which C. B. has built upon this assumed admission becomes useless in the dispute, and he has still to combat the arguments of Mr. Foster upon other ground.—In reply to Mr. Foster, who says, that “a promissory note should either have intrinsic value in itself, or else be nothing more than the representative of it,” C. B. asks: “why may not a promissory note possess at once, intrinsic value in itself, and be, at the same time, the representative of ‘some higher value?’” Then, choosing to assume that Mr. Foster declares this to be *impossible*, he proceeds to assert, that “it is upon so palpable an absurdity, that ‘Mr. Foster rests the foundation of his doctrine.’” This is all mere assumption and assertion. Mr. Foster (see his book, p. 84) has not insisted upon any such *impossibility*, much less had he made it the foundation of his doctrine. In speaking of the dollars, considered as promissory notes, he says: “but a promissory note should either have intrinsic value within itself, or be merely the representative of it: if it is issued as the value itself, it can be no more valuable than the silver it contains; if issued merely as the representative of value, why go to the expense of having it of such precious materials?” He does not say, that it is *impossible* for a bank note to be issued having an intrinsic value less than its nominal one; but he fairly and clearly lays down the principle upon which notes are issued; he truly supposes, that the note *should* be

a thing of *full* intrinsic value, or of *no* intrinsic value, that there should be no confidence, or all confidence; and the former is the case in the present instance; there is no confidence: the dollar is fully worth five shillings in Bank-paper, and so it is regarded by the people. These dollars are not made a *legal tender*. Why are they not? If they are merely bank-notes, why is this species of notes excluded from the advantage of that law so salutary to the affairs of the bank? Is it because the minister was unwilling to extend the protection given to the bank, or because the bank directors knew, that, in this instance, they stood in need of no protection? Those gentlemen well knew, that they were in no danger from a run upon them, on the part of the holders of dollars, especially as they could augment to any degree that paper into which alone the dollars could be converted. They knew, that four dollars would be regarded as worth more than a pound-note; but they should, by way of grace, have asked for a clause to make them a legal tender, and thus have furnished a pretext for calling them notes of hand. — How C. B. could, with such a grave face, suggest that the bank-directors may have made their small notes of silver from motives of humanity, I am at a loss to conceive. If, however, he really thinks that the bank directors have put themselves to this immense expense merely for the sake of preventing those acts, which bring so many of the brotherhood of money-makers to an untimely end, perhaps he may be induced to persuade them to walk on a little further in this path of humanity and brotherly love, and to issue *gold notes* in lieu of some portion, at least, of the eighteen or twenty millions' worth of paper ones which they have afloat, and for which they owe the holders gold and silver in amount agreeable to the nominal value of the paper. But, if such was their motive in issuing dollars instead of paper, it seems that it has been rendered abortive by the inferior class of money-makers, who, in defiance of the law, have already proceeded with great success and to a very great extent, in imitating the beautiful productions of Mr. Boulton's Birmingham mint; inasmuch that we are told, that Mr. Boulton is preparing gauge-plates, by the help of which the public will be enabled easily to distinguish the counterfeits from those of the original manufacture. But, as these useful utensils cannot, as we are informed by a circular paragraph bearing a strong resemblance to a puff, be got ready with as

much dispatch as the indefatigable industry of the forgers may render necessary, the public may, in the mean-time, detect the counterfeits, by help of a pair of weights and scales, the counterfeit weighing about *one fourth part* less than the original dollar. This circumstance, while it shows what a wide field here is opened for the commission of this sort of crime, is a pretty clear proof that the intrinsic value of the real dollar is equal to its nominal value in bank-notes, otherwise there would be a profit upon the counterfeits without diminishing their weight. Amongst the numerous bad effects of a depreciated paper-money, is, the strong temptation to counterfeit, to clip, and to debase the current coin. No laws, however strict, no punishment however severe and prompt, will prevent this. If the government will force paper-money upon the people, some part of the people will bring the coin to a level with it, till at last the government will no longer receive the coin in payment of taxes, and then it totally disappears. This has been the progress of the silver coin in Ireland, and this will be the progress of the silver coin here. — My correspondent C. B. revives his arguments respecting the price of dollars as bullion; and, I again tell him, that I am not talking of silver in the shape of old pots, but of silver circulating side by side with English bank-notes; and, as I here find, that four Spanish dollars are now equal in powers of purchase to a one pound note, I conclude, that the note has depreciated ten per centum from its former value. To strengthen his argument he says, that guineas may now be had for bank notes without a premium: I do not say that, in particular instances, they may not; but I deny, that that is any proof that the paper-money has not depreciated. I before stated the reasons on which this opinion was grounded; and if an additional one was required, it would be easily found in the proofs which we have of the extensive practice of counterfeiting and debasing the coin. Mr. Foster speaks only of a depreciation of English bank-money in the degree of 2½ per centum, and I am desired to reconcile this with my arguments which went to prove a depreciation of 10 per centum. But, Mr. Foster confines himself to the open discount of the notes exchanged against guineas, whereas I have always contended, that there is going on an unseen depreciation, and that this depreciation reaches very far, affecting coin as well as paper, till that part of the coin which is not either clipped or counterfeited will no

longer keep company with the paper ; then comes the open discount, and the amount of such discount marks the degree in which the paper-money has sunk beneath the metallic money in its degraded state, and not the degree in which it has sunk beneath the metallic money in its original state. This opinion is, I think, fully corroborated by the sudden rise of prices (which is only another phrase whereby to express the depreciation of money) since the immense issues of paper-money took place, and especially since the law was passed to protect the issuers against the demands of the holders. From the year 1750 to 1790, we perceive that the depreciation was no greater, or very little greater, in this country than in Europe in general ; but, during the last ten years it has proceeded at a rate far surpassing any thing of the kind that was ever heard of, except in cases where bankruptcy closed the progress. Yet, during all this time, a pound note and a shilling has, for the common purposes of purchase, been as good as a guinea. But, the reason of this has been, that the nominal value of the guinea was fixed before the depreciation began. Dollars, which were a new coin, would not submit to this degradation, and, therefore, a value was assigned them higher than that which they bore, and which they still bear in other countries, not excepting the British colonies, where the army, for instance, are now receiving as four and six, or four and eight pence, the same piece of money which in England they receive as five shillings, except that, in the former case, it has not been honoured with the stamp of the gentlemen of Threadneedle Street.—

In these discussions, it is next to impossible to avoid connecting the evil you complain of with those who have been the immediate agents in producing it ; but, convinced as I am, that the bank-directors have done no more than any other traders so situated would have done, I wish always to be understood as imputing no blame personally to them. The source of the mischief is in the *funding system*, swelled out has it has been by the splendid project of what is called the Sinking Fund. This has produced a new sort of connexion between the Exchequer and the Bank, and that connexion has produced the present state of things, the exaltation of France and the humiliation of Great-Britain not excepted.

**INVASION.**—The ministers are, it would seem, really apprehensive that the enemy is about to attempt an attack upon some part of England ; and, though I differ with them in opinion ; though I think that

the policy of France so evidently is to *let us alone*, I should be very sorry that this opinion should prevent even one man from making the utmost exertion in his power to be prepared for the defence of his King and country. There can be no harm in preparation ; and as to the minister's *wearying* us with his alarms and his projects, we must not suffer ourselves to be wearied. If we dislike him, it is our duty so to tell our Sovereign through the regular constitutional channel of parliament, and unless we do this, we can have no reason to complain, much less to make the circumstance of his being minister a pretext for lukewarmness in the cause of our country. No ; we should resolve steadily to persevere, till we have defeated both the minister and the enemy ; but, at all events, the enemy. It is certainly ridiculous, not to say disgusting, to see the public prints filled with gasconading accounts of the military achievements of Mr. Pitt, who, Heaven knows, has quite enough to do in Downing Street ; but, we are not, on account of his puerile parade, to remit our serious exertions for the safety of the country, with the fate of which our own fate is inseparably connected.—The bustle that is making about horses and carriages is, in my opinion, calculated to do mischief rather than good, unless its object be to give the enemy a terrific idea of our warlike means, and in that case it will certainly be useless ; for, Sir Brook Watson may be assured, that Buonaparté is not to be scared by a display of our strength in horses, too many of which must be an injury to any country, particularly in time of war. To be able to convey troops with celerity from place to place is certainly a desirable thing, especially when the troops of the country are, proportionately to the parts to be defended, few in number, which is the case in this country at this time. But, in speaking of the conveying of troops in carriages of any sort, we should always consider, that the number so conveyed to any one spot must be very small to render the movement of the whole rapid. The moving of the baggage of an army is attended with trouble and delay enough ; and what must these be when the soldiers themselves are to be conveyed in carriages ? A regiment of foot will march thirty miles in a day for three or four days successively ; at least the French infantry did it last war, in several instances ; and, if ten thousand men were to be moved from Surrey to any one spot in the lower part of Kent, it would be utterly impossible to convey them in carriages, so soon as they would march thither on foot. For the conveyance of forage, am-

munition, provisions and equipage, horses and carriages would be very useful, and, in particular cases, for the conveyance of small bodies of men; but, *armies* are not thus to be conveyed; they must move themselves; and, if the enemy should land, it is right that the people should be warned, "not to put their trust in chariots and in horses."

—*Three millions of horses!* Why this exaggeration? If you include all the cat-ham'd poney of the Hampshire forests, all the mules, all the asses, and all the horses in the toy shops, the aggregate would not make three millions. God forbid it should! And I differ from Sir Brook too as to the policy of being prepared with subscriptions of horses and forage. When a measure can be made general, it never should be made partial in its operation; and, in the hour of trial I have much more confidence in the power of the law than in the effect of voluntary zeal, which zeal, supposing it to exist in a sufficient degree, is difficult to regulate, and is therefore far inferior to an obedience to a general law. For these and other reasons that could be mentioned, I would have had no subscriptions; I would have had no meetings of coach masters and horse-jockies upon the subject of national defence; I would, by a proclamation of the King, have notified to all persons having horses and waggons, that, upon an order being issued for that purpose, all those horses and waggons, or as many of them as should be wanted, should be delivered up, for the public use, into the hands of persons appointed to receive and employ them. I would, at the same time, have stated the sort and degree of compensation that would be made to the owners. How quietly would the whole matter have been thus settled! Every horse and waggon in the kingdom would have been ready at a moment's warning: when the occasion arrived, government would have taken just what it wanted and no more: there would have been no confusion, no noise, no ostentatious subscriptions, no invidious distinctions, exertions of patriotism for the sake of getting a place or a contract: all would have been regular and quiet, the King would have lawfully commanded and his people would have cheerfully obeyed. But this course would not have at all answered the purposes of Mr. Pitt and his Caledonian colleague. They want bustle and noise. They have ever delighted in subscriptions and volunteering of every sort. The subscribing is first made a test of loyalty. Those who do not subscribe are disloyal; and when great numbers have thus been induced to enrol themselves, the

whole matter takes a party turn, and men learn that they have subscribed to the support of the minister. His party purposes are served, too, in another way. His adherents, if not his creatures, are always at the head of such subscriptions; they harangue at the meetings; they inculcate his sentiments; often they broach opinions which he does not think it prudent to avow till the pulse of the people has thus been felt; and, as the least possible effect in his favour, every shilling that is subscribed has the appearance of being given from friendship towards, and confidence in, him. None of these advantages would accrue to him from the operation of a general law or regulation, and therefore the subscribing system, though evidently tending to undermine the legitimate authority of government, is constantly preferred; and the people, before they are allowed to make exertions in the cause of their country, are moulded into a ministerial faction. Those who cannot overcome their repugnance to such degradation, remain inert; their example has an injurious influence on those who do not reflect; odious comparisons are made, private envy and hatred come to the aid of party malignity; and thus are we divided and enfeebled; thus, from being "the dread and envy of all nations," we are become an object of their contempt and scorn.

RUMOUR OF AN ALLIANCE.—Such a rumour has prevailed for some time: an alliance between this country, Russia, and Sweden. It would be difficult to point out any one advantage that could result to us from such an alliance, unless the making of a peace upon the principle of an abandonment of the object of the war can be called an advantage. It must not be forgotten, that, as to the point relating to Malta, Russia was decidedly against us. In fact, Russia did not wish that Mr. Pitt's constitution (for he was the real maker of it) should be established in Malta. Russia wanted Malta for itself, and France had little objection to the favouring of her views: so that, the first article of this much-talked of treaty of alliance will probably be the giving up of that which Lord Melville declared that he went to war for. But, how is this alliance to operate against France? Without the accession of Prussia or Austria, it cannot bear upon France any more than upon the moon. Russia, owing to our having abandoned our allies at the peace, joined France in new-modelling the German Empire. Both sought their interests, but the interest which Russia sought was not of a nature to be useful to her in future wars with any power; while

France, on the contrary, appears to have had constantly in view the strengthening of herself in any war to come and against every power, particularly Russia. Accordingly we find her now surrounded with small states that serve her as fortified cities in some cases, and in others as advanced camps; or, to use the apter figure of Mr. Burke, "as *feelers* or as *claws*," according to the nature of the service they are required to perform; and thus has that which was termed the dream of Brissot been completely verified. How, then, can the arms of Russia be brought to bear upon France? By way of diversion, indeed, a Russian army might be marched into Italy. Such a movement is possible; but, without the co-operation of Austria, a Russian army in Italy must be defeated. At present, therefore, there is no appearance of the alliance of Russia being attended with any practical consequences; and, it will certainly not be doubted, that, without such consequences, the alliance would be injurious to us, as it would only tend to demonstrate the invulnerable situation of our enemy.—In the mean time France appears to feel little inconvenience from the war. We were some time ago told of the insupportable taxes that were imposed upon the people. This source of consolation seems to be dried: Mr. Pitt gives us no hope of exhausting the resources of France; even Lord Auckland and George Rose are silent upon the subject; and well they may, for where is the man who would again believe their statements! Napoleon has, exclusive of his internal sources of revenue, four foreign ones, namely, Hanover, Holland, Spain and Portugal, whence he draws much more than can be required for supporting the expenses of a war like the present. From this fact, a fact, I think, which no one will dispute, Mr. Pitt may learn, that military force is more valuable than money, because the former will always procure the latter, but the latter will not always procure the former. The prevalent notion in this country, and especially since Mr. Pitt has been at the head of affairs, has been, that money would at any time procure military force: we now see the fallacy of that notion, and we feel the fatal effects of having ever adopted it. The country is glutted with wealth, and we stand trembling over it like a miser over his bags. We would fain employ some of it to purchase assistance, but, such is the superior power and influence of our enemy, that no nation, how-

ever well-disposed to do it, dares to take our money. This is the state to which we have been reduced by the policy of a financier! After the fate of France under a Necker and of England under a Pitt, nations will, one would think, take warning by times! We are now absolutely at the mercy of our enemy: by invading us; or by forbearing to invade us, either one way or the other, he is sure to effect our ruin; and, if he be so disposed, the destruction of our government. The minister knows no more than any individual amongst us what will happen the next hour. His agents write to committees of coach-makers, telling them that an attack on our shores is *daily* expected; and so said his predecessor a twelvemonth ago. If an invasion be expected from day to day, and if we are thus to stand waiting for it, amidst incessant alarms, our situation is not only disgraceful, but by far the most disgraceful that ever nation was reduced to; and, if an invasion be not expected, what are we to think of those who thus keep our eyes on the stretch across the Channel, as if to prevent us from seeing what is passing at home? But, the truth is, that, from all the measures, from the actions and the language of the ministers, they know nothing of the views of the enemy; they know not what to do; and really, as to vigour, there was as much, or more, vigour shown by Mr. Addington than there has been by Mr. Pitt, who appears to be infatuated on the subject of his Cinque-Port volunteers, and to be palsy-struck with respect to every thing else. All this the Russian Ambassador knows as well as we do, and he will not, therefore, see much to induce him to recommend a very close alliance with us. In a word, we are precisely in that state in which a nation is shunned by all the world; and we are shunned accordingly.

The letter of D. W. which will be found in p. 229 of this sheet shall be noticed in the next. It discovers some ingenuity, but much more is required to reconcile the 13th resolution to any principle of fair representation.—THE MIDDLESEX ELECTION has, from the manner of its termination, become a great political object: as such it will command attention in the succeeding sheet.—My correspondent, whose letter upon the SLAVE TRADE was inserted in p. 178, shall hear from me soon. In the mean time I trust to the goodness of the cause against which his arguments are opposed.

*"There appear to be circumstances, in which paper-money cannot affect much the price of certain articles of abundance. But wherever there is necessity and scarcity combined, paper-money will always be an instrument to add to the distress."*—Howison's Investigation.

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## A NARRATIVE OF THE PRINCIPAL OCCURRENCES DURING THE LATE ELECTION FOR THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX.

The select committee of the House of Commons appointed to try and determine the merits of the several petitions, complaining of an undue election and return for the county of Middlesex, having, on the 9th of July, come to a determination that the said election was void, the Speaker was ordered to issue his warrant to the clerk of the crown to make out a new writ for the electing of a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex, and the day of election was fixed for Monday, the 23d of the same month. On the following day, the 10th instant, Sir Francis Burdett announced his intention of offering himself as a candidate by the following address, *"To the Independent Freeholders of the County of Middlesex."* GENTLEMEN; the committee of the House of Commons having decided the last election for the county of Middlesex to be void, I take the liberty to request the favour of your vote and interest at the ensuing election, I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your's, &c. Francis Burdett.—On the 13th of July, the following freeholders of the county of Middlesex met at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, "to consider of a proper person to represent the said county in parliament. PRESENT, Henry Thornton, Esq. in the chair, Sir W. Gibbons, bart., W. Mellish, T. Mellish, John Bowles, Col. Wood, J. Wells, T. Smith, T. Harrington, R. Wyatt, P. Henderson, S. P. Cockrell, H. Collingwood Silby, S. Coffey, Christopher Idie, rev. J. Jefferson, Rev. J. Thirlwall, S. Edwards, J. Hunter, J. Reid, D. Hinley, H. Stevens, J. Andrews, J. Thompson, Major Wright, G. Burchett, T. Taylor, Ch. Lush, R. Simpson, J. Coggan, Joseph Rogers, J. Irving, Rev. W. J. French, J. Newton, T. Longbottom, Esqrs." It was resolved, "That George Boulton Mainwaring, Esq., son of W. Mainwaring, Esq. the late worthy representative of this county, be requested to offer himself a candidate at the ensuing election to represent the county of Middlesex, and that a general meeting of the freeholders in the

interest of Mr. Mainwaring be held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern in the Strand, "on Monday next, at 12 o'clock, to consider the best means of exempting him from all expenses, and of securing his election. Henry Thornton, chairman."—On Monday, the 16th of July, a meeting of the friends of Mr. Mainwaring was held at the Crown and Anchor, pursuant to the above advertisement, Sir William Gibbons, bart. in the chair. The resolutions of the former day being read, and the chairman having stated that a difficulty had arisen on the former meeting, as to the propriety of members of parliament subscribing towards defraying the expenses of the election; Mr. Mellish said, that a case had been laid before the attorney general upon that subject. His most decided opinion upon which, he held in his hand. He then read a letter from the attorney general, inclosing a draft on his banker for 100*l.* to be appropriated towards the purposes of the election.—Sir W. Curtis observed, that the learned gent.'s opinion met with his approbation in so high a degree, that he begged leave to subscribe for himself 100*l.* towards defraying the expenses of Mr. Mainwaring's election, and 100*l.* more in case of a petition; he also subscribed 50*l.* for his son, and 100*l.* for a gent. in the country, who had authorised him to appropriate any sum he might think necessary for that purpose.—Mr. Maddox next addressed the meeting; he observed upon the amazing length of time, which the investigation of the late petition had occupied, and the immense expense in which it had involved Mr. Mainwaring, the unequivocal proof of that decided majority which Mr. Mainwaring had over Sir F. Burdett, and which would have been considerably more, had Mr. Mainwaring objected to the assessed voters of Sir F. Burdett. The charges brought against Mr. Mainwaring were practised, he said, to a much greater degree by Sir F. Burdett; he had pitted his principles, and the weight and length of his purse, against the free and independent voice of the electors of the county of Middlesex; who, he was now confident, would assert that freedom and independence, by their warm and zealous support of Mr. Mainwaring. He had known

Mr. Mainwaring many years. He was a man who would ever act up to those principles which he had always avowed; he was a man, who would be alive to their interests, and indefatigable in his duty to his constituents, and the country at large. Their support of him now was only an act of gratitude due to his father; and he trusted he would meet with that zealous and spirited support which his own merit entitled him to, and which, above all, the cause they embarked in called upon them to give.—Mr. John Bowles, proposed several resolutions, tending to the furtherance of the subscription, all of which, after some amendments, were unanimously agreed to. The subscription was then opened, and near 6,000*l.* was subscribed; about 4,000*l.* towards defraying the expences of the election, and the remainder in case of a petition.—Mr. Mainwaring was now sent for, and apprised of the sequel of the meeting. He expressed his obligations to the electors, and assured them, that from that sense of duty which he owed to himself, he could not undertake the contest, without a certainty, or, at least, a guarantee for such a sum as would defray the whole of the expences of the election. A conversation of some length then took place, in which the majority of the meeting expressed their decided determination to support Mr. Mainwaring to the utmost of their influence and fortunes. The meeting was then adjourned to the following day.—At one o'clock on the 17th of July, the friends of Mr. Mainwaring met pursuant to adjournment. The chair was taken at two o'clock by Mr. Samuel Fyler; the resolutions of the previous meeting were read, and the additions to the former subscriptions made known to Mr. Mainwaring, jun. who requested that he might withdraw a short time, promising at his return that he would give the meeting a decisive answer. Mr. Mainwaring then retired from the room, accompanied by Sir W. Curtis, Mr. Mellish, &c. In about half an hour they returned to the meeting. Mr. Mainwaring then addressed himself to the freeholders, in nearly the following words. "I hope the electors will liberally construe my reluctance and delay, by considering that the present is an occasion in which my nearest and most essential interests, as well as my best feelings for the honour and welfare of the county are involved. My prudential objections, however, have been fully satisfied; and I come forward under a specific guarantee—the devoted instrument in the hands of the electors—of rescuing the rights and franchises of the county of Middlesex, and of preventing, if possible,

"those valuable interests from again falling into the possession of a man who, for two sessions, has usurped a seat in parliament. "I pledge myself the willing servant of the county; I shall at all times be eager to obey the voice of the freeholders, and to support the constitution of my country. "It is at the same time necessary to declare to you, and I shall so declare to the world, that it is not my intention to spend one farthing in the contest; and that a perfect indemnity from all expences must be clearly understood. I know, gentlemen, you are taking upon yourselves a great responsibility, and that you are willing to bear it; yet I must press upon your further consideration, that your good wishes, however grateful and satisfactory they may be, are not sufficient to secure my election. Some of the means resorted to by Sir F. Burdett should be used. I say *some*; for, God forbid, that *all* his means should be resorted to: I only mean that an immediate, active, and a vigorous canvass should be set on foot; and that my friends, if they wish me to succeed, should be waking night and day, if possible, in my interest. A bare majority will not suffice the spirit of the county. The issue must afford a complete triumph. I shall conclude, gentlemen, with repeating the deep sense of the honour conferred upon me; and with enforcing the necessity of a large attendance of freeholders at Brentford on Monday next, the day appointed for the election. I hope and trust in God that your efforts to save the county will be crowned with triumph and success."—Mr. John Bowles also impressed upon the meeting the necessity of promoting the subscription as well as the canvass in their respective districts, observing, "that money was the sinews of an election as well as it was of war." He concluded with moving certain resolutions, which were unanimously adopted, and published in the shape of the following advertisement.—"*Crown and Anchor Tavern, July 17, 1804.* At a numerous and respectable meeting of the freeholders of the county of Middlesex, held this day by adjournment, pursuant to advertisement for that purpose, Samuel Fyler, Esq. in the chair: George Boulton Mainwaring, Esq. having attended this meeting, and acceded to the proposal which had been made him, to offer himself as a candidate to represent this county in parliament: Resolved, that the cordial thanks of this meeting be given to G. B. Mainwaring, Esq. for his acquiescence in the wishes of the freeholders: Resolved, that the friends of G. B. Main-

"waring, Esq. be earnestly requested immediately to commence an active canvass in the several districts of this county, as the shortness of the interval, previous to the day of election, renders it impossible for Mr. Mainwaring to pay his respects to every freeholder in person. Samuel Ryler, chairman."—On the 18th, Mr. Mainwaring published the following address:—"To the Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders of the County of Middlesex.—GENTLEMEN, in compliance with the wishes of a large and respectable body of freeholders, I offer my services to represent you in the present parliament. Outraged as the county has been, I could not want motives to induce me to obey the call with which I have been honoured, even if my father had not suffered as he has by the partiality of the sheriffs at the last election. I am bound to acknowledge, with gratitude, the noble and generous resolution which has been adopted by the freeholders, to indemnify me from any expense in this contest. Feeling, as I do, that your cause is that of every elector, and, indeed, of every loyal man, I am proud of being selected to stand forward on such an occasion, and I beg leave to assure you, in case of my success, that my utmost endeavours shall be exerted to prove myself not unworthy of your choice. I have the honour to be, gentlemen, yours, &c., G. Boulton Mainwaring."—On the 19th, Sir F. Burdett published the following address, "To the Independent Freeholders of the County of Middlesex.—GENTLEMEN, the great and disinterested encouragement which I have already experienced in my canvass at once demands my grateful acknowledgments, and inspires me with confidence of success. To insure this, however, your exertions must be unremitting; and the generous support which you have hitherto given me, should be manifested by an early appearance in my favour. Among the successful events of the late scrutiny, I esteem it the chief that a great number of persons were disqualified, who, without any just claim to vote, had long been encroaching upon your rights. These were the prebendaries of Westminster, with a long train of servants and pensioners, all the officers and placemen of the courts of Chancery, King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. By one decision of the committee above 400 voters of this description were disqualified. The removal of these men (the dependants of the minister, and uniformly subservient to his mandates) gives you a decisive majority

"in the county. Let me request you will but exert yourselves as becomes you to maintain it, and you will defeat an interested opposition, which is raised only by contractors, placemen, and others still more unworthy to exercise the franchise of electors. Of those who are contented that the minister should squander public money without controul or inquiry, that English prisons should be made dens of oppression and torture; that the lives of their fellow subjects should be wickedly aimed at under colour of justice; of such men I cannot be a fit representative. Let them carry their votes and their subscriptions to my opponent. He may tread in the steps of his father, and will not blush to receive their support. My better reliance is on the virtue and integrity of those who behold with detestation the progress and consequences of corruption, and who consider each vote that is given (whether by the elector or the member) not as the instrument of private advantage, but as the discharge of a sacred trust. I am, gentlemen, your devoted, humble servant, Francis Burdett."

#### FRIDAY DAY.

Monday, the 23d, being the day appointed for the election, Sir Francis Burdett, with a numerous body of friends, sat out from his house in Piccadilly at seven in the morning, preceded by seven outriders, carrying large banners of blue silk, on which were written, in letters of gold, "Burdett and Independence." The servants and the whole of the party wore purple cockades, with a marigold flower or orange coloured silk in the middle. Sir Francis Burdett and Peter Moore, Esq. went together. A cavalcade of coaches filled with electors, followed shortly after, preceded by a band of music in a caravan drawn by six horses, adorned with banners and purple and orange ribbands, while the band played "See the Conquering Hero comes," until Sir Francis arrived at the house of his solicitor, opposite the poll booth. About ten o'clock Mr. Mainwaring arrived in a chariot and six, with two postillions in scarlet livery, trimmed with silver. Two outriders preceded the cavalcade, and ten carriages followed, occupied by Sir W. Curtis, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Malish, Mr. M. Gore, Mr. W. Mainwaring, Mr. John Bowles, and others, the friends of the candidate. Every avenue from town in the direction towards Brentford was thronged, and long before the commencement of the business of the election, the space in front of the hustings was crowded. Sir Francis was upon the hustings

some time before Mr. Mainwaring; on the appearance of the latter, marks of the strongest disapprobation issued from the spectators. At half past ten the sheriffs, Mr. Alderman Shaw and Sir William Leighton, proceeded to the business of the day. The reading of the writs and the usual preliminary formalities being gone through,

Mr. *Peter Moore*, member for the City of Coventry, came forward and addressed the freeholders in the following words.—Gentlemen; it has frequently fallen to my lot to address numerous meetings of the freeholders of Middlesex, but on no previous occasion did I feel myself so forcibly called upon by a sense of public duty, to come forward and urge you to protect all that is sacred and dear to you as Englishmen. It is not merely the question this day what candidate you shall chuse, but whether you shall be represented at all; whether your elective franchise shall be preserved to you, and Middlesex be still the free and independent county which it has heretofore been; or whether it shall be surrendered up into the hands of a knot of jobbers and contractors, who have entered into a nefarious confederacy to *bargain* away your rights. I use the strong term *bargain*, because you all of you have seen, even in the advertisements of the gentlemen who are now embedded on the hustings, that they have made a gross and unprecedented bargain, in order to seize upon your rights. They have advertised for a candidate, and have made a positive bargain with him for your representation. The history of corruption never exhibited a plot so nefarious, or a stratagem so undisguised. If they should succeed, what name would you give to a representative so chosen? Yours he would not be. He must be the tool, creature, and instrument of the jobbers and contractors who fitted him out for the speculation. He must be considered as an agent, appointed to carry on the traffic of their loans and jobs; to assist them in perpetuating the calamities by which they thrive; to second the minister in every attack upon your properties, and to deprive you of all means of watching, checking and controlling the expenditure of the public money. With such a representative Middlesex must be degraded into the condition of a rotten borough. It must be lost to the people and surrendered for ever into the hands of the minister of the day; or what is worse, into the hands of those money jobbers who do the dirty work of every ministry.—But I own I hope better things from the feelings, the pride, the spirit, and the patriotism of the crowded assembly that

I address. I cannot believe for a moment that you will forget what is due to the memory of your ancestors—to the claims of your children. I cannot believe that you will hesitate for an instant in your choice between the two candidates who appear before you, and one of whom I shall have the honour to put in nomination before I have done. At the last election I was scarcely acquainted with Sir Francis Bardett. The support I gave him then arose entirely from an approbation of his public conduct; but since that time I have had the means of learning his private character, and I take upon myself to say, that a man more exemplary in all the relations and duties of life never existed in any country at any time. He is pure from every stain. He was a good son. He is a most affectionate husband and father, a most valuable friend, a most exemplary member of society—and all these virtues of private life he carries into his public conduct. With the warmest patriotism, and the most constitutional zeal for the rights of Englishmen, he possesses the most dutiful affection and loyalty to our beloved King. I speak from the bottom of my heart, and if the sheriffs will administer the oath, I will swear to the truth of what I say. I do not know in this world a purer or more unblemished character, or a man of more public and private worth than Sir Francis Bardett. If he has a single fault, it is, that in the generosity of a sanguine mind, he expects to find more virtue than belongs to these depraved times; and through that virtue to obtain all the happiness for his fellow subjects that the principles of our free govt. are calculated in themselves to confer. But in the ardour of this expectation, I do not know of a single act of his life that detracts from his reputation, or ought to lower him in the esteem of any good or candid man. I speak within the hearing of some of those persons who have been the most virulent in their invectives and most licentious in their misrepresentations of his conduct. I know that, jaundiced as they are by party violence, they feel in their conscience the truth of every syllable I have uttered. I have served with Sir F. Bardett in parliament, and I have observed his conduct there. He never gave a vote but for the constitution, for peace, for morals, and for the happiness of the human race. If I were called upon to select a person whose conduct was a model for the representative of a free people, I should point out my friend, Sir Francis, as the man. On every question upon which the great interests of the empire depended, he voted with

those persons whom you all love and reverence, and you see him this day surrounded and supported by them.—I need not tell you, gentlemen, that we had in parliament repeated struggles to procure an administration on broad inclusive principles which should have combined and embodied all the vigour of the realm, to give us at least a chance for the restoration of peace, and for the security of the empire. I say this also in the presence of his revilers. They know that he uniformly voted for that comprehensive administration, and in so doing, shewed himself to be a true, loyal and considerate subject of his Majesty. — Gentlemen, it would be improper in me to detain you by any further remarks on the claims of my friend to the honour of your election. I cannot doubt of the preference that you will give him, and I therefore conclude by putting in nomination Sir Francis Burdett, Bart. to be your representative in parliament on the present vacancy.

Mr. *Knight* said, that he was happy to express his cordial assent in the opinions delivered by his worthy friend who opened the business, and to second the nomination proposed. Of his hon. friend, who was the subject of that nomination, he entertained a sentiment which he believed, was general among all who had an opportunity of appreciating his character, and such as he was firmly persuaded was universally felt in the County of Middlesex.—Upon the subsheriff's desiring to know whether any other candidate was to be proposed,

Sir *William Curtis* stepped forward, and began by stating, that there was no man who more cordially agreed than he did in the panegyric which had been pronounced upon the private character of Sir F. Burdett, and admiring that character as he did, he regretted that his public duty obliged him to stand forward upon this occasion. No man, he contended, whatever the hon. bart. might say, could esteem the constitution of this country more than he (Sir William) did — Here there was such a degree of hissing that the worthy alderman found it necessary to retire; on which

Mr. Sheriff *Shaw* stood forward and addressed the meeting. He said, they were summoned this day to exercise a very valuable and important privilege, which was enjoyed in no other country of the world; it was nothing less than the right of electing an individual to hold a place in the great council of the nation, and on the discreet exercise of this immunity essentially depended public liberty and happiness. He

hoped that gentlemen would give to the friends of each candidate a fair opportunity to express their sentiments; after which, it would be for the electors to determine who was most deserving of their choice.

Sir *William Curtis* again appeared. He would now, he said, say a few words in favour of the candidate he had the pleasure to propose. He was the son of that man who had been long a representative of the county of Middlesex, and given satisfaction in that situation to the independent freeholders. The opponent of the candidate whom he had the honour to propose, had declared, by the mouth of the hon. gent. who spoke in his favour, that he wished to be judged by his conduct. The freeholders of Middlesex would recollect what that conduct had been at the meeting at Hackney, where Sir F. Burdett had been openly charged with uttering sentiments subversive of the best interests of this country. It would also be recollected that his defence, if it might be called a defence, satisfied scarcely a single freeholder among the very respectable number that was then present. The consequence of this was, that the address which at that critical time the county thought proper to present to his Majesty, the freeholders had deemed Sir F. Burdett as unworthy of the honour of attending the sheriff's to deliver, and had almost unanimously determined that Mr. Byng alone should present the address to his Majesty. What action of Sir F. Burdett's had made any amends for his conduct on that occasion? None. It followed then that he was an improper person to represent the county of Middlesex; and, therefore, he hoped that the freeholders would choose in his stead a man whose situation in the county, and whose political principles, rendered him worthy of representing in parliament the free and independent electors of Middlesex. He concluded by proposing Mr. George Boulton Mainwaring, as candidate for the county.

Colonel *Wood* seconded this proposal. He considered this as a contest for a man whose father had long been a worthy representative of the county, and with whose disposition and loyal principles the freeholders had good grounds to be satisfied. The county of Middlesex, he contended, had for the last two sessions of parliament been most shamefully misrepresented. A person had sat in the House of Commons as a representative of the county whom a committee of that house had afterwards declared to be in a minority of votes. He had, however, succeeded in depriving him who had the majority of votes

of his seat; and how did he deprive him of it? Why, by proving that a little ale and beef had been given to the electors, who had often come from a considerable distance to poll. He meant not to blame any party or person concerned in this affair, but certain it was that this was the first time he heard that the proper exercise of old English hospitality was a ground for disqualifying a man for a seat in the House of Commons. He hoped that the freeholders, on this occasion, would surmount all difficulties, and endure every inconvenience, in order to put an end to this contest, and to deliver the county from those disturbances to which it had been subject since the hon. bart. had become a candidate. The hon. bart. had reported that his friend was connected with Governor Aris. No such connexion had ever been proved, nor was there the smallest grounds for any such suppositions. It was merely brought forward by the hon. bart. to serve the purpose of the moment; but he trusted that the freeholders of Middlesex would shew that proper and loyal principles would have a greater effect upon them than any artifice that could be contrived to mislead them.

Sir *Francis Burdett* then came forward; but the acclamations of the crowd were so loud, and constantly repeated, that for some time he could not be heard. At length he spoke as follows: Gentlemen, I shall not commence this election as the hon. gent. who spoke last has done, by disclaiming my former friends and connexions. I do not disclaim the friends who upon the late election honoured me with their support. I have no reason to do so; for it is with satisfaction I find that not one of those who supported me in a former instance, manifest the slightest disposition to desert me upon the present occasion. How different is the feeling of my adversaries! and I must say, gentlemen, that it is a little ungrateful in them to disavow the friends in this election who gave them such active support upon the former, and are willing to afford it upon this also; for I can state from my own knowledge that Mr. Aris has not remitted his endeavours to promote the interest of his patron. I have crossed him in my canvassing, and found that he was eager to serve the son of his friend, Mr. Justice Mainwaring. I do not blame Aris, though I tax his friends with ingratitude; for nothing can be so natural as that the gaoler Aris should be anxious to oblige the son of his protector; but yet it appears to me a misapplication of the time of a man who is employed to retain robbers, to engage himself in endeavouring to retain

voters to rob you of your independence. The worthy alderman, as I must, through courtesy, call him, and his supporter, have talked a good deal about beef and ale; these are very good in their own way, but I trust, my countrymen, you have too much good sense to barter your birth-right for a mess of pottage. Gentlemen, I shall not long trespass on your attention, because I am anxious that you should come to the poll, in order to put an end to this contest, which I regard disgraceful both to you and me, considering the character of the opposition we have to encounter. Gentlemen, as to the motives which induce me to stand forward on this occasion, I shall only say, that after the liberal support I had the honour to receive at the last contest, under the most disadvantageous circumstance to me; after a minute scrutiny, in the course of which no degree of partiality was manifested, at least to me; after so many voters were left unscrutinized, it appears that the majority of my adversary was but nominal, and that, at best, his situation was but equivocal two thousand unexceptionable voters being admitted on my side, which is a much greater number than ever before gained an election for this county. Under these circumstances, gentlemen, I feel that I should be ungrateful for your kindness, and should desert my own duty, if I were to abandon the object of this contest; and I also feel, that I should insult your understanding, and degrade myself, if I should condescend to notice the calumny and misrepresentation which have been propagated respecting my conduct, particularly when I consider the quarter from whence they came. We all know, gentlemen, the gross charges which have been urged against you by the opposite party respecting the late election, not a title of which was proved. The only illegal thing, indeed, proved with regard to either party at that election was, that which produced the disqualification of Mr. Mainwaring himself. You are all aware, gentlemen, that it is an illegal thing to buy voters; and I do not know that it is less illegal to buy a candidate; of this I am certain, that your independence is equally s ruck at in both cases. I am aware that a high legal opinion has been promulgated on this point, no less than that of the Attorney General; but we all know, gentlemen, that the opinion of that learned gentleman is far from being infallible! [This remark having an evident allusion to the opinion of the Attorney General upon the volunteer question, produced a general burst of laughter.] Gentlemen, I shall not detain you any longer from the great

business of the day, because the delay of the poll must, from all appearances, be peculiarly disadvantageous to us, and I shall reserve any thing further I have to offer till the close of the poll. (Peals of applauses.)

Mr. *George Boulton Mainwaring* then advanced, but the hissing was so loud that we cannot pretend to do his observations strict justice. His speech was in substance as follows: Gentlemen, I congratulate you, at the present moment, that another opportunity has been afforded of asserting the independence of the county of Middlesex, because you have thereby a complete occasion for declaring your real and unbiassed sentiments, of which you had been nearly deprived by the issue of the late election. You have now an opportunity of declaring, whether you are to sanction, by your vote, that monstrous misapplication of the right of representing you in parliament, which has taken place for these two last years. You have an opportunity of shewing, whether you are to sanction, by your vote, the means by which my opponent has been enabled to obtain his seat in parliament; and whether you approve of a man for your representative, who has fulfilled none of the pledges which he gave you. At the last election he amused you with promises that he would make the prison gates fly open. Has he made any attempts to this effect? Has he instituted an examination into the state of the prisons, and the situation of the prisoners? No; not one act of his has tended to fulfil these promises. Now, when the contest is renewed, he will perhaps come forward with the same promises, and vilify my father as he used to do. My father's mild and inoffensive disposition was scarcely capable of bearing up against this monstrous conspiracy which was set up against him, and these persecutions he therefore in some measure suffered in silence.—(Here the crowd grew very clamorous). I value not the clamours of a mob. It is not to them I look for support. This contest is not to be decided by clamor, but by solid votes. If the county is not wanting to itself, I shall not desert it; whatever may be said of me; and although my father bore his "faculties too meekly," I can assure the hon. bart. that he shall not vilify me with impunity. I shall stand foot to foot with the hon. bart., and contest every inch of ground with him. I assure the county that I, at least, shall not shrink from any duty that it may be incumbent on me to perform: I only intreat the county not to sanction the hopes of a man who has formed a conspiracy against loyalty, and who is the companion and eulogist of traitors.

(The hisses here became so loud, that Mr. A. thought proper to retire).—The two candidates were then proposed by the sheriffs, when the shew of hands was declared to be in favour of Sir F. Burdett, on which a poll was demanded on behalf of Mr. Mainwaring, by Sir W. Curtis and Mr. John Bowles, which was immediately acceded to. The qualification of Mr. Mainwaring was then required. Upon which that gentleman, as we understand, swore that he possessed 6000l. a year in lands and houses. The situation of the property was stated to be in the parishes of Edmonton and Enfield. The poll accordingly commenced and continued till five o'clock, when the sheriffs came forward and declared the numbers to be, for Sir F. Burdett 611; for G. B. Mainwaring, Esq. 526. Majority for Sir F. Burdett 85.

Sir *Francis Burdett* then came forward, and spoke to the following purport:—Gentlemen, I shall detain you but for a few moments, to express the satisfaction I feel that my conduct has, after a considerable experience, been found deserving of such marked approbation as your poll of this day evinces. It is among the happiest reflexions of my life that, at the time I first offered myself candidate for this county, I experienced the highest degree of affection and regard, which could only result from your attachment to the principle which originally recommended me to your notice. To that principle I still adhere, and the same line of public conduct I am determined to pursue. While that continues unchanged, I cannot, from the evidence you have afforded me of your disposition, entertain any doubt of that countenance and active support which I have met with upon every occasion hitherto. Of the motive which induces me to stand forward as a candidate in this instance, you cannot be unaware. You must feel that it cannot proceed from any motive merely personal—that a seat in parliament cannot be the object of my ambition; for, under the present circumstances of the house of commons, I could for much less exertion than it has cost me in the prosecution of this contest obtain ten seats in that assembly for my family for ever. This, gentlemen, cannot be considered a mere contest between two candidates; but, whether a combination of interested distillers, publicans and brewers, of magistrates and contractors, shall have the nomination of a representative for this county. This is the evil I wish to remove; and when I consider that the persons I allude to, and others of the same description, are so much under the influence of the minister, or so completely in

the paws of the magistrates, that they dare not exercise their own will, it is with a view to raise the country, or this county at least, to independence, that I encounter so much trouble; and I shall think this trouble more than repaid if I succeed in my object. Although I have thus alluded to the persons who oppose me, I would not be understood to entertain towards them the least enmity; for, on the contrary, I feel for them, considering their situation, the utmost sorrow and compassion.—Gentlemen, I shall delay you no longer, for your time may be much more valuably employed to secure the complete and speedy success of our views in this glorious struggle, by an immediate and active canvass. I am sorry to understand, that so many of my friends who have been early in their attendance to-day, have been disappointed in their endeavours to make their way to the hustings to be polled, but I trust that they will not suffer a case of that nature to damp their zeal. They must be assured, that any inconvenience they may endure does not proceed from me. It is my wish, as it must be my interest, not less than theirs, to facilitate their access to the hustings; but, however, any disappointment they have met with, will not, I hope, tend to relax their efforts in the common cause, and that they will not impute any blame to me. They must be sensible that every effort is necessary to insure our speedy success, and that nothing now remains to be done, but to attend at the hustings to-morrow in such numbers, as shall serve to extinguish every hope which our opponent may have entertained of reducing the county of Middlesex to the condition of a ministerial borough. I have nothing more to say than to return you again my sincerest thanks for the support I have this day received, and to express my full hopes that this contest will end as you could wish, in the securing for ever your interests and the independence of the county.”—Sir Francis’s speech was throughout highly applauded by the majority, both in and about the hustings.

Mr Mainwaring then stood forward, and, with some difficulty, obtained a partial hearing. He felt, he said, from the event of this day’s poll, a confident hope of a favourable result before it should finally close. He expected that to-morrow would deprive his opponent of his boasted majority, for he knew the great exertions which had been made by his opponent and all his party to make out a majority on the first day’s poll. He knew, he said, the crowd which were before the hustings made such a

violent clamour, that it was impossible for Mr. Mainwaring to make himself heard. Perceiving that he could not be heard on account of the uproar, he retired from the hustings.—The poll was then adjourned till 10 o’clock on the following day.

In consequence of a report which generally prevailed, that Mr. Byng had openly declared, “that his warmest wishes were to have a colleague animated by the same Whig principles as himself, and of the two candidates Sir F. Burdett was such a man,” the following advertisement appeared in the public papers of the day.—“*To the freeholders of the county of Middlesex.* Gentlemen, finding that several persons have been canvassing for Sir F. Burdett in the name of Mr. Byng, and that it has been publicly reported that Mr. Byng supports Sir F. Burdett’s interest, I take the liberty of informing you that Mr. Byng, no later than Tuesday last, declared his firm intention to remain neuter, and not take any part, or endeavour to influence a single freeholder, at the ensuing election. I have the honour, &c. T. Mellish, Lincoln’s Inn.”—In contradiction of this assertion the following article appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 25th.—“The active and zealous support which all the friends of Mr. Byng give to the election of Sir F. Burdett, has induced the committee of Mr. Mainwaring to disgrace themselves by a frivolous advertisement, in which they include a letter of Mr. T. Mellish, the special pleader, and misrepresent its contents to serve their purpose. Mr. Byng is not in the way to refute their insinuation, but we can say for him, that no man could be more explicit, clear, and candid in his declaration than he was on the subject of the election. He went on Thursday last to the committee of Sir F. Burdett, of which his own confidential friend Mr. Gregory is the chairman, and there in the presence of Mr. Burdett and other gentlemen he said, that ‘he wished it to be understood unequivocally, that, though from delicacy as representative of the county, he did not think it would be proper for him personally to interfere, yet it was his wish to have a colleague that was animated by the same sentiments as himself, and of the two candidates, Sir F. Burdett was the man.’”—To the truth of Mr. Mellish’s assertion John Stockdale a bookseller in Piccadilly, thought proper to make the following affidavit. “*Middlesex to wit;* John Stockdale, of Piccadilly, bookseller, maketh oath

"and saith, that a few days previous to the present election, G. Byng, Esq., came in to his shop, and openly and publicly declared, that he did not mean in any way directly or indirectly, to interfere in the contest between G. B. Mainwaring, Esq. and Sir F. Burdett. And the said John further saith, that it did appear that the said G. Byng came into his shop, knowing it to be frequented by persons of the first consequence, for the purpose of making the said declaration. And the said John further saith, that Col. Byng, towards the end of last week, called again at his shop, and fully confirmed the declaration made by his brother, his intention in doing so, and his full determination to adhere scrupulously to the resolution he had then avowed.—John Stockdale."

SECOND DAY, July 24.—At the close of the poll at 4 o'clock, the sheriffs declared the numbers to be, for Sir F. Burdett 972; for Mr. M. 927. Majority for Sir F. B. 45. After the numbers were declared,

Sir Francis Burdett came forward, and addressed the people as follows: "Gentlemen, it is not my wish to prolong your attendance here, because it is not your interest, or that of the cause for which we struggle, to withdraw you from that exertion that is necessary, and to which I know you are sincerely disposed, in order to bring this contest to a speedy and successful termination. Of this termination I entertain not the shadow of a doubt. Our adversary has contrived to make some advance upon the poll to day, but that advance is owing to causes for which it is easy to account, and which can have but a transitory influence. We still retain a majority of 45—a number which you must remember to be propitious to our cause; and though he, through whom the celebrity of that particular number originated, deserted your cause, you may rest assured that I never shall, but will use my utmost endeavour that 45 and liberty shall go down connected together to the latest posterity. Gentlemen, the contractors and the magistrates have been extremely active since I last had the honor of addressing you. Yesterday they issued their commands; to day they issued their threats; and to those may be attributed the success of my adversary on this day's poll—Gentlemen, the supporters of my opponent, are mercenaries under the influence of fear, and must come forward when summoned: my friends are volunteers, who, possessing the zeal of that gallant body, although not so well disciplined, or capable of the same subserviency as the troops of our enemy, leave me not the least room to

doubt that, when the occasion presses, that zeal will be sufficient to achieve a complete victory."—Mr. Mainwaring then attempted to address the electors, but after a variety of efforts, the tumult of the populace was so very great that he pointed several times to the numbers on the poll board, and then retired from the hustings.

THIRD DAY, July 25. At the close of the poll, the numbers were, for Sir F. B. 1237; for Mr. M. 1238. Majority for Mr. M. 1. Mr. Sheriff Shaw having reported the state of the poll,

Sir F. Burdett came forward and said:—"Gentlemen, I hope and trust the trifling advantage which the advocates of our adversary have gained to-day, will not tend in any degree to damp your spirits or cramp your exertions, particularly when you consider that they have it in their power to enforce the attendance of their voters, and that, generally, the ministerial candidate produces his largest muster at the outset of an election. Our support, it must be recollected, is quite voluntary, and it is natural to think that men will consult their own convenience in attending here. The trifling majority obtained by our adversary to-day will appear, from what I have mentioned, to be an extremely bad omen for his cause, and a very encouraging prospect for us. This opinion will be still more justifiable when you consider the extraordinary exertions that have been made—when you know that while my friends address a request to the freeholders, "We'll thank you, Sir, for your vote," the agents of my opponent emphatically tell them—"vote for us, or else—." If, gentlemen, you were to ask me what was necessary to insure a speedy triumph, I would say, be active and canvass. If you value your independence be active and canvass. If you are anxious to maintain the liberty of your country, and to resist the baneful influence of corruption, be active and canvass. If you wish to prevent your county from becoming a court borough, I would strongly advise you to be active and canvass. I have the best founded reasons to believe, that on Friday and Saturday the scale will turn so decidedly in our favour as to exclude all hope of success from our adversary; at all events, I trust that you will offer, by your conduct, satisfactory evidence that the spirit of independence is not inferior in activity to the spirit of corruption; that your zeal in a good cause will not be exceeded by the zeal of our enemies in a bad cause. I am fully certain that you have strength enough to bid defiance to any combination, however formidable in number, wealth and

power, or however fertile in artifice."—Mr. M. then came forward to address the multitude, but was, as usual, assailed by such a noise and clamour as rendered it impossible to hear a word he uttered.

FOURTH DAY, *July 26*—At the close of the poll, the numbers were for Sir F. B. 1424, for Mr. M. 1495. Maj. for Mr. M. 71. Upon the numbers being announced by the sheriff, Sir F. *Burdett* stepped forward, and spoke to the following effect: "Gentlemen, you will recollect that in the few words I offered yesterday, I expressed nothing like confidence in the result of this day's poll. My confidence, which is still the same, referred to the exertions of to-morrow and Saturday, to bring this contest for the freedom and constitution of the country to a happy termination. This confidence cannot be shaken by reflection upon the circumstances in which we are placed; when we recollect the superior amount of the majority against us at the same stage of the poll on our last contest; when we consider that we have, again, the same power to contend with, and that its influence is evidently reduced, there exists not the least ground for apprehension on this occasion. Of this I am certain, that nothing like dismay can ever enter into my mind while there yet remains any opportunity for exertion, or that reliance on the zeal which animates my supporters. But whatever may be the event of this contest, I feel that a consequence has resulted from it to the independent interest of the country, of such a nature as sufficiently to compensate me for the exertions I have made, and to reward you for the toils you have undergone. It is a great triumph that above 400 persons are disqualified to vote in future, who claimed that right from offices, the tenure of which rendered them subservient to any minister, and willing instruments in favour of any cause. These men are now deprived of that privilege, and therefore an additional energy and strength is given to the cause of independence, upon which they have heretofore lain as a dead weight. This great benefit to your independence, I repeat, is sufficient recompence to my mind for all the exertions I have made, or all that I may be hereafter called upon to make."—Mr. M. came forward, but was as usual received with such hissing and groaning that he could not be heard. Mr. Sheriff Shaw addressed the meeting, to request that Mr. M. should be heard stating that he was sure, if they would reflect, they would feel it their duty to attend to the one candidate with as much liberality

as they did to the other. The hissing and noise did not, however, diminish. Sir F. B. proceeded from the hustings, accompanied by a vast number of his friends, to the Crown and Anchor Tavern to dinner, where, at half past six, about 300 persons had assembled; Lord W. Russell in the chair. After the cloth was removed, the noble chairman gave, "The independent electors of Middlesex; and may they, in the choice of their representatives, ever consult their own dignity, and their country's freedom."—This toast was drank with extraordinary applause. After a short interval, Mr. Francis rose, and proposed, "the health of Sir F. Burdett, the warm friend of humanity, the indignant resister of oppression, and the steady assertor of his country's rights; and may he be crowned with the wreath of victory in the present contest." This was drank with 3 times 3, and every demonstration of enthusiasm. After the applauses had subsided, Sir F. Burdett rose, and said, "If I had been at all actuated by any feeling of personal vanity, I must have felt myself amply gratified by the demonstrations of affection which I have on this, and on every occasion since the election commenced, received. If the object I had in view were the advancement of my own personal ambition, I should have experienced an equal degree of satisfaction. But, gentlemen, let me remind you that it is not for my own interests; it is for your rights and privileges that I now contend. What I wish to establish is not my own consequence, but the independence of the county, whose franchises are attempted to be invaded. If I am able to establish your independence, I shall consider myself amply repaid; and even if I were not to be successful, I should feel satisfied that I had fully discharged my own conscience, by giving all the support that it was in my power to collect to the drooping spirit of liberty in this country. You are aware, that I have a good deal to sustain from the misrepresentations of our opponents. Hitherto I have scorned to answer these misrepresentations and calumnies, because they have appeared to me altogether contemptible; the best answer to them appears this day from the support I have received on the election, and the number of respectable gentlemen who have now come forward to declare that my opponent is not a fit person to represent the independent county of Middlesex. The struggle I have made has been for you, not for myself. Views of ambition and power were out of my contemplation. I did not wish for ia-

fluence, but for the means of controlling power. My sentiments and opinions have uniformly been directed against the system which it has ever been my wish to destroy. I have always endeavoured to shew myself the enemy of despotism, and whether it is exemplified in the conduct of William Pitt or Napoleon Buonaparté, the principle of resistance is in both instances the same. With respect to the object of the present meeting, I think that some means ought to be adopted to form a canvass of a nature at once more extensive and more satisfactory. Our opponents act from the joint motives of influence and fear. We depend on mere spontaneous exertion. Unfortunately for mankind, interest and fear always prevail in the first instance over exertions arising from mere attachment. What we have to do, gentlemen, is to be constantly on the alert. Our enemies will always have their agents in full activity. Our motives to exertion arise out of feelings which are variable. The motives of our opponents are connected with ideas of permanent corruption, and therefore we are not to be surprised, that they have always inducements to make their appearance for my opponent. If my friends exert themselves with zeal and cordiality, I do trust that their exertions will be crowned with success. While I hope that the result of the contest will be favourable, I have no reference to personal interest. What I look forward to, is the establishment of the happiness of the people, and the confirmation of the free constitution of this country."—Sir Francis then gave the following sentiment: "A retrospect to the contents of Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights, and a careful attention to the fragments which remain."—The health of Mr. Fox being given,

Lord *W. Russell* spoke shortly as follows: "In the absence of my illustrious friend, I think it my duty to say, that no one feels more anxious than he does for the issue of the present contest, and that nothing but his unavoidable absence from town could have prevented his presence among us this evening.—You are acquainted, gentlemen, with the principles on which my hon. friend has offered himself to your support. There is, however, one point, which you will allow to be of the highest importance, and you will forgive me for introducing it to your attention on the present occasion. You understand, that Sir F. B. comes forward to ask your suffrages under the sanction of the name of my illustrious friend, Mr. Fox. You are not ignorant, that at the present crisis the necessity of a broad

comprehensive administration was admitted. Contemplating the present aspect of affairs, it was thought, that nothing short of such an administration was at all adequate to the salvation of the country, at a period of unexampled difficulty. You know also, gentlemen, that many persons, the most considerable in this country for their talents and public character, did act under a similar impression. They did, indeed, agree to bury former differences in oblivion, with the view of promoting a great national good, arising out of opposition to a system of court intrigue, which, for 40 years and upwards, has been undermining whatever is good and great in this country. Against this system Sir F. B. has manfully stood forward. He has entered his solemn protest against the unfair and unconstitutional exercise of court influence. He has united himself with the honourable body whose wish it was to unite in the administration whatever is great and venerable in the empire. I am aware, gentlemen, that Sir F. B. has been accused of entertaining sentiments inconsistent with the safety, honour, and dignity of the country. Permit me, to say, that such representations are equally groundless and malignant. What my hon. friend, has said, he will not be ashamed to own. To assert that he ever insinuated that the country was not to be defended at this crisis of danger and difficulty, is monstrous and absurd. The insinuation is repugnant to every feeling of his nature. It is easy for the hon. bart's enemies to circulate these idle aspersions; but I have too high an opinion of the character of the freeholders of Middlesex, to believe that they will produce the slightest impression."—Before Sir Francis left the room, he proposed the health of "The Prince of Wales," which the company drank with the most rapturous applauses. The rest of the evening was spent in arrangements for the conduct of the election.

FIFTH DAY. *July 27.*—At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Sir F. B. 1616, for Mr. M. 1688, maj. for Mr. M. 72.—Sir *F. Burdett*, "Gentlemen, I return you my most sincere thanks for the assistance you have afforded to attain our object. This assistance has been productive of a happy effect. Since yesterday we have become equal to our adversary in the poll which has since taken place, and I have no doubt that through your perseverance, we shall soon be placed in such a situation as to convince the foes of freedom, that it is folly in them to think of shaking the independence of this county by any exertion in their power. Of this you have reason to

be certain when you consider the nature of the influence to which you are opposed—that you have to struggle with corruption upon its own ground: and yet that the advantage obtained over you is insignificant. I have the happiness to tell you, that the result of my personal canvass, has been such as to assure me of final success. This success, I am quite sure, might be accelerated, if my friends were more prompt to come forward. You should always bear in mind that this is a contest, in point of perseverance, between an individual and a confederation of votes, and a confederation of purses. Notwithstanding this inequality, I feel that with the aid of your exertions all the difficulties that are opposed to us may be overcome, and that that right and independence, for which I know that you would readily lay down your lives, will be effectually secured. — With respect to the calumnies which have been circulated relative to my public and private life, with a view to depreciate my character, and to injure me in your opinion, I feel that I should disgrace myself and offend you, were I to enter into a formal defence against them. It best becomes both you and me to treat them with contempt, and the poison they are meant to convey must be destroyed by the support with which you have honoured me. This support I consider a sufficient answer to all the foul and false charges I have alluded to. I therefore dismiss them with saying, that they are as gross, open, and palpable as the father by whom they were begotten, and, “pass by me like the idle wind, which I regard not.” — Mr. Mainwaring came forward, and, notwithstanding the hisses and groans, we could bear him say, that he was ready to offer his tribute of gratitude to the sheriffs for their proper conduct, and also to bear testimony to the liberality of his opponent.

SIXTH DAY, *July 28.* — At the close of the poll this day, the numbers were, for Mr. M. 1840; for Sir F. B. 1718. Majority for Mr. M. 122. — Sir Francis then came forward, and observed, that he did not feel the slightest objection to the temporary triumph which his opponent had gained. He had no doubts on Monday the exertions of his friends would place him at the head of the poll (loud applause). He alluded to the unconstitutional influence which the magistrates had exercised over publicans, in threatening them with the loss of their licences, unless they polled for his adversary. He could assure them, that if any such persons were ultimately injured by giving him their suffrages, that he should consider himself

bound hereafter to bring the business before the proper tribunal. He said he should take his leave of his friends that day, by quoting a very homely saying; and that was, that, in a cause such as he was engaged in, he required only “a clear stage and no favour.” — Mr. M. now stepped forward, but the hisses were so loud and so uninterrupted, that it was impossible to collect his meaning.

SEVENTH DAY, *July 30* — At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Mr. M. 1986; for Sir F. B. 1922. Majority for Mr. M. 64. Sir F. *Burdett*, Gentlemen, the result of this day's poll sufficiently answers the hopes I expressed on a former day. You have only to continue the exertions you have this day evinced, to bring this struggle to an immediate and happy termination. Independently of the amount of the majority, of which you are aware, I have the satisfaction to inform you that between 30 and 40 freeholders have come down which were not polled; in consequence of some coming too late, and objections being started to the greater part. The result of this day's poll fully satisfies my mind, that the spirit of liberty once set in complete motion, is more than enough to overcome any resistance which corruption can contrive, however actively exerted, or systematically organized. You have only to continue your exertions to insure success, and certainly if ever there was a cause which demanded and deserved your attention, it is that which involves the liberty and independence of your country. I am happy that I am enabled to state to you, that the power of our enemy is very low indeed. He has to day brought up the clerks, psalm-singers and bell-ringers of Westminster. Thus, it appears, he is reduced to his dernier resort, to his army of reserve, and to this he is straightened, while our lines are as yet unbroken, and before our gallant volunteers are scarcely set in motion.” — Mr. M. placed himself as usual on the hustings, and as usual encountered the rude hissings and hootings of the mob, till finding himself prevented from speaking, he retired.

A numerous meeting of the friends of Sir F. B. dined together this afternoon at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, Lord Duncan in the chair. After dinner his lordship gave the health of “Sir F. B. the warm friend of humanity, the indignant resister of oppression, and the steady asserter of English liberty.” After which Sir F. rose and spoke to the following effect: — “When I last had the honour of addressing you, gentlemen, I addressed you in the language of hope: on the present occasion I am entitled,

by your exertions, to use the language of confidence. After the noble efforts you have made, and which have placed me in so advantageous a situation on this day's poll, it does not become me to recommend future activity, and therefore, without in the least degree doubting the continuance of your exertions, permit me to return you my most cordial acknowledgements for the zeal which you have displayed in the great and arduous struggle in which we are engaged. The example given this day by my noble friend in the chair is one which, I hope and trust, all the gentry in this country will be disposed to imitate. I am sure that the best support of their dignities will be found in upholding the rights and the privileges of the people; and I am confident that, by following the example given this night by my noble friend, they will have the best assurance of reigning in their hearts. I beg you to consider what has been the system pursued in this country for the last 40 years, to see what have been its effects, to reflect what a monstrous, unconstitutional, and profligate increase of the national expenditure has been the consequence of it.—At a crisis like the present I should wish to see a display of the spirit of lions; and while I say this I may add, that the best and most effectual defence of the country must be in the defence of its rights and liberties, and in the establishment of a proper controul over the conduct of a profligate and unprincipled minister. England is at present not only deprived of all influence on the Continent, but is actually called on to guard a foreign attack on her own shores. She has lost all that proud pre-eminence which ten years ago she enjoyed. Under these circumstances, who is the man to whom the direction of our national councils is directed? It is the same man who formerly deceived the people, and did more than any other individual to abridge their liberties; it is the same man who has now deceived the Crown itself, and every party with which he was engaged, by a succession of disgraceful tricks and wiles, and who by the practice of the same tricks and wiles, is determined to complete that ruin, the foundation of which he himself laid.—The noble chairman then gave the health of Mr. Fox, which was drank with the loudest acclamations. Several important arrangements were made for the same object, and before nine o'clock the meeting had completely dispersed.

**EIGHTH DAY, July 31.**—The state of the poll this day was, for Mr. M. 2094, for Sir F. B. 2030. Maj for Mr. M. 64.—Sir F. Burdett, "Gentlemen, you will see, with considerable satisfaction, that notwith-

standing all the advantages which our adversary possesses, we are equal to him on this day's poll, and that our majority of yesterday is left untouched. I have further to say, that between 40 and 50 of those avowedly disposed to support me, and who have tendered their votes this day, now remain for the decision of the sheriffs. You must all be sensible, that the question which demands your attention is this, whether you will assert and maintain the independence of your county, or whether you will resign it into the hands of contractors, loan jobbers, police magistrates, and court sycophants.—Gentlemen, I feel it necessary to make some observations upon the very singular advertisement which has this day been published by our opponent. With that modesty which is characteristic of youth, that gent. has charged me with bringing forward fictitious voters and ragamuffins, with resorting to every perjury, &c. to collect voters for the purpose of obtaining a colourable majority. Such an advertisement can have no other effect than to provoke you to a perseverance in the preservation of those majorities which have produced, and must inflame the spleen of our opponent.—Gentlemen, the string particularly and uniformly touched on by our adversary, is the guilt which he alleges to belong to our friends, while all is purity of motive and conduct on his side. According to this statement, his host of friends, his police officers, jobbers, and chief-takers, in the simplicity of their minds, are quite incapable of struggling with the nefarious practices pursued by my friends and me. It would appear that some persons take in a literal sense, and act upon it, the observation of a sarcastic writer, that

He who has but impudence

To all things else has just pretence.

But, gentlemen, whatever may be the pretences of our opponent, I trust that the proud spirit of independence will enable you to mount triumphant, and set an example which shall restore our constitution to its pristine force, vigour, and purity.—Gentlemen, I must observe, that this is likely to be the last contest for Middlesex, if we fail; and to those freeholders who now hang back, I have no hesitation in saying, that, if they persist in their inactivity their votes will become valueless; for no man will again be found to ask their support, or stand forward for their representation upon public and popular grounds.—Mr. M. came forward, but the voice of a Stentor, or the eloquence of a Demosthenes, would have vainly attempted to make any impression; every sentence he uttered was drowned by the hisses and groans of the populace.

**NINTH DAY. Aug. 1.**—At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Mr. M. 2203, for Sir F. B. 2123. Maj. for Mr. M. 80—Sir F. Burdett, "Gentlemen, I beg leave to state, that the majority obtained by our adversary on this day's poll is very inconsiderable, and that his majority on the whole is trifling indeed, compared to that with which we had to contend at a corresponding period of the last election. I trust, therefore, that the advantage our opponent now possesses, will only serve to stimulate you to increased exertion. In the prosecution of this contest, we have, on the one hand, nothing to calculate upon but voluntary zeal and public spirit, while on the other, hope, fear, and interest have their full effect. Is it matter of surprise then that such powerful motives should have a quick and extensive operation? Quick, however, and extensive as they are, I have no doubt of final triumph in this contest, although we have entirely to rely on the pleasure, the convenience, and sometimes the caprice of different men. Gentlemen, I repeat that I consider this a contest for liberty against the foulest corruption, and so regarding it, while there remains a foot of free ground to stand on, I will not relinquish it."

—Mr. M. was received as usual. Mr. Sheriff Shaw addressed the people, and appealed strongly to their candour, requesting that Mr. Mainwaring should be heard. In consequence of this address, Mr. M. was heard. He expressed his satisfaction "that the still maintained his majority, notwithstanding the pompous predictions and vaunting of his opponent, and in spite of the confederated artifices of whiggism and jacobinism." Here he was interrupted by shouts of disapprobation—but he proceeded to say, "that when he was addressing a British multitude, he thought at least he was appealing to men who were capable of compassion."

**TENTH DAY. Aug. 2.**—On the close of the poll the numbers stood thus; for Mr. M. 2309, for Sir F. B. 2222. Maj. for Mr. M. 87—Sir F. Burdett, "Gentlemen, in taking my leave of you this evening, I feel myself entitled to speak to you with more confidence than I did yesterday. Upon a comparison of the progress of the poll since the commencement, it will be found that we stand upon advantageous ground, the opposite party advancing beyond us by such slow and inconsiderable degrees, as betray the weakness of their force, and the ease with which the friends of freedom may, by one vigorous stride, outstrip their course and exceed their trifling majority. I trust and hope, however, gentlemen, that such

of you as have not yet voted will be prompt to come forward. I now exhort you more particularly not to delay any longer, for this reason. Many gentlemen have assured me that they would come up and favour me with their support "upon a pinch:" I have now to say to them, that the pinch is arrived. I do not say so from any regard to the insignificant majority which our adversary possesses; nor from any apprehension that our friends who still hang back are not more than sufficient in number to ensure our final triumph over ten-fold that majority; nor from any doubt of the zeal of the gentlemen who have promised me their assistance. My notion of the pinch proceeds from this, that from the special pleading, quibbling, and spirit of litigation manifested by the agents of my adversary, I have not a doubt, that if my friends will postpone their appearance here until the two last days of the poll, capricious objections, such as we have already witnessed, will be started to their votes. Our friends will then be taken round to the sheriff's box, and it is not improbable that the poll may finally close before any decision will take place upon them. Thus their votes may be lost, and their wishes to support our cause may be disappointed. There is another reason, gentlemen, which should impel you to come forward quickly. The dignity of your cause, and the pride of your own minds, should forbid you to allow your opponent to exceed you for one moment, and should urge you to preserve in that spirit you so nobly evinced at the commencement of this contest, and which I am quite sure you will evince at the conclusion. You cannot surely contemplate, without surprise and regret, that a candidate should have even so much success, who stands forward upon such principles—who is introduced to you by such a party, and supported by such means—who has for his object the destruction of the independence of your country—and whose political system is avowedly hostile to the liberties of the people.—Gentlemen, this is the first instance in which a candidate was ever offered upon similar grounds any where, for the representation of a county; and I cannot suffer myself to apprehend that the respectable county of Middlesex will be the first to sanction such an example. I shall conclude, with repeating to you that which I have so often unfortunately addressed to you in vain, namely, a request to bear in mind that old and excellent maxim of English jurisprudence, "hear both sides."—Mr. M. then came forward and met with

the usual reception. We could, however, collect the following: "Gentlemen, after the repeated instances of your illiberality which I have experienced, I have no wish to address myself to any except those who have so honourably come forward to support my cause. My gratitude, and every possible symptom of respect and thankfulness that I could shew, are due to them. It is not, then, on my own account that I wish to address you, but merely because it is becoming in a candidate who stands in my situation to address the freeholders."—Here the clamour grew so loud and incessant, that Mr. M., by the advice of his friend withdrew from the hustings.—During the course of this day's poll, Mr. Clifford (Sir F. B.'s counsel) tendered one of the Isleworth millers to vote for Sir F. B. After a long argument, in the course of which Mr. Courthorpe, (Mr. M.'s counsel) threatened the voter with an indictment for perjury, Mr. Knowlys, the Common Serjeant, who is the sheriff's assessor and counsel, stated that, in his opinion, the voter had both a legal and equitable freehold, and that, if he would take the oaths, he recommended to the sheriffs to admit him to poll; but the sheriffs said, that they should be accessaries in his perjury, and they rejected his vote. When this voter had been rejected, Mr. Clifford tendered another of these millers, who held 7 shares. After a long legal argument, the sheriffs, by the advice of their assessor, decided his vote to be good, and he polled for Sir F. B.

**ELEVENTH DAY, Aug. 3.**—At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Mr. M. 2407, for Sir F. B. 2277. Maj. for Mr. M. 130.—Sir. *F. Burdett*, "Gentlemen, I trust the disadvantage which we appear to have on this day's poll has not weakened your hope of ultimate success, as, I assure you, it has not diminished mine. The returns which I have got from the gentlemen who have undertaken my cause, and the assurances of support which I every morning receive in the course of my own personal canvass, convince me that I do not deceive you.—Gentlemen, the grossest calumnies, by means of advertisements in the public prints, and by hand-bills and placards, are daily thrown out against me and my friends by our opponent. Several voters who have come forward in my favour, have by public advertisements been charged with the crime of perjury, and the number of votes which I have already polled is represented as false and colourable merely. Gentlemen, 2277 of you, freeholders of the county of Middle-

sex, are represented as parties with me in these perjuries. To such charges, unsupported by fact or argument, I shall only reply by stating what has come to my knowledge within these few hours. Several persons of highly respectable character, who have had their names branded in this manner, and who are equally, if not more, free from such a charge than my opponent, did apply to me this morning, complaining of the way in which their names and characters had been traduced. Some of the respectable freeholders now alluded to did also send to the committee of Mr. Mainwaring, demanding redress for the calumny which had been cast upon them. The committee felt a little ashamed of their conduct, and, perhaps too, were afraid of the consequences which might result from it. They accordingly offered to make an apology. The injury, however, was such as would not admit of apology. When a man's name is stuck up as a perjured person, no apology but one as public as the accusation can be received; and, I trust and hope, that this calumny will draw down on the authors of it a punishment proportionable to the enormity of the charge.—But they also say that I am a great calumniator, and that it is not through your patriotism and love of independence that I stand so high on the poll, but by resorting to means such as they employ. If they think that by calumny and lies all the great and illustrious characters of whose support I can boast, all the rank and independence of the country who have stepped forward in my favour, and all the hard working people whom they denominate *rabble*, can be called forth, they indeed explain their own conduct, and afford a complete solution as to their motives in issuing the calumnies which they have so busily propagated.—If I allude to the man who is universally acknowledged to be the greatest character in this country, whose abilities are so transcendent as to hold him out at this moment, not to this country only, but to the whole world, as an object of admiration; if I mention the name of Mr. Fox, in whom every thing that is noble, generous, and open, is combined with every thing that is remarkable for talent, knowledge and discernment, do I not sufficiently illustrate the truth of this observation?—Gentlemen, let my opponent and his friends go on as they chuse. I shall never calumniate any man. I shall, indeed, be ready at all times to become a public accuser, where I see just ground for accusation; nor shall any public grievance or infringement of your rights and liberties be suffered to exist, which I can detect and bring to pu-

nishment—I have little doubt, and personally still less anxiety, about the issue of this contest. I shall have done every thing my feeble abilities could do to secure your independence; and I shall moreover have tried the strength of the independence and spirit of the county against the increasing influence of hired justices, a calamity the greatest which the county has yet experienced.”—Mr. M. attempted to speak, but without success. He then turned towards those within-side the hustings, but the sheriff having noticed the impropriety of turning his back on the electors, he was led off by his friends.—In confirmation of Sir F. Burdett’s assertion in the above speech, “that several voters who had come forward in his favour, had been charged with the crime of perjury,” we select the following advertisement from several others of the same nature.—“Whereas a paper has been published, containing a false and scandalous libel upon me, by stating, that I (amongst other persons) voted at the present election, and, after the strictest inquiry, have not been found to reside as described on the poll, and requesting information of my real name and residence to be sent to No. 7, Carey-street, in order that a prosecution may be immediately instituted against me for perjury; and whereas a gent., stating himself to come by authority from Mr. Mainwaring’s committee, called on me yesterday (Aug. 3), at my house, and promised me an apology for the said libel in all the morning and evening papers, which promise has not been performed: I do hereby request that any person or persons who may know the author of the said paper, will give me immediate information thereof, that I may institute a prosecution against him for this gross and false attack upon a freeholder of the county of Middlesex, who has given his free and unbiased vote for Sir F. Burdett, in right of a freehold situate at Hendon. T. Hunter, No. 17, Mary-le-bone-street, Golden-square.”

**TWELFTH DAY.** *Aug. 5.*—At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Mr. M. 2479, for Sir F. B. 2349. Maj. for Mr. M. 128. Sir F. Burdett addressed the meeting to the following purport:—“Gentlemen, you will perceive from the poll of this day, that the exertions which you have made since last I had the honour of addressing you, already begin to be felt; that the tide has turned and set in in our favour. Gentlemen, I should not think it necessary to take up so much of your time, day after day, if

it were not for the calumnies which are daily invented and propagated by our adversary and his agents. Whether you regard the inclosures which are sent in circular letters, the advertisements that are published by our opponent himself, in which he charges your efforts to maintain your independence, as the foulest conspiracy, the fables which appear in the hired public prints of the day, or the placards which are so widely diffused in the capital, you will find nothing but the same cuckoo-note of “treason and perjury.” If those persons will deal in falsehood and calumny, they should at least show some ingenuity, and not constantly persist in repeating the same absurd tale, and in almost precisely the same terms. By the uniformity of their strain and method, and by the injudicious distribution of their slander, they absolutely lose their own purpose. These men seem to have adopted the maxim that “sufficient for the day is the lie thereof,” but they should remember that the same lie will not suffice for every day in the week; they should, therefore, endeavour to vary a little their calumnies, and thus give them somewhat the appearance of novelty, and not allow them to grow stale in the hands of their customers.—Gentlemen, among the other slanderous libels propagated against my character, and which I pass by in scorn, I find in the “Morning Herald” of this day, the following “Card,” which purports to be addressed to the editor by the Marchioness of Salisbury:—“The Marchioness of Salisbury desires the Editor of the M. Herald will immediately contradict a paragraph, which she supposes he has inadvertently inserted in his paper, stating, that she had sent a number of voters to support Sir F. Burdett, as she would, on the contrary, certainly use every possible exertion against so professed an enemy of this happy constitution.”—Gentlemen, I would ask, whether a more gross and infamous libel can be imagined by the mind of man, and whether it is possible that a woman, a gentlewoman, should thus obtrude herself upon public notice—should so far forget what is becoming her rank and sex as to bring her name in question, by giving her support and testimony to an assertion, of the justice of which, at best, she could know nothing.—No, gentlemen, the thing is not to be believed: I must reckon it among the tricks and artifices to which my opponent has thought proper to resort. But, gentlemen, like his other artifices, it is clumsy and easy of detection, for who that knows any thing of the political history of this country, could suppose for a moment that the

Marquis of Salisbury would be found among the advocates of our cause. No one could fancy that our object would be supported by the Marq. of Salisbury, who has had more places, and, if report lie not, sold more places, than any man in England. We know that his main employment is what they usually call at Court a White Stick.—Now, gentlemen, with reference to the phrase used in this libel of “happy constitution,” I beg to say a few words. It is no wonder that the Marq. of Salisbury and I should differ as to the meaning of that phrase—there are many who consider it in different points of view. Some mistake the abuses of the constitution for the constitution itself, and undoubtedly I am, and ever shall be, an inveterate and active opponent of those abuses. People have different modes of estimating different things; some adopt the maxim—

“What’s the value of any thing

“But so much money as ’twill bring.”

In that sense certainly it is to the Marquis of Salisbury, and such persons *invaluable*—to us, gentlemen, it is very *dear*. My views of the subject are extremely different, as the rights, privileges and interests of the people are, in my opinion, the most essential part of the constitution.”—Mr. M. then came forward and said, “Gentlemen, it is needless, for many reasons, to attempt to address you here at length, nor is there any great necessity for it. Though prevented by your illiberality from addressing you with freedom, the harm is not great, while the numbers on the poll” (pointing to the numbers) “speak for me with an eloquence more powerful than any that I could employ”—Here the noise grew so intolerable, that Mr. M. was under the necessity of retiring.

THIRTEENTH DAY, Aug. 6.—At the close of the poll the numbers were, for Mr. M. 2586; for Sir F. B. 2499. Majority for Mr. M. 87.

Sir F. Burdett, “Gentlemen, I cannot but feel highly gratified by the flattering manner in which you are pleased to express your satisfaction at the state of this day’s poll. I feel an additional gratification because the hope which I have uniformly held out to you is thus in a great measure fulfilled. This hope, I was always assured, had the best foundation. It is now evident to every man, that it was never thrown out to delude you. I have also to add, that were it not for the system of objection in which the agents of our adversary seems determined to persevere, we should have had a still farther increase to our majority of between forty

and fifty votes, which now remain undecided by the sheriffs. It has been just mentioned to me, that there are no less than fifty-seven votes which have been tendered for me and objected to in the course of this day’s poll; upon none of which the sheriffs have yet pronounced any determination. Gentlemen, it has been industriously spread abroad, that I am a person hostile to England, to Englishmen, and to the English constitution, in fact, to every thing to which my whole life has been a perpetual struggle. A paper has just been put into my hands, which has been enclosed, I understand, in circular letters, to the freeholders of this county, and in which it is stated, that “whoever votes or “canvasses for me, must be considered as “abetting calumny, perjury, treason, murder, and invasion.” These, gent., are slight insinuations thrown out against my character, which our adversaries, no doubt, consider as fair election squibs. To be serious, however, it happens, fortunately, that such is the grossness, malignity, ignorance, and vulgarity of all their libels, that they recoil upon themselves, and are capable of inflicting a wound upon those only from whom they issue. These men have perpetually in their mouths, expressions of respect for rational freedom, and the liberty of the press. As to the sincerity of their attachment to the former, it is unnecessary for me to say any thing to you, and the publications I have referred to, sufficiently betray the rational, decent use which such persons are disposed to make of the liberty of the press. These decent, inoffensive men, would use the press merely as the means of publishing their innocent, inoffensive, compositions against you and me. Really, gent., I do not know what such persons mean in their cant about the freedom of the press, unless it be that freedom which their hireling prints daily take with your character and mine.—With regard to my opponent, gent., I know nothing of him. I do not consider myself as opposed to him personally. You are all perfectly aware that our struggle is against a system, not an individual—against a system supported by servile justices, and unprincipled contractors, who have made my opponent their tool for the purpose of destroying the independence of this county. To this system and object I am decidedly adverse. Can it therefore be said that I am an enemy to the English constitution?—No.—I am an enemy to its abuses, which I ever have, and ever shall, actively and loudly reprobate. If I have opposed a corrupt ministry, who have abused the royal ear, and royal prerogative, and have trampled on the

rights and privileges of the people, shall it be said that I am an enemy to Englishmen? My principles stand upon the genuine basis of the British constitution, which consists in a fair exercise of the prerogative of the crown, controuled and regulated by the rights and interests of the people. These principles I am perfectly convinced are as essential to the security of the King as to that of the humblest individual in the land. They as nearly concern the stability of the throne as the happiness and comforts of the people."—Mr M. came forward; some hissing was heard upon his appearance, and his friends thought proper to take him away.—The following is an extract from the address of Sir F. B. which appeared in the public papers of this day. "To all the atrocious falsehoods of my adversaries, I return an answer by your voices already given in my favour, about 2,200 votes, which could not be influenced by any undue motives of hope or fear. Are there as many of this honourable character on the list of Mr. M.? I do not require his patrons to increase the number of their perjuries by swearing to the affirmative. I appeal to the names upon their poll, I appeal to the notorious mode of their canvassing, and the consciences of those unhappy men who have been reduced to the hard choice either of voting as they were commanded, or losing their bread for disobedience. My charges against those wicked hirelings of a minister are explicit. I accuse them of supporting a system of gross corruption, and of employing for that end tyrannical influence in elections; it is a part of that servility to which they are enuring the people of England; and they know the arrogant and unprincipled employer by whom they will be heard with triumph while they boast of their success.—But notwithstanding all nefarious practices to obtain a majority, my opponents, still feel themselves insecure. They are well aware that unless they can induce Mr. Byng's friends to stand neuter, they must ultimately lose the election. An insidious advertise ment is therefore circulated for the purposes of misleading them, by certain declaration which Mr. B. is said to have made. I hope that no friend of Mr. B. will be deceived by the artifice, nor believe that he can be an indifferent spectator of the present contest. It is not, it cannot be true, that he has made any declaration to that effect. Only give your friend M. B. credit for so much common sense as to understand his own interest; and so much honesty as to maintain his own prin-

ciple; then judge for yourselves what his wishes must be, and act accordingly."

FOURTEENTH DAY. Aug. 7.—At the close of the poll, for Mr. M. 2722—for Sir F. B. 2636, majority for Mr. M. 86.

Sir F. Burdett, "Gentlemen, I shall detain you this day but for a few moments. You must observe that the whole system of our adversary consists in calumniating our voters without the hustings, and obstructing them within. By the double operation of this system they hope to accomplish their object, and disappoint your wishes. They propagate the foulest calumnies against our voters abroad, in order to give rise to the other system of obstruction here. They first contrive to raise a suspicion, and then make use of that suspicion to excuse the objections which they think proper to start here, and which in almost every instance have proved to be frivolous.—About 40 of those freeholders who have been good enough to tender for me to day, and who have been objected to, returned without any decision upon their votes by the sheriffs. If that decision had been made, I am justified from experience in believing that, instead of a majority of one, I should have had a majority of 40 to day. An advertisement has been this morning published by our opponent. He charges you and me with every kind of offence and crime, and accuses me with using improper influence and tyrannical means to bring up voters. How far this charge is grounded, or to whom it would best apply, I leave it you to determine. It is stated, that I am a person who generally contrive means adequate to the end in view. I trust that this, coming from an adversary, will be regarded as a compliment, for if there is one thing more characteristic of wisdom than another, it is that what a man undertakes shall be practicable—that his means shall be equal to his end. The means by which we propose to accomplish our ends are fair, open, and universal. Our ends are liberty and the happiness of mankind—our means honesty and courage. Our ends, then, are unquestionably fair, and though past the conception of our adversary, our means are simple. There is also in this advertisement, a repetition of the old charge of perjury. He states that he would disdain to be guilty of perjury. I trust, gentlemen, there is no one who hears me, can feel it necessary for me to make such a public declaration. With respect to that charge, however, I will say, that I do not pretend to a conscience more delicate than other upright men, but every man has a peculiar feeling, and there is one thing to which I should object. I should certainly not take

an oath that I had such an estate in Edmon-ton and Enfield, as my opponent swears that he has. I will only add, that if I were permitted to qualify voters, as my oppo-nents have been enabled to qualify a candi-date, I should not have much trouble in car-rying this contest. Gentlemen, I have fur-ther to say, that impressed as I am with the importance of the object for which we struggle, it is my determination not to give it up till the last moment that the law allows me to pursue it. In doing this, whatever may be the issue, I hope that I shall be judged to have done my duty to those free-holders who have disinterestedly and nobly stood forward in my favour. Having done that, I shall feel myself amply repaid for all the exertion and trouble I have under-gone, and I trust that in the course of this arduous contest, I have never commit-ted one act which should deprive me of the esteem and confidence of my friends.—I beg leave, gentlemen, to add one word more. I am said to be an enemy to the British con-stitution. This constitution I consider an unsullied gem, not to be touched by pollu-ted hands; but it may be stolen by corrupt ministers; and, as in the case of the Jews of old, a counterfeit held up in its place for the people to worship. I trust, however, the result of your exertions to-morrow, will be to set aside this counterfeit, to recover the valuable gem we have so long lost, to re-store the constitution to its primitive purity and lustre.”—When Mr. M. came forward, he met that kind of hissing which, was but a signal from his own friends to retire.—In confirmation of the assertion of Sir Fran-cis “that the system of his opponents was to obstruct the freeholders who tendered themselves to vote for him, Mr. Clifford ad-dressed the following letter.”

“*To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.*

“SIR,—As a proof of the conspiracy  
“of Mr. M’s friends to obstruct the poll,  
“by objecting indiscriminately to all the  
“freeholders who tender themselves to  
“vote for Sir F. Burdett late in the day, I  
“beg leave to state, that about 2 o’clock  
“this day, Mr. Filer, a Barrister who acts  
“for Mr. M. on the Hustings, informed  
“Mr. T. Mellish, in the Sheriff’s box, that  
“a great many voters were coming up for  
“Sir F. B., to which Mr. Mellish answer-  
“ed, in my hearing, ‘object to them all,  
“‘for God Almighty’s sake!’ I immediate-  
“ly stated this to the sheriff, but without  
“effect. They were all objected to, and at  
“the close of the poll, 45 votes objected to  
“this day, remain undecided, of which only  
“5 had tendered to vote for Mr. M.—  
“Your’s, &c. H. CLIFFORD.”

FIFTEENTH DAY. Aug. 8.—We <sup>comes</sup> now to state the circumstances of the close of the poll. Considerable variance appear-ed in the numbers as they stood in the 3 sets of books.—The first notice given to the surrounding multitude was by a board stuck up on the hustings, with the word “Burdett, majority 10.” It was found, however, that this number was erroneous; but, whatever the numbers might be, the sheriffs declared that they must preserve their faith with the freeholders, and they would not declare the numbers till the tendered votes should be examined and decided on. A number of those deferred voters were present and de-manded the examination.—Mr. Courthorpe, counsel for Mr. Mainwaring, objected to this course, and contended that nothing should be done after the hour of 3 o’clock. The sheriffs, by the advice of their assessor, Mr. Knowlys, determined to examine the right of all the persons who were then pre-sent, and who should answer to their names whose votes had been actually tendered, and put on the books. Accordingly the names were called aloud on the hustings. The multitudes were immense, and amidst the acclamations of so many thousands, it was hardly possible to hear the names as they were called. About 30 only, out a much larger number actually in waiting, answer-ed to their names, and subscribed a paper pre-sented to them by the sheriffs, and were then sent out, but desired to wait, that they might come up each in his turn when summoned. Of these 30 but 19 were deci-ded on, the rest not being able to get up again through the confusion at the entrance. The decision was as follows.—I was rejected; 3 whose names had been put down were allowed to tender so as to entitle them to petition, but whose votes they could not reckon. Of these, 2 tendered for Sir F. B. and 1 for Mr. M. 11 were declared good tenders for Sir F. B. and of these 10 having taken the oath were put by the sher-iffs on the poll. 1 after being declared a good vote, went away by mistake without taking the oath, and therefore he was not put on the poll. 4 were allowed to poll for Mr. M. and were put on the poll, making in all 19. In consequence of these deci-sions the poll on this evening stood as fol-lows: At 3 o’clock the numbers on the sher-iffs poll stood, for Sir F. B. 2823; added, on examination by the sheriffs 10—making 2833. For Mr. M. 2828; added by the sheriffs 4—making 2832. Maj. for Sir F. B. 1. Such was the state of the poll at 7 o’clock on the evening, when the further proceeding was adjourned till 9 o’clock on Thursday morning. At the adjournment

Sir F. *Burdett* came forward and addressed the people as follows: "Gentlemen, in addressing to you the very few words necessary for me to say on taking my leave of you this day, I believe it will be right first to observe, that the issue of this contest, though I think it is not now doubtful, is however not yet ascertained. Though I am much gratified by the satisfaction you so universally express at the probable result of this contest, I beg leave, at the same time to observe, with all proper respect and humility, that there is nothing in the hour of triumph that can better become Englishmen than moderation, discretion and temper.—Gentlemen, while you trust your constitutional rights to your constitutional magistrates, and while you depend for a fair result of your exertions on the impartiality and candour of the present sheriffs, you cannot, I trust, repose those rights where they will become more secure, or to persons better adapted to use their power and influence for your benefit and advantage.—Gentlemen, I beg to inform you all, that the court will be adjourned till 9 o'clock in the morning, and I have therefore one word to address to the freeholders, who had not the good fortune to enrol themselves in the list of those men who hereafter will be looked up to by the county as its saviour. I trust I need not require one exertion more on the part of those freeholders. For the sake of their own characters, which must supersede every consideration, they will come to this poll booth to-morrow, at 9 o'clock, finally to establish their votes, and contradict, in the plainest and most simple manner, the calumnies employed against them.—Gentlemen, I should not think it necessary, were it not for the daily aspersions and insinuations propagated through the country against my character; aspersions which I know have added strength to the force employed against me, and damped the exertions of my best friends.—Gentlemen, had it not been for that most powerful and useful ally of my opponents, this poll, which, owing to some of the best feelings of Englishmen, has been at times so much against me, would, long ere this, have concluded; but it is an alliance which has been obtained by falsehood and misrepresentation, and I am confident that without it the contest never could have been carried on as it has been. I was going to state, that in my political conduct I have ever been a steady supporter of what is called the Whig interest of this country. Without being a party man, without having any private views, I have on all occasions, to the utmost of my abilities, given that interest

my unbiassed and active support. I have done this because I believe the Whig principles are those which must save the country. I am of opinion that the creed professed by those who support that interest, is a creed calculated for freemen; but if I should find that the Whig interest deserted its principles, or if the Tory interest abandoned their errors, and set about repairing the constitution of the country, you would find me as ardent in the ranks of their forces as I have hitherto been in those of the Whigs.—Gentlemen, various have been the epithets affixed to my name—among others some have thought I was a wild-headed enthusiast; that appellation does not shock me, for I know that in these times to labour for the benefit of mankind is looked upon as the highest degree of enthusiasm. The name of "*Quixotte*" has been applied to me in a ludicrous sense; but neither this, or the more formidable epithet of "*Jacobin*," will deter me from pursuing my endeavours to restore the rights and liberties of the country. Some persons, I know, have thought that I have spoken disrespectfully of the House of Commons. To those persons I answer, that towards the constitutional part of the House of Commons, no man has a greater esteem than myself. I esteem, I venerate, I revere it, and I am willing to confess that I regard a seat in that house as the real representative of 3,000 freemen, the highest honour that can be conferred upon me. I prefer being the guardian of the rights of free Englishmen more than any seat among nobles, or even a seat on the throne. For the unconstitutional part of that assembly, I publicly avow my indignation and contempt." After this address, Sir Francis withdrew, and continued for some time, that he might be permitted to return to London without the cavalcade. But nothing could exhaust the patience of the multitude. They positively insisted on it, and he was drawn the whole of the way from Brentford to the Crown and Anchor, amidst a cavalcade, that appeared like a moving wood; the carriages and horsemen being covered with green boughs. The two bands of music played all the way, "See the conquering Hero comes," "*Britons Strike Home*," and "*Rule Britannia*." Behind Sir F. B.'s carriage, was displayed a flag, painted with the figure of *Hercules* treading on the *Hydra*. A numerous body of horsemen, and carriages filled with persons of distinction, hackney coaches, chaises, &c. made a line of considerable length, and so slow was their progress, owing to their numbers, that Sir Francis did not arrive at

his house until 11 o'clock—With all this exultation there was the most perfect order. Not the smallest disposition to outrage was manifested in any quarter. Most of the houses were illuminated in Brentford, Hammersmith, Kensington, and along Piccadilly.

Mr. Plumer and Mr. Clifford, the counsel for Sir F. B., were of opinion that all votes tendered on the poll, for the one or the other candidate, must be decided before the numbers could be declared: but desirous of learning the opinion of Mr. Erskine, Mr. Clifford wrote the following letter from the hustings to that learned gent.—“ My dear Erskine, by 25 of the King, c. 84, s. 1, it is enacted, ‘ That the returning officer or officers at every election shall immediately, *or on the day next after the final close of the poll, truly, fairly, and publicly declare the name or names of the person or persons who have the majority of votes, and shall forthwith make a return of such person, &c. unless a scrutiny be demanded.*’—I wish your opinion *decidedly* on this point:—As many votes objected to will be undecided at the final close of the poll, is or is not the sheriff bound in duty to decide on their cases if they tender before three o'clock, before he can declare ‘ *truly and fairly*’ who has the majority of votes, provided it can be done before 12 o'clock to-morrow night? Your’s, &c. H. Clifford.”—To this letter Mr. E. returned the following answer:—“ Dear Clifford, it appears to me, that if persons have tendered themselves to be admitted to vote *for any of the candidates* during the legal continuance of the poll, and the sheriff has not rejected them, but has put them aside for consideration, he ought to decide upon their rights, by admitting or rejecting them before he makes his return, as far as the time prescribed by the act of parliament will reasonably admit. But, as I give this opinion upon the sudden, I would neither be bound by it myself nor think it prudent in you to act upon it, unless our friend Plumer and you yourself concur in it.—I write this, of course, to you *privately*, because, as a member of the House of Commons, I am not at liberty to give any public or professional opinion upon a matter which may come before me in judgment. Your’s, &c. T. Erskine.”—“ *To the Editor of the M. Chronicle.* Sir, in this opinion of my learned friend, Mr. Plumer and I perfectly coincided, and forthwith acted upon it. Your’s, &c. H. Clifford.”

August 9.—At the opening of the pro-

ceedings this morning, a requisition in writing was made to the sheriff, signed by Mr. Mainwaring, Sir W. Gibbons, Mr. Rae, Mr. Mellish, and Mr. John Bowles, demanding that they should declare the numbers as they stood on the poll at 3 o'clock on the preceding day, and make their return accordingly. Mr. Pigott, as counsel for Mr. M., contended that they had no discretion, and that nothing could be added to the poll after the hour of 3 on the 15th day of the poll.—Mr. Plumer protested against the revival of a question already decided. It had been agitated the day before at great length. The counsel for Mr. M. had been heard, and the sheriffs had not merely decided, but had acted on their decision. They had added a number of votes to the poll, and they now made an essential part of it. The question was at rest.—Mr. Taddy and Mr. Pigott insisted that the question was not the same. A number of freeholders now demanded their rights; and if the sheriffs had been led into an error, it was fit they should rehear the question, and correct their error.—Mr. Plumer replied that the question was the same, though it was brought forward in another form. It was the same question, whether it was brought forward by the candidate for himself, or for the electors. The paper might be received as a protest, but the question raised by it had been decided yesterday. It was not a point on which the other side were taken by surprise; it had been mentioned in the early part of yesterday, that they might be aware of it. The assessor then thought, that the voters were entitled to an investigation. The counsel for Mr. M. had the whole day to consider of it. What had been done by the sheriffs had been wisely and properly done. It was no alteration of the poll. The votes were tendered in due time, and were entered *nunc pro tunc*.—Were we now to scratch out the names? In a case which was decided yesterday, we brought a man whose right had been misunderstood in this box; but the assessor said his vote had been decided, and the decision, though wrong, could not be revoked.—Mr. Knowllys said, it would be a satisfaction to the sheriffs to hear the question argued, as it was not *quite* the same as that decided yesterday.—Mr. Taddy said, that the words of the act 25 G. 3. c. 24 which require that the poll should finally close at 3 o'clock on the 15th day, must mean the stoppage of any further inquiry as to the votes. The tacit agreement that inspectors might take objections to the voters, might be considered as an argument that the votes were doubtful, and therefore they ought not to

be considered after the poll closed. There had been no proceedings on the previous day of polling, after the poll was closed, and he argued that this was owing to the want of jurisdiction in the court, after the poll closed. —Mr. Clifford denied this fact, and stated that several persons had been sworn, and their poll taken in the box, after the poll book had been closed on the previous day. —Mr. Knowlys also said, that the not proceeding on the objected cases after 4 o'clock, was not for want of jurisdiction. —Mr. Pigot said, if the sheriffs found themselves engaged in an irregular and illegal manner, there was no inconsistency in their doing right. All that had been done after the final close of the poll, at 3 o'clock, was irregular and illegal. —Mr. Plumer considered this as a question arising, solely, upon the interpretation of the law, and not at all connected with the question, as to the competency of the legislature to enact a law, or the obligation of the sheriff to obey it. That no freeholder could tender his vote after 3 o'clock, he was ready to admit, but if the tender should be made before that hour, and it was the act of the sheriff to postpone the decision upon it, he contended, that no management of such sheriff, still less any neglect to execute his own promise, could be allowed to deprive a freeholder of his franchise. —Here the arguments closed and the parties withdrew. After the sheriff's and assessor had deliberated for about 15 minutes, the counsel and agents on both sides were called into the box, and Mr. Knowlys, the assessor, stated that the Sheriff would immediately proceed to declare the numbers upon the poll. Mr. Clifford proposed an investigation of the tendered votes which had been objected to. Mr. Knowlys said, that the sheriff's had determined not to proceed in that investigation. The sheriff's then came upon the hustings, and the under sheriff declared the numbers as follows, at the close of the poll at three o'clock yesterday for Mr. M. 2828, for Sir F. B. 2823. Maj. for Mr. M. 5. The under sheriff then announced, in the usual form, that Mr. G. B. Mainwaring, was duly elected. This declaration was received with loud and long continued hissing. Mr. M. made his bow and retired.

When the crier was announcing the breaking up of the court, Mr. Clifford interrupted him by stating that the poll was improperly cast up, and ought to be revised, but the sheriff's directed the crier to proceed.

When the business at the hustings was declared to be finally at an end, Mr. M. was conveyed under the protection of the

police to the house of a friend. Sir Francis, with a few of his most particular friends, walked up to the house of Mr. Saunders, near the poll-booth. The people became exceedingly clamorous at the statement which they had seen and heard published from the hustings. Mr. P. Moore came out before the house, and entreated the people to conduct themselves in an orderly manner, and rest in a confident reliance on the exertions of the patriotic candidate to obtain redress for any violation of their rights. The hon. gent. then retired to the private manner in which Mr. M. retreated from the hustings, observing, that they seemed to carry him away as a set of thieves convey a piece of stolen goods, or something which they were conscious did not properly belong to them. The people became quite vociferous for the charring; but Mr. Moore said that it was contrary to the wishes of Sir Francis himself, for whom they had expressed so much partiality; and he had authorised him to beg it as a favour that they would not insist upon such a thing, but that they would for the present be satisfied with giving him only such testimony of their approbation as they had always been so ready to bestow upon him. If Sir F. should hereafter be declared the legal representative of the county, which he had no doubt but he must be, the charring would then be infinitely more glorious, as their victory would be quite complete. The people saw the justice of the last remark, and declared themselves content. Sir Francis and his friends then went into their carriages. The people at first wished to take the horses from his carriage and draw him into town, but at his earnest solicitation, they gave over the idea. He was preceded by six men on horseback, carrying banners of Imperial purple, with the words "Burdett and Independence" in gold letters. His own chariot had a flag with the inscription "Middlesex no Court Borough." A great number of Freeholders accompanied him on horseback, and he was greeted all the way to town with uninterrupted plaudits and acclamations.

On the day after the election Mr. Mainwaring published the following address "To the Freeholders of the County of Middlesex." "It is not in my power to express, in a manner at all adequate to my feelings, my gratitude for the generous support which you have afforded me in the great and arduous contest which is now so happily terminated, for the honour you have conferred upon me, by electing me one of your representatives in parliament. But

"gent., my obligation is much greater than it appears to be on the face of the poll, instead of being returned with a majority of only 5, I consider myself elected by the general voice of the county. I felt it my duty repeatedly, during the election, to charge my opponent with resorting to means of the most unjustifiable kind, in order again to obtain a colourable majority, and to deprive the real electors of their constitutional rights. This charge was not like the calumnies by which my father was so grossly vilified, invented to serve the purposes of an election, but a just accusation, founded by indisputable and notorious facts. Repugnant as it is to my feelings to appear triumphant over a vanquished adversary, I cannot refrain from congratulating you, on the victory which you have enabled me to obtain over a faction as desperate as it is enterprising; a faction which hesitates at nothing to obtain its ends, and which is no less inimical to the people whom it flatters than to the throne which it seeks to subvert. I am proud in being the instrument in your hands of rescuing this county from the grasp of such a faction. Permit me to assure you, that it is the first wish of my heart, and shall be the grand object of my life, to merit your favour, by an unremitting attention to the duties of the honourable station in which you have placed me, and by the utmost zeal and exertions in that great and important cause, in which, under your auspices, I am so propitiously embarked. I am, &c. G. B. MAINWARING."

#### BATH VOLUNTEERS.

The following statement, which has been published by the Fifth Company of the *Loyal* Bath Volunteers, exhibits another instance of the effects of that famous system, on which the minister has made the safety of the country depend. The language made use of both by the officer, as he is called, and the private man, is well worth notice; and, having read the whole paper, let the sober and reflecting reader ask himself, what will be the conduct of such corps, if ordered upon actual service? And also, what effects will their example produce on the soldiers of the regular army?

"Incontrovertible facts in defence of the Fifth Company of Bath *Loyal* Volunteers."—To a liberal public the following statement will, we trust, have the effect of exculpating us from the charge of having acted with intemperance, or of having, without sufficient reason, deserted

the great cause in which we had embarked.

—On Monday July the 30th, the regiment was assembled in the Villa-Field, and, in the course of their manœuvres, Mr. James Higgs (private in the above company) was alluded to, by Mr. George Norman (subaltern in the fourth company) in the following words, addressed to the sergeant-Major, "That fellow is drunk, damn him, turn him out, he can't march three steps right." Mr. Higgs felt the indignity that was offered him, answered, "You are an impudent puppy, Sir, you think, because you have a long sword, a long coat, and a cock'd-hat, that you may insult persons equally respectable as yourself, but I'll not be insulted by any of you." This was the extent of Mr. Higgs's ill conduct. On the following Monday, Mr. Norman appealed to the Colonel, and demanded an apology from Mr. Higgs, he peremptorily refused, till some acknowledgment was previously made by Mr. Norman, who was undoubtedly the first aggressor. This altercation continued throughout the evening's parade, at the end of which, Mr. Higgs received a message from the Colonel, that he must apologize that evening, or his discharge from the regiment would be sent the next morning: the threat was put into execution, as will be seen by the following copy of the discharge, which was received.—"*Loyal Bath Volunteer* Infantry, commanded by Col. J. Strode. These are to certify that the bearer hereof, James Higgs, private in Captain Brander's company of the above regiment—has served in the above regiment and company for the space of ten months—and he is hereby discharged by order of Colonel Strode. Given under my hand this seventeenth day of July, 1804. John Strode, Col."—We deem superfluous any comment on the elegance of diction, or correctness of its orthography; but cannot resist expressing our surprise, that Colonel Strode should sign a paper, which, from its illiterate style, it is impossible he could have read.—On hearing the measures that had been adopted, each individual of the company resolved to send his resignation, fearing that he must either tacitly receive a similar insult, or meet with the like disgraceful punishment. As a means of preventing this unpleasant circumstance, a meeting of the privates of the company was called, and the following resolutions agreed to:—Resolutions: First, That in consequence of the dismissal of Mr. James Higgs from the regiment; (without assigning any cause, as the enclosed literal copy of the discharge pecu-

liarily species) we, the undersigned members are determined not to attend the muster in future, until our much-respected comrade be honourably re-instated in the ranks.—Second. That we sincerely lament the unpleasant necessity which has imperiously dictated the present meeting; and that notwithstanding our loyalty may be retarded through the unprecedented conduct of a subaltern, we still earnestly wish to render ourselves useful to the country, by uniting ourselves to the regiment, as soon as the present disagreement is adjusted.—Third. That it is decidedly the opinion of this meeting, strongly supported upon the most respectable military authority, that the interference of any inferior officer with a company to which he is not attached, is not only unsoldier-like, but (in the present instance) ungentleman-like.—Fourth. That a deputation from this meeting be appointed to wait upon Captain Brander, with a copy of these resolutions; and that he be earnestly requested to lay the decisions of the company before the Colonel; and further, to declare a wish, that the latter would be pleased to re-investigate the subject under consideration: doubting not, he may then feel the honour of the regiment at stake, and revoke a measure pregnant with the most mischievous consequences to the unanimity of the corps.—Fifth. That the company feel happy on the present occasion, to express their warm attachment, their sincere gratitude, and respect to their worthy captain for his independent spirit as a man, and his military conduct as an officer. [Here follows the names of the company.]—In compliance with the above request, Captain Brander waited on Colonel Stode, who gave him an absolute promise that the case should be investigated by the committee of the regiment. At the next meeting of the committee the matter was accordingly brought forward, but Captain Hargis (the Chairman) refused hearing a syllable on the subject, giving his word that the Colonel intended to call a select committee for that purpose.—No committee has been called, and we are given to understand, that the investigation will not take place, as the officers have sent a letter of thanks to the Colonel for his firm and impartial conduct.—Can a breach of promise be called firmness of character, or hearing but one side of the question, impartial conduct!!!—Under these circumstances, we have no alternative but to resign;—no opportunity of defending our conduct, but by this address. Colonel Stode has asserted his right of dismissing Mr. Higgo, from the circumstance

of his appearing intoxicated on parade—this we positively contradict. Immediately after the parade, Mr. Higgo appealed to Lieut. Col. Dumbleton, if he then appeared to be in liquor?—the Colonel answered, No. Could his situation, half-an-hour before, have been such as to warrant his discharge from the regiment? Respecting the reports of other instances of our comrade's misbehaviour, we can only say they are altogether unfounded. We have testimony to vouch for the authenticity of the above statement,—testimony of men who too much regard their own character, either to countenance, or take shelter under a falsehood. And you, our fellow-soldiers, belonging to other companies, let us exhort you, not to interfere in this unhappy dispute.—Let it rest entirely with us. Your officers, seeing the effect of impetuosity, will hereafter treat you with that lenity and respect, which should ever be shewn to men who sacrifice their time to the public weal. That you may continue an united body, undisturbed by insolence or arrogance, is our sincerest wish; you will then be the pride and boast of your city—the able defenders of your country's honour. With these sentiments deeply impressed upon our hearts, we bid you farewell.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MIDDLESEX ELECTION.—It was my intention to have submitted, in the present sheet, some observations upon this important subject; but, it was necessary first to give a narrative of the occurrences to be observed on, and the length of this narrative together with an article on the Bath Volunteers, of which it would have been improper to postpone the insertion, have so narrowed my limits, as to oblige me to defer my purpose to the next sheet, in which I shall endeavour to place the merits and the conduct of the candidates and their friends respectively in a fair and impartial light. In the mean-time the narrative and documents should be read with attention. The materials have, of course, been collected from the public prints, but I trust it will be found, that the compilation is, as, indeed, it ought to be, such as neither party can with reason complain of.

PRICE OF BREAD.—The price of the quartern loaf having already risen to a *shilling*, I must take the liberty, though it should expose me to the charge of vanity, of again referring to the warning which was given to the minister in p. 82 of the present volume, no longer than five weeks ago, when he was told, that, if the corn-bill was persevered in, and if we should have a wet

harvest, the quartern loaf would sell for a shilling before Christmas. That the bill here mentioned has had a considerable share in this sudden and alarming rise there can be no doubt; because, the moment it was passed, it became, and it continues to be, an inducement for the speculators in corn to with-hold it from the market, which they are enabled to do by the facility which the paper-money system affords them of obtaining discounts and of postponing the dates of the demands upon them for payment. That, finally, all their corn must come to market, and that they will be ruined, if they keep it back too long, is certain; but, the knowledge of these facts will, in the mean-time, be no consolation to the suffering people, nor will it afford the government any security against the effects of those discounts, which scarcity never has failed, and never will fail, to excite. In my last article upon this subject, I expressed a wish to see the degree of this influence of paper-money upon the price of provisions, in times of scarcity, ascertained; and I spoke of the works of Mr. Foster and Mr. Howison. Speaking from memory I mistook Mr. Foster's work for that of Mr. Parnell, who has made a quotation from Mr. Malthus, and has added thereto some very useful remarks. I still find, that neither of these writers affords the information to be wished for as to the *degree* of this dangerous influence; but, Mr. Howison has laid down the principle in a manner so satisfactory to my mind, that I am induced to believe that those, who have not had an opportunity of perusing his excellent pamphlet, will thank me for the extract I am now about to make from it.—

"In articles of necessity, when limited in quantity, the distress may be carried to a still greater degree by means of paper credit, or paper money. The consumption of articles of luxury, or even of convenience, when the price is high, may be deferred until the price becomes suitable. But in articles of necessity that cannot be done. They must be had as long as within the power of the user, at whatever rate. Any means, which enable the possessor of such commodities in times of scarcity, to, with-hold the articles from market, enable him to raise the price just as high as he may choose, or as the last shilling of the user can reach. Discounting of bills, in the late scarcity, enabled corn-dealers to relieve the demands upon them for payment of prices, and to feed the markets just as their avarice dictated, and thereby must have added greatly to the distress in the dearth. By a speculation in rum, founded upon discounted

"bills, it was raised to three prices, which limited the consumption so much as to accumulate the quantity beyond the power of the speculators. The consequence was the ruin of the speculators, and an after distress to the grower of the article, arising from the glut. In this instance, discounted bills equally produced ruin to the adventurer, as in the diminished consumption it caused an injury to the planter, to trade, and to the revenue. By the command of fictitious money in paper, the same thing may be done, and is done, more or less, in every article. The Bank Directors, by with-holding, or pouring upon, the public paper money, may raise or lower prices as they please, so long as the public have no check upon them, by demanding the conversion of their paper into value. No person, who buys during an increased circulation, can sell, during a diminished circulation, without loss, if not ruin. By the restraining law, nothing seems to be left with the public in self-defence against such consequences, short of the absolute rejection of paper money in the first instance; for violent measures always give rise to severe, if not to violent, remedies. Gold, the general standard of money in society, is not subject to such abuse, and cannot be made the means of such irresistible distress to individuals. It is as much beyond the restraint of power, as it is proof against the devices of private fraud and of public deception. Fortunately for mankind, however, there are times and situations, in which the prices of necessary commodities cannot be influenced by the operations in money. Among the burning sands in the deserts of Arabia, where there is little or no water, the last sixpence might be extorted for a drink of water; but, on the banks of the Nile, it is impossible to bring in ordinary circumstances any price upon it, the quantity there being so much greater than the occasion for it; and still water is of equal utility to the animal economy in both places. Corn is now become in such plenty, from the late favourable seasons, the fictitious state of paper-money cannot influence it; notwithstanding the depreciation of money: that article has fallen back in price. Animals being longer in attaining maturity, butcher's meat cannot be so soon supplied, and, not being in such quantity, it is, like most other articles of luxury, kept up in price upon the scale of depreciated money."—Then follows his conclusion, as expressed in the words which have been chosen for the motto of the pre-

sent sheet, and which conclusion I take to be incontrovertible. The degree, however, remains to be ascertained. The task would, probably, be very difficult for persons possessing infinitely more information and talent than I can pretend to; but, that the degree is not inconsiderable may, I think, be fairly presumed for the rise which has now taken place, and which is an increase of nearly one half of the former price, in the short space of five weeks; an increase by no means to be attributed entirely to the prospect of a scanty harvest, but to the combined causes of real threatening scarcity, of the influence of a paper-money not convertible into specie, and of the act of parliament recently passed for granting a premium on the exportation of corn. For the sole purpose of passing this law the late session of parliament, already protracted to nearly eight months, was protracted a week longer, and was actually passed in the face of an acknowledgment, on the part of the minister, that there was a prospect of a scanty crop, and that that prospect had already, previous to the passing of the law, produced a rise in the price of bread! Call you this wisdom? Call you this prudence? Call you this man a "safe politician?" But this is only another instance of the interference which Mr. Pitt feels with respect to any consequence to the public when compared with his own interest or ambition. Every debate is, with him, conducted upon *party* views. If he gave way upon the subject of the corn-bill, he lost some little of his consequence, and, perhaps, some few of his votes, rather than which the whole nation might perish. He was told, in opposition to the bill, that it had already caused a rise in the price of corn, and that this effect might become particularly injurious at the eve of a harvest which wore an unpromising aspect. Oh, ch! says he, this is a fine catch for me! Up he got, therefore, and insisted that the gentleman's argument made nothing against the bill, because, the prospect of the harvest being bad, the rise which had taken place in the price of corn ought to be attributed to that prospect, and not to the bill. This, with his manner of stating it, was quite a clever thing, and would not fail to bring a triumphant smile upon the faces of those profound statesmen and legislators by whom he is surrounded. But, as was before observed, he could not deny the enchanting effect of the bill, without acknowledging that the prospect of the harvest was bad, and to such a degree as already to have caused a rise in the price of corn; and, who is there that will attempt to justify him for having, with

the knowledge of this fact, persevered in passing the bill? This is the act for which he is censurable, and highly censurable. The nation will, perhaps, owe more calamity to this one instance of his love of triumph in debate, of his passion for domineering, than to whole years of foreign hostility.——The high prices will occasion an increase of the paper-money, from the same cause that a similar increase is produced by every additional tax: the commodity being raised in nominal value, there requires, of course, a greater quantity of circulating medium to move it from hand to hand. The increase of paper-money will cause a further diminution in its value, and this depreciation will produce a further rise in the price of provisions, or will, at least, prevent the price from falling back to its former state. And thus, very probably, will the corn-bill have contributed towards the producing of troubles and mischiefs of which it is impossible to see the end.——A correspondent, whose letter comes from a town in Hampshire, says I am mistaken as to the state of the prices of labour. His words are these: "You are certainly misinformed with respect to the prices of labour. They have been reduced according to the prices of corn, and as low as they were previous to the great scarcity. As provisions become dearer, they will rise again without any difficulty. They are always kept in proportion to the value of the bushel of corn; and the farmers, on the one hand, and the men themselves on the other, take care to lower or raise them continually." Now, with due submission to a person who speaks so positively, I venture to state, that if this be the case in the country, it is not so in the town; and, I believe, it will not be denied, that journeymen tradesmen, who can remove from master to master with the greatest facility, and who have besides (thanks to the countenance which Mr. Pitt and Parliament have given to benefit clubs) funds to maintain such as are thrown out of work by their demands of higher wages; I think it will not be denied, that these persons are more likely to keep their wages up to a level with the price of bread than the country labourers are, who, for the most part, cannot quit their parishes, and would, in almost every instance, find it very difficult to quit their masters. That the farmers may not have reduced the rate of their mens' labour I will not insist, but even that they could not do all at once; and, as to the mens' raising their wages according to the rise in the price of the bushel of corn, I would ask my correspondent whether he really means to say, that the country-labourer's wages

has, within these six weeks, received an increase of one half of its former amount? The bread has, during that space, risen from 3½d. to 1s. but, I am afraid that my correspondent will find, that no addition whatever has been made to the wages of the labourer. That they will receive an addition in time, there can be no doubt; but it will come very slowly, and will be yielded to nothing less than that sort of necessity which bears down all resistance: in short, the labourers and their children must be deprived of every thing but bread, and must want even a sufficient quantity of that, before their wages will take any considerable rise. The interval is a season of suffering, of consequent discontent, and, if care be not taken, of great danger to the state, especially when we consider the effect which has been produced by that most injudicious, that mad measure, the corn bill, and when we cast our eye over the multitudes, into whose hands the wisdom of the minister has put arms and ammunition.—With such a prospect before us, it behoves the minister to think betimes of means of prevention; and not to stay till the danger is at our doors, and then tell us “there is not time to deliberate;” not to bring us into a state which will afford an excuse for the application of one of his desperate remedies; a dose of his horse-physics; one of his potent state nostrums. It is now more than a year ago that he was explicitly warned of the danger of scarcity united with his volunteer system: not a month during the whole twelve has past without a repetition of the warning: the danger is now approaching, and, on his head be the consequences! Be his conduct what it may, however, we must not neglect our duty in this dangerous season. Every one should, according to his means, encourage the people to bear the calamity of the times with fortitude; to keep always in their view the important truth, that war does not tend to enhance the price of provisions; and, above all things, to check every attempt to excite a prejudice against the persons engaged in the growing, the preparing, or the vending of bread; for, let it never be forgotten, that amongst the charges of farmers, corn-dealers, millers, and bakers, will always be included the *risks* of trade. For this reason I cannot help regarding as very censurable, the following paragraph of a Portsmouth paper of the 18th instant: “We exceedingly lament in stating, that the price of “Bread will encrease here on Monday “next 4d. per gallon, which will make it “1s. red. Flour, which sold last week for “5s. per sack, *the farmers enhance this*

“week, to 6s.” Why the farmers? The farmers, like every body else, sell their goods for as much as they can; and are they, merely because they deal in wheat, to be pointed out as objects of public hatred? The harsh epithets bestowed upon speculators in corn or meal are equally unjust. To speculate in those articles is a trade, and though, in consequence of the paper-money system, it is a trade which, in certain cases, is extremely injurious to the community, yet the persons who follow the trade cannot be blamed for making as much by it as possible; the livelihood of themselves and their families depends upon their success in this trade, and therefore it is as unreasonable to blame their speculations as it would be to blame a blacksmith for shoeing people’s horses. As to the *system*, indeed, which, after having made every thing else an object of gambling, has, at last, set the staff of life upon the cast of the dye, it is certainly an object of abhorrence; but that abhorrence should not be extended to any individual or any class. The same may be said of Bank-Directors and all the inferior tribe of paper-money makers, who, though they are somewhat more closely connected with the minister of the day, do, nevertheless, only follow a trade which is sanctioned by law, and of the mischiefs which that trade produces, they experience, perhaps, rather more than their share. Finally, we should avoid, on this score, all harsh reproaches against even the minister himself, who never was aware of the destructive tendency of his system of finance, and who, for his own sake, would now apply a remedy were it in his power. Besides, all he has done has been sanctioned by the different parliaments to whom his projects have been submitted; and, if he has produced mischief without measure, his associates are not few.

**MILITARY PROJECT LAW.**—This law, which was intended to “establish and “maintain a permanent additional force “for the defence of the realm, and to “provide for augmenting his Majesty’s regular forces,” has, in the space of two months, produced, I am well informed, about 14 or 15 men. I say *fourteen or fifteen!* And I should be very glad to hope that I had misunderstood, and that I had taken units for hundreds or thousands. But, the fact is as I have stated it. The parishes may have raised more; but 14 or 15 are all that government have yet heard of. It was foretold that no *men* would be obtained by this project; that the parishes would pay the fines; that the measure would turn out to be a mere tax, and that this tax, being direct and partial, could not

fail to be extremely odious, and to have a powerful tendency to weary people and to put them out of humour and out of patience with the war. This was, however, the splendid measure; the grandest project of the grand projector. It was the measure, in the conception and execution of which was to be exhibited a complete contrast to the "indecision, the incongruity, the imbecillity, and the inefficiency," which he so loudly attributed to Mr. Addington and his colleagues. This measure and that of the corn-bill seem to be the only instances, in which he has even attempted to rise, in point of energy, superior to his predecessor; and, in both he has discovered equal imbecillity, though, unfortunately for the country, not equal inefficiency, for, his partizans may truly assert, that, if he cannot raise men he can raise bread.

**VOLUNTEERS.**—In referring the reader to an article in another part of this sheet, relating to the Loyal Bath Volunteers, I think it right to observe, that the object of inserting such articles is to convince my readers of the utter inefficiency of the Volunteer System, and, by the means of such conviction, to prevail on them to assist, every one according to his rank and power, in furthering the recruiting service of the regular army. The 400,000 volunteers do not one half of them ever attend any duty, or parade. The public prints lament that such and such a corps musters so thin. Several could be named that have fallen off in more than half their original numbers; and it would not be difficult to point out a regiment, which at first consisted of *sixteen hundred* men, which was highly honoured by royalty itself, and which does not now muster under arms much above *three hundred* men. Lord Castlereagh, who may, probably, be an eye witness of some of these back-slidings, will, the next time he is called on, be more modest in his statements; at least one would think so, but there is no speaking with confidence upon such a subject. His lordship's famous speech, which will be seen in the Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I. p. 202, and in which he made our military force to amount to a number approaching a *million* of men, was published in the French and Italian languages, and circulated in all the courts of Europe! This was an old trick of George Rose's and Mr. Pitt's. But, can it be supposed, that the nation will finally derive either honour or advantage from thus circulating fallacious and exaggerated statements and calculations? In answer to George Rose's pamphlet there was, I have been told, a very able pamphlet published in Italy, exposing the fallacies contained in the former work. To expose

them did not, indeed, require much ability, for fallacies more glaring never were committed to paper.—The volunteers will, however, still be numerous enough for all the purposes for which they are, or can be wanted, or, at least, to which they can be applied; for, as to their going into the field of battle against a regular disciplined army, every one now ridicules the idea. In proper numbers, however, they may be very useful in their several districts, and it is to be hoped that the minister, having seen the evils of attempting to extend the system too far, will keep it within due bounds, and will turn his attention to an improvement and an augmentation of the real army. He has given up the ballot: that is much, and, in the course of another year, experience may possibly teach him the necessity of doing still more in the same way. But, to do any thing effectual, he must give up his favourite project of making the parish-officers recruiting serjeants, and must do away all competition of bounties.

**MILITARY CARS.**—It would appear, that the project of conveying soldiers to the coast, if need be, in carriages, is to be persevered in, and we are told, in the public prints, that carriages are already prepared sufficient to convey 10,000 men to any given point of the coast, in a few hours. Nay, one of these prints states, that, in consequence of the subscriptions of carriages and horses, we shall have "the means of bringing 200,000 men to act against the invading force of the enemy within 36 hours;" and, I am pretty clearly pointed at as "wishing to induce Buonaparté to come over," because I represent the project as nugatory. This very print, and, indeed, all the others that talk the same language, have a hundred times expressed their wish, that Buonaparté would come over, and that he would come quickly too, thereby echoing the sentiment of Mr. Pitt, who gave, as a toast, "the English Volunteers, and a speedy meeting with Buonaparté on our own shores." Now, if this were really their wish so long ago, how could they blame me and others who agree with me in opinion, if we were to "wish to induce Buonaparté to come over?" But, as if this proof of inconsistency were not sufficient, this writer, in the very same paragraph, accuses us of endeavouring to persuade Buonaparté, that "he may stay at home, look on, and see us ruined without giving himself any trouble at all;" and that his attempt at invading us would be an useless risk. Well, then, as far as our endeavours this way have any effect upon the enemy, they must tend to prevent his "coming over." Strange! that

we should at once wish to induce him to come, and endeavour to prevent his coming ! In the first place, however, all these opinions about the ruin that Buonaparté may produce here without attacking us having been given with qualifications, with qualifications not implied, but expressed, and that too in a manner not to be misunderstood, even by persons of this writer's capacity. It has always been said, that such will be the consequence, if such and such measures are persevered in, if such and such precautions are not adopted, if such and such exertions are not made; and never, upon any occasion, has the position been laid down in the naked state in which it is represented by this writer. As to wishing Buonaparté to come here, from what statement of mine can such a wish be inferred; unless, indeed, it be supposed, that I can wish to see the country conquered, and then a fool's head as well as a traitor's heart must be attributed to me; for, from the moment the war was talked of, and even before, I have been almost incessant in my endeavours to prevail upon the government to raise such a force and to make such exertions as would render the conquest of the country next to impossible, though the strength of France were brought against it.

—It is said, that we “oppose every thing the present minister brings forward for the advantage of the country, that we counteract the cause of the country itself, and are regardless of hastening its ruin, provided the minister fall with it.” How profligately false this is the readers of the Register need not be told; but I cannot forbear quoting upon this occasion a passage upon this subject from the last Number, p. 252. “There can be no harm in preparation, whether the enemy be really coming or not; and, as to the minister's wearying us with his alarms and his projects, we must not suffer ourselves to be wearied. If we dislike him, it is our duty so to tell our Sovereign through the regular constitutional channel of Parliament, and, unless we do this, we can have no reason to complain, much less to make the circumstance of his being minister a pretext for lukewarmness in the cause of our country. No; we should resolve steadily to persevere, till we have defeated both the minister and the enemy; but, at all events, the enemy.” Again in the Register of the 28th July, p. 118, upon the subject of the Military Project Bill. “The present project of the minister must be excessively expensive to the country, as well as vexatious and oppressive to individuals; and, after all, I fear, it will prove lamentably ineffi-

cient; but, be this as it may, it is our duty strictly to obey the law that has enjoined the execution of that project; and, not only to obey the law, but to give it all the aid in our power, and thus, by our loyalty, patriotism, zeal, and activity, to make up as far as we are able, for the negligence, the incapacity, or the obstinacy of the ministers.” Let what I have, from the first talk of scarcity, said upon that subject be examined, and let it be denied, if any one can deny it, that, as far as my writings are calculated to produce effect, the effect must be to render the people quiet and patient under their suffering. With what decency, then, can this writer assert, that I “counteract the cause of the country, and am regardless of hastening its ruin, provided the minister fall with it?” He is insincere: he does not believe a syllable of what he says: he knows I am as warm a friend to my country as any man that that country contains: but he also knows that I attack the follies and faults of the minister, and he, like a good honest hireling, endeavours to avenge his employer, by representing my attacks as being made against my country. “You oppose,” says he, “every thing that the present minister brings forward for the advantage of the country.” Here we differ: I do not think that what I oppose is for the advantage of the country: on the contrary, I endeavour to prove that many things which he brings forward are likely to produce injury to the country, and however small may be my success in convincing others, most people will believe that I am myself convinced of the correctness of my opinions. But, if you are opposed to the minister, you are opposed to your King and country. Mr. Pitt and his partisans did not, indeed, seem to entertain this way of thinking a few months ago, when they wished to turn out poor Mr. Addington: Mr. Pitt himself could then deal about his degrading epithets at a pretty liberal rate: but, being himself in power, his old maxim is revived: the partisans identify him with the King and country; to oppose him, therefore, is to oppose both King and country, and thus, in due course of reasoning, every one that opposes Mr. Pitt is neither more nor less than a traitor, and, of course, deserves to expiate his crime upon the scaffold! In spite of this terrific doctrine, however, I shall continue to disapprove of such of the measures of Mr. Pitt as I think either foolish or wicked; to the former class, it appears to me, the Military-Carr Project properly belongs, and I am persuaded that a very little reflection upon the subject will convince the reader that my

opinion is not entirely destitute of foundation.—The ministerial writer above referred to argues as if the objection to this project was, that it would afford the army the “most expeditious conveyance to the field of battle;” but, I appeal to the reader, whether my objection was not of an exactly contrary nature: I explicitly gave it as my opinion, that, “if ten thousand men were to be moved from Surrey to any part of Kent, it would be utterly impossible to convey them in carriages, so soon as they would march thither on foot.” In support of that opinion I shall now offer such reasons as present themselves upon a first view of the matter, and let me assure the ministerial writer, that if he means to counteract their effect, it must be by showing that they are erroneous, and not by imputing factiousness to the person from whom they proceed.—Ten thousand men have been mentioned as the number to be conveyed to a given point, and mention has been made of two hundred thousand to be conveyed to meet an invading enemy, and, as the invading enemy will most likely be found assembled at one point, the two hundred thousand are, of course, to be conveyed to one point. First let us make a calculation of the space that the necessary cars will occupy. Every four wheeled carriage with four horses, and room to walk round it, will take a space in length of 8 yards, at the very least. As every carr is to carry 12 men, including sergeants and drummers, the space, that is to say, the length of road, necessary for 10,000 men, thus hoisted into cars, would be 4 miles and about half a furlong: suppose it to be four miles, and, then, the space necessary for 200,000 men, would be 80 miles. But, observe; this is the *standing* space: very different indeed must be the space in which the cars could move, even as slow as foot could fall, as every one must be convinced whose eye was ever, for one moment, fixed upon a procession of any sort, particularly of four-wheeled carriages. To travel for any distance, taking the effect of hill and dell into account, no carriages, though with horses ever so well disciplined to the business, can be allowed an interval for each of less than thirty yards. This calculation stretches the 10,000 men along 20 miles of road; and, the 200,000 would require a space longer than from Penzance to Dover! Nay, I am not jesting with Sir Brook Watson, as the ministerial writers seem to suppose. I am in earnest, and I venture to assert, that no man who knows any thing at all about the matter, will deny, that, for every such carriage, so travelling, a length of road

of 38 yards is absolutely necessary, and that, even with that space, the travelling cannot, if there be only a hundred carriages, be at a rate greater than about four or five miles an hour, stoppages not included. But, quitting these thoughtless creatures with their carriages for 200,000 men, and even those with their 10,000 men, let us come to something practical, or at least, something within the compass of rational calculation. It will be said, that all the men to be conveyed to any given point will not depart from one spot, and will not arrive by the same road. True; but, as they approach the field of battle, they must all come into one or two roads, or they must alight at a day's march from the field, and some of them much more; and, the confusion that must arise from different processions coming here and there into the same road is much more easily imagined than described. To advance by cross-country roads would be absolutely impossible: by such roads a procession of a hundred carriages would not get on at the rate of a mile an hour, to say nothing of oversetting, breaking down, and stoppages from the narrowness of the roads filled with vehicles belonging to the country people, flying in every direction from the enemy. Along the turnpike roads alone the military cars could possibly go, and, from what has already been said, it appears that the number destined to any one spot must be very small to advance with speed. I spoke of conveying 10,000 men from Surrey to the extremity of the Kentish coast; and I have shown that the procession would take up 20 miles of road. The van carr would hardly venture, for reasons which shall be mentioned by-and-by, to approach nearer than within thirty miles of the enemy; so that, supposing the thing to be at all practicable, the men in the rear carr would ride only fifty miles out of the hundred; for, when the van stops, they must all alight. I shall be told, perhaps, that the ten thousand men would not all go by one road; but, as I have said before, they must all come into one or two roads before they arrive at a given point, unless some of them at least alight at more than a day's march from that given point, and it will at once be perceived, that, if they come up by regiments, day after day, the cars will have answered no other purpose than that of scattering the men about the country, of exposing them to be attacked piece-meal, and being thus rendered an easy prey to the enemy, to whom their horses and a few of their cars, but particularly the former, would be of singular utility. To avoid, however, all possible dispute about the number

of roads; let us confine ourselves to a calculation of the force to be conveyed by one road; and I am sure it will be readily allowed me, that 1200 men at least must, to meet an enemy on the eastern coast of Kent, be conveyed by the great Kentish road, I mean through Rochester and Canterbury, and so to Dover, supposing, for facility of calculation, the enemy to be landed at 80 miles from the Horse Guards, and supposing the 1200 men to be quartered in the Barracks in St. James's Park. We are told, that the horses and cars are *now* ready; but, allowing another month for preparation, there can be no excuse on that account. Every thing being prepared, then, news arrives, that the enemy is landing at the distance above supposed. Orders are immediately issued to bring the cars to the parade in the Park, where, at day light, on Monday morning, the men are ready to mount. Does any man think that the cars, a hundred in number, with horses properly harnessed, fed, and mounted, will be ready before nine o'clock; The men are soon seated, and according to the performance of the *single* car, with which a trial was made under the inspection of Mr. Pitt, the van car will get to Welling, eleven miles, in two hours and ten minutes. Then the horses must be changed, or you must stop to bait. If you stop to bait, an hour and a half at least will be required, and then you go on to Dartford, where you must change both horses and drivers, or you must rest six or eight hours. If you change horses at Welling, it will require a relay of 400 horses; and I shall suppose it to be fine weather, that these horses may stand out of doors, for barns and stables for them to stand and feed in there are none. But, the hundred cars could not go five miles an hour, no, nor three miles if you count the arrival of the last car as the period when this first stage shall be completed. Before the horses of the last car would be changed, and the procession got clear of Welling it would be one o'clock. At Dartford both horses and drivers must be changed, and here, in addition to 400 more horses, there will be wanted 200 fresh drivers. The procession, barring all accidents, would arrive at Rochester about nine o'clock at night, and then your riding soldiers must have rest and sleep, for they will be infinitely more fatigued than the 1200 men which I should have marched to the same place, from the very same quarters, in the morning of the very same day. You cannot, you dare not, take your cars on within 20 miles of the enemy. You must be in a compact defensive body before you approach so near him,

for a single foraging party, finding you thus mounted and stretched along the road, would cut every man of you to pieces. One shot would plunge all your horses and drivers into distraction. Sixty miles out of the 80 is the utmost that you could venture to go in the cars; and at the end of that 60 miles my noiseless battalion would reach long before the van of your procession; and you would have employed 100 cars, 1200 horses at least, and at least 400 drivers. You would have filled the road with horses and with forage; you would have obstructed the passage of women and children fleeing towards the capital and towards the centre of the kingdom; and you would have taken 400 draft horses to within a day's march of the enemy, where you must have left them, for six hours at least, to be, in case of necessity, defended by their drivers. This a calculation for 1200 men only let it be recollected; and it has proceeded upon a supposition of fair weather; it has included no allowance for any of those accidents, by which the whole procession might be arrested for hours in its progress; and it has supposed, that soldiers are liable to no calls of nature except eating, drinking, and sleep. Therefore, if we suppose, the enemy landed on the eastern coast of Kent, will any man in his senses contend, that it would be possible to make use of cars in the conveyance of troops from Middlesex, Surrey, or Sussex? And, is it not evident, that if the number of men to be conveyed upon any one road amounts to a thousand, they must arrive slower in cars than on foot? But, when we come to add to this circumstance the dangers arising from crowding with horses and forage all the roads leading to the enemy! when we consider that it is by thousands and tens of thousands that it is proposed thus to convey soldiers, and when we consider the numbers of cars, horses, and drivers, that would be absolutely necessary for the conveyance, even if there were roads sufficient for the purpose; when we consider all this, it is impossible to refrain from astonishment, that such a project should ever, even for a single moment, have been entertained, especially by some of the persons who appear to have given it countenance. — No: it was very far from me to think of jesting with Sir Brook, whose zeal and activity I applaud, though I cannot agree with him in thinking it a fortunate circumstance, that we have, just at this time *in* particular, three millions of four-legged creatures that eat a-nights, and that we can never eat in return, and though I disagree with him still more as to the project of con-

veying soldiers upon planks slower than those soldiers can be marched on foot. It was, indeed, no subject to jest upon; and I, who am but a very poor jester at any time, felt much more inclination to be sad than merry, when I saw that a project had been broached the most likely in the world to bring the enemy to our shores; an event which my readers will bear testimony I have never expressed my desire to see. I believe, that the French have no intention to invade us at present; I believe it, because I am fully convinced, that it is sound policy on their part not to do it, and because I have constantly observed, that they act according to the dictates of sound policy. I feel confident, that our men of war would utterly destroy their flotillas; it appears evident to me, that they would run a great risk without the possibility of accomplishing any thing, which, if our present military and financial systems are persevered in (mark the qualification) time will not accomplish for them: yet, were they well assured, could they possibly regard it as certain, that, in case of their landing, this wild project of military cars would be put in execution, I should not at all be astonished if the temptation were to prove too great for them to resist.—These are my reasons for disapproving of the car-project, and for wishing our foot-soldiers to keep, as they hitherto have kept, upon their legs.

CONTINENTAL ALLIANCES.—Upon this subject, the opinions which I have sometimes offered have been so much misrepresented by the ministerial writer before alluded to, that I must beg leave to trouble the reader with a few comments upon what he has said, first citing a passage from him. “They” [meaning the Register and the Morning Chronicle] “maintained, that the great disadvantage under which England laboured in the present contest, was the total want of continental allies. Mr. Fox, for whose authority one, at least, of these parties might be expected to have some respect, afford us the strongest argument in favour of the Russian mediation, that if France were unreasonable, we should have the advantage of having Russia with us against France. We have now the prospect of having Russia with us, and these persons contend, that the co-operation of Russia will be of no avail. They say we must have Austria with us, or we can do nothing. We are not without hopes of having Austria too. If we have, and Mr. Pitt continues minister, we are sure

“these persons will say we can do nothing without Prussia; if by any unlooked for operation of interest, we should have Prussia too with us, we should not be surprised if they should refer us to the Emperor of China.”—As to Mr. Fox’s argument, how is it inconsistent with the opinion now entertained, that the alliance of Russia, without that of Austria, will produce no practical effect in our favour? Mr. Fox said, “obtain the mediation of Russia; agree with her first as to the question relative to Malta; make her acknowledge that your claims are just, and you will not only have her heartily with you, if France reject your claims, but you will convince all Europe of the justice and moderation of your views.” Was there no difference between this and the obtaining of the assistance of Russia now, without a mediation, and upon conditions, perhaps, repugnant to the feelings of the other courts of Europe? The answer will demand no hesitation.—There are, then, *hopes*, it seems of having Austria too. I am glad of it; but I cannot think that it was wise in Mr. Pitt, so very lately, to reproach Austria on account of the interest due upon the Imperial loan: I cannot think that it was wise to say, upon that subject, any thing likely to revive the quarrel with the court of Vienna, a quarrel which contributed not a little towards producing the events which led to the ten months peace of Amiens. No: if Mr. Pitt should launch both Austria and Prussia against France, we will not be so unreasonable as to call upon him to add the Emperor of China to the alliance; we will only require of him to find guineas enough to keep regularly paid the subsidies in Germany, and, as a preliminary step absolutely necessary thereto, to remove the restriction of cash payments at the Bank. But, from the language of Mr. Pitt, there is reason to fear, that he has conceived the idea of making the Austrians work out, or rather fight out, their debt; if so he will be miserably deceived, for armies never fight for money that they have already spent: their views are always prospective: a good soldier never looks behind him.

P. S. In consequence of the length of the Narrative and Documents relative to the Middlesex Election, in which compilation *every thing material is included*, the remarks which offer themselves with respect to the Plot at Warsaw are unavoidably postponed.

"Plums and Directors, Shylock and his wife,

"Will club their testers, now, to take your life."—POPE. Sat. 1.

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STATE OF IRISH CURRENCY.

SIR, I have to acknowledge the obligation I feel for your insertion of my letter on Irish currency, in your Register of the 28th ult., (p. 137). I beg leave to say a few words in reply to your observations upon it. You have stated it as your opinion, that the government of Ireland is not deserving of the censure which I have attributed to it. As the issuing of coin is the prerogative of the Crown, so of necessity must the preservation of it pure and without depreciation, be one of its indispensable duties. The executive government of Ireland are bound to attend to the state of the coins in the realm over which it presides, and the subjects of it have a just right to look to it for that care, and that wisdom, and such measures as are best calculated to prevent the evils which have been experienced. That these evils have originated in the bank restriction I freely admit; but that the state of the currency in this country reflects great discredit on the government of it, and is proof of a deficiency of those talents which an able government should possess, is too true, in my humble opinion, to be denied. If at the period when the debasement of the silver coin first became the subject of universal complaint, which I have stated in my letter to have been about two years ago, the government had acted wisely, they might have easily checked the subsequent destructive debasement, by ordering the public offices to do, what they afterwards did, when they at once put an end to the circulation of *white* currency; for it is very evident, that if the public offices were prohibited by government to take bad coin in payments, the circulation of pewter and brass could never have become so general as to produce a complete debasement of the silver currency.—The blame I impute to government is not that of having committed errors, but of doing nothing, and thereby not committing itself in any manner whatsoever. Many evils are complained of, and nothing done to remedy them, though they increase daily; the government is upright, honest and impartial, but evils are complained of in the administration of justice; evils are complained of in consequence of partial superiority, as to political rights, of one portion of the people of this country, over a portion

of them treble in number. The government does nothing out of the common course of the routine of business, and therefore apparently does no wrong; but wrongs of great extent exist, are daily growing up, and hourly increasing. The system of government is too passive for the circumstances of the country. There is no country on earth that requires a more active and vigorous government than Ireland, and for this reason, because all its laws and ordinances, the political measures of centuries, and the various systems of rule which have been experimented here, conspire to produce in every hour some new evil that requires the interposition of government. The basis of regulation in this country is so defective, that instead of conducing to promote a facility of governing, it only engenders a result of error and additional defective regulation. The state of Ireland is of such a nature, as to require, not the insignificant aid of one partial measure, which may in itself be good, and reflect credit on the author it, but such a purification from the crimes and follies of six centuries, of a short-sighted and jealous system of managing the affairs of Ireland, as can only be effected by a comprehensive investigation into the causes of complaint, and such a reformation in every department, as will be calculated to please all parties, and to set at rest for ever that jealousy and those apprehensions which have hitherto actuated the British cabinet.—I have been led into this general discussion of the state of Ireland unawares, in attempting to justify my former position respecting the conduct of government in regard to the silver currency. I should, on reading it over, have erased it, as foreign to the subject, but that it strikes me, that the perusal of it by some of your readers may be productive of advantage. Should this outline of my ideas concerning the political state of Ireland appear to you, Mr. Cobbett, in the same light, I shall on a future occasion submit to your consideration a more detailed communication on this interesting subject. At present, I shall return to that of Irish silver and copper currency.—In the first place, it is necessary to remark, that even at this period, Mr. Curry's remedy has not operated; and that, notwithstanding the proclamation of Sir Evan Nepean (whom Mr. Pitt ap-

pears to have discovered to have been somewhat out of his element), the greatest difficulty prevails throughout the kingdom for small change. The consequence of the disappearance of white metal currency, has been an universal issue of paper tokens by every shopkeeper of every description, in amount from 6d. to 9s. They acquired circulation through the emergency of the moment, and then comes the new act of parliament for abolishing them. The act has not arrived in the country so as to be read, and the people hearing that such an act has passed, take it for granted that all the tokens they hold will be lost to them; and a new scene of confusion, uncertainty and complaint, has been the result. Employers cannot pay those whom they employ, till a large sum is due to them; the latter can ill manage to wait thus long for the earnings of their labour; and even when they obtain their due, they cannot purchase the small quantities of the variety of articles which constitute the food and clothing of themselves and families.—This is not all: since the Bank of Ireland have issued Bolton's dollars at 6s. the whole of the Spanish dollars, which have been issued into circulation in prodigious quantities, at 5s. 11½d. per dollar, are at once sunk in value to 4s. 10½d. Our currency, therefore, presents a very strange feature in the history of commercial policy. A loss has been and is sustained of 10l. per cent. by all landlords, and other persons, whose income is paid in bank-paper, and is secured to them by old contracts. A loss has been sustained of 75l. per cent. upon the whole of the white metal currency; in some instances it operated as a loss to individuals of several hundred pounds; as whatever sums were on hand when this coin was cried down, seldom produced more than 25l. per cent. A loss of near 20l. per cent. has been sustained by all persons holding Spanish dollars, on the issuing of the new Bank dollars; and a considerable loss must accrue to the holders of the paper tokens, now that the issuers of them are suddenly called upon to pay off the immense amount that has been sent into circulation since last April.—Let us now examine the state of the copper currency. This term in Ireland is, in the first instance, inapplicable to any description of our currency, since the days of King James; notwithstanding the reign of William, and the famous toast, "the glorious memory," not only wooden shoes, but brass money have still continued to exist. Though Mr. Edgeworth has ably related the fatal catastrophe that once attended

the "skying of a copper," no description of coin, that has been current in this country for many years, has been, even in any solitary instance, fabricated of that metal. To ascertain what alterations have been effected, and are likely to take place in the portion of the currency vulgarly called "brass," we must understand, that previous to any alteration being apparent, the pieces which composed it were all of them tolerably well stamped with the King's head on one side, and the harp on the other, and that no pieces of brass, or copper and brass, were current, unless they possessed this qualification; but as it is now usual to see thin flat pieces of a mixture of metals, of the colour of halfpence, circulating without any appearance of a stamp, and, in fact, little better than buttons beaten quite flat, and the shanks taken from them, it becomes interesting to examine into the causes of their admission into circulation, and to consider the probable consequences that will attend it.—The cause I conceive to be as follows: the scarcity of silver produced so great an inconvenience from the difficulty of obtaining change, that a great demand suddenly took place for halfpence; the trouble of carrying them and counting them was of no consideration, in comparison with the assistance they afforded. The number of them were unequal to supply the demand; the wants of the public induced it to admit any thing in receiving payment, which would again be taken in making it; and thus, as in the case of the paper and silver currencies, there came to pass a general acquiescence to admit a most debased brazen currency. The coiners, who had lost the shilling trade, did not fail to take advantage of the wants of the public, and their mints are now as productive as ever in supplying the kingdom with a circulating medium. The consequence of this acquiescence of the public to take, and of government to permit the progress of this debased coin, must be the same as that which attended the same acquiescence in regard to the debased white metal coin; namely, the sudden stoppage of its circulation, and at some period not very distant, new, and even greater difficulties than have hitherto been experienced.—I have now given you, Mr. Cobbett, as faithful a description of the different metal currencies in Ireland, as my means have enabled me. I do think the government was remiss in not obliging the public offices to refuse bad silver in the first appearance, two years ago, of an excessive debasement; and that it is now wanting in its duty, and has been so since last April, in not pro-

viding an abundant supply of copper coin. No nation was ever more insulted than this was, when its finance minister gravely informed the House of Commons, that the evils of our currency were remedied; and certainly no instance has ever before occurred in any nation, of the chief minister of a government proclaiming the necessity of taking bad coin, as a means of removing the inquiry which had resulted from its debasement.—I. T.—*Dublin, Aug. 8th.*

#### PLOT AT WARSAW.

*Translated from the Courier de Londres.*

For some time past a variety of reports, but to which the degree of attention which they deserved had not been paid, had given intimation that some design was in agitation against the person of Louis XVIII. At last, the 22d July brought to light the infernal plots carried on at St. Cloud, by a foreigner, who has dared to seat himself on the Throne of St. Louis.—On Friday the 20th July, two men came into a billiard room, kept by one Coulon, a Frenchman by birth, and put several indirect questions to him concerning the King. They were acquainted with Coulon's intimacy with the King's domestics, particularly with his cook. Next day these same men came back, and asked Coulon, in a more direct manner, "whether the King went abroad frequently?—if he went out by himself?—what were the number and persons of his suite?—and if they were armed?" Coulon, thinking these questions proceeded from mere curiosity, gave on each point the answer required. In the course of the conversation, the two persons inquired, to whom the billiard table belonged? "It is mine" (said Coulon), "but I have not paid for it." "How, then, do you expect to pay for your establishment?" "I got a loan of the money, and I intend to pay for it out of the profits." "There is a way" (replied the strangers) "by which you might immediately gain a great deal of money." "And how so?" "We will tell you; but the thing is to be a profound secret." "O, if that were all," said Coulon.—"But take care; your life might be in danger." "Never mind; say on." The men then explained to him their plan; and said, that being acquainted with all the servants of the King's family, and particularly the cook, he could go into the kitchen at any time without exciting any suspicion. "If you should succeed" (added they) "your fortune is made." Coulon hesitated;—spoke of his wife. The two strangers sent for punch and made Coulon drink, and his

wife also (the latter, understanding but little French, took no part in the conversation). "Take no apprehension about your wife" (said they next); "we will carry her to France along with you; and we repeat it, your fortune is made." The glasses of punch went round briskly. Coulon, fearing to intoxicate himself, would drink no more. They separated; and on seeing them to the door, Coulon heard the two strangers say to each other, in bad Italian, "Time presses; we have not a moment to lose."—Next day, Sunday the 22d, a man called twice during the forenoon at Coulon's. He was gone out. In the evening a man he did not know came and asked him to walk along with him a few yards; and spoke of the conversation that had taken place the day before. Coulon agreed. The unknown carried him into the Old Town, then to the New Town, and then into a house, the situation of which he could not point out, on account of the darkness of the night, and the winding lanes by which he had been conducted to it. There they found one of the two persons he had seen the night before, who asked him, as did the man who had been his guide, if he still persisted in his resolution? Coulon replied "Yes; why not?" Champagne was called in. They fell to drinking, and one of the two strangers got drunk.—The following is the manner in which it was resolved to execute their plan: Coulon was to go and visit the King's cook, and tell him that for a long time past he had not ate any mutton chops; and that he should ask him to do a few. After the precaution of making the cook drunk, he was to throw into the pot a parcel with which he was to be provided. "Very well" (said Coulon); "but the money you have promised me; you have promised me 400 louis, but you have given me nothing." The stranger, who was drunk, said, "I don't know if Boyer \* would give you so much as that." He who was sober said, in an angry tone, "what do you mean by that? Boyer is not here; he is gone, and will not return for two days." Coulon insisted on the money; again mentioned his wife, the expenses of the journey, &c. They told him not to be uneasy on that score; that he had nothing more to do than to come next day at eleven o'clock in the evening, and be within 20 yards of the Village Neuf;

\* From the time that Louis XVIII. had resided at Warsaw, the French government had one Gallon Boyer, with the title of Commercial Agent. There never had been a person in that capacity at Warsaw before.—Note of the Editor of the *Courier de Londres.*

that there some one would give him the packet; that he was to put it into the pot on Tuesday the 24th July; that then he should go to the Five Gallowses, where he should find a person who would conduct him to a place of safety, and carry him into France. "A d my wife?"—said Coulon. "Give yourself no trouble on that head; and there is a ducat to drink with the cook."—At one in the morning they left this house; forced away Coulon, who wished to stop till day, saying, that his house was shut, and then they carried him back to his house by bye-ways. Coulon immediately went, and waited on M. the Baron de Milleville, Usher to the Queen, and informed him of the plot. M. de Milleville communicated it to M. de Pienne, First Gentleman of the Chamber to the King's Chambers; and M. Count d'Avaray, Captain of the King's Guards, ordered that the report should be put in writing, signed and cyphered. M. the Count d'Avaray thought it proper to conceal from his Majesty the danger till he had obtained more positive information. The life of all the Royal Family was threatened, and he was afraid that the sensibility of the King, alarmed for the safety of the Queen, and of Madame the Duchess d'Angouleme, would betray a secret which his courage would easily have kept if his own life merely had been in danger. Without losing a moment, M. the Count d'Avaray sent to ask an audience of M. the President de Hoym, in which he laid before him an account of the intended crime, pointing out to him the necessity either of preventing the consequences of such an attempt, or of unmasking the imposture of a man who had denounced a conspiracy only in the hope of obtaining a reward.—M. the President de Hoym on this occasion displayed a zeal with which M. d'Avaray was much affected.—He authorised him, in case the information was well founded, to cause the authors of the plot to be arrested by the King's domestics, either at the rendezvous near the Five Gibbets, or in the walks of Lazienky (a country house near Warsaw inhabited by the King); and to send them to the *Garde de Corps*, whither M. de Hoym promised to repair in person.—On the morning of the 23d M. de Avaray sent for the King's cook, and after having bound him by an oath to preserve inviolable secrecy as to the subject about to be entrusted to him, he ordered him to let Coulon come into the kitchen, and to allow him to come near the pot. On the other hand the Baron de Milleville had been ordered to send Coulon orders to

repair to the rendezvous appointed at eleven in the evening, the same day of the 23d July: Coulon obeyed with fear. After passing the Barriere leading to the village Neuf; he was followed by a man, who in a few minutes cried—"Are you Coulon?" "Yes," replied he. Then another man came out from a field of corn. Both of them told Coulon not to go any farther, lest the dogs should raise an alarm. They asked him if he continued in the same intentions? Coulon answering in the affirmative, they gave him a packet and six crowns, expressly recommending to him not to turn the packet upside down, because it contained carrots, hollow in the inside, and what was in them might fall out.—Coulon demanded the money promised. The others answered that they could not give more, having already been several times deceived, and not considering themselves perfectly sure of him. On this, Coulon said to them, "if you distrust me, let one of you go along with me, I will get him introduced." They refused, saying it was impossible; besides too, he might already have prated of the affair, though they did not believe he had. "For the rest," added they, "if you do not succeed, it will be your own fault, if you do, you have only to repair on Saturday to Schaczer. The Postmaster of the place, who knows you, will make you welcome, and will give you whatever you want. When you arrive there, we will give you the 400 louis d'ors, and we will set off for France together. If you do not do this on Saturday, on Sunday you shall not be in life. We have promised you 400 louis d'ors, but you shall have 100 more for every person who dies within a month." They then pointed out to him the forty-fifth tree from the barrier on the road to Village Neuf. At the foot of this tree they buried a handkerchief, one of the corners of which they left above the ground. Should Coulon be unable to execute the project in the course of Tuesday the 24th, he was to take away the handkerchief, and in case of success he was to leave it. On leaving him they gave him a small bottle, and said to him, "you will drink two glasses of this before entering, which will give you courage, and when you have put in the packet you need not be afraid, because it will not operate suddenly." They then told him, that if he should remove the handkerchief, they would see him again in the evening: Coulon asked where? They told him to give himself no trouble, for they knew very well where to find him. Coulon declared that he could not be certain, if the two men

who met him on the night between the 23d and 24th were the same, who first made the proposition to him; but that he was very certain, that the tallest of the two, who was present at all the interviews, was the person who gave him the packet, and placed the handkerchief, &c. The two men followed him to the end of the road. On their leaving him he fainted away, and was assisted by a Prussian Officer, who happened to be passing. — All these facts are extracted from a declaration which Coulon made on the 24th. On the evening of the same day he added to his former declaration, that the street to which he had been conducted by the two strangers was Siegen-gasse (Siegen-street). He thinks he entered a sort of court surrounded with houses. As far as he could judge he went out by a different door from that he entered by, and before which there were trees and a palisade of planks. He was in a chamber, on the second floor, which had two windows, and where there was a chest of drawers, painted of a pale mahogany colour, and placed close by one of the windows. — On the morning of the 24th, Coulon carried the packet and the bottle to M. de Milleville, who went instantly to Lazienky, and communicated the whole to the Count d'Avaray. This nobleman having had a conversation in the evening with the President de Hoyme, wrote to him requesting an interview. M. de Hoym repaired at ten in the morning to the house of the Count d'Avaray, who communicated to him the declaration of Coulon, and shewed him the packet and the bottle. The Count d'Avaray requested the President de Hoym to sign an attestation of the communication made to him. M. d'Avaray, who had put his seal on the articles committed to him by M. de Milleville, asked M. de Hoym to do the same.

[*To be continued.*]

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Circular Letter from Lord Hawkesbury to the Lords Lieutenants of Counties in Great-Britain, dated Whitehall, Aug. 20, 1804.*

MY LORD, I have received his Majesty's commands to communicate to your lordship the inclosed particulars of an arrangement to be adopted in the several counties of Great-Britain, in the event of the invasion of the country in force by the enemy. His Majesty relies on your zeal and exertions in giving effect, within the county committed to your charge, to those regulations, which in the supposed crisis may become indispensable, for the purpose of preventing the confusion which, in the first moment of

alarm, might otherwise arise, and of the utmost importance with a view to the operations of his Majesty's army, to the protection of individuals, and to the internal peace and tranquillity of the country. — I request that your lordship would inform me, with as little delay as possible, of the names of the magistrates to whom you would propose to entrust the different divisions of the county of —, and that you would communicate to them the heads of the proposed arrangements, and concert with them as to the most effectual means of carrying them into complete execution. — It is essential, that the magistrates who are thus employed, should, if possible, be persons not holding commissions as volunteer officers, nor liable on any other account to be removed from the county in which they reside. — His Majesty has the fullest reliance that, in the event of the enemy succeeding in making good a landing on the coast of this kingdom, the loyalty and public spirit of all classes of his subjects will induce them to submit to every sacrifice, and to concur in exertion which the safety of the country may render necessary; and that they will be impressed with the conviction that the peace and good order of those districts which shall not be attacked by the enemy, will contribute most effectually to assist the exertions of his forces in those parts of the country which may become the theatre of the war, and of enabling him thereby to bring the contest in which we may be engaged to a speedy and glorious termination. — I have only to add, that directions will be given to the general, or other officer commanding the district in which the county of — is included, to communicate with your lordship on the subject of these regulations, and to afford you every assistance in carrying them, if necessary, into execution. — I have the honour to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

*REGULATIONS for the preservation of good Order, to be adopted in case of actual Invasion, in each County in Great-Britain. — Dated Aug. 12, 1804.*

The magistrates of each division of the county remaining at home, to sit daily at a place to be appointed in each division for that purpose. — To procure the trust-worthy housekeepers and others to enrol themselves to serve as special constables under their orders, where the same has not been already done pursuant to the secretary of state's circular letter of the 8th of Nov. last. — To be attended at the place appointed for each division by an officer of the volunteer force, if any should remain in that division, and

by the chief or superintendant of the special constables enrolled for that division. Such volunteer officer and chief of the special constables to receive and execute the orders of the magistrates, in preventing and quelling disturbances, in taking up and conveying offenders to prison, in supplying escorts for all military purposes required by the general or other officer left in command of the district, and in furnishing a guard for the county gaol or other prisons, if required.

—If, contrary to expectation, any impediments should occur in the regular supply of the different markets, every assistance to be afforded to the persons who are accustomed or who offer to supply them, and escorts to be granted in cases where it may be necessary for the secure passage and conveyance of cattle and provisions.—The constables within each division, assisted by patrols of volunteers, if requisite, to see that all public houses within the same are orderly and regularly conducted, and, if thought necessary by the magistrates, to be shut up at such hours as they may direct; and to bring all unknown persons, who cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves, before the magistrates.—A certain portion of the constables and volunteers, in rotation, to go such different rounds in the night, as shall from time to time be prescribed by the magistrates of the division, to whom they are to make their report each morning.—The magistrates of each division to report daily to the lieutenant of the county, or deputy lieutenants within the division appointed to receive the same.—The lieutenant or deputy lieutenants so appointed, to report all matters of importance immediately to the secretary of state for the home department, and to the general or officer who shall be left in command of the district, or to the officer who shall be appointed by him within the county to receive the same, to whom they are to apply in case of wanting further military aid.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MIDDLESEX ELECTION.—From the manner in which this contest has been terminated, or rather suspended, it is become an object deeply interesting to every man in the kingdom; at least, to every one who is equally anxious to preserve his own liberties and to support the prerogatives and authority of his Sovereign. In the preceding sheet of this work, p. 257, will be found a narrative of the occurrences during the election, in which narrative great pains has been taken to omit nothing that appeared material in order to enable the reader to form a

correct opinion with regard to the relative merits of the two candidates, and also with regard to the conduct of themselves and their friends since the issuing of the writ. With this narrative before them, I should have thought it quite unnecessary to trouble my readers with any observations of mine, had not the typographical champions of Mr. Mainwaring, I mean the loyal and immaculate proprietors of the *Times* and the *Courier*, challenged me to the field; and had not Mr. Mainwaring himself, or rather the persons in whose hands he was according to his own expression “the devoted instrument,” thought proper to stigmatize all his opponents, as “a faction which hesitates at no thing to obtain its ends, and which is no less inimical to the people whom it flatters than to the throne which it seeks to subvert.” There can be but little doubt but that this charge was meant to extend to every one, not only of Sir Francis Boddett’s immediate supporters in the election, but of the party (if indeed a vast majority of the lauded interest, of the birth and talents in the country, ought to go by the name of party) with whom Sir Francis has recently acted in parliament; and, therefore, it becomes the duty of every man, who is attached to that party, and who has an opportunity of so doing, to defend himself against so foul and heinous a charge, to show that the having been opposed to the pretensions of Mr. Mainwaring is not a proof of a man’s harbouring designs inimical to the people and the throne, of his being at once a tyrant and a traitor.—With respect to the merits or demerits of Mr. Mainwaring, little can be said, because very little can be known. He was, previous to the election, Treasurer of the county; that is to say, a clerk to the magistrates who appointed him, and of whom his father was and is the chairman. This circumstance argued nothing against him, nor any thing for him. It was quite insignificant, till the treasurer of the county came to offer himself as a knight of the shire, and then, no one will deny, that the people had a right to inquire into the grounds of such a transformation. They were told, that he was the son of their late worthy representative, who had forfeited his right again to be elected, in consequence of having disobeyed the law during the last election. Treating is not regarded as a cardinal sin; but, from the *monopolizers* of morality and civil obedience, one might certainly have expected praises less unqualified of Mr. Mainwaring senior; for, notwithstanding the logic and the eloquence of Colonel Wood, that gentleman was guilty of a breach of the law,

and, in consequence thereof, he was not duly elected to serve in this parliament, and, of course, the seat was not "usurped" by Sir Francis Burdett. The personal merits of Mr. Mainwaring junior, have, indeed, been, by his friends and supporters, put upon a footing that relieves us from the necessity of any inquiry on the subject; for, there was not one of them, as far as my observation went, but was ready to declare him to be a person totally unfit to represent, not only a county, but the meanest borough in the kingdom: they were, in truth, ready to go much further, and to make admissions which it would be illiberal to repeat in print. It is notorious that the fashionable declaration was: "I do not vote for Mr. Mainwaring, but *against* Sir Francis Burdett." The accepting of such support as the means of *avenging his father* may be excused in Mr. Mainwaring; and if a county was thus to be made use of, the county and not he was to blame; but, to talk of the "*honour*" of such support, and to avow himself to be "the devoted instrument" in the hands of those who thus spoke of him, was to deprive himself of the best apology, if not the only one, that reason or decency could afford him. His hostility to Sir Francis Burdett and even his triumphing over him, though the latter savoured, perhaps, somewhat too much of boyish impetuosity to be regarded as seemly in a knight of the shire, would not only have been excused but applauded by every man who had a son, or who duly reflected on what the feelings and the conduct of the son of Mr. Mainwaring ought to have been upon such an occasion; but, to preserve his title to this applause, the son should have abstained from every thing that was calculated to discover, that he was actuated by motives other than those of filial duty and affection; he should have taken care not to make a sort of contract to be "the devoted instrument" in the hands of the persons who, on their part, specifically bargained to defray the expenses of his election; and, above all things, he should have avoided giving way to those party expressions in his last advertisement, from which it has been concluded, by persons for, as well as against him, that he will have little objection to become, as far as may be required, a "devoted instrument" in the hands of the minister, as well as in those of Sir William Curtis and Co. — The merits and demerits of Sir Francis Burdett form a more copious subject. During the recent election, and, indeed, ever since his former election, I have seen nothing in his conduct to find fault with. In some of the opinions which he has expressed, I have, for

reasons that I shall by-and-by mention, disagreed with him; but, these were mere opinions, and upon points as to which two men, both as loyal and as little factious as possible, might be completely at variance. That Sir Francis Burdett's private character is, in every respect excellent, has been openly and explicitly proclaimed by his friends, and not less openly and explicitly granted by his enemies; that his family and fortune are such as are likely to induce and enable the knight of a shire to be really and truly the asserter of the rights of the people no one will deny; and, I think it a position to which few persons will refuse their assent, that, of whatever Sir Francis Burdett is disposed to perform, the performance will not fail from the want either of talents, of courage, or of constancy. — The objections to him, as a member of parliament, must, then, be confined to his political principles and views, and for the evidence of these we are referred to his *former* conduct. To such a standard I object, on many accounts. It tends to revive the political animosities of the late war, and to divide us into parties bitterly hostile to each other, at a time which imperiously calls for an union of all hands and hearts in defence of our country and of that monarchy, under which alone our liberties can exist. This standard, too, is no longer applicable. The times are widely altered since Sir Francis Burdett first became a public character, and even since his former election for Middlesex. The tide has turned: from popular enthusiasm it has run back to despotism: Buonaparte's exaltation to the post of Consul for life began the great change in mens' minds, which has been completed by his more recent assumption, and which not only removes the danger before to be apprehended from the prevalence of notions in favour of liberty, but tends to excite apprehensions of a different kind, to make us fear that, by means of the immense and yet growing influence now deposited in the hands of the minister by the funding and bank-note system, we may, in fact, though not in name, become little better than slaves, and slaves, too, not of the king, but of the minister of the day, who threatens to exercise his authority alike over king and people. Nobody censures the writers of Queen Anne's, or of George the First or Second's reign, or even of the former part of the present reign; nobody censures Pope or Gay or Akenside or Goldsmith or Johnson for the lashings which they so plentifully bestowed upon court-sycophants, parasites, pensioners, bribed-senators, directors, contractors, jobbers, hireling-lords, and ministers of state; nobody thinks,

or ever thought, of imputing disloyalty to these celebrated men, but, if any one were now to write as Pope wrote, it is to be feared, that that which rendered the poet immortal would prove mortal to his imitator! Granted, that during that whirlwind of passion, that state of political madness, produced by the French revolution; granted that, during such a season, it was the duty both of writers and speakers to be cautious in uttering their sentiments and expressing their feelings upon political topics, it by no means follows that the restraint ought *still* to be adhered to; for, in that case, all that we have gained by preserving our constitution, is, an abridgment, a lasting abridgment, of our liberties. In fact, if this restraint is to continue, and especially if it be necessary that it should, we have *not* preserved the constitution, which is not what it was but something else. The former sentiments and expressions of Sir Francis Burdett were not, therefore, for the most part, so wrong in themselves as in the season of their application. Some of them, indeed, were such as no time or place would justify. Nothing but satisfactory proof of a change of mind, and that proof furnished too, by a striking change of conduct, can, in any man, atone for the expression of "*hired* parliaments and "*kings*," which will be found in one of Sir Francis Burdett's former addresses to the freeholders of Middlesex, and for which as far as I can consider his present defeat as a punishment I heartily rejoice at it. Nay, if I could possibly regard Mr. Mainwaring's friends and supporters as having been actuated by a desire to avenge this insult to the person and office of the king, I should be strongly inclined to approve of all their conduct, notwithstanding the uncharitableness of the principle upon which they must in such case have proceeded. His language, and many of his acts, during the former election, as well as previous to it, were seditious to a degree bordering upon treason; they did, in my opinion, totally incapacitate him as a member of parliament; the contest seemed then to be a war of the thieves against the magistrates; and, considered in that light, though I never liked the milk-and-water Mr. Mainwaring, I greatly preferred him to his opponent, who chose to disgrace his cause and himself by an appeal to the worst passions of the worst part of the people. But, if nothing of a seditious nature has appeared in the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett since that election, upon what principle will his opponents justify their resentment against him, when they are so ready to overlook the political sins of others? I have no time to

dip into the history of the supporters of Mr. Mainwaring; I do not wish to have recourse to personal arguments, but when I am publicly called upon to defend myself against the charge of not having joined the opponents of Sir Francis Burdett; when I am censured for not now endeavouring to punish him for his former conduct, why then I must be allowed to ask the *Translator of the "Queen of Albo"* how he would relish this principle of action, if it were applied to himself? That work, at once the most disloyal and obscene that ever offended the public eye; that work which, perhaps, more than any other contributed towards the murder of the Queen of France and the destruction of the French monarchy; that most mischievous and most infamous work was, for the benefit of the good people of these realms, translated into English by one of the most zealous and most active supporters of Mr. Mainwaring, one of the loudest in his entries against the disloyalty of Sir Francis Burdett, one of those who is amongst the very foremost in inculcating the necessity of making an example of that gentleman, for having imbibed and acted upon errors, which he has now evidently abandoned. The *Translator* is, I dare say, very sorry for his past errors; which, indeed, may be called crimes; and, according to the harmonizing principle on which I would wish to see men proceed as to politics and parties, he would be included in the act of oblivion; but, unless he can convince us, that the acceptance of a pension and a place is the only admissible proof of sincere reformation, he will, I imagine, have a hard matter to maintain the ground of exclusion against Sir Francis Burdett, without receiving in their full force all the charges that ever existed against himself. I could refer to some other persons amongst the friends and supporters of Mr. Mainwaring, whose loyalty, if loyalty means any thing further than place hunting, is, by me, rather more than suspected; but, for the present, let us see how the principle, upon which they are acting towards Sir Francis Burdett, agrees with that upon which they appear to act towards Mr. Pitt, that Mr. Pitt whom opponents they represent as "*a faction who are seeking to subvert the throne.*" Sir Francis Burdett is accused of having been acquainted with several persons who have since proved to have been, as to politics, of infamous character. Here, one would think, they might have stopped, particularly as it never has, in any one instance, been proved, or attempted to be proved, that Sir Francis Burdett had any part in the crimes laid to the charge of the persons who are thus represented

as his associates; but, not contented with his political associates, as they call them, they mention the name of a man recently condemned for forgery on the bank of Lisbon, and yet they have never blamed Abraham Newland, nor have they, though some of them are Directors, ever taken any blame to themselves for having associated with Mr. Aslett! Allowing Sir Francis Burdett to have been acquainted, and even intimate, with a person since condemned for forgery. The fact of intimacy is not very probable; but, allowing it to be true, how is Sir Francis Burdett answerable for the crime? and why should he be liable to reproach on account of it, any more than were the many noble persons who were intimate with the unfortunate Doctor Dodd? This item of accusation furnishes us with the means of judging of the degree of liberality, with which these gentlemen have, upon this occasion, thought it consistent with their character to act. Another of Sir Francis's intimate friends was Arthur O'Connor, who has since been condemned for high treason, and who is now at Paris, where he is thought to be employed in aiding the councils of Buonaparté, particularly as to such matters as relate to the intended attack upon this country. O'Connor was tried, and was pardoned, as to the sentence of death, in consequence of discoveries which he made. Did he make any with regard to Sir Francis Burdett? It is notorious that he did not. The intimacy was, then, a mere misfortune to Sir Francis, and was no more a crime than it was in Mr. Pitt to be intimate, *extremely intimate*, with Mr. Walter Boyd, whom the Treasury prints are, with what truth I know not, now representing as having been taken into the pay of Buonaparté, and of being his principal adviser as to the means of ruining our finances. With respect to their former acquaintances, O'Connor and Boyd are, if the public prints state truth, perfectly upon a level; why then is this amazingly wide distinction made between Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Pitt? Is the latter, good man! to be excused upon the score of greater simplicity than the former? Or, is the imputation foreborne from indulgence to his warmness of heart? Or, does he (oh, ye saints that translate and sell "the Queen of Abo!") does he owe your forbearance to the places, the pensions and the contracts that he has to bestow? Mr. Horne Tooke is another of the persons, with whom Sir Francis Burdett is accused of having been, and of still being, intimate; and, after this name, Mr. Mainwaring's friends add these words: "who was acquitted of high treason." They mean

to insinuate that he was guilty of high treason; but, they should have recollected, that he was acquitted upon the ground, that he and his associates were endeavouring to accomplish no more than what had been by Mr. Pitt himself represented not only as lawful but as absolutely necessary to the preservation of even the smallest degree of liberty in this country; and that this ground was so firmly maintained, that it formed the leading feature of the judge's charge. If it be a crime to be intimate with Horne Tooke, Mr. Pitt committed it first, and to put Sir Francis Burdett upon a level with him in this respect, Sir Francis, having become minister, must abandon some former foolish principles, and if Horne Tooke should adhere to and endeavour to act upon them, Sir Francis must bring him to the bar for his offence. Then will these gentlemen be upon a level: then will Sir Francis Burdett's demerits, with regard to Horne Tooke, be as great as those of the minister, whom Mr. Mainwaring is to support against "a faction that seeks to subvert the throne!" Despard closes the list of those persons whom these candid gentlemen have given to the world as the associates of their opponent. It is well known, that not one word came out in evidence upon the trial of Despard relating, either directly or indirectly, to Sir Francis Burdett; and, whoever recollects the circumstances of the trial, and the parties concerned, must be persuaded, that no fact of importance could possibly have been disguised. Indeed, that which has been frequently stated upon this subject appears to have been the truth; that Despard, knowing the exertions which Sir Francis Burdett had made in his behalf, entertained a degree of gratitude towards him, which, at times, became troublesome, while Sir Francis felt, on his part, a strong desire, that a person for whom he had said and done so much, should not, after he obtained his liberty, appear to be unworthy of it. That Sir Francis Burdett was generous to Despard there can be little doubt; but, that he ever had any reason to suspect him of entertaining treasonable designs there is not the slightest ground to suppose. Upon the subject of Despard, it is not immaterial to remark, that the complaints against the Cold-Bath Fields Prison did not *originate* with Sir Francis Burdett; and, as to Despard himself, my memory very much deceives me, if his wretched condition was not first described and complained of to the Secretary of State by Mr. Reeves, who represented the treatment of this man as cruel in the last degree, and as novel and hitherto unheard of in this country, especially when it was considered,

that he was committed only in virtue of a suspension of the law of habeas corpus. It was long after this, I believe, that Sir Francis Burdett took up the matter: it is very strange, therefore, that his conduct, in this respect, should have been imputed to disloyalty, while that of Mr. Reeves was probably commended. Mr. Reeves went silently to the Secretary's Office, while Sir Francis spoke out to the world: but this arose from the circumstance of one being merely a justice of the peace, and the other a member of parliament. If cruelties, or severities unknown to the laws, were exercised in the prison, it was right that they should be known and complained of. Members of parliament were not to stop to consider, whether such complaints would affect the character or the stability of the ministry, much less were they to forbear their complaints, on such a subject, on account of the dangers of the country; for, you have only to adopt that doctrine, and there is an end to all idea of liberty or of justice: if the dangers of the country once are admitted to be a sufficient ground for suppressing inquiry into the conduct of any branch of the government, particularly that branch in which the power of *imprisoning suspected persons* is vested, our talk about freedom will become a farce too broad to be borne.—But, I have heard, that the supporters of Mr. Mainwaring insist, that Sir Francis Burdett has not changed his conduct, that there has been no such alteration in his behaviour as I allow to be necessary in order to remove the objections that formerly existed against him. I have, I think, been as narrow an observer of his conduct as any man, and I have, since the former election, seen little or nothing in it to object to, especially when I consider the change which has now been effected in men's minds by the exaltation of Buonaparté. Before, however, I proceed to an examination of the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett, subsequent to the former election, it is necessary to fix upon some general principles, according to which our judgment upon that conduct is to be formed; it is necessary to come to some understanding with the supporters of Mr. Mainwaring as to what are to be admitted as proofs of patriotism and loyalty. The greater part of those persons by whom that gentleman was put forward, and by whom also the expenses of his election were defrayed, are known to be dependents upon, or expectants of, the ministry. They are, for the far greater part, contractors, persons holding places or pensions during pleasure, and who are, of course, more strongly and immediately attached to the minister of the day than to

the general interests of the people or of the throne. Nor can I from this description exclude the chairman of Mr. Mainwaring's committee, I mean Mr. Thornton, who, besides his being by no means deprived of his share of patronage, is himself a bank-director, which, though it was formerly a post quite independent of the minister, can no longer be so considered, now that the treasury and the bank are so closely connected, and especially since the bank company totally depends upon the minister for protection against the demands of its creditors. When men shall become so bold and disinterested as to prefer their public duty to the friendship of those who have it in their power to plunge them instantly from affluence to poverty, then, and not before, may we expect to see the directors of a bank, the notes of which are by law protected against demands of cash-payment, set the minister at defiance; but till then, never will one such director be found amongst his opponents. I am far, however, from saying, or insinuating, that directors, contractors, placemen and pensioners have no right to interfere in elections, and still further if possible am I from denying, that they may be very honest, patriotic, and loyal men: what I object to is, that, for no other reason, that I can discover, than that they are in their several ways and degrees dependent upon government, they set up pretensions to be the *sole* possessors of these qualities, and will allow no man, who is not a dependent, to have either honesty, patriotism, or loyalty: I call none of their rights or virtues in question, and, in no sense of the word, the assailant, but stand purely on the defensive, and beg leave to presume that I ought not to be regarded as a disaffected person merely because I do not live upon the public money. Neither is the fact of their superior riches, acquired so suddenly as they are, an argument so convincing with me as it appears to be with many persons. There is something quite preposterous in the course of reasoning which it is fashionable to pursue upon this subject. When you express your surprize, and can hardly restrain your indignation, at seeing a broker, a contractor, a placeman, or speculator of any description, start all at once from the dunghill to a coach and four, with half a score grooms and footmen at his heels, you are told that his rise is a proof of his merit. For my part, I generally draw an exactly opposite conclusion, and in this I adhere to the rules not only of reason but of the law, which teaches us to suspect of demerit and even of dishonesty, those who exhibit signs of a sudden increase of their pel-

and which go so far as to authorize the magistrate to call upon such fortunate persons to render an account of their acquirements. So far from the sudden finery of a poor man's family being regarded as *prima facie* evidence of his industry and integrity, it is pretty sure to expose his common honesty to suspicion, and, perhaps, it may subject him to show cause why he should not take up his lodgings in a prison and be reduced to his pristine rags. I find no fault of this law: the principle upon which it is founded is perfectly wise and just: but, I cannot see why it should not be carried, in theory at least, a little higher, if not quite to the top of society: if sudden great riches be not, like sudden little riches, regarded as *prima facie* evidence of dishonesty, I see no reason why the rule should be completely reversed, why they should be regarded as *prima facie* evidence of industry and integrity, why they should be looked upon as the test of merit. But, as if the reasoning, thus far, were not whimsical enough, it takes another turn just as it approaches the top; and, accordingly we find, that a minister's merit, particularly as relating to his honesty, is generally estimated in an inverse proportion to his riches; hence the toast of that calculating moralist Mr. Alderman Shaw, who has discovered degrees in honesty, and who, upon comparing Mr. Pitt's reputed poverty with his known means of amassing wealth, very naturally concluded that he must be "the *honestest* man in the world." Pope calls "an *honest* man the noblest work of God." I disagree with him: but if the poet and the alderman are both correct, it follows of course, that, at this present time, Mr. Pitt is the noblest of all God's noble works. This mode of estimating the merit of prime ministers has given rise to a perfect rivalry for the reputation of poverty, inasmuch that some of them have left themselves almost without bread to eat; but it has, I think, generally been observed, that, like the unjust steward in the parable, they take care to provide themselves beforehand with some good fat, grateful friends.—To return to the persons into whose merits it is more immediately our business to inquire. I never can allow that their riches are any proof of their *industry*, unless I were to give to that word a meaning that I am not disposed to give to it, though it might be familiar enough to the ears of some of Mr. Mainwaring's supporters. Industry, in the better sense of that word, is generally a sure and safe road to riches; but, through that road, the progress from poverty to riches is slow, unless assisted by extraordinary ta-

lents; and, for talents to be extraordinary, their possessors must necessarily be few in number. But, directors, contractors, and speculators are found in droves; and, as to talents, you will find scores of them who are ignorant of every earthly science. Where is the ground, then, upon which these persons presume, that we should regard them as superior in merit and virtue merely because they are rich? Or, rather, where is the ground upon which they dare to boast of their wealth, unaccompanied with an explicit account of the means by which it was so suddenly acquired, especially when they publicly hold it forth for the purpose of deciding a great political question? I have no animosity to persons of this description; I do not hate, and I am sure I do not envy them; I know that they are not their own makers, that they are engendered by the system which has grown up through a series of errors, and which will continue to engender their like; I reproach them not; I blame them not; all the way I stand upon the defensive, and only wish to show, that, because men are not dependent upon government, it does not, as they would insinuate, necessarily follow, that they "seek to subvert the throne." If they insist, that there is no patriotism except amongst those who applaud every measure of the minister of the day; if they insist, that there is no loyalty unaccompanied with a contract or a job; if they will have it that the minister is identified with the country and the king, and that all opposition is treason, then it will, of course, be impossible to justify the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett subsequent to the former election; but, to persons who hold different opinions; to persons who think that it may sometimes be a duty to oppose a minister, as Mr. Pitt himself seems to have thought it a few months ago; to such persons I have little doubt of making it appear, that, since the time to which I have referred, there is no part of Sir Francis Burdett's public conduct which is not perfectly justifiable.—The heads of accusation against Sir Francis, between the two elections, are three in number; to wit, his speech at the county meeting at Hackney, his speech at the anniversary of his election at the Crown and Anchor, and his recent speech in parliament upon the subject of the Civil List.—With respect to the speech at Hackney, the first thing that I recollect is, that, by the hiring prints of the late well-meaning minister, Sir Francis was made a party with myself and others in endeavouring to "create despondency," though I was then, and had long been, labouring with all my feeble

powers to rouse the spirit of the people, and to prepare them for the sacrifices which they have since made, and yet have to make. The charge against Sir Francis Burdett was, on this occasion, equally false, his evident motive was equally misrepresented; for, the utmost extent of his meaning was, that, while we prepared for the defence of our country by arms, we ought to be equally zealous and active in our endeavours to procure a change in His Majesty's servants and councils; an opinion entertained by every loyal and zealous subject; nay, an opinion entertained and soon after acted upon by the present minister and his present supporters, not excepting some of those who now impute this very opinion to Sir Francis Burdett as a crime.—The speech at the Crown and Anchor, which has been garbled not less shamefully than some foolish or wicked partizans of Sir Francis has garbled the speech of Mr. Pitt upon the corn-bill, contained nothing, in the report of it that I saw, which might not consistently have been uttered by the most patriotic and loyal of men. The selection of topics was not, perhaps, the most judicious; but there was no part of it the tendency of which was to sneer at the efforts of the people, or to lessen their resentment against the enemy. The ministry, indeed, were not spared; their selfishness, the corrupt principle upon which they held their places, were sufficiently dwelt upon, and in the description of their “inconsistency, their indecision, their negligence, and their imbecility,” Sir Francis has not been surpassed even by the “modern Cicero” himself, who has much more recently delivered his sentiments upon the same inexhaustible subject.—The speech upon the Civil List remains to be considered; and, as this has been represented as an attack upon the crown, the magnitude of the charge demands a circumstantial refutation. Here, fortunately, we have unquestionable authority to refer to, the speech having been printed (see *Parl. Debates*, Vol. II. p. 915) from the speaker's own notes. It will be recollected, that, on the 2d of July last, application was made to parliament for a grant of 591,842*l.* where-with to pay off the arrears of the Civil List; and it will also be recollected, that a similar grant for the like purpose was applied for and obtained no longer ago than the year 1802. Now, though these grants may have been necessary; though it should appear perfectly reasonable and right that the public should be told that the annual amount of the Civil List is less than 500,000*l.* while, by these occasional grants, it is augmented to an increase of twelve or thirteen hundred

thousand; though all this may be so, it certainly will not be denied, except, perhaps, by the virtuous committee, that it was a subject upon which a member of the House of Commons might speak; might be permitted just to open his lips, without thereby subjecting himself to the charge of disloyalty. Sir Francis Burdett took the liberty to say a few words to the thirty or forty persons who were about to grant this half million of money, which was to be raised upon the people, and, I am persuaded, that, in every sentiment he expressed relative to the subject immediately before him, he will be cordially joined by the reader. He objected to the ground upon which the minister had made this application, and could not see, he said, why the rise in prices and the consequent abridgment of every man's comforts should be urged as a reason for augmenting the amount of the Civil List. He complained, that there was a waste of the public money; he said, that the minister himself had confessed that, with regard to one part of the expenditure, he had acted contrary to law, and he insisted that it would be better and more constitutional to repeal the law, than thus to act in open defiance of its letter, and in violation of its principle. He did not decalaim against taxes, but against their too great amount and against the misapplication of them. “I repeat,” said he, “that feeling the pressure of the times, and the misapplication of the public money, I am averse to every thing that has a tendency to increase our difficulties. I am, however, far from wishing to make a general declamation against every species of taxation. I am of opinion, on the contrary, that taxation, properly applied, may be as beneficial as the moisture absorbed by the sun from the earth, which, falling again in rains and dews, fertilizes the soil. But, how different that taxation which is extorted from the industry of the people, and applied only to corrupt their morals, and undermine their freedom! Such is the system which has been the ruin of other countries, and is likely to be the ruin of this, if the constitutional interposition of parliament does not prevent it.” And who is there, except he be a contractor, a farmer-general, a paper-money maker, or a hired author, that can find any thing objectionable in the sentiments here expressed, in the principles here laid down? And what reason do they afford for charging the speaker with want of attachment to his country, to its cause, or to the settled order of things? How often have I observed, that our system of taxation,

extended as it now is, has greatly impaired, and would, if it could possibly proceed much further, totally destroy all real political liberty, after which civil liberty could not long exist? From such a state the change is to civil commotion, and most likely an annihilation of the government. Who was it that destroyed the French monarchy? "The Jacobins," says one: "The Freemasons," says another: and, perhaps, the saint-like members of Mr. Mainwaring's committee might be inclined to ascribe the deed to the "amours of the Queen of Abo." Alas! it was none of these: it was the financiers, the loan-jobbers, the paper-money makers, and the farmers-general. Had it not been for the previous labours of these gentry, the Jacobins would never have existed, and the Freemasons would have continued to be as childish and as harmless as they had been for centuries before. The canker-worm of taxation had eaten out the heart of the French monarchy: the farmers-general and the rest of the swarm that had sprung from the taxing system, when they found the monarchy, as then established, too weak to answer their purposes of exertion, looked about them for another sort of government. It was this description of persons who first urged the necessity of siezing on the property of the church, and of abolishing titles of nobility: they envied the latter their honours, and they demanded the revenues of the former to make good that interest upon their loans and advances which could no longer be made good by the ordinary modes of taxation. Indications of a similar disposition have not been wanting amongst the nouveaux-riches in this country: they are notoriously the enemies of the church and of the ancient aristocracy; and, as to their loyalty, if only probed a little, it will be found to consist in nothing more than a wish to preserve a king merely to sanction the measures of the minister, of any minister, by whom the system on which they fatten is persevered in, though the country is all the while reduced to the misery and disgrace of an island besieged. And shall Sir Francis Burdett, or any other man, be accused of disloyalty, because he objects to a system like this? He declared, that, with respect to pensions, nothing was further from his heart than a wish to limit the bounty of the parliament or of the crown; he expressed his regret, however, at seeing so much bounty bestowed upon persons who could pretend to no public service whatever, while so little comparatively had fallen to the share of such men as Lords Nelson and Hutchinson and Sir Sidney Smith. Who does not join him in this sentiment? Is there

any one but a mere ministerial sycophant who will deny, that it was an outrageous insult to the nation to give Mr. Huskisson, when out of place, 1200*l.* a year for life, while only 1000*l.* a year has been, by the same minister, awarded to the hero of Acre? And will any one that is fit to live, say that George Rose's son ought to receive more from the public purse than Lord Nelson? Is such a distribution of the bounty of government calculated to endear that government to the people? And is, then, every man who dares to complain of it, though he complains from his seat in parliament, to be regarded as "seeking to subvert the throne?" With regard to the royal family, Sir Francis Burdett explicitly stated, that nothing was more repugnant to his feelings than a desire to inconvenience any one of them. So far from objecting to the support of the regal dignity, he stated, that if the money to be granted were to be expended in a display of magnificence there would be less reason to complain. His great objection to the civil-list system was, that its tendency was to render the members of the royal family a set of ministerial dependents. "My most serious objection," said he, "to the vote proposed, refers to the unconstitutional application of the public money. I advert to the sums advanced to the princes of the blood without the consent of parliament. I do not think it decent or becoming that the princes of England should be dependent on the minister of the day. If they wanted relief, they ought to have made application to the House of Commons, and not condescend to receive bounties from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I recollect, however, and the reflection gives me pain, that whenever they have applied to this house in a constitutional way, for that relief to which they were entitled, their claims have been rejected. This has been particularly evinced in the applications of that illustrious member of the family who enjoys, as he deserves, the particular affection and confidence of the people; and is therefore, perhaps, an object of jealousy to some. But whenever these princes have appealed to ministers privately, that assistance has been unconstitutionally granted which ought only to have flowed from parliament. It is a subject of regret and surprise, that what parliament has refused, should be bestowed by ministerial influence." Now, can any one deny the facts here referred to? If not, will he controvert the sentiments? Will he, particularly if he be a loyal man, insist that it is decent and proper for the princes of the blood

to be dependent upon the minister of the day? Will he insist that they ought to receive their subsistence as a bounty from the Chancellor of the Exchequer? And will any one deny, that it is a subject of regret, and of very deep regret too, that the minister, having voted with a majority in parliament against a grant to a member of the royal family, should dare afterwards to make the grant of his own authority, and that he should then come and find that same parliamentary majority ready to sanction his conduct? Is there any sycophant so shameless as to stand up and say, that this is not a most scandalous abuse, and that it ought not to be corrected? If there is not, and I can hardly believe there is, even in Mr. Mainwaring's committee, what blame attaches on this account to Sir Francis Burdett? What reason is there here to conclude, that he and those who now support his cause are "seeking to subvert the throne?"—But we have not a full and fair view of this speech of Sir Francis Burdett till we take along with it the speeches of Mr. Banks and Mr. Pitt. Mr. Banks after remarking on several misstatements, sums unaccounted for, and other matters of detail, made the following observations as to the principle of the measure: "There is," said he, "another item in the report on the table upon which I confess I cannot touch without pain, but my sense of duty will not suffer me to overlook it. This is an advance of 10,000*l.* to the Duke of Clarence, which was to be paid by instalments, and of which 7000*l.* is still due. If the salary of that illustrious personage, or of any other branch of the royal family, be found inadequate to provide for the comforts which belong to the station they should occupy, I should be as ready as any man to consent to any increase that may be necessary; but I dislike the principle of such occasional advances as that to which I allude. It is a complete deviation from the spirit and letter of Mr. Burke's bill. It tends to disorganize the whole system of the civil list. It will serve to place the princes of the blood in a kind of dependence on the first lord of the treasury, who may, if this practice be tolerated, advance any sum he pleases in this clandestine manner, without the consent of parliament, to any person he chooses to accommodate, whether that person belongs to the royal family or not. For it is hard to say to what an extent the principle may be carried. It has, indeed, in one instance been extended to a military officer (Major-Gen. Gardiner), to whom above 20,000*l.* has been advanced,

with the stipulation of repayment at the rate of 300*l.* a-year, not a guinea of which has been yet received. How comes it, that the performance of such an engagement was not enforced by those who had the means of doing so, by deducting from the salaries they had to pay? The next point is the deficiency in the fees of officers in the treasury, which amounts to 15,000*l.* a sum equal to the whole salary of the higher officers in that department. How such a deficiency has grown up I wish to learn. Upon the whole, indeed, of the items to which I have alluded, I am anxious for explanation, perhaps that explanation may remove my doubts. To the time at which this proposition is submitted, I cannot help saying, that I have much objection. At such a crisis as the present, when the country has such burdens to bear, and such difficulties to encounter, I do not think it is decorous or fitting to make this application on the part of the crown."—This speech of Mr. Banks is, as to every point, much stronger than that of Sir Francis Burdett. It should be observed, too, that Sir Francis not only spoke after he had listened to Mr. Banks's very accurate, candid, and able exposition, but also after he had heard that Mr. Pitt could make no satisfactory answer to any part of it, while, as to the most material part of all, he was compelled to acknowledge, that "he was *not prepared to satisfy* his honourable friend, but yet he had no *doubt* that all the deficiencies could be satisfactorily accounted for." Was this to satisfy Sir Francis Burdett? The answer given both by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington to the remarks of Mr. Banks relative to the principle of occasional advances to the members of the royal family and others, was, that they, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington, *disferred from Mr. Banks in opinion!* Their respective answers upon the different points were truly curious. "I," said Mr. Pitt, "have no immediate concern with several of the points alluded to by my honourable friend, but I make no doubt that they *can all be explained in the most satisfactory manner.*" . . . . "I," said Mr. Addington, "was no party to the accommodation given to a branch of the royal family and to General Gardiner, but *I know it to have been extremely proper!!!*" And this was to be received as an answer to Mr. Banks! It was this juggling subterfuge that was to satisfy, or at least to silence, Sir Francis Burdett; and, if he was not silenced by it, he was to be stigmatized as disloyal, and that, too, for barely repeating in substance, but in some-

what milder phrase, what had been uttered by Mr. Banks, and notwithstanding his having uttered which, that gentleman has never been accused of disloyalty, but has still been called Mr. Pitt's "honourable friend!"

—The conduct of Sir Francis Burdett during, and particularly at the close of, the last election, shall now be shortly surveyed. He set out with appealing to the popular passions; he inveighed against the corruption and tyranny of ministers, in terms certainly somewhat too vehement and much too general; but this was rather an error in point of taste than an indication of vicious principles; for language much stronger has been made use of, hundreds of times, by men who never were either accused or suspected of disloyalty, as may be verified by any one who will take the trouble to read the speeches of the late Lord Chatham and his contemporaries. Sir Francis's flags, on which "NO BASTILLE" was exchanged for "BURDETT AND INDEPENDENCE," were of themselves strongly indicative of that moderation which he discovered from the beginning to the close of the election. Had I never known any thing of his former wild conduct, I should, had I been a free-holder, have instantly given him my vote; but, it was impossible not to remember and to disapprove of many things which he said and did during the former election, and, therefore, I had some doubts as to what I ought to wish, respecting the result of the election, till I saw the close of it, and till I was compelled to join my voice to that of every truly loyal and independent man in the country, in expressing my admiration of the spirit, the perseverance, and the moderation with which he had conducted the contest. The declaration of his political principles, which he found it necessary to make at the hustings were such as could not be disapproved of, except by the partizans of the minister; and the gentleman who proposed him vouched for his inviolable attachment to the constitution, to the person of his Majesty, and to his royal house. The supporters of Mr. Mainwaring may say, that this declaration was not sincere; but, though they should prevail upon the public to believe that Sir Francis Burdett is a person to disguise his sentiments, they must allow, that it was upon the principles of the declaration above referred to, that it was upon the grounds of loyalty, of inviolable attachment to the constitution as well as to the person and family of the King; they must allow, that these were the grounds upon which Sir Francis Burdett did, at the last election, claim the support of the freeholders of Mid-

dlesex. But, "he also rested upon the "ground of persevering opposition to the "present ministry, and to Mr. Pitt's system "of debts, of taxation, of that influence "which threatens to enslave both King and "people, and to render the minister the "absolute dictator of the country." He did so; and this may be a very good objection to the dependents of the minister; all that I beg of them is, that, if it is no objection with me, they will, another time, refrain from inferring therefrom, that I belong to a faction that "seeks to subvert the throne." I do not blame them for voting against Sir Francis Burdett, who, in the three words of his motto, sufficiently declared his hostility to them. I blame no men for hating their enemy, particularly when he is so powerful and persevering; but, then, I cannot allow that such men have any right to vilify me, because I do not participate in their hatred; because I do not think it just constantly to stir up and keep alive the political sins of Sir Francis Burdett, while the greater and far more mischievous political sins of Mr. Pitt are buried in oblivion; because I have wished, and still wish, to prevent the revival of those political animosities, which were, during the last war and at the last peace, so fruitful in national calamity and disgrace, which destroyed all freedom of discussion and almost of intercourse, and which, while it sheltered all the follies and faults of the minister even from inquiry, exposed every word and act of every other man to misrepresentation and suspicion. I never think of those times, but I blush for my country: I look back to them with a degree of abhorrence equalled only by that which I feel towards the wretches, who, at a moment when the people are united as the children of one common and beloved father in defence of their home, are, for their own malignant and interested purposes, endeavouring to sow the seeds of discord amongst them; to divide them again into Jacobins and Anti-Jacobins; to haich a pretext for measures of extraordinary coercion; to create discontent and disloyalty, to unnerve the arm of war, and to lay us prostrate at the foot of the enemy. I hope, however, that their diabolical efforts will fail of success; a hope which is greatly strengthened by the conduct of the people of Middlesex at and since the close of the election. I trust, that the recent example of the person in whose favour they have taken, and do still take, so deep an interest, will continue to induce them to refrain from clubs and cabals, from the revival of any of those associations, which, though innocent in their

beginning, seldom fail to lead to mischievous and disgraceful consequences; and, if that example should, unfortunately, be withdrawn, if this inducement should be too feeble to overcome their ungovernable and unreasonable antipathy to the minister and his system, let them recollect, that, to perpetuate his power and his system till England is completely undone, till the remnant of her glories are laid in the dust and her monarchy is annihilated, there requires only the establishment of one single society, however contemptible, which Mr. Mainwaring's committee shall be able to denominate—a Jacobin Club.—Remarks upon the conduct of the Sheriffs must be deferred to a future opportunity.

**MILITARY CARS.**—The foregoing article has left no room for observations upon other subjects, but I cannot forbear to observe, that the Volunteering System has produced amongst the coach-makers consequences exactly similar to those which it produces amongst every other description of persons, and which from its very nature, it must produce. When this project was first mentioned in the Register, p. 253, foreseeing the bickerings it would give rise to, I endeavoured to show, that a proclamation of the King, commanding all persons to hold all their horses and carriages in readiness, would have been greatly preferable, concluding my remarks with these words: "How quietly would the whole matter have been thus settled! Every horse and waggon in the kingdom would have been ready at a moment's warning: when the occasion arrived, government would have taken just what it wanted, and no more: there would have been no confusion, no loss, no ostentatious subscriptions, no *importunate distinctions*, no exertions of patriotism *for the sake of getting a place or a CONTRACT*: all would have been regular and quiet; the King would have lawfully commanded, and his people would have cheerfully obeyed." This was said no longer than fourteen days ago. I was grossly abused for it. I was, in one print, accused of *libelling* the gentlemen who had come forward with so much zeal and disinterestedness; and, in another print, my remarks were represented as calculated to invite the enemy to invade our shores. After this I think I shall be excused for copying, from one of these very prints, the following extract of a letter published by some of the patriotic coach-makers. "At a meeting of the coach-makers

"held at the Freemason's Tavern, on the 13th of August, Mr. Lukin, the chairman, observed, that he had received a letter from the Commissary-Gen. stating that it was the farther wish of govt., to have four harness to each carriage so subscribed; and, if any coach-maker had not old ones, by him, new ones were to be made, according to a pattern to be seen, the expense of which would be paid for by govt. Every coach-maker present, I entertain no doubt, viewed the matter in this light. The meeting under this impression, was adjourned by the chairman, and has never since been reconvened, although govt. recommended to the committee to view and value the carriages, entered, or to be entered, in the paper, that if lost or damaged, they might be paid for according to their value. Since this meeting, the Commissary-Gen. has thought proper to adopt, (for what reason I know not,) another mode of procedure. He has entered into a *contract* with two coach-makers only, residing in Long Acre, for 1500 pair of harness, to be made according to pattern and price agreed on. This he has done *without again advising with any of the members of the committee*, or any other of the coach-makers, who have not only so liberally come forward with their offers of carriages, but have also, at the recommendation of the chairman, gone about among their brethren soliciting their subscriptions. On reviewing the subject I feel myself at a loss to account for the sudden change in opinion manifested by the Commissary-General, which I cannot forbear regarding as a *most extraordinary one, every thing considered!!!* It appears to me somewhat inconsistent, after convening a body of people together for a particular purpose, fully explained and defined in a proposition of his own, that the Commissary-General, even after having induced that meeting to forsake their individual capacity, to lead others into a similar situation, should, without any regard to his own *CONTRACT* with the coach-makers in general, or to the *honour of the country*, have made a *PRI-VATE CONTRACT* with two individual coach-makers only. — N. E. One of these two, at the first meeting, subscribed as his number, *eighteen* carriages, and after the second meeting, which was adjourned, he restricted his offer to *ten* carriages."—There is the text, Sir Brook; furnish you the comment!

*"Public debts, which at first were a security to governments, by interesting many in the public tranquillity, are likely, in their excess, to become the means of their subversion. If governments provide for these debts by heavy impositions, they perish by becoming odious to the people. If they do not provide for them, they will be undone by the efforts of the most dangerous of all parties; I mean an extensive discontented monied interest. If the men who compose this interest find the old governments not to be of sufficient vigour for their purposes, they may seek new ones that shall be possessed of more energy; and this energy will be derived, not from an acquisition of resources, but from a contempt of justice."*  
BURKE. Reflections on the French Revolution.

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## TO THE BRITISH SHIP-OWNERS\*.

"Assuredly this restriction" (meaning the complaint made by the assembly of Jamaica of that which they style the injurious restriction laid on their intercourse with the United States of America) "is to them a great disadvantage, merely as planters of Jamaica; but there remains no doubt in my mind, that the navigation laws may be strictly adhered to, as to spirit and utility, without leaving the Jamaica or West India planters any ground of complaint."—  
COBBETT'S Observations on the Complaints of the West India Colonists.

Gentlemen,—Such are the sentiments of a political writer who seems from the several papers recently admitted into his work, and from his observations upon them, to support, in some measure, the object of the West I. colonists, to obtain permission to employ generally American ships in the trade of the British West I. islands: it therefore afforded me much satisfaction to observe your attention had been directed, by a recent writer under the signature of Alfred, to the pamphlet lately published on this subject by Mr. Jordan, the agent for Barbadoes; and I fervently hope the shipping interest of G. Britain will not fail to avail themselves of the timely intimation given them of the projects of the West I. planters, and to exert all their influence, not only to prevent such ruinous concessions being made to them, but to obtain early in the next session of parliament, an investigation into the actual state of the navigation of the country; for it is evident to me, that the public are not fully apprized of the real and truly depressed state of the shipping interest.—If the present moment is neglected the persevering efforts aided by the political influence, in a certain quarter, of the West I. planters,

will most probably produce the concessions they are now so strenuously soliciting, and which is evident, not only from the pamphlet referred to, but also from the several communications made by the different assemblies of the colonies to the ministry: indeed it will require the united exertions of the ship owners of G. Britain to counteract the endeavours of the West I. planters to obtain the suspension of the act of navigation, so far as to afford American vessels a free intercourse to trade with the British West I. colonies. The planters are not only powerful in parliament, but they are to be feared from the great talents and the various complicated interests connected with them, which are now exerted in their favour; and it is not improbable they may abandon their objections to many other points in difference between them and the govt. of the mother country, should the ministry (but which God forbid) be inclined to yield to their application with respect to the employment of American ships in the trade of the British West I. islands.—The dissensions between the assembly of Jamaica and the govt. of that island have tended to encourage this particular claim of the planters; and every means appear to have been adopted by them to compel the late administration to accede to their desire of being allowed to employ American ships in the trade of the islands; but fortunately for the shipping interest, and for the country, the happy change in H. M.'s councils took place before it was effected. The monopoly of the navigation act, so called by Mr. Jordan, the high rate of freight of British ships, the state of the English market for sugar, and the additional duties imposed by this govt., have of late been the constant theme of the planters and their agents, which, together with the outcry of a free intercourse for American ships with the British islands, too manifestly shew the anxious desire of the planters for a closer connexion with the U. S. of America. It is scarce necessary to point out the evils which

\* This letter, it will be perceived, has already appeared in another public paper. The subject is very important. Both sides of it should be fairly and fully viewed. Some remarks referring to this letter will be found in the Summary of Politics.

will most assuredly result to the mother country, should American ships be admitted to trade generally from that continent with the British colonies on the same footing as British ships; they are, indeed, too obvious to need enumeration; I shall therefore, at this time, merely select a few passages from the papers alluded to, which are evidently written at the instance of the planters, and leave it to a more able pen to depict the calamitous consequences which will ensue to G. Britain by giving way to this, amongst many other inordinate claims of the West I. planters — “ Besides the severity of misery in laying such duties, another wound to the interest of the planter, is the high rate of freight, which is imposed on account of the enormous expense of sailing merchant ships. The navigation act, as you observe, is another grievance; for North America is the life and soul of Jamaica. Sugar is to be shipped there, only in British bottoms, which the American govt. takes care to burden with charges of entry to almost a prohibition.”

POLITICAL REGISTER for July. — “ The amount of debt with which Jamaica is loaded commercially, should be known to ministers.” — “ So open to the consequences of war, the enormous private debts, increasing public debts, destruction of internal credit, and agitation of credit with English merchants; the change in the Spanish trade, the costs of shipping, the power of the navigation act, &c.”

Id. — “ Such are the extracts I submit to your consideration, and such are the observations I have presumed to make, in order to give effect to Alfred's views in directing your serious attention to this subject. It is much to be regretted, that amongst so numerous and meritorious a class of H. M.'s subjects, and whose interests are so deeply interwoven with the dearest and first interest of the empire, there should appear so much supineness and indifference. The want of energy and unanimity in the shipping interest of the country, notwithstanding the immense capital they have embarked in shipping, has subjected them within the last twelve years to many grievous impositions and injuries, and although “ the society of ship owners of Great Britain ” has, since its recent establishment, produced great good to the maritime interest of the country, yet much remains to be done. The jealousy with which that laudable and patriotic institution has been viewed has, in some measure, retarded its progress; but the openness and candour which has characterised all the proceedings of its members can-

not fail to satisfy the mind of the most fastidious, that this establishment will ultimately be attended with the most beneficial effect to the nation.

EXTRACT FROM THE FRENCH OFFICIAL PAPER, THE MONITEUR, RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF THE KING OF SWEDEN.

The article which is inserted under the head of Ratisbon, is preceded by the two notes which will be found below; and mention is also made of a third note, delivered to the Diet of Ratisbon so long ago as the 8th of May, 1801, in which the King of Sweden, as Duke of Pomerania, caused to be communicated to the three colleges of the empire, by his minister to the Diet, M. the Baron de Belt, a note, in which he invites his co-estates to shew their gratitude to his R. H. A.-D. Charles, who has twice saved southern Germany from the invasion of the enemy, by the erection at Ratisbon of a colossal statue, representing that prince, to which all the estates of the empire ought to contribute. — The two other notes are as follows. — *Note dated 26th Jan. 1804.* — “ The undersigned has received the order of his Majesty the King of Sweden, as Duke of Anterior Pomerania, his most gracious King and master to declare — “ That his Majesty the King, always animated with the liveliest solicitude for the welfare of the German empire, has not been able to behold with indifference and in silence the unconstitutional attempts which several princes of the empire have lately made upon the ancient rights of a part of the immediate nobility, and upon its political existence, secured to it by the constitution and the last law of the empire. “ He has, in consequence, found himself under the necessity of representing to the Diet of the empire, that it is of the highest importance to stop and to prevent in future such disorders and arbitrary proceedings. The King therefore supposes, that his co-estates will join in the resolution which he has taken to pray his Imperial Majesty, in virtue of his authority and of his rights, as supreme chief of the empire, that he will be pleased to employ the means which Providence has placed in his hands, to maintain untouched the Germanic constitution, and to guard it from any attempts directed against it. As to abuses by the said princes of the empire, which are made the pretexts, that may have grown up in the course of several ages, his Majesty

“ the King is persuaded, that the Emperor  
 “ and the empire, when they shall have  
 “ been requested by the interested states  
 “ of the empire, will cause them to be in-  
 “ quired into with the most rigid severity,  
 “ and have them fully disclosed to view;  
 “ in order that justice may be done to  
 “ each, and that in future they may not  
 “ afford room for such discussions, which  
 “ might have consequences more danger-  
 “ ous.—His Majesty is also convinced,  
 “ that the deliberation which may be  
 “ opened for this purpose between the  
 “ Emperor and the empire, may take place  
 “ with reciprocal harmony and good un-  
 “ derstanding, so necessary to the general  
 “ welfare; and that, in consequence,  
 “ the mediation of foreign powers, in an  
 “ affair which exclusively relates to the  
 “ internal concerns of the empire, will be  
 “ declined, as such mediation would be  
 “ contrary to the independence and the  
 “ dignity of the empire, and might give  
 “ birth to an idea that the Emperor and  
 “ the empire are two different powers,  
 “ while, in fact, they form but one and the  
 “ same power; that they are united by  
 “ the most sacred and inviolable duties,  
 “ and, consequently, want no other medi-  
 “ ator but the constitution and the laws of  
 “ the empire.—His Majesty, the King,  
 “ therefore, deems it necessary to fix anew  
 “ the attention of the empire upon the  
 “ consequences of these illegal takings of  
 “ military possession, and to repeat what  
 “ he has already made known upon the  
 “ subject, as a proof that his Majesty, in  
 “ disapproving of these illegal proceedings,  
 “ foresaw at the same time the prejudicial  
 “ effects of such examples.—His Majesty  
 “ the King, in consequence, invites his co-  
 “ estates to put an end to these attacks,  
 “ and to consider that their own safety,  
 “ their particular independence, and the  
 “ independence of the empire in general,  
 “ depend upon them; as an estate of the  
 “ empire can only exist under the ægis of  
 “ the constitution and of the laws, and  
 “ that its existence is incompatible with  
 “ violent encroachments; for, from the  
 “ moment it suffers them, its power and  
 “ its consideration rests upon tottering  
 “ bases. The strong would then fancy  
 “ that they had always a right against the  
 “ weak; and the empire, reduced by its  
 “ intestine divisions to a state of dissolu-  
 “ tion, would become, in the end, the prey  
 “ and the spoil of foreign powers.—To  
 “ prevent, in time, such baneful and cala-  
 “ mitous events, it is absolutely necessary  
 “ that all the states and members of the

“ empire should prevail upon themselves  
 “ to draw closer the bonds of union and  
 “ reciprocal confidence; and that they  
 “ should abstain, above all things, from  
 “ every arbitrary act against the constitu-  
 “ tion of the empire, which is the object  
 “ of their common safety.”—*Note dated*  
*14th May, 1804.*—“ His Majesty the King  
 “ of Sweden, having been informed of the  
 “ contents of the declaration which his  
 “ Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the  
 “ Russias has communicated to the Diet of  
 “ the empire, dated the 7th April last,  
 “ conceives himself also obliged to declare,  
 “ that in all cases relating to the guaranty  
 “ of the German constitution, he can rec-  
 “ kon upon himself, as King of Sweden,  
 “ and, with a just title, as one of the most  
 “ ancient, being the guarantee of the peace  
 “ of Westphalia; but, however, that his  
 “ Majesty has not thought it necessary to  
 “ declare his sentiments as a guarantee of  
 “ the constitution, in the business in ques-  
 “ tion, always conceiving that the chief of  
 “ the empire would make known to the  
 “ Diet his mode of thinking and acting.  
 “ The sentiments of the King are, besides,  
 “ too well known, and have been too often  
 “ communicated to the Diet, for his Ma-  
 “ jesty to think that it is necessary to  
 “ repeat them upon this occasion.”—

*Remarks of the Moniteur, in that print of the*  
*14th August, 1804.*—“ We have read the  
 “ strange declarations which the King of Swe-  
 “ den has addressed to the Diet of Ratisbon.—  
 “ Nothing could be more striking than the in-  
 “ consistency of these steps on the part of the  
 “ Swedish monarch, if the stamp of folly  
 “ which is impressed upon them, did not strike  
 “ still more forcibly. What! whilst Poland  
 “ has been divided under your eyes; whilst  
 “ the enfeebled Ottoman empire exists no  
 “ longer than the powers bordering upon your  
 “ states will permit; whilst France, by shut-  
 “ ting her ports against the ships of your na-  
 “ tion, can so essentially injure your com-  
 “ merce; without provocation, without any  
 “ motive to induce you to it, you delight in  
 “ offering her daily insults.—When Gustavus  
 “ was successful in the thirty years’ war, it was  
 “ with the assistance of France, and with that  
 “ force of genius and inclination, which cha-  
 “ racterises all the measures of a great man.  
 “ Poland was then respectable; Turkey ex-  
 “ isted in all her vigour; and Russia had not  
 “ yet any existence in Europe.—But by what  
 “ right, and with what views, do you excite  
 “ the Germanic body against France! When  
 “ Germany was engaged in a disastrous war,  
 “ through the instigation of Sweden, you were  
 “ the first to make your peace, and you sent

ambassadors to reside at Paris. During every crisis, the G. body heard nothing of you; but peace was hardly concluded, when you resolved to shew that you were still in being, and you demanded that a statue should be erected to prince Charles.—This prince has acquired glory and the esteem of Germany. France is the first to acknowledge it. But is it with your troops that he has acquired it? If you are a member of the empire, why did you not succour it with your army? If you are one of the guarantees of the treaty of Westphalia, why did you make your peace before the G. empire made theirs?—How does it happen, that you are the only power that does not feel how disagreeable your proceedings at Ratisbon are, even to the G. body itself?—Whilst you sell your cities, you engage in a fantastic discussion of concerns in Germany; whilst you enjoy hospitality at Baden, you insult your father-in-law. There has not been a day of your residence at Carlsruhe, in which you have not given just cause of complaint to that prince. Lastly, during your abode with your brother-in-law, the Elector of Bavaria, you sign and date from Munich, a note, contrary to his interest. This prince was then weakened by the war; he was surrounded by armies; he was on the point of being invaded; he would have wanted your assistance, if your arm could have given him any; and it is at that moment, and in the very heart of his capital that you write against him!—You are yet young; but when you shall have attained the age of maturity, if you read the notes you issue as impromptus when travelling post, you will surely repent of not having followed the advice of your experienced and faithful ministers; you will then do that, which you always ought to have done; you will regard only the welfare of your subjects, and the good of your country; what it has done for you and for your ancestors, requires that you should not sacrifice its interest to vain and irregular passions. You will attempt no more than you can perform; and you will not drive the G. body into a war, to the success of which you could contribute nothing; and in which your father-in-law and brother-in-law would probably make a common cause with France.—And then, if the interest of the Baltic induces you to unite with Denmark, you will feel that this interest is truly yours; that it is connected with the safety of your states, with the dignity of your crown, and the glory of your nation. You would have taken your precautions so as not to have left your coast unprotected, or to have suffered an enemy's fleet to pass

with impunity, within half a cannon shot from your shores, to bombard Copenhagen. It is not by such trophies that your ancestors acquired glory, and adorned the page of history. In short, you will not make, from the inducement of a pitiful subsidy, what no nation of Europe has yet made, a treaty so unworthy of your rank, as to be nearly tantamount to an abdication of your sovereignty. —We really think that, if you read this advice, it will be lost upon you; but we believe, at the same time, that you will not receive any other lesson from France. She is very indifferent to all your steps; indeed she does not call you to account for your conduct, because she cannot confound a loyal and brave nation, and a people who, being her faithful allies for centuries, were justly called the French of the North; nay, she does not confound them with a young man led astray by false notions, and unenlightened by reflection.—Your countrymen will be always well treated by France; your merchant ships will be well received by her; even your squadrons, if they are in want, will be victualled in her ports; she will see in your flags none but the ensigns of Gustavus, who reigned before you; and when the fire of your passion shall be extinguished, when you shall have learnt the true situation of Europe, and appreciated your own, France will be always ready to regard the true interest of your nation, and to shut her eyes upon what you have been, or what you shall have done.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

INVASION.—The alarm and bustle, upon this score, have again subsided. The spectre has vanished, and we are ourselves again! But, when will it be laid never again to rise? Even Napoleon could not answer the question. It is more a matter of contingency than any thing that ever occupied the attention of any portion of mankind. Precisely what will be the result no man can tell, and hardly can guess; but, to lay down our arms as we took them up; to continue in the same relative situation with respect to France that we were in previous to hostilities, and also to continue in the same, or nearly the same, internal state, is, as far as I can judge, absolutely impossible. At present there appears to be no inducement for France to bring the contest to a close by negotiation; nor is it easy to discover how such an inducement can arise. Russia, who has her own quarrel with France, and her own views to answer, will, if she declare war, not continue it an hour for the purpose of putting us in possession of

Malta, while it is truly amusing to see her, by our connivance, getting, inch by inch, possession of Mr. Pitt's far-famed "infant republic" of the Seven Islands, the establishment of which republic that gentleman, in his speech of the 3d of November, 1801, represented as "an acquisition of great importance for this country, not inferior, perhaps, to the possession of Malta itself!"—Russia cannot, I repeat it, of herself, make any diversion in our favour; and, as to those who expect aid from Sweden, God help them! Well, then, what are we to do? Ask that of the ministers, who began a war with the avowed intention of "repressing the ambition and chastising the insolence" of Buonaparté, and who, in order to execute their plan, locked up all the force of the kingdom in militia and volunteer corps. Ask them how we are to be relieved from this embarrassing and tormenting situation. One thing, however, any body may safely assert, and that is, we cannot be relieved, till our *bank-notes are payable in specie*; for till then, the enemy will never desist from his attempts to ruin us in this most certain, and to him most easy, of all possible ways.—Nor is this circumstance less important, if considered with respect to continental alliances, it being well known, that British gold is, and must ever be, the soul of such alliances. I am not supposing, that, because we see no guineas in England, the government is therefore unable to send subsidies to the Continent. That is not the ground of my opinion as to the difficulties attending the granting of subsidies. The ground is, that, to grant subsidies of any considerable amount, the minister must greatly add to the taxes, and the Bank must make a proportionate addition to its paper; and, in this way, our allies would be fighting for the enemy more than against him.—The eyes of the Continent are not shut with respect either to the magnitude, the nature, or the cause of our embarrassments; and we may be assured, that, till our prospect clears up, we shall have few, if any efficient aid from other powers. This being our situation, we should be the more firmly resolved to bear with fortitude whatever toils or sacrifices may be necessary to our own defence: and, indeed, we should not be over scrupulous in inquiring what is necessary and what is not: every one should bear and should perform as much as he is able, let the requisition, provided it be authorized by law, come through whom it may. For, we should always remember, that it is not the minister, but our King and our country that

we have to fight for.—A ministerial paper of the 1st inst. has the following curious passage: "*We very much regret that the enemy has actually returned to Boulogne, without enforcing his threat by a descent on our shores.* It would have afforded us the means of putting the question of invasion to rest, perhaps for ever. We should have had the satisfaction and the glory of defeating, if not destroying, that enemy who has annoyed, and who now terrifies the other powers of Europe."—This is so much like the Bully Bluff; it is so flagrant a mark of vulgar cowardice, that it would be a shame to quote it without observing, that it has met with the unqualified contempt of the public, who, like myself, neither express nor feel any regret, that the enemy has not made a descent upon our shores, but, on the contrary, are very glad of it. I, for my part, do not wish him to put to sea; but, if he does, I have no hesitation in praying, that every boat may be destroyed by our fleet, at a very great distance from our shores. This, I am pretty confident, would be the result; and in that confidence I am much happier than in any hopes from the exertions of either Mr. Pitt's corps, or the cars of Sir Brook and his committees of coach-makers.—If there should be any persons who wish to know my opinion as to the probability of a serious attempt at invasion being made, it may not be improper for me to declare, that, for the reasons which I have frequently given, I am persuaded, that the attempt will not be made for a year, or more. But, I repeat again and again, that our preparations should never be laid aside, till the question is decided. It is every man's duty to be ready.

CAR-PROJECT.—When, in a former sheet, p. 315, I submitted to the public my reasons for believing, that the project of conveying armies in carriages would, if attempted to be put in execution, prove nugatory, if not mischievous, I thought it necessary to apprise the ministerial editors, that, if they wished to counteract the effect of those reasons, it must be by showing them to be erroneous, and not by imputing factiousness to the person from whom they proceeded. Notwithstanding this caution, however, the persons alluded to, have, instead of opposing my reasons by better reasons, or by any reasons at all, misrepresented me; referred to false facts, appealed to the superior judgment of persons in power! and have, one of them at least, given way to more violence and abuse than ever; a sort of conduct which I should have treated with the silent contempt it eminently deserves, did it

not afford me a favourable opportunity of showing, how totally incapable of defence this mischievous project is, even by those whose business, whose bounden duty, it is to defend it. "To the writer," says one of them, "who has given a long and edifying dissertation, to prove that men travel much quicker, and arrive at the end of their journey much less fatigued, on foot, than in carriages, we have nothing to offer. We have, however, heard of the advantages the French gained at the commencement, and at many subsequent periods of the last war, by conveying their troops in carriages. We also attach some respect to the present plan, from its being approved by the Commander in Chief, and by many men of knowledge and judgment, as well military officers as others, and we can by no means condemn it, because those who have no pretension to judgment in the matter, appear satisfied with it." This is the *answer* to a long dissertation, as this writer calls it! It is not long, but it contains enough to show, that the writer of it is not entirely without pretensions to judgment in the matter. The appeal to the superior wisdom of persons in power, particularly the Commander in Chief, is one of those arguments, which, as Swift observes, "like a flail, there is no defence against;" of those knock me down arguments, with which a well-drilled ministerial mercenary always goes about ready armed, and according to which wisdom and virtue exist in an exact proportion to the power that the possessors have of doing him harm, or good.

"Tis from high life high characters are drawn;  
 "A saint in rags is twice a saint in law;  
 "A judge is just, a chancellor juster still;  
 "A gentleman learn'd: a bishop what you will;  
 "Wise, if a minister, but, if a king,  
 "More wise, more learn'd, more just, more every  
 "thing."

His Royal Highness, the Commander in Chief, if, indeed, he has approved of this project, will, I am persuaded, despite the persons who adopt this mode of arguing in its defence, as he must, from sad experience, well know, that there is not a wider difference between Satan and an Angel of light than between a court-sycophant and a loyal subject.—The other writer, to whom I have alluded, and in whose production the temper, or rather the intemperance, of one of Mr. Pitt's young friends is but too evidently, prefers his remarks with abuse in quantity so great, so foul in its nature and so rapid and indiscriminate in its course, that it can, in the whole physical world, find no adequate representative, except it be one of those torrents, which, after a sudden storm,

bears to the Thames, through a filthy gutter, the more filthy contents of some stench-ed-up alley. The editor of the Morning Chronicle appearing to agree with me, in most respects, as to the car-project, we are, by this writer, taken together. He ascribes our objections to "daring and wanton malignity;" he talks of the shafts of our "malice," of our "sneering impertinence," of our "impudent animadversions;" he accuses us of "scoffing" at measures necessary to the defence of the country, of "libelling" every public man who differs from us not excepting the King, of the "foullest calumny," of the "basest licentiousness," of "scandalous infamy;" we ourselves are called "scribblers and borples;" and, as to the Opposition in general, he describes them as a "faction dangerous to the true interests of the country," and as a "desperate junta." This is the best description he can afford of an Opposition including almost every nobleman in the kingdom of ancient family, and almost every commoner of independent circumstances and character: this is the description he gives of that Opposition, which, as will be seen by the division upon the military project bill, included more than two-thirds of the county-members of England; that Opposition which contains nine-tenths of the property as well as the talents of both Houses of Parliament; that Opposition under which Mr. Pitt and his projects must finally sink, never more to rise. It is right to observe, too, that these accusations are conveyed to the public through a print, in which great regret was expressed that the leaders of the present Opposition were not admitted into the new ministry, and in which the blame of exclusion was ascribed personally to the King; and yet this is the print through which the whole of this Opposition is now styled a desperate junta, and in which the Morning Chronicle is accused of libelling the King, because it hints that his Majesty lends to his minister too ready and implicit an ear! With this editor, as well as with his relation, the maxim may be, "away with the measures and principles, and give us the men;" but, I think, they will find it hard to make the public believe, that any such maxim has ever been inculcated, or acted upon, in the pages of this work, where, if men have been, and still are, censured, it has been, and still is, on account of their principles and measures. Before I dismiss this part of the subject, I cannot help adverting to a sentiment which I find here, and which, if not new with writers of this cast, is somewhat out of the common road just at this time. In alluding to the Opposition writers, this champion of the

ministry says, "they attack the members of every department in that government under which they live and by which they are protected." Now, if this sentence has any meaning at all, it is, that we live by mere sufferance under the present government, or ministry, and that we ought to be grateful for the protection it affords us! But, is there any man in the country willing to admit a principle like this? Is there any man who will thus acknowledge, that the means and the powers of the state, that the revenues, the courts of justice, the army and the navy, are the *property* of the ministry, and that the protection those means and powers afford can, at the pleasure of that ministry, be granted, or denied? In a word, is there an Englishman breathing, is there any one, bearing that name, so base as to look upon protection as a *favour*, and not as a *right*? So detestably base as to be content to enjoy his property and his life by the *permission* of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville, Mr. Canning and George Rose, Messrs. Huskisson and Sturges? If there be, the wretch may sleep in quiet: the armies of Napoleon have no terrors for him: he has nothing to apprehend from the conquest of his country: he has neither political nor civil liberty to lose, and he is a slave far too submissive to be chained.—Trusting to the indulgence of the reader for having suffered myself to be provoked into so long a digression from my subject, I now come to what this writer has said respecting the military-car project. Speaking of the editor of the *Morning Chronicle*, "he has," says he, "been at particular pains to turn into ridicule the meetings for the speedy conveyance of troops that have been held at different places in this metropolis. Does the sage writer of these criticisms recollect what prodigious advantages were obtained by the French when their northern territory was invaded in 1794? When the quick manner of transporting the troops procured them victory in every quarter, and gained them the applause while it excited the admiration of all Europe? Or does the machinery by which the troops are to be conveyed meet with this great man's sarcastic observation? Though he may choose to yoke himself to the same vehicle with another opposition scribbler, does he wish the defenders of England to be drawn by such ill-assorted cattle? Whatever the motives of the man may be, the fact is, that as the country invaded does not choose the spot where it is to meet its enemy, it is necessary to be prepared in a variety of places. Celerity of conveyance for the troops is then a matter of the very greatest impor-

tance. This was fully experienced in 1794, when, from the lines of Weissemburg to West Flanders, an extent of six hundred miles, there was a connexion kept up between the French armies; and the troops appeared and disappeared, like magic, just as they were or were not wanted. The invading army cannot have the same advantage, because they are farther separated. If there are numbers of attacks made at once, and if they are only at one place, there is no occasion for it at all. The French had not the means that we have; but they had energy and will, and it was not an uncommon thing to see six or eight grenadiers mounted on a plough, carried along at a brisk trot from one army to the other.—If they did not arrive with great expedition, they at least arrived fresh, which is the best half of the business, and were therefore ready to act as soon as they alighted. Mr. Pope says, when he was a young man, alluding to his conceit of himself. "And every thing was 'wrong I did not know!' The two men to whom we allude, a notorious opposition scribbler and his brother labourer, in another similar publication, might make a parody on this line by saying—'And every thing was wrong I did not do.' Suppose the enemy arrive at Brighton and Deal at the same time, neither is very distant from the metropolis, and if we cannot oppose him at both places with superior force there might be much danger; but by means of speedy conveyance, our troops can arrive faster than theirs can disembark, and thus we may stop their progress on their very landing, which is certainly what we ought to expect ourselves to accomplish; so that the difference between having 20,000 or 40,000 men to attack the enemy on its debarkation, depends entirely on the celerity of conveyance. Besides the advantage of promptitude in assembling an army of powerful and superior numbers, it is of great importance to attack an enemy when sea-sick, which, at the end of so short a voyage, and coming in such craft, is certain to be the case to a violent degree. Not only are the men and officers sick, but they have what is termed the Sea Brain; that is, a wild confusion in the head, which prevents them from drawing up in order. This continues for several hours. We must therefore applaud, in the highest terms, those very measures which these two harpies condemn." When the reader has taken time to admire the style and phraseology of this passage, I shall beg his attention to a remark or two upon it.—The ad-

vantages which the French are said to have derived from conveying troops in carriages is, I rather think, purely imaginary. That there was a connexion kept up between the lines of Weisemburg and the army in West Flanders, and that carriages were of some use therein nobody will deny; but that ten thousand men, or even one thousand men, were ever conveyed from army to army, on one road, at one time, in this manner, has never been stated upon any authority worth notice, and never will be believed. But, the story of six or eight grenadiers being carried along at a brisk trot *upon a plough*, and arriving *fresh* at the end of their journey, renders the whole too romantic to deserve a serious refutation. Yes, it was indeed said that the allied armies were beaten in consequence of the "French troops appearing and disappearing like *magic*;" and, I dare say the reader will recollect, that Captain Bobadil was "planet-struck," though threshed in exactly the same way, and with nearly the same sort of instrument, that one threshes a sheaf of wheat. It did not require a supposition of a double disembarkation to convince me, that there would be great danger unless we could oppose the enemy with superior force at his first landing; and, I would beg to know, when I said, or insinuated, that, in case of a landing, it would not be desirable to convey troops to the spot as speedily as possible? When I said, that our success would not, in a great measure, depend upon our being able to meet the enemy with superior force at his landing? These are points upon which there neither is, nor can be, any difference of opinion. As to a "sea-brain," however, I remember that the army of Abercrombie experienced no inconvenience from it upon their landing, in face of the enemy, at Aboukir; and, if I were permitted to hazard a conjecture upon so delicate a subject, I should express my fear, that this writer had been describing the state of his own brain instead of that of an invading French army, a fear which swells into perfect terror, when we consider that, from the recent projects, there is but too much reason to suspect, that this disorder, "this wild confusion in the head," has descended very far before it reached the unhappy person in whom it has now become so conspicuous.—To return to the speedy conveyance of troops. I deny none of the positions of this writer as to the advantage of such conveyance; I only deny, that the troops, in any number above four or five hundred, upon any one road, from any one point, can be conveyed in cars so soon as they can march upon their legs. This is my position: in support of it I have given some

reasons: I am convinced that they cannot be refuted; and many others are of the same opinion. This position, therefore, it was his business to overset; and not to occupy his columns with idle stories about grenadiers trotting upon "a plough," and about the allies being beaten by troops that "appeared and disappeared like magic." Who ever denied, that the enemy will choose the place of his landing, and that it is "necessary to be prepared in a variety of places?" Have I denied this? No: but I have denied, and I still deny, that, let him land where he will, you can convey a thousand, only one thousand, men in cars, upon one road, from one spot, so soon as you can march them on foot. I have supposed the case of a landing; I have stated particulars as to numbers, distance, and time; I have specified the difficulties and dangers of an attempt to execute the project; and I have shown, that, even if it were practicable, it would be useless. In answer, what am I honoured with? A reference to the superior judgment of the ministry, a blinking of the question, and a torrent of abuse! If this is the best that "Mr. Pitt's young friends" can do, it would certainly be prudent in them to let politics alone.

NAVIGATION LAWS.—The reader will not have failed to observe, that a contest of great importance, in many points of view, has recently sprung up, relative to the degree of rigour, with which the navigation laws should be enforced with respect to the West India islands, particularly as it affects the intercourse between those islands and the United States of America. The planters contend, that the execution of the laws ought to be relaxed: the British ship-owners, that they ought not to be relaxed. A Mr. Jordan, agent for Barbadoes, has published a very able pamphlet in support of the claims of the planters, and to that pamphlet I must, for the present, content myself with referring the reader. The ship-owners have made some publications in the diurnal prints, in addition to the pamphlet published on their side of the question by Lord Sheffield. One of these publications I insert in the present sheet; and I shall here give the substance of a statement, which was therewith transmitted to me by one of the ship-owners. He states:—1, That there is, owing to various causes, a great depression in the shipping interest of this country:—2, That, at present, the capital embarked in shipping does not produce a clear profit of four per centum, being a very inadequate return for money so employed, considering the risk and the heavy responsibility which the law of England imposes upon ship owners:—

3, That, since 1783, there has been an average advance on ship-provisions of £89, 8s. 8d. per centum, on materials and stores £84, 16s. 9d., on seamen's wages £44, 4s. 11d., and that there has been an increase of the duties on the importation of naval stores, including the duties imposed during the two last sessions of parliament, of £98, 10s. 6d. per centum; while, the average advance of freights, during the same period, has not been more than £24, 5s. 0d. per centum:—4, That, to ascertain, whether capital embarked in shipping is beneficially employed, a reference to the custom-house books is not sufficient, because those books, which are, at best, an uncertain standard, are particularly so with regard to the quantity of British shipping, seeing that the register-act, which was passed in 1786, does not compel the owners to return the registers of such of their ships as are lost, broken-up, or taken:—5, That, in the accounts laid before parliament, there has not been any allowance made for the tonnage of such ships, while all the new and other ships entitled to British registry, since 1786, have been regularly added to the list of ships which were admitted to registry in that year, whence has arisen a fallacious representation of the state of the tonnage belonging to the country, which, year after year, the parliament are taught to believe to be much greater in amount than it really is:—6, That another inaccuracy, in these parliamentary accounts, arises from the number of voyages each ship makes in every year not being particularized or distinguished, the amount being made out and entitled the quantity of tonnage including the repeated voyages, &c. so that, in fact, instead of producing the account of the actual tonnage belonging to the country, it produces an account of the quantity of tonnage employed including the repeated voyages:—7, That the true way of ascertaining the quantity of British tonnage employed, and whether there has been any increase or decrease in the employment of foreign ships in the trade of G. Britain, is, to refer to the accounts of exports and imports, distinguishing those in foreign and those in British vessels, and, that, from such an account, it would appear, agreeably to a statement in the Register, vol. I. p. 559, that the increase of foreign vessels in the trade of this country was, for the three years ending with 1801, one-fifth, while British vessels had only increased one-fifteenth.—Such is the substance of the statement with which I have been favoured; and, I am fully persuaded, that the depressed state of the shipping interest is therein by no means exaggerated. Yet, I know not how to say

to the West Indian planters, that, for this, or for any other reason, they ought to be content to starve, or to derive no profit from their capital. The intolerable duties upon their produce have rendered it absolutely impossible for them to live, without a relaxation of the navigation laws in favour of their intercourse with other countries, particularly that country, whence alone they can be furnished with those things, provisions and lumber, without which their cultivation cannot proceed. A relaxation has taken place; but a further relaxation is necessary; and a further and a further will be necessary with every addition that is made to the duties upon their produce. That such additions will be made, if the present system be persevered in, is certain: so that, the consequence will be, that, as far as relates to the West Indies, the custom-house, or, more properly speaking, the funding system, will swallow up the navigation; and this is one of the many ways in which that system is undermining the strength, and hastening the subjugation, of the kingdom.

PAPER-ARISTOCRACY.—Amongst the great and numerous dangers to which this country, and particularly the monarchy, is exposed in consequence of the enormous public debt, the influence, the powerful and widely-extended influence, of the monied interest is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it necessarily aims at measures which directly tend to the subversion of the present order of things. In speaking of this monied interest, I do not mean to apply the phrase, as it was applied formerly, that is to say, to distinguish the possessors of personal property, more especially property in the funds, from persons possessing lands: the division of the proprietors into a monied interest, and a landed interest, is not applicable to the present times, all the people, who have any thing, having now become, in a greater or less degree, stock-holders. From this latter circumstance it is artfully insinuated, that they are all deeply and equally interested in supporting the system; and, such is the blindness of avarice, or rather of self-interest, that men in general really act as if they preferred a hundred pounds' worth of stock to an estate in land of fifty times the value. But, it is not of this mass of stock-holders; it is not of that description of persons who leave their children's fortunes to accumulate in those funds, where, even according to the ratio of depreciation already experienced, a pound of to day will not be worth much above a shilling twenty years hence; it is not of these simpletons of whom I speak, when I talk of the monied interest of the present day: I mean an interest hostile alike

to the land-holder and to the stock-holder, to the colonist, to the real merchant, and to the manufacturer, to the clergy, to the nobility and to the throne; I mean the numerous and powerful body of loan-jobbers, directors, brokers, contractors and farmers-general, which has been engendered by the excessive amount of the public debt, and the almost boundless extension of the issues of paper-money.—It was a body very much like this, which may with great propriety, I think, be denominated the *Paper-Aristocracy*, that produced the revolution in France. Burke, when he was writing the passage that I have taken for a motto to this sheet, evidently had *our* monied interest, as well as that of France, in his view; but, when, in another passage of the same celebrated work, he was showing the extreme injustice of seizing upon the property of the Church to satisfy the demands of the paper-aristocracy of France, he little imagined that an act of similar injustice would so soon be thought of, and even proposed, in England, where clergymen and pauper are become terms almost synonymous. He had been an attentive observer of the rise and progress of the change that was taking place in France: and he thought it necessary to warn his own country, in time, against the influence of a description of persons, who, aided by a financiering minister, who gave into all their views, had begun the destruction of the French monarchy.—Our paper-aristocracy, who arose with the schemes of Mr. Pitt, have proceeded with very bold strides: theirs was the proposition for commuting the tythes; theirs the law for the redemption of the land tax; theirs the numerous laws and regulations which have been made of late years in favour of jobbing and speculation, till at last they obtained a law compelling men to take their paper in payment of just debts, while they themselves were exempted, by the same law, from paying any part of the enormous debts which they had contracted, though they had given promissory notes for the amount! Their project for commuting the tythes was of this sort. All the tythes, small as well as great, *belonging to the Clergy*, were to be sold to the owners of the houses and land subject to such tythes; or, if the owners did not choose to purchase them, they were to be sold to other persons, as fast as such persons could be found. From the property of the church these tythes were to be changed into property of the nation, and the Clergy were to receive, each of them according to his merits of course, a stipend from “his Majesty’s confidential servants,” payable, not in assignats, like the stipends of the constitutional clergy of

France, but in paper, according to the old saying, “as good as the bank,” though, perhaps, not very readily convertible into gold and silver, or even into brass. This project failed, and for the failure we have to thank his Majesty much more than any body else, not even excepting the bishops, who, if we may judge by their conduct with respect to the bill for what is called the “redemption of the land-tax,” had not the permanent interests of the Church so closely at heart as one might wish. If Mr. Pitt and his paper-aristocracy had succeeded in their project for commuting the tythes, they would have strengthened themselves not only by the apparent security which the funds would have derived from so much property being in a manner brought to the account of the nation, but much more by the influence which such a change would have had upon the Clergy, who, feeling their very existence to depend upon the preservation of the paper-system, would necessarily have been its advocates; and thus the Bank and Lloyd’s would have had a zealous agent in every parish in the kingdom, in every nook and corner, where, even on days of religion and rest, twenty people were likely to be assembled together.—That the commutation of the tythes would have been followed by a similar measure with regard to the glebe, the parsonage houses, and other property of the Church there can be no doubt, especially when we consider what has, with so little opposition, been done in that way in the law for the redemption of the land-tax, which law I regard as the first direct and open blow aimed at the church and the ancient nobility. Much has been effected of late years, in England as well as in France, by an artful selection of terms; the mass of mankind always being much more taken with the *word* than with the *thing*. Hence, while France was fighting for Robespierre alone, she was animated with all the enthusiasm of “*liberty and equality*,” hence the poor fools that live even within a hundred yards of Threadneedle-street most religiously believe that the parliament has passed a “*restriction*” upon cash payments at the bank; and hence few persons have ever supposed, that the “*redemption* of the land-tax” means a seizure, made by the government, of a part of every man’s estate. First a law was passed to render the land-tax perpetual. Who ever heard before of a *perpetual* tax? Yet so this tax was made. That being done, the tax was rendered saleable; the proprietor of the land having the preference as a purchaser. Had the measure stopped here it would have been less mischievous; but, in order to create as many purchasers as possible, in order to

bring as great a sum as could be brought to the account of the Exchequer, and thereby prop the paper system, the effect of entails was removed as to private estates, while the collegiate and church-establishments were let loose from those bonds which had heretofore preserved their possessions entire. That a farmer should sell one field out of ten, or a tradesmen one tenement out of ten, in order to clear the other nine from the land-tax, was a matter of little consequence: the tenth field or tenth house would fall into the hands of other persons in nearly the same rank of life: no heir would be injured, no establishment weakened, by the sale. But, in suspending, for this purpose, the effect of entails, the heads of noble families were enabled, were invited, were tempted, and, in some cases, were obliged to alienate part of those estates, which they had received entire from their ancestors, and which should have descended entire to their heirs. Tom Paine and Joel Barlow, had they clubbed their talents in forming a scheme for sapping the foundations of the privileged orders, could have devised nothing at once more plausible, more popular, and, as far as it goes, more effectual than this law, which transferred to brokers and jobbers no inconsiderable portion of estates, several of which had descended from ancestor to heir from the Norman conquest to the administration of Mr. Pitt. The fields and the houses of farmers and tradesmen were divided, perhaps, amongst other farmers and other tradesmen; and, it is possible, though not very likely, that a considerable part of the land tax of the nobility was bought up by themselves, or, that whether by purchase from one another, or from the other classes, the class of nobility gained, upon the whole, nearly as much property as it lost. This is barely possible; but what can, in this respect, be hoped with regard to the Church? Here the property does not descend in families; here the proprietor is merely a tenant for life; here, unlike the case of the nobility, it is impossible for one part of the order to gain by the loss of another part; here whatever is taken away never can return; and, therefore, the establishment is by so much robbed, impoverished, and weakened. This alienation and transfer of part of the property of the Church affords a clear illustration of that which is, in most instances, very dark and complicated, namely, the operation of the funding and paper system upon house and land. The country people wonder how it is that all the old gentlemen's families are dropping off, one by one, and that those which remain are completely out-shone by the new gentlemen, from

whose gilded footmen they learn that their masters were, but a few years ago, butchers, bakers, bottle-corkers, or old-cloaths-men, and that, in fact, they are not, as to *visible* profession, much better now. At this the country people stand gaping with a mixture of amazement and curiosity; whereat some footman more profound and eloquent than his fellows, informs them, with sonorous voice and solemn accent, that the circumstance, at which they seem so much surprised, arises from the astonishing prosperity of the country. Upon which the country people gape still wider, not being, for their very souls, able to discover how that prosperity, which elevates bottle-corkers to country-gentlemen, should reduce country-gentlemen to bottle corks! But, the talkative footman, who, perhaps, begins, by this time, to grow impatient at their stupidity, flatly tells them, that, as he wants no dispute about the matter, those who differ from him in opinion may walk out of the hall; and, as country people love good things as well as town's people, it is most likely that the far greater part of them will stay. This mode, however, of arguing with the belly instead of the brain I do not approve of; and, therefore, if the country people will listen to me only for a minute, I will endeavour to explain to them the cause of this phenomenon. The prosperity, of which they hear so much, does not extend its influence to *all* the people in the country: Its sphere is, indeed, rather confined, and it would be, I fancy, difficult to find many of its beneficial effects beyond the circle of the paper-aristocracy. The country gentleman, who wishes and endeavours to live independently upon his estate, is obliged to pay to the government, for the support of the funding system, so great a portion of the revenue of that estate, that he has not enough left to live upon in the style in which his ancestors lived; and, in order to support that style, he sells part of his patrimony; once broken into, it goes piece by piece: his sons become merchants, clerks or East India cadets; his daughters become companions or lady's women to the wives of those in whose service the sons are embarked; the father, seeing his end approach, secures a life annuity for his widow; some speculator purchases the tottering old mansion; and thus the funding system swallows up the family. Generally applicable as this remark is, obvious as are the effects in every part of the country, the cause is not so distinctly seen as to render illustration unnecessary. What one loses another gains: the land all remains, belong to whom it will: howsoever much some class-

es may lose, there is no loss upon the whole; and there is room for contending, that birth, honour, and virtue gain as much wealth in some places as they lose in others. But, the instance of the Church sets this question at rest: from the Church part of the real property has been taken: not part of its revenues: not part of its annual income: but, part of its house and its land has been taken away, sold, and the money applied to the payment of those who have made loans to, and other bargains with, the government: and the Church possesses less than it did by so much, and it never will regain that which it has thus lost, or any portion of it. The same may be said with regard to the alienation, which, at the same time, took place, of the real property of the collegiate establishment, not excepting hospitals and other charitable foundations, part of the property of some of which was thus alienated for the purpose of supporting the funds, while the persons living within the walls of such hospitals and colleges were compelled to have recourse to the parish rates in aid of their income, which, by the depreciating effects of the paper-system, had already been reduced to a pittance, in many instances too small to afford them bread. Was this? Need I ask it? Was a scene of things like this ever contemplated by the liberal, the pious and benevolent founders of colleges, schools and hospitals; or by that government in whose wisdom and justice they confided for a due execution of their bequests? None of this alienated property will ever return to any of these foundations; and, though we cannot say that it is impossible for the property, alienated in the same way from noblemen's and gentlemen's families, to return; yet, there can, especially when we cast our eyes over the country, be but very little doubt upon the subject. Let it be observed, too, that there is now another land-tax; and, if the present gentleman should have a war to conduct for only a very few years, I have, for my part, very great fears, that another *redemption* will take place; that another slice, and that a large one too, will, in the same way, be taken from the property of the ancient nobility and the Church. My fear may, perhaps, be groundless; for the circumstances of the times are different: men have now seen what a destruction of the nobility and clergy finally leads to, and they have not *now* to fear, that an opposition to any measure of the minister, be what it may, will be attributed to motives hostile to the monarchy itself; a fear which certainly facilitated, during the last war, the adoption of many measures which never could have

been carried without the aid of that or some equally powerful cause.—The influence which the paper-aristocracy has had, and has now more than ever, in politics, may easily be seen by a reference to the list of the present House of Commons. Indeed, for them and them alone, war appears to be made and peace to be concluded. The disasters of the last war, and, finally, the total failure of its avowed objects, which were, "*indemnity* for the past and *security* for the future," were all to be ascribed to the interests of the 'Change having been consulted, in preference to the interests of the nation. The measures of the war were determined on at Lloyd's. "Give us trade," and we will find you money," was the cry. The traffic went on very prosperously for a while: for several years there was nothing but boasting: the war could be carried on "for ten years without any material inconvenience to the country;" or, it was, at least, so asserted by Mr. Pitt, who declared, at the same time, that he never would make peace till the balance of Europe was restored, and till we could obtain indemnity for the past and *security* for the future. Whether he kept his word as to the former, let the kings of Naples and Sardinia, let the Queen of Portugal and the Stadtholder, let the Hans Towns and Hannover and the Princes of Germany tell; and, with regard to the promise of "*security* for the future," if we want any one to vouch for its observance, we must all at once have imbibed a degree of incredulity hitherto totally unknown to our character. The balance of Europe was not restored: on the contrary it was completely overturned. We had obtained no indemnity for the past. We left ourselves without any security for the future. Two years of the ten were not expired; yet Mr. Pitt recommended peace; assisted in making peace; openly defended peace; and for what? In order to "husband our resources;" or, in other words, to preserve the funding and paper system, weighed in the balance against which, the honour and the safety of the country, the liberties of the people and the stability of his Majesty's throne, were light as a feather.—But, year after year, as the paper itself increases in quantity, the paper-aristocracy seems to gather strength and boldness. Its love of rule, as well as its spirit of hostility to the known, legitimate, established and ancient orders of the kingdom were amply displayed in its proceedings relative to the LLOYD'S FUND for the rewarding of meritorious soldiers and sailors. There was great objection to such a fund, the largesses of which were to be

bestowed by, and at the discretion of, persons officially unknown to either the army or the navy; but, when an attempt was made to draw into this fund, and to place at the disposal of its aspiring committee, all the collections made in all parts of the country, the rivalry between Lloyd's and St. James' became more apparent and more evidently dangerous. There was something audaciously unreasonable and bold in this attempt: something that argued a consciousness of strength too great to be overcome, if not too great to be thwarted by any power in the state. Yet, this might have been borne; but, the censure, not to say abuse; the severe reproaches and malignant insinuations, put forth, in the public prints, upon this occasion, against the nobility and clergy for not subscribing to the fund, can never be forgotten, and, politically considered, ought never to be forgiven. It was not enough for them, a self-created club of jobbers, brokers, and dealers in paper-money, to arrogate to themselves the office of collecting all the patriotic offerings of the country; to erect themselves into judges of the merits of the fleet and army; and, finally, to assume the functions of sovereignty in bestowing rewards upon soldiers and sailors; all this was not enough, their partisans must take upon them to judge also for the nobility and clergy, to reproach them with lukewarmness in the cause of the country, because their subscriptions fell short of what was expected; because they did not bring every pound they could borrow, and give it up to be disposed of at the pleasure, and in the name of, the committee at Lloyd's, thereby strengthening the interest and increasing the influence, which was already too powerful for them to contend with, and under which they were daily and hourly sinking!—Of a similar nature and tendency has been, and is, the conduct of the Paper-Aristocracy relative to the recent election for the county of Middlesex. Not content with coming forward and unreservedly stating, that with their money they are resolved to procure a person, whom they fix upon, to be elected a member of parliament for the county, which person openly promises to be “a devoted instrument” in their hands; not content with acting up to the letter as well as the spirit of this resolution, they accuse, not only the gentleman who opposes their candidate, not only his immediate friends and active supporters, but also all the party with whom he has acted in parliament; all these, including a vast majority of the talent, birth and public character of the country, they have the modesty to accuse of disaffection

and disloyalty; and one of their partisans, who, in his fierce cat-a-mountain style, describes the young noblemen who canvassed for Sir Francis Burdett, “as sprigs, or rather, *exerescences* of aristocracy,” tells the public, that this support given “to the *ja-cobin* candidate” will enable them “to appreciate the effects of that broad-bomed administration, which so many persons of consequence, and so many more of no consequence, so lately combined to form,” and which formation, be it remembered, Mr. Pitt's partisans have solemnly declared, that he used his utmost endeavours to effect, and for his not being able to effect it this very writer has *blamed* the King! But consistency is no part of the creed of a sect, who, in their quality of saints claim, upon the argument of their renowned predecessor, Ralpho, a privilege which is wisely denied to the wicked, namely, of unsaying what they have said and unswearing what they have sworn, just as often as convenience requires.—It is not till of late years, however, that saintship has been united with money-changing. The money-changers of old times seem to have been almost the only class of persons who patiently and silently submitted to rebuke. When their tables were overset, they shook their ears probably, but they appear to have made neither resistance nor clamour. Whether it be that the changer becomes bold in proportion to the worthlessness of the thing to be changed, or that, from its union with saintship, the trade has been exalted, I know not; but, certain it is, that our money-changers, though utter strangers to gold and silver, have a most plentiful stock of brass, as they have fully evinced in every stage of the proceedings relative to the Middlesex election, and more especially, I think, in their last meeting at the Freemason's Tavern, with Mr. Henry Thornton at their head. Of the resolutions passed at this meeting it is necessary to say nothing, the object of them being the same as that of the original combination; I cannot, however, refrain from admiring one sentiment of Mr. Thornton relative to the proposed subscription; to wit; that “the distant parts of the country looked often with anxiety to the metropolis, and expected from the *great public virtue* of the more opulent and *enlightened* classes in the county of Middlesex such sacrifices [as might be necessary to repress the evils, to which it was subject, and to protect the constitution.” Now, though the “*great public virtue*” of directors, contractors, brokers, and jobbers of every description; though the great public virtue of those persons who have inundated the country

with promissory notes for which the possessor cannot demand payment, and who have left us coin scarcely sufficient to carry on the daily traffic for the necessities of life; though persons of this description should have a monopoly of the public virtue as well as of the public wealth, and though it should be perfectly consistent with the rules of modesty for Mr. Thornton and his friends to consider themselves as the most *enlightened* class of the county of Middlesex; though all this should be right, I never can agree, that the people in the distant parts of the country look with any degree of anxiety to Mr. Thornton and his friends for the "protection of the constitution." The people in the distant parts of the country have no anxiety at all upon the subject: they see Mr. Thornton and his friends subscribing, or, as he calls it, making sacrifices; and, if they have any anxiety about the matter, it arises from the fear, that a remuneration for those "sacrifices" will come out of their pockets—Mr. Thornton all along makes his cause the cause of the government, or ministry, and charges Sir Francis Burdett with inconsistency in his language and conduct relative to Mr. Pitt. "He has used," says Mr. Thornton, "to inveigh particularly" against Mr. Pitt, whom he has held up to "the utmost abhorrence of the people; yet, if we may believe the speech of the gentleman who nominated him, he was one of those who laboured night and day, as they term it, to form an administration on a broad foundation; that is to say, an administration of which this very Mr. Pitt was to be a member!" And, what inconsistency was there in this? Were we not, all of us; or, at least, did we not all profess to be, for an union of *all parties*, in order that all political animosities should be buried, and that the enemy should see that he had the whole force of an undivided people to meet? Was not this the language of the nation, at the time when the change of the ministry took place? Was it not the language of those who disliked as well as those who liked Mr. Pitt? Or, will Mr. Thornton insist, that every one who professed a wish for an union of parties, and who did not like Mr. Pitt, was a canting hypocrite? Besides, if a ministry upon a broad foundation had been formed, Mr. Pitt, though "a member," would not have been the *master* of it. Disapproving of Mr. Pitt both as to person and system, Sir Francis Burdett would naturally prefer him in a situation where he would have the least degree of power that it was possible to pacify him with; and, cordially joining Sir Francis in disapprobation, as to the *system* of Mr. Pitt, my wish respecting the new ministry

was the same, as I have more than once or twice unequivocally expressed it. So long ago as the winter of 1802, I gave it as my opinion, that Mr. Pitt never ought again to be at the head of a ministry: the same opinion, with some of the reasons whereon it was founded, was repeated in December, 1803; and, again, with additional reasons in the month of May last; yet, I was for a coalition of all the men of talents of all parties, doubtless including Mr. Pitt; and, I have not, on this score, at least, ever been accused of inconsistency. Indeed, the language and conduct of Sir Francis Burdett, with regard to Mr. Pitt, present no inconsistency; and the subject appears to have been introduced by Mr. Thornton in order to give an indirect blow at the whole of the Opposition, especially those persons who disapproved of the juggle, by which the present ministry was patched up.—This "enlightened" gentleman does not make use of the word *jacobin*, nor that of *jacobinism*, but he labours hard to inculcate the notion, that the election has, on the part of Sir Francis Burdett, been conducted upon jacobin principles, and that "his supporters are, unhappily, associated with men of the worst description, with men from whom arise our chief domestic danger, and the triumph of Sir Francis, therefore, would be the triumph of anarchy over law, and of democracy over the British constitution." This is, from the ministerialists, at least, the first we have heard, in so official a manner, of "*domestic dangers*." Mr. Addington and his colleagues repeatedly boasted, and I believe with perfect truth, though not with much decency, that, under their sway, the people were become unanimous; that they had, as it were, but one soul, as to their attachment to the constitution and their resolution to defend it at the risk of their lives. Whence has arisen, then, the disaffection, and the domestic dangers, of the consequences of which Mr. Thornton is so apprehensive? Mr. Thornton himself, in speaking in defence of the peace of Amiens (for what ministerial measure has he not spoken in defence of) said, that it had "destroyed all" "discontents and rendered the people unanimous." Since when, I ask therefore, have these "domestic dangers" again come to light? With all due submission to this bank director, our chief domestic danger does not consist in the machinations of democrats or anarchists, but in the *excessive quantity of bank notes*, which, if a stop be not put to its increase, will, I am fully persuaded, produce effects fatal to our liberties and to the throne of our sovereign.<sup>133</sup> This is the great cause of all our troubles and dis-

grace. It is, in fact, the cause that we are now at war. "Pay your bank-notes in specie," said the *Moniteur* at the breaking out of the war, "and then we will believe in your ability to continue the contest." Here we have, in a very few words, the opinion upon which the French cabinet proceeds in the war against us; and, I think, that there is no man in his senses who will venture to question the soundness of the opinion. If we continue to humour this paper-aristocracy; if they continue to issue million upon million of their paper; or even, if they are much longer skreened from the payment of what they already have afloat, we must sink beneath the enemy, without his firing a shot at us. He has nothing to do but to stand where he is, now and then showing us an aspect somewhat more menacing, till the paper system shall have brought us to the point at which we must arrive, and at which he well knows we must arrive, in the course of a very few years. Nay, if an invasion were to take place at this time, our "chief domestic danger" would arise from the excessive quantity of bank notes. Does any man believe, that, if the enemy were landed in any considerable force, bank-notes would pass, especially near the enemy, in payment for provisions? Most assuredly they would not; and the confusion that would ensue can hardly be conceived, much less described. Lord Grenville, during the last session of parliament, suggested the adoption of some measure of precaution against this danger; but, by way of *answer*, he was reminded, that he formed part of the ministry when the bank restriction bill was passed! Precautions there are none adopted yet: the minister seems to be as much averse from making preparations against this contingency as some men are from making their wills: volunteers, men and horses, and even carriages, he is preparing in abundance, but not a word about money; though every man of the least reflection must perceive how extremely dangerous our situation will be, in case of actual invasion, if money, I mean *real* money, be not prepared in a considerable quantity for the payment of the army and the fleet.—In returning to Mr. Thornton and those persons in whose existence he professes to perceive our "chief domestic danger," I shall take the liberty to make an extract from that part of his speech, where he states his principal objection to Sir Francis Burdett, as a member of parliament for the county of Middlesex. "The chief ground," says he, "on which the defeat of Sir Francis was assumed to be so certain, was the circumstance of his having connected himself with various persons suspected of se-

dition and treason—Persons, of whom some have been acquitted, and some convicted by a jury of their countrymen. It was not believed that a gentleman who had been the companion of Despard and of O'Connor, who moreover had chosen for the chief agents in his election Mr. Bonney, the secretary of the Corresponding Society, and Mr. Frost, the delegate sent to the bar of the French Convention by the disaffected societies of this country, a man who had also been sentenced to the pillory, could be so far acceptable to the county in general as to be selected as its representative. Mr. Thornton here observed, that he admitted it to be very possible for a person of a warm temper, and of merely opposition politics, to become familiarly acquainted with one who should afterwards prove to have been guilty of treason; but he contended that Sir Francis Burdett by choosing for his principal agents such persons as he had named, must be understood to have proclaimed himself as of their party; that he must be considered as wearing the colours of Mr. Frost, and as ranging himself under the standard of Mr. Bonney, and the contest, therefore, was not of an ordinary political nature."—Upon the candour of attempting to make Sir Francis Burdett answerable for the principles and even crimes of O'Connor and Despard I remarked in the preceding sheet. But, Mr. Thornton, in his pious zeal for the welfare of the constitution (in *church* I warrant you, as well as state!) has discovered a new way of stating the case. He had perceived, probably, that men were shocked at the promulgation of a principle that made every one answerable for all the sins of his acquaintance, future as well as past and present; and, therefore, he softened it down, allowing that "a person of warm temper, and merely opposition politics, might become familiarly acquainted with one who should afterwards prove to have been guilty of treason;" but, as if exhausted by this wonderful exertion of candour, the godly gentleman contends, that Sir Francis Burdett, "in chusing such persons as Mr. Bonney and Mr. Frost as his agents, must be considered as *proclaiming himself of their party, and ranging himself under their standard, and, that, therefore, the contest was not of an ordinary political nature.*"—Such is the candour of a godly politician! Such is the candour of a potent prince of the paper-aristocracy! Of *what* party did Sir Francis Burdett thus proclaim himself? *What* standard must he be considered as having ranged himself under by his employing of these two persons

amongst his agents? The answer which is intended to be conveyed by Mr. Thornton's statement is: 'the party of the Corresponding Society of which Mr. Bonney was secretary; the standard of the French Convention to which Mr. Frost was sent as a delegate.' Let us see, then, how this mode of reasoning will be relished, if applied to the ministry; "to his Majesty's "confidential servants." I could mention a score or two of quondam "citizens," who have been taken into high favour at Downing-street and Whitehall. Some of the loudest amongst Mr. Mainwaring's supporters have openly, and in print, accused a person, now very near Mr. Pitt, of having been a member of the Jacobin Club at Paris. The same prints accused Mr. Addington of giving the command of a regiment of volunteers to a person who had been a member of the London Corresponding Society. But, to come to names: has not Mr. Mackintosh been forgiven? Nay, taken into favour, and invested with an office of great profit, as well as great importance in a political point of view? Mr. Mackintosh did not, however, belong, as far as I know at least, to the Corresponding Society, like Mr. Bonney; nor was he, I believe, sent as a delegate to the French Convention, like Mr. Frost. But, the list of those political sinners, who have been washed in the waters of Downing-street, affords us one who was both a member of the Corresponding Society and a delegate to the French Convention; I mean, that celebrated personage Mr. Redhead Yorke, who, though he did not, I believe, stand in the pillory, has very candidly acknowledged that he deserved it, and he was actually imprisoned, as is well known, during several years of last war. This person, then, be it known, was not only forgiven by the government, but was taken into favour; was caressed, employed, and paid. I do not say that he was an intimate friend of the Addingtons and the Lord Chancellor, but I do say, and positively assert, that he was frequently with them: I believe, and am almost sure, that he dined with them occasionally: he called himself private secretary to Mr. Hiley Addington, and in print he boasted of the patronage of the Lord Chancellor. Many more of these "citizens" converted into courtiers could be named, did not want of room compel me to hasten to a close of this article. I cannot, however, refrain from citing the notable instance of the converted *Monsieur Mehée de la Touche*, who,

though he had been not only a revolutionist, not only a republican and a jacobin, but a *bloody Septemberizer*; though he had notoriously been all this; though his history, and particularly his conduct during the French revolution, was known, even in minute detail, by "his Majesty's confidential servants," they not only overlooked his crimes, but, if he states truth, they admitted him to great personal intimacy; they confided in him so far as to admit him to official consultations; they entrusted him with considerable sums of money, with important secrets of state, and exposed one, at least, of our foreign ministers to his mercy. "Aye," say the committee of contractors, "but Macintosh" "and Yorke and Mehée de la Touche" "were enrolled under the banners of the "ministry!" Exactly so! and thus the whole of Mr. Thornton's objection to Messrs. Bonney and Frost consists in their having been for "Burdett and Independence," while *independence* alone forms his objection to Burdett. The accepting of a place or a job is, therefore, with these persons, as was before observed, the only test of political reformation; but, if Sir Francis and his friends will take that test, though with as little sincerity as certain persons swallow the sacrament in order to qualify themselves for power and profit, if they will but become the "devoted instruments" in the hands of the minister and his paper-aristocracy, they may not only obtain absolution for the past but a stock of forgiveness for the future.

"Silent and soft as saints remov'd to heav'n,

"All ties dissolv'd, and ev'ry sin forgiv'n.

"There, where no passion, pride, or shame transport,

"Lull'd in the sweet repenthe of a court;

"There, where no father's, brother's, friend's disgrace

"Once break their rest, or stir them from their place:

"No cheek is known to blush, no heart to throb,

"Save when they lose a question or a job."

But, if they either will not or cannot take this test, then they are jacobins, particularly if they dare to talk of *independence*. For my part, I am no indiscriminate declaimer against courts and courtiers: I know there always must be placemen, and that there always will be and always ought to be pensioners; and I further know, that the cry of *independence* is frequently mere popular cant: but, what I never can allow, is, that loyalty is the exclusive possession of those who depend upon, and who, of course, always support every measure and every pretension of the minister of the day.

*Abate the edge of traitors, gracious Lord,  
That would revive those horrid days again,  
And make poor England weep in streams of blood!* SHAKESPEARE.

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# FINANCIAL DISTRESSES

## THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

SIR,—Although the consequences of the French revolution have occupied great part of the attention of the statesmen of Europe since it happened, they have bestowed little consideration on the causes by which it was produced; yet, without ascending to the causes it is impossible either to reason justly, or to act consistently in regard to the effects. To a deficiency in this respect the progress of the French revolution beyond the limits of that kingdom, is perhaps, as much owing as to its own internal force.

It was about the beginning of the sixteenth century, that the French monarchy began to assume its present form, but it was not till after the middle of the seventeenth, that the royal authority was thoroughly established. In the intervening period, the country had been frequently distracted by the great feudatories of the crown, who often made use of a difference of religion as a pretext to cover their own ambition: though they were restrained by the enlightened government of Henry the IVth., and their power broke by the severe administration of Cardinal Richlieu, it was not till the last years of Mazarine that their influence was completely sunk in that of the crown. This gave additional force to the royal authority, but was by no means favourable to the strength of the government. The higher nobility had formerly resided much in the country, among their connexions and dependents, whose attachment they assiduously cultivated as the means of supporting their own consequence. This made them formidable to the crown, but through them a connexion was formed with the lower noblesse, and from the latter with the inhabitants of the provinces, which established a chain of subordination from the throne to the cottage. When deprived of this source of importance, they sought distinction at court from the patronage of that power which they had formerly opposed; when they did visit their castles, it was no longer as hardy and turbulent barons to court the resort of the provinces, but as refined and effeminate

courtiers, who viewed the provincial with contempt, and his manners with disgust. This change operated still more powerfully by affecting the influence of the whole order of noblesse; no longer employed as leaders of the people in war and politics, they sunk into a sort of separate cast, almost distinct from the rest of the nation, and that gradation of authority which forms the basis and stability of all government was lost; consisting of more than an hundred thousand, they included all the men of birth, most of those of large property and liberal education, but divided amongst themselves into the old and the new, of the court and the province, of the sword and the robe, without any point of union they were not formidable to the crown, but neither did they retain that influence of birth and property which is the great support of monarchy. The state of learning in France had likewise occasioned a considerable change in the opinions of part of the nation. To the classical age of Louis the XIVth. had succeeded a spirit of literature, the essential part of which was to ridicule the follies, the errors, and the superstitions of mankind, on moral, political, and religious subjects. It soon extended to the institutions themselves, and about the middle of the last century, the minds of the literary men in that country were brought to a contempt of the existing establishments, when the rudiments of that dogma peculiar to the new philosophy, that man is naturally good, that government is unnecessary, and is an imposition upon mankind, were first started and were received by them with avidity. No class of men have a higher opinion of their own importance than men of letters; they have ascribed the French revolution principally to their own labours, and the industry with which their tenets were propagated after it took place obtained them more credit than they were entitled to. But their opinions extended very little beyond the circle of the studious: notwithstanding the rage for the company of literary men that prevailed in France for some time, there was no appearance of their having made many proselytes; even during the very time that their speculations were at the height, the court, the parliaments,

and the people were engaged, and the nation divided about absolutism and extreme unction.—But these were alternatives, the effects of which might have long lain dormant in the constitution, if a much more active and powerful principle had not brought them to light. Legislative assemblies in France any way analogous to the parliament of Great Britain, are a subject only for the disquisitions of antiquaries, but the principal courts of justice which received that name, were the first and most active agents of the French revolution. The first parliament is of considerable antiquity; others were at different periods erected in several provinces of the kingdom. How they were originally constituted I am at a loss to say, but, I believe, "it was about the middle of the sixteenth century, that places in them were first sold for a sum of money advanced to the government: this being an easy and ready mode of raising money, was so often resorted to as to make many of them numerous. They ceased to bear the character of courts of justice; instead of a judge or a few judges entering a court divested of prejudice and partiality to administer justice, they allowed themselves to be solicited for their votes, and appeared in the arena as combatants for the cause they had espoused. To compleat the errors or more properly abuses in the administration of justice in France, the King or rather his minister, frequently stopped their proceedings and cancelled their judgments. In a political light, the changes they underwent were of no less importance. The legislative power of France had for centuries centered in the crown. As a form of promulgating the laws, they had been registered by order of the King in the parliaments. They soon began to deliberate on the edicts sent them for registration, which furnished them with an opportunity of reviewing many acts of the government. However necessary some restraint might be on the despotism of the crown, it cannot be supposed that a thousand or fifteen hundred men divided into twelve or thirteen assemblies, dedicated to the practice of the law, and bred to the science of disputation, could be either a very salutary corrective or tend much to the peace of the state. In the internal commotions they had likewise taken a part, and in those of the minority of Louis the XIVth. they were courted by all parties as the only constitutional body known in the state. During the reign of Louis the XIVth. they were overawed, but he had no sooner expired, than instigated by the intrigues of the

Duke of Orleans, the parliament of Paris cancelled the will of Louis the XIVth, and declared the Duke regent. He found it prudent to flatter the parliament to get his authority acknowledged, but the pretensions of the robe were so little consistent with the prerogative of the crown, that he had not acted long as regent before the usual disputes commenced. Some of the Duke's ministers were far from respectable, and his administration by no means steady; however, government suffered but little in his hands, except from the licentiousness of manners and want of decorum that he introduced among the higher ranks, which did not add to the respect with which they were regarded by the other classes of society. The long reign of Louis the XVth seldom had claims either to vigour or ability. It probably had not escaped the observation of either the parliaments or the people, that the crown though the fountain of power had often suffered its mandates to be resisted, and that it had frequently even yielded to opposition, for soon after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the opposition of the parliaments assumed a more systematic form; they entered strenuously into the religious differences that ensued, and were generally supported by the people. At first, these disputes between the clergy and the parliament, were a subject of mirth for the levies of Versailles, but they afterwards came to so great a height, as to lay the foundation of disturbances in several parts of the kingdom; and the parliaments became at last so troublesome to Louis the XVth. that he entered warmly into the scheme of Mons. Maufronn, for effecting a change in the courts of justice, which that dextrous politician accomplished.

Taxes have been productive of more commotions than all other causes together; they were likewise the first subject of those dissensions that led to the French revolution. For a considerable time the greatest part of the extraordinary demands on the French treasury, had been supplied by loans upon annuities for a term of years, or repayable by instalments, while at the same time, few new taxes had been laid or any provision made for making good the payments, by which means the debt increased rapidly. At the close of the American war, the revenue was far below the expenditure, and the government like a spendthrift who is afraid to look into his own affairs, for three or four years made good the deficiency by new loans. It then amounted to about five millions sterling, when it was at last seriously determined to put the finances upon a pro-

per footing. No kind of government can dip so freely into the purse of the subject as a free government. The French minister of finance would not venture to cover so large a deficiency by the power of the crown alone. He therefore, called an assembly of notables, the principle object of which was to sanction the taxes he intended to levy, although several petitions were submitted to their consideration to smooth the way for the imposts. Whether such an assembly appointed by the crown, had they given their full assent to the taxes, would have added much weight to the royal authority is to be doubted; but, they were no ways disposed to that end. They so little answered the purpose intended, that the minister of finance was disgraced while they were sitting, and though little of their proceedings was made public, I believe it was well known to those who were acquainted with the interior, that the principal opposition was among the first class of subjects, to which the partiality shewn for several years to a few favourites, had probably, contributed considerably. One of the chief reasons for which they were called together, and in which the higher orders were most interested, was to get their consent to a general land-tax in place of the twentieths; to that they gave almost a negative. The reforms or rather the reductions in the expenditure, which the court commenced with great activity, by no means tended to remove the coldness on their part, especially that in the article of pensions, many of which had been given to great families whose affairs were incumbered, and they even gave a positive opinion against reducing them. A project likewise for taking the debt that the clergy had contracted by their free gifts, into the debt of the nation upon extending the land-tax over their lands, was as ill received, and produced some strong remonstrances from them. Had the states general been called at that time, instead of the notables, it is probable, that the circumstances of those held in 1789 would have been reversed: that the opposition the crown would have experienced, would have been from the privileged orders; and, that if the *tiers etat* had not supported the crown, they would at least have remained passive. Louis the XVth, on his accession to the throne, recalled the Count de Maurepas to be his minister, who had been disgraced about thirty years before for a court intrigue. In the earlier part of his life he had been more remarkable as a man of gaiety and pleasure, than for the depth of his understanding, he was then nearly superannuated, and he having no favour for the adminis-

tration of the latter part of the reign of Louis the XVth, which followed his disgrace, and the King as little on account of family considerations, the chancellor was disgraced and the parliaments restored. The expenses of the government having been made good by loans and anticipations, few subjects of contention between the administration and them had occurred till the meeting of the notables, except in regard to regulations respecting their own body, and in the registration of the new loans, when some admonitions to economy were given in so free a stile, as to shew that they wanted only opportunity to equal if not surpass their former animadversions. The opportunity then occurred, and was not neglected. Notwithstanding the coolness or rather aversion of the notables, to the new financial arrangements, the court resolved on their dissolution to carry them into execution and began the registration of the edicts in the parliament of Paris, by those for the provincial assemblies, commutation of the labours for the roads, &c. So prone was that court to opposition, that though it might have been expected that most of these regulations would have been gratefully received, they were not registered without a great deal of discussion; but, when the edict for a stamp tax was brought forward, instead of complying, they called for a state of the receipt and expenditure, as if they had been a legislative body who were to grant subsidies upon the people. Without waiting for the issue of this contest, the King ordered the edict for the land-tax to be carried to them; in the additional altercation which it occasioned, the renewal of the states-general was suggested by one of the most factious of the members, immediately approved, and afterwards persisted in as likely to catch the people, and embarrass the court. The King held a *lit de justice*, and ordered the edicts to be registered; he had no sooner retired than the parliament declared the registration null, and afterwards met to debate the propriety of the edicts themselves, upon which they were exiled to Troyes, and the King ordered the registration anew in the chambers of aids and accounts, where it likewise experienced resistance, as well from those chambers themselves, as from the people. Their arrears were cancelled by the court, and afterwards the whole proceedings of the parliament shared the same fate by an order sent to Troyes. During this time the kingdom had been inundated with the most licentious publications, in the form of addresses and remonstrances, not only by the parliament of Paris, but by the other parliaments, con-

taining the most virulent invectives, and accusing the King of prodigality and despotism, some of the most essential parts of which they must have known to be false, that the deficiency was chiefly brought on since the peace by the profusion of the court. A small part of the debt had been occasioned by the negligence and profusion of the court and the princes, but the far greater part of it had evidently been contracted in the national service. These libels being circulated with impunity, were highly dangerous and inflammatory, for they shewed the people that after setting the power of the crown at defiance, it might be treated with abuse and contempt. It is from that period that that fermentation may be dated, which afterwards terminated in the French revolution. The same dissatisfaction with the court had likewise continued in the higher ranks; the peers and sometimes the princes of the blood, had attended at the most violent of the parliamentary sessions, the former had served upon parliamentary committees, and supported their reports. In such a state of public affairs, a favourable issue was not to be expected without an administration of great weight and ability; but, since the meeting of the notables there had been repeated changes in the ministry, during the last troubles hardly a week had passed without a resignation, almost every man of rank, consequence, and connexion had retired; and, at last, the Archbishop of Toulouse was appointed prime minister. It was evident that the disorders of the state were such as to require a radical cure. Such too was the temper of the nation, that it must have been hazardous for any ministry to have made use of strong measures immediately, and the minister might by that time have been satisfied, that without them nothing was to be expected from the parliaments. If the state was to be saved, subordination must be restored, and activity infused into the administration: it was perhaps, necessary to find means to enable government to go on independent of the parliaments long enough for that purpose to be effected. By a few retrenchments which would have effected only the amusements of the court, by changing that part of the national debt which was upon temporary or life-rent annuities into perpetual funds, and by improving the customs (a part of the French finances entirely neglected) with very small loans that object might probably have been attained. But, imperious as the circumstances were, the views of the minister seem not to have extended further than palliatives, procrastination, or merely to re-

lieve the difficulty of the moment. Some negotiations had evidently taken place with the parliament of Paris, for upon a sort of petition from them, and their agreeing to register an edict postponing the new taxes for two years, they were recalled; when he likewise announced loans for four years to come, to cover the deficiency of the finances, with a strong insinuation almost amounting to a declaration that the states-general would be held at the end of that period. This was a weak compromise for the past, and, if he had been led to believe that the parliament had agreed to carry this arrangement into execution, he was completely overreached: or, if he took for granted that they were to agree to it, he as much deceived himself. For, in a few days after they had again assembled, the King ordered the registration of a loan; they entered into a long debate upon it in his presence, during which he likewise ordered the registration of an edict in favour of the Protestants. As soon as the King had retired, the parliament as before declared the negotiation null; on which two of the most refractory members were arrested; the Duke of Orleans who had protested beforehand against the expected proceedings of the day was exiled, and the princes and peers were desired not to assist at the meetings. The peers reluctantly obeyed, but the parliament then refusing to proceed in the edict respecting the Protestants, the King in a few days allowed the peers to return; the first use they made of that condescension was to join in an application for the recall of the Duke of Orleans, in which the King after giving a refusal, so far acquiesced, as to permit him to come to the neighbourhood of Paris. The parliament had already made some slight attempts to act in a legislative capacity, by proposing alterations in laws, but when they came to take the edict in favour of the Protestants into consideration, they appointed a committee, of which the peers made a part, to examine and report upon it. It was at last registered, but they likewise voted an *arrêt* in respect to *lettres de cachet*, which bore a strong resemblance to a law.

During the whole of these disputes with the parliaments, the manner in which they were conducted was highly injurious to the royal authority: the King had almost uniformly told the parliaments at every step, that he was firmly resolved not to be obeyed; and, as certainly upon their adhering steadily to the purpose he had yielded. Nor was the language in which his intercourse with them was expressed less dangerous, instead of that simple, dignified, and concise

stile which every government ought to preserve with the subject, he entered into arguments about their submission. No government can be too careful to shew that the motives by which it is actuated are pure, but that government which trusts to argument instead of authority for obedience, is travelling fast to its own destruction. While these transactions had taken place with the parliament of Paris, the provincial parliaments had, if possible, exceeded them in violence. Some of them had registered the edicts for the provincial assemblies, others refused; some reprobated the compromise on the part of the parliament of Paris, some had submitted in part; some were in open hostility to the administration, and some were exiled.

It was suspected very soon after the last resistance of the parliament, and the arrest of the members, that the minister had some changes in contemplation; the suspicion proved to be well founded, a few months produced the *cour plénière*. It was evidently intended as an imitation of the change in the courts by Mons. Maupoux, but it was the imitation of a man of ability by an ignorant pretender. Mons. Maupoux, before proceeding to the execution of his plan, had been indefatigable in securing by promises, persuasions, and bribes, a sufficient number of the robe; he brought the new courts into immediate activity, and removed the parliaments from any competition with them. The minister, although the state of the kingdom required infinitely greater preparation, took no precaution to engage the men of the law, he left the parliaments in existence, and their powers undefined. In critical situations, it is to be doubted, if even want of judgment be more fatal than want of firmness. There was no necessity for proceeding to such lengths so rashly, for superficial as had been the object and the means of the minister, the loan contrary to expectation had been filled, notwithstanding the opposition of the parliament, which made him independent of them for a year, and might have made him so for a much longer time. Prematurely however, as this crisis had been brought on, and injudiciously as it had been conducted, it is not impossible, but it might have been so far successful as to have made the parliaments more tractable if it had been pursued with perseverance. In a short time judges had been found for the inferior courts, in several parts of the kingdom, they had begun to administer justice, and others were following their example. Concession and condescension only add to presumption; yet the minister seemed to think that

he could gain the object he had in view by forbearance, and granting every other demand. When the minds of men are unhinged, if the government cannot withdraw their attention from dangerous novelties, they at least should not direct it that way; and if they cannot prevent, they should not countenance new assemblies of the people, for there can be few such that will not be a focus of sedition. The minister on the contrary, kept their expectations constantly alive with the prospect of the states-general, and readily agreed to renew the ancient states of most of the provinces. Tumults were to be expected, and there could be but one way for the government to act in regard to them; to avoid giving cause for them as much as possible, but when they did happen to enforce the laws of every civilized society, and punish the authors of a breach of the peace. A tumult took place at Grenoble, in which the military force retired before the populace, the leaders were left unpunished; this was followed by an anomalous meeting of the *noblesse* and *tiers état* to the number of about five hundred, after which, Dauphiny never was quiet. In Brittany there were disturbances in which the army and the populace had nearly come to blows; there they remained unpunished, and there the same consequences followed. On another tumult happening soon after in Navarre, the King at once gave up the cause and dismissed his minister, although the greatest part of the kingdom still remained undisturbed. He immediately resolved to recall the parliaments, and assemble the states-general. It is much doubted, if the states-general was ever properly a legislative body; they had been repeatedly summoned to sanction laws prepared by the crown, and had sometimes presented petitions or remonstrances, but rarely had any business originated with them. They had not met for near two centuries, and so little was clearly ascertained, that all the antiquaries of France had already been encouraged to collect information concerning them. But, whatever they had been in times past, they were now loudly called for as an assembly that was to regenerate the state. The people had already been taught to treat the crown with contempt, they were now led to look for the authority of government in other hands. Among the evils resulting from the disorder of the finances, one of the greatest was, that the minister of that department had begun to be esteemed the principal member of the cabinet, by which means the administration had been in a great measure committed to bankers, lawyers, and priests. Now, at one of the most critical

periods that the kingdom had ever seen, which demanded an administration of the first influence and ability, the fate of France, and, it is to be feared, of more than France, was intrusted to a man who had not a rational political conception beyond the treasury, and whose passion was popular applause; the latter, which ought to have been an insuperable objection to him in the state the nation then was, was that which brought him back to office. The notables were again called to consider of the form in which the states-general should be constituted. A difference of opinion still appeared; one of the chambers presided by the first prince of the blood, was of opinion, that the representatives of the *tiers état* should be equal to those of the other two orders; but the other chambers decided that the members of each of the three should be equal. While this question was in agitation, the effect of impunity in those provinces where the troubles had taken place was strongly shown. In Dauphiny the states met with a representation of the *tiers état* equal to both the others, and did not conceal their intention of claiming a legislative power. In Brittany the *tiers état* met by themselves, and with a list of grievances and innovations, demanded that they should have a double representation. The noblesse at last were alarmed. The Prince of Conti presented a note almost prophetic to the united commissioners of the chambers of the notables, representing the danger of the monarchy, and the alarming state of the nation: the note was transmitted to the King, but it was so little congenial to the sentiments of his minister, that it was ordered not to be taken into consideration. However, upon a division of the whole notables, an equal representation of each of the orders was carried by a great majority. So determined, however, was the minister in his own projects, that he resolved to give the *tiers état* a representation equal to both the other orders, and so infatuated was the King as to permit it. From the form that had been adopted, and still more from the state of the public mind, the elections became of the first importance. Had the noblesse been united and active, it is probable they might have prevented the dangerous effects of the numbers of the *tiers état*, and, perhaps, have entirely changed the spirit of that part of the states-general. A question had arisen whether the order of noblesse, as forming part of the states-general, should not be confined to those holding fiefs; had they admitted this principle, it would have given that order some distant resemblance to our House of Peers, and had the rest of the no-

blesse offered themselves for representations of the *tiers état*, it was to be expected from their interest and connexions, that many of them would have been elected, and excluded a great part of the most violent of their members. The noblesse, however, except a few who were attached to the popular opinions herded together, with that apathy and inaction which must make any description of men or any nation, fall before an active enemy, that with vigour and exertion they might have easily resisted. But, if no other means were to be made use of for tempering the heat of the *tiers état*, it became the duty of the crown, and every person attached to order and good government, to endeavour to make the choice fall upon men of discernment and moderate principles; but, such was the philosophical spirit of the minister, that he thought the elections could not be left too free, by which means they were abandoned to the populace, who returned a great part of the representatives of the *tiers état* of the retainers of the law, inflamed with all the fury of the parliaments, most of the rest were physicians and literary men, whose heads were filled with Utopian schemes bred in the closet. Most of the electors drew up instructions for their representatives: those of the *tiers état* in general contained a variety of projects relating to the administration and civil liberty, some included changes in the government itself; but, the *tiers état* of Paris exceeded all the rest, for they appointed separate committees for the constitution; and all the principal branches of administration. When the states-general met, the King in his speech at the opening of the session called upon them to restore order and tranquillity in the kingdom, which amounted to a declaration that government had escaped from his hands. The speech of the keeper of the seals, which the King said was to explain his intentions, was an invitation to them to new-model the state; but, at the same time contained an insinuation, that it was expected they would confine themselves to the liberty of the press, the finances, and *lettres de cachet*. The speech or rather dissertation of Mr. Necker, exclusive of the finances, which occupy a great part of it, was a sentimental homily, in which, through the whining and academic phrases in which it is composed, may be discovered that that apostle of the revolution had made the representatives of the *tiers état* equal to those of both the other orders, that he might by their means insure the innovations that he intended, that in regard to their voting by orders or by numbers, he thought he could play them one

against the other as he pleased; and that he fancied that while he made them his puppets to new model the government at his pleasure, he could reserve such a share of power to the crown, and no more than he in his wisdom thought proper. The *tiers etat* were not deficient in the part he had assigned them. From the first they assumed a superiority over the other orders, and demanded that they should come to them to try their powers or returns of election in common. The thing was in itself of very little consequence, if it had not become so from being considered by all parties what it really was, a trial whether the states should vote by orders or by numbers. If the public affairs had been in the hands of a man of discernment and sound principles, he could not have wished for a better preliminary means of judging of the temper of the different orders, and discovering how to act in regard to them. The *tiers etat* would not proceed to any business unless the other orders complied with their demands; at last commissioners were appointed by the three orders to endeavour to settle the point; but, as the *tiers etat* or the commons, as they then stiled themselves, would abate nothing of their pretensions the meeting was fruitless. The next day the commons sent a message to the clergy, requesting them to join them, which occasioned long and warm debates in that order, without coming to any decision. In consequence, however, of that message, the noblesse resolved that the monarchy was threatened by that step, that they were determined to defend it, and maintain the voting by orders. Mr. Necker, who wished not to fix any general rule, but to make use of either way, as best suited his own views upon every occasion, seems to have been a good deal at a loss how to act; the King merely sent an order to renew the conferences, which was not agreed to by the commons without a remonstrance, in which they say, the inactivity of the states was owing to the noblesse, and hypocritically adding in the tone of the sixteenth century, that they are the natural allies of the crown against the higher orders, and the most faithful subjects in its defence. At the renewed conferences the minister endeavoured to evade the question, by suggesting that the reports of the different orders should be laid before the commissioners of the other orders; but this had no better success. On the conferences failing the commons decreed to proceed to business, and to call over all the returns themselves. If the court had not before seen or not adverted to what the arrogance of the *tiers etat* might lead, this

might have warned them so far at least, as to have kept the noblesse distinct, to balance them, and to have prevented any concessions on the part of that order, till it was known how far the commons would go. But the noblesse were allowed to depart from their former resolutions, and accede to the mode proposed by the King's commissioners, although the commons had treated it with utter contempt. In a few days after the *tiers etat* declared themselves the national assembly, annulled all the taxes, but re-established them provisionally till the end of the session, or till they should be granted by the consent of the King and the nation. The decrees of those two days having been moved by the Abbé Sieyès, has induced a belief that the *tiers etat* were at that time led by the speculative members; but, the fact was, that decrees had been suggested, and even motions partly to the same effect made, long before by the members from Dauphiné, which was the first field of sedition; but the assembly not being then sufficiently prepared for so bold a procedure they fell to the ground. The monarchy was overthrown by practical politicians, educated by the parliaments and bred in the popular disturbances, nor was much attention paid to the lucubrations of the metaphysicians, till after the revolution was completed. By annulling the imposts, and afterwards re-establishing them by their own authority, the *tiers etat* had assumed a great part of the powers of government, and given strong reason to think that they intended to assume the rest. It was very little if any thing short of high treason, by the laws of the freest as well as the most arbitrary governments. It is probable, that they would never have proceeded to the lengths or taken the rash steps that they did, if it had not been an opinion prevalent, and almost established in France ever since the wars of the Fronde, that, if acting with a constitutional assembly individuals ran no risk, further than banishment or imprisonment for a short time. When affairs had arrived at such a crisis, it would be presumptuous in any person who did not thoroughly know the principal actors, and was not intimately acquainted with their intrigues, to pretend to decide what the precise line of conduct of the court should have been, but there is little hazard in saying, that it ought not to have been that of concession. The good of the state no less than the safety of the crown, required that the commons should be obliged to relinquish their usurpations. So unwarrantable were their proceedings, that it is reasonable to think that they must have defeated their

own object, and revolted the nation against them if the court had been commonly prudent; but they do not appear to have had a perception of the actual state of the nation. The long continued disputes with the parliaments had introduced a routine which they seemed to think must be adapted to all public assemblies, and to all circumstances. It was resolved that the King should go to the states-general, and hold what in the language of the parliaments was called a *lit de justice*. If the court had not been then sensible of the situation in which they stood, transactions took place in the few days that intervened before it was put in execution that might have informed them. As soon as it was seen that the commons received no effectual check, the minority of the clergy by a trick after the sitting was raised, procured a false majority, and such was the impression produced by the weakness of the court, that an actual majority of one, of that order joined the *tiers état*, and that too in the most violent of their proceedings. When it was determined that the *lit de justice* should be held, the place in which the commons met was unaccountably ordered to be shut up to prepare for it, without giving them regular notice. When they were refused admittance, they immediately went to a tennis court, where they entered into an obligation under an oath, not to separate till they had formed a constitution: they next day met in a church, where they were joined by that part of the clergy. Notwithstanding such reiterated resistance and unceasing defection, the court were not only incapable of seeing themselves, but even of being warned by others. A resolution of the noblesse occasioned by the first decree of the commons, was presented to the King, stating in pointed terms that the monarchy was aimed at, and the state in danger; to which he returned for answer, that he knew the rights of the noblesse, and that he would protect them; and that he hoped the noblesse would comply with the terms of reconciliation that he was to prescribe. He went to the states, laid down rules for their meeting jointly and separately, cancelled the proceedings of the commons, stated the privileges he intended to grant, and the powers he was to reserve, as deliberately as if his authority had never been disputed. Again the total want of foresight was striking. The assembly had been ordered and was expected immediately to retire, but no provision had been made in case of hesitation or resistance: they sat mute and apparently undetermined, after the King left them, but at last finding that they had the field to themselves, and that nobody

was to contest it with them, they soon recovered their former insolence, and treated the commands of the King with insult, although delivered in person. It has never been ascertained by whom the proceedings of that day were advised; there were many things in them contrary to the sentiments of the minister, and there were many others conformable to his known opinions. He did not attend the King, and it was expected that he was to resign, but after a conference in the closet, it was declared that he was to remain in office. The next day a majority of the clergy joined the *tiers état* in a regular meeting; the minority of the noblesse resolved to follow their example. The day after the minority of the noblesse had joined the commons, the electors of Paris, which city afterwards acted so conspicuous a part in the revolution, sent a deputation to congratulate the assembly on the wisdom and firmness of their proceedings; and the King held a council which terminated this, like every other crisis of his reign, by giving up every thing that he had so pompously announced he was determined to maintain. The two privileged orders were requested to join the *tiers état*, which was, in fact, constituting them the states-general, as they had a strong party among the clergy, and no contemptible one among the noblesse, while the other orders had no adherents among them.

Hitherto the obedience, if not the discipline of the army had been preserved; even the French guards who were so much connected with the citizens of Paris, had quelled the riots in that city; but, so strong was the last instance of imbecillity, that it began to be shaken. The populace of Paris had for some time been endeavouring to debauch the soldiers, and some of the French guards having been absent from quarters, were put in confinement; their friends in the city collected in great numbers, forced the place of confinement, and set them at liberty; not satisfied with this, they and the electors of Paris, who had already begun to be active in the cause of anarchy, sent a deputation to the states-general to request them to intercede with the King in their favour, which too well suited their own views, not to be readily complied with. When their note to that effect was presented to the King, he is said to have made a reply which baffles all comment; that their resolutions were wise, and it is added, that Mr. Necker applauded that reply. A species of fatality seems to have attended Louis the XVth.; the army had been neglected for many years, and, at

the moment that he was going to trust the fate of himself, and that of the state to it, he sanctioned an example that struck at the root of all discipline. Soon after the meeting of the states-general, it was known that a large body of troops was to be collected in the neighbourhood of Paris and Versailles, as soon as the overbearing dispositions of the *tiers état* began to appease, the officers received orders to join their regiments; the day after the *lit de justice*, the place of meeting was surrounded with troops; but, on the commons refusing to proceed to business they were removed; immediately after the King ordered the junction of the orders, Marshal Broglie was appointed to the command, in a few days the troops with a train of artillery began to assemble. A strong remonstrance was carried on the motion of Mirabeau, to which the King gave for answer, that the disorders in Paris and Versailles were notorious, and that the troops were collected to preserve order and tranquillity; but, that upon the request of the states-general, he was willing to change the place of meeting to Noyon or Soissons. The remonstrances of the states happened most opportunely for the court, if they had taken full advantage of them. From the intercourse that had already taken place with Paris, it was certain that a motion to remove farther from that city would not come from them, but the remonstrances themselves were a sufficient ground for putting it in execution; if they complied, it carried them to a distance from that support which made them formidable; if part of them refused it divided them and destroyed the influence that they had by acting together. From the transactions respecting the French guards, it was highly necessary to order them out of Paris to restore discipline; if they obeyed it deprived the citizens of all military assistance; if they disobeyed, it furnished the most favourable opportunity that could have occurred for trying a question that it was evident must soon be brought to issue; whether government was to stand or fall; and one on which it must have received the support of every friend to order and military discipline. But they were allowed to remain in the town, and were held up by the citizens as an example to the other troops as they arrived: the army being left inactive was exposed to every species of seduction, the soldiers were enticed into the town, some desertions followed, and the discipline of the whole was affected. When Mr. Necker and his ministry were dismissed, nothing was done to give that measure effect, for unless

the states were removed, divided, overawed, dissolved, or means found to enable the government to go on without them, a change of ministry was to no purpose. If a commotion was not expected, why collect an army? if it was expected, Paris was the only place where such a one as was to be feared could happen, yet no precautions were taken to prevent it. The agitation began there as soon as the news of Mr. Necker's dismissal arrived. There are not many internal commotions that may not be easily crushed in the beginning; the actors at first are few, the crowd are merely spectators, but the first success converts the spectators into actors. A small number of troops, chiefly cavalry, entered the town, but were soon glad to retire. By some strange oversight the battalion of artillery at the Invalids had been withdrawn, the arms and artillery left, and no other troops sent to defend them. If the mob had been repulsed there, it is far from improbable, that they would have dispersed: even at the Bastille the force of the insurgents was not great, and had it been garrisoned only two days before by a few good troops, and a determined commander, it is to be doubted if the insurrection would have arrived at any height, for it was not till after their success there, that it assumed any consistent form. Though it then became an object of serious attention, it was by no means of such magnitude as to be decisive of public affairs; prompt and vigorous measures were no doubt necessary, and if they had been made use of earlier to resist the usurpations of the *tiers état*, their success would have been easier; but, even at last, the insurrection was confined to the city of Paris, and had it extended much farther, if the King, as might have been expected, had put himself at the head of the army, and called the noblesse around him, there can be little doubt that the fidelity of the troops would have been secured, and that the cause of government would have prevailed; for the army even after witnessing the humiliation of the King, protected the departure of those emigrants who thought it prudent to fly from so weak a court, and afterwards obeyed the orders that were given them. Whether he succeeded in the undertaking or fell in the contest, it was the only determination worthy of a King; it is difficult to conceive how he could act otherwise, or without resistance resign the government of a great nation; but, such an exertion was foreign to the character of Louis the XVth, he rather chose to descend from his throne. On the 15th day of July, 1789, when Louis

the XVIth. walked to the national assembly, and delivered himself into their hands, the French revolution was consummated, on that day the executive power expired; constitutions might be decreed, any name might be applied, any form might be affixed to them, but government was no more.

Unless the supposition of an interior cabinet is admitted, the conduct of Louis the XVIth. is utterly inexplicable, measures apparently those of Mr. Necker were pursued for years after he was first dismissed from office; notwithstanding the opposition of the first meeting of the notables, and the disgrace of the minister, there was no variation in the spirit of the administration; when he seemed to yield to the parliaments a plan was laid for their destruction; and, notwithstanding the defection of every man of rank and character from the ministry, the attempt was made; from almost the first meeting of the states-general, it was evident that there was a system within that of the ostensible administration, and whose principles he had ultimately tried. If such a cabinet there was, the number of those now in existence who are acquainted with its secrets must be small indeed. It would be imprudence or worse than imprudence to attempt to argue upon unconnected hints and unauthenticated surmises; but something there is unexplained in the latter part of the reign of Louis the XVIth., and the vacillations of his counsels between the two opposite lines of conduct, and his always failing both in the hour of trial certainly accelerated, and, it may be said, produced the catastrophe that followed. That the Sovereign of a powerful kingdom, who not three years before was supposed to be, and who actually was, in the plenitude of power, should be deprived of his crown, not by a combination of men of rank and influence, not by men of great talents and elevated genius, not by a rebellion excited by oppression, not by great generals or victorious armies, but by an impulse of the populace, the principal instruments of which were attorneys, petty lawyers, and empty visionary projectors is unheard of in the annals of history. It bears no analogy to any former revolution, for every other revolution was a change from one form of government to another, or from one ruler to another; but the French revolution was the cessation of all government. It is in vain to search for the origin of so mighty an event in the frivolous causes that have been assigned; scribblers, false philosophers, illuminati, levelling clubs, and secret societies, are symptoms of the decline, not the causes (primary causes I mean) of the

destruction of government: as well might it be supposed that the sparks that preceded an irruption, had created the convulsive fires of Etna. Let the political quack and the fancied philosopher enjoy the self-complacency that they may feel in the flattering idea of their own penetration in having foreseen it. The statesman will say that he who foresaw the French revolution, must likewise have foreseen that Louis the XVIth was to be king. That there were predisposing causes will hardly be denied, but they were such as under an administration of but moderate ability would not have been sensibly felt: to mature it required a continual system of administration that by always imperiously commanding, and always feebly yielding practically taught resistance from one end of the kingdom to the other; still it is incomprehensible; to complete it, it was necessary that a man born to the most elevated station, should tamely descend from that station to become the puppet, the toy, and the victim of the despicable adventurers who successively attempted to seize the power he had abandoned. It is an awful warning to all governments; it was probably amidst the din of arms, and the career of victory, by being ablest in the council and foremost in the field, that the first foundation of that authority, called government, was laid; when arrived at maturity it does not require, and it is fortunate for society that it does not require, all the vigour of youth to preserve it from decay; but without a sufficient share of the vital principle by which it was first animated, it feels the weakness of age, and the French revolution has proved, that when no longer animated by that principle it may, like man himself, perish and sink into the grave.—CAMILLUS.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SAINT DOMINGO.—It appears that the blacks, after having become masters of every other part of the island, have made a regular attack upon the ancient city of Saint Domingo, the capital of that which was till the late treaties the Spanish part of the island. This place the blacks had not subdued when the last intelligence came away, and, it was stated, that a re-inforcement of the garrison was proceeding from the island of Cuba, which re-inforcement, however, the British ships were upon the watch to intercept. Thus, from the beginning to the end, our government have acted in a manner directly contrary to the principles which they professed, with regard to Saint Domingo, at the time when they permitted the fleets and ar-

mies of Buonaparté to sail thither. They have now proved to the world, that it was pusillanimity, and not policy as they pretended, which induced them to give that permission. The "black empire," at the idea of which they affected to be so much terrified, is now established as firmly as ever it will be; and towards that establishment they have contributed as much as it was in their power to contribute. It is possible, and even probable, that the city of Saint Domingo may hold out for a long time against the awkward attacks of the negroes, and, that it should so hold out is, certainly very much to be desired by us, seeing that, till the conquest of the island is completed, our islands will not have so much to dread from the neighbourhood of a black emperor and his army. Yet, as if we lost sight of our own important colonies in the West Indies; as if their security, or, at least, their tranquillity were nothing when compared to the desire of doing mischief to Frenchmen, however situated, and in whatever cause engaged, we are employing our ships of war in endeavouring to prevent the arrival of those succours, which might protract the war in St. Domingo, and consequently occupy the attention of Dessalines and his blood-hounds, for, at least, several months longer. These cruizers of ours it would be much better to employ in protecting our trade amongst the Leeward and Windward islands, where those wolves, the French privateers, are making dreadful havoc in our flocks of merchant vessels. But, we are, in this respect, acting with perfect consistency; for such has been, during the whole of this war, and of the last war too, our miserable policy: if, indeed, it be proper to give the name of policy to the puerile conceptions of such minds as those which can exult in the conquest of Saint Pierre Miquelon, and in the success of co-operations with a band of revolted and murdering negroes.

**EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.**—The taking of this title by the Emperor (all the official document relative to which will be found in the next sheet of the Register) cannot be considered as a step of trifling importance with respect to the House of Austria itself, or with respect to the future relative state of the great powers of the Continent. The motive by which the court of Vienna may have been actuated it is not very easy exactly to ascertain; but, it seems less difficult to conjecture what the effects of the measure may be as to the present war between England and France, and also as to the war that is kindling between France and the North of Europe. For, whatever may have been the motive of the Austrian cabinet in as-

suming the hereditary title of Emperor, it is hardly to be believed that the assumption would have taken place until the acknowledgement of the title by France had been secured; and, to secure such acknowledgement Austria would naturally be obliged to engage for the performance of a reciprocal good-office towards the person and family of Napoleon. Those who are of this opinion, an opinion which events appear already to have confirmed, will entertain no very sanguine hopes of obtaining the co-operation of Austria in the present contest against France; especially when they consider, that Buonaparté's taking the title of Emperor forms, perhaps, the better half of Alexander's grounds of quarrel. The court of Vienna has long viewed with jealousy the strides of the Russian Emperors: it is utterly impossible that it can have forgotten the part which Russia so lately acted in the new modeling of the empire of Germany: and it is by no means unnatural that the House of Austria should rejoice at an opportunity of mortifying the pride and checking the ambition of its rival in dignity and in power, and who is, moreover, a neighbour from whose increase of influence and strength it has much more to apprehend than from the further increase of the strength and influence of France, by which (thanks to the new division of Germany) it cannot now be, as formerly, materially and suddenly affected. We, as well as Holland and the North of Europe, now feel, and shall every day more sensibly feel, the consequences of the House of Austria being driven back to its present position. At the time Russia was assisting France in new-modeling the German empire, and that the lovers of "peace and a large loaf" were preaching all over this country the doctrine of political and belligerent self-sufficiency; at the time when Talleyrand was telling the nations of the Continent that they were too honest to have any connection with England, and when Mr. Wilberforce was telling his proverbially honest constituents, that England was too honest to have any connection with the Continent; at that time, when the demons of France and the saints of England seemed to have united their efforts for the purpose of destroying even a desire of future co-operation between this country and Austria; at that time an endeavour was made, in the pages of the Register, to prepare the public for the dangers, which, from this cause, it had in future wars to apprehend. The letter (a letter addressed to Lord Hawkesbury) to which I more particularly allude, and from which I shall take the liberty to make a short extract, was dated on the 10th of October, 1802, and will be found in Vol.

II. p. 449. " Sir Frederick Moreton Eden, " in his defence of the peace of Amiens " has, indeed, observed, that, notwithstanding the various changes in the states on " the Continent, Britain has long *flourished* " *great and free the dread and envy of them* " *all*, and he has further stated, that the " French may possess the Rhine and yet not " annihilate the commerce of the Thames, " and that *England may be free though Hol-* " *land is in chains*. Alas, my lord! it is " not the repetition of the threadbare cho- " rus of a vaunting hyperbolical song; it is " not assertion upon assertion, conveyed in " a strain of flippant antithesis, and totally " unsupported by facts or by argument; it " is not a treasury pamphlet, never read, " though circulated gratis, and though so " earnestly recommended by those sapient, " independent, and impartial reviewers, the " editors of the British Critic; it is not any " or all of these, my lord, that will overset " the wisdom of a system of policy, invari- " ably pursued by the statesmen of Eng- " land from the reign of the Tudors to the " administration of Mr. Addington; much " less is it by means like these, that we " shall be able to defeat the hostile regula- " tions and armaments, *which will be di-* " *rected against us from the coasts of Flanders* " *and of Holland, when Austria is completely* " *removed, as she now will be, not only from* " *the French frontiers, but from all the west* " *of Europe*; when little republics or states " of some sort or other, are placed as bar- " ricadoes between them, when, in short, " the key of the whole German empire is " finally and irretrievably lodged in the " hands of France." Lord Hawkesbury snickered at this, and feasted away upon his porcelaine de Seve. The time is already come, however, when the nation has dearly to pay for his having possessed power: for this cause, and others of a similar nature, the nation has already smarted severely; but, of its sufferings not one thousandth part have yet been experienced. How the war will end in other respects, it would be impossible to divine; but, it will be strange indeed if it ever does end without events that will, for ages and ages to come, make Englishmen remember what it is to be committed to the rule of such men as Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Pitt.—Austria, unless Russia is ready to assist in undoing the work of the German indemnities, has no interest, nor indeed, any apparent object in joining Russia in a war against France; and, as to England, Austria has nothing more to do with her, at present, except to repay Mr. Pitt the amount of his loan! In short, such has been the

management of our foreign affairs, that it appears next to impossible, that Austria or Prussia should now join us in the war; and, without the active and the hearty co-operation of one of them, at least, an alliance with Russia will afford us no relief from our immediate dangers, while it may probably add to those which are not so immediate, by augmenting the quantity of bank notes and by giving to Russia a fast footing in the Mediterranean.—It is, therefore, necessary to guard the people against the indulgence of any hope founded on the assistance to be afforded by Russia, or any of her little neighbours of the north, of whose power France has no dread, and whose hostility, unless she could unite them in a neutral war against us, would, in the present state of things, be full as servicable to her as their friendship: it would in fact, give her one more national bank to draw upon; it would render one more kingdom tributary to her, without forcing her to add twenty thousand men to her army. Nothing is so dangerous to a country, situated as England now is, as the indulging of fallacious expectations of foreign aid; because such indulgence has an unavoidable tendency to prevent those measures of precaution and preparation, to slacken generally, all those exertions, which it is the duty, and which it is at present the inclination, of the people to make in their own defence. To preserve and cherish the patience of the people is, too, a principal consideration; and, every one must know (for the observation must be common to every rank and state and stage of life), that patience is exhausted so soon and so radically by nothing as by a succession of expectations and disappointments.

FINANCE RESOLUTIONS.—The two letters, inserted some weeks ago, upon the subjects of the Finance Resolutions have not yet been noticed by me, because, as will be perceived, other matter more urgent has presented itself; and, to notice those letters in a manner suitable to their merit and the importance of the subject they treat of would require a considerable space. As to the main object, however, that I had in view no answer to those letters is required. I only meant to show, that, if Mr. Pitt did mean to cause it to be believed that the old taxes had not fallen off since 1792, he was either deceived himself, or intentionally deceived, or endeavoured to deceive the parliament and the people. Both these gentlemen acknowledge (indeed it is impossible to deny it), that the taxes have fallen off. They differ from me as to the degree, and as to the meaning and

intention of the minister's statement; but as to the point which I was anxious to establish, they say nothing that I am desirous to contradict.—And, I beg leave here to observe, that I entertain no hostility to the finance system, merely because it is the minister's; my dislike to it arises from a conviction, an experimental conviction, of its ruinous effects. In a late *Register* the financial system, the enormous debt and taxes, were referred to as the chief cause of the overthrow of the monarchy of France; and I must confess that I am greatly flattered by the confirmation which that opinion has received from an essay, in the present sheet, proceeding from the same able and admired writer, whose essays on the *State of the Continental Powers*, and on the *Foreign Policy of Mr. Pitt*, were inserted in Vol. V. pp. 422 and 705. Great folly, inconsistency, indecision and imbecility are obvious in the conduct of the cabinet of Versailles previous to and during the first stages of the revolution; but, upon analysing the several parts, it will be found, that the disorders in the finances was the great, the standing, the ever-prevalent, the efficient cause. The effects of all the other causes might have been overcome: but this was not to be overcome, and the monarchy sunk under it. I am afraid, too, that, in more than one respect, a most striking resemblance will be discovered in the political conduct as well as character of Mr. Neckar and Mr. Pitt: the same constant desire to put off the evil from day to day; the same shifts and expedients; the same love of projecting, the same want of all fixed principle; the same attempt to keep all parties at variance with each other in order the easier to command the whole; the same means of obtaining popularity with the selfish part of the nation; the same knack at resigning and resuming his place; and, . . . but here the comparison must stop for the present, and every one must hope, that events will never enable us to pursue it further. In some points, however, we may, to the honour of our country, insist upon a wide difference. The French financier was a sad solemn personage, who, when a project was hissed, fell into the vapours, took quite a religious turn and wrote godly books. Our gentleman has more elasticity in him: if he sinks under the reprobation called forth by one project, you instantly see him rising with another. He is more lively, active, and diverting, and has infinitely more resource than the French operator, who, had a scheme like that of the military project failed him while a considerable part of the

kingdom was compelled to have recourse to paper-representatives of *half-pence* and while the whole kingdom was hastening towards the same state, would have lost all his spirits and thought about preparing his coffin; whereas ours appears to rise with his difficulties, dashes into new scenes, casting his cares behind him; and, what with his processions of military cars, his grand reviews, his sham-fights, and his other exhibitions, instead of being hooted off the stage, he has certainly divided the attention and the plaudits of the summer with Mrs. Thornton; and bids fair not to be driven quite out of the field even by the "Infant Roscius" himself.

FRENCH FINANCE. — The following statement, upon this subject, is taken from the *Moniteur* of the 29th ultimo. "From the official financial statements, recently submitted to the Emperor, it results, that our position is satisfactory; that however great our expenses may be, our resources are still more so; in fine, that the state will be in no need of extraordinary succours, nor of any new taxes. The statement has been made in the supposition of peace. — Each of the two years which have just elapsed, has seen our army augmented by the ordinary contingents of the conscription: it is now more numerous than it was in Nivose, year 9, the period when our armies inundated Germany and Italy. — It is true that our expenses, on account of the state in which our land army has been maintained, and the efforts which have been made for our navy, amount to upwards of seven hundred millions; but our receipts for the year 12 have exceeded seven hundred and fifty millions, and those of the year 13 are insured for more than seven hundred millions. — From this may be seen, the wisdom and foresight of the administration. Although we should even have to support a continental war, like that of the coalition of the year 7, no extraordinary measure of the finances, nor any extraordinary levy for the army, would be necessary. The ordinary contingent of the conscription already decreed, would amply suffice. — In no period of the history of France, was there so much money ever spent in constructing ports, canals, bridges, and roads; yet, to complete this picture, the taxes have been diminished, and are less heavy than they have ever been. This latter circumstance will not escape the eyes of the historian." This representation is very much in the manner of Lord Auckland, Mr. Chalmers, and George Rose: the main object seems to be

to give the world, and particularly the people of France, a high opinion of "the wisdom and foresight of the administration." But, it must be confessed, that the editor of the *Moniteur* refers to some facts, which, if true, are indubitable marks of real national prosperity. George Rose and his fellow-labourers could ring all the changes upon national prosperity and upon the foresight and wisdom of the administration, but they could never say, that, while the army was greatly augmented, while the fleet was increasing, while more money than ever was expended in fortifications of different sorts, while the foreign relations were maintained in a way to give the nation a complete ascendancy amongst the powers of the continent; while such was the result of the operations of government, George and his fellow-labourers never dared to assert, that "the taxes had been diminished," and that the "foresight and wisdom of government" rendered new taxes quite unnecessary. Whether it be true, or false, that the taxes in France have been diminished it would be very hard to say; for the *Moniteur* is no more entitled to belief than are the pamphlets of George Rose; but, we know, that the army has been greatly augmented, that immense, and, to us, fearful, additions have been made to the maritime means of offence and defence, and we also know, to our sorrow and our shame, that the foreign relations of France have not been neglected. Nor is it very likely that the *Moniteur* would so plainly mistake the fact relative to the taxes. In any more general representation of financial prosperity, one ought to have no hesitation in supposing the chances to be greatly indeed on the side of falsehood; but, in stating so simple a fact, and a fact, too, with which every man having any property must be feelingly acquainted, it is not likely that truth would be set at defiance. Indeed, the loans and tributes, which have been extorted from Spain, Portugal, and the Hans Towns, together with the rich plunder of Hanover, have formed no trifling addition to the revenues of France; and, when we consider the power that she has of continuing these extortions, while so large a part of her army is maintained in foreign states, and out of the purse of those states, we shall not, I imagine, be easily induced to lend an ear to Lord Auckland or Sir Francis D'Ivernois, or any of those writers who would still amuse us with the hopes of final success from the ruin of the French financial resources. In this respect, as well as in the talents of the two administrations relatively considered, the contest is lament-

ably unequal; and this inequality has not failed to be perceived by those who have large capitals in money, and some of whom have, accordingly, already transferred those capitals to France, where, since the commencement of the present war, land has risen in value nearly ten per centum: so true it is, that wealth, in spite of all obstacles, will seek the protection of military force; that military force will always obtain riches, and that riches will not always obtain military force.

REVIVAL OF JACOBINISM.—In the two preceding sheets I endeavoured to shew the folly, as well as the injustice towards individuals and the mischief to the public, of attempting to revive the cry of *Jacobinism* at this time, when an union of all men of all parties is absolutely necessary to the defence of the country; and, as the charge of *Jacobinism*, particularly against Sir Francis Burdett, seemed to have been revived principally, if not entirely, by the sect of the Methodists headed by Mr. H. Thornton, I should have inserted, had I not wanted room, at the close of the last sheet, a remark or two upon the conduct of Sir Francis Burdett, relative to the volunteer system, contrasted with the conduct of the saints, relative to the same system.—It can have escaped no man of common observation, that, all those who have been desirous of obtaining the applause and support of the many, have been loud and indiscriminate in their praises of the volunteer system, and not only of the system but of the conduct of every body of persons, and of every single person, included in it. In truth, if a public man wished to obtain a degree of popular favour and support that would render him formidable to the state, it would be hard to conceive a way more likely to obtain his ends than to make himself the ostensible champion of all the armed part of the people; amongst whom are, doubtless, included many, at least, of those persons in whose breasts *Jacobinism* must exist, if it exist at all. Yet we do not find Sir Francis Burdett amongst the fulsome eulogists either of this body of four hundred thousand citizen soldiers or of the individuals composing it: we do not find him, like the Addingtons, the Jenkinsons, the Castlereaghs, and Mr. Pitt, paying his court, in the most abject style, to this armed populace: on the contrary, when the committee of one of these corps surpassed their powers and appeared to threaten part of the county of Middlesex with military contribution, he was the first, and he was the *only* member of parliament, who stood forward in defence of order and of

law, in defence of the rich against the unwarrantable threats of the lower, or, at least, the middle, class of the people. The committee of the volunteer corps of the parishes of St. George and St. Giles' had published a most daring and inflammatory paper, calling upon the rich inhabitants for larger sums than they had been willing to give, reminding them that it was the poor whom they must look to for the defence of their riches, and hinting very intelligibly that, if they refused to draw their purses, a time might soon come when they would lose their all. This paper, a copy of which will be found in page 28 of the first volume of the Parliamentary Debates, Sir F. Burdett brought into the House of Commons, at the opening of the last session of parliament, and spoke of it in the following words: "In what I am going to say, I mean not the smallest censure upon the volunteers at large, nor even upon the system. Neither do I intend the slightest censure upon the corps, of whose conduct in one respect I disapprove. I can easily believe, that they may have been actuated by the best motives. The necessity of the times, the novelty of their situation, zeal for the service in which they have embarked, may all have prompted them to speedy and vigorous measures, the consequences of which they had not maturely considered. But, Sir, I hold in my hand a paper, which purports to be an address from the St. George and St. Giles's Bloomsbury Volunteer Association, directed to be carried from house to house through those parishes; calling upon those who have already contributed as well as upon those who have not; giving their opinion of the ability and wealth of the different inhabitants; and advertising them of an intended domiciliary visit to each house by two of the corps; threatening to publish their names at the close of the year; and particularly pointing out the aged, the infirm and the women, whose fears may be supposed most easily excited. That an armed corps should be a deliberative assembly was never thought advisable; but, that we should have parochial parliaments through the land, raising money at their will upon the inhabitants, can not be borne for a moment: especially when it is considered, that these same persons undertake to determine the gross amount of the sum to be raised, and the quota of the individuals, and that these same persons are to receive it, to dispose of it, and partake of it. The principle of this measure goes directly

and immediately to the destruction, not only of this, but of every kind of government, and tends to the introduction of that anarchy of which so much has been said to be apprehended. The motive may excuse the individuals; but it does not at all abate the malignity of the principle; for, it is well known, that many of the practices the most ruinous to nations have been begun from good motives and for good purposes." Now I ask any man of sincerity, and who has no base passion or interest to gratify, was this, even without any reference to the parties threatening and the parties threatened, the language, and were these the sentiments, of a person who wished to overset the established order of things? And, if we consider who and what the parties concerned and interested were; if we consider that it was the poor and middle classes of inhabitants threatening the rich, amongst whom the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice were well known to be particularly, though most unwarrantably, aimed at; if we consider this, it will require a degree of malignity greater than ever was engendered, even in the gall of a saint, to attribute to Sir Francis Burdett a desire to find an occasion to act upon jacobin or levelling principles.—That part of the conduct of the saints, to which I shall at present confine my remarks has been exhibited at their head quarters, their grand focus, the city of Bath, where, as my correspondents inform me, they have not been less troublesome and mischievous in the volunteers than they have been in matters of religion. In one of the corps an open quarrel and a secession have, as my readers have already seen, taken place. I published the declaration of the seceders in p. 301; but another printed paper apparently published by persons actuated by a similar spirit, now lies before me, and whether its tendency be not to render the soldiers of the regular army discontented and mutinous I leave to be determined by those, who called upon the Attorney General to prosecute me for my opinions relative to the state of the fleet. "The very character of a volunteer supercedes the necessity of severity or force to exact the necessary performance of his duty. In every point of view, the officer" [of the regular army of course,] "is supported by the military law—in courts-martial, where the officers themselves are constituted judges of their own conduct; and in no respect, has a private redress, or the liberty of being tried by his equals. To preserve the

“rights of the few, against the encroachments of the many, is the wisdom of government, and the indispensable usage of military order since it imperiously suggests the necessity of such a procedure; but, in the *Volunteer System*, where good conduct and respectability are found to pervade along the ranks, is it not lamentable to observe an unnecessary exercise of tyranny, to effect what a manly and temperate mode of conduct would produce with emulation and alacrity—good order and strict discipline?—This is not a question of dispute merely between two individuals, a subaltern and a private; it is a common cause, interesting, not only to the regiment of Bath Volunteers, but to every other volunteer regiment in the kingdom.”

The paper, from which this passage is extracted, did, it appears by the imprint, issue from the press of S. HAZARD of Bath, the same press whence proceed the tracts of Mrs. Hannah Moore, and of that society of which Mr. H. Thornton is at the head. Now, I do not say, nor do I think, that this circumstance, though greatly strengthened by the letters of my correspondents, ought to be regarded as conclusive evidence against the saints; but, certain I am, that evidence much weaker would have been regarded as conclusive against those persons whom, and whom alone, Mr. Thornton has chosen to consider as the friends and acquaintance of Sir Francis Burdett. I do not agree with my correspondent “True Briton,” that “His Majesty’s Attorney General ought to file an information against the printer in order to come at the author;” for, such a proceeding would only point out to the soldiers what, otherwise, they would never see, or hear of; but, if a similar publication had issued from any press formerly employed by the Corresponding Society; if such a paper had been written by any person formerly belonging to any society or club suspected of entertaining disloyal principles, let Mr. Thornton say, whether he would not have produced it in company with the circumstance of Sir Francis Burdett’s acquaintance with Despard, for whose treason Sir Francis and his party are no more answerable than Mr. Thornton and his party are for the treason of the *three* saints, who were executed for the same crime and upon the same scaffold with Despard, and who, previous to their execution, were, at their own especial request, attended and assisted in their devotions by preachers of the methodist sect. This latter circumstance is not introduced for the purpose of conveying any insinuation

against the loyalty saints in general; but, the very mention of it may serve to convince Mr. Thornton of the absurdity, to say nothing of the malignity, of his introducing of Despard and his crimes into a speech levelled at the principles and the party of Sir Francis Burdett. In fact, nothing can be more mischievous, more hateful and diabolical, than any attempt, made at this time, again to divide the people from the monarchy, let the demonination made use of be what it may; nothing can be more opposite to the exhortations that the ministers themselves have, till very lately, made use of; nothing could more effectually serve the cause of the enemy, because nothing would so powerfully operate in sapping the foundation of our force, by sea perhaps as well as by land, and, of course, nothing would be so likely to induce the enemy to invade us, or to facilitate his work after an invasion. It is fresh in the memory of every one, that the late ministry repeatedly boasted, that, whatever harm their peace had done, it was much more than overbalanced by that incalculable good, “the uniting of the people in one common bond of affection for their own government and of resolution to resist the enemy.” This was the expression of Lord Hawkesbury. Upon what ground, then, is it that his lordship, in his *Thatched-house* advertisement, now makes use of words, which clearly imply, that he regards part of the nation as being *disloyal*? Has jacobinism been conjured up from the grave by Mr. Pitt’s return to power? Or, was it never dead? And did his lordship deceive us? The truth is, that the extinction of the wild and levelling principle of jacobinism is a good that we owe neither to the war of Mr. Pitt, nor the peace of Mr. Addington, but to the ambition and despotism of Buonaparté. Jacobinism, such as it was, can never be revived; but, loyal people may be rendered disloyal, in the same way that a stupid jealous husband drives a virtuous wife into the arms of a rake. In the present case, however, justice bids me declare my belief, that the ministry, except in the mere accidental sally of Lord Hawkesbury, has had little or nothing to do in the attempt to revive the odious political distinctions, which divided the nation during the last war, and which so largely contributed to the disgraceful issue of that contest; and, it is to be hoped, that all those, be they who they may, who have made this attempt, and who would sink the country rather than abandon the gratification of their selfish malice, will meet, from every class and every party, reprobation so strongly marked as to compel them to desist from their iniquitous pursuit.

*"To defeat the intention of the enemy to harass us by perpetual apprehension of descents upon our coast, it is not, in my judgment, sufficient to make those naval and military preparations which would prevent an invasion from being ultimately successful, but to make such vigorous and extensive arrangements for national defence, as may diffuse a sense of the most complete security against even the temporary impression to be produced by such an attempt, and may enable every individual to lay down his head to rest."*—MR. PITT'S Speech, 23d May, 1803.

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## EFFECT OF BANK NOTES ON THE PRICE OF PROVISIONS.

SIR,—You mention in your Register of the 25th ult., that neither Mr. Parnell or Mr. Foster afford in their works the information to be wished for, as to the degree of the influence of paper money upon the prices of provisions. The doctrine of prices is yet to be more fully investigated, before it is completely understood, and the usual criterion of them taken from the proportion of the supply to the demand can in future be depended upon only in such cases where currency remains of steady value. The method which appears to me to be the best to be adopted in prosecuting the inquiry of the causes and variations of prices, is first to consider what they are, and how they vary, under the supposition of the currency in which they are calculated remaining of a fixed value; and, secondly, under the supposition of its being of a fluctuating value. Under the first supposition, it may safely be assumed that prices are the consequences of demand, and vary in the proportion of the supply to the demand. Under the second, our first business is to ascertain the effects of an abundant and of a deficient currency on prices; and then, by adding or subtracting them from the price of any commodity, the real price according to a fixed standard of currency will be found. I conceive, Sir, that an issue of paper, that is greater than the effective demand for it requires, operates on prices in the following manner. The system of discounting which gives rise to this excessive issue, affords to every one so great a facility of acquiring money, that the person who has any commodity to sell is able to hold it over till he can get the price he lays upon it; and the person who wishes to buy it, can afford by the same facility, to give this price, though apparently very high, and much greater, than according to the customary criterion of value it is really worth; and thus, by this power of holding over, and power of purchasing, the prices of all things advance without observation, just in proportion to the extent of discounting, which, in fact, is in

proportion to the excessive issue of paper. Then again, every advance in prices creates a new demand for increased circulation, which is provided by new discounts and forms an additional excess of paper; and, in this manner, the quantity of it which can get into circulation may be augmented to an indefinite degree, and prices, as was the case in France, be advanced in an equal proportion. The conversion of paper into gold being impossible, there can be no limit or degree ascertained of the influence of paper money on prices. The issuers of it can alone regulate its operations, and as the national banks of England and Ireland regulate by their issues the amount which private bankers can issue, the prices of every thing, even of our bread is almost entirely within their jurisdiction. Such is, Mr. Cobbett, one of the many miserable consequences of the never to be sufficiently deplored and condemned restriction of cash payments.—We may consider it as certain, that the influence of an excess of paper money on prices, is at least equal to the depreciation which results from that excess. This in England is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, according to the evidence given before the exchange committee, which states that guineas bear that premium; and, in Ireland, is 10 per cent. That this influence may be greater, I am not prepared to deny, but, I am inclined to think, that it is not, for we cannot observe the influence of paper money to operate in augmenting prices, until the quantity of it issued is excessive, because, till it is so, it only supplies the effective demand for circulation; and, as the depreciation of paper is the effect of an excessive issue, and varies in its degree in proportion to the excess, and is in fact, the degree of value which the paper loses and the goods acquire that are purchased with it; it is apparently safe to conclude, that this influence of paper on prices is exactly in degree equal to the depreciation of it. To say that the price of corn are more affected than the prices of any other article, I do not think admissible. Though country bankers certainly give the farmers a power of holding

over the sale of their corn, which they have not hitherto possessed, it by no means follows that the corn would be consumed at a cheaper rate if they did not take advantage of this power; it might the easier find its way into the hands of the corn-factor, but, he would not dispose of it until he could acquire the benefit of his credit with the neighbouring bank. The operation of the influence of paper money on the sale of corn appears to be this, that it makes the farmer a corn-factor, and that the corn lies a longer time than has been usual in the rick or stores of the farmer, and a shorter time in the granaries of the factor. This is the extent of the influence of country bank paper issued within due bounds, which extent is enlarged by producing an advance in the price of corn, in proportion to the depreciation of paper, whenever the issues of it are excessive. Though it is true, as Mr. Howison states it, that discounting of bills enables corn-dealers to withhold the corn from the markets; it is very evident that this power must be in proportion to the extent of the system of discounting, or in other words, to the depreciation of paper money; and, it is equally evident that whatever advantage this system of discounting gives to the seller, it gives at the same time an equal advantage to the purchaser. For it is the same identical cheapness of money which enables the seller to hold over, and the person who wishes to purchase to do so; and, in pursuing the operation of paper money on prices, we shall find that the only purchasers who do not experience this advantage which results from the system of discounting, are those persons who do not earn the means of purchasing, by being in the first instance sellers, but who receive their incomes under leases, annuities, or other contracts. Thus the common labourer who has an increased rate of wages as a result of a scarcity, can have no reason to complain of the influence of paper money, because his wages will be augmented according to the prices of provisions, which exist under the double operation of the scarcity and of paper money; nor can in truth any complaint be well founded on the part of any other persons than those who depend on fixed incomes, and they can only complain of an evil which is general in its effect on the prices of all articles of sale, as well as upon the prices of corn, and is the evil of depreciation.—I think Mr. Howison attributes too great an influence to the discounting of bills in the time of scarcity. It would appear by his work, that all bills discounted for farmers and cornfactors, advanced the prices of corn; this is viewing

the subject in much too contracted a point of view, and encourages an acquiescence in errors which are injurious, because they induce people to look to improper causes for the high prices of corn, and prevent them from paying sufficient attention to the real cause of the disturbance of our prices, the bank restriction.—In the quotation made by Mr. Parnell from the essay of Mr. Malthus, it is ably explained in what manner a scarcely makes it necessary that the circulating medium should be augmented, in order to prevent the embarrassments that would arise from one that was deficient; and, we may well suppose, that the discounting of bills by country bankers, which takes place in scarce years, is in a great measure absolutely necessary, and eminently useful; and, therefore, that it is rash to impute to it the unqualified charge of advancing the prices of corn. It is clear that so long as the discounting goes no farther, and in times of scarcity it may go to a great extent, than merely supply the new effective demands for circulation, it cannot operate to enhance prices, and that it is, as before stated, the excess of discounting which does so.—Upon a mature consideration, therefore, Mr. Cobbett, of this subject, I am fully of opinion, that in general, it is supposed, that paper money has a much greater influence on the prices of provisions, than it really has, and as the excess of it gives equal advantages to both purchasers and sellers, and as in all cases almost, every one is a seller either of his labour or his goods before he becomes a purchaser; and as farther the operation of this excess is gradual, universal, and unobserved upon all things that are subjects of value, I am also of opinion, that provisions have their prices affixed to them just exactly on the same principles, by which they are formed for all other things; and that the proportion of the supply to the demand, and of the value of the existing currency to the value of it, at such periods of comparison as may be selected, are the true criterions on which these prices are regulated.—I am, &c. I. T.—*Dublin, Sep. 1, 1804.*

#### DEPRECIATION OF MONEY.

SIR,—Your correspondent C. B. in his letter of the 23d of July, lays it down as a conclusion, which must result from his argument, that “no proof of a depreciated currency can ever be drawn from the rates “or balances of exchange.” He admits that it may affect them, but he at the same time asserts, that it can never be any thing more than a plausible conjecture, to attribute any variation in their rates to a depre-

ciated currency, because the rates of exchange are liable to be affected by so many other causes. After the very ample and very able discussions of the doctrine of exchange which have lately been made public, and the great exertion with which you have endeavoured to procure attention to those parts of them which are most deserving of it, it was not to be expected, that so absolute a position as that above mentioned, should have been at this day advanced, and without any attempt to support it, except by a presumption that the world was as ignorant as ever of the ramifications of commercial exchange. As your correspondent admits that the rates of exchange may be affected in some degree by a depreciated currency, and as we must take it for granted, that he would likewise admit that they are affected by what is usually understood by a balance of trade, he leaves us to divine, for surely it is not easy to say, what the many other causes are which affect the rates of exchange. To me, who am perfectly satisfied that the science of exchange is perfectly simple, it appears, that the opinions of your correspondent are not only untenable, but such as betray a want of a perfect comprehension of this subject. It is only necessary for me to look back to a period of some few months to bring to my recollection, that the universal opinion of those who deservedly ranked as able commercial politicians, was, that the subject was so intricate, and affected by so many causes, that it was impossible to account for the unusual high rates of exchange between Dublin and London. It always occurred to me, when inquiring the cause of this phenomenon, that those who made answer that there were many causes, conveyed the surest proof of total ignorance of the subject, because I have always understood that the criterion of science was the clear and simple reduction, step by step, of every effect to its own proper cause. Under these impressions, Mr. Cobbett, I am very far from being able to agree with your correspondent in considering it "nothing more than a mere conjecture to attribute any variation in the rates of exchange to a depreciated currency." On the other hand, I am, so far as I have been able to form an opinion, very much inclined to think, that variation in currency is the sole cause of variation in the rates of exchange; I even go so far as to feel quite sure, that the balance of trade only affects exchange in proportion as it in the first instance affects the currency. For what other is the operation of a favourable balance of trade but to make current coin plenty and cheap, or of an unfavour-

able balance but to make it scarce and dear. If, then, we suppose specie in circulation, and the term of the balance of trade, to mean a balance of all accounts of a pecuniary nature, how weak and of how little avail must any conclusion on this subject be, which is inferred under a supposition, that not only a depreciation of currency, and a balance of trade, but also several other circumstances are to be calculated upon as causes of variations in the rates of exchange. —I cannot enforce what I wish to establish in any manner more to the point than by following your example, in quoting from Mr. Parnell's work on the subject of Irish exchange. The manner in which he has sifted the doctrine of exchange appears to be the most useful, because it is a clear and correct statement of a scientific proposition, and leads the mind to an easy comprehension of the subject, without permitting its exertion to be diffused on the extraneous matter with which the doctrine of exchange has usually been embarrassed. The definition of exchange is, in my opinion, so novel, and bears so immediately on the part of your correspondent's letter alluded to, that I think it may be of service in preventing the evils that must ensue from erroneous sentiments and measures concerning a subject at this moment of such infinite importance. —"The par of exchange between different countries is the comparison of the value of their respective currencies; when these currencies are of permanent value, a permanent per-centage will express the par of their mutual exchange of currency. Thus, whilst guineas were the standard of the value of English and Irish currencies, the fixed and acknowledged par of exchange was  $8\frac{1}{2}$ , being the exact difference between the number of pounds, shillings, and pence, contained in a guinea in the regulated currency of Ireland and in that of England\*. If a practice of debasing coin had at any time become so general as to diminish the value of all the coin in circulation in Ireland 10 per cent., whilst at the same time no such practice existed in England, it would be evident that  $8\frac{1}{2}$  would not express the par of exchange between England and Ireland, the par under the new circumstances of the Irish currency would be exactly  $18\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. But if, instead of the coin having been debased, it had disappeared, and a currency of paper been

\* This difference in the currencies arises from a difference in the copper coin, 12 s. in England, and 13d. in Ireland make a shilling, and therefore 100l. English is equal to 108l. 6s. 8d. Irish.

"introduced in its place of a value less than  
 "that of the currency of specie by 10 per  
 "cent.; it is equally evident the par of ex-  
 "change with England would be  $18\frac{1}{3}$ \*. As  
 "specie has actually disappeared, and as  
 "also a currency of paper supplies its place,  
 "of an inferior value by 10 per cent., it is  
 "clearly erroneous now to say, if the  
 "exchange of Dublin on London is  $16\frac{1}{2}$   
 "per cent., that it is 8 per cent. above par;  
 "the fact is, it is 2 per cent. below par, and  
 "it is also a fact, that an exchange of 16  
 "per cent. is a proof of a balance of trade  
 "and remittances in favour of Ireland.  
 "The state and variations therefore of cur-  
 "rencies are in this case and often the  
 "principal agents in producing variations  
 "in exchange; and where the variations  
 "are very great, unusual, and after some  
 "time cease, leaving exchange very diffe-  
 "rent to what it generally had been, it is  
 "then certain that some great alteration in  
 "currency has happened. In the reign of  
 "King William, before the reformation of  
 "the silver coin, the exchange between  
 "England and Holland was 25 per cent.  
 "against England; but the value of the  
 "current coin was at that time rather more  
 "than 25 per cent. below its standard va-  
 "lue. Before the reformation of gold in  
 "1772, the market price of bullion ex-  
 "ceeded the mint price, and the rate of  
 "foreign exchange was depressed, even the  
 "exchange with France was 2 or 3 per  
 "cent. against England. It is understood  
 "that at that time the French coin, though  
 "worn, was not so degraded as the English,  
 "and was perhaps 2 or 3 per cent. nearer  
 "its standard. Very soon after the recoin-  
 "age in 1772, the market price of bullion  
 "fell to the mint price, and there was a  
 "corresponding improvement in the course  
 "of the exchange †; in consequence of the  
 "depreciation of French assignats, the ex-  
 "change between London and Paris fell 70  
 "per cent. to the disadvantage of the latter  
 "place."—Here then, Sir, is not only  
 "strict logic, but authenticated facts to dis-  
 "prove the doctrine of your correspondent;  
 "and evidence of the real cause of variations  
 "in exchange, which should open the eyes of  
 "ministers and of the empire to the baneful  
 "operation of the restriction of cash pay-  
 "ments, and which points out the manner of  
 "remedying the evils which have attended it.  
 "—I have the honour to be, &c. T. T.—  
*Dublin, 25 Aug. 1804.*

\* Guineas bear a premium of 10 per cent; this is the rate at which they are now selling at Mr. Frank's office in Suffolk-street, Dublin.

† *Wealth of Nations*, l. 62. II. 215.

## MIDDLESEX ELECTION.

SIR,——I observe by a quotation from Mr. Thornton's speech, in your paper of Saturday last, (p. 380), that Mr. Thornton has misled you, and misrepresented me. When he mentions my name as an agent for Sir Francis Burdett, Mr. Thornton calls me the Secretary of the Corresponding Society. The political sins of 1794 were sifted to the very dregs, in the trials of Mr. Horne Tooke and the other persons acquitted of high-treason: my concern in the transactions of that day was completely laid open to the public. Those trials were too important to the ministers who were the prosecutors, not to have been read by Mr. Thornton, a member of parliament, and a zealous supporter of their measures. Mr. Thornton, therefore, must have known, that I was not Secretary of the Corresponding Society; that I was not even a member of the Corresponding Society; and, that I was secretary of no political society whatever. My offence against the administration (for it was proved to be no offence against the law) was being a member of the Society for Constitutional Information, of which the Duke of Richmond and many other persons of the first rank and talents in this country had been also members; and of the proceedings of which Society, Lord Chief Justice Eyre, said, they wore a very different aspect from that imputed to them by the prosecution, when they came to be read with the key furnished by Mr. Horne Tooke's cross examination of the secretary of that society, the witness for the Crown.—I do not trouble you with this letter from any personal feelings of my own. Mr. Thornton's praise and censure are alike indifferent to me. But, when falsehood and misrepresentation are used, under the cant of loyalty, with a view to destroy the character of an honourable and illustrious patriot, and through him to attack the liberties of my country, I feel that it would have been criminal to have remained silent.—I am, Sir, your obedient, humble servant, JOHN AUGUSTUS BONNEY.  
*Gray's Inn, Sept. 13, 1804.*

## PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Decree of the Council of State at Vienna.*

*Dated Vienna, 11th August, 1804.*

His Royal, Imperial, Apostolic Majesty arrived in this city on the 10th inst. from Baden, to assist at an extraordinary conference of state, at which were present his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles, the Archduke Palatine of Hungary, the Chancellor of Hungary, that of Bohemia and Austria, that of Transilvania, the Tavemnicus of Hungary,

and the President of the Chamber of Finances and of the Bank. In consequence of the supreme determination which has been declared in this Council of State, the following patent is published :

**PATENT.**—We, Francis II. by the Grace of God, elected Emperor of the Romans, always August, King of Germany, of Hungary, and Bohemia, of Galicia, Lodomeria, &c. Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy and Lorraine, Grand Duke of Tuscany, &c.——Though we have already attained by the Divine will, and by the choice of the Electors of the Roman and Germanic Empire, to a dignity which leaves no room to desire any augmentation of titles and consideration ; it is however, our duty in our quality of Chief of the Austrian House and Monarchy to provide for the maintenance and preservation of that equality of hereditary titles and dignities with the first Sovereigns and Powers of Europe, which belongs to the Sovereigns of Austria, both on account of the ancient lustre of their House, and in regard to the extent and population of their estates, comprehending independent kingdoms and principalities, so considerable, and which have been secured to them by possession, agreeably to the right of nations, and by treaties. To establish, in a durable manner, this perfect equality of rank, we have determined, and think ourselves authorised, after the example which has been given us in the preceding century by the Imperial Court of Russia, and that which is now given to us by the new Sovereign of France, to confer also on the House of Austria, as far as relates to its independent states, the hereditary title of Emperor. We have therefore resolved, after mature reflection, solemnly to assume and to establish, for us and for our successors, in the unalterable possession of our independent Kingdoms and states, the title and dignity of Hereditary Emperor of Austria (as the denomination of our House), in such a manner that all our kingdoms, principalities, and provinces, shall invariably retain the titles, constitutions, prerogatives, and relations which they have hitherto enjoyed.——According to this supreme decision and declaration, we decree and enact :—I. That immediately after our title of Elected Emperor of the Romans, shall be inserted that of Hereditary Emperor of Austria, after which shall follow our other titles of King of Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, &c.—then those of Archduke of Austria, Duke of Styria, &c. and those of the other hereditary countries. But as since our accession to the throne, there have successively taken place, in the possessions of our House, several changes, which

have been confirmed by solemn treaties, we at the same time make known the under-mentioned titles, newly regulated according to the present state of things, and our will is, that they be introduced and employed in future. II. The title of Imperial Prince and of Imperial Princess, shall be given and conferred with that of Archduke and Archduchess, as well as of Royal Highness, to our descendants of both sexes, and to those of our successors in the sovereignty of the House of Austria. III. As all our kingdoms and other possessions must retain, without restriction, their present denominations and relations, this is understood in particular of our kingdom of Hungary, and of the countries which are united to it, and also of such of our hereditary states as have hitherto been in immediate relation with the Germanic Empire, which ought in future to preserve the same relations with it agreeably to the privileges granted to our House by the Emperors our predecessors. IV. We reserve to ourselves the right of determining hereafter the solemnities which shall take place at our Coronation, and that of our successors as Hereditary Emperor. Those, however, which were practised at our Coronation, and at that of our predecessors, as King of Hungary and Bohemia, shall continue to subsist in future without any change. V. This declaration and ordinance shall be published and carried into execution throughout all our hereditary kingdoms and states, without delay, and in the accustomed forms. We have no doubt that all our states and subjects will receive with gratitude and patriotic interest this disposition, the object of which is to maintain the consideration of the Austrian Monarchy.

**GRAND TITLE.**—We, Francis II. by the Grace of God, elected Emperor of the Romans, always August, Hereditary Emperor of Austria, King of Germany, Jerusalem, Hungary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria ; Archduke of Austria ; Duke of Lorraine, Venice, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola ; Grand Duke of Transylvania ; Margrave of Moravia ; Duke of Wurtemberg, Upper and Lower Silesia, Parma, Placentia, Guastalla, Auschwitz and Zator, Teschen, Frioul and Zara ; Prince of Suabia, Eichstadt, Passau, Trent, Brixen, Berchtolsgraden and Lindau ; Princely Count of Habsbourg, Tyrol, Rybourg, Gorizia and Gradiska ; Margrave of Burgau, Upper and Lower Lusatia ; Landgrave of the Brisgau, Ortenau and Nellenbourg ; Count of Monsfort and Hobenems, of Upper and Lower Hohenberg, Bregentz, Sonnenberg and Rothenfels, Blumeneck

and Hofen; Lord of the March of Esclavonia, Verona, Vicenza and Padua, &c.

**MEAN TITLE.**—We, Francis II. by the Grace of God, elected Emperor of the Romans, always august, Hereditary Emperor of Austria; King of Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Esclavonia, Galicia, Iodomeria, and Jerusalem; Archduke of Austria, Duke of Lorraine, Venice and Salzbouurg; Grand Duke of Transylvania; Duke of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola; Wurtemberg, Upper and Lower Silesia; Princely Count of Hasburg, Tyrol, &c.

**SMALL TITLE.**—Francis II. by the Grace of God, elected Emperor of the Romans, always august, Hereditary Emperor of Austria; King of Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, &c. Archduke of Austria; Duke of Lorraine, Venice, Salbourg, &c.

*Note presented to the Diet of Ratisbon on the 24th August, 1804, by the Imperial Envoys, accompanied by the Imperial Patent already published, containing the grand, ordinary, and abridged titles of his Majesty the Emperor.*

The Envoys for the Electorate of Bohemia, and the Archduchy of Austria, have received from their Sovereign, the annexed printed pragmatic ordinance, by which his Imperial and Royal Majesty, as Sovereign of the Austrian Monarchy, after the example of France, and for the reasons therein contained, has resolved to assume the hereditary Imperial title. The undersigned Envoys have not delayed to communicate this ordinance to the General Diet of the Empire, and as his Majesty has already addressed letters of notification to his several co-estates, it is not to be doubted that his communication will be received with the most friendly regard. As this new hereditary dignity, according to the express contents of the pragmatic ordinance, will produce no alteration whatever in the relation between the German hereditary States and the Roman Empire, the undersigned envoys for the Electorate of Bohemia, and Archduchy of Austria, have it particularly in charge, explicitly to declare that no change will be hereby produced in any other political relations and connexions, but that his Majesty will, with redoubled attention, continue to preserve, unimpaired, the friendly and benevolent sentiments which he has constantly most assiduously cherished towards all his co-estates of the Empire.

FREDERIC COUNT DE STADION.

EGID JOSEPH CHARLES DE FAHNENBERG.

*Note on the part of the King of Sweden communicated to the Diet; dated August 26, 1804.*

In consequence of the note given in to the Diet of the Empire on the 25th inst. by the Envoys for the Electorate of Bohemia and Archduchy of Austria, relative to the Austrian Imperial title, the undersigned Envoy from his Swedish Majesty finds himself obliged to declare—That his Majesty the King of Sweden participates with the most sincere satisfaction in every thing which can tend to promote the interest or gratifications of his Imperial House, yet his Swedish Majesty, both in quality of guarantee of the constitution of the Empire, and in that of a State of the Empire, cannot but consider the object of this notice as so inseparably connected with the composition of the German Empire, that it is not to be laid before the Diet merely as a notification, but as a subject for deliberation, in the discussion of which all the members of the Diet may express their opinions as authorised by the Constitution.—Knut BILDT.—Ratisbon, August 26, 1804.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

RUSSIA AND SWEDEN appear to have resolved on war with France, and we shall probably soon be informed of the grounds upon which they mean to justify that resolution in the eyes of their subjects and of the world. Indeed, if they intend sincerely and heartily to act upon the principle stated in the demi-official paper that will be found in another part of the present number of the Register; if they mean to make war against Buonaparté as the oppressor of Europe; if their object really be to protect weak states against the dictation, the encroachments, and tyranny of the strong; if such be their views, their resolution to make war will need no justification; their cause is the cause of justice itself. It were, however, to be wished, that, amongst the oppressed princes, for whom they are about to draw the sword and to fight side by side with Mr. Pitt; it were to be wished, that, amongst these illustrious and unfortunate persons, they had not included Louis XVIII. King of France and Navarre. Disguise the matter how we may, the cause of Louis XVIII. is the touchstone whereby to try the principles of those, who profess to go to war for the deliverance of Europe. If they openly and explicitly espouse that cause, they must be regarded as sincere in their professions, and, of course, as disinterested in their views; that is to say, as having no immediate interest, no selfish purpose in view; but, if they

blink that cause, if they avoid any explicit declaration upon the subject, if they make such a declaration a contingency in the war, and, in the mean-time, make a tool of the unfortunate monarch; in short, if they make the war a war of "existing circumstances," they will make another. Is no, not another peace of Amiens, for their terms will not be nearly so good. This was the original sin of the last war. The minister consulted the money changers instead of consulting with statesmen; a nest of greedy speculators and contractors formed his council of war like operations; his writers vilified Mr. Burke, because he was for a war without immediate gain and with permanent security. Europe can have no hope, that Mr. Pitt will join heartily in a war for its deliverance, even if he had the means. The declarations of himself and Lord Hawkesbury, in defending the peace of Amiens, that "the object of the war was *not* the restoration of the House of Bourbon," will, and ought to be, long remembered by the nations of Europe. And yet, even after that declaration, some of us have the modesty to demand gratitude at the hands of the royalists of France!—In what part Russia is to make an attack upon France is a question which it would be difficult to determine. In Italy? How is a Russian army, of force sufficient to meet even a detachment of French, to reach Italy, except through the dominions of states dependent upon, or friendly to, France? In Holstein? Will Denmark permit that? And, if it does, how long will it be before Copenhagen is laid under contribution? The season for a campaign, especially for a Russian campaign, is now past: nothing will be done this year; and, it is more than probable, that we shall see one more new loan and one more budget of new taxes long before a shot will have been fired between Russia and France.——Some suppose, that Mr. Pitt has stipulated with Russia for the deliverance of Hanover for a certain sum. It is an odd idea enough that the minister should absolutely make a contract for killing or beating the enemy. There is great fear, however, that such contract, if it has been made, will not be performed. To clear Hanover of the French requires not only the permission but the assistance of Prussia; unless a powerful diversion could be made elsewhere, a diversion so pressing as to compel France to withdraw her army from Hanover, and this could scarcely happen without a successful attempt upon Holland or the Netherlands.——As to efficient aid, therefore, England has but little to expect from the alliance which is said to be formed with Russia. Yet, this alliance

may lead to others; Mr. Pitt may possibly so act as to regain the confidence of the powers of the Continent; if he does, and if he makes an honourable peace, a peace that shall give us a fair prospect of security against the enemy, and that shall not be purchased with any new sacrifices of national honour; if Mr. Pitt does this, then will he merit the applause of his country; but, if he fail in any part of it, be his the responsibility, for he has at his command all our persons and all our property; every thing is given up to him and his projects; nothing is retained, and, if there were no responsibility for failure, no real responsibility, we should be the most slavish race that ever the sun shone upon.

PLOT AT WARSAW.——The account of this plot, which will be brought to a conclusion in the next sheet, is a faithful abridgment of the official documents, published by Mr. Peltier in his *AMBIGU*.——There is much reason to suspect the truth of Coulon's relation. Indeed some of the circumstances are quite incredible; and, upon an impartial consideration of the whole matter, one is constrained to believe, that the persons near the unfortunate Louis have been imposed upon by a sharper, who wished to extract a sum of money from them, and who, for that purpose, seems very anxious to introduce, upon every occasion, a description of his poverty. That the persons in the suite of Louis XVIII. should be easily imposed upon will appear surprising to no one who reflects but for a moment on the situation of themselves and their royal master, a situation from which suspicion must be inseparable, especially when the character and means of their enemy are taken into the view.——One reason, however, for discrediting the reality of the plot, is, that it is not easy to see what benefit Buonaparté could promise himself from it. In the *Moniteur* itself the protest of the King of France was first inserted, proof quite sufficient of the contempt, in which the new Emperor and his counsellors held any efforts that the King might be able to make, and a proof, too, that they feared not that the people of France were entirely weaned from the family of their ancient sovereigns. In this persuasion they might err, but the fact of their entertaining it strongly tends to convince us, that they would regard the assassination of Louis as an object far too trifling to be balanced against the effect of that universal horror which the deed must excite. The truth is, I fear, Napoleon is firmly fixed in his throne, if not in the hearts of the French nation, whose ruling passion is a love of the glory of

France, and in the indulgence of which passion they are abundantly gratified by their present ruler. They love splendour too, and splendour he seems determined to give them. If there be another thing which they required to keep them in constant good humour, it is the prospect of invading, ruining, and subduing this country; that too he has given them. Buonaparte is no longer the adventurer he was previous to Mr. Addington's peace: he has, since that time, settled the affairs of the church; he has erected a legion of honour, which, however it may be laughed at, will yield him a support that few monarchs can expect from their nobles. He who has with him the church, the aristocracy, and the army, has very little to fear from what man can do unto him; how firmly, then, must he be fixed, when it is well known that all these must live or perish with himself? when all men in power and place, and when no small portion of the holders of real property, know that their rank and influence and possessions are held by the same tenure that Napoleon wears the imperial crown?—For these reasons I am inclined to think, that the French government never employed any body to poison Louis XVIII., being perfectly indifferent as to the life or death of that monarch, having but too certain an assurance, that his cause would never be manfully and efficiently espoused by the great powers of Europe, and reposing a perfect confidence in the effect of that change which the last sixteen years have produced in the minds of the people of France. In speaking of the sentiments of the French people, and particularly of their attachment to the family of the Bourbons, we but too often overlook this important circumstance. Those who are now thirty years of age, were only fourteen when the French revolution began, and when notions hostile to the Bourbons began to be generally imbibed; and, we have only to look at a regiment of soldiers to be convinced, that it is upon men of five or six years on each side of thirty, that, in military countries especially, the fate of government must generally depend. As towards their rulers, the present active population of France presents a new race of men; and it must be evident, that every year will weaken those feelings from which one might hope to derive some aid in the restoration of the royal family, and which, in the early part of the last war might have been turned to such glorious account.

*INVASION.*—The fashionable phrase, in the diurnal prints, is, “nothing new from the coast yesterday.” *Invasion* is become a regular head of intelligence, like that of

*Ship-news* or *Old Bailey*, or *Price of Stocks*; and we go about asking one another whether we think Buonaparté will come and how long it will be first and what will be the consequence; just as people talk in a city besieged. In the next number of the Register will be found the French official accounts of the late skirmishes off Boulogne between our squadron and some boats of the French flotilla. This account, which does by no means diminish the dangers the flotilla has to apprehend from our ships, informs us of a fact, which we were before unacquainted with, namely, that Napoleon himself was on board the flotilla during the skirmish; that he remained on board till late in the evening; that he visited the several divisions, and particularly examined the boat, the deck of which was injured by a ball from our ships. This circumstance, however, does not tend to convince me, that he means to invade England in person, or, that he means to send, at least for some time, an army to attempt such an enterprize. It would rather tend to persuade me, that, at present, the object is to excite alarm, to keep us in constant agitation, and to increase our expenses. Napoleon is no coxcomb in military matters: he had no occasion to go on board the flotilla to amuse the French army, or to convince them that he dared meet the fire of the enemy: but, to scare the shop-keeping nation the step might be thought not altogether useless, and I will venture to say, that his having been on board has caused many a thousand pounds to be sold out of the stocks and many a thousand dollars to be locked up in chests, or put under ground. These timid wretches should, however, reflect, that Mr. Pitt and his partner in the government are continually upon the watch; that the latter of these brave gentlemen has been on board as well as Napoleon, though it remains for us to learn the effects which the terror of his name produced in France. The French people may, perhaps, laugh at the names of Pitt and Dundas; but if they knew them as well as we do, one could have little hesitation in ascribing such laughter to foolhardiness rather than valour. Napoleon little imagined that he should have met with that species of hostility, of which we have shown him we are capable. He expected, probably, that we should draw out all our soldiers and sailors, but he never dreamed, that we should fit out our hackney coaches against him; that we should have Secretaries of State serving in the ranks as privates; that our prime minister would turn colonel of foot and reviewing general; and that a Scotch lawyer would

sally forth to take an inventory of his batteries and his fleets. These are exertions of which he could have had not the least notion, and, therefore, it is not impossible, that circumstances so unexpected may disconcert, at least, if not completely defeat, his malicious intentions against us.—Much praise is due to the managers of the places of public entertainment for the great pains they take; and, indeed, the great expense they are at, in selecting and getting up such exhibitions as are calculated to rouse the public spirit, and to incite to deeds of renown, at this momentous crisis. These gentlemen seem to vie with each other in this career of patriotism and loyalty; but particular notice is attracted by the ingenious and loyal person, who tells us, that, in his representation, we may see not only the late engagement off Boulogne, with all the fire and smoke and waves so natural as to prevent any spectator from regretting that he missed a sight of the thing itself; not only all this does he show, but also Buonaparté upon the top of a hill near Boulogne, “wringing his hands, tearing his hair, stamping and swearing like a mad-man, while, in another part of the scene, *our gallant first Lord of the Admiralty* is seen “on board the ship of Lord Keith, viewing “the combat with the utmost composure “and most steady bravery!!!”——Mr. Pitt was continually exclaiming against his predecessor for want of vigour. The country had, therefore, a right to expect an improvement, in this respect, when Mr. Pitt himself became minister; but, I will venture to assert, that he has surpassed the expectations and even the wishes of the country; for, of the fifteen millions of persons, which the kingdom is said to contain, there is, perhaps, not one whose imagination ever rambled into the idea of Mr. Pitt’s undertaking a survey of our coast, while Lord Melville undertook to survey that of the enemy. Were not every thing turned topsy-turvy; were we not in a state of general dislocation, the fact would appear utterly incredible; and, when one reflects on it seriously, it is impossible not to believe, that it will hereafter be cited by the historian as one of those instances of presumptuous folly that preceded the dreadful calamities, which it is to be feared, he will have to detail.——If Mr. Pitt were to spend a small part of his time in making provision against the consequences which invasion may produce with regard to bank-notes, it appears to me that he would be acting rather more in conformity with what the country has a right to

demand from him. The sort of security as to the physical means of defence which he represented to be the duty of the minister to provide may be seen in that part of his speech, made at the out-set of the contest, which has been chosen as a motto to the present sheet; whether he has fulfilled that duty, whether our situation is such as to enable every man to say that he can “lay down his head to rest,” let those determine who hear the continual alarms that are rung in our ears through the treasury prints, and who witness the bustle of Lord Hawkesbury and Sir Brook. If there be no danger from invasion, why these alarms? If there be danger, why are no measures of precaution taken with regard to the consequences which may be produced by the paper-money? Of Lord Hawkesbury’s late circular to lords lieutenant I cannot, of course, disapprove; because of the steps which it recommends to be taken, I suggested the far greater part nearly a twelve-month ago; and I was then greatly blamed, I was called a libeller of the country, for earnestly beseeching the ministers to take such measures before hand as would convince the rich that their property should always be protected and the poor that they should always have a supply of provisions. To take effectual means for preventing any, even the least, interruption to the supply of the markets in London was dwelt upon with particular stress; and, I hope that that object will be, in the minds of the ministry, not inferior to the defence of the coast; for, in all human probability, a riot in London, owing to a scarcity of provisions, or to the want of a regular supply, operating in conjunction with the effects of an actual invasion, would be fatal to the monarchy and to the country, for in my mind these are never separated. A riot of even a trifling magnitude would so alarm the country, that London would be as completely cut off from all useful communication with the counties as if it were infected with the plague; and, to prevent riots strong bodies of well-armed and well-selected volunteers should be collected in every parish; and, one of the chief uses of them should be to protect the venders of provisions against the violence of the distressed as well as against those of the disaffected, if any such should unhappily be found to exist. An invasion, however inadequate as to its ultimate object, will assuredly cause a sudden and fearful depreciation of the paper-money at and near the parts invaded. We know how rapidly this effect increases and spreads; and he

must know nothing at all of the paper system, who does not clearly perceive, that London would, in a few hours, participate in the effects produced upon any part of the coast. In the country, the labourer would wait a week or two patiently for the return of paper credit: there the people know one another for miles round: the baker would be trusted by the miller, and would trust his poor neighbours. It is quite the contrary in and about London, where the poor man must have wherewith to pay for his food before he touches it, or his family must literally starve. What, then, must be the consequence, if a sudden depreciation of the currency should unhappily take place, without efficient force at the command of the civil magistrate? But, the magistrate is not, in this case sufficient: he should, in every parish, be aided by persons of weight and respectability; persons in a great way of trade, and, of course, well known amongst the common people. That "hunger will break down stone walls" is an old proverb, and it is not less true, that it will break through all other human means of restraint; it leads directly and certainly to a death, compared to which, death in any other form loses all its terrors. That the stock in hand of both bakers and butchers might, and would, be taken and distributed there can be no doubt; but, who would cause their shops to be replenished, without giving security for payment, and, indeed, without producing payment upon the spot? The vendors of provisions would not, all at once, refuse to take paper-money in exchange for their commodities; but, all metal-money would disappear, or would be obtained only at a great advance; the prices to take a nominal rise of a fourth, perhaps, and this to the poor man would be a real rise of so much, because his wages will not have risen; the evil will daily and hourly increase, and if there be a man who can contemplate the consequences without trembling, he must be made of more than mortal mould. In the Register of October the 8th, 1803, (vol. IV. p. 512), I gave a hasty sketch of what I thought might tend to lessen the dangers to be apprehended from this cause. It was suggested with great diffidence, because diffidence would upon such a subject have become even the wisest and most experienced of men; but, a correspondent, who differs from me as to most other points, has thought my endeavours upon this score worthy of commendation. I have not the presumption to believe, that I am equal to the task of pointing out an

adequate preventive of the terrible evil that invasion and a sudden depreciation of currency may conjointly produce, but I hope that I may contribute towards inducing others of more influence to turn their attention to the subject; for, if Mr. Pitt had under his command four hundred millions instead of four hundred thousand volunteers, if Lord Melville were to live on board instead of sailing over to take a survey of the enemy's force, and if there were a thousand Lords Hawkesbury and Castle-reagh instead of only two of them, I should never lay my head down to rest in perfect security as to invasion, unless I could see adopted some efficient measure of precaution with regard to the consequences which such invasion might produce through the means of the paper money. The enemy may, probably, not invade the country, and then such precaution would be useless. True; but this observation will apply to every other measure of precaution, of whatever nature it may be; it will surely apply equally well to the preparations for inundating the land at only a few miles from London, and to the fortifying of London itself! It is something truly strange and whimsical, that a minister of finance should be making military surveys; should be examining every inch of the coast, should be trying experiments of inundation, should be assisting at councils of war held over machines for the conveyance of troops, should be performing alternately every office from that of drill-serjeant to that of commander in chief, while not one single measure of precaution as to the currency of the country is ever so much as talked of! Timely precaution upon this head is infinitely more necessary than upon any other; because, without a real effective currency, the war, if the enemy should land, cannot be carried on. The soldiers and sailors must be paid in a currency that will bring them what they stand in need of, or they will either disband themselves, or plunder. This has uniformly been the consequence in similar cases, and upon what can Mr. Pitt ground a hope, that it would not be the consequence now? Timely and wise precaution as to the currency might, too, prevent an attempt at invasion; for, with more truth than ever might the minister now assert, that the national debt, (that is to say the paper-money) "is the best ally of France." I am confident, that the French place greater reliance upon the effect of that money than upon the force of their arms; and, therefore, it is of the utmost importance, unless indeed Mr. Pitt

still burns for "a speedy meeting with Buonaparté upon our own shores," to convince them that an invasion would not throw us instantly into pecuniary confusion.

**MILITARY PROJECT.**—This project, as far as relates to the obtaining of *men*, will, when parliament meets, be found to have failed. In many of the parishes neither men nor fines have been raised, and it is probable that the project will be given up. It has been stated, in some of the public prints, that great difficulties had arisen in attempting to execute the law in Ireland; other prints have stated, and, as far as I know, more correctly, that no such difficulties had arisen in that country. Time, the decider of all disputes of this sort, will show which of the parties have truth on their side. But, certain it is, that no number of men have, in virtue of the military project, been raised in England; and this was the measure, in which we were to see the proofs of Mr. Pitt's superiority over his "imbecile inefficient predecessor!"—The military project has numerous faults, but the chief, if we consider it with reference to the necessities of the times, is its inefficiency. To obtain men was the main object, and, failing in that, it is nugatory. If a parochial levy was to be determined on, the best way would have been to make the fine so heavy as to render the levy certain. The whole number of men might have been smaller, too; and it would have been as well to demand them for the regular army at once as for that mongrel species of service, the army of reserve. There are about twelve thousand parishes in Great-Britain: they might have been obliged to furnish, upon an average, two men each, in the space of thirty days from the promulgation of the act, or to pay, in case of default, a hundred pounds fine for each man wanting to complete their respective quotas. This would have been a strong measure; but it would have been efficient. It would soon have been over, and the regular army would have been relieved at once from all competition. In this manner twenty-four thousand soldiers would have been instantly produced, a number that will not now be recruited in two years, unless regulations very different indeed from the recent ones are adopted. If you are to have a strong measure, you should be sure to secure its efficiency: the present is just strong enough to vex and disgust, and just weak enough to be useless. Such ever will be, and ever will be, the measures of a minister of "existing circumstances,"

of shifts and expedients; of a minister who proceeds upon no fixed principles, who has no general scheme of policy either in war or in peace, and who always acts as if the preserving of his own power in the country, and not the power of his country in the world, were the principal object in view.—Whether we shall have a new project next year, or whether the amazing proficiency acquired by the volunteers will be held out as sufficient to enable us to dispense with any further increase of the regular army, it would be very hard to foretell with more than an even chance of being wrong; for, really, every step seems to be so much the result of momentary impression, the opinions of the minister seem to waver backwards and forwards, to vary according to the sight he has last seen or the person he has last conversed with, that there is no guessing what he will say or do from any thing he has said or done. Say or do what he will, however, we know that it is our duty to defend our king and country against the enemy, if ever he should attempt to invade us; and from the performance of this duty nothing should turn us aside. This is not a duty to be performed by talking. Men should make up their minds to act. To serve in their persons and with their property as far as either can be useful. To send, not old rumbling hackney coaches and other useless lumber to meet the foe, but to go themselves and send their sons to assist the army, to perform any duty that may tend to obstruct and destroy those, who, if unobstructed, would, most assuredly, destroy them and erase even the name of England from the list of nations. The crown which Napoleon will receive at Aix-La Chapelle, though formed of the contributions of tributary republics and kingdoms, will not content him: he looks forward to that crown of glory, wherewith the conquest of England is to decorate his brow. He may defer his enterprize, and there is little doubt but his intention is to weaken us by long suspense; but his design will not be abandoned. Of this we may be assured, even though he should grant a peace to those supplications, which he will, in all likelihood, receive from Mr. Pitt in about eighteen months time. He will never desist either from his design or his preparations, till we defeat him, or till death takes him from the world. If this opinion be correct, and I think it would be difficult to find arguments to combat it either in the character or situation of our enemy, or in our own character or situation, does it not behove us to look well into our means of maintaining this awful contest?

Does it not behove us to betake ourselves, while yet there is time, to something better, something more dignified, something more solid and permanent, than the wretched expedients, by which we are now attempting to deceive the world, but by which we succeed in deceiving nobody but ourselves?

**THE CAR-PROJECT.** — This youngest born of our follies appears still to be cherished with the utmost affection. Merely to allude to an advertisement from the office of a Commissary General, inviting persons to come and put their names down as contributors towards equipage for the army, in case of a descent on our shores; to allude to such an invitation as being published in the diurnal prints of the metropolis, amongst the advertisements of auctioneers, showmen and quack-doctors, is not sufficient; it must be quoted entire, or, a few years hence, we ourselves it is to be hoped shall hardly believe the thing possible: "Commissary General's Office, 5th September, 1804. "The nobility, gentry, and others are informed that the subscription papers for "horses, carriages, &c. are withdrawn "from the Thatched-house Tavern, the "Mansion House, and Golden Cross, Charing Cross, and lay at the Commissary General's Office, in Great George Street, "for such further subscriptions as may be "tendered; and that machines for hanging "on the carriages of coaches, chariots, and "post chaises, will be delivered to those "who have subscribed, on application to "Mr. Hall, Hamilton-street, Hyde Park-Corner." — This is exactly in the pauper style; exactly in the style of a gentleman of good family gone to decay. Subscription papers lying at the bar of taverns and inns, thumbed by the waiters and pot-girls, to come at last, stained with beer and stinking with tobacco, into the clean hands of the Commissary General! And is this the way in which a great national purpose is to be provided for? We are told, that, by means of the car-project the government will be able to convey "two hundred thousand men to any given point of the coast "in the space of thirty-six hours." This is an assertion which would have been hazarded in no country where the people's minds were not thought to be stupified by a succession of alarms; but, if we allow the assertion to be true, there can be no doubt but that the car-project is the most important measure that ever was conceived in this country; and, if so, must we not admire the mode that has been pursued of coming at the means of execution? Must we not

admire the speeches and advertisements of Sir Brook, the deliberative assemblies of coach-makers and coach-masters, and the consultations of worshipful hair-dressers and tailors relative to the means of conveying an army to the coast? "Twas pitiful! "Twas wondrous pitiful!" — In former numbers of the Register, I have shown, that this project, if attempted to be put in execution, would produce no good, and might produce great mischief. Much abuse has been poured out against me and against others who are of my opinion; but not one argument has been made use of to remove the impression that we have made. To bring scattered companies, or small corps, together in parts of the country very distant from the enemy, cars might be of some little use in here and there an instance; but, in vehicles of any sort, no body of men, above three or four hundred in number, can be conveyed from one point to another point, upon one and the same road, so swift as they can march on foot, to say nothing of lumbering up the road and of taking so many horses to within a day's march of the enemy. In answer to the calculations upon this subject, the defenders of the project have exclaimed: "what! do you assert, that men "can go faster on foot than in a carriage and "four!" This is the way they *answer* us: and the conclusion they draw, is, the charitable one that we maintain this proposition, because the carriages are the invention of the minister, and that thus it is evident, that it is the man and not the measure that we are opposing; nay, they go further, and conclude, that we should oppose any measure of his, though we were certain it would save the country. This, it must be allowed, is spinning a pretty long thread out of such scanty materials; but, the misfortune is, it will not hold; it breaks somewhere or other, and the labour of the manufacturer is lost. At first sight, it does seem strange to say, that men can go faster on foot than in a carriage and four, relays of horses being prepared on the road. People know that they go from London to Dover in a single night, and they feel that they could not walk the same distance in three days and three nights. No thought is, by the mass of the public, bestowed, at first, upon the difference between the travelling with one carriage and with several hundred carriages; they take no time to think of the length of road which a procession of such a number of carriages must occupy; of the slow pace in which processions of every sort, but particularly of carriages, must necessarily move; of the

effect of any accident, however trifling, or of any variation in the pace of the leading carriage of the processions; of the confusion and delay which the recoiling, the breaking down, or the oversetting of one of the carriages would inevitably occasion; of the long time that would be required to change or feed the horses, owing to the want of stabling and grooms, and to the uproar that such an enterprize would produce in every town and village, and, indeed, from one end of the line of march to the other; for, is any one weak enough to imagine, that the inhabitants would not flee in an opposite direction to that of the cars, or that a naked sword would prevent them from crowding up the way with their children, their cattle, and their goods? Of none of these things did the mass of the public think at first; but, when they heard men accused of a desire to ruin the country by opposing the car-project, or rather by pointing out its inutility, that love of justice, which is ever powerful in an Englishman's breast, induced them to examine a little into the grounds of so weighty a charge, and it required very little indeed to convince them, that the project was, as to military purposes, perfectly nugatory, if not mischievous, and that it could answer no other purpose than that of making a visible enrollment of partisans under the banners of the minister.—Your very crafty men are apt to outwit themselves; and I cannot help thinking that such will prove to have been the result in this instance. At a very early stage of this project, while it was yet in the cradle, I took the liberty to intimate to Sir Brook, that there was something rather unseemly, if not dangerous, in assembling together crowds of coach-makers and horse-jockies to settle the affairs of the nation; and, notwithstanding the loyal and patriotic feelings which he appeared to have inspired by his at once sublime and pathetic eulogy upon the ancient and numerous family of horses, I could not forbear warning him against the effects of the precedent he was about to furnish; I could not refrain from expressing my fears, that the coach-makers, job-masters, and others possessed of carriages and horses would meet again without Sir Brook at their head; I begged him to be upon his guard against committees, their discussions, and their resolves. Sir Brook had hardly left them but they constituted themselves a sort of political society, discussed the nature of their duties towards the government in this case, as well as the effect likely to be produced by the execution of the project. In a few days, a very few days, a

schism took place amongst them, occasioned by the alleged preference which Sir Brook had given to two particular coach-makers in a *contract*, of which every one thought he had a right to a share! The grounds of complaint, on the part of those who were excluded from a slice of this job, will be seen stated in a letter, published in the diurnal prints, and copied into the Register, present volume, p. 351, where there is some severe censure, and some foul insinuation, levelled at Sir Brook, who is roundly scolded for entering into any contract of this kind at all “without again *advising* with “the members of the committee, or, at “least, with some other of the coach-makers.” He is told that his conduct is “*extraordinary and unaccountable*,” and the writer confesses himself quite at a loss to discover the reason, “that the Commissary-General, even after having induced that “meeting to forsake their individual capacity, to lead others into a similar situation, should, without any regard to his “own *contract* with the coach-makers in “general, or to the *honour of the country*, “have made a *private* contract with two “individual coach-makers only.” What this son of the hammer means by a meeting forsaking their individual capacity and leading others into a similar situation, it is impossible to say; but, through the obscurity of his affected jargon, it is not very difficult to discover, that his loyalty and patriotism have met with a severe disappointment in not having procured him a share of a government contract, and that, in the bitterness of his soul, he wishes to make the public believe, that there is something *very mysterious* in the contract which the Commissary-General has made with the two selected coach-makers; in short, that the Commissary-General has a fellow feeling, of some sort or other, with the contractors, than which insinuation nothing, I dare say, can possibly be more false, and certain I am, that no insinuation ever arose from a motive more manifestly base. The motive staring through the act in the manner that it does will have every where defeated the malicious intention of the writer; but, this ought, one would think, to be a sufficient warning to the minister not to expose any department of the state, and by consequence the state itself, to the rude assaults of low-bred and low-minded men, whose selfishness renders them, as occasion serves, slavish or insolent.—But, the consequences of the precedent afforded by Sir Brook's meeting was not confined to matters relating to the conveyance of troops. Being assembled from

that "noble impulse of loyalty and patriotism," which, as a daily print told the public, induced them to offer "every spoke" and spring they had in their possession." the coach-masters seem to have regarded it as a convenient enough opportunity to form a committee and draw up some few resolves against the new tax that has been laid upon their vehicles of divers sorts. Accordingly their committee, as appears by public advertisement, made their report upon the subject, whereupon certain resolutions were proposed and unanimously agreed to. They resolve, that the new tax is "manifestly unjust and severely aggravated by the laws regulating the number of passengers; that its unprecedented exorbitance and unjust distribution, connected with vexatious and useless restrictions of other laws, will be ruinous to the coachmasters and seriously injurious to the public at large; and that the burden of the tax falls wholly on the middling and lower classes of the people, while it affords an entire exemption to the higher; that it is partial, invidious, and oppressive." These are the sentiments of "that loyal and patriotic body of men," who have subscribed "their last spoke and their last spring!" It must be confessed that neither loyalty nor patriotism forbid men to complain of the effects of a tax, particularly if it fall on the middle and lower classes of the people to the entire exemption of the higher; if it really be partial, invidious, and oppressive; but, while I allow that very loyal and patriotic men may make such complaints and may even promulgate them in newspapers, I must be permitted to observe, that such a complaint, preferred by certain other persons that could be named, would be regarded as an indubitable mark of jacobinism — But, to return to the proceedings of the meeting: it was finally resolved to appoint a select committee, with "instructions to adopt such measures as might be deemed most proper for obtaining a repeal of this unjust and impolitic act." And, as to the ways-and-means of the measure, how were they to be raised? Why, how should they be raised but by a *voluntary subscription*! And, as if the devil had been piqued at the growing fame of Sir Brook, the books for this purpose were ordered to be deposited side by side with those of the car-project, at the Thatched-house, the London Tavern, and the Golden Cross, just as one boy lays lime-twigs close by the call-trap of another! — These fooleries, succeeding each other so rapidly as they do, would afford a constant source of mirth, were not

their risible tendency checked by the apprehensions of the dangers to which they may expose the country. If we could be certain that they would produce no mischief, we might be allowed to laugh our fill; were they confined, as to their effects, within the bounds of a parish, or some small district, ridicule would be their natural and only effect; but, when we consider, that they may finally lead to the ruin and subjugation of our country, and that their consequences may be felt by our children's children, then they assume another character, and excite far other sentiments. — When the car-project was first mentioned in the public prints, I pointed out what appeared to me to be the principal evils of this volunteering system of procuring the means of executing the measures of government, amongst which I did not omit to state, the tendency which it naturally had to divide and weaken the efforts of the people at a crisis like the present; I observed, that this manner of calling forth the resources of the country was calculated solely to create partisans for the minister; that subscribing was first made a test of *loyalty*, and, of course, that those who refused to subscribe were reckoned disloyal. Such a sentiment is not clearly expressed, but I am persuaded, that every one will perceive it to be clearly implied in Lord Hawkesbury's advertisement from the Thatched-house Tavern, dated 14th August, 1804, and of which the following is a copy: "At a meeting of the nobility, clergy, and gentry of the metropolis and its neighbourhood, held here this day, the Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury in the chair, a subscription was entered into under the following head:—We the undersigned nobility, clergy, and gentry, of the metropolis and its neighbourhood, considering it to be the indispensable duty of every LOYAL subject, at this important crisis, to forward to the utmost of their powers the exertions of Government in defence of our country against the attempts of an invading enemy, do promise and engage to provide and hold in readiness for the public service, on the shortest notice, in the event of invasion, the number of horses and carriages, with drivers and harness, expressed opposite our respective names, for the purpose of conveying troops to the army, and to supply the drivers and horses with provision and forage sufficient, at least, for forty-eight hours from the time of being called out." He does not, in so many words, declare that all those who do not subscribe are disloyal men; but, I leave it to any one to say whe-

ther such be not the inference left to be drawn. He and his meeting, mere actors with all the parts arranged before hand, with all the resolutions ready cut and dry, perhaps, do not content themselves with a promise voluntarily to provide such and such things for the public service, though that would seem to have been all they had to do. They must preface this promise with a declaration of what is the duty of every man at this time, and also of what is requisite to entitle him to the character of a *loyal* man. First they declare it to be the duty of every loyal man to forward the exertions of government, by which they clearly mean, that every loyal man *will* forward the exertions of government; for, as to its being his *duty*, it is not more his duty than it is the duty of the disloyal man: their inclinations may differ in this respect, but their duties are the same, unless Lord Hawkesbury should be ready to contend, that with the sentiments of loyalty the duties of loyalty cease. This, then, is the amount of his declaration: that, *considering that every loyal man will*, at this crisis, forward the exertions of government, he and his meeting have entered their names on a subscription list for that purpose. And this is clearly to infer, that subscribing is a *test of loyalty*; and that, of course, all those who are able, and yet who do not subscribe, are not to be relied upon as loyal, that is to say, they ought to be suspected of disloyalty! By what authority; in virtue of what office, of what lawful power, I would be glad to know, did Lord Hawkesbury issue this declaration from his chair at the Thatched-house tavern? Had the declaration come from a person out of office, it might have been regarded as impertinent, though there would have been no ministerial responsibility; but, it assumes quite a different quality when coming from a Secretary of State. Upon what authority, then, has he made this declaration? again I ask. Has he made it by the commands of his sovereign? Has his Majesty commanded him to issue a paper necessarily implying a doubt, at least, that part of his subjects are disloyal, and making a "*voluntary* subscription" a test of loyalty? No; most assuredly his Majesty has done no such thing: he has too much wisdom: he knows that he is, as he deserves to be, beloved by *all* his subjects; and his royal mind must revolt at the idea of being made the king of a party. His Majesty must perceive, too, that this subscribing system saps the foundation of his own high authority; he must perceive that the subscriptions are, in fact, given in support of the minister,

and not in support of the throne; he must have perceived that the long lists of voluntary contributors are counted up as friends of the treasury; and he must have perceived, that, while it is his interest, the lasting interest of his illustrious family, to preserve harmony amongst his people, to keep them all firmly united, it may have been, and may again be, compatible with the views of his minister to divide them into sects, to split them into parties, to excite amongst them mutual suspicions, to subdue them by the means of each other, and to render them a resistless mass easily moulded to his purposes. And, who is this Lord Hawkesbury that takes upon him to brand with a want of loyalty all those who, being able, do not choose to enrol their names amongst his "*voluntary* subscribers?" It surely cannot be the same person that used to talk about the Corsican adventurer; that used to threaten to march to Paris! It never can be the man that negotiated the treaty of Amiens; the peace of experiment that had "*united the hearts of all men never to be again divided!*" What! and is it really the person who signed himself Robert Banks Jenkinson, and who so gloriously feasted himself upon the Porcelaine de Seve! Is this the man under whose banners the nobility, clergy and gentry of the metropolis are to enter as volunteers upon pain of being regarded as *disloyal*! . . . . Upon such a topic there is no proceeding further.

REVIVAL OF JACOBINISM.—To the mischievous endeavours of those, who were working hard to conjure up the ghost of Jacobinism out of the proceedings during the Middlesex election, it would seem to me that the death blow has been given. The public is no longer pestered with their common place vociferation and meeting-house cant; and though they will by-and-by make their appearance again in an indirect way, they will never make head against the general indignation, which at present prevails, and which is daily increasing, at any and every attempt that may be made again to divide us into parties, distinguished by terms signifying an opposition to each other even as to our wishes and intentions relative to the existence of the monarchy and the preservation of the independence of the country; this indignation is so generally felt and so strongly expressed, that no attempt to revive such dangerous and disgraceful distinctions will meet with even a momentary success. So confident do I feel upon this point, that I should not have introduced the subject upon this occasion, were it not for the purpose of re-

ting a letter, which will be found in another part of the present number, from Mr. Bonney, whose name was mentioned in page 380 of the present volume, where, as the reader will recollect, I thought it necessary to comment on a speech of Mr. Henry Thornton, who had represented Mr. Bonney as having been not only a member, but the secretary, of the Corresponding Society, who had dwelt upon this circumstance as conclusive evidence, that the principles of Sir Francis Burdett were such as to render him unfit for a member of parliament, and who had most artfully endeavoured, by the intermediate link of Sir Francis, to connect Mr. Bonney and his former supposed principles with all the political party now opposed to Mr. Pitt! Upon this candid and godly effort of Mr. Thornton I had before occasion to remark: I showed the injustice of the conclusion which Mr. Thornton drew from the circumstance of Mr. Bonney's having been an agent of Sir Francis Burdett at the election; and, I might have asked, whether, upon the principle on which he was arguing, an opposite conclusion might not, and ought not, to have been drawn from the circumstance of Sir Francis Burdett having employed Mr. Plumer as his principal counsellor. Mr. Plumer was, if I mistake not, a member, and a distinguished member, of the "Loyal Association against Republicans and Levellers;" yet he was and is employed by Sir Francis Burdett. Now, this is a circumstance, which, especially when we take Mr. Bonney's letter into view, we can hardly believe to have been quite overlooked by Mr. Thornton, from whose distinguished piety we might have reasonably hoped for a security against any such material suppression. The fact, however, relative to Mr. Bonney will admit of no dispute or doubt. Mr. Thornton positively asserted, and the assertion stands recorded in a report of his speech published by authority, that Mr. Bonney was Secretary of the Corresponding Society, and Mr. Bonney as positively asserts, that he never was even a member of the Corresponding Society, that he never was secretary of any society whatever, and that he never belonged to but one club or society in his life, and that was the Society for Constitutional Information, to which many of the first noblemen and gentlemen in the land are well known to have belonged. Now, as the proof is so near at hand, as it is recorded in

the proceedings of a court of justice, there are few persons who will entertain any doubt as to the correctness of Mr. Bonney's statement; and, it necessarily follows, that there can be very little doubt, that, upon this occasion, Mr. Thornton has positively asserted that which is contrary to truth; and that this he has done, too, for the purpose of producing an impression which he regarded as extremely injurious to the public character as well as to the cause of Sir Francis Burdett. Upon such conduct it is, I trust, unnecessary to make a single remark, except this; that Mr. Thornton is the person who has stood forward at the head of those, who have endeavoured to revive the cry of Jacobinism.—Before I entirely dismiss this subject, I cannot refrain from remarking on the altered language of the ministry and their partisans relative to the opinions and voice of the people. No one can have forgotten, that, in answer to all our statements against the ignominious peace of Amiens, we were reminded that the *people*, the *nation*, had decidedly expressed their approbation of it. I could quote more than one hundred passages from speeches in parliament, where this argument was made use of with triumph by the present ministers and their supporters; and that their friends out of doors took the same tone need not be mentioned. But, now, behold, when joy at the supposed success of Sir Francis Burdett is expressed by two or three hundred thousand voices, the people are no longer the *people* and the *nation*, but the *mob* and the *rabble*! In the cause of Burdett and Independence it will not be asserted, that there was any base and cowardly; yet those who join in that cry are called rabble, while the name of *the people* and *the nation* are given to the vile and infamous herd, who, though they knew that LAURISTON brought the confirmation of their country's ignominy, harnessed themselves to his chariot, forced him through the ranks of the guards, and drew him in triumph along the road, which, till then, had ever been appropriated exclusively to the use of the King. But, the shouts of that worse than brutal rabble were convertible to ministerial support; those plaudits were in favour of a measure, for which the ministers stood in need of a justification; then, therefore, the applauders were the people and the nation, but now they are rabble and mob.

*"All the grounds of distinction are now at an end, and the honest and wise men of all parties mean the same thing, and ought to lay aside and forget old names, and become one party. . . . . For my own part, I have no quarrel to names and persons, and would join in any just measures to save the kingdom; and will oppose, to the utmost of my power, all who will not."*—TRENCHARD'S Letters of Cato, No. 10.

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## LETTER I.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

### INTRODUCTION.

SIR,—Nothing is either more common or more true, than the observation, that, in order to provide an adequate remedy for evils, whether moral or political, it is necessary, first to inquire into, and, if possible, ascertain, the causes whence they have proceeded; and, I trust, that, when it is considered what must, in the present instance, necessarily be the objects of inquiry, it will be thought in no wise improper, that I address myself to you; not only because you are the first minister of the King, and, of course, are responsible for measures now to be adopted, but also, because you have, from your long and uncontroled possession of power, contracted a deep responsibility with respect to the past.

In estimating arguments, relating to any subject, and particularly to measures and events, in which the writer has taken no part, personal considerations with regard to him ought never to intrude; but, Sir, this intrusion, so inimical to the cause of truth and of justice, experience has convinced us that nothing can prevent in the case of political discussions; where, though the reasoning have no possible connexion with the character, conduct, motives, or views of the reasoner, though the door be barred against them by every principle according to which men, in other cases, form their judgment, intrude they will; and powerful indeed must be the talents of him who can with safety bid them defiance! Greatly and justly diffident in this latter respect, feeling the full weight of the task I have ventured to encounter, and being, therefore, anxious to avoid the assaults of any extraneous adversary, I shall, I hope, be excused, especially when some recent transactions are taken into view, if, previous to my entering on the important subject before me, I endeavour to guard against the foul hostility of personal considerations, whatever degree of conviction

my reasoning may have the good fortune to produce.

It is now, Sir, ten years since I first took up the pen with an intention to write for the press, on political subjects; and the occasion of my so doing is too curious in itself, as well as of too much importance as to the sequel, not to be described somewhat in detail. At the memorable epoch of Doctor Priestley's emigration to America, I followed, in the city of Philadelphia, the profession of teacher of the English language to Frenchmen. Newspapers were a luxury for which I had little relish, and which, if I had been ever so fond of, I had not time to enjoy. The manifestoes, therefore, of the Doctor, upon his landing in that country, and the malicious attacks upon the monarchy and the monarch of England which certain societies in America thereupon issued through the press, would, had it not been for a circumstance purely accidental, have escaped, probably for ever, not only my animadversion, but my knowledge of their existence. One of my scholars, who was a person that we in England should call a Coffee-house Politician, chose, for once, to read his newspaper by way of lesson; and, it happened to be the very paper which contained the addresses presented to Doctor Priestley at New York, together with his replies. My scholar, who was a sort of republican, or, at best, but half a monarchist, appeared delighted with the invectives against England, to which he was very much disposed to add. Those Englishmen who have been abroad, particularly if they have had time to make a comparison between the country they are in and that which they have left, well know how difficult it is, upon occasions such as I have been describing, to refrain from expressing their indignation and resentment; and there is not, I trust, much reason to suppose, that I should, in this respect, experience less difficulty than another. The dispute was as warm as might reasonably be expected between a Frenchman, uncommonly violent even for a Frenchman, and an Englishman not remarkable for *sang froid*; and, the result was, a declared

resolution, on my part, to write and publish a pamphlet in defence of my country, which pamphlet he pledged himself to answer: his pledge was forfeited: it is known that mine was not.—Thus, Sir, it was, that I became a writer on politics. “Happy for you,” you will say, “if you had continued ‘at your verbs and your nouns!’” Perhaps it would; but the fact absorbs the reflection; whether it was for my good, or otherwise, I entered on the career of political writing; and, without advert- ing to the circumstances under which others have entered on it, I think it will not be believed that the pen was ever taken up from a motive more pure and laudable. I could have no hope of gain from the proposed publication itself, but, on the contrary, was pretty certain to incur a loss; no hope of remuneration, for not only had I never seen any agent of the British government in America, but was not acquainted with any one British subject in the country. I was actuated, perhaps, by no very exalted notions of either loyalty or patriotism; the act was not much an act of refined reasoning, or of reflection; it arose merely from feeling, but it was that sort of feeling, that jalousie for the honour of my native country, which I am sure you will allow to have been highly meritorious, especially when you reflect on the circumstances of the times and the place in which I ventured before the public.—Great praise, and still more great success, are sure to operate, with young and zealous men, as an encouragement to farther exertions. Both were, in this case, far beyond my hopes, and still farther beyond the intrinsic merits of my performance. The praise was, in fact, given to the boldness of the man, who, after the American press had, for twenty years, been closed against every publication relative to England, in which England and her King were not censured and vilified, dared not only to defend but to eulogize and exalt them; and, the success was to be ascribed to that affection for England and that just hatred of France, which, in spite of all the misrepresentations that had been so long circulated, were still alive in the bosoms of all the better part of the people, who, openly to express their sentiments only wanted the occasion and the example which were now afforded them.—From this time (the summer of 1794) to the year 1800 my labours were without intermission. During that space there were published from my pen about twenty different pamphlets, the whole number of which amounted to more than half a million of copies. During the three last years, a daily paper, surpassing in extent

of numbers any one ever known in America, was the vehicle of my efforts; and, in the year 1800, I might safely have asserted, that there was not, in the whole country, one single family, in which some part or other of my writings had not been read, and in which, generally speaking, they had not produced some degree of effect favourable to the interests of my country. But, there were some services, of which I must claim the right of making particular mention, and the first of which relates to the order, given by Mr. Dundas, for bringing in American vessels “for adjudication.” This measure, which it seemed impossible could have been conceived in a cabinet of statesmen; this order, worthy only of the mind of a low, and a very low, lawyer; this order, from which no good could possibly arise to any body but the greedy speculators who had fitted out privateers for the express purpose of profiting from its equivocal meaning; this order, for the effects of which the people of England have already paid 600,000*l.* smart-money, and have, probably, nearly as much more to pay; this at once foolish and outrageous measure, coming in aid of the animosity engendered during the revolutionary war, and nourished by the pecuniary stipulations of the treaty of peace, was within a hair’s breadth of deciding the American government to yield to the loudly-declared voice of the people in uniting their arms to those of the French Convention, and that too at the critical moment when Holland was first taken possession of by the republican arms. A treaty was negotiated with Mr. Jay; it was approved of finally, and war with America was happily avoided. But, far other exertions than those of the two cabinets were necessary to secure the conciliatory object of that treaty. The writings, the meetings, the debates, upon the subject, lasted nearly a twelve month, during which all the resources of art and ingenuity, of talent and of perseverance, were brought into action. The state, the whole society, were shaken to their very centre. The government was greatly at a loss how to act; by the papers which have been since published, it clearly appears, that the President Washington was, for some time, upon the balance whether he should ratify the treaty or not; and, the question for carrying it into effect was, in the lower House, at last decided in the affirmative, by the casting vote of the Speaker. If that question had been lost, nothing could have prevented America from joining France in the war; the French faction would have rapidly gained the ascendancy, and the government must have yielded to its dictates to

save itself from destruction. In the whole of this controversy I took an active part; and, at the same time, lost no opportunity of giving the people a just notion of what they had to expect from the fraternity of France. I know how to make allowance for the overflowings of gratitude and of friendship, and for the expressions of applause attendant on success. I pretend not, therefore, to be entitled to all the merit which was awarded me (in America, I mean) as to the result of the contest; but, I certainly was in the front rank of those by whom the victory was achieved. The importance of that victory to England, it would, perhaps, be difficult to render intelligible to the mind of Lord Melville, without the aid of a comparison; and, therefore, it may be necessary to observe, that it was infinitely more important than all his victories in the West Indies put together, which latter victories cost this country thirty thousand men and fifty millions of money.—You will recollect, perhaps, Sir, that there were, during the last war, certain dispatches of the French minister, Fauchet, intercepted at sea by our cruizers, and sent back to America. The person, who jumped overboard and saved them from being sunk, has, I believe, been liberally rewarded by government. He deserved it. But those dispatches, which, by the exposition that I gave of them, so materially contributed to turn the tide of popular opinion against France, would, had it not been for me, have produced very little effect. My exertions on this occasion were such as hardly to be credited, if they were fully described, and the effect they produced cannot possibly be conceived by any one who was not a witness of them.—I shall mention one more instance of the effect of my exertions; one that I can never reflect on but with something more than pride. Several vessels, in consequence of General Maitland's famous evacuation of Port-au-Prince, arrived in the Delaware with French Royalists on board, under the flag of his Majesty. From sinister motives of some persons a fearful representation of their numbers, and the number of their armed negroes, had been made to the Governor, and, by him to the President. Whereupon, without a moment's hesitation, the Upper-House of Congress proceeded to pass a law to prevent the landing of these unfortunate people; and, if the law had passed and been executed, it was not easy to see how they could have avoided perishing. In this extremity the Royalists had, by means of their friends, applied to the British Minister, who, with that zeal which marked the whole of his conduct, applied to the government on

behalf of these unfortunate persons, but could obtain nothing whereon to build even a hope of success. In the mean time, indignant at the injustice, the cruelty, and the baseness of thus repelling these people by an *ex-post facto* law, and that, too, out of pure fear as to what barely might happen, and without any previous examination or inquiry into the truth of the facts alleged, I had taken up the cause of the Frenchmen, and had reprobated, in terms, perhaps, not the most mild, the intended measure of the government and the Congress. And here, Sir, give me leave to exhibit to you a specimen of mercantile baseness, such as I imagine you have never yet seen. The merchants and shopkeepers, several of whom, when I began to write, I found in French cockades, and who were ready to stone me to death for writing against Frenchmen, now came to my house in crowds to scratch their name from my list, *because I wrote in favour of Frenchmen!* They were frightened; and you know, Sir, very well, that if they are once put into a good fright, all ideas of liberty and law instantly vanish from their minds. Solomon describes the fool's wrath as being extremely dangerous; but woe unto him who has to sustain the wrath of a coward! Even this, however, did not deter me from my purpose. The Frenchmen, finding that they had no other hope, sent their friends to me to consult as to the measures to be taken. On the Saturday the bill had been read three times in the Senate, and had been ordered to the lower house. On the Sunday I procured an accurate statement of the number and description of the persons on board, together with a sort of certificate from the commander of each ship. These I conveyed to the President on the Sunday night, and sent copies of them to a number of the lower-house of Congress the next morning. Proceedings were immediately stopped; an official examination was ordered by the President; it was found that there was no danger; the Frenchmen were landed; and my merchants and shopkeepers, who would have emigrated me only two days before, now came sneaking to thank me for having saved their city and their country from disgrace.—I will weary you with no more particular instances. This is merely a specimen of the exertions I was continually making for six years, during the whole of which time, I can truly say, that I lived not for myself or my family, but exclusively for my country and my King. I enjoyed nothing that the world calls pleasure, fortune was entirely neglected, and personal safety but very little attended to. When I began to write, the prejudice, the

hated, against England were so great, that scarcely any Englishman would publicly own his country. If asked of what country he was, his answer was evasive; he came from "the old country," or he called himself an Irishman or a Scotchman; for *English* was the hated epithet. Of the violence, the rage of the times, no man not upon the spot can form an adequate idea; but some conception of the dangers that I must have been exposed to may be conveyed by the fact of the people having, in their fury against yourself, hanged, and afterwards beheaded, the marble statue of your father! It was in the midst of a scene like this, Sir, at the time that the Philadelphians were tearing down the image of King George II. from the walls of the church which he had founded for their fathers; it was at that time that I exhibited the pictures of all the Royal Family of England in a window exactly opposite that very wall, and there I determined to exhibit them, and did exhibit them, till their name was once more honoured in the city. Mr. Long would have called this "indiscreet and chivalrous;" but, Sir, there are times and seasons when to venture every thing but character is the very height of discretion; and, indeed, discretion, as to such circumstances, consists in knowing when to venture, and when not to venture. The sequel proved that I was discreet. I succeeded in my object far beyond my utmost expectations. I met every adversary that appeared against my country; defended it against every accusation; exposed its secret, and chastised its open enemies; emboldened its friends to speak, and "stilled the madness" of the crowd." In that city, where, when I started on my career, an Englishman was ashamed to own his country; where my life had been a hundred times threatened unless I desisted to write against France; where the name of his Majesty was never mentioned unaccompanied with some epithet too foul and calumnious to repeat; in that city I lived to see a public celebration of Lord Nelson's victory over the French, and to be serenaded with the tune of "God save the King!" What a change! Certainly not to be entirely ascribed to me. But, it was a change which I had a considerable share in producing; I staid the mischief; I prevented that which would have prevented us from profiting from the events which time was hastening along. My American friends give me all the credit of this change: I claim no such thing; but I know, that I deserve, and that I shall have, the lasting gratitude of both countries. The services, of which I have been speaking, have not ceased their

operation: they are still active: the people of America cannot, even if they would, forget what they have learned against France; nor, which is, indeed, of more importance, will they again be silenced with regard to the merits of Great Britain. The time of my writing will be looked back to as a memorable epoch, not only in American politics, but in the political mind of America. I untied the tongue of British attachment: by an extraordinary exertion I broke the shackles in which the public mind had been held from the commencement of the revolutionary war, and once more opened a way for the workings of nature and of truth.

Now, Sir, though, upon my return to England, I expected no reward for these services; though I never either received or asked for or wished for any, yet I might, without being too unreasonable, have hoped, that, if my services should happen to be publicly commended, I should escape an assault from a press under the control of that government, in defence of which I had so zealously and so disinterestedly laboured: I might have hoped, that, though an orator were, by way of rhetorical figure, to award me a statue of gold for my services across the Atlantic; even in that case I might have hoped that a tool, yea a very slave, of the Treasury would not dare to style me an *American* and a *traitor*. These are wrongs not easy to justify or to palliate; especially when they come without provocation; and certain I am that I never gave any, except that of refusing to become brother-slave; a refusal which arose not only from my dislike to the situation itself, but from a conviction, which has been since fully confirmed by observation, that the pen of a slave seldom produces effect.—From my arrival in England to the preliminaries of peace, or, at least, during a part of that time, I endeavoured to support a daily paper, in which endeavour, from various causes I failed; but, however awkward I might appear in a scene to me entirely new, I think it will not be pretended, that, in my diurnal print, there was any departure from those principles of loyalty and patriotism, which I had inculcated and practised in America.

At the preliminaries of peace a new question in politics arose. I remained upon the old ground; you departed from it. The Treasury writers have accused me of "deserting Mr. Pitt, whom I had so highly extolled, and of going over to Mr. Fox, whom I had so severely censured." And thus I am, by way of allusion, charged with a crime almost as heinous as any that man can commit. But, to desert, a man must

first be enlisted, and, if I might be said to be enlisted, it was in the cause of which I regarded you as the champion; and not in your personal service. It is very true, that, while in America, and immediately after my return to England, I did highly extol you; but, Sir, it must be evident to every one, that this my conduct arose from my regarding you as the great assertor of the cause of my country and of monarchy. You were always defended and applauded by me as the person, who was at the head, who was the rallying point of all those, who were opposed to the principles and the natural consequences of the French revolution. In the course of my proposed inquiry I shall, I think, show, that want of true information (a deficiency that will need no accounting for, when my then situation, not only as to place, but as to various other circumstances, is considered) misled me: that you were not the champion of the cause of monarchy, and that it was chiefly owing to your wrong system of policy that that cause was finally ruined. But, to justify my *desertion*, as it is called by the Treasury writers, there needs no inquiry into your measures during the last war. Your conduct relative to the peace, contrasted with your declared principles and avowed object as to the war, are all I require to prove, that, in ceasing to be your eulogist and in becoming your assailant my conduct has exhibited a perfect consistency. In supporting you, Sir, what was the object I had in view? Some of your liberal partisans will probably say, a good round sum of money. But, be that as it may, what was the object which I professed to have in view? for, here, if any where, must be found the marks of desertion. What, then, was this object? It was, Sir, that which you professed to me, as well as to every man in England and in Europe, upon several occasions during the war, and particularly, in your speech made in the House of Commons, on the 7th of June, 1799. In that speech you declared, that we were in circumstances which forbade us to stop short of "an adequate, full, and "rational security;" that war might be carried on for any length of time, "without "the creation of new debt;" and that it would not be difficult "to provide taxes for "eight years.".... "We shall not," said you, "be satisfied with false security. War, "with all its evils, is better than a peace, in "which there is nothing to be seen but injustice, dwelling with savage delight on "the humbled prostrate condition of some "timid suppliant people.".... "The time "to come to a discussion of a peace, can "only be the time when you can look with

"confidence to an honourable issue; to such  
"a peace as shall at once restore to Europe  
"her settled and balanced constitution of  
"general polity, and to every negotiating  
"power in particular, that weight in the  
"scale of general empire, which has ever  
"been found the best guarantee and pledge  
"of local independence and general security. Such are my sentiments. I am  
"not afraid to avow them. I commit them  
"to the thinking amongst mankind; and,  
"if they have not been poisoned by the  
"stream of French sophistry, and prejudiced by her falsehoods, I am sure they  
"will approve of the determination I have  
"avowed, and for those grave and mature  
"reasons on which I found it."—I, Sir, had not been poisoned by the stream of French sophistry; I did approve of the determination that you avowed; I not only approved of it, I applauded it, I exulted at it, as my American friends will remember to their present mortification. But, Sir, because I highly extolled you for this noble determination, and for the inexhaustible pecuniary means that you had provided for carrying it into effect, was I to continue to extol you when you broke a determination so solemnly avowed, and, that, too, under the pretext of husbanding those pecuniary means? Because I highly extolled the Mr. Pitt of June, 1799, was I bound to exalt the Mr. Pitt of November, 1801, when he called upon the country for its lasting gratitude towards those men who had negotiated the preliminaries of peace? It is a well known and undisputed fact, that you yourself, Sir, directed those negotiations; that it was at your suggestion they were undertaken; that in every stage you were consulted; and that no stipulation was made without your consent and approbation. But, if there were any doubt upon this point, there can be none as to your open conduct with regard to the measure, in which you did not merely acquiesce, which you did not merely approve of and support, but which you declared to be such as to "afford matter of exultation to "the country, and to entitle the ministers to "its warmest approbation and most grateful "thanks." And, Sir, did consistency call upon me to extol you after such an eulogium upon a compact in which all your principles had been abandoned, and all your promises falsified? Will any one say, that the peace of Amiens "restored to Europe her settled "and balanced constitution of general polity?" Will any one pretend that the peace of Amiens gave us "indemnity for the past "and security for the future?" To ask the questions seems like a sort of mockery. Will

it be said, that you were unable to carry on the war? Then Mr. Fox was right, for it was a peace of necessity. But, if this was the case, then comes your other difficulty; for, I was deceived by your statements of 1799, to say nothing about the more elaborate statements of your Secretary Mr. Rose, whose official pamphlet came forth to aid the deception. I believed you, when you so confidently and so solemnly declared, that "the war might be carried on for any length of time without the creation of new debt," and that "it would not be difficult to provide taxes for eight years;" and, though I saw you, in two years afterwards, make a peace, in which not only all your avowed objects of the war were abandoned, but by which the ancient honours of the country were surrendered; though I saw the balance of Europe remain completely overset; though the enemy seized state upon state even during the negotiations; and though I clearly saw and explicitly foretold that England itself would be exposed to that constant and imminent danger, of which every man is now feelingly sensible; in spite of all this, was I still to adhere to you, still to extol you, on pain of being stigmatised as a political deserter! Will any one, even in the purlieus of Downing Street and Whitehall, attempt to maintain a position so repugnant to reason? Because you, either from choice or from necessity; impelled either by your interest, your ambition, or the consequences of your errors, changed your course in politics, throwing aside all the principles which had induced me to follow you, was I bound to change too? Is the mere name of Pitt, (for there was little else left) sufficient to compensate for the absence of every thing that we desire to find in a minister, and is it entitled to political allegiance from all those who have once expressed their attachment to the principles with which it has been, but no longer is, connected? Is there any one who will pretend, that you are not only so great as to have a right to abandon your principles, without exposing yourself to censure, but to render it a duty in others to abandon theirs for the sake of yielding you support? Is there any one who will venture to urge a pretension so offensive, so insulting to the feelings of the world? And, if not; if it be not insisted, that every man who once supports a principle of yours, becomes by that act solely your bondsman for life, then, I think, if *desertion* be a proper word to employ, it will be allowed that I did not desert you, but that you deserted me.

But, though thus deserted, I might, say

your friends, have avoided going over to your political opponent. Here too, Sir, I shall, I hope, find very little difficulty in showing, that, though, in this case, the path pointed out by reason and by honour, by legality and by patriotism, was strewn with thorns, I have, in no single instance, deviated from it.—I am, Sir, your, &c. &c.  
*Bolton, Hunts, Sep. 24, 1804. W. COBBETT.*

#### INCAPACITY OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

[The following letter is, I believe, from a correspondent, who before dated from the Middle Temple. As the subject is very important, and as the utility of his treatise will greatly depend upon a connexion of the parts in the mind of the reader, it is requested that he will forward the sequel as soon as he conveniently can. I am very happy to perceive a person of so much talent and so well versed in constitutional doctrine agreeing entirely with me as to the distinction, which I have so often insisted upon, between the "King's government," and the "administration of his public servants." When men have got into office, it is very convenient for them to call themselves *the government*; for this plain and most cogent reason, that to *oppose* the government is a crime! Yet even in parliament, and on both sides of the House, one sometimes is obliged to listen to this phraseology. We hear members talk of a weak government and of a strong government; of the late government and the present government: of supporting the government and attacking the government. Those members may mean the *ministry* all this while; they certainly do so mean; but, if one side of the House is not aware of the force of *words* and of *habits*, the other side is: if their opponents will but allow them, only by name, to be "the government," they will take care to keep possession of its powers?—W. C.]

SIR,—You will probably recognise my signature and hand-writing, though I date from a different place. My distance and the impossibility of procuring the necessary books, where I have lately been, have hitherto prevented me from taking notice of a correspondent in one of your numbers \*, who has made handsome mention of my former letter. He is entitled to my best acknowledgments; and, I am desirous of shewing my gratitude, by giving him every assistance in my power. If before, on the occasion to which he alludes, I ventured to suggest information to a learned brother of the law; he, who seems to represent himself as

\* No. IV. of the present Volume. EDIT.

one of the laity, will, I trust, permit me without offence to offer him something of sounder materials to work upon, than he appears at present to possess.

His general notions of the English monarchy are just and correct. "PERPETUITY," to use the comprehensive term which he quotes from Blackstone, is undoubtedly an essential "attribute of the King's Majesty." Wherefore, in the contemplation of the law, not only the King never dies; but, he may be said never to sleep; he never suffers any interruption of his royal functions; he, and he alone, is incessantly acting in all which his ministers officially do, though he cannot act in any thing but by their advice. If we imagine any official act, and much more any train of such acts, to be done by them, without any real or virtual reference whatsoever to his will, we do in so much depose the Sovereign, set aside the succession, and place the servant on the throne of his master. There is nothing, which they who truly love the monarchy, or honestly wish to preserve the internal tranquillity of the country, ought to watch with more anxious jealousy, than this sort of tacit usurpation on the part of ministers. Begun perhaps, with the excuse of a momentary necessity; continued under the pretence of public convenience; disguised by professions of affectionate delicacy towards the person of a prince, revered and beloved by his subjects; if it once becomes familiar, it may tempt a statesman of lofty pretensions, and talents equal to his ambition, even beyond his own original views into a situation from which he may think it less difficult and less dangerous to advance than to retreat. It is a track which obviously leads, and in the experience of mankind has often actually led, to the change of a dynasty or a constitution. In this manner it was that the Mayors of the Palace in ancient France, transferred the crown to their own brows; and the modern jacobins saw the advantage, which might be derived to their designs, from impressing a similar belief, where the fact did not exist. In all their writings they studiously characterised the period subsequent to the death of Louis the XIVth., as *the reign of ministers*. And they knew what they were about: they were masters of their trade: they were systematical revolutionizers. To disconnect the government and the monarch in the minds of the people, tends directly to prepare them for regarding the one as an empty form, and the other as an unprofitable incumbrance; just as, on the other hand to, teach them rightly to distinguish between the King's government, to

which alone the attribute of perpetuity with all the other attributes of perfection belongs, and the administration of his affairs by his public servants, which is liable to all chances and changes, and every infirmity of human nature, is the best expedient to cherish and keep alive the veneration and love so necessary to the safety both of the monarchy and the monarch. The administration cannot be too widely open, more especially in times of difficulty, to all connexions of men, and to all men individually, who from their birth, their wealth, their reputation for heroic valour or civil wisdom, have influence to command the confidence of the largest portion of their fellow-subjects. The King's government cannot be too exclusively perpetuated on all occasions, except of the last necessity for the preservation of the whole, in that line only, which nature marks out, and our constitution has directed for the sake of public peace and prosperity.

The doctrines intimated by your correspondent have carried me farther than I intended, though indeed but a little way in a field so extensive. So far, however, he and I probably agree. But I do not think him happy in his choice of the historical passage, with which he introduces his reflexions, and by which he means to illustrate the practice of our ancestors in emergencies, where the perennial fountain of authority has been obstructed at the head. He relates shortly, in the words of Hume, what passed in 1454, when "Henry the VIth. fell into a distemper, which rendered him incapable of maintaining even the appearance of royalty;" and the leading remark, which he makes upon it, is, that on the King's falling ill, "there was no delay in appointing a regent." But, alas! Sir, nothing can well have been further from the reality than this representation; unless it be the account itself upon which it is founded. The ingenious writer has been misled by following too securely a most fallacious guide. Hume was never thought the best instructor in the study of our constitution; and, there are few general historians, perhaps none, who can be trusted with safety for the exact truth of any nice and important transaction. They are all of them, especially since the success of his seductive work, too apt to sacrifice every thing like distinctness of parts to the pleasing effect of a clean, lively, glib narrative. Dates and residences are considered as dull matters of fact, too clumsy to come cleverly into the structure of a neat period, and too insignificant to be perpetually noted in the margin. In consequence, the writer becomes absolute master of time and

place, and confounds them at his pleasure, as may suit the flow of a sentence, or any more disingenuous purpose. They who cultivate this sort of composition are usually men of letters, not statesmen, not lawyers, not soldiers, not divines; yet there are many essential points in the civil, constitutional, military and ecclesiastical branches of our history, which require a man of practical knowledge in such affairs to understand them properly, and the genuine spirit of which a man so qualified would be enabled to collect with the greatest precision from scattered traces too slight to catch the notice of a general scholar. Besides, even on such subjects, as do not demand the fine tact of professional experience, it is more easy, and carries at the same time a plausible air of superior information, to colour a regular train of actions by reference to some consistent motive, real or imaginary, than to examine and compare the minute circumstances of each particular action, often in the eccentricities of the human heart, reducible to no uniform system, and perhaps directly repugnant to the motive most obvious to be supposed. And thus historians are tempted, when they first meet a distinguished person in their way, to conduct themselves like dramatists; they set out with conceiving the scheme of a character in the abstract, and to that they accommodate all the subsequent incidents and events of the piece. These, however, are common faults. Hume has one source of fallacy peculiar to himself, and arising out of the order in which he wrote. He began at the wrong end. He worked backwards. His publication commenced with an artful apology for the House of Stuart, in the disputes of those unhappy princes with their parliaments and people; and his aim was, that the whole should be considered as a mere question of political prudence in the exercise of long established power on the one side, and the irregular control of fortunate innovation on the other: to which end, affecting, with an insidious semblance of candour, to pursue a middle course between the extremes of opposite theories, and disguising his own partiality under a style of subtle management, which suggests much more than it asserts, he endeavoured to make it the inevitable conclusion of the reader himself, that all our earlier constitution was without any fixed landmarks and boundaries in the limitation of the monarchy, full of fluctuation, confusion, and darkness, affording very little of useful example, and nothing of sure and solid principle. When, therefore, he afterwards proceeded in his own inverted method

through the House of Tudor, to more remote times, he had already prejudged the result, before he fairly entered upon the inquiry; and, what was worse, he had actually bound himself to his own conception of it in the face of the world. He had one strong inducement more than other historians, not professed partisans, can have felt, to suppress, select, combine, extenuate or exaggerate, according to his declared view. It was in some sort an act of necessity, to maintain his former credit with the public. And for this reason he is of less authority, perhaps, than most of his rivals, wherever he touches on the proceedings of Parliament. Add to all this, that he is frequently as superficial and careless on points of considerable importance, as Rapin is meritoriously, though not always successfully, laborious and diligent.

If I merely wished for a striking instance, to exemplify how little credit is sometimes due to this celebrated author, I could not find one more to my purpose, than the short extract which your correspondent has taken. There are as many gross errors in it as sentences. It asserts in substance, "that the Queen and Council appointed the Duke of York, *lieutenant of the kingdom*; that Parliament also, taking into consideration the state of the kingdom, created him Protector; and, that he continued Protector till 1456, when the King was promoted in the House of Lords by the Queen, and re-assumed his authority." Now, Sir, in the first place, the Queen and Council did not appoint him *lieutenant of the kingdom*; and the very instrument to which the historian refers in his margin, shews that they did not. He never had that appointment; and he never held the *regency*, which Hume, and consequently, your correspondent, elsewhere confer upon him. But, if he had been either regent, or lieutenant of the kingdom, it would not have been necessary for the Parliament to have created him "*Protector also*," as if that title conveyed an addition to his dignity and authority; for it was an inferior office. In fact, Parliament gave him the protectorate, expressly because they did not choose that he should have the name of Lieutenant or Regent; and this reason they recorded, where Hume might have read it in very good old English. Neither was the Duke so created immediately on the meeting of that assembly, *without delay*, as your correspondent fairly infers from the language of the historian; nor, as he may further have supposed, on a more general consideration of public expediency; but, after an interval of more than seven weeks,

and not without satisfactory evidence of the nature and extent of the King's malady, regularly obtained and entered upon their proceedings. This protectorate ceased in the beginning of the year 1455, when the King recovered so far as to take his place, not in the House of Lords, but in the Council; and, in the November following, the Duke of York was again made protector, probably on the King's relapse.

By this time, Sir, your correspondent may have more than begun to suspect the justness of his remark; but, there was still a greater delay, of which I do not wonder that he did not discover any trace in the clean, lively, glib narrative, which he consulted: I allude to the time which elapsed between the public notoriety of the King's illness, and the appointment of the Duke of York, to be what is erroneously called Lieutenant of the Kingdom. After acquainting us with Henry's indisposition, in the words quoted by your correspondent, Hume tells us, that "the Queen and Council, destitute of his support, found themselves unable to resist the Yorkist party; and they were obliged to yield to *the torrent*;" a metaphor by the way, which gives a notion of a *sudden*, as well as violent force. He then adds, in a single breath;—"They sent Somerset to the Tower, and appointed Richard lieutenant of the kingdom," as if both these acts were done in one and the same sitting of the Council, within two or three days after the King had become incapable. And yet, Sir, it is very certain (the historian indeed had the proof in his hands) that there was a space of little less than three months between those two events; and that Henry's disorder had still more early manifested itself, so as to attract general notice. In truth, between five and six months altogether, were suffered to pass, before any measure was taken for permanently supplying the defect so occasioned in the government; for, it was only in virtue of the protectorate and other dignities joined with it, that the Duke of York had any share of what we now distinguish by the appellation of the Executive Power. Here then does appear a *delay*, and so considerable, that it would be difficult to account for it, without making a large allowance for the novelty of the situation, the great length to which the Queen's party pushed their desire of retaining power, excusable only from the peculiarly critical circumstances in which the Royal Family then stood, and the singular moderation of the Duke of York, the illustrious and popular opponent of the

court; a moderation, which, I must observe in passing, Hume himself at once praises as "very unusual and very amiable," and laments as attended with much evil in its consequences to the country.

This is a pretty tolerable specimen; and, did I look no further, might be a sufficient caution to your ingenious correspondent for the future. But my views in entering upon this discussion were higher. Permit me, therefore, to request room in some future Register for the remainder of my subject. My intention is, to point out some of the other principal mistakes or misrepresentations, with which our most popular historian abounds in this interesting part of our domestic story; to give a connected view of the procedure really observed on that occasion, which is more or less disfigured in all our histories; and, to endeavour, as well as I can, to deduce and develop the principle of our constitution, applicable to such emergencies as it was understood by our ancestors. It was at this very precedent that I formerly glanced, when I said that the twelve men mentioned by Doddridge, had actually been sent to ascertain the cause of the King's absence; and, it was one, which was warmly debated and strongly pressed by the present minister between fifteen and sixteen years since in the House of Commons. But when our passions and interests are at work, our judgments are liable to be disturbed. If we would derive benefit from ancient wisdom, we should seek it at the source, when our bosoms are in the best disposition to receive it, unpolled by any temporary impurity. Happily this is such a moment. Under the blessing of Providence we can now speculate with tranquillity upon this, as upon any other curious point of our admirable constitution. —I am, Sir, your constant reader, T. M. *Liverpool, Sep. 10, 1804.*

#### STAMP DUTIES.

SIR,—I wish through the medium of your useful publication to call the public attention to the great increase of duty, which by the last stamp act takes place on mortgages after the 10th day of October next, viz. a duty of 20l. on every fifteen folios or skin of parchment containing the ordinary quantity of writing where the sum borrowed exceeds 20,000l., and so in proportion for any less sum. The injustice and oppression of such a duty will, upon a little reflexion, I think, appear manifest. In principle it is bad as a tax upon distress; but when it is considered that the difficulties or perplexities attending a title, in general, regulate the

length of the deed, and of themselves impose a heavy expense upon the borrower, it is an aggravation of his necessities that I almost think was unintended by the government and the legislature to make that very burthen the rule of laying so heavy an additional one, increasing in proportion with the other. Surely if such an enormous duty as that I have mentioned be required by the public exigencies, it would be better to impose it upon purchase deeds, in proportion to the price, than directly upon the loan of money, and which, though it would affect vendors, would yet, for evident reasons, be shared if not principally borne by purchasers, who might be regarded as opulent or competent to the extent of their respective purchases.—I cannot help indulging a hope that the *ad valorem* duty I have instanced was intended to apply to the whole deed and not each skin of parchment, particularly when I refer to the duty upon bonds; however the act operates as I have stated, and I think, Mr. Cobbett, you will be of opinion it is a matter of sufficient importance to communicate to the public in the way I take the liberty of requesting, and which I sincerely wish may be the means of producing some alleviation from so grievous, and in my view, unjust and partial a tax.—I remain, Sir, your very humble servant, T. N.—*London, 14th Sept. 1804.*—P. S. It may not be amiss to inform your readers, that the present duty is 15s. a skin 10s. upon each deed.

#### IRISH ADDITIONAL FORCE BILL.

SIR.—I beg leave through your publication to correct an error which has been fallen into by several of the public prints in England, respecting the proceedings of the deputy governors of some counties in Ireland concerning the additional force act. The manner in which these proceedings have been stated conveys an insinuation of a dereliction of duty on their part, and would make it appear that there has not been that zeal for promoting the common cause of all good subjects of the empire, which should have been evinced in fulfilling the ordinances of the above-mentioned act. As the charge is somewhat of a serious nature I have taken pains to ascertain where the blame should properly be attached, and in order that the subject may be fully before the public, I shall here recite the facts which have come to my knowledge.—The act for raising an additional force in Ireland, received the royal assent on the 14th July; It enacted that each county should raise before the 1st September, as many men as were deficient of the quota

which should have been raised by the reserve act, and as many men by the 1st November as would be necessary to supply the deficiency of this quota, by the numbers who, in the course of the last year, had enlisted into the regulars, who had deserted, died, or been discharged. By the second clause of the act the inspector general, or his deputy, were directed immediately, to make returns of the numbers deficient, and to be raised by the 1st September in each county, to the clerks of the general meetings, and upon the receipt of these returns the governors were directed to appoint county meetings, but not sooner than fourteen days after the receipt of the returns.—Though the act was passed on the 14th July, these returns were not received in any instance, earlier than the 12th August, and of course the earliest day on which a county meeting could be held, was on the 27th August. Notwithstanding the readiness of the deputy governors to carry the act into effect was in some instances so far evinced, and particularly in the Queen's county, as to appoint the earliest day possible to have their meeting, the first communications made by government to the gentlemen of Ireland, were by circular printed letters of Sir Edw. Littlehales, dated the 23d August. With these letters came the first copies of the act into the counties, and intimation to the deputy governors, that in eight days from the date thereof, a considerable number of men were to be raised in each county, under a penalty, in case of their not being forthcoming, of £20 for each man deficient, to be levied under an imperative clause of the act, by county cess.—Another circumstance remains yet to be mentioned: by a clause of the act the clerks of the subdivisions are directed to make returns to the clerks of the general meetings, of the number of men deficient in each subdivision, and each barony of the subdivision, within ten days after the passing of the act, and in case of not complying with this regulation, each clerk is liable to a penalty of £20.—As the act of Parliament was not promulgated in the counties, till after the 23d of August, it was impossible for the clerks of the subdivision meetings, either to avoid the penalties, or to prepare the necessary returns for the information of the deputy governors.—These are, Mr. Cobbett, as far as I have been able to ascertain, the facts and circumstances attending the effort made by government to carry the additional force act into effect. That the deputy governors should have found some difficulty and made some difficulties in attempting to comply with its regulations cannot be a matter of surprise.

They who had resided in counties near the metropolis and had appointed county meetings to be held previous to the 1st Sept., could only have a few hours to read and study a very complicated act of 42 long sections, and those who lived in more remote counties were not even able to appoint their meetings till after the 1st Sept., and, of course, were incapable of adopting any measures for avoiding the penalties to be levied for such men as were deficient of the original quota on that day — From what has been stated, it is very evident that the true reason why the act has not been carried into effect, is the delay which took place in making the county acquainted with it. It appears that a period between the 14th July and the 23d of August was permitted to pass over without any communications being made on the subject by government to the deputy governors, and that, in consequence of this delay, the time left for the different counties to raise their deficiencies was so very short, as to render the compliance with the act altogether impracticable. In respect to the deputy governors of the Queen's County, I find, upon inquiry, that it has been erroneously stated that they declined to act—they did not adopt any measures for raising the men because no returns were made to them by the clerks of the subdivisions, but they applied to government for instructions to know how to proceed. Being at all times conspicuous for their public exertions, there can be no doubt that every thing would have been done to meet the object of the legislature that was practicable for them to do. Should Mr. Pitt, therefore, be disappointed with the success of his Military Project in Ireland, he must ask Sir Edw. Littlehales why the inspector general did not transmit to the several counties, returns of the deficiencies before the 12th August, or why he did not forward the act of parliament to the deputy governors before the 23d? or he may ask Sir Evan Nepean, why he did not, in framing the act, give a longer period than from the passing of the act to the 1st September for carrying its numerous regulations into effect?—From all that has occurred respecting this business, we may collect additional proof of the present system of administering the government in Ireland being greatly defective. It is impossible to make the circumstances of Ireland bend to the measures of every English secretary, whether a chief secretary or a secretary to a chief secretary. If the copartnership of secretaries are to form measures for Ireland without any acquaintance with Ireland, it will inevitably happen that local circum-

stances will sometimes counteract their measures, and though Sir Evan may undertake to raise the 3000 men deficient in six months, and Sir Edward may curtail these six weeks by law to six days in practice, they will fail in their project and prove but inefficient members of Mr. Pitt's administration. I have the honour to be, &c. HIBERNICUS.—  
Dublin, Sept. 15, 1804.

## FINANCE RESOLUTIONS.

SIR,—By the last resolutions on Finance presented by the Chancellor of the Excheq. to the House of Commons, and agreed to by them, it is stated that the Funded Debt for Great Britain stood on the 1st of February last..... £. 583,000,778  
Since borrowed..... 18,000,000  
Funded Debt for Ireland at  
the above period..... 25,548,000  
Since borrowed..... 8,190,000  
Funded Debt for Emperor of  
Germany..... 7,502,633

£. 642,449,611

It is also stated that interest, charges of management, and sinking fund on Funded Debt was on Feb. 5, 1804... £. 24,110,475  
Ditto on new debt of  
£18,200,000..... 487,000

£. 24,597,475

Of this sum there is stated for the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the National Debt, for the year 1804..... 6,851,192  
Remains for interest and charges of management on Funded Debt for the current year..... £. 17,746,283

Funded Debt as above.... £. 642,449,611  
Interest on that sum exclusive of charges of management at only 3 per cent. £. 19,273,488

How then is it possible to believe Mr. Pitt, when he states this interest, including charges of management at a little more than  $2\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. when it is known that some of the debt bears an interest of 4 and 5 per cent., and none of it under 3 per cent.—It is true, that by the same resolutions there appears to be £100,601,854 of the Funded Debt taken up by the commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt, but as the country still continues to be charged with the interest on this portion of our Funded Debt, it cannot be deducted from

the gross amount therefore, in any statement regarding the interest payable. I should be glad to see an answer to the objections I have thrown out to this part of Mr. Pitt's statement.—I have the honour to be, &c. A. B.—*Edinburgh, August 22, 1804.*

#### PLOT AT WARSAW.

(Concluded from p. 332.)

M. de Hoym, who had at first yielded to the reasons which M. d'Avaray gave for identifying the suspected articles till they should be submitted to a chemical analysis by some professional men, then refused to affix his seal: he would not even accompany him to the Archbishop of Rheims, whose house was close by M. d'Avaray's. On leaving him he renewed his assurances of the respect and devotion he entertained for the person of the King and his august family; and it was agreed that the Count d'Avaray should transmit to M. de Hoym such ultimate details as might appear necessary to enable him to discover the criminals. The Marquis of Bonnav, an officer of the *gardes du corps*, honoured with the King's confidence, and intrusted with his correspondence, was employed by M. d'Avaray to transmit to M. de Hoym the particulars requested. To supply as much as possible the want of the seal of the Count de Hoym, the Count d'Avaray went to the house of the Archbishop of Rheims, who had been previously informed of the affair, and requested him to affix his seal, which he did.—The King had fixed his departure for the next day, and the Count d'Avaray thought it time to inform his Majesty of the whole affair, that he might act in future by his orders. The King discovered on this occasion a warm solicitude for his family and faithful servants; but in respect to himself the same serenity he has discovered on every similar occasion. His Majesty wrote to the President de Hoym the following letter: "Sir, —I have received information of a plot entertained against my life. If none but myself were aimed at, if mortal weapons were the means, accustomed as you know me to be to such threats, I would pay them little attention; but my wife, my nephew, my niece, my faithful servants, are likewise threatened with poison, and I should betray my most sacred duties if I despised this danger. Perhaps I am beset with ruffians; perhaps it is only a base imposition. In either case I find it necessary to confer with you. I beg of you to come this evening, when I shall have the additional satisfaction of assuring

"you, &c."—The Count d'Avaray did not find M. de Hoym at home, and had not an opportunity of giving him the King's letters, till nine o'clock at night. M. de Hoym replied verbally, that he should have the honour to send an answer to M. the Count de l'Isle, and that the next day he would attend his commands. He added, that every thing was in the hands of the police, and should be followed up with activity. M. d'Avaray expressed his surprise that Coulon had not yet been apprehended, whose tour was perfectly well known, as it was important that he should be strictly examined, whether his declaration was true, or whether he was an impostor.—The 23d July, the day fixed for the departure of the King, arrived. No answer from M. de Hoym having been received by his Majesty, he was obliged to postpone his journey, and charged the Count d'Avaray, to communicate the affair to M. the Duke d'Angoulême, requesting him not to apprise Madame. The Count d'Avaray gave a detailed account of the affair to the Duke d'Angoulême in presence of the Count de la Chapelle, whom the King was to leave at Warsaw, charged with special powers for the further investigation of this affair.—The Count d'Avaray transmitted to M. de Hoym the supplementary declaration made by Coulon, on the 24th in the evening.—The answer of M. de Hoym arrived on the morning of the 25th. It stated "that the nature of his duties did not permit him to perform more than a merely passive part in such an affair, and that he had given the police the necessary instructions."—The King having no longer any hope of seeing M. de Hoym, and of communicating verbally with him, thought it time to make a demand in form, which he did in the following terms: "The Count de l'Isle has received the answer of the President de Hoym to his letter of the 24th of July, in which he promised to wait on him. He relies too much on the friendly solicitude of his Prussian Majesty towards him and his family, and on the sentiments of personal attachment of which the President de Hoym has given so many proofs, not to be convinced of the activity with which those measures will be carried into execution, that were ordered in consequence of the declaration made by the person called Coulon. The Count de l'Isle had expected that the President de Hoym would have come on his invitation, but finding from his letter that he would not come to Lazinky, he finds it necessary to make the following demands: 1. That the person

“ called Coulon, along with his wife, be secured, in order that they may not effect their escape; and that they may undergo, as soon as possible, the necessary examination. 2. That there be immediately nominated professional men to assist and co-operate with the Physician of the Count de l'Isle, in analyzing the articles considered as suspicious, and given, up by Coulon. — M. the Count de l'Isle hopes that the President de Hoym will have no objection to give him immediate satisfaction in those several respects. Whatever may be the result of those measures, the Count de l'Isle relies with confidence on the exertions of the President de Hoym, for the safety of those dear and precious objects which he leaves here under the protection of his Prussian Majesty.” — The Duke de Pienne, charged by his Majesty to carry this to M. de Hoym, returned with the answer, “ that the police was apprized of the whole affair, and that it would do its duty.” This might be satisfactory in regard to Coulon, but was by no means an answer to the demand made of professional people to analyze the articles in question. It was now six in the evening, and the King's note had been sent at two in the afternoon. Notwithstanding the danger of a delay, which might alter the nature of the articles contained in the packet, the King was under the necessity of waiting till next day for the answer of the government. — During this interval Count d'Avaray charged M. de Faivre, the King's physician, to procure the assistance of two physicians and an apothecary to make an analysis of the articles delivered by Coulon. — On the 26th, at eight in the morning, the King received an answer from M. de Hoym. It stated, “ that the nomination of a commission for the analysis demanded, depended neither on him nor the police; that it could only take place subsequently to a criminal process already begun; that the person of Coulon could not be secured, because the laws of the realm did not permit his imprisonment so long as he was not charged with any crime.” — Without losing a moment, the Count d'Avaray, accompanied by the Duke de Pienne and the King's physician, went to Dr. Gagatkiewicz, one of the most distinguished physicians at Warsaw for his skill and moral character. There, in presence of Dr. Bergenzone and M. Gudeit, apothecary, the Count d'Avaray broke open the seals affixed to the packet by him and the Archbishop of Rheims, took out one of the three carrots and submitted it to the medical men present. The opening made at

one of the extremities was pasted over with a clammy substance, of a colour nearly resembling that of the vegetable. M. Gudeit opened it. When they had finished their chemical operations, they drew up a procès verbal, and delivered, in the mean-time to M. d'Avaray the following attestation: — “ After several chemical experiments made on the mass found in the inside of a carrot which was delivered to us, it appears beyond a doubt that this mass is a poison of arsenic, consisting of a mixture of three sorts of arsenic — white, yellow, and red, as shall be afterwards more particularly stated.” Signed, Valentine Gagatkiewicz, doctor in medicine. — Gudeit, apothecary. Doctor Bergenzone being obliged to attend a very pressing engagement, only signed the procès verbal.” Dated Warsaw, July the 26th, 1804. — The bottle delivered to Coulon by the two strangers, only contained a spirituous liquor. The carrot on which the experiment had been made, was returned into the packet, and again sealed with the seal of the Duke de Pienne, with that of the Count d'Avaray, and those of the professional men present. — The same precaution was observed with respect to the other two untouched carrots and the bottle of spirits. — Furnished with the certificate of the medical men respecting the existence and nature of the poison, the King addressed the following note to the President de Tilly, chief of the special Police of the City, to whom M. de Hoym, alleging his incompetency, had recommended the affair. — “ M. the Count de l'Isle was obliged, according to the forms pointed out to him, and which he has hitherto constantly followed, to address the President de Hoym as Chief of the Province, for the prosecution of the attempt denounced by the said Coulon. But M. the President de Hoym, by his letter of the 23d, received this morning, having declared himself incompetent to judge of this affair, and that the business belongs to the Special Police of the City, M. the Count de l'Isle addresses with the same confidence the President de Tilly. He consequently directed the Count d'Avaray to put into his hands a packet containing the articles hitherto considered as suspicious; but which the report made and signed this day by the medical men (which report the Count d'Avaray is also charged to deliver to him) really proves to be infected with poison. Besides this man Coulon, in consequence of the threats he says were made to him, thinking his life continually exposed, M. the Count de l'Isle, without allowing him-

"self to give his personal opinion as to the truth of the information given by him, thinks himself bound to place him specially under the protection and safeguard of the police and of the law. M. the Count de l'Isle has always had too much reason to be satisfied with the conduct of M. the President de Tilly, to doubt his activity in following up this affair in such a manner as to detect the guilty. He seizes with pleasure this opportunity of assuring M. the President de Tilly of the respect he entertains for him."—M. de Tilly was not to be found on the 26th. The King's note and the packet containing the report of the professional men, and the substantial proof of the crime, did not reach him till the 27th.—In the evening M. de Tilly returned an answer, acknowledging the receipt of the King's note and the letter of M. d'Avaray. He stated, "that in quality of Chief of the Police he kept the packet put into his hands in order to be delivered as farther orders might be given. But that he could not on any account proceed against those who were supposed guilty of the affair in question; since it is solely within the sphere of justice that the examination of every thing connected with it can now be referred."—Hitherto M. d'Avaray had thought it proper to avoid all direct communication with Coulon, in order to leave to the police the commencement of the measures to be taken respecting him. The magistrate having taken up the affair, and Coulon remaining at large in Warsaw, M. d'Avaray was of opinion that it was his right and duty to examine him himself. He sent for him to the house of M. de Milleville, on the 27th July, and in his presence, and that of the Duke de Piennes, Coulon narrated all that had passed. The Count d'Avaray put questions to ensnare him; affected to allude to important circumstances with which he (the Count) was acquainted, and which Coulon did not reveal.—Coulon did not vary in his declarations, was firm in all his assertions, was decided upon some circumstances which at first had appeared doubtful. The Count d'Avaray requested Coulon not to give way to his apprehensions and not quit the town, assuring him that the King had placed him under the protection of the police and the law. The following day, the 28th, Coulon underwent a new examination, and his answers were such, that the persons to whom they were communicated, convinced of the truth of his information, have added their signatures to that of M. the Count d'Avaray. (Signed) The Count d'Avaray. Alex.

August, Archbishop Duke of Rheims. The Duke de Piennes. The Marquis de Bonnav. The Count de la Chapelle. The Duke de Havre et de Croy. The Abbey Edgworth de Fermont. The Count de Damas Crux, Count Stephen de Damas.—One essential circumstance which we have omitted is contained in the posterior declaration made by Coulon on the 25th, in the morning, and it is this.—That at one in the morning, the strangers opened the outer door of Coulon's house with a picklock, as he thinks, and attempted to pick the door at the foot of the staircase, but without success, as the key was in the inside and Coulon holding it. He heard some one say, "the stroke has failed," we must instantly apprise Boyer and set "off." Another said, "Do you see! had we but given money." They then talked together, but lower, and Coulon could not hear what they said.—Description of the two men:—Five feet one inch (French), full person, large nose, black eyes, black hair, cropped, mouth middling, light blue cravat, great coat, iron grey, buttons of the same, fancy waistcoat with violet stripes, nankeen pantaloons, white silk stockings, and sharp pointed shoes.—The other, five feet four inches (French), complexion brownish, light eye-brows, black eyes, face long and thin, small nose, blue cravat with white spots, blue coat with velvet collar, two fancy waistcoats, nankeen pantaloons, and boots.

*Letter, written by the Duke D'Enghien, a short time before his death, to the British Minister at Vienna.*

SIR,—General Ecquevilly having informed me of the very great willingness with which you took upon yourself the office of making known to your government my desire to be employed in the course of the present war, and of the kind manner which you evinced with respect to me, I could not delay returning you my sincere thanks, and expressing to you how deeply sensible I am of the interest you have taken in my behalf. I repeat with full confidence, Sir, what General Ecquevilly no doubt has communicated to you from me. The absolute nullity in which I vegetate, whilst the path of honour is open to so many others, becomes every day more insupportable. I wish only to give your generous government proofs of my gratitude and my zeal. I dare hope that the English will deem me worthy of combating, by their side, our implacable enemies, and will permit me to share their perils and part of their glory. Entirely devoid of all private interest relative to my

cause, my request has no other object than some rank in your army, or an honourable commission. It differs too much from that which has been made by the members of my family, resident in England, not to induce me to entertain a hope of obtaining a happier result. You will infinitely oblige me, Sir, by dwelling strongly upon this difference. Undoubtedly it is our sacred duty to serve till death our legitimate sovereign, and our cause; but it is also a dear and pressing duty to me to serve my benefactors, and to prove that my gratitude is as deep as it is disinterested. This desire, which my heart has long felt, becomes more ardent every day. Do me, therefore, the favour, Sir, to acquaint me confidentially with the means you may think the most likely to obtain this end, and be assured of all my gratitude, as well as my particular esteem and my distinguished consideration.—L. A. H. DE BOURBON, DUC D'ENGHIEN.—*Ettenheim, Electorate of Baden, Feb. 15, 1804.*

#### EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

*Organic Senatus Consultum, conferring the Title of Emperor on the First Consul, and establishing the Imperial Dignity hereditary in his Family.* (Concluded from p. 211.)

CXII. Denunciations by the legislative body can only be delayed at the demand of the tribunate, or the requisition of fifty members of the legislative body.—CXIV. In both cases the demand and requisition must be delivered in writing, and signed by the president and secretaries of the tribunate, or by ten members of the legislative body. If the charge is against a minister or counsellor of state, it is communicated to him at the expiration of one month.—CXV. The denounced minister or counsellor of state is not to appear in person for the purpose of answering the charges against him. The Emperor nominates three counsellors of state, who appear before the legislative body on the day appointed, and learn the particulars of the denunciation.—CXVI. The legislative body in a secret committee, discusses the facts contained in the demand or requisition, and decides on them by ballot.—CXVII. The act of denunciation must be circumstantial and signed by the president and secretaries of the legislative body. It is transmitted to the arch-chancellor of the empire, who forwards it to the attorney-general of the high imperial court.—CXVIII. Cases of delinquency or abuse of power in captains-general of colonies, colonial prefects, governors of establishments beyond sea, in acts of disobedience on the part of generals or admirals, and of pecula-

tion on the part of prefects, are also denounced by ministers. If the denunciation is by the grand judge, minister of justice, he can take no part in the decisions on the said denunciation.—CXIX. In the cases determined by articles CX. CXI. CXII. and CXVIII. the attorney-general acquaints, within three days, the arch-chancellor of the empire, that it is necessary to assemble the high imperial court. The arch-chancellor, having received his orders from the emperor, appoints some period within eight days for opening the sittings.—CXX. At the first sitting of the high imperial court it determines its competency to enter upon the case before it.—CXXI. In cases of denunciation or complaint, the attorney-general, assisted by the tribunes and the three magistrates at the bar, examine whether there is due ground to proceed. The decision is with the attorney-general. One of the magistrates at the bar, may be appointed by the attorney-general to conduct the proceedings. If the public ministry determines that the charge, complaint, or denunciation ought not to be received, it moves certain resolutions to be approved of by the high imperial court, after hearing the magistrate charged with the report.—CXXII. When the resolutions are adopted, the high imperial court concludes the business with a definitive judgment. When the resolutions are rejected, the public ministry is ordered to go on with the proceedings.—CXXIII. In the second case provided for in the preceding article, and likewise when the public ministry determines that the complaint or denunciation shall be admitted, it is ordered to prepare the act of denunciation within eight days, and to communicate the same to the commissary, or his deputy, appointed by the arch-chancellor of the empire, from the judges of the court of cassation, being members of the high imperial court. The functions of this commissary, or, in case of absence, his deputy, consist in drawing up the instructions and the report.—CXXIV. The reporter, or, in case of absence, his deputy, lays the act of accusation before twelve commissaries of the high imperial court, chosen by the arch-chancellor of the empire; six from the list of senators, and six from the other members of the high imperial court. The members thus chosen take no part in the decision of the high imperial court.—CXXV. Provided the twelve commissaries determine that there is sufficient reason to proceed with the complaint or denunciation, the reporting commissary issues a declaration to that effect, and proceeds to draw up the instructions.—CXXVI.

Provided the commissaries determine that the complainant ought not to proceed with the accusation, the case is referred to the high imperial court, which pronounces a definitive judgment thereon.—CXXVII. The high imperial court cannot come to a decision unless sixty members are present. Ten out of the sixty may be challenged by the party accused, and ten by the accusing party. The judgment of the court is determined by the majority of votes.—CXXVIII. The discussions on these occasions are open to the public.—CXXIX. Persons accused may employ advocates. If they are unprovided, the arch-chancellor of the empire appoints them one gratis.—CXXX. The high imperial court can only decide in cases which come within the penal code.—CXXXI. In cases of acquittal, the high imperial court places the person acquitted under the protection of the high police of the state, for the time it may deem proper.—CXXXII. No appeal can be made against the decision of the high imperial court.

#### TITLE XIV. OF THE JUDICIAL ORDER.

CXXXIV. The decisions of the courts of justice are intitled *arrêts*.—CXXXV. The presidents of the court of cassation, the court of appeal, and of criminal justice, are nominated for life by the emperor, and may be chosen out of the courts in which they preside.—CXXXVI. The tribunal of cassation takes the title of the court of cassation. The tribunals of appeal take the title of court of appeal, and the criminal tribunals that of court of criminal justice. The president of the court of cassation, and also the president of the courts of appeal divided into sections, take the title of first president: the vice presidents that of president. The commissaries of government in the court of cassation, the courts of appeal, and the courts of criminal justice, take the title of imperial attorneys general.

#### TITLE XV. OF PROMULGATION.

CXXXVII. The emperor causes every organic *senatus consultum*, *senatus consultum*, act of the senate and law, to be sealed and promulgated. Organic *senatus consulta*, *senatus consulta*, and acts of the senate are promulgated within the ten days subsequent to their adoption.—CXXXVIII. Two copies are taken of each of the acts mentioned in the preceding article. Both copies are signed by the emperor, examined by the titularies of the grand dignities, counter-signed by the secretary of state and the minister of justice, and sealed with the great seal of the state.—CXXXIX. One

copy is deposited in the archives of the great seal; the other in the archives of the public authority whence the act originated.—CXL. The promulgation is in the following terms: “N. (*the surname of the emperor*), by the grace of God and the constitutions of the republic, emperor of the French, to all present and absent, greeting: the senate after hearing the orators of the council of state, has decreed and ordered as follows:” ———— (*or provided it is a new law*) “the legislative body on the ———— (*the date*) have issued the following decree, conformably to the proposition made in the name of the emperor, and after having heard the orators of the council of state and the sections of the tribunate: we hereby command that the present, sealed with the seal of the state and inserted in the bulletins of the laws, be addressed to the courts, tribunals and administrative authorities, to be inscribed in their registers, and duly observed and executed. The grand judge, minister of justice, shall watch over the execution of the same.

#### TITLE XVI AND LAST.

CLI. The following proposition shall be presented for the acceptance of the people, according to the forms determined by the decree of the 20th Floreal, year 10. “The people wills the imperial dignity to be hereditary in the direct, natural, legitimate, and adopted descent of Napoleon Buonaparté, and in the direct, natural, and legitimate descent of Joseph and of Louis Buonaparté, as regulated by the organic *senatus consultum* of the 28th Floreal, year 12. Signed, CAMBACÈRES, second consul, president, Morand de Galles, Joseph Cornudet, secretaries. It is our will and pleasure that the present, sealed with the seal of the state, and inserted in the bulletin of the laws, be addressed to the respective courts, tribunals, and administrative authorities, to be inscribed in their registers, and duly observed and executed. The grand judge, minister of justice, is charged to watch over the execution of the same. (Signed) NAPOLEON. By the emperor, (signed) H. B. MARET. Examined by us, arch-chancellor of the empire, (signed) CAMBACÈRES. The grand judge, minister of justice, (signed) REGNIER.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Admiral Gantheaume, Counsellor of State, Grand Officer of one of the Cohorts of the Legion of Honour, Commandant of the Imperial Naval Army of the Ocean, to his Excellency the Minister of the Marine and Colonies.*—On board the *Vangeur*, in the

harbour of Brest, 16th Thermidor, Aug. 4, Year 12, 1804.

My Lord,—In my dispatch of the 14th I had the honour to inform you that the squadron of observation had sailed. I announced to you that we had discovered in the Yroise only two frigates, which retired before ours, but I supposed the enemy's fleet to be at no great distance from the island of Ushant, and that in all probability the fog which then prevailed had prevented the watch-posts from discovering them, and informing us by signal. My opinion in this respect was the better founded, as in the evening of the 14th, having proceeded towards Point St. Andrew, I heard in the offing a great number of cannon fired in broadsides, which in the English navy is very commonly a signal for rallying. — During the night of the 14th we kept a good look out, and were always prepared either to take a position in the pass, or to return to Brest. — On the morning of the 15th, we discovered at intervals through the haze, five sail, which we judged to be two of the line, one frigate and two smaller vessels. The wind was too weak and uncertain to put all the ships under sail, but all our frigates had orders to reconnoitre the enemy. The enemy in their turn gave chase to our vessels, and in the evening approached in to examine our position. A ship of 80 guns came even within cannon shot of our squadron. This assurance left me no doubt that a superior force was coming up. The fog still continued, and we could scarcely see the vessels at the distance of two leagues. The frigates had orders to follow the enemy's division, and to endeavour before night, to reconnoitre as far out to sea as possible. All the ships were entirely ready to return to the pass, when the headmost frigate made a signal of seeing the enemy's fleet, to the number of 15 sail, crowding all sail towards us. I expected it would be sufficiently dark to prevent our preparations for sailing being seen. All the vessels were under sail the moment my order was issued, and they manœuvred in concert with great precision. The wind was faint, and the night very dark; thick banks of fog often concealed from us the coast, and yet there was not the smallest confusion in the squadron, and at ten at night we were all anchored in the road of Brest, without the least accident. — In the night the enemy made various signals by the firing of cannon in the road which we had quitted, and at day light two frigates, with their cutters were still in that spot, with a view, no doubt, to examine

whether we had left there our anchors, and to take up the buoys. The enemy's fleet was seen at the same time, to the number of nineteen vessels, several frigates and sloops. The squadron of observation continues ready for sailing on the first notice, and your excellency may rest assured that we will do whatever is possible. — Health and respect, — GANTHEAUME.

*Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, Commandant of the Squadron of Rochfort, to his Excellency my Lord Minister of the Marine. — On board the Majestueux, in the Road of the Isle of Aix, 16th Thermidor (Aug. 4) Year 12.*

My Lord—The day before yesterday the Jemappe and Suffrein, with the frigates Armide and La Gloire, got under sail. For several days they saw no English vessels but a frigate. These vessels chased her out of sight of the coast, and were coming up with her, but they soon discovered five sail, and immediately tacked about. Yesterday five vessels, two frigates and a corvette of the enemy were seen. — Health and respect, — VILLENEUVE.

*Vice-Admiral Latouche Treville, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, Grand Officer of the Empire, Inspector General of the Marine, and Commander in Chief of the Squadron of his Imperial Majesty in the Mediterranean, to his Excellency Vice Admiral Ducres, Minister of the Marine and Colonies. — On board Le Bucentaure, in the Road of Toulon, 19th Thermidor (Aug. 7), 12th Year of the Republic, and the 1st of the Reign of Napoleon, 1804.*

General,—I have the honour to acquaint you, that after a cruise of three days, the division under the command of rear-admiral Dumanoir returned. This officer informs me that he performed continual evolutions, and is satisfied with the precision and manœuvres of all his captains. The squadron kept always at the distance of six or seven leagues from the land. The signal men placed on the coast having yesterday discovered six of the enemy's ships, I ordered out the Neptune to render our squadron equal, but the English proceeded S. S. E., and were not seen by our ships from the mast head. — I salute you with respect, — LATOUCHE TREVILLE.

*Answer of the Ottoman Porte to the Circular Note of General Brune (see p. 233), dated Constantinople, August 9, 1804.*

The sublime porte has received a note presented by its friend, the French ambas-

sador, and understands its contents—it says: Napoleon Bonaparte, the first consul, is elected an emperor of the French; this dignity shall continue hereditary with his children and descendants, or, in default of such issue, then it shall descend to the legitimate children of Joseph and Louis Bonaparte.—Farther, that the representatives of the French empire in foreign countries have orders, until they obtain their new credentials, to abstain from all official communication, with the exception of those which require an immediate discussion for the continuance of the friendship subsisting between them and France. The sublime porte, according to its usual frankness, has rejoiced in the advancement to dignity, honour, and glory, of this, as well as of every other friendly power. The sublime porte declares, therefore, to its friend the French ambassador, that it has heard with real pleasure a measure which makes faster those ties which unite it with France, and which are nearly connected with the internal security and tranquillity of the French empire. With regard to the communication, that this note is not to be regarded as official, until its sentiments are known; and the necessary changes which have taken place are approved of; the above answers this observation. With satisfaction the sublime porte shall always regard every measure, which confirms its so fortunately subsisting friendship with France.

*Note transmitted by order of his Swedish Majesty to M. Caillard, the French Chargé-d'Affaires at Stockholm, Sept. 7, 1804.*

His majesty the King of Sweden has received a report of the improper, the insolent, and the ridiculous observations which Monsieur Napoleon Buonaparte has allowed to be inserted in his *Moniteur* of the 14th of August, under the article *Ratisbon*.—The tone, the style, and even the subject of this article, are all of so extraordinary a nature, that his majesty has been yet hardly able to comprehend the object of such an act of political extravagance. If it has been done in the hope of misleading the public as to the conduct of his majesty, as it appears from the uncommon pains that are taken to draw a line of separation between his majesty and his subjects, let the world understand, that any instigation to that effect never could have been less likely to succeed than at this moment, or than it always will, with a people whose interests are bound up with those of a sovereign, who has never separated his prosperity from theirs, and who never feels so happy as when he contributes to the glory

and to the happiness of his subjects.—As his majesty cannot, consistent with his own dignity, or the honour of his crown, permit any official intercourse, after such an insult, he has ordered me, Sir, to communicate to you, that, from this day, all diplomatic intercourse of every kind, both private and public, is immediately to cease between the French legation at Stockholm and his majesty's government.—As a sentence in the article above-mentioned seems to imply that the French government is disposed to admit that the continuance of the commercial intercourse between Sweden and France would be attended with some advantages, his majesty, on his part, is willing to permit the same, from those sentiments of esteem which he has always entertained for the French people; sentiments which he has inherited from his ancestors, and which owe their origin to far happier times.—(Signed) T. D. EHRENEHEIM.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Report of the Engagements of the 8th and 9th Fructidor, (26th and 27th August), between a part of the French Flotilla stationed before Boulogne, and the English Squadron.*

On the 8th of Fructidor (Aug. 26), at noon, the line of the Imperial Flotilla was composed of 62 boats of the first class, 42 of the second, six bombarding boats, and 36 pinnaces. The enemy were at anchor at the distance of one league and a half, on a line parallel with ours—their force consisted of two ships of the line, two frigates of 44, seven sloops of war with three masts, two luggers and a cutter. The wind blew from the N. N. E. a little fresh; the weather was very fine, and the sea but little agitated, when at two o'clock, P. M. one of the enemy's sloops of war, with three masts, manoeuvred to observe our line. They remained at a long cannon shot distance, and fired several broadsides directed against our boats. The Admiral made a signal to the first division of gun boats, commanded by Capt. Le Ray, to weigh anchor, and to advance from the line, in order to drive back the sloop of war. This order was executed with celerity, and scarcely was the division under weigh, bearing down upon the sloop of war, before she fell back on her squadron. The sea at that moment opposed us, and the tide was just beginning to be felt. The division received orders to tack and keep to windward, which they effected with such success, as to be in a little time more than a league out from the right of our line. In the mean time the enemy had formed a detachment composed of one frigate of 44, one sloop of 24,

three brigs of 18, and a cutter of 16 guns, to attack our division, and oppose their rallying. At three o'clock the French division, on a signal being made to that effect, instead of remaining on the defensive, went to meet the enemy; the action commenced at half gun shot, and the firing soon became general. At this moment his Majesty the Emperor embarked in a boat with the Admiral, to direct more closely the movements of the flotilla. His Majesty was accompanied by the Ministers of War and of Marine. The enemy at first stood off, but they soon resumed their line, and, tacking towards the land, came again to attack the right of the flotilla, at two-thirds cannon shot. This distance was soon diminished by an order given by the Emperor to come to close quarters with the enemy. The Admiral made all the boats come into a close front line, steering towards the enemy. This movement brought the two lines within less than half cannon shot, and a very hot fire commenced between them. The enemy sustained it for two hours with great firmness; but it was all at once observed that the enemy's sloop of war, in consequence of signals which she made, was joined by a brig, which towed her out of action.—The frigate herself tacked, abandoned the field of battle, and was followed by her division, entirely disabled. Our gun boats and several armed pinnaces pursued her, cannonading her in the retreat. The cutter, which formed part of the English line, had not time to join her squadron; she was so roughly handled by our fire, that she sunk about three quarters of a league from the anchorage of her consorts, in the sight of an immense crowd, who had come to the coast in order to witness the combat. At this moment the tide being already very strong, and carrying the flotilla to leeward, the Admiral made the signal to manœuvre, in order to retake their stations in the line. It was then half past six o'clock, and soon afterwards our vessels anchored in good order, in the posts which they should occupy in the roads. At 4 o'clock P. M. the fourth division, commanded by Captain Pevriex, had also orders to make sail and to work to windward, in order to join the first division. In executing that movement, they had an opportunity of cannonading the headmost vessels of the enemy; they manœuvred very well; their fire was extremely hot, and contributed greatly to the retreat of the enemy. This division received orders to return to anchor at the same time with the first, and, like it, retook its position. A section of the Prussian mortar pinnaces, commanded by Lieut. Maison Blanche, bore down upon the

enemy with our first division of gun boats, and, by the audacity and intelligence of its manœuvres, constantly cannonaded the enemy at a very short distance, during the whole time of the action. Another section of the same pinnaces, commanded by Lieut. Lalsalle, which could not get out of port till three o'clock, succeeded by its efforts and good manœuvres, in coming up with the enemy during the action, and having also come to close action, fought him to advantage. Several boats of this kind, commanded by young officers of the marine, went within 200 fathoms of the English frigate, as well as of other ships, and thus placed themselves in a position to board, if the freshness of the wind had fallen. In general the Admiral has only praises to bestow on the conduct of all the divisions, all of which had a share in the engagements of that day. He speaks highly of the attention which has been paid to his signals, and of the precision with which his orders have been executed. It was impossible for him to remark, from his Majesty's boat, in which he was embarked, the vessels which had the greatest right to testimonies of his satisfaction; but he was able to distinguish the bold and well supported manœuvres of the section of pinnaces, commanded by Lieut. Mason Blanche, which fought from the commencement to the termination of both actions. That commandant has rendered a very favourable account to the Admiral of the two Ensigns Massieu and Vatinel, each commanding one of the pinnaces of his division, and of Bernard, commanding the Prussian Mortar Pinnace No. 69, which approached nearest the enemy, where she maintained herself with a firmness and courage deserving the highest praise. His Majesty the Emperor, as well as the Admiral, remarked, particularly at the conclusion of the engagement, when the enemy were in retreat, the fine conduct of Ensign Morin, on board the gun boat No. 108; of the Ensigns Bourdon and Delaunay, both commanding pinnaces, all of whom reconducted the English frigate to the anchoring ground of her squadron, cannonading her at a very short distance. During the course of the engagements which took place on that day, the batteries on the coast kept up an equally hot and well directed fire on the enemy, as often as they came within reach. Before going ashore, the Emperor visited a part of our line; he put various questions relative to the events of the combat to those who had taken part in it; and finally, after having gone on board the gun-boat No. 108, of which the deck had been split by a 32lb. ball, his Majesty disembarked in

the port of Boulogne, and ascended to his head quarters at the Tour d'Ordre, where he passed the night. That day, which cost the enemy one of their vessels and its crew, without counting the other men which they must have lost, as well on board the frigate as of the other vessels, almost all of which were disabled, leaves us only to regret one man killed on board the gun-boat No. 108; seven others were wounded, one of them very badly. As to our vessels, they suffered in their sails and hulls; but none of them sustained considerable injury, because their little height above water presenting but a very small surface to the enemy, the balls passed over them, or fell near without striking them. On the following day, the 9th, the enemy's squadron had been reinforced in the night by a frigate and several sloops of war.—The wind blew moderately from the S. W. The Admiral availed himself of the rest of the tide to make the 3d division of boats, of the first class, commanded by Capt. Guinguand, as well as a section of pinnaces carrying Prussian mortars, commanded by Lieut. Lasalle, to get under weigh. These vessels worked very promptly to windward, and formed in the order of battle to the S. W. of de L'Heurt. The enemy immediately detached two frigates of 44 guns, and four small brigs of war, which approached our division; these went to meet the enemy, and the combat commenced. The enemy, incessantly manœuvring to keep themselves at long cannon shot, and having resumed the tack which would conduct them to their squadron, our division received orders to come to close action. In executing of this order, all the vessels composing it bore down at once upon the English, and the action soon became more warm; but the enemy, always eluding a decisive engagement, allowed themselves to be drawn towards their squadron by carrying sail, and thus left ours the field of battle. Half an hour afterwards, the Admiral, fearing that, with the wind which blew, the flood would not permit our vessels to resume their stations in the line, made them the signal to tack, in order to get higher up. This manœuvre having got them sufficiently to windward, each took his post at the anchoring ground, according to the orders of the Admiral. There was but one man wounded, and none killed in this little engagement. Some of our boats received a slight damage in their hulls; but we may presume that the enemy, who, towards the conclusion of the contest only fought retreating, has suffered much more severely.

—(Signed)

LAFOND, *Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Flotilla.*

## RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

*Copy of a demi-official paper, published and circulated on the Continent, by way of answer, on the part of Russia, to the late observations in the French paper, the Moniteur.*

There is no reason why the formation of an army of 5 or 6000 Russians, in the Republic of the Seven Islands, should give rise to much political conjecture. Such a measure is undoubtedly a very inferior part of that general system which Russia thinks it incumbent on her to follow at this moment. The attention of the political world should not be directed to an expedition of 6000 men; it is the whole of the system that we are to look to.—Twelve months are scarcely elapsed, since Alexander the First ordered that 111,000 men should be raised in his Empire; and that levy has been so effectually executed, that they are, at this day, formed into regiments, and perfectly disciplined. This levy has increased the Russian military force to upwards of 400,000 soldiers, and 60,000 seamen. Add to these, 50,000 irregular troops, which are already embodied, and 100,000 more, which may be assembled in a short time, consisting of Kalmucks, Bashkiers, and the different hordes of Tartars, every man of whom, upon the promise of being allowed to plunder, would enrol himself: with such a force at its command, can it be asked, if Russia have a right to the character she assumes, in an age when the power of the strongest is the only one that is respected?—It must be acknowledged, morally speaking, that it is to France that Russia is indebted for the brilliant situation which she now occupies, and which cannot be denied to be of the very first order. The period from whence this commanding and prominent position was occupied by Russia, may be dated from the commencement of that system of tyranny and injustice, which France has established; a system of invasion, of rapine, and of oppression, which has been exercised wherever its power could reach; and above all, since it became apparent that its ambitious views were directed to no less an object than the attainment of Universal Monarchy. Since that time Russia has become the shield of the weak, and Alexander, seated on his throne, has assumed the character of the protector and arbiter of empires. Can France compel her to lay aside this dignified character? Let her not deceive herself in imagining

she can. Russia is not in the situation of an actor, who puts on the purple to play the part of a King; she is not an upstart, who appears what she really is not; the attitude of the lion befits her, because she possesses both his force and his dignity; she is a Colossal power, whose eyes have been unsealed by the faults of others, and viewed, in her true light, a Colossus of the most formidable description.—Whether Russia will unite herself to Prussia or to Austria, whether she attaches herself to England, or stands alone, she must always be respectable, and among the first order of powers respectable, as long she shall follow a system of justice and disinterestedness, and that, confident in her strength, she shall openly resist a plan of universal despotism, and lay open to the world the violation of rights the most sacred; that impious violation, which has been so well described in the strong but temperate note, which was presented at Ratisbon.—Russia, it must be admitted, can never be a considerable gainer by indulging a desire of conquest. She is extensive enough already; her boundaries are such, that she need not wish for any alteration in them; but she may be a gainer, and so may Europe, by the consequences of any war that the plain dealing and foresight of her Sovereign may induce him to declare.—Alexander is naturally of a mild and amiable disposition, but in whatever concerns the principles of justice, he is decided almost to obstinacy; and they know him but little, who imagine that the note to the Diet of Ratisbon, was suggested by Markow, and his adherents, inveterate as their hatred is supposed to be.—What is the great danger to which a war with France would expose the Russian Empire? It does not follow that the Russian army is to march to Paris. No, nor can the French reach Petersburg, Moscow, or the Crimea, since they are not able to detach a single ship, the whole of their navy being blockaded and confined to their ports. As to battles and marches, brave as the French are, they are but men like others—they cannot exceed the limits which the laws of nature have placed to human efforts.—Will it be said, that the commerce of Russia will be affected by a rupture with France? Certainly not—for with what articles does she supply that country? None directly.—What does she import from thence? Articles of luxury, which are prohibited. It is true, she receives some wine from France; but with that article she is, at present, plentifully supplied—and even if she were not, she could do without it, as she did

during the former rupture.—Will it be asserted that France could do infinite mischief to Russia, by the troubles that her emissaries could excite in the interior of the country? Of all the errors in political calculation, this would be one of the greatest. The people of Russia are those which approach nearest to a state of nature, except the savages; and they are the only people in the universe who neither know how to read or write, but still they are not barbarians.—They know no government but their own, which they fear and respect. They honour their Sovereign with the title of a God upon earth. They have no other civilization than the practical one which their sovereigns thought it useful and necessary to introduce. Masons, carpenters, joiners, locksmiths, armourers, and artisans of all sorts, and all excellent in their kind, are to be found in Russia in abundance, and still they know not how to read or write. The strangers who reside in Russia are regarded by the natives as a parcel of leeches who absorb their wealth. After this description, let the emissaries and instigators of France attempt to excite divisions in that country, and they will find that the government, with a single blast can eradicate them.—It is certainly true that the population of Russia, compared with its extent, is rather small; but this, however, admits of some explanation. In the first place, the population is not equally distributed through the empire; and again, there are parts of Russia which are absolutely uninhabitable. Besides, where is the necessity of augmenting the population of the country? It is the duty of a Sovereign to make his people happy, but it is not so clear that it is his duty to increase the number of them. In a moral point of view, war is assuredly a very great calamity; but in a political consideration, it is sometimes a necessary evil, and much good results from it.—The Russian force at this moment paid and provided, and actually under arms, is even more than sufficient to encourage their Sovereign to declare war. It is said that the military strength of this country is embattled on the Persian and Tartarian frontiers; quite the contrary. On the whole line between the Caspian and the Sea of Ochoty, there are only 7 or 8000 men, and there is no necessity for a man more if we look to the situation of the country, the number of forts, the immense deserts, and the disposition of the contiguous countries. In time of peace, between the Caspian and the Black Sea, there may be about 12 or 13,000 men; but at present there are from 20 to 25,000

on account of the peculiar circumstances of the hostility which is carried on in that vicinity. There are, moreover, 25 or 30,000 troops on the frontiers of Sweden; and, notwithstanding all these deductions, there are still 300,000 well disciplined and hardy troops, between the Black Sea and the Baltic. One hundred thousand of such gallant and hardy men, if once landed in Italy, would not be so easily conquered as some of the French politicians are pleased to suppose. Let them only bring to their recollection the gallant achievements of a handful of Russians, who, in the last war, in one campaign, drove all Italy and Lombardy before them, and they will find that the most renowned French generals were defeated one after another; and that, even at Zurich, Russia gained admiration, notwithstanding the faults of her Chiefs, and the backwardness of her allies.—All this serves to prove, that a declaration of war, on the part of Russia, against France, would be sufficiently formidable to encourage the German Empire, now crushed by the latter power, to occupy the troops of France, and by that means to afford an opportunity to Italy, to Switzerland, to Spain, to Portugal, to Holland, and to Hanover, to shake off the Gallic yoke. As to the project of invading England, it is an absolute chimera, a castle in the air, which can never be successful; and even were it so, it must prove destructive to the rest of the world. England is at this moment at the highest point of elevation; she can never decline if she continue where she is, for higher she cannot be. But how can England, who only exists by her industry and her trade, preserve her present situation, unless by upholding the balance of the world? It is then the obvious interest of Russia to assist England, who, by its system, should be friendly to all nations; and to repress France, the selfish principles of whose government are inimical to the greater powers of Europe, and oppressive to the smaller.

#### FESTIVAL AT BOULOGNE.

*Curious Account, published in the Moniteur of the 23d of August, of the Exhibition at Boulogne, on the birth-day of Buonaparté.*

Seated on the throne of one of the King's of the first race, the Emperor had, immediately on his right Prince Joseph behind him the great Officers of the Crown, on each side the Ministers, the Marshals of the Empire, and the Colonels General; in front, and on the steps, were his Majesty's Aides-de-Camp; and on benches at the foot of the throne were, on the right, the Counsellors of State, the Generals arrived

from the interior, and foreign officers; on the left, the Civil and Religious Functionaries. The remainder of the space in the middle was occupied by the Imperial guard, and the musicians on one side, and 200 drummers on the other; at its extremities were the grand staff of the army, and the general staff officers of the camps. The Emperor saw on his right the two camps and the batteries, the entrance of the port and a part of the roads; and on his left, he had a view of the port of Vimereux and the coasts of England. In front of him advanced 60 battalions formed in twenty columns, the heads of them occupying half the circumference of the circle. In front and in the interior part, still nearer the throne, were platoons of legionaries of all ranks, and of the different branches of the service. The extremities of the columns advanced towards the heights, which were occupied by twenty squadrons in battle array, and which were completely covered and decorated with an immense crowd of spectators, and the tents appointed for the ladies.—Never was there a disposition more simple, nor one which presented a more imposing aspect. But every thing announced that the tempest, which prevailed on this part of the coast for eight and forty hours, would also disturb the enjoyment of this splendid day. The south-west wind accumulated dark clouds, and agitated the waves. The English cruisers had retired, and appeared only through the haze of the horizon. At noon the Emperor left his hut, and a salute from all the batteries of the coast announced his arrival. That instant the sun illuminated the ceremony, and there was no more wind than was sufficient to make the colours wave.—On the appearance of the Emperor, the drums began to beat, and the shouts of joy, on the part of the army and the spectators, marked his presence, and the enthusiasm which it excited. The drums then beat a charge, and the different columns instantly closed their ranks. This fine movement electrified all the heroes with a military ardour.—The Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour pronounced a discourse; and, after a ruff of the drums, his Majesty recited the oath; all the legionaries exclaimed, "we swear it!" From a spontaneous impulse, the whole army repeated this oath of fidelity and attachment; and the cries of Live the Emperor! resounded amidst all the ranks, who brandished their arms, and waved their colours, by way of expressing their joy.—The great officers, the commandants, the officers, and the legionaries, then approached the throne, where, being presented by the Minister at War, they indi-

vidually received from his Majesty's hands the decoration of the Eagle.—It was delightful to behold the Marshals of the Empire, the Generals, the Counsellors of State, the Prefects, Bishops, Officers, Soldiers, and Sailors, receiving each in their turn the reward of honour from the hands of Buonaparté, who recognizing all of them, received them as the companions of his toils and his glory. The decorations were held up by several officers, in the helmets and bucklers of the armour of Duguesclin and Bayard.—The sight of this splendid and brave army, of those fields, of those ports, the work of their hands, of those piers and light houses, resounding with the noise of the waves and cannon; the view of the chalky coasts of England; those rays of the sun darting through the clouds to illuminate this august scene; those hostile vessels, tossed by the tempest, and disappearing in the haze of the horizon; all those objects combined gave to the sentiments and thoughts excited by the presence of the Emperor, on the soil once trod by Casar, a grandeur, an indefinite charm, incapable of being expressed.—There was one trait wanting to complete this magnificent picture. The flotilla could not go out; but the stars of the Emperor conducted one, as if for the express purpose, from Havre. All eyes were turned towards the sea, and the most lively joy was manifested, in beholding the ocean pay its tribute to the entertainment of the Emperor, and that convoy which had been expected for six days, arrive at the moment of the solemnity.—It was now four o'clock, the wind freshened and the billows rose. After the flotilla entered, four boats and five pinnaces, which had cleared the Channel, grounded on the sand bank under the wooden fort; they have, however, received no damage, and next tide they will be floated off and brought into harbour.—The Emperor passed the evening in his hut; and all the legionaries were entertained at the tables of Prince Joseph, the Minister at War, the Minister of the Marine, Marshal Soult, and Admiral Bruix, in tents decorated in a military stile, and the health of the Emperor was drank with enthusiasm, amidst the report of all the artillery of the batteries on the coast.

Paris, Sept. 11.—*Imperial Decree.*

Napoleon, by the Grace of God, and by the constitution of the empire, Emperor of the French, upon the report of the minister of the marine, and of the colonies, with the approbation of the counsel of state, decrees, —Art. I. A maritime court martial may be formed in the ports and maritime arsenals of Antwerp, Havre, Cherbourg, and Dunkirk.

—II. The chief of the marine service shall preside at the court-martial. His two assessors shall be chosen by himself, the one from the oldest military officers, and, failing these, from the oldest officers of the marine artillery, the other from the oldest officers of the administration; and, failing these, from the oldest officers of marines. Their age must at least be 25 years.—III. An officer of the jendarmerie, attached to the maritime service, provided he hold the rank of lieutenant, and be of the age of thirty years, or failing him a lawyer, (*avocat*), the one or the other, at the choice of the president, shall perform the functions of commissary-auditor.—IV. The functions of keeping the register shall be performed by a clerk of the marine, also chosen by the president.—V. Each maritime court-martial shall be made up in conformity to the law of the 12th of October, 1791, for the organization of a maritime court-martial, and the regulations of the same law with respect to competency, to the form of procedure, and the infliction of punishments, shall be executed according to their form and tenor.—VI. The minister of the marine and the colonies is charged with the execution of the present decree. NAPOLEON.

(Signed) H. B. Maret.

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

*Copy of a Letter from Lord Harrowby, his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, to P. Colquhoun Graf, Esq., relative to the Navigation of small Craft, between Tonningen and Hamburgh.—Dated Downing Street, July 8th 1804.*

‘That the lighters be permitted to navigate between the rivers Weser and the Elbe.’ Orders have accordingly been sent to his Majesty's ships of the blockade, to permit the passage of lighters, barges, and other small craft, answering the above description, and carrying unexceptionable goods for neutral account, and to suffer the same to pass without molestation to and fro, along the Danish side of the Elbe, through the Watten, between Tonningen, and Hamburgh.—His Majesty hopes, that this permission will be properly attended to, and not abused, and that no unfair advantages shall be taken of it, by which his Majesty should see himself forced to order the blockade to be resumed with greater strictness. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HARROWBY.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SIR ROBERT WILSON'S INQUIRY.—The question, how we can best and most effectually provide against the dangers of inva-

sion, is a subject that can never be uninteresting as long as those dangers exist. That invasion, if seriously attempted, cannot be repelled without a powerful army, unless frustrated by our fleets, most men will readily allow; and, as nothing is so uncertain as operations by sea, it necessarily follows, that our security depends upon possessing a powerful army. The questions, then, which naturally present themselves, are, have we such an army? and, if we have not, how ought we to proceed in order to obtain it? The minister, who, be it observed, was the real adviser of all the steps which have led to our present situation in military matters, will probably say, and, if he does, his partisans will be ready to swear, that we have a powerful army; and, if he should not be quite so pertinacious upon that point, he will, doubtless, contend, that the way to obtain a powerful army is to proceed with his volunteering and his army of reserve. The reverse, as to both these points, has been maintained by many persons, out of parliament as well as in parliament, and, to the weight on this side of the question Sir Robert Wilson has now added that of his talents and experience, in a pamphlet addressed to Mr. Pitt, under the title of "an Inquiry into the present State of the Military Force of the British Empire, with a view to its re-organization." — That this pamphlet has given great umbrage to the person whom it is addressed to, and in disapprobation of whose projects it very freely speaks, there would be little doubt, even had its author been suffered to pass unabused by the prints of the treasury; but, whatever desire Mr. Pitt may have to prevent military men from discussing his military measures, the public can have no such desire; and, therefore, I shall in this place endeavour to lay before my readers the substance of those parts of this work which appear to me to be of the greatest and most immediate importance. — Sir Robert Wilson gives no opinion as to the time when an invasion may be expected; but he appears to entertain no doubt as to the attempt being made, first or last, and that too in fearful force compared to that which we have, at present, to oppose to it. "Strange and fearful times," says he, "are approaching. On British ground must Englishmen, within a few years, if not sooner, contest for the future possession of the soil. This, if Buonaparté lives, is the arena, where he will combat for the empire of the world. He comes not, like a thief in the night, to pillage and depart, but he blazes forth his mighty preparations, and he braves, in pride of daring, our fiercest re-

sistance." This opinion so perfectly coincides with what was expressed by me, in the preceding sheet, page 438, that, in order to give the coincidence the weight which it is fairly entitled to, it is proper to observe, that, when the passage last referred to was written, I had not seen the pamphlet of Sir Robert Wilson. To this point it is the more necessary to attract some attention, as there appears to prevail, particularly amongst the partisans of the ministry, a notion, that, from some cause or other, they know not what, Buonaparté will, at no very distant day, be very glad to desist from his purposes, if we will acknowledge his new title. And, what can this notion possibly have arisen from? Acknowledge his new title! Why, did he ask Mr. Addington, the colleague of Lord Hawkesbury; did he ask them to acknowledge his other title, either of consul or president? What is so disgusting as the pride of a state from which the power is departed! No; be assured, that Napoleon will never suffer my good Lord Harrowby to insert, in any treaty with him, any expression that shall possibly bear a construction that may favour the idea of England having acknowledged his title to the diadem he is about to assume. Desist from his purpose! What should induce him to desist? Has he not advanced regularly on towards the conquest of this country, without experiencing any inconvenience from his efforts? Has his ambition been repressed by the war? Has his insolence been chastised? To what, either in his character or his conduct, even his recent conduct, do we look for the hope of security from his pacific intentions? — Sir Robert Wilson considers the state of our military defence under the four heads of *volunteers, militia, army of reserve, and regulars*. Under the first head, he sets out with the following exposition of the fashionable error in comparing our volunteers to those of France, "By the extraordinary energy of the nation, an armed body of 500,000 men have assembled to learn military exercise, and defend the country in case of invasion. At the first enumeration of this number, it must appear to superficial observers, that invasion no longer could be hazarded, even if the battalions of this force were alone destined to oppose the army that should be disembarked. The brilliant successes of the French national troops, at the commencement of the contest, have impressed the generality of all nations with false notions of the prowess of an armed populace. The change of name and of dress have deceived mankind, and the sympathetic enthusiasm excited in favour of men

"fighting for liberty, has produced a voluntary failure of recollection as to the circumstance of there being near 250 000 regular instructed troops, amongst whose ranks the volunteers and conscripts were dispersed. Of which original force, two or three regiments only quitted the republican service, and but few officers; and after the first year the French army was never augmented more than one fourth, so that in fact, these volunteer battalions were as well organized as any in Europe, and as fit for service.—But the British volunteer system presents a very different formation, and they must march into the field under auspices diametrically adverse. Nevertheless with all the advantages which the French national armies retained, were they not beaten every where at the commencement of the war; and was not a tract of country instantaneously over-run by the allies, which if traversed in England by a French army, from the most distant point of debarkation, would be more than necessary to bring the enemy to London—And how was the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick at last effected? Certainly not by force or any apparent danger."—Let us hope, then, that this deception will no longer prevail. Let us hope, that the nation will not be the dupes of their own indolence and fears, which teach either to neglect the means of defence, or to shut their eyes against the danger. How often were we, at the beginning of the present mad system, reminded by the ministers of the feats of the volunteer armies of France and America, and, how often were those ministers told, that not only the situation of France and that of America were totally different from the situation of this country; but that their volunteers were different from ours, and really became regulars before they were led to battle, and were, after all, for a long time beaten by their assailants; how often were they told this by Mr. Windham, Col. Craufurd, and others, and how often did they, in spite of refutation upon refutation, again and again put forward the delusive argument drawn from the deeds of the volunteers of France!—The next topic with Sir Robert, is, the incapacity, as commanders in the field, of the volunteer officers, and here, I am persuaded, that the justice of his remarks will meet with no denial.—"I do not arrogate for the officers of the army superior courage, or am ignorant that the greater part of the volunteer officers possess the highest feelings of honour, and natural spirit. I know that they are fellow-men, fellow-citizens, and have been educated in the

"same notions of manly character; but is not the novelty of action sufficiently extraordinary and agitating as to require their whole attention for their own individual demeanour, without expecting from them the responsibility of commanding others? And would not the anxiety of the men probably terminate in irresolution and panic, when they find themselves in a new danger, without the appui of confidence to invigorate their minds?—nor could they be justly stigmatised as cowards. Ignorance cannot demand the homage which is the right of experience.—He who studies the history of mankind, knows that it requires the powerful stimulus of example to infuse the energy of an active courage, which capacitates men to advance against danger, when their natural passions are not operating; and that *the strong grasp of discipline and long habits of obedience can alone secure the steadiness of the mass in perilous exigencies.*—Active courage and resignation to inevitable death, are very different efforts of the mind. The most abject people will die with calmness, nay, apparent indifference. Nations have submitted to slavery, torture, and individual extirpation, but, nevertheless, dared not to rise upon the handful of their oppressors. The annals of the world teem with instances of even warlike nations being subjugated by small but well disciplined armies. The rebellion in Ireland is a remarkable proof that experience and confidence in officers was requisite, and the more recent events in India establish the fact, that immense numerical superiority and equal personal courage are unavailing against troops composed of the same nations, but officered by those whose capacity to command was not problematical.—Many, unacquainted with the operations of war, presume that the use of the truly British weapon 'the bayonet,' would compensate for this deficiency, and imagine that the *inclination to engage in close action ensures the opportunity.* Perhaps I may fail in correcting this opinion, but nevertheless the idea is altogether erroneous. An able and active enemy will, in an inclosed country, mock such an attempt, and in security mow down the hordes of assailants. The invention of gun-powder has facilitated the enterprise of invaders, by elongating the otherwise overbearing weight of numbers, and unless the French, despising the advantage of ground, and rashly confident in presumed superiority of skill, venture upon Salisbury plain, or some other particular open tract, it can

“only be after the most frightful loss (indeed too frightful for the best troops) that the intrepid survivors reach their ranks. But are the necessary qualities for this heroic determination, and indifference to sacrifice so instantaneously acquired? Are previous habits, the comforts of life, and endearments of existence, from which they have been so recently separated, so soon forgotten? Does the mere investiture of a British uniform endow with all the splendid military virtues? Are the influence of a military life, a particular train of consequent reasoning upon the object and chances of the profession, the habitude of considering a premature death as preferable to disgrace, a cannon ball *a better destiny* than the ordinary terminations of life, the *perpetual practice of obedience*, but imaginary advantages, without which the same results may be produced? Are submission in moments of difficulty, and patience under all privations, no longer to be considered as the consequences of discipline, or are we to believe that the British volunteers are favoured with præternatural powers to exhibit these phenomena, in opposition to every acknowledged principle? Had an enemy landed in this country before the army had received its reinforcements, a fatal proof to the contrary would assuredly have been manifested, and even now the errors of the establishment may only be corrected after a severe experience of their existence. The creation in time of danger of an amphibious force partially partaking of the military character, but incessantly maintaining the nature, and applying itself upon the rights of the citizen, is no more than an artifice to impose by a return of numbers, but is in fact a body affording no real protection to the state.”

—In pointing out these fearful evils, the author has, I think it will be allowed, pushed his candour and politeness to the utmost, in appearing to have perceived, that “the *greater part* of the volunteer officers possess the *highest* feelings of honour.” True, they are our countrymen, a term which I prefer to “fellow-men” and “fellow-citizens;” but, is it so very easy to find fifty or sixty thousand men of the “highest honour,” in any country; especially when we consider, that no trifling part of them belong to those occupations which have always been denominated servile, and which are servile too? It might become Sir Robert Wilson not “to arrogate superior courage for the officers of the army,” he himself being one of them; but, I should be very

sorry not to regard them as possessing courage greatly superior to that of ninety-nine hundredths of the volunteer officers, and I am much deceived if these latter would not participate in my regret. The nature of his objection to them required no such palliation. He was about to state truths which no one not engrossed by empty vanity would attempt to deny. To say, flat and plain, that they and their men would run away in the day of battle against regular troops, would not have been going too far; for, I am deceived if the history of the world affords a single instance to the contrary. “The regular army is composed of ‘the same sort of men.’” No. They are all of the same country; but, the latter, besides being fitter from hardships previous to enlistment, have been changed by their submission to martial law. The *habit of obedience*; not a sort of sham obedience; not obedience for show in Hyde Park, and to talk about in a news-paper; but real obedience, obedience against the feelings both of the flesh and the spirit, and that obedience *habitual* too; this sort of obedience, and this *alone*, will make an army capable of meeting and resisting a regular army. But, this is a truth so universally acknowledged in theory, and so firmly established by practice, that one cannot help being ashamed, that there should exist a necessity for enforcing it. Such, however, is the fact; such necessity does exist, and that in a very great degree; for, so great have been the pains, which the minister, with a view of at once securing popular favour and sheltering the weakness of his means, has taken, and so extensive the influence employed, for the purpose of propagating the notion of *security arising from the volunteer system*, that the brain of the country actually seems to be turned, inasmuch that men have lost the faculty of reasoning upon the constituent parts and the operations of armies.—If, unhappily, an invasion by a large army should take place, while our military force is in its present state, the evils arising from the high rank, which has been bestowed on volunteer officers will be dreadful. To avoid these evils, Sir Robert Wilson would not have collected the volunteers into regiments, except in the metropolis; he would have placed the volunteers of each parish, or smaller district, under the command of some gentleman of the neighbourhood, and would have confined the rank to that of captain commandant, which, in such case, he justly observes, would have contented the gentlemen, and would have been more convenient and more pleasing to the privates. When

necessity required, he would have collected these companies under the command of the senior captain with the rank of major-commandant, and would have left it to the general to appoint a field officer from the regulars to command each regiment when marched against the enemy. "It would," says he, "be lamented that corps were ever regimented, if the high rank which has been granted to unprofessional men was the only bad consequence: so many self-evident evils are connected with this mistaken indulgence to gratify false pride, that men unacquainted with the secret springs of government must be astonished at the motives which influenced their consent; but actual warfare being the most serious of all human operations, should never be offered as a subject for folly and levity to play their antics with, and when the contest is about to be for such an awful stake as our country, *private political projects* should never interfere with the defensive arrangement, much less expose to injury the public service.—The volunteers assuredly now prefer to be directed by their own chieftains; but in the day of battle will they insist upon these leaders retaining the command? When life is upon the die, will they collect votes for their retention from those who might with great willingness and propriety commit the constitution to their discretion? But let us not believe that gentlemen would insist upon high military rank to gratify a vanity which cannot give them any additional real distinction; that they ever required, as the *sine qua non* of their services, the admission of this dangerous and indecent encroachment upon the military profession.—It is singular that in the arrangement of the volunteer force those precautions were so avowedly neglected, which, from practical experience, were found essentially necessary for the regulation of all armies; that for a remote warfare measures of precaution should be taken, which in one of so much more importance are deemed insignificant.—Six years most an officer serve in the British army before he can obtain the rank of a field officer, before he is esteemed as qualified (notwithstanding all that time he may have been on actual service) to undertake the responsibility of the command which attaches to his situation; but the volunteer at once assumes the rank of full colonel, by virtue of which high station he commands nearly every regiment in the king's service; and if invasion absolutely should take place, may find him-

self in the command of an army. It is no counter-argument that his discretion would induce him to consult officers of intelligence. He has a power, which ought to be delegated to no man, unto whom such a charge could not, consistent with the rules of the service, be committed. That there may be *heaven born generals* among the volunteer officers is possible. In the French revolution there were many proofs that there may be great officers without a regular initiation into the army, but such incidents do not justify so wide a deviation from established practice, nor have the officers proved themselves so unworthy of fulfilling their own duties. When once high rank was given, every nobleman and gentleman, of equal station in society, required the same concession, and thus jealousy became the true lever of the mischief which puts authority and responsibility where there is no possible experience, and prevents the militia and the volunteers from being commanded by the gentlemen of the country."—Sir Robert observes, that it is extraordinary that a clause in the last bill for regulating the volunteers positively directed, that no officer of the army under the rank of a general officer should, in any case, command them. That the bill did and does so provide is certain enough, but by no means *extraordinary*, as any one must allow, who has been an observer of the constant aim of the ministry, past and present, to flatter and wheedle the volunteers and militia-officers, and thereby gain them as political partisans. To contemplate the possibility of a volunteer officer, some London broker or barber, perhaps, falling into the command of the wing of an army, on which the fate of the kingdom might depend, and that, too, in a moment of great emergency, in a moment, possibly, when victory and defeat might be nearly balanced, is something so terrible, that one can hardly refrain from the severest reproaches against those, who have exposed the country to such a risk, especially when one thinks of the motives, from which alone they appear to have acted.—If this system is to be persevered in, even for a few months longer, the author of this inquiry suggests the necessity of some immediate alterations as to cloathing, from which he would abolish all the expensive foppery at present in vogue, all the *red*, all that tends to make the men look like what they are not. He would reduce them to sober grey, put a round hat upon their heads, give them a pair of overalls, and a

great coat. He says, and with great truth, that they should have no camp equipage; that it can be of no service, and may be highly detrimental. "Each volunteer company is now allowed a cart to carry baggage. What a Persian array will be their line of march! What a fatal indulgence may this not prove!" This must have been in the press at the very moment that our friend Sir Brook was haranguing his coach-masters, and that Lord Hawkesbury was holding his meetings at the Thatched-house! If Sir Robert calls the volunteering baggage-carts a Persian array, what would he have said of the car-project? I observed to Sir Brook, that the baggage of an army was a most troublesome and injurious appendage; and, it requires not military experience or military study to prove, that the nearer you can come to the point of rendering the soldier self-dependent for all the purposes of moving and of halting, the nearer your army comes to perfection, and the more powerful it must be in proportion to its numbers. After describing, several months ago, the dress that I would have given to the volunteers, I added: "thus equipped a man may pass an English winter without fire, and almost without a house." It would have been Sir Robert Wilson's aim to render the volunteers as little burthensome as possible; as little expensive to themselves and to the public treasure; as little noisy and annoying; instead of which, there really seems to have been some pains taken, and some ingenuity employed, to effect purposes exactly contrary—"The yeomanry," says he, "are susceptible of the same improvements. Great advantage would result to that service if the corps were, at least, broken into squadrons. At the present moment there is the greatest difficulty in procuring proper officers; and to complete the required number for the formation of a regiment, all descriptions of persons are admitted, without any consideration of the principle of the establishment. The yeomanry should be men of property associated together for the purpose of preserving internal tranquillity, and performing those irregular duties in case of actual service, which would enable the regular cavalry to direct their whole attention to offensive operations against the enemy. When parliament decreed that the yeomanry should be exempted from the penalties of martial law, it presumed, that the yeomanry were men composed of the most respectable class of the nation.

"But if parliament had known that the great proportion of many corps were the servants and lowest labourers of farmers, without a shilling of fixed property, or any horse but that which occasionally was lent to obtain the exemption from the horse tax, I must doubt whether the indulgence would have been extended so far; and I am confident that it ought not to have been, consistent with the rights of the volunteers. The yeomanry system, as at present conducted, costs the nation an enormous sum of money, and will still more, for the officers now require pay; whereas, if only the real yeomanry of the land had been admitted, no other demand would have been made upon the nation, collectively, than some allowance for horse appointments and forage for the horses when on duty."—With the alterations which he proposes, he thinks the yeomanry may be made very useful; but these alterations, which necessarily suppose a reduction of numbers, a breaking down the corps into smaller bodies, and a submission to the command of field officers of the regular army, must take place before even the yeomanry can be regarded as adding much to our national security against the consequences of an invasion.—This part of his performance concludes with the following remark and most apt reference to the battle which decided the fate of that famous people, whom the French have chosen for our prototype. "The yeomanry force will be highly useful, if conducted ably: they must, at all events render some service to the country, and this body would not, if properly formed, be any detriment to more general service: but, as to the volunteers, the battle of Zama should be a warning to England. Hannibal drew up his army in three lines; in front were placed the mercenaries, in the second the volunteers and national levies, in the third the veterans and troops on whom he could depend. The mercenaries fought bravely, but, being pressed by numbers required support from the second line: but the second line began to run away, which so exasperated the mercenaries, that they ceased to fight with the Romans, and turned their arms upon the fugitive volunteers, slaughtering a great many. The gallant exertions and talents of Hannibal, aided by the intrepid courage of the veteran army, could not repair this misfortune; and Rome thus fulfilled the insulting menace which she had for so many years vaunted.

"Has England not her mercenaries. (Hannoverians), her volunteers and militia, and her small corps *d'élite*, the regular army—the resemblance is painfully accurate!"—The remaining three heads of inquiry cannot now be analysed; the mention of some detached and important facts must not, however, be delayed. Sir Robert states, that, with all the efforts of government and of individuals, not above 17,000 men have been raised for general service, that is to say, for the regular army. He states, that the military-project bill will not produce, in a year, more than 13,000 men, and in this no one will deny that he has been sufficiently liberal in his allowance, for the bill has produced no *men* worth speaking of yet. He says that the men raised by the military-project bill, supposing the number to be 13,000 in a year, will not repair the common wear and tear of the army in Europe without a continental war. If the men be thus raised by dribblets, England, he observes, can never have a disposable force, for the supply is not equal to the present expenditure. Finally, he says that 30,000 men are wanted to complete the *present* establishment; that is to say, to fill up the regular regiments already in existence: so that, to say nothing about an *augmentation* of our army, the men are not now raised fast enough to supply the daily wear and tear, and, of course, the present vacancies cannot, if the present wretched system be persevered in, ever be filled up.—At the appearance of statements like this, how quickly the exaggerations and deceptions of the ministers vanish! and ought we not to blush at our folly for having been so deceived? The pompous enumeration, contained in Lord Castlereagh's speech of the 9th of December last (see *Parl. Debates*, vol. I. p. 202), indeed, the whole of the speech, has, as I once before stated, been published in French and Italian, and has been distributed abundantly in all the courts of Europe! Gracious heaven have mercy upon the nation that is committed to the rule of such men! Did the ministers think, that, by this paper array, they should gain allies, or that they should frighten Napoleon Buonaparté? There is something at once so cunning and so foolish in the attempt; something so much like the cuteness of idiocy, that one hardly knows whether to laugh at, or to pity, the operators. The French know exactly the state of our army. They know what every species of our force is worth. Lord Castlereagh cannot deceive them, if he can deceive us; and, as Sir Robert Wilson observes, they

would not, with the consciousness that 500,000 volunteers are enrolled in Great Britain, hesitate one moment to land their army, if the safe passage of the Channel could be secured. "If," says he, "they should land, however, it is to be hoped that Marshall Turenne's proverb, that 'the bon Dieu generally takes the side of the most numerous battalions,' will prove true; for a miracle must, indeed, be worked, if any early success can otherwise prevent a considerable French force from penetrating very far towards the capital, if that point be their object."—The observations under the heads, militia, army of reserve, and regulars, are all of great importance, though not of importance so immediate as those which relate to the volunteers. An analysis of them shall be submitted to the reader in the succeeding sheet, or sheets, of the Register, as a sequel to the present article, which I shall now proceed to close with a remark or two on that part of the work, which relates to military distinctions, and which I regard as being of the utmost consequence. "Military distinctions," says he, "is a subject more congenial to the military character than an investigation of pay, although in the British service these honourable feelings have not been much encouraged, nor has this cheap defence of nations been sufficiently estimated. Much has been done to destroy this generous ardour, to direct the attention of the soldier to more substantial but not equally satisfactory remunerations. Distinctions, which were considered as such, because they were the appendages of meritorious services, have ceased to retain their value since they no longer testify as the positive evidence of any merit. There are now so many Royal uniforms in the different corps of our heterogeneous army, that to see a regiment without the blue-facing is a matter of surprise. The Parliament of England has even been induced to bestow the thanks of the nation for anticipated service, where such an approbation should only follow the most distinguished good conduct. The army has hitherto been disposed to regard the thanks of the British Senate as a consecrated eulogy—as the most gratifying and highest reward which could be conferred. But the sanctity of the act has been violated, and the charm much weakened, if not altogether dissolved."—It will be recollected, that, when the "*Royal Pimlico Volunteers*" were formed, under the command of that gallant captain, my Lord Hobart, having Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh

reach in the ranks as privates, that I put in my protest against this prodigal distribution of the honour of *Royal Regiments*. I explained the nature of the distinction, and showed how injurious the bestowing of it upon corps that have never seen service, and, of course, can have acquired no claim to it, must be. But, what I have said is of small weight: how often, how ably, and how eloquently, has Mr. Windham pointed out the evils of thus destroying the value of all military distinctions and of degrading the military profession! Sir Robert Wilson does, indeed, make honourable mention of the obligations which the country owes to Mr. Windham for his exertions as to the means of our defence; and, certain I am, that, if it be not the fate of this kingdom to be subdued by France, it can be preserved only by the system which Mr. Windham would have adopted, and would still adopt. Had Mr. Windham been, for the last two years, in a situation to direct in the formation of the army, I have not the least doubt, that we should, at this time, have had 40 000 men to spare for any foreign enterprize that might have offered, while our home defence would have been such that we might indeed have "laid down our heads to rest." How different would our situation have been from what it now is! We might, then, have, in reality, "out-threatened the threatener." Forty thousand men, ready to embark from England at a day's notice, would have prevented Napoleon from becoming an Emperor. But, we are now in the hands of stock-jobbers and quibbling lawyers. Mr. Pitt's triumph over his political opponents, and not England's triumph over her enemies; Mr. Pitt's place at the Treasury and in the cabinet, and not England's place in the world, appears to be the primary object of all the measures of government, and of all the sacrifices which we are called upon to make.—To return to the subject of military distinction: there is one way, in which the lavishing of military honours, rank, and clothing degrades the profession of a soldier, which no one that I know of has yet dwelt upon: I allude to the wearing of cockades by *menial servants*. The cockade is the ancient, the standing, the invariable symbol of the military profession; and, it appears to me, that the fashion of giving cockades to the menials of officers of the army, must have been introduced by persons who did not entertain too high a veneration for the name of soldier. What other profession is thus lavish of its emblems of distinction? The Law, the Priesthood, the Magistracy? No: you find none of the me-

nials of persons in these professions wearing the same marks of distinction as their masters, nor any part of those marks. The uniform coat, &c. is of much less importance than the cockade, which is the peculiar mark of the profession of arms. But, if the lavishing of this mark of distinction upon the menials of officers of the army be injurious to the profession, what must be the effect of extending the abuse to the volunteer system, which includes about seventy or eighty thousand officers, not a hair-dresser of whom, who is able to keep a *Scrub*, but will deck him off in a cockade? The effect is, indeed, visible: go where you will, your sight is offended by these party-coloured gentry in cockades; you see them swarming at the corners of streets and about Inn-yards; there is hardly a hat to be seen behind a carriage without a cockade in it. And this frequency of the military array is what the Cockney think will make us "a military people!" It has, as Mr. Windham has so ingeniously and yet so clearly shown, a directly contrary tendency; and, it would be by no means difficult to prove, that it is to the want of a military spirit; that it is to the reluctance to become a military people; that it is to the propensity to trade and its concomitant indulgences prevailing over every other feeling that we owe the volunteer system.—In considering the symptom of the lavishing of rank and distinction, Sir Robert Wilson appears loath to draw the natural inference. "The inference," says he, "which I am about to draw is certainly "not strictly applicable; but, it is extraordinary, that the well-informed proposer "of the vote of thanks to the volunteers "did not remember, that the best historians "have observed, that, as states are *declining*, "honours are lavishly distributed." Thus, "when Cicero demanded for Sulpicius, "who died on a journey, the same honours "as were decreed for those ambassadors "who were killed at their post, it was regarded as a certain indication of the tottering condition of the commonwealth." The case is not, indeed, exactly in point, because the Roman honours were lavished on an ambassador; but, that circumstance does by no means obstruct the course of the principle, which goes on directly to the fair and unavoidable inference, that, as to those qualities by which a nation maintains its independence, *Great Britain is upon the decline*, and has already gone so far, as to be in a tottering condition; an inference the truth of which, if it wanted any confirmation, would certainly need no other than that which is so abundantly afforded

by the shameless boastings that fill our public prints, and that are uttered upon the boards of our theatres to applauding audiences. The peculiar characteristic of Englishmen has always been modesty, modesty bordering upon sheepishness. The French call it *mauvaise honte*. For this sin we no longer deserve reproach, as every one must be convinced who has had the mortification to read, to hear of, those acts of heroism, which our volunteers are daily performing, and the relations of which are so disgustingly vain-glorious, so intolerably base in their flattery, that it is impossible that they could be committed to the press in any country not very far gone in degradation. It will be said, perhaps, that we must not judge of the mind of a nation from the effusions of the minds of editors of newspapers and writers of plays; but, without stopping to show that the same base propensity predominates in books and pamphlets, of almost every description, to say nothing of certain speeches that one might easily refer to; without stopping for this, we may be assured, that, whether we regard the public prints and the theatre as exhibiting a picture of the national mind, foreign nations will so regard them. And, indeed, so they ought to be, and so they must be regarded; for editors and play writers studiously consult the mind of the public, and, generally speaking, according to the state and taste of that mind they fashion their performances. What a disgraceful picture do we, then, exhibit to Europe; to all those nations who formerly envied our exalted state! Penned up here, as we are, with the spade ready to cut down our dykes and the torch ready to set fire to our beacons; living here as we do in constant alarm and agitation; regulating our sales and purchases and almost our lodging and our diet by the variation in our hopes and our fears relative to the power and the threats of the enemy; thus situated, the slaves of our own selfishness, the pity of friends, and the sport and scorn of our enemies, we have still the strange perverseness to be the greatest boasters that the world ever saw. The toast at the London Tavern, together with the subsequent apprehensions and alarms of the gentleman, who then wished for "a speedy meeting with Buona-  
"parté on our own shores," affords a complete specimen of what we are capable of in this way; and, upon this occasion, it is impossible not to recollect, that, at the very time when the toast was given, the partisans of the toaster were insidiously complimenting Mr. Windham upon his "*chivalrous*

"nature and his contempt of discretion!" The effect of such insinuation has, as was foretold, been done away by the events of the times: the nation has now seen too many of Mr. Windham's predictions fulfilled, even to the letter; they have now, in many ways, felt the consequences of his advice being rejected, and in none more sensibly than in the expenses and dangers they have incurred from the rejection of his counsel as to the formation of an army, as to which point, according to Sir Robert Wilson's statement, nine tenths of the military officers are decidedly with Mr. Windham.—The importance of the subject is the only apology that can be offered for the length of this article, in which I have only to hope, that the tediousness of the comment may not impair the force and diminish the utility of the text.

REVIVAL OF JACOBINISM.—This topic has been again forced upon me by the language of the ministerial prints, in which it is insinuated, that SIR ROBERT WILSON is a jacobin, or, at least, acting, according to their jargon, *jacobinically*; and, one of them has not scrupled gently to hint at the propriety of dismissing Sir Robert from the King's service! Here, then, we have a complete exposition of their doctrine. Every one who dares to open his lips against the system of the minister, or, indeed, against any of his measures, is a jacobin. This is really too grossly absurd as well as impudent, to merit any thing so serious as indignation. Not so, however, the hint for *dismissing* Sir Robert Wilson from the service! It will be said, and truly, that this hint has proceeded from some newspaper proprietor; but, it must not be forgotten, that the persons of that description who are connected with the Treasury, never even hint at any thing which they are not pretty certain will be quite agreeable in that quarter.—As being somewhat connected with this subject, I think it proper to say here a few words relative to a publication, consisting of Extracts from the Register, which has just appeared, and which I understand to have been published by the Middlesex friends of Sir Francis Burdett. It contains the *whole* of the article from p. 331 to p. 351, of the present volume; the passage from the top of p. 373 to the end of page 384; and the whole of the article from p. 412 to the end of p. 416. Let any man read those articles, and then say, if he can, that he believes the persons, by whom they have been circulated, to be jacobins; nay, I appeal to any candid man, whether persons so acting can possibly entertain notions and

views hostile to the established order of things in this country. It is proper for me to state, that I have had no act or part in the publication; that it was begun before I heard of the intention; and, further, it may not be unnecessary for me to say, that I left London before the close of the election, that I have not been there since, except on a mere journey thither and back again, and that I have not, from the beginning of the contest to this hour, conversed with any person of either party, except in one single instance, when I heard that several deserters from the army of reserve were going to vote for Sir Francis Burdett, and when I referred my informant to Colonel Robinson, as a person likely to afford him the means of detection, if his suspicions should prove well-founded. My opinion upon the subject has been formed upon a deliberate, calm, and impartial consideration of all the facts and circumstances, as they have come before me in the public prints. I thought I saw a sinister and most mischievous attempt again to split us into hostile divisions; to force men into clubs and combinations; and, I flatter myself that my endeavours to prevent such a dreadful evil will have met with general approbation. The conduct of those who have directed the publication, of which I have been speaking, is such as I cannot but approve of; and whoever has read the whole of the passages that they have selected, will, I am certain admire their candour. This publication is, in fact, a pledge of their loyalty to the king and of their firm attachment to the established order of things.

DISPUTE WITH SPAIN.—The following curious article, on which I have at present no room for remark, appeared in a demi-official paper of the 24th instant. The reader may depend upon it that it came from Downing street. It is only there where you find that race of men, who can write a newspaper column full without saying any thing. “His Catholic Majesty, by furnishing to our enemy, as has been done by a public treaty, the very sinews of war, has undoubtedly committed an offence against the laws of neutrality, perfectly sufficient to justify a declaration of war on our part. As an injury to our National honour, nothing but the feelings of pity, or our considering the Spanish government as not master of its own actions, could justify our originally passing over its conduct without public and exemplary notice. But this observation applies only

“to the question, if we suppose that the late ministers were not tacitly consenting to the proceedings of his Catholic Majesty.—A national injury may be increased or diminished; it has a relative importance, and may be made ground of war, or not, as other circumstances direct; but a national insult must be promptly atoned for, or promptly avenged. We know that this principle has not always been acted upon, and we suspect that the temporising conduct of his predecessor may have led the present minister into a difficulty with respect to the point of honour. But it is not in speculations like these that we wish to indulge; we wish merely to place upon the proper shoulders the responsibility that may attach to our conduct in respect to Spain, and to place the question (as far as can be done) in its true light.—Whether it be to be argued as a question of necessity (and such we will beg leave to call the vindication of our honour), or only as a question of policy, the facts before the public do not enable us to determine. But in considering the latter we should not forget, as the editor of the Morning Chronicle seems to have done, that Spain has a navy. Every argument founded on our supposed inability to carry on offensive operations on land, makes it more necessary for us to preserve our preponderancy at sea; in this respect we should make assurance double sure. We throw out these hints to counteract the attempts that have been made to prejudge a question of great national importance, upon which our readers have not, and cannot have, the materials to form a decisive opinion.”—The object seems to be to prepare the public mind for some West-India or Galleon war, and to throw the blame of the past upon Mr. Addington. But, let us wait, at any rate, and hear, without prejudice, what is to be brought to light upon the subject. Premature discussions are always mischievous.

#### COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.

The SECOND VOLUME of this work, bringing the Proceedings of Parliament, the Accounts, &c. down to the close of the last session, is now published, price 1l. 10s. neatly half-bound in Russia, and may be had of the publishers of the Register, and of every book-eller and newsman in the united kingdom. Of whom also may be had complete sets of the Register.

"As for eternal enmity, I detest the idea; and, if I have an eternal enmity, it is against the partisans of a principle so detestable."—LORD GRENVILLE'S Letter to the Marquis of Wellesley.

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## LETTER II.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

INTRODUCTION (*concluded from p. 460*).

SIR,—Though the doctrine of *never-ending adherence* would be, as far as relates to his own case, very agreeable to every man who has once been the object of support or of praise; though there is not a country in the world, and scarcely a rank of life in any one country, where men would not, almost without exception, anxiously desire to retain the suffrage which they have, at any time, been able to acquire; though this doctrine would necessarily be of catholic convenience, few will deny, that to you it would be far more convenient than to any other person in this kingdom, and, perhaps, than to any other person in the whole world. To all those, who have ever divided the voices of any portion of the people; to all those, who have ever been the object of contending voters, from the lowest to the highest, from a Chairman of Sir Brook's committees to a member of parliament, it must be of some importance to have a claim to a perpetuity of all the support they have heretofore received: how valuable then, or, rather how far beyond all valuation, must this claim be to you! To you, who have been prime-minister for twenty years; who have had, during that time, pass through your hands seven hundred millions of money; who have had a majority in the parliament ever since the year 1783; and, who, owing to the peculiar nature of the times and the alarm which prevailed for the safety of the throne, have, first or last, had the support of nineteen twentieths of the people! Only establish this claim, therefore, and you are safe from every assailant upon earth, except Buonaparté: let your measures be what they may, nothing internal can ever shake your power; and, if we could be prevailed on to subscribe to the doctrine which is above described, and which your partisans openly teach, you and your noble associate might (Buonaparté's good pleasure being obtained) rule over us to the end of your na-

tural lives; and might, for aught I can see to the contrary, bequeath us at your death, upon the principle that those who had already so cheerfully submitted to your delegate, could have no reasonable objection to submit to your legatee. But, Sir, to this doctrine I do not subscribe. At a period not far removed, a great majority of your former supporters will, I trust, be found to reject it with disdain; and, acting upon those public principles, which I am now proceeding further to develop, I feel confident, that they will cease to boast of the honour of being your partisans, the lifeless pageants in a political show, at the moment that their country is on the verge of destruction.

Having, in the preceding letter, proved, that, in ceasing to adhere to you, I departed from no principle that I had ever entertained, or professed to entertain; that, to the cause of which I had regarded you as the champion, I remained firmly attached after you had totally forsaken it, together with all your openly and solemnly declared objects and determinations relative thereto; that, it is you who are, in this respect, chargeable with defection, and that, to borrow an illustration from your newly and miraculously acquired science, it was not, in this case, the soldier that deserted his general, but the general that deserted his army, or, all that part of it, at least, which was not composed of mere mercenaries, and which could not be inveigled to follow him after he had abandoned the cause it had taken up arms to maintain: having, and in a manner which I cannot help believing to be incontrovertible, established this point, it is my intention, next to examine into the charge of *going over*, as it is called, to join with Mr. Fox; first unequivocally avowing, that, as far as a person like me can with propriety be said to join with a great political leader, I have joined with Mr. Fox, inasmuch as he, together with Lords Fitzwilliam, Spencer, Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the other distinguished persons that are co-operating with him in parliament, are acting upon those principles that I have *always* professed, and are endeavouring, if I correctly judge of their views, to procure the adoption of those

measures, relating as well to our internal as our external policy, without which I am, for the reasons I have heretofore given and in these letters propose more elaborately to give, sincerely convinced that England will, at no far-distant day, become a colony of imperial France.

In those political regions, where it is the established custom to consider every question merely in a personal light; where all political writers are regarded as bondsmen to one master or another; where the abject votaries cry, "away with the measures and give us the men;" in those regions of servility, obduracy, and wilful blindness, so far am I from expecting to produce conviction, that I do not even hope to be understood.—But, amongst those who retain a due respect for principles; those who claim a right to think for themselves, and acknowledge the same right in others; those, who, to use a very strong, though, in this case, not inapplicable phrase, still "dare say that their souls are their own;" amongst such persons it will, in order to come at a just notion as to my going over to Mr. Fox, be thought not unnecessary to inquire, *whence* I have gone and *whither*; that is to say, from *what cause* or *what principle* I have departed, and to *what cause* or *what principle* I have gone; in *what cause* or on *what principle* it was that I was *opposed* to Mr. Fox, and in *what cause* or on *what principle* it is that I now have *joined with him*.

My career as a writer began with the *French Revolution* and the subjects closely connected therewith. Mr. Fox's political life naturally divides itself, for consideration, under five principal heads, corresponding with five great events of the country; to wit; the *American war*, the *India Bill*, the *regency*, the war against the *French Republic*, and the *Present War*.

As to the first of these, in which you, treading in the steps of your father, co-operated with Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, and, I believe, Mr. Windham, I, with the knowledge, which peculiar though accidental advantages, have enabled me to acquire, have no hesitation in saying that I should have differed from you all. The *India Bill* I never read: I confess myself almost totally ignorant of the question in dispute; but, unless Mr. Fox's bill would have made a job of India, and rendered an extensive and valuable colony a mill-stone round the neck of England; unless it would have created in Leadenhall-street a set of sovereigns the rivals of the House of Brunswick; unless it would have powerfully assisted in impoverishing the landholders in England

in order to carry on wars for the enriching of upstarts to come and thrust them from their fields and their mansions; unless its tendency was to expose us to the cruel mortification of beholding

"The wealth of climes, where savage nations  
room,

"Pillag'd from slaves to purchase slaves at home;" unless these were the consequences, to which Mr. Fox's India system inevitably tended, I think it would, at this time, be very hard to shew, that it could have been so injurious to the kingdom as that which was adopted in its stead. On the Regency question I also confess my ignorance, and I hope it is one upon which no circumstances will ever arise so pressing as to induce me to submit my crude notions to the public; though, I cannot help thinking, that, the present is, of all others, the season for men of learning and of talents to bring forward, through the means of the press, some principles, that may, if the necessity should come, prepare our minds for the discussion; and, thereby prevent the adoption of any hasty, unadvised measure, any measure of "existing circumstances," any hazardous "experiment," any popular innovation, that would tend to efface from the minds of the people the remnant of that reverential awe, which they once entertained for the kingly office, and which, though less amiable, perhaps, than personal attachment to the sovereign, is assuredly not less conducive to the permanent security of the throne. Upon neither of these subjects, especially as connected with the public character or conduct of yourself or of Mr. Fox, did I ever attempt to enter, so far, at least, as to express any thing bearing the marks of a deliberate opinion.

The French Revolution, then, or, to render the object more definite, the *last war* waged by England against France was the cause, and the only cause, in which I stood opposed to Mr. Fox; he maintaining that the war was neither just nor necessary, and I endeavouring to maintain that it was both necessary and just. And here, Sir, I might, if I chose, revoke my opinion upon a plea much more satisfactory than any which you have brought forward, or can bring forward, for the revoking of your opinion with respect to Mr. Addington and Lord St. Vincent, particularly the former, with whom, previous to your recommendation of him to the parliament, you had lived in habits of intimacy even from your childhood. My utter inexperience and my youth would form no feeble apology for adopting and pursuing an error, especially if that error

evidently arose from a laudable feeling; and, though, generally speaking, twenty-eight years of age is not very young, yet a person of that age must be regarded as a young politician, if he be only then beginning to *read*, and even to *talk*, as well as to write upon politics, which was literally the case with respect to me. But, this plea, as well as that which might fairly be founded upon the circumstances connected with my local situation, which exposed me constantly to hear the expression of wishes hostile to the war-like efforts of my country, and which, therefore, naturally wedded me more closely to the cause in which she was at war, and, of course, led me to defend and applaud the man by whom the measures of that war were principally directed; all these grounds of apology I explicitly forego and disclaim; distinctly declaring, that, with regard to the French revolution itself, as well as with regard to the justice and necessity of the last war with France, I still retain all those principles, as to which I was, both during and since the war, opposed to Mr. Fox.

The peace came: the war was no more: and why did not my opposition to Mr. Fox cease, when the cause of that opposition ceased to exist? In the first place, if men continue to act at all, they must *oppose*, or, *co-operate*; and, after an opposition, especially of long duration and of great warmth, there must, amongst men not blessed with the singularly happy disposition of the Hawkesburys and the Castlereaghs, be both time and circumstance to produce co-operation. In the next place, the cause of opposition had not ceased. Considered as to political principles and opinions, a peace always must be inseparable from the war that it has put an end to; because the terms of the peace are the result, though, as is proved, I think, by the present case, not always the natural result of the war. I continued opposed to Mr. Fox, because Mr. Fox continued to oppose the principles upon which I had so long been acting; because he approved of the peace upon the very ground that he had always disapproved of the war; because he maintained that the peace was absolutely necessary to the country, and was a necessary consequence of the war; while I was fully persuaded, and most earnestly endeavoured to prove, that it was not. With respect to you, Mr. Fox was completely triumphant. He had constantly told you, that the necessary consequences of the war would be, an extension of the dominion and an increase of the power of France, confirmed by a disgraceful

peace on the part of Great Britain.—And, Sir, that either the peace of Amiens was *not necessary*, or that Mr. Fox's predictions were *fulfilled to the letter*, is, I think, a proposition, which will never admit of dispute. The ostensible ministers; those persons in whose behalf you demanded "the most grateful thanks of the country" for the peace they had made; those persons did, indeed, in words, "disclaim the plea of necessity:" yet, your immediate successor, the once "able" but now "imbecile" (I use your own epithets) Mr. Addington, declared that "peace was necessary in order to husband our resources against another day of trial;" while his worthy and now your worthy colleague Lord Hawkesbury, in most manfully denying that it was "a peace of necessity," did, with not less discrimination than candour, acknowledge that it was "a necessary peace;" while Lord Levison Gower, declaring the peace to be "a capitulation for safety," gave it his cordial support; and, while you, in the same breath that you "thanked God that we were yet far, very far indeed, from the end of our pecuniary resources," did, nevertheless think it advisable "to keep those resources for the purposes of defence and security, and not lavish them away in a further continuation of the contest, with the certainty of enormous expense, with the hazard of making our relative situation worse, and without obtaining so great a degree of security."\* Not to appeal, therefore, to the scores, the hundreds, of pamphlets, essays, and speeches, which were written, or delivered, in defence of the peace, and in all of which, whether coming from your friends or from the old opposition, the plea of necessity was, in some guise or other, strenuously urged; not to appeal to any of these, suffer me to ask you, Sir, what sort of compact that peace must have been, which would have given us a *less* degree of security than we have enjoyed since the peace of Amiens; the peace that merited the "most grateful thanks of the country?" And, if even your imagination can conceive no state of greater insecurity; if merely to provide for our defence became, in ten months after the peace was concluded, an object "quite sufficient to occupy the whole of every man's mind;" if such be our present situation; such the immediate consequences; the clearly foreseen and repeatedly foretold consequences, of the peace which you se-

\* Speech of 3d November 1801, See Register, Vol. II. p. 1143.

cretly made, or, at least, openly defended and extolled, what but necessity, what but the last necessity, what but an absolute inability to continue the war another month, can possibly be pleaded in justification of your conduct? Here, then, Sir, is a dilemma, from which there is no getting loose: Lord Belgrave may again pour forth his soul in expressions of gratitude, "upon casting his eyes on the vessel of state, having weathered the storm, and riding in triumph and security in her native port;"\* Mr. Canning may again treat the stock-jobbers and contractors (amongst whom, upon the occasion alluded to, too many persons of high rank and reputation had, as I observed at the time, the weakness to mix) with a versification of his lordship's balcony ideas; † and, the younger George Rose, with a degree of piety and delicacy truly worthy of the stock whence he sprang, may again call upon the congregation to "bellow the day that gave you birth;"‡ still, in spite of the dignified attachment of those who become partizans merely because it is awkward to be nothing; in spite of that generous gratitude, which, though inspired merely by personal favours, is so powerful as to extend, in its operation, to the public conduct of the private friend, even if that conduct be in direct hostility to the principles professed by the grateful party; in spite of that hardy adulation, which nobly pushes on to its object, amidst the unanimous hisses and scorn of mankind; in spite of all these, Sir, this grand dilemma will for ever remain: either the peace of Amiens, a peace in which every one of your avowed objects of the war; in which the balance of Europe, the independence of its states, and the tranquillity and security of Great-Britain, were all abandoned; either such a peace as this was made without any necessity for it, or all Mr. Fox's predictions relative to the result of the war were completely fulfilled.

To prove that this notion has not arisen from a revised consideration of the subject; to prove that no recent change as to parties has produced its promulgation, I have only to quote the words, which I published more than two years ago, and, of course, immediately after the conclusion of the peace. "It must be allowed, that, if either the existence, or the conduct, of the war did really render such a peace necessary; if the situation of the country was (which I deny) such as, 'upon the whole and under all the circumstances of Europe,'

"to render the peace of Amiens advisable; then, it must be allowed, that those who opposed, in all its stages, the prosecution of the war, were, by far, the wisest politicians."\* Thus it was, then, that you and Mr. Fox appeared in my sight at the conclusion of the peace. He still as widely as ever differing from me as to the war, and differing from me also as to the necessity of the peace; but, being, at the same time, perfectly consistent with himself: while you differed from me full as widely as Mr. Fox did, and while this difference arose from your having turned your back up in those principles, and having flatly falsified those promises, which had before induced me to agree with you. Mr. Fox triumphed over the cause that I had espoused; a triumph which few persons felt more severely than I did. To be disgracefully beaten, at the end of seven years of such exertions as I had made, was well calculated to increase my hostility to the chief of the Opposition; but, by him I had not been deserted; by him the cause had not been abandoned; him I could not accuse of inconsistency; and, in short, whether the peace was a measure of necessity, or whether it was not, it was impossible not to perceive that it stamped him your superior as a statesman: if the former, greatly your superior in discernment, if the latter, not less your superior in political integrity.

Shall I be told, that my disappointment, and, of course, my anger against you, in consequence of the peace, was owing to my own folly; to my over-sanguine disposition; for that your promises must, of course, have been made with an implied reservation as to the effect of subsequent events? In your defence of the peace you had an eye to these promises. "There were times," said you, "during the war, in which government hoped to be able to drive France within her ancient limits, and even to make barriers against her further incursions; but, in this we were disappointed; it became, then, necessary, with the change of circumstances, to change our objects; for I do not know a more fatal error, than to look only at one object, and obstinately to pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remains." This was delightfully received by every weak and mean man in the country. It was the very language of that "prudent young man" Lord Hawkesbury, and was echoed from alley to alley, from counter to counter, through every department of the 'Change and the Bank. But, Sir, was not this? in

\* Political Register, Vol. II. p. 1242.

† Ibid. p. 1026.

‡ Political Register, Vol. II. p. 1025.

\* Political Register, Vol. I. p. 762.

good truth was it not a most miserable attempt to preserve consistency? "There was a time in which the government *hoped!*" What! was it thus that "the aspiring blood of Lancaster dropped! I thought it would have mounted!" When the "*government hoped!*" You should have said there were times, during the war, when *I said*, when *I declared*, when *I vowed*, when I most solemnly *pledged myself*, without reservation or qualification, that *I*, and not that indefinite thing called the *government*, never would make peace with France, till I could obtain "an adequate, full, and rational security; till such a peace could be made as would restore to Europe her settled and balanced constitution of general polity, and to every negotiating power in particular, its due weight in the scale of general empire." Having said this, you should have proceeded to confess, that events had frustrated your purpose, that your declaration was rash, and that you hoped to be forgiven. Forgiveness, from me, would have been readily granted; but, I never would have put it in your power again to mislead, again to disappoint, again to disgrace either myself or my country. A part, however, and a very material part, of your promises, remain to receive even the sort of justification that I have here been noticing: I mean your promises relative to the pecuniary resources of the country, which promises were, as I have before stated, backed by a very elaborate publication, under the name of your secretary, Mr. Rose, and which publication was printed at the public expense and transmitted, in French as well as English I believe, to all foreign courts where we had resident ministers, or other diplomatic agents. These promises were, that, in June 1799, not two years before the negotiation for peace was humbly solicited of a Commissary of Prisoners, such were our pecuniary resources, that "war might be carried on for any length of time, without the creation of new debt, and that it would not be difficult to provide taxes for eight years." Now, Sir, as to this promise, no change of circumstances in the war can possibly avail you aught. You were not the master of war-like events, though you had much to do in producing them; but, of the purse of the country you were the absolute master. All its means were at your command, and the extent of those means was a mere matter of calculation; a point to be settled by the counting of fingers. Yet this promise too was broken; this full and specific and deliberate declaration was contrary to truth; and, Sir,

it is beyond the powers of sophistry here to obtain for you any other choice than that which lies between wilful mistatement and inadequate knowledge. The truth is, however, that your partisans attempt no apology; they frankly give up the point; and, with a modesty and morality peculiar to themselves, upbraid me with perverseness for having confided in your declarations and promises; a species of reproach which is exceedingly mortifying, and against which, therefore, as I think you will do me the justice to acknowledge, I have, since the preliminaries of peace, taken every precaution in my power to guard both myself and the public.

But, still your partisans insist, that all this is no justification for my having joined Mr. Fox. Some of them allow, because they have not the face to deny it, that I was fully justified in opposing you; but, they say I should have done it "upon *independent* ground;" by which they mean, that I should have stood alone; and that, though I might have a right to attack you, I was also to continue to assail your opponents. This doctrine, which is precisely that which was so earnestly inculcated by Mr. Addington's partisan, in the "*Cursory Remarks*," is not less convenient to a minister than the doctrine of never-ceasing adherence; for if, by any means, no matter what, he can keep his opponents in a state of constant, or even *occasional*, hostility to each other, great indeed must be his imbecility if he fails to give a good account of them one at a time, a practical demonstration of which was given in the shameful state of parties during the administration of the person last named, a state of parties the effects of which the nation will long have to lament. It is curious, too, that, while this doctrine of "*independent* opposition," as it is at once drolly and artfully denominated, is held forth as an essential in the political character; while eternal enmity is to exist amongst all those, who have ever differed from each other, and who are now opposed to the minister, an exactly opposite doctrine is held and acted upon with respect to all those who will support the minister. If you will but stand and vote on the side of the minister, you may be cordially reconciled to men with whom but yesterday you were in open and violent hostility; while, to persons, together with whom you are in opposition to the minister, you must not be reconciled though there has been time and circumstances more than sufficient to soften your asperity: nay, so preposterous is the whole of this set of principles, that,

if there be a person from whom you have ever differed in the whole course of your life, you must not, in opposition to the ministry, agree with him upon any point as to which you never disagreed with him; whereas, in favour of the ministry, you are not only released from this restraint, you are, not only as to new questions, at liberty to agree with those from whom you formerly differed, but, as hath been lately most strongly exemplified, you are at full liberty to agree with them upon the very same questions as to which you have not barely disagreed with them, but as to which you have actually delivered your opinion against them, and have given to that opinion the sanction of a vote!

To those who may relish this doctrine I leave it as a guide: me it does not suit: I am, and ever have been, of opinion, that a party is only to be opposed by a party; a ministry by an opposition, uniting, if possible, all those who are not on the side of the ministry; and that, in order to render such an union efficient, not only all private prejudice but every minor public consideration, ought to give way. Under the influence of this opinion, thoroughly convinced that you never ought to be prime minister again, and suspecting (what has since proved true), that the open operation of a scheme for your return to the helm was at no great distance, I began, so early as the month of June, 1802, to suggest the necessity of a new-modelling and combination of parties. "The question of peace or war is now at an end; and as the Old Opposition do not stand committed on those other great objects of public consideration which will hereafter present themselves, there are five modes of conduct which lie open to their choice; first, they may act in a detached body, as they do at present; secondly, as the allies of some other party; thirdly, as neutrals; fourthly, they may set up a sort of armed neutrality; fifthly, they may divide, and, in the quality of mercenaries, be opposed to each other, without any diminution of that mutual regard and that love of country, which the virtuous Swiss are said to entertain at the very moment when they are plunging the bayonet into each others breast.\*" This was not directly pointing out what I wished the Old Opposition to do; it was not directly saying, "join the New Opposition, or you too will become insignificant;" but, that such was the suggestion intended to be conveyed

no one can doubt. From this time, however, to the renewal of the war, such was the disjointed state of parties, so completely were the great public men detached from each other, that there appeared no means whereby to endeavour to accomplish a change for the better. The war awakened the leading characters who are now opposed to you, not only to a sense of the dangers of the country, but, which was not of less importance, to a due sense of that situation, in which, by the influence of their mutual dread of appearing to be the first to concede, they exhibited the consummately ridiculous spectacle of great men, become, through *pride*, the battling puppets of a mere underling, and one, too, from whose name "imbecility" was inseparable! This was too humiliating, too shockingly degrading, long to be endured. Their opposition soon began to assume a milder tone: this change was succeeded by marks of mutual reconciliation, though, as yet, by no evident approaches towards an union of action: for, Sir, it falls to the lot only of the happy few, such as those of whom you lately spoke under the denomination of *Nobles*, to change all at once; to open the mouth with a bite, and close it with a kiss; to lick the hand that yet sweats with the labour of lashing them. At the meeting of Parliament, however, in November last, it was evident, that, in spite of all the arts of the ministry, and of others, whom it is not now worth while to mention, a co-operation in Parliament between the Old and the New Oppositions was at no great distance.

From the moment that I perceived even a glimmering of hope, that an union of the great men of the country might be accomplished, I lost no opportunity of endeavouring to enforce the necessity of it, and to put to silence those by whom it was opposed; and, finally, I had the pleasure to hear Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham once more publicly exchange the name of "friend." Still, will your partisans say, that I was to stand aloof? You were, at this time, propping occasionally and occasionally undermining the ministry which you had erected, and which had brought upon the country so many and such dreadful mischiefs. Your conduct was, with me, an object of hostility scarcely inferior to theirs; both tended greatly to increase the dangers of the country. Yet, I'll warrant, that your partisans will maintain, that your conduct, be it what it might, could be no inducement for me to turn towards Mr. Fox, notwithstanding there was no other way left of coming at even a

\* Political Register, Vol. I. p. 761.

chance of effecting such a change of measures as I regarded absolutely necessary to the safety of the state. Besides, Sir, when, of two rivals, one sinks, the other naturally rises in the same degree. Mr. Fox had, in my estimation, and, I believe, in the estimation of the world (for America I will answer), taken an amazing vault above you at the epoch of the peace of Amiens; and, I think, it will hardly be contended, that, when your conduct between the peace and the renewal of the war came to be calmly and conscientiously surveyed; when I saw you, first keep aloof from the parliament, without any alleged public reason for so doing, and with the obvious intention to avoid giving support to, and thereby incurring any responsibility for, measures which you yourself had advised and even dictated; when, as the embarrassments of Mr. Addington increased, I saw you, who had kept from the sittings of parliament under the pretext of ill health, hastening to the treasury, negotiating for place, and quite able and willing to take upon you, in conjunction with lord Melville, the whole business of the state; when, in consequence of the failure of that negotiation and of the exposure that ensued, I was enabled clearly to view and correctly to judge of your conduct at the time when you retired from office; when I discovered, that, after having prevailed upon your colleagues to retire, because his Majesty would not consent to the measure of catholic emancipation, you offered to remain in office *yourself*, for an indefinite term, without such consent being obtained, though you afterwards explicitly declared in parliament, that the want of such consent was the sole cause of your resignation; when, in putting all these circumstances together, and finding in the negotiations for place, no mention of, nor any allusion to, catholic emancipation, reason compelled me to conclude, that your real object in resigning was, to get rid of your intractable colleagues, to court the people by a peace, and to swim along in "peace and plenty" with just such a ministry as that you have now formed; when, in passing over scores of minor political transgressions, and hastening to the close of this climax of cardinal sins, I saw you (to repeat almost my own words relative to your conduct upon Mr. Patten's motion, as viewed in connexion with your negotiations for peace with Mr. Addington), when I saw you ready and willing, provided your terms were acceded to, to enter the cabinet, to join and to co-operate with the men, of the whole of whose principal measures, foreign and domestic, you have since

declared your disapprobation, but the leaders of whom you were willing to keep in place and in power provided you amply participated with them; and when I saw you, not being able to obtain the share that you coveted, seizing on the first opportunity for commencing against these men (men whom you had collectively and individually recommended to the parliament) an opposition of the kind best calculated to render them contemptible and odious in the eyes of the world, being evidently restrained from open and violent hostility only by the fear of giving offence in that quarter where you wished to supplant them; when I had seen all this between the conclusion of the peace and the breaking out of the war, I think, it will hardly be contended, that the interval could fail to produce a powerful bias towards the person who had so long been your rival, and without a co-operation with whom there appeared little prospect of making a successful stand against the strides of your ambition and the destructive tendency of your projects.

With the question upon the address to the king, in answer to his notification of the declaration of war, my opposition to Mr. Fox ceased. New questions arose, questions entirely new both to him and to me; questions whereon to side with him clashed with no opinion I had ever delivered, no wish I had ever expressed, but was perfectly consistent with all those principles of party co-operation and with all those notions of public duty which I had constantly entertained and had frequently expressed, particularly where I had had occasion to speak of the conduct of Mr. Burke, Mr. Windham and others, in joining you during the last war. As to the more *personal* assaults upon Mr. Fox; general censure, unqualified reproaches, harsh imputations, cutting sarcasms, these are the weapons with which writers fight, especially in times and upon occasions such as those here alluded to: besides, if, at a time like that of the conclusion of the peace, when not to be stung to the soul would have argued a total want either of sense as to the present or of sincerity as to the past; if, at a moment, when, smarting under the mortification to which an unmerited confidence in your declarations and promises had exposed me; if, at such a moment, I treated with too much personal severity our triumphant opponent, your partisans, Sir, are certainly not the persons to complain, nor am I the person at present to be censured. Mr. Fox might, indeed, if such could possibly have been the case, subjected himself to

the imputation of meanness in *coming over to me*; but, it would be an inconsistent sort of reasoning to insist, that, having once been too *personally* violent against Mr. Fox, when writing upon a subject upon which we had long been directly opposed, I am thereby bound to stand aloof from, nay to abandon, a *public* cause already espoused, lest, in supporting that cause, I should also support Mr. Fox. To inculcate such a principle may be attempted, but it is too inconsistent and perverse not to be instantly rejected by every sensible, candid and disinterested man.

Thus, Sir, I have, I hope, shewn, that, in "going over," as it is called, to Mr. Fox, I have departed from no principle that I ever either acted upon or professed; and that (to repeat my proposition), though, in this case, the path pointed out by reason and by honour, by loyalty and by patriotism, was strewn with thorns, I have, in no single instance, deviated from it. Had I chosen the tone of apology instead of that of justification, I should not have been at a loss for superabundant precedent to keep me in countenance; precedent not sought for in the conduct of those leeches of the state, who hang on through all the vicissitudes of sickness and of health; who are transferred from minister to minister, like the lumber of a ready furnished lodging, and who pass from occupant to occupant as an incumbrance attached to the possession; not of these, Sir, but of yourself I might have cited the example. As to the doctrine of never-ending adherence, I might have asked, how, consistently with that doctrine, you could have ceased to adhere to Mr. Addington and Lord St. Vincent, whom you had so strongly recommended to the parliament and the nation, of whose capacity for conducting the national affairs you had so strongly censured the Opposition for doubting, and the latter of whom you had described as a person whose name alone was a guarantee for security against all attempts of the enemy; I surely might have asked, how you could, upon the principle now set up in your own behalf, not only cease to adhere to these persons, not only become their assailants, but affix to their names, names which you bade us consider as synonymous with wisdom and safety, every epithet expressive of their incapacity and of your contempt? I might, with respect to joining with persons from whom one has heretofore widely differed, have inquired upon what principle it was that you joined with Mr. Dundas and Mr. Eden soon after the close of the American war; with the Duke of Portland, the

Lords Fitzwilliam and Spencer, and Mr. Windham, at the beginning of the last war; only four months ago with six of those persons who are at this moment in the cabinet with you, and whom you had included in the description of that mass of "incongruity and imbecility," from which you professed your wish to deliver the nation; and, finally, with Mr. Fox himself, without whose co-operation that laudable and patriotic wish could never have been accomplished. If any thing more than the last-mentioned circumstance had been necessary to afford a fair inference that you yourself deemed Mr. Fox worthy of the confidence of his Majesty and the Parliament, I might have appealed, not, perhaps, to your public declarations, but certainly to declarations that you solemnly made, and that were repeated by your confidential friends as well as by all the public writers in your interest, who circumstantially described the long efforts you made for the purpose of introducing Mr. Fox into the cabinet, and who, in their anxiety to defend you against the imputation of duplicity, forgot a much higher duty, and scrupled not to lay the blame upon the King, though they now have what I must call the profligacy to reproach me with an abandonment of principle, because I have joined "citizen Fox," because I have joined that very person, your earnest desire and strenuous efforts to introduce whom into the cabinet formed the only ground upon which they attempted to make an apology for your conduct. And, Sir, as to that eternal resentment which your adherents now represent as the indispensably necessary consequence of personal hostility, need I, in opposition to so diabolical a principle, have gone further than your offer, nay, I will call it not only your distinct offer, but your invitation and even your solicitation to Mr. Tierney to keep that place, of which, upon his refusal Mr. Canning, with a condescension equal to your magnanimity, thought proper to accept? To these and many more instances I might have referred, if I had not chosen to stand upon the intrinsic merits of the case; if I had not disdained the thought of recrimination, and if (without any affectation I say it) I had not felt, that, in the eyes of those whose good opinion I most esteem, your example would afford no justification for me.

Here, Sir, fully aware that I have already but too far transgressed the bounds of more than ordinary patience, I should put an end to this letter; but, there is one point, which, left untouched, would leave incomplete a

subject, to which, I trust, I shall never have occasion to return: I mean, the circumstance of my now opposing you, whom, in my repeatedly-expressed wish to see an union of the *great men* of *all* parties, I must, of course, have included amongst those whom I desired to see in power. Granted: that inclusion was a matter of course: to deny it would be either a subterfuge, or a vapid insult. But, Sir, without particular references, I may safely appeal to the memory of all those who have thought my writings worthy of perusal, that, since the peace of Amiens, nay, since the preliminaries of that ignominious and fatal compact, not only have I never spoken of your return to the *prime* ministry as an event to be wished, but that, whenever the subject has been agitated, I have positively declared my dissent from such wish. The truth is, Sir, that, having, as far as the compass of my mind will permit, carefully and impartially considered the nature and tendency of the whole of your system; having arrived at a thorough conviction, that that system points directly, and is proceeding with hasty strides, to the subversion of the Church, the ancient Aristocracy, the Throne, and, of course, the Liberties and Independence of England; and, not less firmly convinced, that your system is, and must remain, inseparable from your possession of the first place amongst the servants of the King, I thought it my duty to endeavour to prevent your return to that place. Thus thinking, my opposition has been decided, but it has, I trust, also been fair. I never have had recourse, and never shall have recourse, to any of those arts which have been but too often employed against myself. I have never wilfully and deliberately misstated any fact; I have never, except from want of talent, made use of a sophistical argument, or intentionally left a false inference to be drawn; and I never have, on any occasion, addressed myself to, or wished for success from, the vice, the ignorance, or the prejudice, of any description of people. The uniform intention, and I will add the uniform effect, of my writings have been, and are, to counteract the efforts of the enemies of monarchy in general and of the monarchy of England in particular, under whatever guise or denomination those enemies have appeared; to check the spirit and oppose the progress of leveling innovation, whether proceeding from clubs of jacobins, companies of traders, synagogues of saints, or boards of the government; to cherish an adherence to long-tried principles, an affection for an-

cient families and ancient establishments; to inculcate an unshaken attachment to the person and office of the king, an obedience to the laws, a respect for the magistracy, a profound veneration for the church, and a devotion of fortune and of life to the liberties and glory of the country.

To the weariness which a letter of such length, and upon such a subject, is calculated to produce, I will not add by a ceremonious conclusion; being well aware too, that, if, for having said so much relating to myself, the apology with which I set out, and which was founded upon the great importance of the discussion on which I am about to enter, be not thought sufficient, no other apology can possibly be found.

I am, Sir, your, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*Botley, Oct. 4, 1804.*

#### INTERCEPTED LETTERS.

[On board the English East India ship, called the Admiral Alpin, lately captured by the French, were found eighty-four letters from persons in this country to persons in India, the ship being bound to Madras. Amongst those letters which have been published by the French, and, almost the whole of which appear to be very insignificant except to persons engaged or interested in the low intrigues of the India House, there are two worthy of notice; one from Lord Grenville to the Governor General, the Marquis Wellesley; and the other to the same person from his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley. The flippancy of Mr. Wellesley may be excused when one considers that he was writing a private letter to a brother, and as to his political notions and views they are just such as every one would expect such a person to entertain. Lord Grenville's letter is worthy of great attention: here we hear his lordship speaking in private to his friend, and we hear all those manly sentiments that he has so frequently uttered in public. Nothing could possibly have happened more advantageous to the reputation of his lordship. It would be curious to hear what the viperous slanderers of the Addington faction could say to this letter. It must be observed that these letters have undergone a double translation. The manner must have suffered, and perhaps the matter.]

*Letter from Lord Grenville to the Marquis of Wellesley, dated, July 12, 1803.*

MY DEAR WELLESLEY, — Two days ago I received your letter of the 16th Feb., and I now reply to it, though I am not entirely certain, when I shall have an opportunity of transmitting to you my answer. In

regard to your stay in India, this question has been long ago decided; and so great is the distance which separates us, that before this can reach you, the time fixed for your departure will have arrived. I am not certain whether the event of the war which our wise ministers have at last declared may not have induced them to beg you to continue your stay in India some time longer. No one was better able than they to appreciate the certainty of this event, so that we ought to suppose they have taken all those measures which the moment required; but every thing, however, shews that they were taken as much unawares as if that event had been little expected. It is consequently not improbable, that when they found war unavoidable, that is to say, on the day when they declared it, they may have dispatched orders to you to remain in India. But as I am entirely ignorant on this subject, I cannot reason on it. Should this not be the case, I hope nothing will prevent me from having the pleasure of seeing you next year, supposing at that period that you have still a *country to revisit*.—When I make use of this expression, do not imagine that my dissatisfaction with the conduct of the government has made any change respecting the means and resources of this country; I have never been among the number of growlers (*aboyeurs*) on this subject. It is not so much opinion (if I do not deceive myself), as a perfect knowledge equivalent to a certainty, which induces me to say that the country possesses not only abundant and ample means of defence, but means sufficient to make our enemy repent of his hostile conduct, and to force him to fear, and consequently to respect us. But hitherto there has been so much indecision, timidity, and slowness in all the measures taken to obtain resources, and all our courage at this moment exhibits so much the impression of fear, that I cannot have the satisfaction of being warranted in doing justice under that point of view to the talents which have been called into action, and to the dispositions which have been made.—My plan of political conduct, as you must have seen, differs more and more from that of government. In regard to the opinion I expressed on the peace, I have the satisfaction to find that justice is done to me in all countries. Not only have subsequent events proved that the small body with whom I acted in concert on this occasion, were composed of the only persons who then knew how to appreciate this measure and its consequences; but it has been generally acknowledged, that we rightly foresaw what would take place. All the infamous

calumnies of government have fallen, with double force on their own heads. In every thing I have since done, and in every thing I have abstained from doing, you will, I hope, perceive those sentiments, and those principles, from which no opinion, however unfavourable it may be to the personal conduct of any individual, shall never make me deviate.—Had I been certain of an opportunity, I should have written you a detail of what has taken place since April last, in regard to the projected change in the government, and would have explained to you (as far as I had been able to understand) the basis of the conduct which Pitt has since observed. It gives me great pleasure to see that, while my quarrel with Addington becomes every day more serious, all the motives which made Pitt and me differ in opinion and conduct daily decrease.—We have not yet been able to assimilate completely our plans of political conduct. Our situation, indeed, in one essential point of view, is entirely different.—Though he did not recommend Addington to his present employment (and, indeed, who is there that knows him would have done it?) he nevertheless gave him a certain portion of influence more active than my opinion would have permitted me to grant, in the formation of the new administration. He advised their measures a long time after I had ceased to have any intercourse with them, and he approved of them in different points, which appeared to me the most criminal, and which were indeed so, as proved by the event. He is consequently more hampered in his conduct than I am, and he does not at present enjoy the inestimable advantage which I possess of never having concealed nor compromised my opinion, in regard to matters of so much political importance; but, I believe that his ideas on their political conduct are not much different from mine, if they differ at all, and to all this must be added a resentment justly merited from the personal conduct of Mr. Addington towards him. He does not endeavour to conceal his sentiments. If he has written to you (which he certainly must have done had he not contracted the bad habit of never writing to any one) he must have expressed to you, I am persuaded, all these sentiments without reserve; and it is under this persuasion that I enlarge so much to you on his opinions. The measure indeed, which he has lately adopted (I allude to his motion of adjournment or his vote of censure, ill judged in itself, as I think it was, and unfortunate in its result, since it lessened his public influence) has at least the merit of expressing, in an unequivocal man-

ner, his disapprobation of the conduct of government.—I will not hazard a conjecture in regard to the new events which may take place before your arrival, and the only advice I wish to give you is, what I have more than once suggested, not to engage for any thing until you return, but to retain the liberty of acting according to such motives as you shall judge proper to direct your conduct when you are on the spot, and according as the different relations between persons at the head of affairs in the different subdivisions of parties shall have enabled you to judge what suits you best. In regard to the idea thrown out in the extract you have sent me from your letter to Mr. Addington, you ought, in my opinion, to consider it only as one of those remote events which may take place. As for eternal enmity, I detest the idea; and, if I have an eternal enmity, it is against the partisans of a principle so detestable. But much is due to public opinion, as well as to the personal situation and character of individuals, which ought to be respected long after they have ceased to have resentment, or to take pleasure in giving proofs of it; and nothing appears to me less probable than to see Pitt and me at any near period (I believe I may say at no period of our lives) reconciled, and disposed to establish with Addington relations of confidence and friendship.—The papers, if you have them, will inform you that all our conversation at present turns on invasion, and that we at length begin to take measures for enabling us to face our enemies, if they should be able to effect a landing, which, though very improbable, is not certainly in any manner impossible. To speak of conquering or subjugating ten or twelve millions of men, if prepared for battle, and directed by a government desirous and capable of animating their efforts, would be completely ridiculous. But experience has shewn, that the number of inhabitants alone, and even advantage of local situation are nothing, if the direction of the defence remains in the hands of men distinguished only by their imbecility and weakness. In Holland even, and still more in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, the countries were given up, not by the inhabitants, but by the weakness of their governments, and in like manner if in this Island, or in Ireland, we should experience any considerable check, we shall owe it not to the timidity or ignorance of the nation, but solely to those of government. You must be already enabled to judge how far these qualities exist in the present government, if (as I suppose) you have, before you receive this letter, read

the correspondence of Lord Hawkesbury with Otto and Lord Whitworth, and compared the dates of the different counter-orders in regard to the Cape, during the course of our communications with France.—It would be superfluous to add to the length of this letter, by expatiating on the pleasure which I experienced on finding in your letter those expressions of friendship which revive our old and continual intimacy. I never did more for you, than you would have done for me on a like occasion, and if the intrigue planned against you is totally without effect, and your measures are justified before they have been condemned, I cannot flatter myself with having contributed to this result by my efforts, but you may, in my opinion, consider the affair as terminated. It does not appear that a single word of it was mentioned in Parliament before Christmas, and I really believe that you have nothing to fear. The only thing to be apprehended on this subject, can be only the pain and disagreeableness of a contest of this particular nature.

*Letter from Mr. Henry Wellesley to Marquis Wellesley, his brother. Dated London, July 28, 1803.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,—I have just learnt from Lady Wellesley, that an overland dispatch will be sent off on the 28th, and I hope this letter will reach you in time to enable you to make preparations for quitting India in January next. I shall now communicate to you, as shortly as possible, every thing that has taken place, in regard to India, since my arrival, and then you will be enabled to judge what degree of support you have to expect from the present ministers, and whether the Board of Control has not been actually transferred from the Council to the Court of Directors. I arrived in London in June, and immediately waited on Lord Castlereagh, who received me with the greatest politeness. He spoke of you in the most favourable terms. He approved of all your measures, but at the same time, it is perfectly evident that he cannot obtain what the Court of Directors has resolved not to grant. He spoke a great deal of the College, and appeared to be fully convinced of the importance as well as the necessity of the institution. He believed he should be able, he said, to make the Directors consent to its continuance according to your plan, with some modifications, which you would not think of much consequence. He told me that the Directors had written to him on this and on other subjects, several cool letters,

and that nothing could be more disagreeable than the situation in which he was placed. I told Lord Castlereagh, that on this occasion the Court of Directors had decidedly broken their word, for one of the principal conditions on which you was to remain still a year longer in India, was, that they should not at all interfere in your nominations; that they had displaced a man who had passed through all the inferior ranks in the service of the Company.—I then told him that your health was very good, and that there was no sacrifice you was not ready to make for the public service; but that I thought it impossible you could remain in India beyond January next, unless you were strongly solicited on that subject by his Majesty's ministers, and by the Court of Directors. That in regard to his Majesty's ministers. I thought they were of opinion that your stay in India was a thing very desirable under many points of view; and that, in regard to the Court of Directors, they ought to know whether they wished for it or not.—He made no reply to the first point. In regard to the second he was very explicit, for he told me that the Court of Directors had been so incensed on account of the opinions which you had manifested in some of your dispatches, (which proves that they have not the least idea of the true interests of India, and that in this respect they are *obstinate fools*), that he was persuaded they would rather wish to see you resign, though it was impossible for them not to acknowledge that your stay in India might be very useful to the public interest.—In another conversation I had with Lord Castlereagh, he spoke a great deal of the *Mahratta* negotiations, and I succeeded in convincing him of the justness of your measures at Poona, and of the great advantages that must result from them, if we should establish our influence in that Court. He again asked me, if you had come to a fixed determination, in regard to the period of your return to England? I repeated what I had said to him on another occasion, to which he made no reply. He spoke to me of the nomination of Barlow, and asked me if I thought you would approve of it? I told him that you had the best opinion of Barlow; but, that you thought no servant of the Company ought to succeed to the Governor-Generalship. I told him also that the new nomination was useless, as Barlow had been previously destined to succeed you provisionally, and that it was better to wait for your return before any person was presented for this new nomination. In my opinion there is a certain secret intrigue, in regard

to the nomination of Barlow, and it is this.—When the ministers proposed Lord Wm. Bentinck for Madras, the Court of Directors made the most formal objections to that nomination; but they were at length obliged to yield, consoling themselves with the idea that one of their own servants would be appointed Governor-General.—I saw Addington at a dinner given by Lord Castlereagh. He spoke to me of you in the most pompous and most affectionate terms. He spoke to me also of the nomination of Barlow, as a measure that ought to be very agreeable to you. The result of my conversations with Lord Castlereagh, has convinced me that ministers feel the importance of your continuance in India, and that they are very desirous you should remain there, but they are not sufficiently strong to contest that point with the Court of Directors, who are equally determined to force you to return. I think they might make new and successful attempts to induce the Court of Directors to solicit the prolongation of your stay, but after having seen them recently violate the engagement they entered into, not to interfere in any of your nominations, it would neither be prudent nor dignified, to take any step which might give reason to suspect that you wished to remain in India, or that any other motive but a full persuasion that it is only for the public good could induce you to remain an hour longer than the period you had fixed for your return.—I received from the President a civil but a very cool reception. He spoke to me of ameliorations in commerce, but did not say a word of my personal services. He seemed disposed to find some fault in every thing that we did at Poona, and we separated after a conversation of ten minutes, with his telling me that he had so much business, that he had not had time to read the dispatches (though they had been five days at the India House), but that he hoped to have frequent opportunities of talking with me on the affairs of India. I have not seen him since, (though I remained a fortnight at London to have an opportunity) and the Court had not even the civility to ask me to one of the dinners which are given every Wednesday. I have since been obliged to return to Chester House on account of my health, which is still very bad.—Another motive which induces me to wish for your return, is the situation of the different parties in England. I suppose you have received a letter on this subject from Lord Grenville; but I will tell you every thing I know, and what I had in part from an intimate friend of Pitt.—It appears

that Addington proposed, some weeks ago, to Pitt to join the ministry, on certain conditions. Pitt, on this overture of Addington, began a negotiation with him; explained the conditions on which he wished to form part of the ministry; declared that he would not insist on the introduction of any person to whom the King might have any objection; but that he would insist on the whole affair being kept secret until it was totally arranged; and that, at the same time he would reserve to himself the power of withdrawing from the negotiation, should it be conceived that his services could not be useful to the public.—On these conditions he gave the outlines of his plan to Addington, mentioned several persons whom he wished to propose, among whom was Lord Grenville; still, however, continuing to declare that he would not introduce any person in opposition to the King, but that he would reserve to himself the power of retiring. Addington proposed this plan to his colleagues, who rejected it, and the negotiation was broken off.—At present all Addington's friends declare that Pitt refused to join the ministry, because he wished they would allow him to introduce Grenville, &c. Pitt, as you must have seen, has since opposed Addington in the House of Commons, and they are no longer on speaking terms. Lord Grenville (who is the organ of Canning) told me that Pitt has such a contempt for Addington, that he would not at present act with him on any conditions whatever. At the same time, Pitt daily opposes in the House of Commons the Defence Bill, as a counsellor would do, and by the means which he employs, he has rendered it fit for answering the proposed end, which it never otherwise would have done. On one occasion he divided the House, and, to the astonishment of every body, his division was under fifty. I nevertheless think, as many others do, that it is impossible things should long remain on their present footing, and I believe that Pitt will return to office in the course of a year. This makes me wish that you should be on the spot, to form part of the new ministry, which would then be excellent, if Pitt were at the head. What do you think, pray? You would be able to obtain every thing you wish in regard to India, and, if you thought proper, to return again as Governor General.—August 5—I began this letter at London, but having met Lord Castlereagh, he told me that the dispatches would not be sent off before ten days.—Pole had been with Addington to speak to him of me, and he has promised me that he will consult Lord Castlereagh on

the means of forcing the Directors to reward me for my services in India. I however expect nothing from them.

#### PUBLIC PAPER.

*Order issued by the Court Chancellor at Stockholm on the 7th of Sep. 1804.—Signed by C. B. ZIBET and A. D. HUMMEL.*

His Majesty the King has been pleased to inform me, by his gracious letter of the 26th of August, that for a long time the prevalent tone of most French Journals and Daily Papers has been marked by a want of due respect for Kings and Princes, and for every lawful government; that this inscience, so worthy of chastisement, has continued to increase, and the consequences thereof have lately appeared in one of the newspapers most generally known, which has dared to insert expressions attacking the King's exalted person, and, consequently, the dignity of the Empire; and as this cannot be passed over without animadversion, his Majesty has been pleased to order:—I. That from the hour when this notification is made public, the importation into the Swedish Empire, and the provinces belonging thereto, of French Journals, Weekly Magazines, and Daily Papers, is strictly prohibited; and that no exception can be granted or demanded.—II. That all importation of Books and Writings, which may be printed in France in future, is likewise prohibited; those, however, which have already appeared, are not included, provided their contents be not contrary to the regulation of the ordinances still in force; but, with respect to French books, which may be published in future, exceptions may be admitted, if an humble request be made for the purpose through the office of the King's Court of Chancery.—In consequence whereof, I am required to publish this gracious command and ordinance of his Majesty the King, that all people may conform themselves thereto.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Decaen, Captain General of the French establishment to the Cape of Good Hope, to the Minister of Marine and Colonies. Headquarters at the Isle of France, May 15.*

I have the honour to announce to you, Citizen Minister, that Rear Admiral Linois arrived and anchored at the Isle of France the 1st of April, with the *Marengo*, the *Semillante*, and *Le Berceau*. This un-

expected return naturally excited my surprise, particularly after what the Rear Admiral had said to me, in a letter dated Batavia, the 16th of December. After enumerating the naval forces of the English, he said, "as they have many points to guard, their forces must be necessarily much divided, and I hope to do them considerable mischief by appearing rapidly in different parts of the Indian seas, at great distances from each other;" and in his postscript he added, "I have just completed six months provisions at Batavia for the squadron." The dispatches of the Rear Admiral, sent by Le Belier, apprized you of these circumstances, and must have inspired you with hopes of more favourable results. I was so confident in my expectations of his success, that when signals were made for his squadron being in sight, I augmented it in my imagination by the persuasion that the China Fleet had been met, attacked, and the greater part of it captured. I even supposed that the two other frigates which were not present, as well as the Dutch brig which was placed at the disposal of the Rear Admiral, had remained to escort the vessels which the Rear Admiral had taken, and that he had come on before to clear the way of the English cruizers, if there had been any about the Isle of France. But I was deceived in my expectations; above all, when my aide-de-camp returned with a letter to me from the Rear Admiral, which begins thus—"I cannot have the pleasure of seeing you until the ships of my squadron are under the protection of the batteries, and I beg you will give orders for our entering the port as soon as possible"—To this letter the Rear Admiral added a detailed account of his cruise. I here insert an extract from it; after which you will judge whether it was not natural that I should express some astonishment the next day, when the Admiral and his Officers came to pay me a visit.—On the 13th February, at day break, they perceived twenty-seven ships N. N. E. The great number of ships left them no doubt but that it was the China convoy. The Rear Admiral had with him then only Le Berceau and L'Avanturier; the frigates La Belle Poule and La Semillante having been carried two leagues by the force of the currents. At a quarter past eleven four of the enemy's ships came down to reconnoitre their squadron; the others lay to. The Rear Admiral, profiting by a mist which prevented the enemy from seeing his manœuvres, collected his frigates and kept the

wind in line of battle.—At half past five in the evening the Admiral made a signal of his intention to avoid an engagement by night; he waited till break of day to attack the enemy, endeavouring, however, to gain the wind.—If the appearance of the enemy during the day had only been a stratagem to hide their weakness, they might have profited by the darkness of the night to attempt to alter their position, and on that occasion the Admiral might have taken advantage of their movements, but he was soon convinced that their security was not merely an appearance. Three of their ships had cleared for action, and the fleet kept their position during the night and remained well together. The Admiral still endeavoured to gain the wind, and observe them more nearly.—On the 14th, at six in the morning, the enemy were within half gun-shot: the circumstances of the case not permitting the Admiral to undertake any thing against them, he profited of the opportunity to summon on board his ship the captains of the division, in order to make known to them his intentions, which were, at the first encounter to menace the centre of their line, and to cut off the ships of the rear. All the captains expressed the most ardent desire to second the projects of the Admiral: the same ardour prevailed amongst the crews; and it was not without admiration that he saw some of the sick, then very numerous in the division, quit their hammocks, to take their post in the action.—At half past seven the enemy hoisted their colours; and the division likewise hoisted its colours. Although he endeavoured to distinguish accurately the vessels of the fleet, the Admiral could not discover its real force: twenty of its vessels appeared to be ships of two decks; he thought he recognized a frigate. The brig of war carried a blue flag, as well as did three ships. These last made part of eight vessels which appeared charged more particularly with the protection of the convoy.—According to the information which the Admiral had received from neutral vessels coming from China, he knew that there were seventeen of the Company's ships, six country ships, and the brig, in all twenty-four vessels, ready to sail. The three additional vessels which he saw might well be supposed to be the announced escort.—At eight the breeze having freshened, the fleet sailed to the southward, and formed line. Eight or ten ships formed a double line. The division bore down upon the head of the line, but the wind having va-

ried to W. N. W. the Admiral could not bear more to the windward than the centre.—At length, at noon, profiting by a light fresh breeze, the Admiral took his station to cut off two ships in the rear of the enemy's line.—Scarcely was this manœuvre indicated, than five ships of the double line tacked and bore down upon the division. The plan of attack of the Admiral was changed; and in order to prevent being placed between two fires, he tacked, in order to meet the two first of the ships which had thus bore down upon him, and to attack them.—At half past twelve the first shot was fired from the *Marengo*, and immediately afterwards the engagement commenced. The enemy's ship which was nearest having experienced some damage, slackened sail, but being supported by those which followed, they formed anew, and kept up a very brisk fire. The ships which had bore down, joined those which were combating the division, and three of those which had first taken part in the action, manœuvred to double the rear, whilst the rest of the fleet crowded sail, announcing the project of surrounding the division.—The enemy by this manœuvre had rendered the position of the Admiral very dangerous. The superiority of their force was discovered; and there only remained to deliberate on the part which ought to be taken to avoid the sad consequence of an unequal engagement. The Admiral, profiting by the smoke which enveloped them, took a course to the E. N. E. and distanced the enemy, who continued to pursue for three hours, until they saw the division had gained upon them several leagues.—The Admiral remarked during the action, that six or eight vessels fired from two decks; and he does not doubt that they had a desire to be attacked, since it was not till the moment of the engagement that they shewed their first deck. This engagement lasted forty minutes; the enemy's shot did but slight damage to the ships of the division, and no person was wounded.—This cruize offering no other advantage, the Admiral determined, on the 15th, to sail for Batavia. After having re-passed the Strait of Gaspard, the division was joined on the 21st by the *Atalante*, and on the 25th anchored at Batavia.—Vice Admiral Hartzinck, commanding two ships and a frigate, recently arrived from Europe, had also anchored in that road. The limited instructions of this admiral did not permit him to undertake any expedition against the enemy by combining his forces with those of the Admiral.—In five days the division had com-

pleted its water and six months provisions, together with a stock of refreshments for the sick, of whom the number was about 70 on board the *Marengo* alone.—The Admiral, desirous of accelerating the sale of the prizes, the Admiral Reynier and the *Henrietta*, after having concerted with the captains of the division, accepted the proposition which had been made to him by the *Shabendar*, of purchasing, in gross, the two prizes, with their cargoes, for the sum of 133,000 piasters, exempt from all expenses.—The High Council of Regency, out of respect for its allies, consented to the exportation of this money on board the division.—On the 4th, the division anchored at Batavia, where it met that of Vice Admiral Hartzinck at anchor under the Isle of Nord; it had not been four days arrived. In passing into the Straits of Sunda, by the passage of the Isle Nord, to the middle, the French division was surprised by a calm, and carried away by the extreme violence of the current; it was for some time in great danger. A small anchor of *La Belle Poule*, was happily all the loss we had to regret. On the 6th, being out of the Straits of Sunda, the Admiral detached the frigates *La Belle Poule* and *L'Atalante* on a cruize, and kept with him *La Semillante* and *Le Berceau*, steered for the Isle of France, where he arrived safely on the 1st of April.

*Extract of a letter from Captain General Decaen, to the Minister of Marine and Colonies. Head-Quarters, Isle of France, May 28, 1804.*

I had the honour, Citizen Minister, of announcing to you, in my preceding letter, No. 45, the return of the two frigates, *La Belle Poule* and *Atalante*; they came to anchor at the Isle de France on the 8th of May, with the prize the *Althea*, valued at about 5,000,000 francs (200,000*l.*)

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Circular letter to the Lords Lieutenant of England. Signed by Lord Hawkesbury, Sec. State, and dated Sep. 15, 1804.*

As it is of the utmost importance to the defence of the country, that every exertion should be used to complete the levy of men to be raised for the additional force, in the manner prescribed by 44 Geo. III. cap. 66; and as considerable delays have, from various causes, taken place, it is my duty to call the attention of your Lordship, and, through your Lordship, that of the Lieutenantcy of the County, to the necessity of supplying, without delay, the force which is required of the County of

by the above mentioned Act.—It is to be distinctly understood by the Lieutenancy, that the number of men to be raised, in the first instance, and until an appointment shall be made by the Privy-Council of the future number, is only the amount of the deficiencies and vacancies (from death, desertion, and discharge), existing in the Army of Reserve and the Militia; the amount of which, in regard to the Army of Reserve, will have been ascertained in the manner prescribed by the first nine clauses of the Act; and, with regard to the Militia, in the usual mode of notification, by the commanding officers of regiments to the subdivision clerks.—As, however, the time specified by the 20th clause of the Act, within which the number required to be raised in respect of such deficiencies and vacancies, is already expired, I have to acquaint your Lordship, and request that you will immediately communicate the same to the Deputy Lieutenants of your county: that the commanding officers of the regiments to which such men are to be attached, will not receive orders to raise any recruits to make good the deficiencies aforesaid, until the for the County of ; in which interval it is expected that the parish officers will leave nothing undone to discharge the duty required of them by law, and which it should be explained to them to be their own interest, and that of the parish, that they should perform; but at the expiration of which time, if the full number of men required shall not have been raised by the parish officers, the commanding officers of regiments will receive immediate authority to recruit for the deficiency; and in every such case, the penalty will be forthwith assessed and levied upon the defaulting parish, in the manner laid down by the 35th clause of the Act in question

*King's Proclamation relative to the meeting of Parliament.*

GEORGE R.—Whereas our Parliament stands prorogued to Thursday the 4th day of October next, we, with the advice of our Privy Council, do hereby publish and declare, that the said Parliament shall be further prorogued on the said 4th day of October next, to Tuesday the 27th day of November next: and we have given order to our Chancellor of that part of our United

Kingdom called Great Britain, to prepare a Commission for proroguing the same accordingly; and we do further, hereby, with the advice aforesaid, declare our Royal Will and Pleasure, that the said Parliament, shall, on the said 27th day of November next, be held, and sit for the dispatch of divers urgent and important affairs: and the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, and the Commissioners for Shires and Burgesses of the House of Commons, are hereby summoned and commanded to give their attendance accordingly, at Westminster, on the said 27th day of November next.—Given at our Court, at Weymouth, the 20th day of September, 1804, in the 44th year of our reign.—God save the King.

*Letter from JOHN TURNBULL, Chairman of a Committee of Spanish Merchants, to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle relative to a conference between those Merchants and Lord Harrowby Sec. State for Foreign Affairs.—Dated Sep. 28, 1804*

SIR,—The substance and particulars of what passed at the interview which took place at Lord Harrowby's Office, on Tuesday last, the 24th inst., between his Lordship and a Committee of the Spanish Merchants, who, by his desire, waited on him, having been very erroneously stated in the public Newspapers, I have been desired by the gentlemen of that committee, to request that you would insert in your paper, that the sole communication which his Lordship made on that occasion, was, in substance, as follows:—That his Lordship had desired to see us, in order to acquaint us, that his Majesty's ministers had received intelligence, that considerable armaments were preparing in the Ports of Spain, of which no explanation whatever had been received, nor did it appear likely that any satisfactory explanation could be given; and his Lordship added, that he had thought it proper to communicate this information to us, in order that the merchants concerned in the trade with Spain, might then act in their commercial concerns as they might judge expedient.—Lord Harrowby gave no further information than the above on the subject in question, either at the first meeting, or at the one of yesterday, which was confined to a particular application from the merchants, for the convenience of trade.

*"I have no hesitation to say, that Lord Melville will make a better First Lord of the Admiralty than Lord St. Vincent; and though it may not be fit to speak of myself, few persons, when they reflect that the office of First Lord of the Treasury is now held by me, will doubt that a very real change has taken place."*—MR. PITT'S Speech, 18 June, 1804.

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## EFFECTS OF PAPER MONEY IN TIMES OF SCARCITY.

SIR,—As the high character which your Political Register has deservedly attained, gives it a considerable influence on public opinion, it is a matter of general importance that the doctrines which are circulated under the authority of its name, should be impartially examined. I observe that you give a fair opportunity to those correspondents who differ from you in opinion, of fully stating the grounds of their dissent; a practice which will certainly tend to give additional value to your excellent publication. On subjects which spread out into a variety of intricate relations, and which naturally present themselves under various aspects to different minds, a person of the least manliness of character, or of a liberal turn of thinking, would undoubtedly prefer an unrestrained interchange of opposite opinions, to a tame and indolent acquiescence in his own particular views. "He that wrestles with us," observes an admirable writer and an illustrious statesman, "strengthens our nerves. Our antagonist is our helper." In the ardour of speculation we are too apt to fancy that we have struck out into a train of original thinking, that we have exhibited a new and luminous exposition of an obscure subject, when to an indifferent spectator we appear to be blinded by the malignant influence of our own vain and foolish paradoxes. Opposition to our opinions forces to an intimate acquaintance with our subject; we are compelled to retrace our steps, and to examine all the intermediate gradations, by which we are conducted through a long process of ratiocination, from the radical position to the final conclusion, and we often discern on a second examination, omissions and inaccuracies which escaped the superficial glances of the mind, while yet warmed by the contemplation of its own ingenuity.

Availing myself therefore, of the privilege which you have so liberally extended to your correspondents, I shall point out to you the opinions in your Register which I think exceptionable, and the grounds on which I dissent. After a few observations on the Corn Bill lately passed, with which I cordially

agree, you lay down the following position, that the paper-money system tends to raise the price of corn, by the facility which it affords the corn speculator to withhold supplies from the market, and you support this opinion by a long quotation from Mr. Howison.

The nature and effects of paper-money have been so amply and ably elucidated by many eminent writers on political economy, that it is quite unnecessary for me to enter at any length into that subject. It is evident that by the substitution of a very cheap instrument of commercial exchange, instead of a very expensive one, the accumulation of national wealth is very rapidly accelerated, and that this important improvement has operated more effectually than any other cause, in invigorating the efforts of industry, and in calling into action all the energies of commercial enterprise. It has directly tended by facilitating the rapid increase of capital, to enlarge the scale of commercial operations, to increase the productive powers of labour, by enabling those entrusted with its management, not only to follow out to a greater extent the principle of subdividing it into a variety of minute departments, but also to introduce into every species of manufacture the use of ingenious machinery, by which the effects of human industry are augmented to an incalculable extent. By these means a total change has taken place in the aspect of society, and the condition of the labouring classes of the community has been in a particular manner ameliorated. The great stream of national riches has not confined itself to a few individuals, it has broke off into a variety of lesser channels, and has diffused plenty and comfort over the whole face of the country. Indirectly it has had a very important influence on the arts and sciences, and on the political relations of Europe; and, although it would be very difficult, if not impossible, amid the various contradictory principles, by which the appearance of civilised society is affected, to assign to this or any one particular cause its exact share of influence in the joint effect of the whole, or to disentangle it from those causes and effects with which in its

remoter operation it is complicated, yet its beneficial consequences may not be less sensibly felt, although we cannot set accurate limits to their extent.

Now, Sir, allowing your reasoning to be perfectly correct, to what practical conclusion does it lead? What remedy does it point out? How is the evil to be disengaged from the good? I do not well understand whether your disapprobation be directed against a paper currency *in toto*, or whether you only reprobate the perversion of those fundamental principles on which its purity depends. The practice of discounting bills, of which you complain, as enhancing the price of provisions during scarcity, is not peculiar to a paper currency not convertible into specie, but must be carried on to more or less extent, under any system of paper credit whatever. No doubt the immediate convertibility of any paper-currency into specie operates as a check upon excessive issue, but it does not appear that the rise of price which you complain of, is connected with the rise occasioned by excessive issue. In the case of excessive issue, a depreciation of the currency may take place, which will occasion a nominal rise of price; but, if your complaint be just, namely, that the corn-dealers withhold corn from the market, and thus raise the price, and that they are enabled to do so by the facility which the paper-money system affords them of obtaining discounts, and of postponing the dates of the demands upon them for payment, then it is an increase in the real value of corn which takes place through the influence of capital and credit. As I consider this opinion to be erroneous, and as you say it is laid down in a different manner by Mr. Howison, I shall not attempt to offer you a few remarks on the passage you have quoted.

The general principle which that gentleman lays down appears to be indisputable, but he has totally failed in its application, which is, indeed, a naked assertion. "Any means," he observes, "which enable the possessors of such commodities (articles of necessity) in times of scarcity, to withhold the article from market, enable him to raise the price just as high as he may choose, or, as the last shilling of the user can reach. Discounting of bills, in the time of scarcity, enabled corn-dealers to receive the demands upon them for payment of prices, and to feed the market just as their avarice dictated, and thereby must have added greatly to the distress in the dearth. By a speculation in rum, founded on discounted bills, it was raised three prices, which limited the consumption so

"much as to accumulate the quantity beyond the power of the speculators. The consequence was, the ruin of the speculators, &c." Allowing the preliminary observation to be correct, what evidence have we, that "the discounting of bills enabled the corn-dealers to feed the markets just as their avarice dictated." Mr. Howison seems to have considered this proposition as intuitive, for he has not even attempted to establish it by even the shadow of a proof. The illustration concerning rum proves nothing. The circumstances are by far too vaguely and generally stated to admit of any positive inference. "A speculation on rum founded on discounted bills." The very point which ought to be proved is here taken for granted. Indeed, a case of this nature would require to be detailed in a manner the most circumstantial; facts ought first to be established, and then principles; but here facts and principles are huddled together in the most confused manner. All the unexceptionable information which the case contains, appears to be, that a few rash merchants ruined themselves by an attempt to command the rum market. The rest is a string of gratuitous suppositions. The other position respecting corn rests on no better foundation. There is a link wanting in the chain of syllogistical deduction, by which Mr. Howison endeavours to connect it to the preliminary proposition. "Articles of necessity must be had, any means which enable the possessor to withhold them from the market, enable him to fix the price." Here follows the link which ought to be filled up: by proving that by means of paper credit corn is withheld from the market. But, as Mr. Howison has not attempted to establish this fundamental point, his whole hypothesis falls to the ground. I shall not, however, content myself with negative proof. As it is a common opinion, and as persons as it is founded, that the price of provision are raised by unfair means, during a scarcity, I shall examine it at some length.

It is evident that immediately after the harvest, the whole produce of the year must be in the hands of the farmers, who dispose of it to the corn merchants at different periods, according to the various circumstances in which they are placed, or according to the still more various views of interest or convenience by which they are guided. Those whose capital and credit enable them only to manage their farming concerns, will sell from necessity, and if they had not the corn-merchant, to whom they could easily and readily dispose of their produce, they would

be forced to withdraw a portion of their capital from agriculture, and employ it as grain merchants. The other class of farmers whose monied resources are not only sufficient for keeping up their lands in the highest state of cultivation, but, who possess besides, a surplus capital, may watch the fluctuations of the market. Their power of selecting such a period as appears to them most favourable for making sales, must be exactly in proportion to the quantity of surplus capital which they possess. That period must be settled therefore, partly by their various necessities, and exclusive of that consideration, will be chosen by different persons from different motives; some will sell earlier, some later; according as the appearances of things change in themselves, and according as the actual state of their minds is affected by the information which they receive; according as men are timid or adventurous, gloomy or sanguine; in short, the corn trade, like all other trades, is influenced by all the different combinations of the character and circumstances of the individuals who carry it on, and the supposition that they act upon one plan, or are influenced in the same manner by the same circumstances, is contradicted both by principle and by experience. It appears, therefore, that in ordinary circumstances, by the adequate operation of a thousand different causes, and through a thousand different channels, there must flow into the corn market a perennial supply. The only mode in which the price can be artificially raised, is by intercepting this supply in its progress to the consumers; and for this purpose the corn-merchant must buy all that is offered for sale, as the least hesitation on his part, would instantly bring down the price. According to Mr. Howison, he is enabled by the discounting of bills to accomplish this purpose, to withhold supplies from the market, and to raise the price. In the first place, it may be observed, that the relief derived from the discounting of bills is subsidiary only to capital already accumulated: it extends its power, and is rendered by the merchants more frequently instrumental in enlarging the scale of their operations, than in enabling them to keep up goods. But allowing that this portion of capital, with which merchants are accommodated, is exclusively employed in intercepting supplies from the corn market, when we consider the immense value of what is daily consumed, and the immense value of what is continually rushing upon the corn merchants, which the least rise in price increases by a two fold operation, by increasing both the value and the quantity, can any man be-

lieve that any capital would be equal to intercept the supplies even for one hour? But, besides the capital requisite, it is absolutely necessary that the dealers should be linked together in a firm combination, in order that they may act upon one pre-concerted plan; for, if we suppose corn merchants to be governed by the ordinary principles of action, which I have already laid down, and which, I think, are interwoven with the structure of the human mind, the increase of price which the interruption of supply will immediately occasion must, by the irresistible operation of moral causes, open the stores of the corn-merchants, who will be unable to resist the pressure of an increased quantity attracted by the high price to the market, and exclusive of pecuniary considerations, will be tempted to sell by the prospect of immediate profit on the one hand, and the certainty of ruin on the other, which you justly observe, inevitably awaits them, if their projects should fail. Now, those who sell will not only keep the market to its natural level by the supplies which they pour into it themselves, but in case any corn-merchant should ever have indulged the chimerical idea of raising the price of grain, by withholding his own individual pittance from the market, he would soon see that he was keeping his own capital idle, and allowing others to reap the profit. Antecedent, therefore, to any scheme for keeping up the price of grain by means of capital or credit, there must exist a complete combination all over the kingdom, of which I need not waste time in demonstrating the impossibility. Any partial combination would not do; that would only effect a local rise, which would immediately attract an increase of supply, and occasion thereby a corresponding depression. It appears, therefore, that though in some points the interests of corn-merchants agree, the causes of disunion are so copiously scattered among them, as most effectually to counteract the predominance of any one powerful principle, by which their efforts as individuals, to better their own circumstances, can receive any thing like a systematical direction.

But allowing Mr. Howison's statement to be just, that the markets are fed during a scarcity by the avarice of the corn-merchants, I do not understand why they should limit their demands to the price for which corn sold during the last scarcity. Long before paper money was known, we have instances of much higher prices; now, as corn-dealers are represented as almost callous to the common feelings of our nature, and as avarice with which they are said to be tainted in an

eminent degree, deadens all the amiable sympathies of the human mind, why do they not screw up the price to the highest pitch. If they can withhold supplies from the market, they have the unlimited power of fixing the price; now, why do they not fix it at the highest rate ever known? There are many other facts which to me are totally unaccountable on Mr. Howison's principles. I do not understand why, if the operation of credit and capital be attended with such effects during a scarcity, their influence should be suspended during a season of plenty. Supposing for instance, that the supply is one-third diminished, and the price is increased to three times its ordinary rate, and that the next harvest is more abundant than the former one by the one-third which it wanted, the same command of capital and credit which kept up the price so very high during the scarcity, should still enable the dealers so far to control its diminution, as never to allow it to sink below that point, when the aggregate value of the produce of the two years would be equalized. It is evident that by the increased abundance, corn could not be kept up at its former high price, as the same means would not be sufficient to intercept the supply in its progress to the consumers; it must fall therefore, till it comes within the grasp of the corn-merchant's capital, when it will remain stationary. The price of corn ought, therefore, to depend upon the quantity of capital employed in its trade, and not on the proportion between the demand and the supply; and, if by the high profits a greater quantity of capital should be attracted to it, even during a season of abundance we might experience all the miseries of a scarcity. According also as the quantity on hand diminished, and particularly a month or a fortnight before harvest, when the corn merchants are morally certain that no supply can be had before a certain period, the power of credit and capital would be exerted with tenfold energy to withhold from the market the small portion of grain not yet consumed, and to raise the price to an exorbitant rate. How contrary the fact is to both these suppositions, I need not point out.

It is in vain we look for any satisfactory solution of these difficulties in Mr. Howison's reasonings. On the contrary, he has involved himself in such a confusion of ideas, that it seems a hopeless task to extricate him from his perplexity. The illustrations concerning Arabia and the Nile, for which he has travelled so far, prove nothing more than this, that rather than perish with thirst we will part with our last sixpence, and that no-

body would be so foolish as to pay for a drink of water when he can get it for nothing. This I do not mean to dispute. Mr. Howison proceeds to observe, "corn is now become in such plenty from the late favourable seasons, the fictitious state of paper-money cannot influence it; notwithstanding the depreciation of money, that article has fallen back in price. Animals being longer in attaining maturity, butcher's meat cannot be so soon supplied, and not being in such quantity, it is, like most other articles of luxury, kept up in price upon the scale of depreciated money." Before making any remark upon the passage here quoted, I must request your attention to the passage in which it is asserted, that the discounting of bills enabled the corn dealers to relieve the demands upon them for the payment of prices, and to feed the markets as their avarice dictated. This is exemplified by referring to a speculation in rum, founded on discounted bills, in which that article was raised three prices. Here it is evident Mr. Howison means a real, not a nominal increase of value. But the increase of prices arising from depreciation is merely nominal. What connexion, therefore, has the question of depreciation with the influence of that portion of additional capital which merchants derive from credit and the discounting of bills, on the price of grain during a scarcity? It is stated that the fictitious state of paper-money can no longer influence corn on account of the abundance, and that the article (corn) has fallen back in price, notwithstanding the depreciation of money. To the expressions here made use of it is not very easy to affix precise ideas. If by the "fictitious state of paper-money influencing (*the price of*) corn," I am to understand that the price of corn is enhanced by the depreciation of money, then it is plain this enhancement is merely nominal, that it depends upon a quality in the money, and has no connexion with the variations in the real value of grain arising from an increased or diminished quantity. The "fictitious state of paper-money," by which I always understand its depreciation, must influence (*the price of*) corn, whether it be plenty or scarce; that is to say, the price of corn, however abundant it may be, must be higher when measured by the scale of a depreciated currency, than when estimated by the standard of primitive purity. When Mr. Howison says, that "notwithstanding the depreciation of money, the article (corn) has fallen back in price," does he mean to assert, that the circumstance of a depreciated currency tends

to retard the fall of the corn-market during a season of plenty, or does he mean to say, that the price fell as low as it was antecedent to any depreciation in the currency. In the first case, it is evident that a variation in the real value of corn has no connexion with a depreciated currency, and that the scale of measurement, being altered by that circumstance in all its relative proportions, is still equally well adapted to ascertain all the fluctuations of nominal value; in the other case, one of two things is certain, that if corn has fallen to its former price, either it is more abundant, or the currency is not depreciated. The first position, namely, that the discounting of bills enabled the corn-dealers, during the late scarcity, to relieve the pecuniary demands upon them, and to raise the price of grain, is confounded with the depreciation of money, and of paper-currency, from which it is perfectly distinct. The depreciation of money may be occasioned by various causes; it may be occasioned by the increasing riches of the country, or by the pressure of taxation, which as you justly observe, acts upon it with compound effect. Depreciation is an evil incident to every species of paper currency when its immediate convertibility into specie, the only effectual check to excessive issue, is withdrawn. These are all subjects of high importance, but ought in all speculations on political economy to be kept perfectly distinct. The conclusion of Mr. Howison, which you say is incontrovertible, if it attributed any of the peculiar evils of a scarcity to a depreciation of money, or of paper-currency, appears to me to be erroneous; inasmuch as they only occasion a rise in the nominal value of provisions, whereas the only cause of distress exclusively peculiar to a scarcity, is an increase of real value occasioned by the great preponderance of the demand above the supply.

If he attributes an enhancement of real value to the pecuniary accommodation granted to corn-merchants, by discounting their bills, or in other words, to the influence of credit and capital, I think his opinion is grounded on partial views, and I must confess, that from the arguments I have submitted to your attention in this letter, I am induced to believe, that the real value of corn is fixed by those principles which have moulded society into its peculiar form; and which act as uniformly and steadily as those laws of material nature, by which the physical constitution of creation is upheld. I am glad that I can add weight to my poor opinion on this subject, by the authority of Mr. Burke, who in his "Thoughts on

"Scarcity" has the following observation: "the balance between consumption and production makes price. The market settles, and alone can settle that price." "Market is the meeting and conference of the consumer and producer, when they mutually discover each other's wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any reflection, what market is, without being astonished at the truth, the correctness, the celerity, the general equity, with which the balance of wants is settled." Such was the deliberate opinion of a man who carried to their utmost extent the capabilities of the human mind, and who has bequeathed to wisdom and virtue an inestimable repository of moral and political knowledge; to whom the admirers of his divine genius may apply, in grateful enthusiasm, the language of the Roman historian: *nec ulla fuit ejus lingua, vivo eo, viguerit, monumentum evanescere nullum exet; vivit, imo vigetque eloquentia ejus sacra scriptis omnis generis.* D. B.

Montrose, Sept. 21, 1804.

#### SIR ROBERT WILSON.

SIR,—In a late number of one of the daily papers, a letter appeared, which attacked with considerable vehemence Sir Robert Wilson's pamphlet, lately published under the title of "An Enquiry into the present State of the Military Force of the British Empire, with a view to its reorganization." The letter-writer is evidently neither skilled in language, nor a master in argument. He is in all probability some volunteer, who, in a rash moment of indignation, and of hot injudicious zeal, took up the pen, and, mistaking bombastical combinations, and high-flown incongruous metaphors for elegance of style, and closeness of reasoning, imagined that he had unanswerably refuted the proofs and facts in that excellent, and let me say, alarming production. What meaning can possibly be extracted from expressions like these? "The change from merit, public and distinguished, to a conduct of pitiful disgrace, is a moral convulsion which disorders the elements of character. It is an EXTENDED EARTHQUAKE OF THE SOUL." Such for the most part is the burden of the whole letter. The only portion of it, therefore, which deserves attention is a passage which accuses Sir Robert of misrepresentation with respect to a very essential circumstance at the battle of Zama. The newspaper scribe, in this bold assumption, has exhibited himself to the public as a man utterly unacquainted with history, at least

original history. But, to place this matter in a clear point of view, I will first quote the expressions of Sir Robert: "As to the volunteers, the battle of Zama should be a warning to England. Hannibal drew up his army in three lines; in front were placed the mercenaries, in the second the VOLUNTEERS AND NATIONAL LEVIES, in the third the veterans and troops on whom he could depend. The mercenaries fought bravely, but, being pressed by numbers required support from the SECOND LINE: but the second line began to run away, which so exasperated the mercenaries that they ceased to fight with the Romans, and turned their arms upon the fugitive volunteers, slaughtering a great many. The gallant exertions and talents of Hannibal, aided by the intrepid courage of the veteran army could not repair this misfortune."—Now, Sir, let us open the 4th vol. of Livy, page 183, edit. 1722, and we shall soon determine whether the author of this important pamphlet, has violated the truth of ancient history to serve a sinister purpose.—"Apud hostes, auxiliares cedentes secunda acies Afri et Carthaginenses adeo non sustinebant, ut contra etiam, ne resistentes pertinaciter primos cadendo ad se perveniret hostis, pedem referrent. Igitur auxiliares tergadant repentē: et in suos versi, partim refugere in secundam aciem, partim non recipientes cedere; uti paullo ante non adjuvi, et tunc exclusi. Et prope duo jam permixta praelia erant, quum Carthaginenses simul cum hostibus, simul cum suis cogerentur conserere manus . . . . . Cæterum tanta strages hominum armorumque locum, in quo steterant paullo ante auxiliares, conleverat; ut prope difficilior transitus esset, quàm per confertos hostes fuerat: itaque qui primi erant hastati, per cumulos corporum armorumque, et tabem sanguinis, quā quisque poterat, sequentes hostem, et signa et ordines confuderunt. Principum quoque signa fluctuari ceperant, vagam ante se cernendo aciem. Quod Scipio ubi vidit, receptui prope canere hastatis jussit: et saucis in postremam aciem subductis, principes triariosque in cornua inducit; quo tutior firmiorque media hastatorum acies esset. Ita novum de integro praelium ortum est: quippe ad veros hostes perventum erat, et armorum genere, et usu militiæ, et famâ rerum gestarum, et magnitudine vel spei vel periculi pares." . . . . It is impossible not to admire in this passage that force of imagination, that vivid colouring, and those animated powers of descrip-

tion, for which the Roman historian has been so justly celebrated by men of taste in all ages: but the excellence of literary composition is not the prominent circumstance which draws our attention, when we examine the relation of this interesting event to the present state of our national defence. Certain it is, and no denial, palliation, or gloss of any kind, can weaken the impression of the fact upon our mind, that the protection of this country depends principally upon a volunteer armament against an enemy the most terrible, bloody, and rapacious, which has ravaged the earth, since the epoch in which the Northern Hive poured its barbarous progeny by millions upon the provinces of the South. In the case of the Carthaginians, Livy has acquainted us with the fatal issue of such improvidence and folly.—"The battle was begun by the mercenaries, who had been stationed by Hannibal in the front for the purpose of checking the first impetuosity of the Romans. They, however, after having behaved with great valour, giving way, were not only not supported by the second line, the Africans and Carthaginians, that is the volunteers; but the latter, fearful that the enemy, by the slaughter of the first line, which made a stout resistance, might reach them, retreated. The mercenaries instantly turned their backs; and being driven upon their own army, part sought refuge in the second line, and part attacked and slew those who would not give them admission. Thus having been left in the first onset without assistance, they were now excluded by the volunteers from their ranks. Hence a double battle, in some measure, ensued; the Carthaginians being under the necessity of engaging at the same time with the enemy, and with their own men. Such immense heaps of dead and of arms covered the place which the mercenaries had occupied a little before, that it was more impracticable to force a passage through them, than it had been through the foe when he stood in order: so that the Hastati, who were in the front, each as he could, pursuing an enemy over the pile of bodies and of arms, and through the slippery streams of blood, fell into confusion: the Principes also, observing a line before them without any order, began to loosen their array. Scipio, perceiving this, commanded the immediate signal to be made for the Hastatis to fall back into their station; and, having conveyed the wounded to the rear, he formed the Principes and the Triarii on the wings, that the line of the Hastati in the center

" might be more secure and firm. Thus a fresh combat began: for now they were come to the real enemy, equal to themselves in the nature of their arms, in military experience and discipline, in the renown of great exploits, and in the magnitude of hope and danger." . . . . . The Romans, we are told, emboldened and confident from their first success over the mercenaries and volunteers, routed at last the African army. We know the fate of Carthage!!!—Now, after this, will any man believe the newspaper writer, when he asserts, in the plenitude of his ignorance, that Sir Robert Wilson has misrepresented the battle of Zama? From the above original extract, and imperfect translation, we can trace the true causes of its loss: the volunteers, terrified by a sudden panic, and not supporting the valiant mercenaries, rendered unavailing the best efforts of the true soldiers, of the veteran and hardy troops, who had been trained, through all the campaigns of the Italian war, in the school of the immortal Hannibal.—I am aware, Mr. Cobbett, that a torrent of clamorous abuse will be poured upon these observations, as if they were intended to disparage, and expose to contempt, the volunteers of England. Disparage, and expose them to contempt? No, indeed: there is not a man more ready and willing to acknowledge their meritorious conduct, their patriotic ardour, and their unwearied assiduity in the pursuit of military knowledge and discipline. To the gratitude and affection of their country they have an undoubted claim. But I contend that, from the very nature of the institution, which labours under an inherent and incurable defect, it is sporting with destruction to rely for protection almost solely upon that uncertain and unwieldy force. But if a numerous, disciplined, and well-appointed regular army had been levied, not only what security, but what a brilliant issue might have been expected from the warlike experience and steady valour of the line, supported by the ardent zeal, and intrepid spirit of the volunteers. Then, indeed, from the proud cliffs of Albion, or even upon its dear soil, we might have laughed to scorn all the menaces and efforts of the Corsican Usurper.

—CARACTACUS.—*Berkhampted, 3 Oct. 1804.*

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

*Copy of a letter from the Rt. Hon. Lord Keith, K. B. Admiral of the Blue, &c. to Wm. Marsden, Esq. dated on-board his Majesty's ship the Monarch, off Boulogne. October 3, 1804.*

SIR,—Their lordships are aware that my attention has, for some time past, been directed to the object of ascertaining the most effectual mode for annoying the enemy's flotillas at their anchorages in front of their ports, under protection of their land batteries.—Having, on the afternoon of the 1st instant, arrived at this anchorage, and finding the weather promising to be favourable, and about one hundred and fifty of the flotilla on the outside of the pier, I resolved to make an experiment, on a limited scale, of the means of attack which had been provided.—The final arrangements for this purpose were made on the morning of yesterday. The officers named below\* were put in charge of the principal vessels which at this time were to be used. The armed launches, and other boats of the squadron, were appointed to accompany and protect them. The *Castor*, *Greyhound*, and some smaller vessels, were directed to take up an advanced and convenient anchorage for covering the retreat, giving protection to men who might be wounded, and boats that might be crippled, and for towing off the boats in general, in the event of the wind freshening and blowing upon the coast.—The operation commenced at a quarter past nine o'clock last evening, and terminated at a quarter past four this morning, during which time several vessels, prepared for the purpose, were exploded amongst, or very close to the flotilla; but on account of the very great distance at which they lay from each other, no very extensive injury seems to have been sustained, although it is evident that there has been very considerable confusion among them, and that two of the brigs and several of the smaller vessels appear to be missing since yesterday at the close of day. I have great satisfaction in reporting, that, notwithstanding a very heavy discharge of shells, shot, and musketry, was kept up by

\* Officers in charge of the explosion vessels above referred to:—Captains—Macleod, of the *Sulphur*; Jackson, of the *Autumn*; Edwards, of the *Fury*; Collard, of the *Railleux*; Searle, of the *Helder Defence Ship*.—Lieutenants—Stewart, of the *Monarch*; Lowry, of the *Leopard*; Payne, of the *Immortalite*; Templer, of the *Sulphur*.—Midshipman; Mr. Bartholemew, of the *Inflexible*.—Captains Winthrop, of the *Ardent*, and Owen, of the *Immortalite*, most zealously and usefully superintended the operations from the Southward, and the Hon. Captain Blackwood, of the *Euryalus*, from the northward. KEITH.

the enemy throughout the night, no casualty whatever, on our part, has been sustained. The enemy made no attempt to oppose their rowing boats to ours.—Their Lordships will not expect that, at the present moment, I am to enter much into detail; but I think it my duty to state to them my conviction that, in the event of any great accumulation of the enemy's force in their roadsteads, an extensive and combined operation of a similar nature will hold forth a reasonable prospect of a successful result.—The conduct of the officers and men, who have been employed on this occasion, deserves my highest commendation: I cannot more forcibly impress their merits upon their Lordships' attention, than by remarking, that the service was undertaken, not only in the face of, but immediately under, the whole line of the enemy's land batteries, and their field artillery and musketry upon the coast, but also under that of upwards of one hundred and fifty armed vessels, ranged round the inner side of the bay; and that the officers and men, who could so deliberately and resolutely advance into the midst of the flotilla, under such circumstances, must be considered worthy of being entrusted with the performance of any service, however difficult or dangerous it may appear to be, and consequently to be highly deserving of their lordships' protection.—I have the honour to be, &c. KEITH.

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EFFECTS OF PAPER-MONEY IN TIMES OF SCARCITY.—The former part of the present sheet will be found to contain a very able essay upon this subject, on which, it will be perceived, the writer differs from me in opinion. Were I now become a convert to his, I should certainly attempt neither justification nor apology, well assured that the having occasioned so ingenious and eloquent a performance would, in the estimation of my readers, be more than a sufficient atonement for much greater errors than those, which he supposes me to have adopted. But, as my opinion, with respect to most of the points in dispute, remains entirely unchanged, it appears necessary to describe, with as much brevity as may be, the obstacles to that change, to produce which my correspondent has considered as an object not unworthy the exertion of his talents.—The general effects of paper-money, or, to speak more definitely, of a paper-money system such as ours, is a subject which I am not at present called upon to discuss; and I could have

wished, that my correspondent D. B. had not, by his unqualified and most eloquent eulogium on that system, compelled me here to say a few words by way of protest. Without avowing that my disapprobation is directed against a paper-currency in toto, there is surely room enough for complaint against a paper system such as that of Mr. Pitt: without asserting that there ought to be no paper-money at all, I may certainly object to a paper-money so excessive in its quantity or so degraded in its quality as to have driven gold out of circulation: without objecting to the banking-system altogether, I may, I trust, with perfect consistency, object to a banking system where the notes, after being issued as payable in specie to the bearer, are rendered not payable in specie to the bearer or to any body else. Without denying that the effects of paper-money in general, and of ours in particular, have been *powerful*, I reserve to myself the right of hereafter shewing, when occasion shall serve, that those effects have been, and are, *powerfully pernicious* to the country; and, I cannot, even for a moment, postpone the expression of my surprise, that a writer of so much acuteness and so much apparant observation and research should, with the more than a million of English parish-paupers and with the present state of the continent before his eyes, have appeared to *exult* at the "influence" of paper-money on the condition of the "labouring classes, as well as on the political relations of Europe!"—Coming now somewhat nearer to the subject, to which I could have desired that D. B. had confined himself, I must first observe, that, in commenting upon the extracts from Mr. Howison's work, he does not seem to have perceived, that the positions of that gentleman had, in passing through my hands, received as to the detail, some degree of qualification. And, I cannot help thinking, that, if D. B. had not overlooked the passage in p. 309 and 310 of that number of the Register, to which he refers, he would have thought it almost, if not quite, unnecessary, to spend any part of his time in controverting the "erroneous and pernicious opinion, that, during a scarcity, the price of provisions is raised by *unfair means*." Mr. Howison had, indeed, spoken of the "avarice" of the corn-dealers. He had said, that the discounting of bills during the late scarcity, "enabled the corn-dealers to feed the markets just as their avarice dictated, and thereby must have added greatly to the distress in the dearth." In order to guard against any

evil effect that might arise from taking the word "avarice" in the most unamiable sense, I took care to state, that it was the duty of every one, having authority or influence, to check all attempts to excite a public prejudice against the persons engaged in the growing, the preparing, or the vending of bread. This was endeavoured to be enforced by shewing, that the existence of such prejudice must, in its degree, tend to enhance the price of bread, by creating a charge for risk from popular discontent and consequent commotion. The harsh epithets bestowed upon speculators in corn or meal, as likewise on the bankers connected with such speculators, were expressly disapproved of; because, as it was then observed, such persons are doing no more than follow their lawful occupations, occupations by which they and their families must live. The system, by which corn-speculators and makers of paper-money have been created, that, indeed, may be, and I think is, deserving of the severest reprobation; but, as to the persons themselves, they can, with justice, no more be blamed for following their trade, than the followers of any other pernicious trade permitted by the law. For my part, I would defend a banker, one who makes promissory notes with not the least intention of fulfilling his engagements; I would resolutely defend, against the violences arising from popular discontent, even such a banker, upon the same principle that I would, under similar circumstances, defend the licensed preacher of a methodist meeting or a licensed vender of lottery tickets; for, though there certainly are much more honest ways whereby to procure a livelihood, yet where these are permitted and even encouraged by the law, though one would not select, as friends or acquaintances, the persons who yield to the temptation, it is impossible, consistently with any principle of justice, not to disapprove of their being persecuted for those arts, in the constant practice of which their profession necessarily consists: and, upon this same principle it was, that the parliament must have been shocked to hear the minister lately declaim so bitterly against crimping, another trade which has increased in a proportion surpassing even the increase of our exports and imports, and which owes its existence solely to that military system, which, in spite of the united voice of military men, he has thought proper to persist in. In short, while the present paper system exists, to attempt to excite a popular prejudice against paper-money makers and persons connected with

them, is, in every view of the matter, unjustifiable; and, such attempts assume a dye peculiarly dark, when we consider, that they generally proceed from that political cowardice, which, daring not assail the author and champion of the system, skulks from the cause, the mighty, the compact, the one-and-indivisible cause, and fastens successively upon the widely scattered and defenceless parts of the effect. —I should now proceed to examine the objections which D. B. has urged against the principle laid down by Mr. Howison, and more pointedly against the conclusion, which I took as the motto of the Register alluded to. But, it is first necessary to explain a very material misapprehension, into which D. B. has evidently fallen as to the meaning of Mr. Howison, whom, in consequence thereof, he has regarded as being "involved in such a confusion of ideas, that it seems a hopeless task to endeavour to extricate him from his perplexity." Whether D. B. has really desired and endeavoured to assist Mr. Howison is more than I can positively determine; but, if he has, it is easy to perceive, that his desire has not been accomplished, that his efforts have completely failed; and, there is some reason to fear, that, if Mr. Howison should happen to cast his eyes upon this sheet, he will be inclined to think, that, in this particular instance at any rate, his "antagonist has not been his helper." With D. B.'s permission I will now try my hand at this "hopeless task," supported by the assurance, that, if I fail, his failure will keep me in countenance. Mr. Howison, after having spoken of the mischievous effect which the facility of discounting has, in seasons of scarcity, by adding to the distresses arising from dearth, proceeds to shew, that, in seasons of great abundance, this effect of discounting ceases. These are his concluding words: "Corn is now become in such plenty, from the late favourable seasons, that the fictitious state of paper-money cannot influence it; notwithstanding the depreciation of money, that article has fallen back in price." These are the words which present to the mind of D. B. such a confusion of ideas, such a perplexity, that he really seems, at times, to have lost himself in the maze. Accordingly he runs out into a dissertation upon the nature and effects of capital and credit contrasted with those of a depreciation of money; he states case upon case, supposition upon supposition, and oversets them one after another; and, at last, quits the hopeless task with gravely observing, that the dis-

counting of bills, with which Mr. Howison set out as the cause of adding to the distresses of dearth, is something "perfectly distinct from the depreciation of money." D. B. very justly observes, that, in the ardour of speculation, we are very apt to think we have exhibited a new and luminous exposition; and, indeed, I cannot help thinking, that it was an ardour of some sort or other that made him overlook a meaning in Mr. Howison's words, which meaning would have spared him the mortification of having failed in the task which he was so good as to undertake; for, to me, who can look coolly over the sentences of Mr. Howison, the passage above quoted appears to mean, that, 'corn is now in so great abundance, that the speculators cannot keep up its price by means of their discounts, that is, by the aid of fictitious capital, or money; and, therefore, the price has fallen back, and is lower even in nominal value than it was a year or two ago—notwithstanding money has been constantly depreciating up to the present time.' It is not denied, that, in the sentence of Mr. Howison, the construction might have been more full, that the pointing might have yielded more aid to the words, and that the circumstance of depreciation of money might have been omitted; but, such as it has now been explained was the meaning that first presented itself to me, and that it so appeared to others will be seen by a reference to the letter of J. T. who, in page 417, has favoured me with his remarks upon the same subject. Indeed, the ideas are kept perfectly distinct. By introducing the circumstance of depreciation of money, Mr. Howison only meant more strongly to mark the fact that he was stating, namely, that the system of discounting could not, in seasons of great abundance, keep up the price of corn. He was not speaking of the depreciation of money as synonymous with "the fictitious state of paper-money," which latter appellation he obviously confined to the effect produced by those pecuniary relations and contrivances, by means of which men trade beyond their real capital, and, sometimes, without any real capital at all. Such trade (if it ought not to be called gambling instead of trade) must of necessity be carried on by fictitious capital, by the mere signs of property; and, as these are obtained, or, at least, with so much facility, only in consequence of the ease with which paper money is now created, was it so very improper and unintelligible to speak of "the fictitious state of paper money?" If the expression be not so precise as we could wish, neither is it so un-

intelligible as D. B. seems to regard it; and, though we cannot but admire the ingenuity which he has displayed in the last paragraph but one of his letter, no one can help lamenting that it should have been employed in a discussion where it is entirely useless. — Having thus removed, as far as I am able, at least, all collateral annoyance, I now approach the main point in dispute — The principle laid down by Mr. Howison, was this, that, *the facility of discounting bills, enabled the corn dealer, in times of scarcity, to keep corn back from the market.* After illustrating his proposition by a reference to the consequences of a speculation in rum, founded on discounted bills, and after very distinctly stating, that discounting loses its power as to the prices of corn upon the return of abundance, he makes this conclusion, that, *wherever necessity and scarcity are combined, paper-money will always be an instrument to add to the distress.* These opinions having been adopted by me, D. B. has thought it necessary to controvert them. He rejects the principle upon which Mr. Howison proceeds; he denies that the discounting of bills can, at any time, or in any degree, suspend or diminish the supply of the corn-market; he insists, that none of the evils peculiar to scarcity ought to be attributed to the paper-money; and, from the arguments he has submitted, he says he is convinced, that the real value of corn is fixed by those principles which moulded society into its peculiar form, and which act as uniformly and as steadily as those laws of material nature by which the physical constitution of the creation is upheld. In support of this conclusion he quotes a passage from Burke's *Thoughts on Scarcity*, which passage must, I think, be regarded as containing observations far too general to afford much aid in their present application; especially when we take into view the very material circumstance, that, when Burke committed to paper his *Thoughts on Scarcity*, the idea of a paper-money not convertible into specie, the idea of the principal cause of the evils of which we complain, could never have entered his mind. Great, therefore, as would, in an opposite case, have been the weight of such authority, it certainly leaves the opinions of D. B. to depend upon the solidity of his own arguments. — Of these arguments the first is, that if the opinion of Mr. Howison be well founded, it must apply to every society, or state of society, where paper-money is in use; because, paper-money must always facilitate, in a greater or less degree, the obtaining of discounts. Such is the tendency of this argument, that it is a matter of per-

fect indifference whether its conclusion be granted or denied; for, if I were to allow, that a paper-money unchecked in its issues by the constantly existing right of the holder to demand payment in specie; if, I were to allow, that such a paper-money contained the same power of checking discounts as is contained in a paper-money convertible into specie; yet, the objection as to the degree would still remain, which is, indeed, the principal objection; because till the degree be considerable, the effect of discounting is scarcely felt, and, of course, does not amount to an evil to be complained of. That the amount of discounts must be in proportion to the quantity of paper is evident; and, that the non-convertibility of the paper is the principal cause of the augmentation of its quantity has been proved by documents too authentic to be suspected of inaccuracy. Indeed, no one will venture to deny either of these positions.—But, D. B. denies that corn can ever be kept from the market by the means of discounts. He denies that the discounting of bills can, at any time, or in any degree, suspend, or diminish the supply of the corn markets; and he complains that Mr. Howison has not *proved* that it can. "There is a link," says he, "wanting in the chain of sylogistical deduction. Articles of necessity must be had—any means which enables the dealer to withhold them from the market also enables him to fix the price." "Here," adds he, "follows the break that ought to be filled up by proving, that by means of paper credit corn is withheld from the market." With the indulgence of the reader I will endeavour to fill up this break; first insisting, however, that, both as to the extent and duration of the influence of discounts upon the price of corn, D. B. has over-rated the suppositions of Mr. Howison and myself; for, it is material here to observe, that the text of that gentleman could not be fairly combated by D. B. but in conjunction with the qualifications contained in my comment. The conclusion, which I regarded, and which I still regard, as incontrovertible, was, "that wherever necessity and scarcity are combined, paper-money will always be an instrument to *add* to the distress." The extent of the distress by this means added was left unascertained; and not only left unascertained, but the task of ascertaining it was expressly confessed to be one too difficult, perhaps, for persons possessing infinitely more talent than I could pretend to. Neither was our meaning, as to the duration of the influence of discounting, by any means such as D. B. has considered it. Mr. Howi-

son's illustration of his principle, as well as the conclusion that I adopted, clearly show, that it was to times of scarcity that the supposed influence was confined. He explicitly stated, that, though avarice dictated the conduct of the corn-dealers, their ruin was frequently the consequence of their speculations; and, as for myself, I took quite sufficient care, I thought, to guard against the notion of an unlimited duration to the influence spoken of; for, after saying that the corn-bill had, doubtless, a share in the sudden rise of the price of bread, because from the moment it was passed it became, an inducement with the speculators in corn to withhold that commodity from the market, which they were "enabled to do by the facility which the paper-system afforded them of obtaining discounts, and thereby postponing the demands upon them for payment." After this I proceed to say: "That finally *all* their corn (upon a supposition that no exportation took place) must come to market, and that they will be ruined if they keep it back too long, is certain; but, the knowledge of these facts will, in the mean time be no consolation to the suffering people." Hence it is, I think, evident, that the article of the Register, to which D. B. has referred, did not, when fairly considered as a whole, tend to encourage the notion of any thing more than a transitory influence upon the price of corn, arising from the facility of discounting: and, seeing that this was the case, I cannot help thinking, that it was rather cruel to pour upon me argument upon argument to prove, that it would be impossible for the corn-dealers to act by combination and to keep the *whole* of the corn from market, for even a single hour; or, to raise the corn, by the assistance of discounts, to *any* price they pleased, and so to keep it for *any* length of time they might choose; suppositions too absurd to be entertained by any man of common understanding.—That *part*, however, of the corn can be kept back from market by the means of discounted bills, or, in other words, that the supply can, in a certain degree and at certain times, be diminished by the means of discounted bills, I still think there can be little reason to doubt; and though it is, perhaps, not easy to afford the sort of *proof* that D. B. may require in order to form "the link wanting in the chain of sylogistical deduction;" yet, it appears to me, that as good proof can be given as can be reasonably expected from the nature of the case.—Were there no discounting at all and no paper-money, a

prospect or even rumour of scarcity of any article, would cause such article to be, in some degree, kept back from the consumer; but, then that degree, which must bear a due proportion to the *real* capital of the possessors of the article, would never be so great as to amount to an evil. Indeed, thus far the power of with-holding from the market is a good; because it operates as a check to consumption, which as to the necessities of life, is the great preventive of famine. If the with-holding here spoken of be allowed to be practicable, it is, then, admitted, that corn may, for a time, and in a certain degree, be kept back from market by the means of that capital which enables the possessor of such corn to meet the demands upon him without bringing all his corn, or so much of it as he otherwise would bring, for sale to the consumer; and this being admitted, which it in substance is by D. B. himself, it does, I think, naturally follow, that discounting, by adding to the quantity of capital, must also, in its degree, confer the power of with holding corn from the market. Of this inference, indeed, D. B. seems to have been aware, for he premises, that discounted bills must be considered as merely subsidiary to capital already accumulated. But, is it not notorious, that a considerable portion of discounted bills are founded upon no real capital at all? that they are truly the representatives of nothing valuable? that they are drawn and discounted for the express purpose of speculation? And, if this cannot be denied generally, what reason is there to make an exception in the particular instance of speculations in corn? The vast amount of the article of corn, does not, that I can perceive, form any objection at all to the supposition of Mr. Howison; for, whatever be the worth of the corn, in whatever degree that article surpasses every other article in amount of value, the capital, whether real or fictitious, possessed by, or at the command of, the persons concerned in buying and selling corn, must bear a due proportion to that amount. The very great number of persons concerned in the corn-trade would have been a good objection, if the fact or the probability, or even the possibility of a direct combination had been insisted on; but, when opposed to an argument founded on the necessarily general inclination and constant propensity of dealers, neither the vast number, nor the scattered locality, nor the partially contending interests of those dealers, can have any considerable weight. They do not combine; but they all act, in certain cases, and

particularly in the case of a scarcity, in concert as perfect (each in proportion to his means) as if united in one firm of trade, because they act under an influence which operates upon them with an uniformity like that of cold or heat. If a law were to be passed granting a premium of a guinea for each bushel of corn exported after next Christmas, will D. B. deny, that such a law would induce all the corn-dealers to raise the corn in hand, and that too from one and the same motive? This is only mentioned to shew, that an union of persons and of particular interests is not always necessary to produce an union of action. There has, for instance, been no visible combination, no union of persons, no concerted plan of action amongst the linen sellers and others in the north of Ireland; they are very numerous, are rivals in trade, must be constantly desirous to out-trade each other; and yet we see, that, by the operation of a feeling, uniform in its effect, that vile instrument of deception, called paper money, has been completely banished from that part of his Majesty's dominions.—If, then, all active capital does, in proportion to its amount, induce and enable the possessor to keep corn back from the market in times of scarcity or approaching scarcity; and, if the discounting bills, unchecked by a due reference to real capital accumulated, greatly and instantaneously adds to the active capital; if these two positions are granted, and I think they will not be denied, it follows of course, that, by means of discounting bills corn-dealers are induced and enabled to keep corn back from the market in those seasons when corn becomes an object of speculation.—It is not, nor ever has been, contended, that the trade of a corn-dealer is, upon the whole, any more profitable on account of the facility of obtaining discounts. That, first or last, all the corn must come to market no one denies; but, would it not have been better if the quarter loaf had been sold at fifteen-pence all through the year 1801, instead of selling for a considerable part of the year at twenty-pence, and afterwards as low as ten-pence? We do not speak of paper money as a *cause* of scarcity, as *creating* scarcity, but as *adding* to the distress when a scarcity of provisions already exists. Neither do we pretend that the application of fictitious capital was the *sole* cause of the fluctuation of prices in 1801, nor in this year, when, in the course of only one month, the quarter loaf rose from eight pence farthing to a shilling; a rise not by any

means to be accounted for upon the principle of D. B. who insists, that the "only cause of distress peculiar to a scarcity is an increase of real value in the commodity, occasioned by the great preponderance of the demand above the supply." Very true: but what cause had produced such a sudden augmentation of the demand, or such a sudden decrease in the supply? A month was no space for the effects of seasons to operate: the harvest was, indeed, hardly begun: the scarcity, as yet, existed only in the mind; but, as the paper-system afforded the means of instantly acting upon the dictates of the mind, the scarcity, as far as it ought to be called one, produced nearly the same evils as if it had all at once become real to the same extent: and thus, in this instance, the paper-money has added, and it at this moment adds, to the distresses of dearth, by precipitating and adding to the rise in the price of bread, and thereby creating a greater disproportion than otherwise would exist between the price of bread and the price of labour, the latter not admitting of so sudden an alteration. It has been stated, by a correspondent, in p. 417, who admits that the corn-dealers are, by the means of discounts enabled to withhold corn from the market, in certain cases and to a certain extent; by this writer it has been stated, that only those who live upon fixed incomes suffer from that part of the augmentation in prices, which arises from the power of discounting. The effect here spoken of is synonymous with depreciation of money; and, as D. B. in pursuing a mistaken meaning attached by himself to Mr. Howison's words, has deviated into the subject of a depreciation of money considered as to its effect in times of scarcity, has thereon stated that the rise thus occasioned is a rise only in the *nominal* value of provisions, and that the only cause of distress peculiar to scarcity is an increase of *real* value in the provisions, I think it necessary, by way of conclusion, just to observe, that, when provisions begin to rise, and, indeed for many months afterwards, the price of labour, particularly agricultural labour, the amount of which will admit of little diminution without producing great distress, does not take any rise at all. Such is the case at present: in the country, the quartern loaf has, since the first of July, risen from *seven* to *eleven* pence; and, after having taken some pains to ascertain the fact, I think I am warranted in asserting, that the price of labour has experienced no rise at all: indeed there requires little consideration to

convince one, of the impossibility of the price of labour keeping pace, under such circumstances, with the price of bread. With respect, therefore, to the labourer, I need not point out to D. B. that, in whatever degree the present rise in the price of provisions is owing to a depreciation of money, in that same degree the depreciation of money has caused an addition to the *real* as well as to the *nominal* value of those provisions.

CATAMARAN PROJECT.—A publication that follows events at only a day's distance can hardly make shift to record the follies of Downing Street, or rather, indeed, of Walmer Castle, quick enough to keep them distinct. What, then, can be expected of a sheet that appears only once a week! The *Catamaran Project*, however, must have a place. All the resources of indignation and ridicule have been exhausted on it. Nothing need be said to expose either the project or the projectors to the contempt that they deserve. The use, therefore, that I shall make of it is, to exhibit to the world, in two separate accounts of the Catamaran Expedition, taken from two different ministerial newspapers, a complete specimen of the ignorance and baseness, to which the present ministers (lower, aye, far lower, than their predecessors) stoop for support.—The public will remember, that these accounts were published on Friday the 5th instant, their pretended news having been circulated the night before.—I shall not distinguish any of the passages by Italic characters, begging the reader to give its full weight to every sentence; and, at the end of every paragraph to say to himself: "such are the men, who praise Mr. PITT and Lord MELVILLE!!!"—The first extract is from a London newspaper called the *Morning Post*.—"We have, at length, the exulting satisfaction of communicating to our readers an event which varies the hitherto dull inactive nature of the war, and which, at the same time that it is the commencement of the great shocks that were to be expected between the two countries, so powerful [and so much irritated, adds new glory to the wreath of British victories, and gives a happy presage of the issue of the contest.—We have for some time known that an expedition was to take place against the enemy's flotilla at Boulogne, though prudential motives induced us to say but little upon the subject. We have now to communicate an account of the expedition having taken place, and of its having

“ been attended with complete success.  
 “ Of the whole of the proceedings on this  
 “ important occasion, a correct account will  
 “ be found in our ship news. It appears  
 “ that the gallant exploit was achieved on  
 “ the night of Tuesday last. There were  
 “ then about 200 of the enemy’s vessels  
 “ outside the harbour. The night being  
 “ dark was particularly favourable to the  
 “ enterprize. Two newly invented ma-  
 “ chines, laden with stones and gun-pow-  
 “ der, worked under the water, and con-  
 “ ducted by small boats on the surface,  
 “ were conveyed to the opposite extremi-  
 “ ties of the French flotilla, in which situa-  
 “ tion they exploded, after a certain time,  
 “ and succeeded in throwing up the stones,  
 “ destroying many of the French boats,  
 “ and throwing the rest into confusion.  
 “ Taking advantage of this, some of our  
 “ fire-ships immediately ran in among the  
 “ enemy, and notwithstanding a brisk fire  
 “ from the land batteries, a dreadful havoc  
 “ was made among them.—The exact  
 “ number of vessels destroyed has not yet  
 “ been ascertained, but it is supposed to  
 “ amount to about 150. The scene was  
 “ distinctly witnessed from our coast, and  
 “ most tremendous was the appearance.  
 “ Such was the solicitude of ministers with  
 “ respect to the result, that Lord Melville  
 “ was on board our squadron when the en-  
 “ terprize took place; and Mr. Pitt and  
 “ Lord Harrowby were anxious spectators  
 “ of the scene from Walmer Castle. The  
 “ event, we rejoice to state, has justified  
 “ every expectation that was entertained  
 “ of it; and we have the happiness to state,  
 “ that in this great achievement we have  
 “ not sustained the loss of a single man.—  
 “ We have for a long time listened with in-  
 “ dignation to the insulting bravadoes of  
 “ the enemy. We have heard, with still  
 “ greater pain, the factious insinuations of  
 “ party men in this country, who, because  
 “ their own friends were not ministers, told  
 “ us the country was in a desperate state;  
 “ that nothing was done for the defence of  
 “ the empire; that there was no hope of a  
 “ fortunate issue from the contest; that if  
 “ the enemy invaded us, we must be con-  
 “ quered; that if he preferred maintaining  
 “ his menacing attitude, without making  
 “ the attack, we in the end must submit  
 “ and deprecate. We always thought  
 “ such abject notions as false as they were  
 “ dishonourable. We argued against them;  
 “ but arguments, until the thing comes to  
 “ issue, however reasonable, must be always  
 “ indecisive. How could we conquer an  
 “ enemy, who would never give us a fair

“ opportunity of bringing him to action,  
 “ how could we refute factious and unpatriotic  
 “ insinuations of weakness and  
 “ cowardice, without gaining victories.  
 “ We suffered all the pain of insulted ho-  
 “ nour, and outraged courage, hoping the  
 “ best, trusting to the spirit and resources  
 “ of the nation, anxiously awaiting and  
 “ eagerly desiring the opportunity. The  
 “ enemy, confident from the late exhibi-  
 “ tions which the boasted flotilla had made,  
 “ drawn up along the French coast, under  
 “ cover of the land batteries, had no longer  
 “ any doubt of being able to assume and  
 “ maintain that position, whenever it  
 “ should be desirable, for the purpose of  
 “ exercising his inexperienced crews, and  
 “ rendering them hardy for the grand and  
 “ desperate attempt. The result of the re-  
 “ cent expedition, planned with as much  
 “ secrecy as judgment, and executed with  
 “ the most unparalleled bravery, will prove,  
 “ both to foreign boasters and factious Bri-  
 “ tons, that this is a country which cannot  
 “ be insulted or menaced with impunity.—  
 “ The enemy threatened our shores; let  
 “ them look now to their own. Their  
 “ ‘ invincible flotilla ’ was to land their  
 “ ‘ invincible army ’ in this country, which  
 “ was to prove ‘ a rich and easy conquest ;’  
 “ it was to bear the fortune and destiny of  
 “ France to our coast. Where is now this  
 “ boasted flotilla? What is the present  
 “ state of the fortune and destiny of France,  
 “ which were so pompously committed to  
 “ it? All that was accessible of it is de-  
 “ stroyed. Sea, fire, and air, have witness-  
 “ ed and contributed to its destruction.  
 “ What is become of that part which is not  
 “ destroyed? It skulks in its harbours, and  
 “ even doubts whether its skulking ensures  
 “ its safety?—This is a most fortunate  
 “ thing for the country.—First of all, be-  
 “ cause it vindicates it to itself; for, like a  
 “ brave individual, trusting to his personal  
 “ courage when insulted by a bully of su-  
 “ perior bodily strength, Britain, inferior as  
 “ she is in population, and particularly in  
 “ military population, to France, could not,  
 “ though determined to perish or conquer,  
 “ be sure of victory till she had gained it.  
 “ The friendly doubts, the kind anxieties,  
 “ the affectionate anticipations of defeat  
 “ and disaster, which some of our patriotic  
 “ prints never ceased to instil, were alike a  
 “ source of pain; but neither could be an-  
 “ swered, except by actual achievement.  
 “ —History, perhaps, will give us equal  
 “ credit for bearing them with patience till  
 “ the opportunity arrived, and for refuting  
 “ them then. To those who exerted them-

"selves, so industriously to depress the spirit of the country, to cramp its exertions, and to infuse a despair of its success, we shall say nothing. The success which we announce, must be the severest punishment, as well as the clearest conviction of their crime.—We are not disposed to seize even the moment of such exulting good fortune as this, to form an alliance with ministers, so as to preclude us from that most enviable privilege of a free press, the exercise of a free judgment to censure or applaud, as either shall seem to us to be merited; and our jealousy of power is such, that we shall probably be always more disposed to be severe in the censure of ministerial offence, than excessive in the praise of ministerial merit. The merit of a minister is indeed but a matter of small consideration in a war like the present. This was a war, in the first instance, for safety; now, we trust, safety is accomplished; and it is a war of glory. When both these great objects shall have been accomplished, and the nation shall look back to the services of those who most contributed towards them, the merits of individuals, whether minister or others, will, we are sure, be left not unrecognised nor unappreciated, not unthanked nor unrewarded. One thing, however, we cannot help remarking, as fortunate for the present ministers, that amidst the charges of inactivity so constantly thrown on them by their opponents, the measures which they had secretly concerted burst upon these opponents, equally unexpected and unprovoked against, as they did on the enemy, creating among them a confusion that is likely to be followed up, and which promises to end in a total discomfiture."—So far the *Morning Post*; now let us hear the *Oracle*, a paper said to be conducted, and in part owned, by a very near connection of a somewhat distinguished second-rate minister.—"It is with the greatest satisfaction we are enabled to congratulate the public on the success of our expedition against the Boulogne flotilla.—For the last two months we have known that such a measure was in the contemplation of government; and although we have now and then dropt such hints as must have convinced those who were in the secret of our knowledge of the fact, yet we cautiously avoided the publishing of any communication which could in the smallest degree convey such intelligence to the enemy as would serve to counteract our intended plan of operations. In-

deed the whole has been so laudably managed, that, by the effect produced, it appears the enemy was totally ignorant of our measures. — Our readers will do us the justice to recollect, that, in our observations on the Boulogne flotilla, we have repeatedly recommended the use of fire ships. About this time twelvemonth, when we were menaced with all the horrors of an invasion, we strongly urged the measure; but the administration who then governed our public affairs, would listen to no plan which did not emanate from their own temple of wisdom. Hence originated the foolish and absurd stone expedition, which terminated as ludicrously as it began, and which entailed on our national efforts ridicule and disgrace.—Plans of greater solidity, and founded in rational principles, have, happily for this country, been since adopted. — We have now to mention a most serious, spirited, and vigorous attack on the Boulogne flotilla in the middle of the night of the 2d instant. Some fire ships sent among the enemy's squadron have successfully exploded in the midst of them! At a late hour last night, none of the particulars had been received at the Admiralty, although, from a variety of private channels, confirmed by some official abstracts, no doubt remained on the subject. From the latter we are not only assured of the success of our brave and enterprising little squadron, but—what is very remarkable in such a perilous plan of operations—that we have sustained no loss whatever! This information we have from the very best authority.—The manly audacity and successful gallantry of our seamen on this remarkable occasion alarmed and confounded the enemy, who, in the midst of such a sudden attack, and such unexpected losses, were panic struck and dismayed. Their confusion and fears were indeed so great, that they were perfectly at a loss how to act, or what to do. Their vessels became unmanageable, and for a considerable time they were made the sport of the elements.—None of our brave squadron having, by the last accounts, returned from the expedition, much is consequently left to rumour and conjecture in the loose statement of facts. In addition to the hasty sketch or rapid abstract which we have now given, we have to mention, as the only addition to these few facts, that the master of a fishing smack has been examined at Deal on the very important news. His statement proves,

“that ‘he was close in with the Boulogne  
 “squadron when our fire ships blew up;  
 “that its effects were grand and tremen-  
 “dous; and that it had the appearance of  
 “ten thousand fire-works being let off at  
 “once!” Such is the description which  
 “this actor and spectator of the scene  
 “gives; and such is the flattering result of  
 “part of a contest, in which, single handed,  
 “we were to have been destroyed and  
 “swallowed up by the mock invincibles or  
 “contemptible bullies of France!—Some  
 “few particulars, evidently written in the  
 “hurry of the moment, may be seen in our  
 “ship news. The rumours respecting the  
 “damage sustained by the enemy, are, as  
 “might have been expected, numerous and  
 “various. In one place it is said that  
 “forty-eight of the enemy’s gun brigs have  
 “been destroyed, and in another place one  
 “hundred! Be that as it may, we may rest  
 “assured that some very serious punish-  
 “ment or chastisement has been inflicted  
 “on our insolent foe; that, on account of  
 “this disgrace, he will be less apt to boast  
 “of his courage and capacity; and that  
 “now, in all human probability, the me-  
 “naced invasion will be postponed till ano-  
 “ther season, or *sine die*.—In confirma-  
 “tion of what we advanced respecting our  
 “hints of a knowledge of the present ex-  
 “pedition, a knowledge which every friend  
 “to his country would then carefully con-  
 “ceal from the enemy, we may now, how-  
 “ever, like some of the first writers of the  
 “first ages, be permitted to quote our own  
 “lucubrations. In our paper of August  
 “30th, we ventured these observations,  
 “which have been completely verified.—  
 “‘These experiments’—(meaning the fre-  
 “quent adventures of the Boulogne squa-  
 “dron out of their harbour)—‘may so far  
 “‘be productive of more confidence on  
 “‘the part of the French seamen; but it  
 “‘is a confidence which will ultimately  
 “‘lead them to their ruin. Should the  
 “‘flotilla continue outside some days long-  
 “‘er to brave our squadron, we are apt to  
 “‘believe that some fire ships sent among  
 “‘them would effect their destruction!’—  
 “The event now noticed has somewhat  
 “confirmed the truth of our observations;  
 “and we may, without too much arro-  
 “gance, assume to ourselves the singular  
 “merit of the suggestion, it being well  
 “known that the editors of all the other  
 “papers remained totally silent on that  
 “particular plan of operations.—But  
 “while we congratulate the country at  
 “large on our present success, what must  
 “that croaker of discord and despondency,

“the Editor of the Morning Chronicle,  
 “say, when he hears that the object of his  
 “daily scurrility and most bitter invective,  
 “Lord Melville, was an anxious spec-  
 “tator of the interesting scene? Does not  
 “the success of this experiment—part, we  
 “hope, of a greater and more extensive  
 “plan—disarm that writer of his wanton  
 “ridicule and illiberal attacks of a noble-  
 “man, whose services merit the thanks  
 “and applause of every true friend of his  
 “country? Were his lordship’s late fre-  
 “quent excursions to the coast, therefore,  
 “in vain? Were they so very incompati-  
 “ble with the duties of the First Lord of  
 “the Admiralty? We do not presume to  
 “say, that Lord Melville was the sole plan-  
 “ner of these operations; but we cannot  
 “help believing, that he was in the faithful  
 “discharge of his duty, as First Lord of the  
 “Admiralty, when concerting with Mr.  
 “Pitt and Lord Keith on the measures  
 “about to be adopted. His lordship was  
 “in the *L’Aimable*, which had not returned  
 “to port yesterday morning.”—It was  
 “not my intention to have added a word by  
 “way of comment; but this closing ob-  
 “ervation forces me to say, that, it is evident  
 “that the intention of the ministerial  
 “creatures was, if the expedition had suc-  
 “ceeded, to give the *whole* of the praise to  
 “their masters, to the exclusion of the offi-  
 “cers who risked fame as well as life in the  
 “expedition. This is as cheering a prospect  
 “for officers of the navy as Mr. Pitt seems to  
 “give those of the army, where he appears,  
 “if we may believe his newspapers, to have,  
 “in many respects, kindly taken on him the  
 “office, or, at least, the functions, of the  
 “Commander in Chief.—The truth is,  
 “that Mr. Pitt and his partner are mere ped-  
 “dlers in war as well as in politics; and now  
 “that they are left to themselves, nothing but  
 “mischief and disgrace can be expected as  
 “the result of their projects.—Their failure,  
 “their utter failure (for such it was) in their  
 “late silly project, will do infinite injury  
 “to the cause of the country. Their creatures  
 “have accused those who think and speak  
 “like me of *creating despondency*: they, the  
 “two grand commanders, it is who are creat-  
 “ing real despondency, and urging on the  
 “efforts of the enemy.—There appears lit-  
 “tle doubt but that Lord Keith was pressed  
 “on to the attempt by the childish impatience  
 “of the projectors. If he was not, how came  
 “he to make it at a moment obviously not  
 “calculated for success, as is fairly to be con-  
 “cluded from his own official relation? This  
 “is a question to which the country has a  
 “right to expect a distinct answer.

"It has been said, that we ought to have obtained something to balance against the vast increase of power which France has obtained: that we have given France the means of increasing her maritime strength; and, in short, that we have signed the death-warrant of our country. Now, in the first place, if we had retained all our conquests, it would not have made any difference to us in point of security. I do not mean to say, that I would not have retained them all if I could; but they were no more important, than they would give us a little more or a little less of colonial power, and only tended to prompt to our security by increasing our finances. But, would the acquisition of all these islands enable us to counterbalance the power which France has acquired on the Continent? They would only give you a little more wealth; and a little more wealth would be badly purchased by a little more war."—MR. PITT'S Speech in Defence of the Preliminaries of Peace, 3d Nov. 1801.

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INCAPACITY OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

(Continued from p. 466.)

STR,—In the short examination of Hume's History, into which your correspondent directly led me, I do not know that in candour and fairness, I can impute to the author any graver fault than inaccuracy and negligence. Of the interval which passed between the imprisonment of Somerset and the issuing of the commission to the Duke of York, to which he refers in his margin, he might, indeed, have received a sufficient intimation from old Stowe and Hollingshed, who quaintly say, that the Duke in the Tower "spent his Christmas without great solemnity;" but the uncertainty and confusion of those Chroniclers, and especially the latter, who seems perplexed and bewildered among the contradictory accounts of that period; and the bad success of Rapin, some of whose dates a comparison of his narrative with that of the better-informed Carte, would at once shew to be erroneous, probably taught caution to their wary successor. So he wrapped himself up safe in snug generalities. He left all the circumstances to the imagination of the reader, who, if he should be wrong, and afterwards come to discover it, could not fix any positive blame on his guide; and, if no officious person should interfere to set him right, might canter on delighted and satisfied with the beauties of the road which he was travelling. In regard to one point only our popular historian has ventured to be a little explicit; I mean that of the commission issued to the Duke of York. But he has been eminently unfortunate; and the probable source of that mistake, which I partly pointed out in my former letter, is amusing. "Some," observes Hollingshed with apparent doubt, "do write, that whilst the King was sick, the Duke of York bore all the rule, and governed as Regent or Viceroy, by autho-

rity committed to him by the Lords of the Realm, then assembled in council." Stowe, or his editor and continuator Howe for him, shortly says, that during the King's sickness the Duke "governed as Regent." Rapin, who had thoroughly explored the vast storehouse of Rymer's collection, then newly given to the world, plainly states in few words what he read there;—that, "before the Parliament sat, the Council empowered the Duke of York to hold it in the King's name." But Carte choosing to go further, fared a little worse. He, with a very laudable spirit of inquiry, had recourse to the original documents. Finding, therefore, the Duke of York indifferently denominated in the Parliament-roll, sometimes "the King's Commissioner," and sometimes "the King's Lieutenant in the present Parliament," and possibly construing the record from his recollection of the above-mentioned passages in Hollingshed and Stowe, he seems to have confounded an appellation, which means only a temporary representative of the Sovereign in his legislative capacity, with the title of *Lieutenant of the Kingdom*, which implies a general delegation of the royal functions. Accordingly, he tell us, that the Council appointed Richard "Lieutenant of the Kingdom, with powers to open and hold the session." Carte stood high in the estimation of Hume, who speaks of him as "having by his diligence and industry given light to many passages of the more ancient English History." But this is in a note where he had taken up two pages in confuting him, and thought, perhaps, that he had thereby shewn his own superior information. Where he follows him, he is guardedly silent: indeed, he takes disingenuous pains to conceal what he borrows.

\* See the note of two pages in chap. xiii. under the year 1291.

Thus, on the present occasion he copies the very words, but without the slightest acknowledgment; omits the reference to the Parliament-roll and the Patent-roll, which, as he never professes to have consulted, he could not have quoted without betraying himself; substitutes another reference of his own to Rymer, where however, unfortunately for him, there is not a syllable that could have given origin to the mistake; and so fixes the proof of his own plagiarism by the very attempt to disguise it.

These little artifices of book-making, and their unlucky result, may perhaps, only excite a smile in you, Sir, and your readers. But, in entering on the sequel, which I have promised, I fear that I can do no less than charge positive and systematic misrepresentation. It is certainly on a very suspicious point, that I bring the charge. It relates to the conduct of Parliament. In my former letter, it was mentioned, that several preparatory steps took place before Richard was created Protector, and that of these there is no trace whatever in Hume: nay, the obvious, direct, and necessary inference of his text is the very contrary: it is precisely what your correspondent drew, that there was no delay at all. Now, were these preparatory steps important, or could they be known to the historian? They were;—two different applications of the Commons for the appointment of a new Council, which would in effect have been, and actually became a Council of Regency; after a pause of four days, the deputation of twelve lords to see the King at Windsor, on that and other business with special instructions referring to Henry's malady, and clearly meant to afford some test of his capacity; a very circumstantial and curious report of the King's condition; and not till after an interval of two days more, the nomination of the Protector and Defender. Now, here are pretty strong marks of deliberation and circumspection, not of precipitancy and party-zeal; of a sincere disposition to provide with their best judgment for the exigency of their situation, not of an eagerness to seize the opportunity of making a revolution. And all this is to be found more or less distinctly in the Parliamentary History, and Cotton's Abridgment of the Records, both of which Hume perpetually cites, and even in Carte's History, which he does not cite, but which, as we have seen, and shall presently see again, lay open before him. Yet passing over all this, he merely states the nomination, which too he takes as a complete and absolute act, though all the details of the power to be conveyed

to the Protector yet remained to be settled; and then, he adds a reflexion the very reverse of that which the facts would have suggested; "Men," he says, "who thus "entrusted royal authority" (which by the way they did not entrust, and expressly refused to entrust) "to one, who had such "evident and strong pretensions to the "crown, were not surely averse to his taking immediate and full possession of it." This however, is not all. The historian then proceeds to intimate a censure on the "timidity" and "irresolution" of Richard, manifested in the articles, which he the next day submitted, when the details were to be taken into consideration. But by some accident or other, he has wholly forgotten to notice the answers of the lords to the respective articles. It is true, that here again he has copied the words of Carte without acknowledgment; but a skeleton of the answers is exhibited by Cotton and the authors of the Parliamentary History. Even there appear two references to precedents, for which an ulterior search was also to be made. Even there is preserved an explanation of the titles conferred upon the Duke of York, and the motive for conferring them rather than others; namely, because they "implied no authority of governance;" and even there is to be found the saving clause, that all this was not to be of any prejudice to the Prince of Wales.—Hume adduces both these authorities within two or three pages before and after the passage in question. They could not therefore, have escaped him here. But, if he had fairly brought forward what they contained, his reflexion on the Parliament must have appeared most unfounded, and the whole character of the proceeding diametrically opposite to that which he wished to insinuate. The men who displayed so much anxiety (and more indeed than has yet been stated) to tread in the steps of their predecessors, to limit the authority which they gave, and to secure the rights of an infant Prince then not six months old, surely were averse to Richard's taking immediate and full possession of the crown. In the trust which they reposed, and the restrictions to which they subjected it, there is every indication, that they were alike guided by principle, and what they believed to be the doctrine and spirit of the English Constitution.

The termination of this first Protectorate is involved in such doubt and uncertainty by Hume, it is not surprising that your correspondent did not understand it to have been terminated at all till the beginning of 1456. We are informed, that "Henry having so

"far recovered, as to carry the appearance of exercising the royal power, he was moved by the enemies of the Duke of York to resume his authority, to annul the regency of the Duke, to release Somerset from the Tower, and commit the administration into the hands of that nobleman. Richard" (it is added) "sensible of the dangers, which might attend his former acceptance of the Parliamentary commission, *should be submit to the annulling of it, levied an army*" for the purpose; it must be presumed, of maintaining it; and so ensued the first battle of St. Albans. This runs very trippingly, it is true; but, pray Sir, can you with any confidence guess from it, whether Henry did or did not do, as he was desired; and, whether Richard did or did not submit to the annulling of his commission? If any thing really was done, would you not clearly imagine it to have been some smuggled, hurried, imperfect transaction, against which the Protector remonstrated the moment that he knew it? No, Sir; very far from it. It was by advice of the Great Council (that is, an open council of all the peers) that the King first ordered Somerset to be enlarged on bail. A full month was then suffered to elapse before his bail, on a new application from him, were discharged. The minute of council is extant, and shews the part which Henry himself took in the proceedings. The Duke of York and his friends were both times present, and seem to have acquiesced. At a subsequent time he was removed from the government of Calais, the most important military command under the crown, which he had himself taken from Somerset; but, to avoid giving him offence, the King declared himself governor of the place, instead of putting it again into the hands of Somerset. All these facts are in Rymer, who is quoted by Hume in this very passage. They are all ingeniously related by Rapin, and must without a remark leave an impression the very reverse of that which the narrative of his successor is calculated to make. Instead of precipitation on the one side in thrusting forward the figure of the King, as soon as he was able to carry the appearance of royalty, and a hasty appeal to arms on the other, both parties studied to play the game of caution and moderation; both felt it to be their interest, as Rapin observes on some part of these very transactions, to shew that they did not act from ambitious motives, as the aim of both was to gain the affections of the people.

That the Duke of York did not levy his army to maintain himself in the Protectorate seems indubitable from his subsequent con-

duct, not to mention his own recorded complaint, of fresh grievances as the cause. When he was victorious, Somerset and the principal leaders of his party killed and the king taken prisoner, Richard remained without that office six months, though there was a session of parliament in the interval. The king in person opened and held that session. But on account of the king's relapse, in the next Richard presided as Royal Commissioner, and after three applications of the Commons for the creation of a Protector, was again invested with that high trust, under the same protestations on his part, and nearly the same answers on the part of the Lords, as before. Our popular historian must have known all this from his two declared parliamentary guides, who accurately distinguish the two sessions, their circumstances, and proceedings. He chose, however, to imitate the confusion of some of his predecessors, and mingled all the proceedings of both sessions together for the sake of a little antithetical smartness at the expense of the poor parliament; and with the same laudable view he thought proper now to display in broad light that tender regard to the rights of even an infant Prince of Wales, which on the former appointment, though in that respect precisely the same, he covered with total darkness. But the entire passage is too curious to be omitted; only I shall, here and there, intersperse the parenthetical comment of a date or collateral fact. Having dispatched the reflexions which on occasion of the battle of St. Albans, the commencement of civil bloodshed might of course be expected, he proceeds to tell us;—that "a parliament, which was soon after assembled" (on the 9th of July, as his margin truly acquaints us) "discovered plainly by the contrariety of their proceedings, the contrariety of the motives, by which they were actuated. They granted the Yorkists," continues he, "a general indemnity,"—which passed on the 23d of July, the king himself being present and a party to it; "and they restored the Protectorship to the duke" on the 19th of November, the king by his relapse having become again incapable. "But at the same time they renewed their oaths of fealty to Henry;" that is, the Lords and they only, many of whom had been at the battle of St. Albans, or in some way, aided and abetted the Duke of York, took these oaths on the 23d of July when the pardon passed: "and," on the 19th of November, the two Houses, with the assent of the king's commissioner, "fixed the continuance of the protectorship

"to the majority of Henry's *eldest*" (he might have said *only*) "son, Edward, "who was invested in the usual dignities "of Prince of Wales, Duke of Cornwall, "and Earl of Chester;" in all which there was nothing new, except granting to the Prince livery of the Duchy of Cornwall, which as the language of the act itself evinces, they regarded as a mere act of common justice not to be denied. The rest was only a transcript or a confirmation of things done the year before by the last parliament; a parliament to which the author himself does not attribute a contrariety of motives, but a willingness to go every length in favour of the Duke of York.

There is but one remaining passage in Hume, which it is necessary now to notice, but it is indeed all that remains of his narrative immediately connected with my present subject. I allude to his remark on the termination of Richard's second protectorate. "Margaret," he says, "availing herself of "that prince's absence, produced her husband before the House of Lords; and as "his state of health permitted him at that "time to act his part with tolerable decency, "he declared his intentions to resume the "government." To this, we are informed, the House assented, and it is added; "the Duke of York even acquiesced in "this *irregular* act, of the peers; and "no disturbance ensued." Now, what but the disposition of this writer at all times to blame or degrade the parliament, a disposition which in his whole story of this second protectorate seems even to have prevailed over the characteristic managements of his style, could have made him pronounce this censure on the peers, it is difficult to conjecture. In an ordinary instance, what *irregularity* could there be in a king coming down to the House of Lords, on his recovery from such a malady, and there formally desiring his resumption of the government to be recorded; or in their assenting to such an entry? But in this case, it happened to be the only regular way of proceeding. The historian, who had mentioned that Richard's first parliamentary commission was during pleasure only, forgets to tell the reader, that the second was *only revocable with the assent of the Lords in Parliament*. Was it then an *irregular* act, because in his opinion the king's recovery was not sufficiently established? That would resolve itself into the simple question, whether we should rather give credit to a contemporary House of Peers, or to a writer of the sixteenth century. And it is to be observed that there were which he

exhibits of the unhappy Henry, is of the historian's own drawing and colouring. Hollingshed, Stowe, and others of our old chroniclers manifestly confound the terminations of the two protectorates, ascribing to the latter, all the circumstances, which, it is now very well known from the records, belonged only to the former. It is singular too that Hollingshed after the most diligent research which he could make so much nearer to the time, speaking of Henry's resuming the exercise of his functions, expressly hesitates, whether, it was from his own inclination, or by the procurement of the queen; yet Hume talks with the confidence and decision of a man, who had not only seen and narrowly watched the king when on the 25th of February, 1456, he went down to the House of Lords to put an end to the substituted authority of the Protector, but had been admitted to the inmost councils of the court party.

Enough, Sir, I trust, has now been said to remove from the minds of your readers, whatever false impressions they may have received on this interesting part of our domestic story. The original occasion of these letters, as well as the reputation of his work, called and fixed my attention principally to Hume. I have examined his narrative very much in detail, and I certainly think that above all others, it is calculated to mislead, in some degree, as to the conduct of the opposite parties, and still more as to that of the parliament. At the same time I have incidentally glanced at most of our other common sources of information, with the purpose of indicating that they are by no means exempt from a considerable share of his faults or from others of equal magnitude, though perhaps not tricked out in a disguise so dangerously alluring. In truth, it must candidly be confessed, that our annals for some years before and after the commencement of civil bloodshed in the quarrel of the rival roses, present a tangled skein of thread, which requires much nicety and patience to unravel it. They are not agreed, whether Humphrey Duke of Gloucester lived six days, twenty-four days, or not a single night after he was arrested at St. Edmundsbury; they seem to have lost a whole year of the Duke of York at the critical period when he first appeared in arms to intimidate Henry into a compliance with his views; even chroniclers who lived at the time differ one, two, nay five years in the date of public and notorious facts; and they who describe Richard as encouraging numerous emissaries immediately after Gloucester's death, to make his title to the



crown the theme of their discourse in all companies, yet represent him twelve years afterwards, as letting out the secret of his designs for the first time, beyond the little council of his most intimate friends, to Sir Andrew Trollop, which caused the defection of that gallant veteran. The writers who flourished at this epoch, are but few; our chief accounts are from those who lived after under the restored Line of Lancaster; and our public records, as might be expected in times of alternate victory and defeat, when for some time every other parliament was of an opposite faction, are by no means perfect. Yet from them much may, notwithstanding, be gleaned. They have never been consulted directly but by Carte, who was himself much warped by party-notions. They are now in print, probably more complete than he ever saw them. With your permission, therefore, Sir, I shall shortly attempt to draw from them, with some necessary assistance for the sake of elucidation from the best materials of general history, a fuller, and, I believe, a more correct view than has yet appeared of the proceedings which took place in consequence of the incapacity of Henry the Sixth.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. T. M.

*Manchester, Oct. 10, 1804.*

#### REMEDY AGAINST THE EVILS OF DEPRECIATED NOTES.

SIR,—I think it very extraordinary that in the midst of the well-grounded complaints occasioned by the Restriction Act, and the ample discussion which the interesting subject has undergone, it has not occurred to any one to inquire how far the public have it in their own power to do themselves justice, and to render in a great degree abortive, at least to the purposes of mischief, this most impolitic and partial measure.—So long as the monied interest shall maintain its preponderating influence with administration, the hope of redress from that quarter must be vain; it is too obvious that the monied interest profits by the Restriction Act, and that while its influence continues, the Restriction Act will not be repealed: it is time therefore that the people exert their power to right themselves; a power which I think I can clearly shew they possess.—The mode is very simple; it is no other than resolutely to refuse to accept any thing but guineas in payment.—It is legal to do so; the law does not make bank notes a legal tender; bank notes are not a legal discharge of a debt unless at the option of the creditor; the debtor it is true cannot be arrested on mesne process, or held to special bail, if

he tender the debt in bank notes, but though he do tender the debt in bank notes the creditor may refuse to accept them, and he may proceed to judgment and execution, he may then take the body of the debtor, or sell his goods and chattels, or extend his lands, unless the debt be paid in specie, a tender of the debt in bank notes will be no satisfaction of the judgment. So the landlord may refuse to take his rent in any thing but specie; he may distrain or pursue his other legal remedies for recovery of his rent; and a tender of the rent in bank notes will not discharge the tenant.—It is perfectly practicable to resort to this remedy: guineas can be had and will appear in plenty if there be a steady and persevering demand for them in all payments, Ireland proves this; guineas have been there at a premium of 10 or 12 per cent., and they totally disappeared wherever bank notes were accepted in payment; but in the North of Ireland, where notes would not be taken at all, or at a discount equivalent to the premium on guineas, guineas circulate in abundance.—It is perfectly just to demand guineas. The depreciation of bank notes operates, at least on all fixed incomes, as a tax on all payments, made in them, exactly equal to the depreciation of the notes. Nothing can be more evident. If 100l. in bank notes be in truth but 95l. or 96l. in specie, the person with an income of 100l. per annum, paid in bank notes, sustains a loss of 4l. or 5l. This might be borne if it were a general tax, but it has this novel and unjust peculiarity, that the only persons exempted from the tax are the very persons who occasion it. It is very clear that all traders raise their prices in exact proportion as the medium of currency sinks in value: if the real price of the commodity, in specie, be 100l., and if the consumer purchase in bank notes, and they be depreciated 4l. or 5l. per cent., it is manifest he must pay, not 100l., but 104l. or 105l. This is again proved by the example of the North of Ireland, there the money price and the bank note price of all articles of commerce is well established. The trader, let him be paid in whatever shape he may, must get the value of his commodity, and that value must always be measured by the general standard of value in the markets of the world. It is also clear, and now perfectly established, and we may say promulgated by parliament itself,\* that the sole cause of the deprecia-

\* See the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Irish exchange, published by order

tion of bank notes is their undue increase: that undue increase is occasioned by the undue accommodation given to merchants, and thus the very persons who cause the depreciation and profit by it, by the undue extension of their trade, and impose a tax on the rest of the community, are the only persons exempted from its operation. — This remedy thus shewn to be legal, practicable, and just, would also be efficacious. — Bank notes would be reduced to their just standard of value, till the world would imitate the conduct at present pursued by the merchant. It is evident that he raises his bank note price exactly in the degree bank notes are depreciated in value; so the landlord, or person of fixed income, would either insist on guineas, or else on a discount on bank notes equal to their depreciation; that is a discount would be established on bank notes, universally, and not as at present partially, in favour of those who suffer, and not as at present, in favour of those who profit. — This discount would be an infallible test of the propriety of the conduct of the Bank; so long as it should exist all the world could pronounce that the Bank unduly extended its issue of paper; the evil thus universally understood would probably cure itself, paper currency would be reduced within its just limits, and the Restriction Act might be repealed. — But if it should not, at least justice would be done. — The property of the nation, and that part of it now most cruelly oppressed, fixed income, which cannot be raised with the enormous and alarming rise in the prices of all commodities, would no longer be taxed in order to swell the already overswollen greatness of the commercial and monied interests.

#### AGRICOLA.

#### LAWS IN THE CONQUERED COLONIES.

SIR,—With your permission I shall avail myself of your valuable paper, to convey the first hints of a most important question to the public. I will consider the justice and policy of establishing the laws of England in the newly conquered colonies of Demerary, Esquibo, and Berbice. You must well remember, Sir, that these colonies were surrendered by two different capitulations to the British forces under General Grinfield: and that by the terms of them both, the Dutch laws were to be still continued. Their

motive, who inserted this stipulation, is evident: these men were not disposed unnecessarily to reitrench or contract their profits or their power: the government was then Dutch: but at the same time it was notorious, that seven-eighths of the numbers they governed were English, and, perhaps, more than that proportion of the property. — But governments exist only for the welfare of their subjects: and, as after a capitulation the independence of the government which makes it must cease, the terms of it can only be exacted from the captors by their subjects, whether this is done by the capitulating government itself or by the individuals, for whose protection and security the contract was made. — Whenever, therefore, by the consent or for the interest of the capitulants themselves, the stipulated terms can be changed or cancelled, that change becomes both equitable and wise. We have now an instance of the truth of the observation in these very colonies, and under the same capitulations. The planters, without a clearance from an English custom-house, could not have sent their produce to London. The establishment of an English custom-house was contrary both to the terms and spirit of the capitulation, but necessary to the welfare of the capitulants: and at their desire a custom house was established and it still continues. “*Juri pro se introducto unusquisque potest renunciari*”. — And, when we have once established the justice of continuing, changing or cancelling the terms of a capitulation by the consent, and according to the interests of the capitulants, we may next consider the policy and propriety of continuing the Dutch laws in these colonies now under the dominion of England. For this purpose, I would first point out the great, primary, and essential difference between the codes of the two nations. — Two centuries have scarcely past, since the Dutch had to wrestle for their independence with the collective power of Spain, through a period of forty years, during which that monarchy was in its vigour, and at the very pinnacle of opulence and power. While their independence was in danger, it was useless to frame laws: and when vindicated and secured, the task became almost impracticable from the complicated nature, and rapidly increasing number, of its objects. The torrent of their prosperity left to the United States no leisure for the labours of legislation. They therefore hastily adopted the civil law in a mass as the code of Holland; and, by the strangest paradox in politics, the laws, framed by wise statesmen for the preservation and security of military despotism over

of the house, where the depreciation of Irish bank notes is fully established, and solely attributed to the misconduct of the Bank of Ireland in unduly increasing their discounts.

conquered countries, were considered as well adapted to the rights and interests of a trading republic, and her colonies!—After this precipitate adoption of a code, the attention of the Dutch legislature was perpetually diverted from correcting the first error of their choice, and gradually adjusting it to the exigencies of their age and country, by the continual dangers to which their territories and their commerce were alternately exposed from the armies of France, or the fleets of England; whose mutual jealousy, while it interrupted their external prosperity and prevented the improvement of their laws, could alone have continued their existence.—How different the growth of the law of England! Transplanted from the forests of the north, and introduced into our island in a remote antiquity, its principles were asserted at Runnymede, and gradually adapted, through eight succeeding centuries, to the ever-varying exigencies and interests of the nation: it has travelled, hand-in-hand, with a still-increasing commerce: it has been from time to time explained, digested, and enforced by innumerable native patriots, lawyers, orators, and statesmen: while its excellence is sealed by the progressive prosperity of past ages; and raised above every comparison by the superior virtues, activity, and talents of the present.—The civil law appears to me peculiarly unfit, from its original constitution and arbitrary character, for colonial governments: they are societies strictly commercial; unlike the agriculturist of Europe, the planter must subsist by credit; the crop of the second year must be gathered before that of the first can be sold. Yet it is not only on the general inaptitude of the civil law to the government of commercial states that our objection to the establishment of the laws of Holland in these colonies should rest. Innumerable other reasons may be urged against it, and each, of itself, sufficient: but the strongest and most striking only can be collected within the narrow compass of a letter.—In the first place the right of appeal involves in it consequences of the utmost importance to the welfare of every colony; and it has been justly called the birthright of every subject. Now, if an appeal is carried to England from Demerary or Berbice under their present constitution, the committee of council must be bewildered among all the labyrinths of the civil law and its more inexplicable and jarring commentaries; or the original, and appellate, jurisdictions will be at variance. Perhaps it may be urged, that the same difficulty occurs in all appeals from our empire in the east; and that the doctrines and distinctions of zemindaries,

rajaahships, and jaghiers in India are as complicated and abstruse as any part of the civil law itself. But it should be remembered, that India is not a colony but a conquest: that 17,000 men could acquire what 100,000 could not retain by mere force; that the continuance of their native laws is therefore a necessary political indulgence; and that all the lands of India are held by Hindoos. Is there then any parallel between the state of India and of our new acquisitions in South America? Where a vast majority of the landed proprietors, cultivators, and merchants are Englishmen, the English language is generally spoken; nor is there any doubt but that, if the voice of the colonies was consulted, it would be (I had almost said) unanimous for the immediate adoption of our laws.—The next argument is one of policy rather than of right: yet, coinciding with the right, it must operate as an additional inducement to enforce it: *i. e.* that the interests of the English merchant must suffer most from this anomaly of laws and language. The secrecy of the courts, the absolute authority of the judges, the mysterious and elaborate confusion of their judicial forms, the dilatory spirit of their repeated indulgences, and the miserable ignorance, and not unfrequent profligacy of the adventurers that act as advocates of themselves, form sufficient obstacles to the ascertainment of rights or the prevention and punishment of wrongs. They are formidable difficulties even to those whose presence prevents open and flagrant injustice; but are increased beyond all resistance, when the absence of the party removes every fear of superintendence and inspection, and insures at once both the plunder and impunity.—As an additional motive of convenience, I would consider the impolicy of continuing the former laws, language, and institutions of a conquered colony. Must it not perpetually remind them of their original allegiance? Must it not serve to endear to them the country they have lost, and at the same time remind them of the violence of conquest? This surely cannot be good policy during a war, in which all our strength and resources have been wasted in mere caution and timorous defence against the dangers of invasion; and it would be unworthy even of our present ministers, as statesmen, to expect any beneficial return of gratitude from the Dutch inhabitants for the continuance of their laws. Gratitude between nations is but a name: while, on the contrary, the prospect of returning once more to the dominion of a state which they are taught by this very indulgence to consider

as their country, must palsy every exertion in favour of their conquerors. But our present rulers are not satisfied with single errors: it was not enough to continue the Dutch laws in English colonies: but in the alchemy of their wisdom, and by the omnipotence of the legislature, Dutchmen must also be qualified to govern them. No Englishman could be found equal to the trust; and therefore, with laudable impartiality, it was delegated to more deserving strangers.— Perhaps you may wonder that I have not hitherto urged the importance of these colonies as an argument in support of my proposition: but I fear this will prove the principal ground of its rejection. In this age of ambition and convenience, private interests bear down all public reasons: and when we consider the activity, ingenuity, opulence, and parliamentary influence of our insular colonists, we shall be able to ascertain what kind and degree of opposition will be made to our retaining settlements, which mock the slow progress of their competitors, and in ten years would almost unpeopled the islands of the Atlantic. For facility of defence they are beyond comparison stronger than every other country, except Holland: like that they can be inundated to any extent and in every quarter; and in the hands of only a moderate garrison would be absolutely impregnable. For fertility of soil, we have only to quote the returns of their produce in the last war, and the first circumstance of this, since their capture: we have only to state, that more than 100 ships (exclusive of the American trade) have been laden with the produce in one fleet, and from merely infant colonies, under all the disadvantages of a change of sovereigns.— We may anticipate one popular and plausible objection to these arguments, which can only be removed by proving it misapplied. No one would venture to impugn the general policy of treating a foreign colony with the greatest lenity, when conquered. It facilitates the acquisition of others and undermines resistance. But when the premises are changed, the conclusion is destroyed: and in the instance of these colonies, the enjoyment of English laws would only strengthen the ties of our union; and, in the event of cession and a future war, facilitate another conquest, because a vast majority of the inhabitants are Englishmen.—I shall now conclude this long letter with one general reservation: that all the preceding arguments are built on the consent of the captivants. We wish no repetition of the disgraceful discussions that took place on the conventions of Saratoga and El Arisch.

*"Fides est servanda."* A principle that a wise government will not dare to violate. Impolitic conventions should be more punctiliously observed, because their observance is the best remedy for their defects, by proving that the misfortune or weakness of the country has not tainted its honour. But let the inhabitants of these colonies have the most distant prospect of being retained by England; enable them to look to her for protection and support: and they themselves will soon sue, earnestly and sincerely sue, to be admitted to the participation of the same laws; and will accept that inestimable privilege with gratitude and joy.—*PUBLIUS.*  
—29th Sept., 1804

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

VIEWS OF RUSSIA.—About six weeks ago, when the alliance with Russia first became a subject of public discussion, very severe reproaches were dealt out upon all those who did not appear to regard it as a measure of much promise. It is probable, that the public, however, will soon adopt this censured opinion. The alliance has taken place; and, as yet, no one has been able to point out any way, in which Russia, without the aid of Austria or Prussia, can possibly give to France any thing worthy even of the name of an ally, except by a co-operation with England in the Mediterranean. Such co-operation appears to have been begun: but, there is, at present, little hope that it will answer any other purpose than that of gratifying the ambition of Russia, at the expense, perhaps, of the Porte, and finally to the great danger of the British colonies in the east. The public will remember with what exultation Mr. Pitt, during his defence of the ignominious peace of Amiens, dwelt upon the success of our efforts in establishing the republic of the Seven Islands. "With respect to the Porte," said he, "we have done every thing we were bound to do, nay more, we have compelled the French to the evacuation of Egypt, and have stipulated for the integrity of her dominions! There is another object which we have obtained, and to which I think not so much importance has been given as it deserves: I mean the establishment of an infant power; viz., the republic of the Seven Islands, certainly an acquisition of great importance to this country, not inferior, perhaps, to the possession of Malta itself!" Now, either we must regard this opinion as a thing of "existing

\* Speech of 3d Nov. 1801. Vide Register, Vol II. p. 1141.

"circumstances;" as delivered merely with a view to effect in the debate, just as a counsellor delivers an opinion in pleading a cause; or what must we think of the foresight, of the wisdom, of the states-man-like capacity of the person by whom it was delivered? It was this part of Mr. Pitt's speech which gave rise to that admired piece of humour which was published soon afterwards, in the first volume of the Register, under the signature of SEPTIMIUS, in which the childish folly of the whole affair was pointed out and ridiculed. This far-famed republic, however, is now in the possession of Russia, who is daily strengthening herself in that quarter, to the evident uneasiness of the court of Vienna; and thus, the first advance that we make towards the purchase of Russian assistance, is to give up that establishment which was of so much importance to this country as not to be inferior, perhaps, to the possession of Malta itself. At the first blush this will certainly appear to be going very far; but, when we come to consider how great the value of Malta is in the estimation of the present ministers; when we recollect, that, avowedly, they thought the perpetual possession of Malta an object for which, and which alone, it was worth while to renew the war; when we consider this, what must we think of the past, compared with the present, conduct of Mr. Pitt? But where, indeed, shall we, as to any branch of administration, look, in that gentleman's conduct, for the steady operation of principles? Where shall we look for any thing more than effects proceeding from the mere fits and starts of necessity or convenience?—The policy of Russia, or, at least, the probable and suspected policy of Russia, has been very clearly and ably developed in an essay lately published in the Morning Chronicle, where, from facts and arguments that it would be difficult to controvert, a conclusion is drawn, that, the alliance between England and Russia, by favouring the projects of Russia in the Mediterranean and with respect to the Turkish dominions, will naturally tend to add greatly to that jealousy, with which, as was observed in a former Register, Austria has long viewed the ambitious strides of the Russian emperors. What such a feeling may produce it would be hard to say; but, there surely would be no great room for astonishment, if Austria were to be found, at no distant period, amongst the belligerent enemies of Russia. "How!" some one will say, "Austria assist France!" No: but, Austria may be permitted to endeavour to preserve herself; and, if she be in great danger from the ambition of Rus-

sia, and no longer in danger from that of France, there is no reason why her arms should not be directed against the former, though she thereby aid the cause of the latter. There is one reason, indeed, and that is, that, by thus pursuing her own interests, her conduct would tend to increase the dangers that threaten England, rather than which she ought to side with Russia against France, though at the evident risk of her own existence as a great power; but, this reason, though of cogency irresistible at Lloyd's and the Bank, is, unfortunately, of little weight at Vienna, where people are so froward as to think, that they are, by no law of either God or man, bound to perish for the sake of a nation, some of whose legislators have loudly proclaimed that it is "too honest to have any connexion with continental powers."—Whatever effect the alliance between England and Russia, and the consequent increase of the Russian influence and power in the Mediterranean, may produce with regard to the sensations and conduct of Austria, it is pretty certain, that that influence and power, if it be suffered to exist in any considerable degree, must, finally, and, perhaps, very soon, become extremely dangerous to Great Britain, that is, to say upon a supposition that the possession of her colonies in the East Indies are essential to the support of her power; for, what security has that great statesman, Lord Harrowby, obtained, that, in less than two years, Russia shall not be on the side of France in a war against England? or, what means has he, in such case, in view, to prevent the footing, which Russia is now getting in the Mediterranean, from being employed against our possessions in India? Russia, it is evident, has entered into the alliance upon her own terms; and, from every thing we have yet seen, there is little doubt that she will turn it solely to the purposes of her own aggrandizement. The rumour of her having obtained from our ministers a stipulation for the cession of Malta to her can hardly be founded in truth; but, it is by no means improbable, that one of her objects is to get possession of that fortress; nor is it at all unlikely, that she may therein succeed, and, perhaps, by virtue of a threat to leave us to sustain the war alone. Malta was, during the last war, the bone of contention between England and Russia. The latter now has reason to expect that circumstances will not permit us to break with her "for such a trifle," as Buonaparté called it. The cession might, too, serve Mr. Pitt as a pretext for demanding that peace, which he will soon again find necessary, in order to enable him to "hos-

“band our resources against another day of a trial.”—What, then, shall we, who have continually been blaming the ministry for not obtaining allies upon the continent, now blame Mr. Pitt for having formed an alliance with Russia? No: he is not blamed for having formed an alliance with Russia; and, it is possible, that he may merit praise for it; but, if that alliance only serves to unite the arms of Austria with those of France, there can be no doubt, that either the forming it, or the terms and management of it, will be a subject of very strong and very just censure. An alliance with Russia, to be efficient for our good, can only be subsidiary to an alliance with one, at least, of the other great powers of the continent: in any other way it can, at the present time, scarcely afford us any real aid, and may do us a considerable deal of mischief.

WAR WITH SPAIN.—It was not intended to make this a subject of remark here, till the public should be in possession of the official reasons upon which a war with Spain had been resolved on; but the length to which the discussion has been carried in the public prints, and the motives whence the measure is now stated (in essays evidently coming from the ministry) to have originated, seem to call for a departure from that intention.—As to the question of *right*, in the discussing of which so many columns of the ministerial newspapers have been occupied, no man, at all acquainted with the circumstances of the case, ever, for one moment, entertained a doubt; though one cannot refrain from observing, that, as far as the right rests upon the fact of Spain having afforded pecuniary aid to France, it exists with respect to Portugal and the Hans Towns in an equal, and, perhaps, greater degree. Not so simple, however, is the question of *policy*, which would have required a very full consideration, and might have been of difficult solution if the defender of the measure, who, from his unparalleled dulness, has been suspected to be Lord Harrowby himself, had not, after having been driven successively from the point of *honour* and the point of *necessity*, chosen to make his last stand upon the point of *profit*. This writer, be who he may, tells us, that it is very wise to have colonies; that there is no reason to apprehend danger from the drain which colonies would make upon our population; for, that a country will always possess people in proportion to its means of affording them subsistence; and, therefore, he infers, that, if the colonies, *about to be conquered*, should cause a great drain upon

our population, the latter would be replenished by ample supplies from those maritime states of the Continent, which are suffering under a stagnation of business, occasioned by the war and by the oppressions of France. This latter circumstance, supposing it to be correctly stated, would by no means tend to reconcile me to a war, of which one of the consequences would be a drain upon our population; for, in estimating the people of a country, I never shall proceed upon the principle that *numbers* only are to be attended to; that an Italian, a Negro, or a Jew, is as good as an Englishman; that stock-jobbers are as good as farmers; and that the squalid inhabitants of commercial and manufacturing towns are worth as much to the state as an equal number of the inhabitants of villages and the skirts of commons. But, what has this subject to do with the point at issue? Who has ever considered a war with Spain, at the present moment, as a question of political economy? Who has said, that it is *not* wise to have colonies? Who has denied, that colonies of the right kind, well situated, and kept in due bounds as to population and geographical extent; who has ever denied, or thought of denying, that such a colonial system is advantageous to a state like Great Britain? Who has apprehended, or affected to apprehend, any danger from the drain which even new colonies would make upon our population? Who has not said, or thought, with me, that “a loss of our colonies in the West Indies, for instance, would close up one of those out-lets to the population of England, which causes her to live beyond her own scanty limits?” And who but this ministerial writer would have given to the public, as a new discovery, the universally acknowledged fact, that population will always bear a due proportion to the means of subsistence, or, applying to nations the emphatical expression and pious maxim so familiar under the roofs of the poor, that, “God never sends mouths without sending meat?” For what, then, were the public led into this subject; except to produce upon their minds an impression, that those who opposed, or should hereafter oppose, a war with Spain, were also opposed to the very existence of the colonial system altogether? Than which impression nothing could possibly be more false.—As I before said, I dislike this premature discussion. It is right the public should be put upon their guard against deception; and, it was in the performance of that duty that the Morning Chronicle made the remarks which called forth the champion

of Downing Street. But, it were always to be desired that the whole of the facts should be before the public previous to any discussion whatsoever. Without those facts before me, I cannot pretend to say, that it is not good policy to go to war with Spain; but, as the measure, considered merely as a measure of policy, has been justified upon certain supposed grounds, it becomes, as to those grounds, fairly and fully open to the examination and the judgment of every one. —The grounds, which are here alluded to, are those of *colonial and commercial profit*. The writer, after having gratuitously given us, in his way, a sketch of those principles of political economy more immediately connected with the subject of colonization, proceeds to a description, extremely loose, and in many respects somewhat absurd, of the advantages of colonial possessions, trade, and commerce; whence he, at once, dashes into all the glories of South American conquests; reminds us of the counsel of Lord Chatham, in the year 1762, says, that “the conduct of his Lordship, upon that occasion, corresponded with the greatness of his character, and, being worthy of imitation, seems to be followed by his son.” —If the smiling reader should here be inclined to ask, whether Lord Chatham was associated with such persons as Lords Melville, Hawkesbury, Harrowby, and Castlereagh; whether he was a colonel of volunteers, or adopted any Car or Catamaran projects, I must beg him to suspend all inquiries, till he has heard my author to the end. —It would, however, be putting his patience to a trial much too severe, to lead him through this writer’s arguments founded upon the success of the expeditions, formerly undertaken against the Spanish settlements and fortresses, under Anson, Vernon, Wentworth, and others; and, indeed, it will be quite necessary to confine my extracts to those parts of this essay which contain a description of the motives by which the ministers are actuated. “The colonial trade,” says he, “is an object wholly in our own power; it is of a good kind, and of such extensiveness and variety as to employ nobly the most inventive genius upon it. Foreign politics have something more splendid and entertaining than domestic prudence; but the latter is ever attended with infinitely more solid and lasting advantages. Indeed, it argues an extraordinary degree of perfection in a government, that has such a principle of increase within itself, as to draw others to unite themselves to the old stock, and shoot out a luxuriance of branches. —Besides,

“our fleet, increasing with our colonies and commerce, will extend our means of defence, and being unconfined to any place or sea, will traverse the world unmolested, while its power is the eternal theme of admiration or dismay. To accomplish this, however, we must always keep in our view, that judicious expense is often the best economy in the world, and that capital, wisely laid out on a good security, such as colonies are in general, yields a greater than usurious interest. —By this time, it will be immediately seen, on what points our eyes are fixed in case of a rupture with Spain. ‘What are we to conquer from Spain?’ As none but a schoolboy, wholly ignorant of history, and un-killed in political geography, could have suggested such a question, we shall, according to custom, endeavour to enlighten the mind even of dulness itself. —Spain is a country that cannot subsist without foreign succour. By a misguided policy, no encouragement whatever has been given either to the husbandman or the manufacturer. Her empire seems rather to have been transplanted to South America, while the mother country exhibits every feature of a sickly, decaying, and dependant province. Where agriculture is considered as a groveling profession, a nation can never prosper. Hence Spain is indebted, first, to her neighbours for the principal commodities of life, and secondly, to her American Colonies, for the means by which she may supply her own and their wants. To cut off those means therefore, is to render her completely inefficient; it would reduce her to such a state of political non-entity, that she would become a cumbersome load on her ally, and the contempt of her enemies. That kingdom is at present shamefully reduced to the condition of a vassal fief, dependant on a strange non-descript kind of government, called an Imperial Republic. During the last war, the principal efforts of this country were directed chiefly against the continental aggrandizement of France. The reduction of her East and West India possessions, was undertaken rather with a view to cripple her resources, than to secure any permanent advantage for ourselves. Hence, the necessity of an active co-operation with our allies upon the Continent, of large subsidies to enable them to carry on the war with vigour, and of powerful fleets and armies to cause diversions in their favour, throughout every portion of the civilized world. But, in the present war,

“ when we are contending *single handed* against the colossal power of France, the means which we have of annoyance, are great beyond all calculation. Although we are not in the least inclined to deteriorate from the great advantages which we may derive from Continental alliances, and fully admit the expediency of affording pecuniary assistance, to such powers as are able and willing to repress the encroachments of France; yet, as we are now circumstanced, those resources must be concentrated within the sphere of our own national exertions, and consequently furnish the means of extending our colonial acquisitions; which, whatever party writers may urge to the contrary, truth and experience prove to be, under a skilful administration, the most fruitful source of wealth to a brave and commercial nation of islanders.”——Begging the reader to bear the conclusion in mind, and reserving till by-and-by, the contrast which is to be drawn between the opinion here expressed and the opinion heretofore given by the present ministers, upon the same subject, I must, however stop for one moment, just to observe, that this writer seems to have forgotten a very excellent rule, and that is, never, in the conclusion of an argument, to introduce any adjunctive circumstance, which his adversary can deny, and thereby start a new question, in the fate of which the whole argument may thus become involved. He had forgotten this rule, or he never would have made the utility of colonies, for which utility solely he was contending, to depend upon the two circumstances, first, that the country should have a *skilful administration*, and, second, that the nation should *unite commerce with bravery*; for, I deny that we have a skilful administration; I deny, that commerce can ever be united with bravery; and, I insist, that, in whatever degree commerce exists in this kingdom, it has destroyed bravery, or, at least, all that sort of bravery which exerts itself for the glory and the liberties of the country. Here, then, I might call upon him to establish, by proof, the positions that I deny; but, his argument itself offers too tempting a prey to be, for a moment, relinquished.——“ Foreign politics,” he says, “ have something more splendid and entertaining than domestic prudence; but the latter is ever attended with infinitely more solid and lasting advantages.” Exactly what he may mean by “ foreign politics,” or by “ domestic prudence;” and, how they came to be put in contrast one with the other, except for the sake of the beauty in the allite-

ration of the words politics and prudence, it is impossible to conceive; for, surely, foreign politics may be punctually attended to, without any neglect of domestic prudence. With the foregoing profound observation, that which follows, and which is equally profound, has not the least apparent connexion. It argues, we are told, an extraordinary degree of perfection in a government, that “ has such a principle of increase within itself, as to draw others to unite themselves to the old stock, and shoot out a luxuriance of branches.” What can this mean! A government having a principle of increase *within itself*, and thereby drawing others (that is other governments) to unite to the old stock, and shoot out a luxuriance of branches!!! He means, however, that it is a mark of great excellence in a government, to have an aptitude at forming colonial establishments, and thereby strengthening the parent state. If experience be worth listening to, this aptitude, considered as to the glory and safety of the mother country, is no excellence in a government; and, when we reflect on the consequences, which, at a time not distant, nay, before the end of the present war, may result from our having once before settled an American Continent, it seems little short of madness to talk seriously of settling another. The *practicability* of such a project is another point, and a point, too, that requires to be decided in a manner much more satisfactory than it has been decided by this writer; but if the practicability be allowed him, he has much more to say to convince any man of the least reflection, that the settling of South America would not, if the settlement remained in our hands at the peace, and if the peace, in our actual state of power relative to France, could be durable, would very soon produce an independent state in that country, the immediate consequence of which would be the utter extirpation of the British power in the West Indies. North America became independent in less than an hundred years from the day that the first tree was cut down upon the spot where arose the city in which the act of Independence was proclaimed. Mexico and Peru are already settled. The people only want leaders. A few years would prepare them for independence. Their first connexion would naturally be with France. Without the aid of North America England could not, in case of such connexion, hold the West India islands a year. And, if once reduced to solicit that aid, who, that knows any thing at all of the views of North America; who, that has observed the longing looks that have for some

time been interchanged between that continent and our islands, can, for a moment believe, that, if reduced to the necessity of resorting to the aid of North America, England could any longer hold her West India colonies in the bonds of allegiance? Thus, by grasping at all, we should lose that which we have.—To enter into a minute examination of this writer's notions relative to the commercial gain held forth by him, as a consequence of the project, would be to throw away one's time. A nation's laying out of capital upon colonies in order therefrom to derive immense profit is an idea well worthy of those ministers, who called a committee of merchants into the cabinet with a view of obtaining, by a side wind, their approbation of a measure of the wisdom of which it was feared the nation would doubt. Spain certainly is a country, which, at present, cannot exist without foreign succour. Her American colonies have banished industry from her soil, and have reduced her to the last stage of baseness and debility; but, are we thence to conclude, that we should derive new vigour from becoming mistress of those very possessions? Such a conclusion should certainly be preceded by something like proof. She is "indebted to her neighbours" for the principal commodities of life, and "to her American colonies for the means by which she may supply her own and their wants." Granted, as far as money is meant by the word wants. But then comes the question of the parable: "*who* is her neighbour?" France as to vicinity; but, Lord Harrowby, the reputed author of these brilliant conceptions, ought surely to know, that with the produce of the American mines, Spain supplies Great Britain, even at this time, in much greater quantities than she supplies France; nay, in much greater quantities than it is possible for her government, to supply the government of France, until a total change has been effected in the commercial relations of Europe. What, then, should we, in a commercial point of view, gain by the conquest of her colonies? To go forth upon a project of conquering customers for our goods is quite unnecessary here; for, those whom we propose to conquer are our customers already; and, were we to succeed in the conquest, it is more than probable that they would soon cease to be so. Indeed, to sever the mines from the dominion of Spain seems to be the only possible way to cut off the channel, through which so large a share of their productions reach this country. So that, were we to conquer Spanish America, we should be endeavouring to realize the fable of the

goose with the golden eggs; but, even in that we should not succeed; for, we should kill the goose, without getting at her eggs, which, as was before observed, would, in all human probability, fall into the hands of those, whose existence would depend upon their success in driving Great Britain from every West India island. North America is now kept separate from South America only by the means of Spain; destroy the power of Spain in that part of the world, and the two continents instantly rush together, under the protection of France. Our islands are now fed by North America: it is evident they seriously aim at a still closer connexion with her: what, then, must be the consequence of making such an addition to her means of warfare? What must be the consequence of removing from those islands every motive for desiring the continuance of a connexion with Great Britain? —It would be easy to show, that the conquest of the Spanish colonies would not at all add to the maritime force of Great Britain, because its tendency would not be to increase her navigation; but, suppose the contrary; this is a sort of force to which we want no addition. We are here quite strong enough. Naval victory and dominion have been carried as far as it is of any use to this country. We have seen that it is incapable of giving us *security by land*, and even of retaining the naval honours won by our forefathers, and, till the last peace, preserved by their sons. It is upon the *land* that we are now called on to fight for our existence, and therefore Lord Harrowby holds out to us the cheering prospect of being able to "*sail* from one end to the other of the world without molestation!" —On Spain what would be the effect of the proposed conquest, supposing it to take place? As a customer of Great Britain, indeed, it would "render her completely inefficient." But, if her American colonies have been the sole cause of her political and warlike degradation, is it likely that she would be sunk still lower by the removal of that cause? She would have no more dollars to lend to France. True; but does Lord Harrowby really think, that she would, therefore, become a burden to France, and an object of greater contempt than she is at present? Does he believe, that the fields of Spain, having lain fallow in consequence of her possessing the American mines, would still lie fallow when she had no longer those mines wherewith to supply, and, poorly to supply, the want of industry? Amongst the effects of taking from Spain the mines of America, might very likely be a subversion

of the monarchy; but, the arms of the Spaniards would not be enfeebled; all the natural resources of Spain would, on the contrary, be drawn forth; and, for awhile, at least, they must be under the direction of France, even more completely than they are at present.—Thus far the project has not been viewed in connexion with our situation at home and in Europe; but, surely, it will not be pretended, that we are now in a situation similar to that in which this nation was at the time when Lord Chatham gave that counsel, now held forth as worthy the adoption of his son? It will hardly be asserted even by Lord Harrowby, that England is now as free from embarrassment in her domestic concerns, and as free from danger from the arms of France, as she was in 1762? Lord Chatham was not a financier; he had not governed according to the advice of speculating merchants and gamblers in the funds. In his time there was no income-tax, no bank-restriction, no sixpenny bank notes in any part of the kingdom. The union with Ireland, which his son has told us adds more to our strength than all the conquests of France adds to hers, had not, indeed, been accomplished, nor even proposed; but, then, the people of Ireland were not under martial-law. In the time of Lord Chatham, there was no thought of inundating either Essex or Kent; no bill had been passed for driving away the cattle or burning the ricks and barns, in case of emergency; no line of circumvallation had been traced round the metropolis; there were no colonels and corps of volunteers, no subscriptions for aiding the government with either carriages or horses. Lord Chatham had the better half of the Continent on his side, and regarded England as perfectly secure from all assaults of the enemy, or Lord Chatham would have merited Eedlam for proposing to rush head-long into a Spanish war, especially if he had already failed in all his schemes for raising an army, on which reliance for home-defence could be placed.—This ministerial writer says, and no one denies it, that the conquering or settling of colonies does not injure a country by draining her of her *population*. But, by population is meant, persons of both sexes, of all the different ages, and the several ranks in life; and, these persons are drained off by colonies only just as fast as they can be spared, or, in other words, only when they can no longer be maintained at home with comfort to themselves and advantage to their country, where their remaining would, of course, only prevent an increase, by new births, equal to themselves in number. Are these persons to be com-

pared to those drained off by military and naval expeditions? Are they to be compared to the flower of the country? To a body of men collected with infinite pains from every part of the kingdom; men whose health and strength have been verified by a scrupulous individual examination, and who, independent of their value as labourers and artisans, have cost the state not less than fifty pounds a man? These are not the surplus population, they are not the hair and nails and fat of a state; they are its sinews and its heart. And, if, at all times, this description of persons are of great national value, and ought not to be sacrificed, even in small numbers, without mature consideration, and for any thing short of an object clearly connected with the glory and the security of the state, is *this* the moment when we ought to sacrifice, or, at least, to hazard them, in great numbers, merely for the purpose of making an addition to our “capital, credit, and commerce?” Lord Harrowby seems to think, that the taking of the Spanish settlements will be a mere holiday enterprise; and he has selected the Havannah and Porto-Rico as the two first objects to grasp, not recollecting perhaps, that both of them were attacked by our forces during the last war; and, it is well known that neither was taken. Why are not Martinico and Guadaloupe taken? And, if it be said, that those are French possessions, then I ask Lord Harrowby, if he really believes, that there are no Frenchmen, particularly French officers, at Porto-Rico, the Havannah, Porto-Bello, and Carthagena?—If an enterprise against the Spanish colonies could be expected to cause a diversion of the European force of France, and thereby, or in any other way, contribute to the security of England, in a greater degree than it must necessarily weaken her defence by the withdrawing of her troops; then, indeed, there would be some ground whereon to stand in defence of the project. But, that the conquest of colonies can now contribute to the safety of the mother country in no other way than by adding to her pecuniary resources is evident; and, in the case of the Spanish colonies, it would not, as has been already shown, contribute even in this way. At any rate, no such contribution could possibly take place soon, while the expense of the expedition must be immediate, and while every soldier that we have is wanted at home.—With respect, however, to the value of colonies, as *affording security to the mother country*, we are so fortunate as to have upon record the opinions of Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt; opinions gravely delivered before

the members of the House of Commons, during the debate upon the treaty of peace with France. Lord Harrowby, if I am not mistaken as to the identity of that noble person, did not publicly speak upon the peace; but, it will not, I trust, be deemed unfair, if I presume, that his sentiments upon this, as well as upon *all* other subjects, were expressed by the above-named three great statesmen, his present colleagues. By those who disapproved of the peace, it was contended, that we ought, in order to give the peace a chance of permanency, to have retained all, or nearly all, our conquests, particularly the Cape of Good Hope, the advanced post of India; Martinico, the Gibraltar of the West India seas; and Malta, the out-post of Egypt. It was also contended, that the value, in a pecuniary light, of the conquered West India colonies was very considerable; and, that, the conquest being made, these colonies ought to have been retained with a view of the better enabling the mother country to support a peace establishment so great as that which it was evident she must support if France was left in possession of Flanders, Holland, and Italy, particularly the two former. What did our statesmen, those who are now about to attack the Spanish colonies; what did they say in answer to this? They asserted, that the retaining of these colonies, amongst which, be it remembered, were Martinico, the Cape, and Malta; that very Malta, for which alone, in the eyes of the world, we are now at war! Yes, they asserted, that the retaining of these colonies, would have been of little or no use, in any way whatever, but particularly as contributing to our security. It is positively stated, that Lord Harrowby is the author of the essay upon which I am commenting; if he be, he will now be convinced, that very great caution is necessary in defending any measure of a minister of "existing circumstances," especially if he be one much in the practice of making speeches, and, moreover, if those speeches are printed. If his lordship had looked back to the debates upon the peace, he never would have represented a disapprobation of colonial conquests as being entertained only by "party writers."—Lord Hawkesbury, the ostensible maker of the peace, said: "I now come to the question of acquisition, as it should be fairly taken with respect to the power and resources of a country. And here let me observe, that the spirit of acquisition may be strained beyond its proper limits. I contend that an increase of power does not take place in proportion to an increase of

acquisitions; and I need not enter into any detail to shew, that this principle, applying to the continent, is equally true with respect to the acquisition of colonial power."\* Lord Castlereagh not only thought, or, at least, said, that the surrendering, and not the acquiring, of colonies was the way to provide for our security, as far as it could be provided for by restoring our influence on the continent of Europe: "If I were called upon to say, what would have the greatest effect in restoring our influence on the continent, I should say: give back to France her colonial possessions!"† Mr. Pitt's opinion has already been quoted as a motto to the present sheet; and, when the reader has referred to it, considering at the same time, that it was advanced in justification of having surrendered, without any equivalent, and merely to obtain peace, all the colonies (except Ceylon and Trinidad) which we had conquered in a long war, and at the expense, probably, of nearly a hundred thousand men and a hundred millions of taxes; when the reader has referred to Mr. Pitt's opinion, and considered it in connexion with the occasion and the motive, then let him say, whether this minister, who is now beginning a Spanish colonial war, as his advocates assert, for profit, be under the guidance of any thing worthy of the name of principle.—It is *possible*, that there are hostile armaments going on in the ports of Spain; *real* ones, I mean, and not such armaments as those which were going on in the ports of France, at the beginning of this war, and which had no existence except in the speeches and manifestoes of our ministers; it is possible, that Spain has been driven to make preparations which, in *truth*, may be big with danger to this country; and, if so, war most assuredly ought to be commenced against her, and that too with very little ceremony; because, the more completely she is under the power of France, the greater reason have we to be vigilant with respect to her operations. In short, when the proofs of her hostile intentions come to be submitted to the world, it may clearly appear, that to declare war against Spain was, on our part, politic as well as just; but, the sort of war to be carried on against her is another question; and, for the reasons above stated, I am convinced, that a war against her colonies,

\* Speech of 3d Nov. 1801. Vide Register, Vol. II. p. 1121.

† Speech of 14th May, 1801. Vide Register, Vol. II. 1333.

in any part of the world, with some one or two little exceptions, perhaps, would be a war tending only to hasten the downfall of the British monarchy.——Need I point out the miserable subterfuge which this writer has had recourse to in order to reconcile Mr. Pitt's opinions and conduct at the peace with his present colonial war project?"—"During the *last* war," says he, "we undertook the conquest of colonies merely to cripple the resources of France, and not to secure any permanent advantage to ourselves." And why? Because we had allies in that war. Now mark this. The very reason upon which the peace and the surrender of our conquests were justified was, that, "we were left alone in the war!" And, indeed, we were left alone in the war. We had not one co-operating ally at the close of it; and yet we are now told, that, the *not* having of allies is the reason why we should make colonial conquests. "But, in the present war," says this reputed noble statesman, "when we are contending single-handed against the colossal power of France, the means which we have of annoyance are beyond all calculation." What does this mean? That we are stronger without allies upon the continent; and that, having no motive to restrain us, we may now give the full swing to our maritime power, indulge even to satiety our love of commerce and of wealth? Alas! this indulgence, though it were to produce no mischiefs to ourselves, could not injure France; could not give her any annoyance. But, this is a mere dream; or, like the catamaran project, it is the creature of the bottle.——It really seems but too probable, however, that a war with Spain has been resolved upon from no better motive. Something was wanted to give the appearance of vigour to the councils of the catamaran ministry: something to make a shew and a talk: "quelque chose pour blouir," as the French charlatan said, when, by mistake, he threw fire instead of light into the eyes of his company: something to "please the sailors and to keep up the spirits of the people:" something, in short, to buoy up the sinking names of Pitt and Dundas. For a short space this sort of success will be obtained. In a money-loving nation a war of dollars will always be popular at its out-set, more especially at a time when specie has disappeared. The

former part of these remarks were written on my way to London. At Winchester there were two farmers standing in the inn yard, one saying to the other: "I wish thur wud coom a good Zpanish war; we shud zee zuar goolde then in playace of this yar d--d pihapar-mooney." Almost the first words I heard in London were from the lips of a shop-keeper in Cockspur-street. "Sammy," said he to his pale sharp looking neighbour, "have you heard th- news? Three Spanish frigates taken and one blown up!" . . . "The deuce!" says Sammy, "any money on board?" "Full," replied the other. "That's right," rejoined Sammy, rubbing his white hands, "we shall now have some guineas again."——Sammy's idea was exactly the same as that of the farmer at Winchester.

"Proud swells the tide with loads of freighted ore,  
And shouting folly hails them to her shore!"

How sadly poor Sammy and my Hampshire farmer will be disappointed it can hardly be necessary to describe. They think, that the money on board the ships thus captured will all be brought on shore, and flow at once into circulation. Not a single ounce of it ever will, unless the bank-notes, "the d--d pihapar-mooney," as the farmer called it, be first destroyed. Sammy thinks, I dare say, that each of the sailors concerned in the capture, will, in a few days time, come on shore with his jacket and trowser pockets and hat full of money. Whereas, whatever share falls to him he will receive in little dirty bits of paper, probably from some country bank. The gold and silver, notwithstanding any waggon-fare that may be exhibited between Portsmouth and London, will all go to countries where there is little or no paper-money. Evident and inevitable as this operation is, however, I should not, after what I have seen, be much surprised to find, that Mr. Pitt himself entertains a hope of restoring his paper money by means of the Spanish mines! I speak with perfect sincerity; for, childish as this notion would be, why should it not exist in that mind whence so many shallow opinions and projects have proceeded?——Want of room compels me to defer those remarks, which I could wish to make without delay, on the manner in which the war with Spain has been commenced.

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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*Teach him, that states of native strength possess'd,  
Though very poor, may still be very bless'd;  
That TRADE's proud empire hastes to swift decay,  
As ocean sweeps the labour'd mole away;  
While self dependent pow'r can time defy,  
As rocks resist the billows and the sky.*—GOLDSMITH.

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## LETTER III.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

### MARKS OF NATIONAL DECLINE.

SIR,—Before I proceed to trace back to its causes the decline of Great Britain, it will very reasonably and naturally be required of me, to shew that the effect itself is not a mere creature of imagination; to point out what it is that I regard as the marks of that decline, of which my proposition necessarily supposes the existence. And, here, Sir, I am not unaware of the hostile feeling that I have to encounter. Men are naturally averse from every thing which tends to the establishing of disagreeable truths. No bearer of sad tidings was ever yet greeted with a welcome; every one turns from the assurance of his dangers with an anxiety proportioned to their magnitude; it is the universal desire that the evil hour should be the last. But, as the bankrupt by shunning his books only hardens the grasp of the bailiff; as the patient who rejects the probe defers nothing but the possible alleviation of his agony; so the people, who shut their ears against the proofs of their national decline, thereby hasten the downfall which they dread, and which from this cause more than from any other they finally experience.

To enumerate all the marks of our decline would require a volume of no moderate bulk. It will be sufficient to point out a few of those which apply more immediately to the present situation of the country; and the first of which is, the *Predominance of Wealth*. I am not complaining that people love money; that they prefer it to every other thing; that virtue and talents and even beauty are nothing when weighed against it: this complaint has always existed, and always will exist, as long as there are poor and rich people in the world. I am not speaking of individual riches as they affect the relations between man and man, but as they are now connected with what is called the wealth of the country; as they affect the public mind,

and as they influence the national counsels.

In a well-constituted and healthy community, or state, individual riches are always held in subordination to higher endowments, and the public wealth is rendered subservient to the liberties and glory of the nation; whereas in states that are hastening towards their fall every other endowment yields to the possession of riches, and the nation's liberty and glory only serve as sacrifices to the preservation of its wealth.—To talk of the decline of a nation which is daily augmenting its exports and imports, its manufactures in every branch, its turnpike roads and canals, and the metropolis of which annually receives an addition equal in extent and population to a considerable city, while the people even to the lowest rank are clad and fed better than at any former period; to talk of the decline of such a nation will, to those who do not reflect, appear utterly incomprehensible. But, whoever has duly considered what it is that constitutes the greatness of a nation, what it is that raises her high in the world, what it is that secures her independence, will not derive much consolation from the custom-house books, or from any other of the usually enumerated signs of public prosperity; and, though his philanthropy may be gratified at seeing the poor eat whiter bread than formerly, his patriotism will certainly be mortified at the reflection that, in numbers three times greater than formerly, they eat it at the hands of the parish.—In estimating the prosperity of nations, we erroneously proceed upon the principles and maxims according to which we estimate the prosperity of individuals. We can form no idea of national decline which does not resemble that of a man's decline in business; and, thus, always involved in our trading notions, it appears to be a perfect absurdity to consider the decline of a nation as pointed out by the predominance of its wealth. Hence all the delusive hopes which were entertained, and held forth to the people, during the last war with France, that the enemy must soon be subdued, because he was ruined in his finances. Year after year, Sir, proceeding upon the maxim

of that profound thinker Lord Auckland, you roused up the spirits of the people by depicting the declining circumstances, the approaching bankruptcy, the inevitable ruin, of the enemy, while the London makers of false assignats were urged on with as much eagerness as if the salvation of the world had depended upon the success of their labours. They did succeed; the much desired bankruptcy arrived; the enemy was, according to your notions, *completely ruined*. The sequel need not be described. Yet, even the peace of Amiens, in every article of which we fell prostrate before this declining, this bankrupt, this ruined enemy; even that compact did not remove the delusive confidence in the effects of wealth; and, when the aggrandizement of France and its fearful consequences were held forth to view, you referred us, with a triumphant smile somewhat partaking of a sneer, to "the immense *wealth* of this country, which was more than sufficient to counterbalance all the acquisitions of France." Your opinion was generally adopted: it was exactly consonant to the trading notions of the people: it was an homage paid to commerce and riches, and, therefore, it was sure to be graciously received. This opinion naturally grew out of the previously adopted error of applying to the affairs of nations the principles according to which we judge of individual prosperity. In every state of life we see that wealth gives power, and, as we know that power gives security, the deduction is, that, in order to provide for our security, we have only to amass wealth. Facts have proved, that, as applied to nations, the leading position is false. But, of this there required very little reflection to convince us. Men of shallow minds, much too shallow to be employed even in the secondary departments of the state, do, indeed, always talk of the affairs of a nation as of those of a shop or a farm; and we have heard, from some of that numerous tribe of small lawyers who inhabit the Treasury Bench, speeches upon a treaty of peace or upon a declaration of war, which, with a change of the names of the parties and of places, might have done exceedingly well for a trial at the Westminster Sessions or at Hicks's Hall. These loquacious gentlemen do not seem to observe the wide difference that exists between the nature of national wealth and that of the wealth of individuals. The latter gives power, but it gives power only as long as it is itself protected by the power of the state, that is to say by the government and the law, or, in one word, by the rich, who defend the rich, and neglect the interests of the poor. To

render, therefore, the reasoning upon individual riches applicable to the wealth of nations, we must first discover some extraneous power, by which each nation is protected in the exclusive possession of all the wealth which it has amassed. Amongst individuals wealth gives power and power gives security, but this is only because there is another and greater power which secures the wealth; and, as there is no such power to superintend the wealth of nations, the rich nation is no more secure than the poor one; nay, it is much less secure, being placed in a situation similar to that in which a rich man would be without the protection of the magistrate, presenting to the plunderer the strongest of temptations with the weakest of obstacles.—It is not the mere possession of the wealth that we are to regard as a mark of national decline; but the estimating of that wealth too highly, and particularly the confiding in it as a means of preserving ourselves against the assaults of a war-like enemy, a sort of confidence that was never yet entertained by any nation not in the last stages of its degradation.

Another mark of national decline is the total want of a military spirit in the country: the aversion which men have to the profession of arms, and the consequent difficulties of raising an army. I think I hear you exclaim: "What! a want of a military spirit in the country, when I have 480,000 volunteers!" I can make allowance for the esprit du corps, and also for a colonel's swelling out his muster-roll; but, I must be excused, if I reject the volunteer establishment as a proof of a military spirit, and even as a proof of personal bravery. I do not say, or insinuate, that the volunteers are not as brave as the rest of their countrymen; but, I deny, that their having entered into volunteer corps is any proof of their personal courage, and, in a national point of view, I regard the establishment as a striking proof of a want of a military spirit. Whence did it originate? Mr. Addington told us, in the loyalty and patriotism of the people. He knew better. All of us knew, that it principally arose from the dread of the ballot, a dread so deeply engraven on the minds of the people, that it will be very long before it be worn out. From this cause the ranks were filled, and replenished, till the passing of the parish-officer-project bill, which, by removing the dread of the ballot has removed about one half of the volunteers from their corps; and, when the bill comes to be thoroughly understood in every part of the country, it would not be at all surprising if the 480,000 men were to be reduced to 50,000, leaving no



thing but those who have assembled merely to play at soldiers, and who have not the most distant idea of ever marching ten miles from their homes. The simple fact is, then, that, of 80,000 men capable of bearing arms, 300,000, at least, entered into volunteer corps from the dread of being forced to enter a more effective service, a service *more military*, and this too at a moment when they regarded the independence of their country as being at stake! If this be not a proof of the want of a military spirit what proof can be given? The men are excusable for many reasons; and the ministers who had recourse to the measure have been justified upon the ground of necessity. They could not, it is said, get men in any other way. If true, this fact only strengthens the position for which I am contending. But, the original cause of the volunteer system is to be sought for in the spirit of trade. The minister, who was by no means deficient in that cunning which is usually found in a mind like his, saw in the adoption of a scheme, which would produce the appearance of vigour and security, while it left the mechanics and manufacturers at the command of their employers, the means of preserving his place for a year or two longer. It was a scheme perfectly congenial with the presumption as well as the avarice of the traders, who, at the same time that they saved, as they thought, the expense of a regular army, grasped at whatever authority was to be obtained amongst the volunteers. They regarded the volunteer force as an army entirely their own: raised for the protection of their warehouses and their banks: upon this army, therefore, of which you soon put yourself at the head, all the praises and honours were lavished: thus a system purely defensive was erected, and Britain became an island besieged.—Of all the marks of national decline none is so unequivocal as that disposition which leads a people systematically to stand upon the defensive and wait for the attack of a threatening enemy. They first endeavour to purchase tranquillity at the expense of their honour; and, failing in that, forced at last into war, their best hope is to escape being conquered and yoked. Look back over the history of the world, Sir, and say, if any such people ever long preserved their independence!—The resentment of such a people, their bitter reproaches against their enemy, are not occasioned by his insults, but by the compulsion they are under to meet him in arms: even their deeds of valour, if they perform any, are to be ascribed to a feeling very different from that which it is necessary for a nation

to entertain in order to preserve its honour and to make it respected in the world. "A people rising unanimously in arms, for the defence of their homes," you seem to regard as the most noble of spectacles; but, it would be much nobler, it would argue much greater courage and much less fear, if only a part, and, proportionally, a very small part, were to rise, while the rest remained tranquilly at home. When the domestics, in some play or romance that I have read, after long disputes as to whose duty it is to enter a haunted chamber, settle the matter by agreeing to go *all together*, this "unanimous rising" is, if I remember right, by no means attributed to an excess of bravery. The bull, when attacked marches forth alone, leaving the herd to graze in tranquillity: while the timid flock, if they venture to make a shew of resistance, never fail to make it in a body.

The want of a military spirit is naturally accompanied with an indifference for national honours, for the distinctions which perpetuate those glorious deeds, which, by means of such distinctions, are handed down from father to son. Of this indifference, Sir, as prevalent in this country, we have a melancholy proof in the conduct of the government, the parliament, and the people, respecting the surrender of the *honour of the flag*, and the still more ancient and still higher honor of the title of *King of France*. What avails it to talk of the heroic deeds of Nelson, since they could not prevent the dishonour of the flag, under which they were performed? For it must never be forgotten that to give up an honour once enjoyed is to be dishonoured. The title of King of France, together with the Lilies, you denominated "a harmless feather;" a term aptly descriptive of that indifference the existence of which I deplore, and which is a sure and certain mark of the debasement of the national mind. "A harmless feather," the preserving of which ought not to stand in the way of so great a blessing "as peace"! If peace were necessarily so great a blessing, why did you go to war? Was it to preserve your honour and dignity? Strange indeed, then, that in order to put an end to the war, you should give up the greatest honour, the most glorious medal, that the nation ever won! "A harmless feather"! Why, all honours and titles and dignities are, then, harmless feathers! Did you go to war to preserve the constitution; or, to use a term of more definite meaning, to preserve the throne? Still more strange, that, for the sake of returning to "the blessings of peace," you should yield, as a harm-

less father, one of the brightest honours of that throne! an honour which contributed not a little to the exciting and the preserving of that national pride and confidence by which it was originally achieved, and on which, let custom-house politicians say what they will, both the throne and the country depended for security. The memory of the conquest of France, recorded upon our coins, and every-where else where the armorial bearings of our sovereign appeared, was one of the most powerful incentives amongst the common people. First or last, every son asked of his father an explanation of the meaning of the title of King of France; that generally led to a relation more or less correct, of the valorous deeds of Englishmen in former times; and the impression thus received was communicated to the next generation.

"This story shall the good man teach his son;

"And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,

"From this day to the ending of the world,

"But we in it shall be remember'd."

Shakespeare, alas! did not contemplate the possibility of times like the present. He never imagined that the lilies, won at Agincourt, would one day be bartered for the privilege of vending bales of goods!—Had the surrendering of this the greatest of all our honours been condemned by the nation; had it been decidedly reprobated in parliament; had it been the sole work of a minister; then there would be some hope that it was no indication of national decline. But, parliament passed the matter over as if it were too trifling to meddle with; and, I do not remember that any one, except my insignificant self, spoke of it, in print, at least, as a subject of regret.—I am aware, that, amongst the smooth little clerks of Downing Street, this notion of the great effects of national honours will be regarded as an excellent subject of ridicule. They laugh at the idea of high sentiments in the minds of low men; but, not to say that the common people are not the *lowest* of men, and though it be not supposed that their notions of national honour are very refined, it may safely be asserted, that upon their minds those honours have a greater effect than upon those of any other class. Do we not always see them the first and the loudest in rejoicing at the victories won by the arms of their country? Their joy and their pride, upon such occasions, are greater than those of any other description of persons; because, uninformed as to the various circumstances of the event, they see the glory unclouded by any reflections upon the cost or the consequences, or upon the general

character or conduct of the parties concerned.—Whoever carefully traces loyalty and patriotism to their source, will, I am persuaded, clearly discover, that neither of them can long exist where national honours are a subject of indifference. Turn over the page of history, and then say, whether those princes who have been the greatest warriors have not also been the greatest favourites, more especially of the lower classes of their subjects. Many of them have been cruel tyrants, the constant practisers of all manner of vices; but military glory, endearing the possessors to the hearts of the great mass of the people, have, almost without exception, enabled them to despise the opinions of the more reflecting and criticising few. This general propensity may, and does, in certain cases, prove injurious to the humbler virtues and to individual freedom; but most assuredly it is the principal means of preserving national independence, which will ever be the first object with wise legislators and statesmen. The mere personal attachment to the sovereign, founded upon his practising those virtues which are met with in every rank of life, must necessarily be confined to the breasts of a few, and comparatively speaking, a very few indeed of his subjects. In truth, such attachment partakes not of the nature of loyalty. Loyalty is a firm and immovable adherence to the king as king, and not as a man: it is shewn in a reverence for his title and office; in a prompt and cheerful obedience to his commands; in a devotion of life, if called for, in his service; and it arises, amongst the mass of his subjects, from an habitual, an hereditary, persuasion, that the king is the repository of all that is necessary to the preservation of the national character, in which the heart of every man, however humble his condition, tells him that he has a share.—And, as to the other great public virtue, patriotism, which, when it exists in its proper degree, is a principle of the mind as strong and as uniform in its effects, as a love of kindred or of life itself; whence does it arise? Not from the desire to get a contract or a job, like that of the patriotism of Sir Brook's committees: not from anxiety for the funds like that of the patriotism of Lloyd's and the bank: not from an affection for the earth, the mere dirt, for the dirt is still dirt, whatever be its geographical description. In the minds of the great and the rich, the principle of patriotism may be strengthened by considerations of individual interest; but, amongst the common people, the fighting part of the community, the prospect sel-

dom extends beyond food and raiment; food and raiment, indeed, of a coarser or finer sort; but, after all, food and raiment are every thing that any soil, under any government, can possibly give them. It is true, that every man has an instinctive attachment to the spot where he first drew his breath; but, his country may be conquered without at all interrupting the indulgence of this grovelling feeling; and, as to mere appellation, in that respect, even Rome herself has lost nothing. No, Sir; in none of these has the virtue of patriotism its foundation, but in that anxious desire, which every man of sound sense and honest nature has, to see preserved untarnished the reputation of that country which he is obliged to own, whose name he can never shake off, from whose calamities he may possibly flee, but in all whose disgraces he must inevitably share. What, for instance, induced me, when so far distant from my country, voluntarily to devote myself to her cause? Her commerce? I neither knew nor cared any thing about it. Her funds? I was so happy as hardly to understand the meaning of the word. Her lands? I could, alas! lay claim to nothing but the graves of my parents.—What, then, was the stimulus? What was I proud of? It was the name and fame of England. Her laws, her liberties, her justice, her might; all the qualities and circumstances that had given her renown in the world, but above all her deeds in arms, her military glory. Had she then been, as she now is, bereft of the principal symbols of that glory; had she then been, as she now is, dishonoured in the eyes of the world, a bye-word and a reproach amongst the nations, very different, indeed, situated as I was, must have been my feelings and my conduct; and, even now, did I entertain the thought of her sinking into a mere money-cart, a mere work-shop, or a factory for traders; did I not hope, did I not, as I do, confidently hope (the causes of her decline first swept away) to see her regain her former greatness, it would, with me, be a matter of perfect indifference, who owned her soil, or who eat the produce.

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amongst the common people, and the consequent and fearful increase of those cuttings and stabbings, those assassin-like ways of taking vengeance, formerly heard of in England only as the vices of the most base and cowardly foreigners, but now become so frequent amongst ourselves as to render necessary a law to punish such practices with death; the prevalence and encouragement of a hypocritical religion, a canting morality, and an affected humanity; the daily increasing poverty of the national church, and the daily increasing disposition still to fleece the more than half-shorn clergy, who are compelled to be, in various ways, the mere dependents of the upstarts of trade; the almost entire extinction of the ancient country gentry, whose estates are swallowed up by loan-jobbers, contractors, and nabobs, who, for the far greater part not Englishmen themselves, exercise in England that sort of insolent sway, which, by the means of taxes raised from English labour, they have been enabled to exercise over the slaves of India or elsewhere; the bestowing of honours upon the mere possessors of wealth, without any regard to birth, character, or talents, or to the manner in which that wealth has been acquired; the familiar intercourse of but too many of the ancient nobility with persons of low birth and servile occupations, with exchange and insurance-brokers, loan and lottery contractors, agents and usurers, in short, with all the Jew-like race of money-changers; the loss of the spirit of independence, which is perceivable in the almost universal willingness and even eagerness, with which the higher classes seek to lean upon the Treasury, and with which the lower classes throw themselves upon the higher in the character of parish poor, thus forming the whole nation into a string of political mendicants, cringing to the minister of the day for a portion of that which he has drained from them in taxes.—Upon these and many other infallible marks of national decline it would be useless to dwell; for, indeed, why need we look for any other mark than that which is exhibited in our situation considered relatively to France? When I am shown the numerous turnpike roads and canals, the amazing manufactories of Manchester and Birmingham, the immense extent and riches of London, I see indubitable proofs of enormous individual wealth; but no proof at all of national *wealth*, which, properly understood, is only another word for national *power*. Of what use are all these riches, unless the nation is more powerful in consequence of them? And, in es-

less father, one of the brightest honours of that throne! an honour which contributed not a little to the exciting and the preserving of that national pride and confidence by which it was originally achieved, and on which, let custom-house politicians say what they will, both the throne and the country depended for security. The memory of the conquest of France, recorded upon our coins, and every-where else where the armorial bearings of our sovereign appeared, was one of the most powerful incentives amongst the common people. First or last, every son asked of his father an explanation of the meaning of the title of King of France; that generally led to a relation more or less correct, of the valorous deeds of Englishmen in former times; and the impression thus received was communicated to the next generation.

“ This story shall the good man teach his son ;

“ And Crispin Crispian shall ne’er go by,

“ From this day to the ending of the world,

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amongst the common people, and the consequent and fearful increase of those cuttings and stabbings, those assassin-like ways of taking vengeance, formerly heard of in England only as the vices of the most base and cowardly foreigners, but now become so frequent amongst ourselves as to render necessary a law to punish such practices with death; the prevalence and encouragement of a hypocritical religion, a canting morality, and an affected humanity; the daily increasing poverty of the national church, and the daily increasing disposition still to fleece the more than half-shorn clergy, who are compelled to be, in various ways, the mere dependents of the upstarts of trade; the almost entire extinction of the ancient country gentry, whose estates are swallowed up by loan jobbers, contractors, and nabobs, who, for the far greater part not Englishmen themselves, exercise in England that sort of insolent sway, which, by the means of taxes raised from English labour, they have been enabled to exercise over the slaves of India or elsewhere; the bestowing of honours upon the mere possessors of wealth, without any regard to birth, character, or talents, or to the manner in which that wealth has been acquired; the familiar intercourse of but too many of the ancient nobility with persons of low birth and servile occupations, with exchange and insurance-brokers, loan and lottery contractors, agents and usurers, in short, with all the Jew-like race of money-changers; the loss of the spirit of independence, which is perceivable in the almost universal willingness and even eagerness, with which the higher classes seek to lean upon the Treasury, and with which the lower classes throw themselves upon the higher in the character of parish poor, thus forming the whole nation into a string of political mendicants, cringing to the minister of the day for a portion of that which he has drained from them in taxes.—Upon these and many other infallible marks of national decline it would be useless to dwell; for, indeed, why need we look for any other mark than that which is exhibited in our situation considered relatively to France? When I am shown the numerous turnpike roads and canals, the amazing manufactories of Manchester and Birmingham, the immense extent and riches of London, I see indubitable proofs of enormous individual wealth; but no proof at all of national *wealth*, which, properly understood, is only another word for national *power*. Of what use are all these riches, unless the nation is more powerful in consequence of them? And, in es-

timating her power, we must not, like those profound statesmen Lords Castlereagh and Hawkesbury, count the number of her ships, seamen and boys, and also of her soldiers, militia, and volunteers, compared with the numbers of her own forces of former times and former wars, and conclude, that, because we find the present numbers greater, the nation must now be more powerful than she was in those times. Power is a relative endowment: nor, in speaking of the power of a nation, must we consider it relatively to the power of the nations of the world promiscuously, or in general; but to that of her neighbours, and especially of that particular nation, who has long been known as her rival and antagonist. I may easily beat a child or an old man; I may mow down whole crowds of cripples; but, am I yet able to encounter the man who is my equal in age, health, and size, and with whom I have fought in all the stages of life, from infancy up to manhood? This is the question which every man will put to himself, in order to satisfy his own mind as to the fact, whether, in point of bodily strength, he has, or has not, declined. And, as to his neighbours, if they see him suing for a cessation of the combat under the pretext of a necessity for "taking breath," and of gathering strength "against another day of trial;" if they see him submitting to the grossest of insults rather than make that trial; and, when at last compelled to it, if they see his utmost heroism, his "glory," confined merely to the preservation of his existence, must they not conclude that he is a fallen and still fading man? It was, therefore, Sir, with great pain and with no small degree of shame, that, I heard you, in your defence of the peace of Amiens, join in the harangues with respect to the secure state and proud attitude of England, when compared with the "degraded nations of the continent," and when I heard you exult over the fall of Tippoo Sultan as "one of the events which had given the greatest consolidation to our strength!" But, Sir, it was not a comparison between England and Holland, or between England and Spain or America, that could afford triumph to any sound common sense; the comparison to be made was one between England and France; between the combatants who had been opposed to each other, and not between those who had been fighting on the same side, the comparison in the latter case being really of a negative kind, and yielding only the miserable, not to say base consolation, that, while our companions had been stripped of their garments, and, in some places,

of their skin, we had escaped without any other loss than that of our badges of honour, our trident and our lilies!—And here, Sir, I will, for a minute, interrupt the thread of my observations, in order to do what I should have done before, namely, remove, in advance, the objection which will, by the small lawyers and petty statesmen of Downing Street, be urged against my arguments founded on the loss of the lilies; seeing that we *threw them away* during the war, or, in the words of the Poet Laureat, "indignantly scratched them from the shield;" and this, for the sake of easy comprehension, I shall do in the recital of a fable. "The beaver," says Æsop, "which is a very timid though laborious animal, has a certain part about him for the obtaining of which he is often hunted down and killed. Once upon a time, as one of these creatures was hard pursued by the dogs, and knew not how to escape, recollecting within himself the reason of his being persecuted, he, with great resolution, bit off the part which his hunters wanted, and threw it towards them." Whether this answered the purpose of the poor beaver, we are left uninformed, but ours it certainly has not answered; on the contrary, it seems only to have rendered our hunters more keen in pursuit of the carcase. The moral, which Croxall has added to his fable of the hunted beaver is singular enough: "Indeed," says he, "when life is pursued, and in danger, whoever values it, should give up every thing but his *honour* to preserve it."—To return to the boasting comparison; it was not the defeat and total overthrow of Tippoo Sultan that we should have heard of; it was the overthrow of Bonaparte, or, at least, of the reduction of his power to within such limits as would have rendered it not so obviously dangerous to England. What was the defeat of Tippoo Sultan to the people of this kingdom? The best purpose it could possibly answer was to insure the tranquillity of colonies the most distant of any that the mother country possesses, the most expensive to her, as is now clearly proved by the accounts submitted to parliament, and the least subsidiary to her native strength, to say nothing about the many ways in which it enfeebles her. How, then, could the fall of Tippoo, which has been followed by war upon war ever since, be placed in the balance against the immense addition which, at the time of peace, had been made to the solid power of France, that power which now enables her to keep us in a state of siege?

In answer to observations upon the decline of the nation, we are always reminded of the fate of former gloomy predictions upon the same subject; and, that patient gentleman, Sir John Sinclair, has taken the pains to collect together passages from twenty or thirty authors, who have, at various times, predicted the "ruin" of England from the effects of the national debt. I shall, in the course of these letters, take an opportunity of showing, that the far greater part of what the most of these authors regarded as the ruin of their country, did, pretty nearly in the time and manner predicted, take place; and that, in many instances, the consequences apprehended were mitigated or prevented altogether, by the measures which their predictions produced. But, unless it be pretended, that, because some past predictions have not been fulfilled, no future ones, relative to the fall of a nation, can be fulfilled, this mode of answering cannot be very satisfactory, at least, until it be shown, that the circumstances, under which former gloomy predictions were made, were similar to, or of a nature still more dangerous, than the circumstances of the present times. It is not my intention here to enter into the subject of the paper-money system; that system will be treated of as a cause, and not as a mark of national decline; but, I cannot forbear just to notice how weak that argument in favour of the funding system must be, which is built upon the failure of the predictions of those who thought they foresaw a national bankruptcy in times when a measure like that of "bank-restriction" had never entered into the mind of man. What resemblance was there, in this respect, between those times and the present? Never till within these eight years was there a scarcity of coin known in England. Till then paper was merely an auxiliary currency. Till then there were no notes under five pounds, now there are in the kingdom notes down to a value so low as that of a depreciated sixpence. Yet, it is with these facts before his eyes, and without a single instance in the history of the world of an extensive degraded paper currency having recovered from its degradation, that Sir John Sinclair has thought proper to produce predictions of a century ago, and from their failure (without proving it) to argue that the present predictions, relating to the same subject, are false!—It is, however, precisely in the same way that we are answered, when we insist upon the political dangers and decline of the country. We are told that such apprehensions have been before ex-

pressed over and over again; but, no mention is made of those apprehensions, which, at different times, have proved well founded, nor any acknowledgment of the fulfilment of certain predictions, in part if not in whole. The decline of the country has been insisted on, and its subjugation (always conditionally) has been predicted; and, because it has not yet actually been subjugated, we are hence bid to conclude, that it has not declined, and that it will not fall. But, unless the persons who have made this conclusion insist that the fall of this kingdom is an absolute impossibility, it behoves them, before they press their conclusion upon me, to show, as in the case of the paper-money system, that the nation has ever before been placed in circumstances equally dangerous to those of the present. When they have shown me this; when they have referred me to a time that saw England without an ally upon the continent, and France in complete possession of all the coast of Europe from the Baltic to the Gulph of Venice, particularly that of Flanders and Holland, countries without whose perfect independence as to France it was a fixed maxim with English statesmen that England could never be safe: when they have shown me the time that the threats of France held the whole people of England in a state of bodily requisition for the mere defence of their native soil, totally uncertain of the moment when they should be called on to inundate their fields, to burn their houses, and to destroy their cattle, lest they should afford succour to an invading French army: when they can point to the time, that, in a war with France, the utmost hope expressed by Englishmen was to be able to defend their wives and their fire-sides, and, that, so great was their terror, they publicly implored the Almighty to save them from being "swallowed up quick:" when, in short, they can show me a time, since the battle of Hastings, since the day when an army of Frenchmen invaded England, defeated an army of Englishmen, conquered the country, enslaved the people, and dishonoured their language and their name; if, since that day any other can be shown me when England stood in such awe of France as she does at this moment, then will I acknowledge that my anxiety for the safety and honour of my country may have augmented its dangers and disgrace; but, if no such instance can be shown me, I shall remain sincerely convinced, that we are in a fearful state of national decline, and, under that conviction, together with the hope of contributing in some small degree to-

wards the application of a remedy while yet there is time, I shall proceed to develop the causes of that decline.

I am, Sir, yours, &c &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*Duke Street, Oct. 25, 1804.*

#### IRISH PAPER-MONEY.

SIR,—Two circumstances have lately occurred in regard to the paper currency of Ireland, which are particularly deserving of animadversion. The first is the refusal of the bank directors to adopt the plan proposed by Mr. Foster to lower the rates of exchange; the second the advance in these rates to 15 per cent. on London.—It is to be hoped that the discussions of so dry a subject, though it has lost much of its novelty, will not be considered as undeserving of attention, for though better understood, the state of the currency in this country is still of such a nature, as to require even more frequent discussion, and some immediate measures to arrest the evils which attend it. So far as exertions have hitherto been made, they have produced no other effect, than the proof of the cause of the malady. No specific step has been taken, nor any tacit reformation been adopted, not even in consequence of the decisive judgment of parliament, and its authority in support of the charge, which has been made against the conduct of the bank directors. The attention therefore of every one, who is interested in the result of the restriction law, whether as to its operations in Ireland or in Great Britain, should not be withheld from the events which occur in the former country, because they are events, which carry with them positive loss to individuals, and afford practical proof of the tendencies of this law to produce similar loss and similar hazard in Great Britain. The approaching meeting of parliament renders the present claim on the consideration of the public still more particularly in season, because it is but reasonable to expect, that, after the unqualified opinion which the committee of Irish exchange have passed upon the causes of the high rates of it, parliament should pursue the subject, and adopt measures calculated to put an end to the depreciation of bank paper.—In respect to the circumstances which have of late taken place, it is undoubtedly of consequence, that the public should be acquainted with the cause of the failure of the remedy of depreciation, which had been recommended by the committee. The conduct of the bank directors is the sole cause of it. It is here known to every one, that Mr. Foster proposed to them

the plan for lowering the exchange mentioned in the report of the committee, similar to that, which, under the same circumstances, was adopted, and was successful in Scotland, namely, the plan of forming a fund in London, on which the bank might draw, by the means of its extensive capital, in competition with the usual dealers in exchange, but with this very favourable circumstance with regard to the state of things in Ireland, that the loan afforded this fund was without expense; whereas the forming of a fund in London was attended both by expense and risk where the directors of the Scotch chartered bank undertook to bring exchange to par. But this plan the Irish directors would not even entertain so far as to permit it to become a subject of their deliberation; and why? because three-fourths of them are themselves dealers in exchange. Three-fourths of those, who can command the greatest commercial capital in Ireland, are interested in the fluctuation and high rates of exchange between Dublin and London.—Hence, Mr. Cobbett, we arrive at the bottom of the whole secret. In this manner it comes to light, why those worthy mercantile statesmen, men of universal endowments, and many of whom were examined before the committee, have so ardently, and with so consistent and uniform integrity hoodwinked, as it were, the question of depreciation. The wise men of the banks have in no instance so strenuously supported the rule of thumb, as in the controversy respecting the causes of the high rates of exchange.—The governor and deputy governor of the bank of Ireland did certainly abet the doctrine of the balance of trade with so much earnestness, that it was not easy to be accounted for; though what might then appear surprising, is now easy of explanation. But occurrences of great abuse, Mr. Cobbett, which take place in Ireland, are so frequently thought light of because they are Irish, and because abuses are common in Ireland, that it is necessary to illustrate the abuse in question by supposing it possible that a similar occurrence had happened in London. For instance, if, by any great paradox in politics, the emperor of Germany had paid two millions of his debt; and if, during the period of remittance, the exchange between London and Hamburg had been very unfavourable, and liable to great fluctuation in the rates of it; and if, after a solemn inquiry into the causes of it by parliament, it should be required by Mr. Pitt of the bank directors to assist him in a plan, which he had matured for lowering the rates of exchange by altering

the mode of remitting this loan; if, after such preliminary events, the bank directors should refuse to act in dealings in exchange, when the interest of the public was concerned, and it should become notorious that the reason for so refusing to act, was because it would interfere with the private exchange dealings in which they had been, and expected to be engaged, and their jobbing on the past remittances of the loan; would not the voice of every one be raised against them? Such has been the precise mode of conduct of the bank directors of Ireland in respect to the remittances of the loans in London, the fluctuations in the rates of exchange, and the remedy proposed by the Irish chancellor of the exchequer. Such conduct, Mr. Cobbett, is reprehensible to a degree not admitting of terms adequate of expressing it.—Let any one consider who the directors of the bank of Ireland are, and what their functions. Let him duly estimate the operations of an immense accumulation of capital in a country, where capitals are generally small. Let him look back to the object and uses of the institution of the bank, and he will be convinced, that the present directors have forfeited the confidence of their constituents, the bank proprietors, and betrayed their trust as guardians of the public interest. The object of the institution was to maintain commercial credit. The object of the proprietors in appointing directors, is to select such men as are best qualified to maintain and fairly improve the value of their stock. How much benefit has been virtually afforded to commercial credit by those excessive issues of paper which have produced so great a depreciation, and which have led to the annihilation of silver currency, and nearly to the destruction of the retail trade of Dublin, it is easy to calculate: and how far the value of bank stock is promoted by another consequence of depreciation, namely, the high rates of exchange, is still to be experienced, when the directors of the bank will be called upon to pay their notes in guineas, on the restriction being taken off in England. But the public have the greatest reason of complaint, because the bank was established by the public through parliament, to protect its interests, so far as they were concerned in all matters relating to the circulation of the country. The public gave the bank the authority under which the accumulation of a prodigious capital is made to operate with all the efficacy of active and secret administration, and yet it is this capital which is brought to the public market in Dublin to injure the public by its operations in main-

taining high fluctuating rates of exchange. —The whole object of the institution is perverted, and this in a most eminent degree, for the directors even refuse to co-operate with the officers of government. In respect, therefore, to the existence of the co operation of the bank of Ireland we may with reason infer from what has been already advanced, that it has produced much injury to the public through its great command of capital, and that it is deficient as an institution calculated to aid the financial measures of the country. That, in fact, it is of no further service than any commercial partnership would be, that by its dealings can make large dividends and bonuses on its stock; and, that in short, it is a striking proof of the injurious nature of all bodies corporate, and of monopoly, in whatever shape it appears, under the protection of the law. — But to return to the immediate object of this letter, the refusal of the bank to become a party in promoting an exchange at par between this country and Great Britain: let us, in the first place, examine by what other means this desideratum can be effected. It appears to me, Mr. Cobbett, that no other remedy is left for our choice than the interference of parliament, to compel the bank to pay their notes, with those of the bank of England. This every one must admit would be a certain remedy; but the bank directors of Ireland will assert, that such a measure would be their certain ruin; Mr. Puget, their agent in London, has declared this opinion before the committee (Min. of Evidence, p. 4). But surely the committee did not examine those who were interested in dealings in exchange, to acquire opinions for the purpose of adopting them as their own, but to procure such information by their examinations as might enable them to form a correct opinion on the subject. — The committee have, in their report, refuted every other opinion which was advanced by those gentlemen, who formed a part of the body corporate of the Irish bank, and had they felt it necessary to report on the specific measure of making them pay in bank of England notes, there can be little doubt, that the same fate would have attended Mr. Puget's doctrine in this instance, as awaited it in so many others. But, under every circumstance, this doctrine is very suspicious, and, if considered in detail, will prove radically fallacious. Mr. Puget says (in answer to the question, "what do you conceive to be the objections to such a measure being adopted?") "If the balance of debt should continue against Ireland, ultimately the ruin of the bank, by its paying the whole

"loss of the exchange of the country." And as Mr. Puget and Mr. D'Olier and Mr. Colville, and many other dealers in exchange, have asserted, that the balance of debt is against Ireland, ergo, the bank of Ireland must be ruined by such a measure being adopted. But the assertions of these gentlemen have been exposed as altogether unfounded, by the able and deliberate decision of the Exchange Committee. This committee, composed of some of the most intelligent members of the House, after a close and daily application for upwards of three months; after having had a full opportunity of consulting every thing that had been said or written on the subject, have declared, that the balance on all accounts, is in favour of Ireland to a very considerable amount. The reasoning, therefore, of the Exchange dealers in respect to the measure of paying in Bank of England notes is exposed as fallacious, and bears very much the appearance of being the result of private considerations, and it may safely be contended, that, if the Bank of Ireland were obliged to pay their notes in those of the Bank of England, there would be no ruin to be apprehended, and through the operations of a favourable balance, no possibility even of any loss accruing upon the transaction. But, in order to express the mode of argument here made use of in a more practical manner, let us suppose that a law had passed directing the Bank of Ireland to pay in Bank of England notes, as they formerly did in guineas, on the 1st day of next month; and even let us suppose, that the rates of Exchange of Dublin on London were as they actually are, 15 per cent. what would be the effect on the funds of the Bank? It would be said by the Exchange dealers, that all persons wanting to remit to London would apply to the Bank for bills, and produce a drain of English notes, which would end only with their entire ruin. That this would not be the result it is by no means difficult to explain. The exports of Ireland maintain, at all times, a certain supply of merchants' bills on London, which are daily sold on the Exchange. These bills must be disposed of, and converted into Irish paper for the purpose of enabling the exporting merchant to go on with his business. The remitters therefore, to London, would still have the market of the Exchange to supply them with bills; and these bills must be disposed of at par, when the buyer has his option to refuse to take them, or go to the Bank and procure Bank of England notes. So long, therefore, as the exports of Ireland together with the imports of loans, amount to a greater sum than the imports of

Ireland, and the exports of the rents of absences, the quantity of bills on the Exchange in Dublin will be greater than the quantity on the Exchange in London, or in other words, there will be a sufficiency of bills at all times in Dublin to answer the demands of the remitters, without rendering it necessary for them to have recourse to the Bank for Bank of England notes. But, if even the remitters did apply to the Bank in preference to the holders of bills, the Bank would have the power of being the purchasers of these bills at par, and thus be able to procure Bank of England notes at par. The immediate reduction of the price of Bills on London to par, being an inevitable consequence of the Bank paying in English notes, and the constant supply of these bills being also an inevitable consequence of the export trade, the balance being in favour of Ireland, this remedy if adopted, could not produce the loss of £5 to the Bank. There could not be any failure of the plan, unless the holders of bills on London were able to keep them out of the market, and to throw all the demand of the remitters on the Bank; but as such an attempt must be made by the common consent of all those who have them, as the Bank may obtain possession of large quantities of them, and as it would require a capital as great or greater than the capital of the Bank, to render the measure of withholding them of sufficient effect to produce any loss to the Bank; there is no good reason to suppose that any attempt of the kind would ever be made.—Thus, it is very evident, that nothing is wanting to secure an exchange at par, except the payment by the Bank of the notes they issue with Bank of England notes; and further, that it is impossible that any loss can attend that measure so long as the balance of payment is in favour of Ireland. As the committee, therefore, have been able to prove that this balance is, and always has been favourable, and have clearly explained the ground on which it is manifest that it will continue to be so, there should be no time lost, in my opinion. Mr. Cebbett, to impose upon the Bank of Ireland the obligation of doing justice to their creditors, so far as adopting Bank of England paper in the place of guineas as payment of their notes, is capable of affording that justice.—This letter, Sir, has been unavoidably extended to so great a length, that it will be necessary for me to postpone the further consideration of the subject of it to another opportunity. I have the honour, &c.

I. F.

*Dublin, Oct. 13, 1801.*

## CATHOLICS OF IRELAND.

SIR,—In your last number, page 507, you observe justly, that “forty thousand men, ready to embark from England at a day’s notice, would have prevented Napoleon from becoming emperor.” You also observe, page 495, that “invasion cannot be repelled without a powerful army,” and you then inquire very naturally, “how you ought to proceed in order to obtain such an army?”—I answer that highly important question thus: EMANCIPATE THE CATHOLICS OF IRELAND, and you can form a disposable army of 100,000 excellent troops within six months.—Allow me, Sir, to recall your attention to the affairs of Ireland. The British possessions in the East and West Indies may enrich the mother-country and feed her commerce, but they are a continual drain of her physical strength; they employ many thousands of her best soldiers and sailors, and yet some of her most valued colonies are said to be on the eve of revolt or of insolvency.—IRELAND is the sole remaining resource of this empire. A timely attention to it will avert the downfall of England, consolidate her credit, double her strength, and re-establish her authority abroad. On the other hand, nothing can be more ruinous to England than the present treatment of that country. It is wholly owing to the ignorance of our statesmen, and to the inattention of the British public. England is now obliged to maintain nearly 50,000 troops in Ireland for the sole purpose of preventing rebellion. Here is an excellent army locked up and actually mouldering away. England has been further obliged, for some years past, to lend about three millions annually for the service of Ireland, and must continue to do so, if she adheres to her present system, because the yearly revenue, as Mr. Foster has lately shewn, is absorbed by the interest of the Irish debt, even as it now stands. Not a shilling of this money can ever be repaid to England. Not a soldier can ever be spared for the defence of England. Ireland also requires, and actually employs, I know not how many ships of war for the sole protection of her coast.—Now, Sir, let us examine what might be effected, by wisdom, for the relief of England from so enormous an incumbrance, and for her support against the common enemy; and for that purpose, I beg leave to premise a few facts, little known or noticed, but, in my mind, of immense importance. These facts are communicated to you by a person who knows England and Ireland well, who loves both countries equally, and hopes to see them

long and cordially united together in strength and affection.—Ireland contains five millions\* of inhabitants. Four millions of these, at the least, are catholics; of these the males are two millions, who can muster 400,000, capable of bearing arms. These are men, generally of robust frames, daring souls, hardy education, and, altogether, of that structure of body and temper, which, by the agility of the one and the impetuosity of the other, is peculiarly fitted for warfare against France. Let experienced officers testify, whether there are any more desirable soldiers and sailors for a foreign expedition than the Irish, who have served under them in Egypt, Holland, and both the Indies. The alertness and military strictness of Irish serjeants are proverbial in the regiments of the line.—Now, Sir, of these four hundred thousand fighting men about one hundred thousand are actually serving in our navy, army, militia and yeomanry. They are almost all non-commissioned officers or privates. The remaining three hundred thousand are dispersed throughout Ireland, not engaged in the general defence, or properly invited so to do. They are principally husbandmen, artists, peasants and day-labourers.—From infancy the catholics of Ireland are obliged, by their political situation, to turn their thoughts to politics, to compare their condition with that of their fellow-subjects, to inquire after the usages and affairs of foreign nations, and to study the works of various political writers. Hence are formed habits of research and discussion. Hence a mutual commiseration, an antipathy to servitude, and a longing for relief. Persecution endears their religion to their hearts, and every new insult offered to their clergy, every unjust accusation preferred against their principles, only tends to compress this formidable body of men into a firm and compact phalanx. Yet they are far from being a priest-ridden people. On the contrary, they are wholly indifferent about the aggrandizement of their clergy, and by no means liberal in donations for their support. Their nobility and gentry are men of ancient families, tolerably well educated, of high and old fashioned honour, scrupulous integrity, and, if they are unversed in the routine of public life, they are likewise untainted by habits of venality or servile intrigue.—Their bishops and priests are about 2,200 in number. The merits of this class are as various as their habits of life, the rank of their respective families, and

\* See Mr. Newenham’s Essay on the Population of Ireland.

the chances of their education. They have, almost all, been educated at one or other of the universities of France, Spain, Germany, and Flanders. Amongst them are very many as pious, learned, and polished men, as have at any time adorned Christianity. Many, too, are rough and uncouth, from necessarily associating with the lower classes; but they are pious, moral, and inoffensive. Indeed, I can testify, that at no one of a great number of assizes, that I have attended, have I ever observed a catholic priest charged with any offence, or even a party in a civil action.—From this cursory view of the catholic laity and clergy of Ireland, I proceed to show, what has been done by our ministers towards gaining the active co-operation of this immense force. In truth, Sir, they have literally “done those things which they ought not to have done, and they have left undone those things which they ought to have done.” They have tried every experiment upon the catholics, save that which alone would succeed. They have resorted to the balloting system: but this has only forced the balloted men either to abscond for a time, or to produce deformed boys or decrepid old men as substitutes. They next offered bounties for enlisting; but these have been sullenly refused. Military ardour was wanting, where the common people (unjustly I trust) suspected, that a successful war would only rivet their chains. Ministers still evading the direct proceeding, have given commissions for raising regiments, within these last three months, to some gentlemen (protestants still, observe) who were supposed to be the most popular amongst the peasantry; but here also they have drawn blanks. These embryo colonels have failed in the respective districts of their supposed popularity, and have been obliged, in fine, to betake themselves to the hacknied system of crimping. The consequence is, that their levies are ludicrously thin, and composed of squalid and wretched objects. In short, it is plain, that ministers must, sooner or later, adopt the only wise expedient, that of “abolishing the oppressive and unchristian code of intolerance, which at this moment actively afflicts the catholics of Ireland, to the disgrace of protestant principles.”—You can scarcely imagine the grievous extent to which this code is pushed in its letter, spirit, and consequences, against catholic industry, comforts, learning, property, and liberty. In a future letter I shall, with your permission, detail the specific grievances to which I advert, and then let it not be ignorantly asked, what do the Irish catholics

want, or, what do they complain of? I shall demonstrate to you, that these grievances may be relieved (very beneficially for the protestants, and without the least risk to our constitution in church or in state) by two pages of an act of parliament. The consequences will be these, and let Englishmen well weigh them.

1. You will easily raise one hundred thousand catholic soldiers in Ireland for the disposable force of the empire.
2. The remaining 200,000 catholics, capable of bearing arms, may, when thus reconciled, be safely armed and regimented for domestic defence.
3. You need no longer maintain 50,000 regulars in Ireland, nor send out the annual loan (or rather gift) of three millions of money to that country.
4. You may safely enlist, for general service, as many of the 21,000 Irish militiamen, now embodied, as you think proper.
5. Of the 480,000 men who compose the British volunteers, two-thirds may return to their homes and their industry; and thus the cultivation of the arts and of manufactures will not be interrupted in Britain.
6. The union with Ireland will be firmly cemented, and the pledge of British faith, solemnly given to the catholics at the union, will be honourably redeemed.
7. Great Britain and Ireland may safely bid defiance to invasion, and every man may “then indeed lay down his head to rest.” No invasion will be attempted. No future insults will be offered by France, and, consequently, it is probable that wars may become less frequent for a century to come.
8. You will be respected abroad. You may act offensively against France, and, probably may dictate the terms of a peace, or, at least, no enemy will presume to dictate the terms of peace to you, if ministers do their duty.

Compare these glorious prospects with the present declining, convulsed, and inglorious state of the empire—and can Englishmen for a moment hesitate to agree with—AN IRISH FREEHOLDER.—*Dublin, October 4, 1804.*

SIR ROBERT WILSON'S PAMPHLET.

[The following letter has been taken from the Morning Chronicle. It is so very interesting, both as to the manner and the matter, that I cannot refrain from inserting it at full length.]

"Sermonum satis ipsa præbet urbs: Loquacitatem suam continet: nos castrensibus consiliis contentos futuros esse sciât."—LIVY. 1. 44. S. 22.

SIR,—I have observed lately a disposition in ministers and their advocates, to discourage any proposals on the part of our most intelligent officers to improve the present plan of national defence.—We have all witnessed the neglect with which Colonel Craufurd's advice was received by the late ministry, when he recommended to them to ensure the safety of the country, by a large increase of the regular forces; and in one of the ministerial papers, there has lately appeared, in the form of a letter signed "HANNIBAL," a direct and personal attack on Sir Robert Wilson, for his manly and patriotic caution against imitating Carthaginian policy in our volunteer establishment.—I cannot help observing, Sir, that this gentleman, who expresses such an aversion to comparisons, has been rather unfortunate in the choice of the name which he has adopted: it is to be lamented, that the gentleman's learning did not suggest to him a more appropriate signature; had he recollected the name of that accomplished pedant, who lectured Hannibal on the art of commanding an army, he would no doubt have felt the propriety of adopting it for his own.—But this ominous mistake, Sir, we must attribute to inadvertency, and not to a fondness for any fancied similarity between himself and his great prototype; since in his own style, which is certainly unparalleled, he has given us a convincing proof of his aversion to resemblances.—The first part of that letter, Sir, I profess I do not understand, but the latter part, which is rather more intelligible, moderates my grief for what I have lost. In this Hannibal seems to accuse Sir Robert Wilson of perverting a passage in Livy, in order to render more striking the comparison of this country to Carthage, and thus increasing the confidence and exultation of the enemy.—In defending Sir Robert against the insinuations contained in this charge, I shall perhaps do for him what he would disdain to do for himself; but as I mean to notice them only as they tend to discourage any reformation in our present plan of defence, I shall not, like Hannibal, be guilty of the indecorum of descending into conjecture, with regard to the motives of a military man, in communicating to his country, in the hour of danger, his opinion on a military question: I shall rather, as one of the public, content myself with Sir Robert Wilson's declaration of his object, expressed in his own words:—"It is idle, it

"is criminal, then, to suffer the views of  
"the selfish, or the antiquated notions of  
"an originally false reasoning, to predominate against the positive security of the  
"country."——To Hannibal, perhaps, the object professed in these words, "To render the country secure, by the exposure of errors in its plan of defence," may not appear to be in the language of the schools *Causa per se*: He may not believe it possible, that any man could be urged by the mere *Amor Patriæ*, to take up either his sword or his pen in its defence. Did not Hannibal's style and ignorance of history free him from the suspicion of being an hireling, we might believe, that his own letter contained a scurrility of censure beyond what mere patriotism could bestow.—I shall now, Sir, proceed to inquire, whether there be any resemblance in the relative situations of this country and Carthage, and how far this resemblance, if it exist, may affect our safety.—During the present contest between France and this country, the cry of *Delenda est Carthago* has been frequently heard from our enemies, who maintain that there is a sufficient resemblance between this country and ancient Carthage to justify the invidious comparison, while their enmity, assisted by their national vanity, creates in them the hope, that they shall render it still more exact by our destruction, and thus establish their own claim to be regarded as the Romans of the modern world.—Although, Sir, a very slight acquaintance with ancient history will enable us to see that the French do not resemble the Romans in the better part of their character, yet it would be unsafe to deny, that there is a great and a dangerous resemblance in those points which must render them formidable as enemies, though not respectable as men.—They are, like the Romans, a nation wholly military; like them, they do not scruple to wage a war of extermination; and, as if the whole world were their inheritance, they affect to treat those who submit to their arms as slaves, and those who resist as rebels.—From this, Sir, we may see, that the comparison on the side of our enemies is sufficiently accurate for all the purposes of hostility; they are perhaps equally powerful with the Romans, certainly stimulated by equal hatred, and will probably be directed by equal talent.—These resemblances, Sir, I urge, not to increase French confidence but English security: to gratify their hope of invading this last retreat of European freedom, I would not leave them even the solitary chance of our imprudence.—It behoves us now, Sir, seriously to consider, whether we do not,

in some points of our political œconomy, resemble the Carthaginians too much for our safety.—Whether we do not, from commercial considerations, weaken, in a dangerous degree, our regular army, and in this great struggle prevent too many of our youth from becoming efficient soldiers, that we may retain them, as citizens and manufacturers, under the denomination of volunteers.—I am ready, Sir, to believe, that, if daring courage could ensure victory, the volunteers of this country would, in the hour of battle, manifest their right to the ancient characteristic of the British soldier, "των αλλων απαντων πλεον αυθαδεα και θυμω υπομενους. But Sir Robert Wilson has, I think, ably demonstrated, that courage in a volunteer will not avail against the discipline of soldiers by profession; and, if his arguments needed any additional support, it might be found in the histories of the civil wars of most countries, wherein the regular troops have almost invariably declined the scale of victory. In that war particularly which put a period to Roman liberty, it may be observed, that the volunteers of Italy, though incorporated with old troops and conducted by Pompey, could not withstand the veterans of Cæsar on the plains of Pharsalia.—If to fight *pro aris et focis* could render volunteers equal to regulars, the Romans would not have comprised in their empire nearly the whole of the ancient world: each of the people, whom they invaded and subdued, had to fight for their wives and their children, their altars and their firesides; they were inspired with every sentiment that might urge men to battle, but they trusted too much to newly raised troops, and the pious wish "*Irruat & causa quem vincit vincat & armis*," and were conquered.—But if we inquire, Sir, more particularly into the causes why the Romans were always victorious in war, we shall find that they possessed an advantage over other states, and more especially the commercial ones, which we should be careful not to allow our enemies to possess over us in this critical period of our history. This advantage consisted in their military institutions, which rendered arms the profession of the great body of the people, and did not leave to any but the *Emeriti*, who had seen 20 years service, the choice of becoming volunteers. Whereas, in the mercantile republics, commerce, operating like Indian policy, to divide men into casts, left but a very small proportion of the citizens to form a regular army.—But it should seem, Sir, according to the author of the letter to which I have before alluded, that Carthage had no

volunteers in her army at the battle of Zama; that is the greatest commercial state in the world, did not employ any of its members in trade, and transform them into soldiers in the hour of danger, when the enemy was near its gates.—If we are to read Livy's description of this battle with no other eyes than those of school-boys, we must construe the words *Carthaginienses* and *Afros*, by the simple terms Carthaginians and Africans; but if we are to take into our consideration the few veterans of his own countrymen, which Hannibal brought with him from Italy, the mercantile pursuits of the people, and the great number of artificers and tradesmen, the natural off-spring of commerce; and at the same time remember, that Carthage was a great city, not an extensive country; we must suppose, that a very great proportion of the native Carthaginian force on that fatal day, was composed of that description of people who are only to be called from their employments by revolution or invasion, too late indeed to become soldiers, and hardly in time to be volunteers.—Besides, Sir, in no other way can the contradictory concessions of Livy, when speaking of the same body of men, be reconciled than by being understood of a mixed multitude of veterans and volunteers, in which the latter were predominant.—In one place, he says, "*Auxiliares cedentes secunda acies*," "*Afri et Carthaginienses, adeo non sustinebant, ut contra etiam, ne resistentes, peritiosaciter primas cædendo ad se perveniret hostes pedem referrent*." In another part of the same narration, he says, "*Tum ubi omnis spes esset Milites Carthaginienses Afrosque*;" and informs us that when the Romans engaged this body, "*Novum de integro prælium ortum est, quippe ad veros hostes perventum erat, et armorum genere et usu Milite, et fama serum gestarum et magnitudinæ vel spei vel periculi pares*."—In addition to this, we may observe, that the very terms of the exhortation which Hannibal used, when addressing this body, are peculiarly adapted to a volunteer force, and such as Mr. Pitt himself would use when exhorting his own: "*Carthaginiensibus mænia patriæ, Divi jenates sepulchra majorum, liberi cum parentibus, conjugesque pavidae, aut excidium servitiumque aut imperium orbis terrarum; nihil aut in metum, aut in spem medium ostentatur*." These fine substitutes for discipline and experience, these talismanic words, which are to convert raw troops into good soldiers, have never yet availed, though assisted by superiority of numbers. If prudence is wanting, all the other deities are absent. Numbers, and the

goodness of our cause, are a poor dependence in battle, and it is a still poorer consolation in defeat, to exclaim with Cato, "*victrix causa Diis placuit victa Catoni.*"—But in trusting to numbers rather than to discipline, Mr. Pitt makes a very natural mistake; he is accustomed to triumph by majorities, and if a battle were like a problem of arithmetic, or to be decided, as many of his questions are, by figures, he would, no doubt, prove a very able general.—But to leave conjecture for proof, we have in Polybius, from whom Livy derived his account of the battle, a direct and positive confirmation of Sir Robert Wilson's assertion. Had Hannibal the ability to read that historian in the original, or the modesty to consult him in a translation, he might materially improve the comments with which he has promised to favour us on Livy's description of the battle of Zama.—Yet Hannibal affects either to deny that there is more than a vague resemblance between this country and Carthage, or deprecates the comparison as increasing the hopes of the enemy; at the same time he is ready to admit, that "France" is a military power, ambitious of general "dominion, and that England is the Queen "of Commerce." Is this then the safest and most appropriate character for England to assume, when she is to contend for her existence with that military power? Is she to take the field with a title which formerly distinguished Carthage, and contributed to its fall?—If the industrious enmity of the Romans had not extended itself to every thing that was Carthaginian, we should, no doubt, have found in the annals of that unfortunate people, the protests of the Windhams and Craufurds of their day, against the folly of remaining merchants and volunteers, when they had to contend with soldiers.—Every country, Sir, has, previous to its fall, its political Cassandra, whose predictions are verified only by being neglected.—Happy would it have been for Carthage, if she could have read her history, as we read it; happy is that country whose rulers are wise enough to profit by it.—Very different, Sir, is the conduct of our ministers and their hirelings, they either deny that there is any truth in the comparison, or reprobate its admission as ominous and discouraging. What should be the cause of more vigorous preparations and safer policy, is despised as dastardly, or condemned as imprudent; and in a contest which demands the wisest and most vigorous exertion of our force, they compromise the safety of our country by feeble and inefficient measures.—But an aversion to profit by history, and an antipathy to paral-

els, is in them perfectly natural; it is fit that they should decry in their doctrine what they disregard in their conduct, and that those men should be averse to a parallel of ancient and modern states, who must blush when compared with their fathers.—It is the practice, Sir, of a wise statesman, to draw useful lessons from the instructive examples of ancient history, and to discern when the remote causes of the subversion of great and ancient empires, have begun to be remote causes in that which he governs; he will then see how two states may resemble each other in their mistakes, and by this provident detection of his errors, he will be enabled to correct them before it be too late, and prevent the parallel from becoming perfect, by the destruction of his country; whereas those who by a blind and obstinate adherence to a pernicious system, refuse to discover any resemblance in their faults, will feel it too late in their punishments.—I could readily, Sir, suffer ministers to acquire wisdom in this way, since they are so unwilling to obtain it by any other mode, were not the fate of my country committed to their care. If, like Chæton, they risked nobody's necks but their own, we might indulge an ambition that would be fatal only to themselves: but in this case it is necessary that the passengers interfere, that they may save their own lives.

SCIPIO.

## SCARCITY OF COIN.

SIR,—Having lately spent a few days in London after an absence of some months, I was surprised to find much more gold in circulation than when I was last there. I was surprised at this, because as I conceived the gold had disappeared on account of causes which continued to exist, I had expected that the effect would have also continued. Those causes I took upon it to be, first, the depreciation of the paper currency, which occasions the exportation of guineas; and, secondly, the disposition to hoard. Now, I conceive that from what you have so repeatedly urged upon this subject, it is pretty evident that the first of these causes, instead of having ceased, must continue to increase progressively; and, consequently, the disposition and temptation to export must increase along with it. I should imagine likewise that the second cause, viz. the disposition to hoard, would have likewise increased. That disposition arose either from the apprehension of the total loss of value by the paper, in case of an attack from France, or of any sudden alarm; or from the conviction that as the paper was silently but certainly hastening to the utmost

point of depreciation, it was prudent and wise, in this case as in the other, for each one to have by him a little bag of guineas, whereby he might supply his necessities during the confusion that would arise in the period, betwixt the annihilation of the paper and the re-appearance of gold in sufficient abundance for general use. The apprehension of the speedy arrival of the French seems, indeed, to be daily wearing off, and, consequently those, who may have been induced by that dread alone to amass a hoard, may with perfect consistency, if not with perfect prudence, now dissipate it.—The other call, however, on every prudent man, to collect a few guineas and keep them by him, instead of decreasing, certainly becomes more loud and strong every day.—Accordingly, I can account for the re-appearance of gold only upon two grounds; either first, on the principle that the French not now being likely to come over (a question which I am not now willing to discuss), the necessity of a hoard is less pressing; and this ground relates only to those who provided merely under that apprehension; or, secondly, on the supposition, which will bear alike upon all hoarders, that they cannot afford to allow part of their capital thus to lie idle and dormant. To those who act upon the first of these grounds I shall only say, that as every precaution must be taken against a contingency and not against a certainty; each man must judge for himself whether the advantage resulting from the precaution, if the contingency happens, is sufficient to counterbalance the expense and trouble of it, in case it does not.—To those who dissipate their hoards from being unwilling to incur the expense of keeping them sacred; I could suggest the propriety, I had almost said the necessity, of submitting to it.—In this case as in the last, each man must judge for himself, and on the same principle; but it should never be forgotten that while one cause of the disappearance of gold, the hoarding, ceases to operate; the other cause, the exportation continues not only in full vigour, but to act with increased energy.—Our paper is now so depreciated, that it is quite vain to expect that guineas will remain in circulation along with it. Those which are not hoarded, will most undoubtedly be exported; and will continue to be so; till not one is left in the country. People then should recollect, what will be the universal distress in case of a total loss of value by the paper, if no guineas are forthcoming from private hoards to supply its place. Some people may expect that there is a large accumulation of cash in the Bank;

which will be drawn out to relieve the necessities of the moment: but supposing that to be the case, it will undoubtedly be the business of those in power not to allow this resource to be dissipated in relieving and assisting individuals, but to be retained for the use of government. And in the supposition that this is not the case; (to which opinion I certainly very strongly incline) they will not have the prospect even of that tardy relief which might then be expected. In short, I must consider the dissipation of these private hoards as a most unfortunate circumstance, and I have, therefore, troubled you, Mr. Cobbett, with this short letter, in hopes that they may induce people to be more provident of them.—In paper money, not convertible into gold, no vast confidence can be placed. The first moment of alarm, it will cease to have any exchangeable value altogether; and as there is every reason to suppose that the providence of government has not been sufficient to amass a supply of guineas for the dreaded emergency, the private hoards seem our best and only resource.—Before I conclude this letter, I must express my perfect agreement with your correspondent, Agricola, as to the remedy of depreciated notes. The remedy he proposes would undoubtedly be effectual; but, at the same time, it would be very difficult to carry it into effect. I believe nothing but an association of large landed proprietors, with that avowed object, could have any effect. Such an association I should be happy to see.—I am yours, &c.—ANNIBAL.—October 22, 1804

### THE CATAMARAN,

AN EXCELLENT NEW BALLAD,

In imitation and to the tune of "Malbrook s'en va-t'en guerre."

DUNDAS is gone to Boulogne  
He has a *paraky* plan  
To burn the French flotilla,  
'Tis call'd Catamaran.

Like ladies in romances  
Their knight's exploits to spy,  
Alott on Walmer castle  
Stand PITT and HARROWBY.

DUNDAS is come off Boulogne;  
He is a prudent man,  
He wisely takes *L'Aimable*  
For his Catamaran.

DUNDAS our tars haranguing  
Now shews his new-made wares;  
As at some prating pedlar  
Jack turns his quid, and swears.

" See fireships, my frog-toasters,  
 " To entertain John Bull;  
 " Of brimstone and of bottles \*  
 " They, like some heads, are full.

" See here my casks and coffers  
 " With triggers pull'd by clocks!  
 " But to the Frenchmen's rigging  
 " Who first will lash these blocks?

" Catamarans are ready"  
 (Jack turns his quid and grins)  
 " Where snugly you may paddle  
 " In water to your chins.

" Then who my blocks will f sten,  
 " My casks and coffers lay?  
 " My pendulums set ticking  
 " And bring the pins away?"

" Your project-new?" Jack utters,  
 " Avast! 'tis very stale:  
 " 'Tis catching birds, land-lubbers!  
 " By salt upon the tail."

So fireships, casks, and coffers  
 Are left to wind and tide;  
 Some this, some that waywonder,  
 Now stern before, now side.

Ships, casks, and coffers blazing  
 Now bring Vauxhall to mind;  
 As if ten thousand galas†  
 Were in one gala join'd.

Aloft on Walmer castle  
 Stand PITT and HARROWBY;  
 " The fireworks are beginning!"  
 With eager joy they cry.

" There in that blaze go fifty!  
 " And there go fifty more!  
 " A hundred in disorder  
 " There run upon the shore!"

From them the joyful tidings  
 Soon flew to London town:  
 By hundreds and by thousands  
 They burn, sink, kill and rown.

Now longs DUNDAS for morning  
 His triumphs to survey;—  
 But, lo! the French are lying  
 Just where before they lay

Lord KEITH sent home a letter,  
 He scarce repress'd a laugh:  
 DUNDAS steals to his office  
 To work his telegraph.

\* The fire-ships, it is said, had a great number of broken and empty bottles, which, we must presume, could only be intended to cut the enemy's rigging in the explosion, without mangling the men. Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt are reported to have made, during the summer, several very handsome patriotic donations in this way.—EDIT.

† This is borrowed from the sublime and beautiful account, which the Oracle gave, on the authority of a neutral captain who saw the spectacle, "that it was like ten thousand fireworks let off together." How much more glorious a notion must this convey to foreigners, of our formidable strength at sea, than the old trite, threadbare, metaphors of naval thunders, floating volcanoes, bolts of fire, clouds of smoke, and other similar stuff of vulgar ballad-mongers; such as celebrated the victories of former wars.—EDIT.

Lord KEITH sent home a letter;  
 PITT thought it very dry:  
 Back to his desk at Walmer  
 He slinks with HARROWBY.

To London came the letter  
 Though slow, as slow might be:  
 Alas! how fell men's faces!  
 It was a grief to see.

Just then their strains of triumph  
 Did Treasury bards prepare;  
 Alas! it was a pity  
 Such puffs were lost in air.

But now to them, who never  
 Did England's hopes deceive,  
 Our Soldiers and our Sailors,  
 Their business let us leave:

May PITT from colonelling  
 Retire upon half-pay;  
 And Admiral Lord MELVILLE  
 The yellow flag display!

### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Letter of the French Commercial Agent at Rotterdam to the American Consul at that place, relative to English Goods, dated, Sep. 12, 1803.*

SIR,—I have the honour to communicate the decree which the French government have just enacted, for preventing the introduction into France, of every description of merchandize from the colonies or manufactories of England, and to instruct you in the formalities necessary to be observed by foreign navigators entering the ports of France, in order that they may be admitted without difficulty.—You will observe that the 2d article exacts the most rigid attention to the landing of vessels destined for France. The necessity of conforming with the views of government, and at the same time to facilitate the means of fulfilling the formalities required by this decree, induces me to adopt the following regulations, which you will oblige me by communicating to the captains of your nation, that they may conform thereto. — Every captain or supercargo intending to load for a French port, should declare at the French consulate office.—That he will not embark any merchandize without the permission of the charterer, and agreeably to the decree regulating the lading.—The permit should be delivered into the consular office, containing a sworn declaration of the charterer, comprising the mark, weight and quantity, agreeably to the original bills; and he should further accompany the above with the declaration of the broker who made the purchases, or with such other vouchers as will fully prove that the merchandize is the produce of neither the commerce, colonies, nor manufactories

of England.—He shall, as before stated, deliver the original bills of merchandize, and when delivered they shall entitle him to a permit to load.—When the captains or supercargoes have finished their lading, they shall return two manifests to the commissary's office, signed by them, and countersigned by the consul of their nation, or when that shall be impracticable, then by the commissary himself. The manifest shall contain the particulars of the marks, numbers, weights, and quantity of each package, and each package of merchandize ought to be accompanied with a separate certificate. One of the manifests to remain in the commissary's office, and the other to be delivered to the captain, countersigned by me. And there shall, moreover, be delivered to the captain such other certificate as the decree of government requires. (Signed) C. GUYZ.

*Note presented to Mr. TALLEYRAND, Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs at Paris, by Mr. OUBRIL, the Russian Minister at Paris.—Dated Paris, July 21, 1804.*

The undersigned has been ordered to declare, that he cannot prolong his stay at Paris, unless the following demands are previously granted:—1. That, conformably to the 4th and 5th Articles of the Secret Convention of the 11th of October, 1801, the French Government shall order its troops to evacuate the Kingdom of Naples; and when that is done, that it shall engage to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, during the present and any future war.—2. That, in conformity to the second article of the said Convention, the French Government shall promise to establish immediately some principle of concert with his Imperial Majesty, for regulating the basis upon which the affairs of Italy shall be finally adjusted.—3. That it shall engage, in conformity to the 6th Article of the Convention aforesaid, and the promises so repeatedly given to Russia, to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. Lastly,—4. That, in virtue of the obligation of a mutual guarantee and mediation, the French Government shall promise immediately to evacuate and withdraw its troops from the North of Germany; and enter into an engagement to respect, in the strictest manner, the neutrality of the Germanic Body.—The undersigned has to add, that he has received orders from his Government, to demand a categorical answer to these four points, and avails himself of this opportunity, &c.—(Signed)—P. OUBRIL.

# FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PRINCE OF WIRTEMBERG'S LETTER to the Privy Council and Chamber of Finance at Stutgard. Dated, July 21, 1804.

The circumstances in which our country is placed must have engrossed the whole of your attention. We think it incumbent upon us to lay aside every thing personal to ourselves; had not an enlightened and impartial public been long since convinced of that necessity, and the justice of the steps, which in consequence of an unfortunate misunderstanding with the Prince our Father, we have been compelled to adopt, they would no doubt find our justification in the nature of the present events. Though we feel no inclination to insert the motives that have led to that step, we cannot, however, forbear from a public declaration of our opinion respecting the present state of things:—At a moment when the interpositions of the French government (which for the liveliest gratitude on our part) had brought about the long reported convocation of a diet of the country; at a moment when the French government entertained with us the pleasing expectation, that by this means would be re established that confidence between the Prince and his dominions, so essential to the welfare of the country; that the rights of the Prince, and the privileges of the subject, would be confirmed; and that legitimate measures would, with one common consent and co-operation, be adopted, in order to heal the wounds inflicted by the most disastrous of wars; it is at that very moment that a most futile pretext is resorted to, for the purpose of sapping the very foundations of the constitution; and a kind of proceedings has been adopted, of which the History of Wirtemberg furnishes no example.—The College of the Privy Council, whose peculiar duty it is to watch over the privileges of the states, not only attempts to justify all these acts of violence, but even some of its members placed themselves at the head of those who allow themselves to be made the instruments of that oppression, in contempt of those duties to the performance of which they are bound by the solemnity of an oath.—It is needless, on our part, to protest against all that has hitherto been done and may be done hereafter. The nullity of the whole of that conduct absolves us from such a duty. But as we fully adhere to the patriotic sentiments of the states, and of those members of the Privy Council who discountenance the persecution of individuals, we declare, in the most solemn manner, not only that we do unite with them in their endea-

vours for the re-establishment of the legitimate and constitutional order of things, but that also when it shall please Providence to call us to the government of these dominions, of which we are by birth the hereditors, we shall exact the most rigorous account at the hands of all those who have proved regardless of their oath to maintain the constitution; and that we shall permit justice to take its ordinary course. We are the more convinced of the propriety of making this declaration, because we cannot by any possibility persuade ourselves that the Prince, our Father, could have ever been induced to adopt such measures through any other instigation than the suggestions of perverse counsellors, of men who have wholly forgotten and disregard the sacredness of their duties.—We embrace this occasion also to manifest publicly our decided opinion respecting the situation of our finances.—The well grounded apprehensions which on this subject we entertain for the future, are of a nature to oblige us to declare, that we shall acknowledge as binding only those debts, of whatever nature they may be, that have been contracted agreeably to the usual mode prescribed by the constitution.

AMERICAN RESIDENT'S LETTER to Mr. Tiffin, Governor of the State of Tennessee. Dated at Washington, June 20, 1803.

SIR,—The resolution of the general assembly of Ohio, expressing their satisfaction with the measures adopted by the national legislature at their last session, in relation to the navigation of the Mississippi, is a just tribute to the wisdom of those measures; it is worthy also the sound discernment with which that state disregarded the seductive suggestions of a supposed separate interest and manifests dispositions to support the constitutional authority of the general government, of which the state legislatures will doubtless ever set the example. Nothing can so effectually contribute to produce the greatest good of our country as harmony and mutual confidence between the general and state authorities, and a conviction that local and general interests, well understood, can never be in opposition.—The confidence which they are also pleased to express in the administration of the general government, calls for my particular acknowledgments. I have conscientiously pursued those measures which on the best advice, seemed most likely to secure the rights and interests of

the western states, in the navigation of the Mississippi; if those interests can be secured (and nothing yet forbids the hope) and our country saved from the havoc and destruction of war, from the burthens necessary to support it, and the consequent increase of the public debt which would not fail in the end to absorb all the produce of our labour and to overwhelm our liberties.—I flatter myself that my fellow citizens will be contented with the course pursued and will countenance future endeavours to preserve their peace and prosperity.—I pray you to accept assurances of my high respect and consideration.

TH. JEFFERSON.

AMERICAN CLAIMS ON FRANCE.—*An Account of the manner, in which the claims of America upon France have been settled.*

The 3,750,000 dollars, that the United States are to pay France, for Louisiana, is to be paid to the citizens of the United States for claims they have upon the French government, embraced by the convention made the 30th September, by Elsworth and Dayie. The second article of that convention is to be considered as null and void. The payment to the United States is to be made to the citizens thereof, in sixty days after the final ratification of the late convention by our government, and exchange of the same, which is to be done here; the payment to be made by bills drawn by our minister in Paris, on the treasury of the United States. Claimants are first to have their claims liquidated by the French government, on which claims they are to be allowed 6 per cent. per annum from the time that the claimants respectively made their demands for payment. After their claims are finally liquidated, a board of three commissioners, appointed by our ministers, are to sit in Paris, who are to examine their liquidated claims, to see if they properly are claims that are embraced under the convention of the 30th September. As soon as this is determined, the claimants will receive their drafts, and they will be paid as they are presented; and should the claims embraced by the convention exceed the sum of 3,750,000 dollars, the remainder is a debt remaining due from France, and to be paid the claimants by that republic. It is understood that claims for supplies to the West-India Islands, demurrages on vessels from France, vessels taken and not restored agreeable to the convention of the 30th September, and supplies under contracts made by officers of the French go-

vernment in the United States, are the proper claims embraced by that convention.

**EXPORTS FROM KENTUCKY.**—*An abstract of the exports from the State of Kentucky, commencing 1st of January, and ending 31st of March, 1803.*

Flour 4597 barrels, apples 26 barrels, cider 2249 gallons, ship-bread 14 barrels, beans 10 bushels, butter 222 pounds, Indian Corn 200 bushels, cheese 238 lbs. candles 270 lbs. cables and cordage 820 cwt copper manufacture 900 dollars, household furniture 84 dollars, flax 3700 lbs. hats to amount of 724 dollars, bacon 22,636 lbs. hemp 500 lbs. bar iron 2 tons, castings value 300 dollars, lard 1204½ lbs. Indian meal 30 bushels, merchandize 27,980 dollars, nails 200 lbs. linseed oil 266 gallons, pork 230 barrels, pease 9 bushels, potatoes 272 bushels, distilled spirits 5507 gallons, saddlery to the amount of 127 dollars, soap 297 lbs. hogsheads tobacco 101, scantling 1000 feet.—Total value, dollars 68,404.

*An Abstract of Exports from the district of Kentucky, commencing April the 1st, and ending June the 30th, 1803.*

Flour 13,540 barrels, pork 1159, Indian corn 78, beef 15, lard 29,625 lbs. bacon 99,625, powder 1035, manufactured tobacco 2155, butter 300, cheese 100, flax 100, bar iron 900, whiskey 9203 gallons, peach brandy 256, cider 2496, beer 350, hemp 13,810 lbs. candles 100, cordage 835 cwt. hogsheads tobacco 278, potatoes 121 bushels, apples 40, merchandize to amount of 15,295 dols.—Total value, 155,720 dols.

**FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE CATAMARAN EXPEDITION.**—*Letter from Admiral Bruix to the Emperor of the French, dated Oct. 3, 1804.*

SIRE,—I have the honour to give your Imperial Majesty an account, that last night the enemy made an attempt to burn, by means of a great number of fire ships, the vessels which compose our line of anchorage; but their plan failed.—For two or three days they had considerably reinforced their station. Yesterday it consisted of 52 vessels, 25 of which were brigs or small cutters, which made me suspect they might be fire ships, and that we should soon be attacked. I was confirmed in that opinion, when, in the course of the day, I saw a ship of the line, three frigates, two brigs, and several cutters, take a S. W. position, a league and a half to windward of the last boat on our left. All these circumstances were favourable for an enterprize of this kind; a strong

W. S. W. breeze combined with the rapidity of the spring tides, and gave them a great facility to send their fire ships against us.—I consequently made my dispositions.—I ordered the military commandant to establish bars before our line, to right, left, and centre. I sent immediately into the harbour, under Rear Admiral La Crosse, a great number of boats, well armed, which, assisted by pinnaces with large howitzers, were to turn the fire ships aside. The general assembled all the captains of the line, and communicated to each the manœuvres to be practised according as circumstances might occur. The attack commenced at half past ten. I was informed of the approach of the enemy by a warm firing between our van and their pinnaces. The enemy dispatched against the whole front of our line several fire ships, which they towed to a certain distance, and when they had quitted them, the wind and tide finished bringing them to us; but our boats then opened a passage for them, and all blew up within the line, very near to the shore.—Eleven of them blew up from ten o'clock to four in the morning, in the space comprised between the Fort de l'Heurt and Vimereaux. Two others, the matches of which were put out, were taken near Vimereaux. The cannonade was very warm, and several of the enemy's boats sunk.—We lost but one pinnace with a Prussian howitzer, No. 267, the captain of which, seeing a fire ship, which appeared to be towed by a canoe with a sail, ordered it to be boarded; the men leaped on board the canoe, but no one was in it; hardly, however, had they come near the fire ship, when it blew up; the pinnace was destroyed by the explosion—27 men alone saved themselves at Vimereaux, in the English canoe. We lost an officer, 13 soldiers, and 7 sailors; there were but six men wounded in all the rest of the line, and we experienced no other damage than a bowsprit, which was carried away by boarding. I have no certain account of the injury received by the enemy; but independently of several boats full of men which were sunk, the disorder which our van observed among the crews who left the boats that towed the fire ships, induces me to think that their loss in men was considerable.—Our gun boats kept up a very brisk fire of artillery on some English ships of war, stationed behind their fire ships, which they were to protect. The cannonading did not cease the whole night; it was successive and incessant along the different points of the line; it was so well kept up, that the enemy's boats, which were ordered to carry in the fire ships, were glad to

abandon them in disorder.—The officers of my staff have given me an account, notwithstanding the darkness of the night, and the frequent and precipitate movements which our vessels were obliged to make, that these movements were made with a degree of precision which prevented all mistake. Great praise is due to general La Crosse, and the officers commanding the vessels in general, shewed skill and *sang froid*.—I cannot sufficiently praise the courage and good disposition of the marines and soldiers who were embarked; they assisted in the manœuvres with as much alacrity as if they were assisting at a fête; and every time a fire ship exploded, the harbour resounded with cries of "*Vive L'Empereur, Vive Napoleon*."—Several of our gun-boats were obliged to get under sail, to avoid the fire ships, nevertheless there was no appearance of confusion. The enemy employed fire vessels of three different kinds; the first were sloops, cutters, and other vessels; the second were a kind of coffers 20 feet long, and three feet broad, without any mast; the third were a kind of barrels, filled with combustibles, and which were so contrived as to explode by a piece of mechanism. The vessels were filled with several pieces of hollow wood, which were filled with inflammable matter, and which was lighted with matches, like bombs; but it seems the effect was not well calculated, for they did no harm. This event, far from having the effect which our enemies hoped, only served to manifest the courage and confidence of our soldiers and sailors, as well as the excellent order established for the safety of the port and city. Every body was at his post, the pumps were prepared, and during the night the rounds were made with as much tranquillity as usual. This morning the enemy's vessels, which were detached to the S. W. joined the rest of the squadron. At six o'clock the wind began to blow fresh W. S. W. and every thing announced bad weather. At two o'clock the enemy got under weigh for their own coast.

(Signed) BRUIX, *Admiral*.

*In another letter of the same day, addressed to the Emperor, General SOULT, Commander in Chief at St. Omer's, expresses himself as follows:*

SIRE,—The English had conceived the cowardly and horrible project of burning the vessels of the flotilla which were at anchor in the Road of Boulogne, and last night they endeavoured to accomplish this horrible design. The result is turned to their shame, and is glorious to the arms of your Majesty. I have the honour to give you an account of

this important event. Yesterday the English squadron, consisting of 52 sail, of which six were of the line, 6 frigates, 16 corvettes, or bomb vessels, 10 brigs, 12 cutters, and two luggers, under the orders of Admiral Keith, anchored at about a league and a half from the North to the West of the Port. During the day they detached one vessel of the line, two frigates, several brigs, and most of the cutters, and a number of boats, to cruise in the South West. At three o'clock it was observed that the ship of the line and frigates had anchored and had ordered the small vessels to come to them; and afterwards they formed in a line. These demonstrations were too apparent for us to mistake the object which they had in view; therefore Admiral Bruix hastened to give the necessary orders to Rear Admiral La Crosse, who commanded in the Road. The batteries were prepared, and the army held in readiness to execute any orders which they might receive.—The wind was at west, a fresh breeze. At ten precisely several shot from the left announced that the enemy had began his attack; the fire extended to the centre; the engagement soon became almost general; and at this moment the enemy launched his first detachment of fire-ships. All the vessels of the flotilla which expected this kind of attack, seeing the incendiaries coming, avoided them, and let them pass between them, without any of them being on board, and the detachment passed to the rear of the line. At half past ten the first blew up, opposite the battery of the Grenadiers: it produced an immense column of fire; the wrecks were scattered on every side, but no person was hurt. The second blew up opposite the Imperial Battery, and produced no harm. Another between the ports of Croy and that of Creeche; and the fourth near the Battery of the Bombadiers, without producing any great effect.—After these first explosions, the fire slackened for half an hour; Rear Admiral La Crosse profited by this to run along the line, and cause to return to their rank some vessels, which, to avoid the explosion, had cut their cables. At the height of the battery of Dunes, which the Etat Major of Admiral Bruix mounted, they perceived a brig, the sailing of which appeared suspicious—it was immediately drawn aground. Scarcely were they at half pistol shot than the vessel exploded, more strongly than the former ones, but happily only two sailors were slightly wounded in the hand. The attack was then made on the right; three fire ships exploded immediately at the port of Vimeux, two others on the left of La Creeche,

two others between Chatillon and the fort De L'Hout, and the twelfth and last at the Imperial Battery, but from this there arose a column much more considerable than the former; and as it approached nearer the land, it produced a commotion so great that it was felt in Boulogne, and for more than half a league within land.—At half past three the fire entirely ceased, and the vessels of the flotilla had all returned to the line—in short, at break of day each was in its rank, ready to combat, and the enemy might have seen that there did not exist the least void in the line.—The result of all these explosions, which shook the coast, and appeared as if they would swallow every thing up was, that we experienced no loss, except a misfortune which was occasioned by too much boldness and temerity. The pinnace, No. 267, commanded by Captain Groney, being near the passage of Vimereaux, perceived an English sloop under sail, which appeared to be directing its course towards the port; wishing to seize it, he gave orders to board it. Michael braham Cloquet, sailor, was the first who mounted the sloop, five others followed, and they extinguished the fire, but in seeking for the helm, which had been taken away, they perceived another vessel very long, floating below in the water, which scarcely presented any surface, and which the pinnace accosted. Hardly had they cut the cable, when the fire ship blew up the pinnace, and swallowed all the men who were on board. Some men of the garrison, who assisted, were saved, and six sailors who were on board of the sloop. Several boats were sent to their aid, but none could get near.—This event occasioned the loss of 21 men; and from all the explosions the result was, that two marines and four soldiers only were wounded, one gun-boat lost its bowsprit, but that arose from getting on board another. It sustained no other damage.—There is every reason to believe that the English have sustained considerable loss by the effect of the explosions and the cannonade. The sloops and two of their boats were taken, two fire ships were wrecked, the one to the east of the Canal of Ambleteuse, and the other to the right of Vimereaux; both are uninjured. In the former the matches were extinguished, and in the second, where the fire was to take effect by means of a movement regulated as a pendulum, which would set off after a certain number of oscillations, four soldiers of the 34th took out the matches and stopped the pendulum, and prevented the explosion, which would otherwise have done much mischief, as several persons were present. Two

hours after they had taken the mechanism out of it, the movement was still going. This morning the shore was covered with wrecks, pieces of iron, and splinters of all kinds.—Such is the issue of this operation, which the English have so long meditated, and for which they constructed, with so much secrecy, great numbers of vessels upon new models. I have, at the beginning of my letter, called this cowardly and horrible, because it is a horrible attempt against the laws of war, by seeking to destroy an enemy without exposing themselves to any danger. I call it cowardly, because the enemy's squadron which made such an attack, carried three times as many guns as our flotilla which was in the road. Why did not Keith imitate the conduct of Nelson in the year 1800, and fight us hand to hand? If that enterprise had succeeded it would have merited our tears.—To attack cannon against cannon, bayonet against bayonet such are the laws of war; but a nation which only employs for its defence poignards and fire ships, has fallen from the rank which it pretends to occupy. History teaches us that nations, when they are capable of conquering, despise the offers of the Physicians of Fabricius; and it is only in the moments of their fall, that they employ such perfidious means. In fine, there is in the position in which we now are, nothing to fear from the fire ships of the English. This appearance redoubles the ardour of our soldiers, who wait with impatience for the moment when they are to fight against the million of volunteers commanded by the conqueror of the Honscoote and the Helder.

*Report addressed to his Excellency the Minister at War, by Marshal Soult, commander in chief in the Camp at St. Omer: dated Boulogne, Oct. 4.*

In the report of the attempt made by the English to burn the vessels of the flotilla in the road of Boulogne, which I had the honour to address to you on the 11th, I mentioned a mechanism of copper, which some soldiers of the 34th had taken from a fire-ship that had run on shore at Vimereux; but I omitted to inform you of the names of the soldiers who had achieved this daring action. I hasten to transmit and recommend them to your notice and generosity. Labarriere, drummer, Aude and Duret, grenadiers, and Letendre, musketeer, all four of the 34th, went down to the beach to assist some shipwrecked soldiers who were in the greatest distress, when they saw a fire ship on shore. After having saved a chasseur of the 10th regiment, they returned

to this infernal machine, to tear out the matches, and prevent its explosion. Fortune favoured them; and by their efforts they detached the machine, the movement of which, in a few moments afterwards, would have communicated with the combustible matter. Two of them remained to guard the fire ship, and the others carried off the machinery, and went to give information of what they had done.—The machine which the soldiers brought away has been taken to pieces, and contains within a movement of clock work, which would go several hours, and of which the springs communicated with a gun lock, which would go off, when the machinery had reached its lowest point. The pan of the lock was filled with powder, and several matches, the ends of which were fixed in it, communicated also with the incendiary. The duration assigned to this movement led us to suppose that the English intended this fireship should run on shore, in the hope, perhaps, that curiosity would attract a number of persons round it, or that they might have brought it into a harbour, that when it exploded, it might have caused a more terrible mischief. However this may be, their measures appeared to be so well taken, both with respect to their machine of explosion and the other they employed, that it is almost a miracle we sustained no more damage. Two other fireships, two catamarans (scaphandres), several barrels of combustibles and powder, another box or frame, similar to that I have described, and a prodigious number of scattered fragments, were found on the shore. A committee has been appointed to examine and authenticate every thing relative to this affair, and the report it will make on the subject, will inform us of the means employed by the English to execute this abominable enterprise.—I shall conclude this first report by recommending to your benevolence Pierre Regaud, chasseur, in the 17th regiment of light infantry, relative to whom I transmit you a report.—This brave soldier threw himself into the sea three times during the night. He had the good fortune to succeed.—*SOULÉ.*

*Report of Gen. Souchet to Marechal Soult.*

Mons. Le Marechal,—I have the honour to transmit to you the copper machine, which you have seen in the camp. It appears to be, or to contain the moving principle of the fire-ship which exploded last night. Its construction will interest you, and a comparison of it, with that of the fire-ship preserved entire, in the port of Vimereux, will furnish you with an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the me-

chanism and composition of this infernal machine, in all its particulars. At half after four this morning, the commandant of the artillery, hearing some plaintive cries from the beach, ordered Labarriere the drummer, Aude and Duret grenadiers, and Letendre musketeer, all of the 34th regiment, to go down to the shore and give assistance, which they did with the greatest alacrity, and were fortunate enough to save a chasseur of the 10th regiment. Near the place they perceived a flat machine, having the form of a canoe not hollowed out, and, convinced that it was a fire vessel, rushed on it to prevent its explosion. Fortune completely favoured them, and they succeeded in detaching the machine, which I have the honour to send you. Its figure is ten square inches, and about five inches in thickness. It was closely fastened to the fire-ship, and all the joinings hermetically closed by a double mastich. The soldiers, certain of having the match, returned to the camp, much surprised to hear a noise similar to that occasioned by the movement of a clock. This noise has continued the whole time since, which is now nearly 16 hours since the machine was found. A serjeant in the same corps, who piques himself on being somewhat of a mechanic, has studied the mechanism of the machine, and, with difficulty succeeded in turning one of the eight screws, which are on the surface. This motion gave a communication with the air, and a rather strong explosion, with detonation, ensued, of the fire-work enclosed in the superior tube, which was detached from the machine, and thrown to a distance. This tube is evidently the point of communication for the firing of the whole machine. (Signed) L. G. SOUCHEZ.

*Report of M. Guidon, Lieutenant in the 36th regiment of the line, to Marechal Soult.*

I have the honour to inform you, that this morning, about one o'clock, a vessel from the enemy, which had already sustained the fire of two gun boats, anchored in front of the vessel on board which I serve, came, bearing down on my larboard with all sails set. I caused her to be fired upon, when I believed her to be within half a cannon shot: my first discharge was scarcely made, when her bow-pprit was entangled in our rigging which she damaged. This vessel was about 50 tons, and her port holes being much higher than ours, I was prepared to give her a good reception; but not seeing any person appearing on deck, I concluded she must be a fire-ship, and in concert with the marine officers, every exertion was made to

avoid the danger which threatened us. The soldiers, not having been able to make the same observations on account of the smoke, were preparing to board, but I prevented them; one of them, however, Jean Rosie, chasseur in the 7th company of the 1st battalion of the 10th regiment light infantry, had his leg broken between the port holes, and was carried this morning to the hospital.—The yards and bowsprit of this vessel were furnished with grapples and irons, which held her so fast on board us, that we despaired of being able to throw her off; at length, after a quarter of an hour's laborious exertion, during which the crew behaved with the greatest *sang froid* possible, we succeeded in extricating ourselves; but we were scarcely more than thirty paces from her, when she blew up; yet, though we were covered with flames, and many splinters, both of iron and wood, fell on board, we sustained no damage, nor was any one of our crew wounded; the fire of the explosion was too much above us to communicate to our vessel. Two other small fire-ships exploded within fifteen or twenty paces of us, but did not reach us. (Signed) GUDON.

*Letter from Rear Admiral La Crosse to Admiral Bruix. Boulogne, 6th Oct. 1804.*

GENERAL.—In the short report which I had the honour of addressing to you, immediately after the attack made by the enemy on the night of the 2d, against his Majesty's flotilla, which was drawn up before Boulogne, it was not possible for me to go into all the details that the importance of that affair required, I hasten to communicate to you those which I have collected from the commanders of divisions, and of which I was in some sort an eye witness.—The wind blowing pretty fresh from the west, the left of our line was the point towards which the enemy could direct their instruments of attack with the most advantage. The position which the enemy had taken, and his manœuvres in the course of the day, which you witnessed, as well as the precautions you recommended, all announced the probability of an attack during the night. Proper measures were adopted to prevent the line from being surprised.—At half past nine the guard boats to the west perceived some vessels coming before the wind, and steering for the ships at the left of our line. A volley of musketry was discharged against them; the enemy, though very near, not returning the fire, we were certain that they were fire ships. Notwithstanding the alertness of the boats' crews which were nearest to them, it was not possible for them to

grapple a fire cutter which was falling down upon our line.—In fact, the gun boats No. 149 and 240 of the first class, belonging to the third division, and No. 241, of the same class, of the second division, veered away their cables to make way for her. M. Conronne, a midshipman, commanding the boats of the third division, was preparing to put some men into the boat belonging to 149, when the explosion took place between No. 149 and 241.—This last, commanded by the provisional midshipman Pasquet, had two men wounded by the splinters.—A second fire cutter, directed against the same part of the line, was in like manner avoided by the vigilance and activity of M. Pasquet. The gun boat, No. 241, which this officer commanded, had scarcely made the necessary movement when the fire ship blew up. This gun boat was covered by the splinters, some of which fell upon the gun boats No. 156, 155 and 238, of the same division, without injuring any person.—M. Saintouen, provisional midshipman, commanding No. 252, of that division, was wounded slightly in the cheek. The shock created by the explosion knocked down the partition of the magazine in that vessel. The mast of the fireship was picked up by No. 168, as was a ring belonging to the mainstay of a large vessel by No. 238.—Captain Regnaud speaks in very high terms of the conduct of temporary midshipman Duval, who repeatedly offered to go and grapple one of the fire ships; as also did M. Pelouse, an officer of the 55th regiment, who being thrown down on the deck by the effect of the explosion, still retained his usual coolness. He had much reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Saillet, who acted as master on board of No. 202.—Several fire ships were in like manner avoided by the dexterity of the manœuvres of the captains who commanded the vessels in the centre of the line.—Some of the enemy's boats, which came from the West, withinside our line, approached No. 405 and 372, of the eighth division of boats of the second class, which compelled them to retreat with loss. No. 405, commanded by Guilford, a midshipman with temporary rank, expended above three fourths of his cartridges. No. 372, commanded by the temporary midshipman Avril, kept up a smart fire of musketry against an enemy's long boat. Although the sides of his boat were riddled with shot he did not lose a man; the mast of a long boat fell into his hands.—The midshipman Salone, commanding No. 381 of the same division, by his skill and the quickness of his manœuvres avoided a fire-ship which was coming

down on him. An English long boat threw some rockets against him, but not being able to support the fire of his vessel, it made off.—The gun boat, No. 267, Capt. Pevrieu, commanding the fourth division of the first class of boats, had its cable cut without the crew knowing how it happened. This officer was witness of the bold and ready manœuvre by which the temporary midshipman Lemonnier, commanding the boat of the sixth division of the second class, No. 362, got clear of a fire-ship with which he was entangled. He speaks in high terms of the coolness of that officer. Several of the soldiers and sailors offered to go and destroy the match of the fire-ship at the moment that she passed along side No. 267. They were embarked when the explosion took place.—Another fire-ship blew up at some distance from this division.—Captain Pevrieu praises the conduct and the subordination of the soldiers and sailors of the division under his orders, on this occasion. None of the vessels suffered the least injury.—Captain Bedel Dutertre, commanding the sixth division of the second class of boats, to the right of the line, gives a similar account of the skill and intrepidity of Captain Lemonnier. The soldiers and sailors belonging to No. 362, who went on board the fire-ship, with which they were entangled, are—Raffa, a master gunner; Boutellier of the artillery; Grillot, Rouget and Rose, fusileers in the 10th regiment of light infantry (this last received a hurt in the foot as he sprang on board); Meses, corporal in the 36th regiment; Pondre, Housset, Gailiard and Brandin, fusileers in the same corps.—M. Leroy, temporary midshipman, chief of the tenth section, was slightly wounded in the leg by the splinters of this fire-ship, which blew up near the boat No. 151, which he was on board of.—I must speak in the warmest terms of the attention of the second division of pinnaces, with long howitzers, commanded by M. Lasalle. This officer completely executed the orders which I had received from you, for disposing the boats under his command on all points of the line, and particularly in the west, and attending personally to see that positions were properly taken. He speaks in the handsomest terms of the behaviour of the cockswains under his orders; particularly Leroux Brana, cockswain of No. 498, and Paris, of No. 302. This last, by a smart fire, and the resolution that he displayed, repulsed two of the enemy's pinnaces coming from the west, which endeavoured to pass between the land and our

line. Constantly remaining at the same post, this cockswain again perceiving the same two pinnaces, fully manned with rowers, recommenced so smart a fire of artillery and musquetry, that they were soon lost sight of. He thinks that they must have been sunk.—The pinnace, No. 309, conducted by Mr. Lasalle, missed a fireship, which took its direction towards the praam La Ville de Mayence; but the explosion did not cause any damage to her. This officer, on being informed of the heavy fire of musketry to the westward, went thither and took a part in it. He praises the skill and courage of M. La Grange, chief of the section. From thence he proceeded to the right of the line, where the second section of pinnaces was, commanded by M. Dupetit Thouars, where he learned that the pinnace 267, which had got foul of a fire-ship, had sustained some damage by the explosion.—M. Dupetit Thouars sent the provisory ensign Chaussac, with three vessels, to get certain intelligence of the event, and to save some men, if possible. This officer found only pieces of a wreck. Being sent again at break of day, he still found nothing but remains of a wreck, but he was informed, that five men from the pinnace were saved on the coast of Vimereux.—Now, general, you may judge of the occurrence from the result.—In the succinct account which I had the honour to send you yesterday, general, you will have noticed the conduct of my adjutant, M. Preaux, provisory ensign de vaisseau, who, with an armed boat which he commanded, went in the midst of the fire, wherever his presence could be necessary, to inform me of the movements, or to execute my orders.—If I myself have been in some personal danger, from the explosion of the fire-ship I was near getting foul of, I congratulate myself, general, in having shared this danger with your officers, Messrs. Solminihac and Guedan, and the crew of your boat; we all of us, deeply penetrated with the cause we had to defend, feeling all the same sentiment of indignation against the most cruel enemy of the French nation, and of its august chief; like men who, on escaping from imminent danger, invoke their tutelary deity, we exclaimed with a spontaneous emotion, "vive l'empereur! vive l'empereur!"—I have the honour to salute you with respect.—(Signed) —LA CROSSE.  
LA FOND.

*The Marine Prefect of the First Arrondissement to his Excellency the Minister of Marine and Colonies. Dated Boulogne, Oct. 6, 1804.*

**MONSEIGNEUR,**—The admiral having informed me, that he had addressed to you, by a courier, the report of the events that took place on the night of the 11th, and not being myself quite certain of the exactness of the details which I received, I did not think it my duty to take up your excellency's time; but I have the honour of sending you herewith the design of one of those infernal machines taken by one of our pinnaces. It is seventeen feet long, and eight feet and an half broad, and carried at its two extremities a barrel of combustibles; two men placed in the middle rowed with two oars each.—The admiral gave orders to take care of it, and it is deposited with the commanding officer.—Near the port of Ambletuse, an incendiary machine has also been discovered, which I have ordered to be sent to Boulogne. It consists of a large barrel, containing about 120 pounds of powder, and furnished with a piece of mechanism. This barrel appears to stand in the water; at one end were suspended several balls of a large calibre, to hold it in equilibrium: a cordage of seven or eight fathoms in length, furnished at the end with a float, to which was made fast an iron rod, with two paws, in form of anchors, was fastened to the barrel. It seemed intended to hang upon a cable, and the explosion takes place at the first shock experienced by the mechanism.—I have charged the chief militaire to get the design made out, and I shall take care to send it to your excellency.—**C. BONNEFOUX.**

#### DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

**LORD NELSON'S LETTER** to the Mayor of London, relative to the Vote of Thanks transmitted to him in April, 1804.—His Lordship's letter is dated on board the *Victory*, August 1, 1804.

**MY LORD,**—This day I am honoured with your lordship's letter, of April 9, transmitting me the resolutions of the Corporation of London, thanking me as commanding the Fleet blockading Toulon.—I do assure your lordship, that there is not that man breathing who sets a higher value upon the thanks of his fellow Citizens of London than myself, but I should feel as much ashamed to receive them for a particular service, marked in the resolution, if I felt that I did not come within that line of service as should feel hurt at having a great victory passed over without notice.—I beg to inform your lordship, that the Port of Toulon has never been blockaded by me; quite the reverse, every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea, for is

is there that we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country, and I trust that they will not be disappointed.—Your lordship will judge of my feelings upon seeing that all the junior flag officers of other fleets, and even some of the captains, have received the thanks of the Corporation of London, whilst the junior flag officers of the Mediterranean fleet are entirely omitted; I own it has struck me very forcibly, for when the information of the junior flag officers and captains of other fleets was obtained, the same information could have been given of the flag officers of this fleet and the captains, and it was my duty to state, that more able and zealous flag officers and captains do not grace the British navy, than those I have the honour and happiness to command. It likewise appears, my lord, a most extraordinary circumstance, that Rear Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton should have been, as second in command in the Mediterranean fleet, twice passed over by the Corporation of London; once after the Egyptian expedition, when the first and third in command were thanked, and now again. Conscious of high desert, instead of neglect, made the Rear Admiral resolve to let the matter rest, until he could have an opportunity personally to call upon the Lord Mayor, to account for such an extraordinary omission; but from this second omission, I owe it not to that excellent officer to pass it by.—And I do assure your lordship, that the constant, zealous, and cordial support I have had in my command from both Rear Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton and Rear Admiral Campbell has been such that calls forth all my thanks and approbation. We have shared together the constant attention of being more than fourteen months at sea, and are ready to share the dangers and glory of a day of battle; therefore, it is impossible that I can ever allow myself to be separated in thanks from such supporters. I have the honour to remain, with the very highest respect, your lordship's most faithful and obedient servant,—

**NELSON and BRONTE.**

**CAPTURE OF SPANISH FRIGATES.**—*Admiralty Office, 23d Oct. 1804.*—Copy of a Letter from the Hon. William Cornwallis, Admiral of the White, &c. &c. &c. to Wm. Marsden, Esq., dated on board the *Ville de Paris*, in Torbay, the 20th Oct. 1804.

**SIR,**—I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of the several communications transmitted to me from Captain

Moore, of the *Indefatigable*, giving an account of his proceedings in the execution of the service he was sent upon, in which he has, in company with the *Medusa*, *Lively*, and *Amphion*, succeeded in detaining the Spanish frigates therein named.—Admiral Montague communicated to me the arrival of the *Lively* at Spithead, on the 17th, with the *Fama*.—I have the the honour to be, &c.—W. CORNWALLIS.

*Indefatigable, at Sea, Oct. 6, 1804.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you, that I have executed the service you did me the honour to charge me with.—On the morning of the 29th of September, the *Indefatigable* got off Cadiz; on the 30th, we fell in with the *Medusa*; Captain Gore having informed me the *Amphion* was in the Sireights' mouth, and that the *Triumph* was off Gibraltar, and that Sir Robert Barlow meant to go into Cadiz for the trade there, on his way to England; I thought fit to send the *Medusa* to apprise Sir Robert Barlow of the nature of my order, that he might then judge whether or not he should go into Cadiz, and I directed Captain Gore to rejoin me with the *Amphion* as soon as possible off Cape St. Mary. On the 2d inst. I was joined by the *Lively*, and on the 3d, by the *Medusa* and *Amphion*; the latter having communicated what I thought necessary to Sir Robert Barlow.—Yesterday morning, Cape St. Mary bearing N. E. nine leagues, the *Medusa* made the signal for four sail W. by S. I made the signal for a general chase; at 8 A. M. discovered them to be four large Spanish frigates which formed the line of battle a head on our approach, and continued to steer in for Cadiz, the van ship carrying a broad pendant, and the ship next to her a rear-admiral's flag; Captain Gore being the headmost ship, placed the *Medusa* on the weather-beam of the commodore; the *Indefatigable* took a similar position alongside of the rear-admiral; the *Amphion* and *Lively* each taking an opponent in the same manner, as they came up: after hailing to make them shorten sail, without effect, I fired a shot across the rear-admiral's fore foot, on which he shortened sail; and I sent Lieutenant Ascott, of the *Indefatigable*, to inform him that my orders were to detain his squadron; that it was my earnest wish to execute them without bloodshed; but that his determination must be made instantly: after waiting some time, I made the signal for the boat, and fired a shot a-head of the admiral. As soon as the officer returned with an unsatisfactory answer, I fired another shot a-head of the admiral, and bore down close on his weather bow; at this mo-

ment the admiral's second a-stern fired into the *Amphion*; the admiral fired into the *Indefatigable*, and I made the signal for close battle, which was instantly commenced with all the alacrity and vigour of English sailors. In less than ten minutes *La Mercedes*, the admiral's second a-stern, blew up alongside the *Amphion*, with a tremendous explosion. Captain Sutton having, with great judgment, and much to my satisfaction, placed himself to leeward of that ship, the escape of the Spanish admiral's ship was rendered almost impossible; in less than half an hour she struck, as did the opponent of the *Lively*. Perceiving at this moment the Spanish commodore was making off, and seeming to have the heels of the *Medusa*, I made the signal for the *Lively* to join the chase, having before noticed the superior sailing of that ship. Captain Hammond did not lose an instant; and we had the satisfaction, long before sun-set, to see from our mast-head that the only remaining ship had surrendered to the *Medusa* and *Lively*.—As soon as our boats had taken possession of the rear-admiral, we made sail for the floating fragments of the unfortunate Spanish frigate which blew up; but, except forty taken up by the *Amphion's* boats, all on board perished. This squadron was commanded by Don Joseph Bustamante, knight of the order of Saint James, and a rear-admiral. They are from Monte Video, Rio de la Plata; and, from the information of the captain of the flag-ship, contained about four millions of dollars, eight hundred thousand of which were on board the *Mercedes* which blew up. Other accounts state the quantity of specie to be much greater, public and private, and there is besides much valuable merchandize on board the captured ships. Our loss has been very trifling. I have not yet had the returns from the other ships, but the *Indefatigable* did not lose a man. The Spaniards suffered chiefly in their rigging, which was our object. The captains of the different ships conducted themselves so ably, that no honour could accrue to me but the fortunate accident of being senior officer.—The zeal, activity, and spirit of the officers, seamen, and marines of the squadron, is best evinced by the complete manner in which they performed their work. Lieutenants Gore, Parker, and Ascott, of the *Indefatigable*, and Lieutenants Howland and Moore, of the marines, gave me that support which their uniform good conduct formerly taught me to rely on. Mr. Griffith's, (the master) conduct has my perfect approbation. I presume to recommend, in the strongest manner, Lieutenant John Gore, of the *Indefatigable*, to your

favour and protection.—I have the honour to be, &c.—GRAHAM MOORE.

Force of the Spanish Squadron.—La Medee (flag ship) forty two guns, eighteen pounders on the main deck, and 300 men, taken; two men killed and ten wounded.—La Fama (commodore's ship) thirty-six guns, twelve pounders on the main deck, and 280 men, taken; no returns.—La Clara, thirty-six guns, twelve pounders, on the main deck, and 300 men, taken; no returns.—La Mercedes, thirty-six guns, twelve pounders, on the main deck, and 280 men, blew up; second captain and forty men saved.

*Indefatigable, Plymouth Sound,  
October 19, 1804.*

SIR,—I have to inform you of the arrival at this port, of his majesty's ship under my command, with the Amphion, which I thought proper to order to England for the security of the two Spanish frigates La Medee and La Clara, which we have brought in with us. We have seen nothing of the Medusa and lively, with the Spanish frigate La Fama, since the evening of the action, when they parted from us. I inclose a copy of the account delivered to me by the Spanish major of the squadron, of the treasure and cargo on board the four ships.—I have the honour to be, &c.—GRAHAM MOORE.

Hon. Ad Cornwallis.

*A General Statement of the Goods and Effects brought by the Frigates of this Division, commanded by Don Joseph de Bustamante y Guerra, Chief of the Squadron of the Royal Navy.*

On account of the King.—Medee. 35 sacks of Vienna wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1627 bars of tin, 203 pigs of copper, and 521,940 dollars in silver.—Fama. 360 bars of tin, 28 planks of wood, and 330,000 dollars in silver.—Mercedes. 20 sacks of Vienna wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1139 bars of tin, 961 pigs of copper, and 221,000 dollars in silver.—Clara. 20 sacks of Vienna wool, 20 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 1065 bars of tin, 571 pigs of copper, and 234,694 dollars in silver.—Total. 75 sacks of Vienna wool, 60 chests and sacks of cascarilla, 4732 bars of tin, 1735 pigs of copper, 28 planks of wood, and 1,307,034 dollars in silver.

On account of the Merchants.—Medee. 32 chests of ratinia, 952,619 dollars in silver, 279,502 gold, reduced into dollars, and 124,600 ingots of gold reduced into dollars.—Fama. 316,597 dollars in silver, 217,756 gold, reduced into dollars, and 25,411 ingots of gold, reduced into dollars.—Mercedes. 500,000 dollars in silver.—Clara. 512,400 gold, reduced into dollars.—Total. 32 chests of ratinia, 1,859,216 dollars

in silver, 1,119 658 gold, reduced into dollars, and 150,011 ingots of gold, reduced into dollars.

On account of the Marine Company.—Medee. 8995 seal skins.—Fama. 14,930 seal skins.—Clara. 10 pipes of seal oil.—Total. 20,925 seal skins and 10 pipes of seal oil.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain Moore, of his Majesty's Ship the Indefatigable, to William Marsden, Esq., dated the 21st inst.*

SIR,—I herewith transmit you, for their lordships' information, a return of the killed and wounded on board his majesty's ships in the action of the 5th of October, 1804, together with the loss of the Spaniards.—I am, Sir, &c.—GRAHAM MOORE.

Indefatigable. None.—Medusa. Her return not received.—Amphion. Lient. William Bennett, wounded, 3 seamen and 1 marine wounded, badly.—Lively. 2 killed; 4 wounded.—La Medee (the Spanish admiral). 2 killed; 10 wounded.—La Clara. 7 killed; 20 wounded.—La Fama. 11 killed, and 50 wounded.—La Mercedes. Blown up; the second captain and 45 men saved by the Amphion, all the rest perished.—GRAHAM MOORE.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRISH CATHOLICS.—In the former part of this number (p. 629) will be found a letter upon the subject of the military force which might be obtained by settling all disputes with the Catholics of Ireland. Perhaps the writer may be correct; but, making allowance for an over-sanguine calculation, the matter is certainly worthy of serious attention. It is a melancholy reflexion, that one third of the population of the empire should, from whatever cause, contribute nothing towards the general defence and enterprizes of that empire. It is to be hoped, that some measure upon this subject will be brought forward during the next session of parliament. Such a measure cannot, and ought not, to be hastened to its consummation; but, if it were only sketched out; if it were only proposed; there would be something for hope to live on, and, in the mean-time, consequences the most beneficial to the general interests of the empire might be expected to result from it.—Being upon a subject relating to the Irish Catholics, I cannot refrain from just noticing a pamphlet, which has been published in Ireland, by way of answer to the narrative of the Rev. Peter O'Neil, which was published in the Register, Vol. V. p. 266. A copy of this pamphlet was, about three months ago, transmitted to me with a request that I would publish it, in "vindication of the

"Irish protestants," against whom Mr. O'Neil's narrative was, by the person who enclosed me the pamphlet, styled, "an 'envenomed libel.'" The first thing I did was to read over again very carefully the whole of the narrative, in which I found not only no one libellous expression against any body, but not even one censorious expression with regard to any particular person or description of persons, much less any thing, either directly or indirectly, levelled against the protestants of Ireland or the protestant faith, the writer confining himself entirely (and in language the most respectful towards all persons of rank or authority) to an exculpation of himself. Such being the result of my examination, I, of course, did not insert the pamphlet in the Register. About a month ago I received a letter, signed, "A dignified Clergyman," reproaching me, in very undignified language, with partiality and with acting solely from party views, because I had not inserted the pamphlet against Mr. O'Neil. Whoever has read the narrative will, I am certain, approve of my decision; but, if he has read the "vindication" also, he will find, that it contains real accusations against Mr. O'Neil, and very severe ones too; that, this "vindication" is *anonymous*, whereas to the narrative, Mr. O'Neil *put his name*; and, I am sure the opinion of every candid man will be, that to have inserted the pamphlet, under such circumstance would not have been to act with "impartiality." This appears, too, to have been the sentiment generally entertained upon the subject; for, as my reproachful correspondent observes, Mr. O'Neil's narrative was published in *all* the London prints, from one of which, indeed, I copied it; and, I believe, the "vindication" has not obtained admission into any one of them. Nevertheless, so strong is my desire that the readers of this work should hear both sides of every subject therein treated of, that I will even now insert the pamphlet in question, if the author (being a person of good and well-known reputation) will send me another copy, with authority to publish it with his name and place of abode. Even the letter accompanying the pamphlet was anonymous. The contents of the pamphlet may be true; but, why, then, this shyness? It appears suspicious; and till this appearance be removed, neither the pamphlet will be published nor its statements credited by me.

IRISH PAPER-MONEY.—The letter in p. 623, giving an account of the failure of the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer's proposition to the bank directors of Dublin,

appears to me to contain censure too unqualified upon those directors. They certainly know their own interests best, and, it seems strange to suppose, that, in pursuing their own interests, they should not pursue also the interests of their constituents, the proprietors of bank-stock, who are, in fact, mere partners with themselves. It is to me far from being so very clear as it appears to be to my correspondent, that either of the schemes proposed by Mr. Foster would answer the purpose intended. When the great difference between the amount of the former capital of the Scotch bank and that of the amount of the present capital of the Irish bank; and when the still greater difference as to the former and present quantity and state of the whole of our paper-money; when these are considered, there really seems to be little room whereon to found an argument of analogy. And, as to the making of Irish bank-notes payable in notes of the bank of England: who can be certain that it will produce any other effect than that of communicating a share of the Irish depreciation to the already depreciated, though less depreciated, paper of Great Britain?—But, upon what authority is the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer acting in this matter? If the measure, or measures, which he has proposed be of such vast importance, and so very necessary to the well-being of Ireland, why did he not obtain an act of parliament for enforcing his designs, especially as we are told, that the opinions upon which he proceeds are the result of inquiries made by a committee of the House of Commons? Acts of parliament are things by no means rarities now-a-days. For a session or two past there have, I believe, no acts been passed for regulating the manner of vending pigeons' and rabbits' dung. I do not recollect any acts of exactly that description since Lord Holland, in 1802, by the force of some excellent observations, quashed a bill, the principal object of which, if I recollect right, was to settle the question, whether, in the sale of the precious commodity above mentioned, the measure should be heaped up, or only filled to a level with the brim! I cannot refrain from digressing a little further to observe, that this legislating upon trifles, and the consequent multiplicity of laws, is a certain mark of national decline. It arises from that confusion of ranks, in consequence of which low men obtain so easy access to persons in high situations, and even to the situations themselves; it inevitably tends to degrade the legislature in the eyes of the people; and, of course, to weaken their respect for all

its acts, and for the whole of the constitution and government.—But, to return to the bank-directors and Mr. Foster; a measure so important as the one proposed was certainly not beneath the notice of parliament, and, amongst the scores (I believe I may safely say *dozens*, at least) of acts, which that gentleman introduced into the House of Commons, during the last month of the last session, all which acts related exclusively to Ireland, he might surely have found a little corner for the affairs of the bank. The measure proposed, that I mean of obliging the bank of Ireland to pay in bank of England notes, might, if adopted, materially affect the property of all the people of England and Scotland. It might, in the space of a few months, cause a further depreciation of money in Great Britain to the amount of eight or ten per cent, thereby producing not only most dreadful hardships amongst people of fixed incomes, but so great and sudden a disproportion between the price of labour and the price of provisions as to plunge the whole country into discontent and confusion. And, is this, in times like the present too, a measure to be adopted without the consent, and even the knowledge of parliament? It is, or, at least, it was, a maxim in England, that property was sacred; that the people, by their representatives, *taxed themselves*; and that in this way, no minister could ever touch any man's property without his own consent. The funding system has blown all such maxims into air. A quarter of an hour's conversation between a person like George Rose and the Directors of the Bank can change the relative value of all our property; can make some of us richer and some of us poorer; can raise thousands into splendor, and sink millions into misery. When, indeed, any *compulsion* or *punishment* upon the people is wanted to strengthen and support the paper-money makers, then, recourse is had to parliament. The quantity of English bank notes was swelled up to its depreciating size without any approbation of parliament; but, when it was feared they would no longer be taken in payment of debt without a law making them, as to all practical purposes, a legal tender, then parliament was applied to, and law was obtained, which law, be it observed, inasmuch as it related to the payment of debts heretofore contracted, was certainly an *ex post facto* law. The bank dollar bill is another instance. As to the issuing of these dollars; as to the issuing of current coin by a company of traders; the imprinting upon that coin the image and superscription of

his Majesty, associated with the arms and superscription of the Bank, and thereby degrading the royal image and authority; as to all this, the consent of Parliament was not asked, any more than the consent of the apple women at the Horse-Guards. But, when it was found that the dollars were counterfeited; when a punishment was wanted to be inflicted to protect the bank and the paper-system; when it was found necessary (and I do not deny the necessity) to inflict severe penalties, then indeed, for the transporting and hanging part of the measure, application was made to the Parliament.—Upon the whole, therefore, it appears to me to be a subject of pleasure rather than of regret, that the Irish Bank Directors have rejected the proposition of Mr. Foster. Parliament will soon meet. If the measure be proper to be entertained, it may then be regularly brought forward, and, if approved of, adopted.—In the mean-time, it is very improper to load the bank-directors with such foul charges; and, in this respect, I cannot but disapprove of the letter of my correspondent I. T., though I am full as anxious as he can be to see the evil of depreciation removed. It is not the bank-directors, but the paper system, extended as it now is, that is in fault. The convertibility of Irish into English paper can only draw the malady from one part to another. It is the convertibility of all paper into gold or silver that is wanted to effect a cure: and, I must confess my astonishment at hearing men of general liberality and of great profundity confine their blame to the bank-directors, while they must know that the real and only cause is the law sheltering the banks against cash demands, which law was first passed and has since been renewed at the express motion of the minister. How unjust and unmanly is it, then, to fall upon the bank-directors as the authors of the mischief? We saw nearly a hundred Irish members voting here last Spring for Mr. Pitt and his systems; and now, behold, they are railing against the bank-directors as the cause of the calamities which arise, naturally and inevitably arise, from those systems! The Emperor, upon evacuating Flanders, is reported to have said to the people: "If you will have the French, why take them; and "much good may they do you!" So say we with regard to the Irish members and Mr. Pitt; but, if they take him, let them take his budget, his projects, his paper, and his depreciation, along with him: to throw the blame of these up on this or that description of persons in Ireland and to proceed from extremes to extremes, or from motives which I do not think it necessary here to describe.—The same remarks will apply to those

persons who compose, what is oddly enough denominated, the "Irish government." The blame of depreciation and of the scarcity of coin has been thrown upon them. But, what have they to do; what have they had to do with the matter? And, as to preventing the effects, or arresting the progress of depreciation, they have no more the means of doing it than they have of turning the wind or putting out the sun.—That the lower classes of the people, those who do not, and who cannot, see the real cause of the calamities they suffer; that such persons should, like the animal that bites the tormenting instrument, not perceiving the hand by which it is applied; that such persons should fasten upon the object nearest to them, upon the bank directors or upon the Irish government, is what one would expect; but, it is really mortifying to see their example followed by men of learning and of great information.

CATAMARAN-PROJECT.—A considerable part of the preceding pages will be found filled with the reports, from different French officers, to the Emperor Napoleon and others, relating to the effects produced by the catamaran-project. It appears, that Lord Keith's account was perfectly correct, as far as it was possible for him to gain positive information. No mischief, worth speaking of, was done to the enemy, who lost only a pinace from the explosion of a fire-ship, and whose loss of lives and of limbs arose from his men having boarded, and, as they thought, secured the possession of a fire-ship.—Of this childish project, of the manner in which it was conducted, and of the *party* effect which it was intended to produce by the aid of hired news-papers, I shall speak more at large, when, in the next sheet, I give an historical sketch of THE CAMPAIGN OF 1804. The French official papers should, in the mean-time, all be carefully read. There is, I dare say, some exaggeration upon the subject of the heroic exploits of the French soldiers and sailors; nor can the refusal of our sailors to undertake the fastening of the blocks, be considered as arising from a want of that undaunted spirit, by which they have been hitherto distinguished above all the men in the world; but, it is certainly matter of deep regret, that the French should have been furnished with a handle for making such a comparison as they will not fail to make, and, indeed, as they have, from this circumstance, already made. It were better that Lord Melville had remained at Edinbro' to the latest hour of his existence!

LORD NELSON'S LETTER.—In referring the reader to the letter of this gallant

seaman, which will be found in p. 659 of the present sheet, I must beg leave to refer him also to the Register, Vol. V. p. 489 and p. 502. At the former he will find a letter signed NAUTICUS, and at the latter some observations of mine: these will afford him a full view of the conduct and motives of the Common Council of London. It was evident, indeed, to every one (though few thought proper openly to say it), that the vote of thanks to the blockading admirals was merely intended as an indirect vote of thanks to the ministers, who had adopted the blockading system. This Lord Nelson seems to have perceived; and, with a spirit becoming his rank and character, he has resented the attempt to make him a ministerial tool. A person of the name of DIXON, I think it is, has, since the publication of Lord Nelson's letter, informed the public, that, previous to his moving the vote of thanks, *he had a conference with the Secretary of the Admiralty.* The fact leaves no doubt as to the origin or the real object of the vote of thanks.—The city of London was, in former times, remarkable for its jealousy of ministerial power. Mr. Pitt has discovered, or rather he has fell upon by accident, an effectual way of silencing that Cerberus; and, if any one asks, when this silence will be broken, the obvious answer is: when the bank shall be compelled to pay their notes in specie. 'Till then, the city and the minister of the day are inseparable in interests. Like monks, they may fight and scratch between themselves; but, they must continue united against every body else.

THE WAR WITH SPAIN seems to be taking a very odd turn. But a few days ago the ministerial papers were singing victory and conquest. Now, it is said, that the commanders of the Spanish frigates have been informed, that they may go where they will with their *ships*; but that they must leave *the money*! This puts one in mind of the conduct of Gil Blas and his comrades, who, in order to quiet their consciences, after having paid a frolicsome visit to Samuel Simon's doubloons, carried the old man back his empty bags. Gil and his comrades did, however, *blow nobody up* in their frolick!—The discussion of this subject must be deferred 'till the next sheet.

#### COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.

THE SECOND VOLUME of this work, comprizing the period from the Easter Recess to the close of the last session, has been for some time completed, and is now published, in the same manner as the First Volume. The two volumes embrace the whole

of the session; and the Editor ventures to assert, that the proceedings of no session of parliament have ever been so fully and impartially recorded, accompanied by so many authentic and useful documents, arranged in a manner so well calculated to abridge the labour of research, edited with so much care and correctness, and printed in a form at once so elegant and so convenient. Notwithstanding the great difficulty of obtaining the reports of some speeches, there will, in these volumes, be found scarcely one, of which there is not a tolerably full account; and, in order to be convinced of the very great degree in which this work surpasses, in point of amplitude, any other of the kind that has been attempted, the reader has only to make a comparison between the two in the case of any important debate; by which means, indeed, were he so far to extend his inquiry, he would find, that, in the course of the two volumes, there are fifty speeches, at least, which are here reported nearly at full length, and of which hardly a trace is any where else to be found in print. Of those speeches which have, under the authority of the speakers, been published in pamphlets, the reports thus authorised have been taken; and no small portion of the whole of the reports have, in point of correctness at least, received, in a greater or less degree, assistance from the notes of the persons by whom the speeches were made, assistance which has been accepted of and even solicited, without any distinction as to persons, parties, or opinions, it being the chief object of the undertaking to exhibit a perfectly impartial view of the proceedings of parliament, and that object having, in the progress of the performance, constantly prevailed over every other consideration. The Official Documents, upwards of a hundred in number, include every parliamentary paper that the editor, judging from no small experience, regarded as useful to students in politics. He is convinced, that, by the aid of the documents thus annually preserved, any person of common capacity may arrive at a sufficient degree of knowledge as to the state of our national affairs, in whatever relates to Public Income or Expenditure, Resources or Wants; and he is certain, that in no other work whatsoever are these documents to be found. Besides the Lists of Minorities, which are most accurately inserted, in their proper places, through the body of the work, there is at the head of the first Volume a correct list of the Members of the House of Commons, as that House was composed at the opening of the session; and, at the head of both the first

and second volume, there is a list of the Cabiners and other Ministers, marking the time when any material change in the ministry took place, circumstances closely connected with the proceedings of Parliament, and the recording of which must, therefore, in a work of this sort, be of great convenience and use. A List of the Public Acts is followed, at the close of each volume, by four Indices; viz., two of the Subjects of the several debates, the one for the Lords and the other for the Commons; and two of the Names of the several speakers. The body of each volume is preceded by a copious Table of Contents, forming a brief chronicle of the proceedings of the two Houses respectively, to which table is added another referring to the several Documents, which are there classed under distinct heads, corresponding with the subjects to which they belong. In the Title Page are fully specified all the circumstances of time and place; and, in order to leave nothing to be wished for on the score of convenience, the date as well as the subject are stated at the top of every page; while the page, being that of a super-royal octavo, divided into two columns and compactly printed, gives to the work at once every advantage, without any of the disadvantages, of a quarto and a common octavo.—The two volumes, comprising 52 shilling-numbers, half-bound in Russia leather, are sold at £2. 18s. od.; and, that the price is very moderate will certainly be granted, when it is considered, that exclusive of the extra-expense arising from the great quantity of figures necessarily employed in the work, the two volumes contain more letter-press than ten common octavo volumes.

The work is published by Mr. BAGSHAW, Bow Street, Covent Garden, and sold also by Mr. BUDD, Pall Mall; Mr. FAULDER, Bond Street; Mr. SYMONDS Paternoster Row; Mr. RICHARDSON, Royal Exchange; and Messrs. BLACK and PARRY Leadenhall Street.

N. B. To those persons who may be desirous of receiving the work in Numbers, during the approaching session, and who reside at a distance from the metropolis, it may be necessary to observe, that publications of this sort cannot be sent post-free like newspapers; and that, for persons so situated, the most convenient way will be, to give their orders in the country to some bookseller who keeps up a correspondence with London. As the Parliament will meet on the 27th of November, the first Number of the 3d Vol. will, of course, be published early in December.

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. VI. No. 18.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1804. [PRICE 10D.

"Russia is, by the present arrangement" [the German Indemnities] "brought forward into the system of Europe, on the Continent; but, in complete subordination to the ambition of France. She will always be a most powerful friend to the latter against either Austria or Prussia, because she lies at the back of both, and has many causes of natural quarrel with both; but a comparatively weak enemy against France, because, from her local situation, she can never bring large armies to act against France for a continuance of repeated campaigns."—COBBETT'S LETTERS to Lord Hawkesbury on the German Indemnities. Register, Vol. II. p. 397.

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
## STATE OF IRELAND.

SIR,—The exertions which were made by the ministry of Mr. Addington, to give to the Irish rebellion of the 23d of July the appearance of an hasty and temporary insurrection, must be still fresh in the minds of every one. To those who knew the state of Ireland, and to those who were acquainted with the feebleness of Mr. Addington's cabinet, such exertions could only contribute to sink the character of that administration still lower if possible than it was at that period. Still they were of considerable avail, because they imposed upon that mass of the people, by whose voice alone a minister can be impelled to attend to grievances, and from whom all measures of change, whether in rendering good governments worse, or bad governments better, must originate. Although the policy of Mr. Addington so far succeeded as to ward off those measures of inquiry into the causes of the Rebellion, and, what, at the moment, was of much more consequence, the extent of that evil, it now appears, by the intercepted letters taken on board the Admiral Aplin, that the considerate and informed portion of our society were too generally acquainted with the circumstances of Ireland to be so deceived. In these letters we have the combined testimony of persons of high rank in the political world, and of persons of great repute for their extensive knowledge in the trade and circumstances of every part of the empire to prove, that the inhabitants of Ireland were considered to be as ready to join with the French in 1803, as they notoriously were in 1798. Mr. Stewart Hall writes: "In Ireland the people are there ripe for revolt. Give to the Irish said they (alluding to Col. Hutchinson and another member) what you solemnly promised them before the Union, and which contributed to effect the Union. Give them liberty and you will find them the best subjects of his Majesty, but if you do not insurrection will succeed insurrection, until the empire is shaken to its very foundation."

(Intercepted Letters, Ginger's edit. p. 13.) Mr. James: "We hope every thing from our unanimity. In Ireland, the case is different: if the French were to land there, with only 10,000 men, the country would be once more on fire. The spirit of treason, rebellion, and animosity against us is there still the same." (p. 52.) Lord C. Bentinck: "Dreadful accounts have been received from Ireland. They (the Irish) have begun according to their ancient custom. If this country is not attended to it will be lost." (p. 55.) Mr. Mac: "I have learnt with regret, that the lower classes of men in Ireland are more disaffected than ever, even more than during the last rebellion." (p. 56.) Mr. F. Faulder: "I have heard it from the first authority, that if the French can land with some troops, they will be immediately joined by 100,000 Irish." (p. 59.) Mr. J. Hartwell: "The public mind of Ireland is very much indisposed; and, should the French succeed in effecting a landing in that country, it is lost to us." (p. 62.) Mr. J. Lumsden: "My only fear is for Ireland, where the standard of rebellion has been hoisted anew." (p. 64.) The Marquis of Titchfield: "Ireland is at present tranquil; but this species of tranquillity, and the little we know of the conspiracy, compared with the unusual preparations made by our enemies, are really very alarming, there is but one opinion of the government of Ireland, which is, that it was excessively remiss, and that it was surprised." (p. 76.) Mr. Stewart Hall, in a third letter: "A descent in Ireland would be successful, inasmuch as the leading men of that country avow their opinions that the French would be received with open arms by the people." (p. 91.)—Such, Mr. Cobbett, are the sentiments entertained in the few letters we have an opportunity of seeing; and very astonishing it is, how general the belief was that the state of Ireland was as bad as possible at the moment when the conduct of parliament, and the taciturnity

nity of public opinion, would lead one to suppose, that the attempts of Mr. Addington to smother the events of the 23d of July, had been generally successful. We may fairly argue, from the evidence of these letters, that the universal opinion entertained at the time when they were written; and, *à fortiori*, at the present moment, was, and is, that the lower classes of the people of Ireland are, as Mr. Mac writes, more disaffected than ever, even more than during the last rebellion, notwithstanding the elaborate exertions to cause it to be believed, that the people who had been worked into arms from one end of the country to the other, in 1798, could not be roused in 1803 beyond the assemblage of a desperate mob, as contemptible in number, as it was atrocious in disposition.——Had we similar opportunities of seeing the whole of the private correspondence of the last year, we should, no doubt, find this opinion received on all sides, and no where attempted to be controverted.——Melancholy, indeed, is the reflection, which must now be formed by every one who can appreciate the value of Ireland to the safety of Great Britain. Whilst the assertions of the ministry respecting it remained unanswered, there was a tendency to believe them arising from the hope, which is characteristic of human nature, that evils are at no time so great as they are represented. But, now that conviction of the extent of the danger in which Ireland is placed, is, at last, produced, and this not only by our acquaintance with the opinions of the leading persons of that country, the facts which have occurred, and the small portion of the correspondence of these realms which we have been enabled to peruse, but also, by the numbers of persons who have been apprehended and confined in prison for treasonable practices in every part of Ireland, and in truth, by the whole tenor of the public measures since the 23d of July, the attention of every one should be closely applied to every circumstance which regards Ireland, and the conduct of the ministry most minutely watched, so that some hopes may yet be entertained that the system of governing Ireland may be amended, before the opportunity of applying a remedy is irrecoverably lost. That a rebellion should take place under the ministry of Mr. Addington is by no means surprising, considering the circumstances under which it was formed, and considering the state of Ireland at the time. But, since that administration has ceased to exist, no small degree of surprise may now be felt on viewing the inactivity and the lamentable apathy of Mr. Pitt,

who so justly and manfully and patriotically stigmatised Mr. Addington for incapacity and incapability.——It gives me great pain to observe, Sir, that though Mr. Pitt has been minister for nearly six months, no one measure has been ever hinted at for conciliating the affections of the people of Ireland; though that minister has unequivocally and undeniably pledged himself to give the Catholics an equal participation of political rights with the Protestants; though he stands committed on the measure of the Union for the safety of the British Empire, so far as that safety is dependant on the conduct of the Irish, and though this measure was proposed by him as a measure to reform abuses, and as a measure wisely to conciliate the affections of those who were adverse to a connexion with Great Britain. I think, Mr. Cobbett, that Mr. Pitt, as the minister of the present day, is solely responsible for every disastrous event which may take place in Ireland; because, either he is competent to render the Union the measure he promised it should be, or he is not competent to do so; if he is competent, let him forward those measures, for which the faith of his ministry is pledged; and, if he is not competent, let him feel that his honour is better worth preserving than his office, and let him not, above all things, give to the people of Ireland the opportunity of complaining, that the plighted engagements of the British government have been violated.——Mr. Pitt, of whose honour I have yet a high opinion, may say, that he has made no promise to the Catholics, because the intimation of the possible occurrence of the circumstance of unlimited emancipation was qualified by the reserve of an indefinite period, when such a measure would be prudent. But one noble lord in close alliance with him, has told the Catholics by a public manifesto, that Mr. Pitt was engaged to grant this emancipation; and another noble lord, of still higher authority, publicly declares, that he will not hold any civil situation, under any ministry, till he can fulfil his portion of the engagement made to the Catholics at the instance of Mr. Pitt.——The responsibility of Mr. Pitt in regard to the state of Ireland, is clearly of a much more serious nature than it is commonly considered; and, as the safety of Great Britain depends so much upon the connexion with Ireland (for what would be the situation of Great Britain if the French possessed a flotilla of gun-boats in Dublin harbour!) the public are in duty bound, consistently with the preservation of their dearest interests, to call on Mr. Pitt for such measures as may relieve the empire from



that danger which is so fully and accurately described in the intercepted correspondence. — That this danger is in a great degree owing to the Union is very evident from the simple consideration of the superior efficacy with which a local legislature can meet the designs of rebellion, to that with which a more distant one can act. "The local parliament had indisputably one eminent advantage; being from the very circumstance of its locality more intimately mixed with the transactions of the country, it had more easy access to information, in respect to its internal state, than a more remote legislature can possess." (Speech of Mr. W. Elliot, Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I. p. 90.) But of this advantage, and very great indeed it is, in times whose principal features are wars, rebellions, and revolutions, Mr. Pitt deprived the British empire by the Union. The event of the 23d of July is a practical proof of the want of a local legislature in Ireland; but, as Mr. Elliot says in another part of his speech, "the loss of this advantage was expected to be overbalanced by the numerous and solid benefits likely to accrue from that measure;" and, sufficiently, indeed, would it have been balanced, had such means been adopted, since the Union, as would have given to the empire the benefit of a conciliation of the affections of the Catholics of Ireland to the connexion with Great Britain. — But, as things now stand, Mr. Pitt has, I fear, done all the mischief that could be done by the measure of Union, and has forgotten to remedy the evils which unavoidably attended it; and, by not making it operate as the means of conferring those essential benefits, which every one who supported the Union was led to expect, as the certain consequence of the difficulties being removed by the abolition of the Irish Parliament, which its existence prevented. — The state of the case, in regard to Ireland and its union with Great Britain, is exactly as follows: the powers which it possessed of repressing the rebellion and of conciliating its people through the medium of its Parliament, are taken away and given to another legislature, which, owing to its distance from the scene of action, cannot be so efficacious in its measures for crushing popular commotions, and cannot feel, from its nature, the same degree of interest towards promoting the magnanimity and loyalty of the inhabitants of Ireland. — That there had existed in the Parliament of Ireland a feeling of bigotry, which contributed much to produce the disasters which it has experienced, cannot be denied; but, if there was a Parlia-

ment now existing in Ireland, and it were a question to be decided whether the Catholics were to be emancipated, or to be again made subject to the penal laws, the superior information of the Irish gentry as to the local state of Ireland, and the great interest which each of them would have at stake; combined with the improved notions of liberality, which now prevail, would unavoidably render the emancipation of the Catholics a measure of certainty. The Union, therefore, as far as it has yet operated, has been productive of all the dangers of open rebellion, and all the injury which has arisen from its having taken from the people of Ireland the natural means of acquiring the wished-for state of conciliation and unanimity. — Is it not, therefore, an excessive misfortune, that now, when the power of suppressing rebellion is placed in a remote legislature, this legislature does not afford any means for removing the causes of rebellion? Has not any proprietor of property in Ireland good grounds for complaining of the danger into which that country has been brought? Has not every inhabitant also of Great Britain reason to consider Mr. Pitt as conducive to its present critical state, by his neglect in not bringing forward such secondary measures to the great measure of forming an imperial Parliament, which the circumstances of Ireland so notoriously require? — The state of affairs is really such, Mr. Cobbett, that unless, as Lord Charles Bentinck writes, "this country is not attended to, it will be lost." What, then, is to be done? Will Mr. Pitt undo the Union, form the boroughs of Ireland, for which compensation has been given, into open boroughs, and leave the country to extricate itself from its difficulties? No; this he will not do. — Will Mr. Pitt propose any measure in the British Parliament, sincerely intended to meet the views of the Catholics of Ireland? Will Mr. Pitt never propose any measure, which might involve in its issue the embarrassment attending the construction of a sacred and solemn oath? Will Mr. Pitt keep his place, break his promise, and risk the safety of Ireland, and with it the existence of Great Britain, in order to gratify the paltry ambition of being prime minister? I cannot help saying, Sir, that I hope and believe and confide that he will not so act. I love to believe that he is not that man. — But, if, unfortunately, nothing should be done by the minister, our constitution has afforded us the means by which to remedy the neglect of any and of every minister. The Parliament must attend to the petitions of the people; and, both the people and the Parliament are so-

leanly bound to come forward at this present conjuncture to endeavour, so far as the constitutional powers enable them, to procure the adoption of such measures for Ireland as the preservation of the empire so immediately require. But, it rests more particularly with the Catholics of Ireland to demean themselves on this important occasion with that firmness which they ought to possess as living in a nation of liberty, and with an earnestness proportioned to the value of the rights which they are solicitous to be restored to. When so many are ready to stigmatize them as rebels, and when it is clear that the invasion of Ireland would, by the probable union of some of the lower classes of the people with the French, give a new opportunity to the enemies of emancipation to attach to the whole body of the Catholics the crimes of the dregs of the people, it is most critically and urgently their duty to adopt some line of conduct, which may prove to the world, that their object is just, and that the means they adopt for acquiring it are perfectly constitutional.—There never was a moment, in which this body were more the subject of general observation, or in which the expectation of the world were more interested in its destiny. Feeling, then, as they must who can at all feel the spirit of constitutional liberty, that they are deprived of a most valuable franchise; and feeling, as they ought to feel, the policy of warding off the shafts of their enemies, they should lose no time in petitioning Parliament for the full enjoyment of the constitutional rights of British subjects.—That such a proposition and such a proceeding, in the present state of affairs, may be termed foolish and factious, and even treasonable, by such persons as the Edinburgh Reviewers, (whose country, by-the-bye, has not in consequence of her union with England sustained any grievance whatever) or other writers employed by the late ministry; but, as to the question of time, the Irish Catholics have a ready answer in the words of a venerable father of the English Church, I mean the Bishop of Landaff: “I love my lords to have politics, on all occasions, founded on substantial justice. If any one should contend that this is not the time for government to make concessions to Ireland, I wish him to consider, whether there is any time in which it is improper for either individuals or nations to do justice; any season improper for extinguishing animosity; any occasion more suitable than the present for putting an end to heart burnings and internal discontent? I should be as averse as any man for making

“concessions to an enemy invading the country; but I would do much to gain a cordial friend to assist me in driving him back; and, such a friend I am confident Ireland will become.” (Speech intended to have been spoken by the Bishop of Landaff, p. 28.) Under the sanction, therefore, and sound authority of this liberal and learned prelate, I would advise the Catholics not to be prevented from coming forward by the aspersions, which may, but which, I hope, will not, be heaped upon them for so doing. They have the most powerful reasons for inducing them to act without further delay; and, as their claims are clearly founded in justice, no liberal man can blame them, and no sensible man will reject their claims.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c. Z.  
*Liverpool, Oct. 14, 1804.*

#### BLOCKADING SYSTEM.

SIR,—The near approach of winter, and the losses and disasters which our navy has sustained in the course of the summer, and even of the present month, in consequence of the blockading system, induce me again to address you on this important subject.—Your ready insertion of my former letters, and your particular reference to them in your Index, encourages me to hope you judged them in some degree, worthy the notice of your numerous and respectable readers.—Higher than this, they never stood in my own estimation. Had I rated them lower, I ought, in deference to the public, to have suppressed them. But, in times like the present, it is the duty of every individual, however obscure in station, or limited in ability, to exert his utmost efforts for what appears to him his country's welfare. If these produce but little effect, they may probably excite others of superior abilities, and more extensive information, to greater and more effectual exertions. Should such be the result of the present attempt, I may rest satisfied that I have not made it in vain.—The arguments by which I, in my first letter, endeavoured to prove the waste, the danger, the inefficacy, and the consequent impolicy of the blockading system, (especially as it respected the harbour of Brest) were at the time of their insertion in your Political Register, opposed, but not refuted, by a writer under the signature of T. H.—This I noticed in my second letter, and invited him to a fair and liberal discussion of the important question. Whether he thought the matter too light or too heavy to take up, I presume not to conjecture. It may not, however, be improper to remark, that the arguments I then made use of to prove the

complicated evils which might probably result from the blockading system, have been too fatally exemplified by very recent experience. Even the present month has abounded with losses and disasters, evidently originating from this destructive cause.—The gallant and indefatigable Cornwallis, though commanding a fleet such as no nation but Britain can supply, though supported by his own unconquered mind, though aided by the unparalleled energy, perseverance, and ability of British officers and seamen, has been forced from his station by incessant and resistless storms, to seek shelter and repairs in British harbours.—Probably, his unwearied efforts to overcome every impediment, may have placed him again on his arduous station. Perhaps too, even at the instant I am writing, a storm may arise which may be far more calamitous than any he has hitherto experienced! Through the long tempestuous period of the preceding winter, was the blockading channel fleet exposed to those impending dangers, nay, liable to that inevitable destruction which baffles the utmost efforts of human power or skill, and from which the Almighty arm of an over-ruling Providence is alone sufficient to yield protection! When we consider the complicated dangers, and expenses, and (what is perhaps a still greater evil) the sure, though imperceptible, consumption by which our dreaded and envied navy must infallibly and quickly be destroyed, in a succession of winter blockades, what Briton is there who can contemplate the dreadful prospect, without the most lively sentiments of grief and apprehension? Who, but would inquire to what purpose must this accumulation of evils be hazarded or incurred? What are the benefits we can expect even from the most successful blockade? The answer must amount to little more than this: we shall, by blockading the enemy, prevent them from leaving their ports to fight our fleets; which repeated experience has convinced us they will not do, even when our ships have been crippled, dispersed, and driven from their coasts.—At the same time, too, that we are thanking our gallant admirals for keeping the French in their harbours, we anticipate a certain victory if they can by any means be induced to come out! Can there be greater inconsistency? But surely the blockade of Boulogne must be a *wise* measure! It not only prevents invasion, but gives us the most favourable opportunities of attacking them, or of annoying their flotillas when skulking from port to port, even under their land batteries?—That it affords an apt occasion to try curious experiments, and to prove that which

it is impossible to doubt, the unrivalled gallantry of our officers and seamen, no one who has read the daily papers of the present month will be hardy enough to deny.—But, though every degree of praise is due to our officers and seamen, yet what advantage have we obtained from those unequalled exertions of daring enterprize to compensate for the loss or mutilation of those heroes who have so severely suffered on those memorable occasions? Have all our “quests, glories, triumphs, and spoils,” off Boulogne, been of sufficient value to compensate for the sacrifice of a single British seaman, or even of a gun-brig? I must confess, it appears to me they have not: though I know it has been the opinion of many, that the effect of those dashing exploits in terrifying and disheartening the enemy, more than counterbalances the losses we sustain by them. Could I admit the premises, I must still deny the conclusion; but both appear to me erroneous. A well concerted *coup de main*, is chiefly indebted for its success to the secrecy, silence, and rapidity, with which it is executed: its novelty excites terror, consternation, and surprize; but the frequency of its repetition has an effect directly the reverse; the enemy deriving confidence from preparation, and energy from resistance, is rather emboldened than intimidated by these frequent attacks, which he now regards no more than the flux and reflux of the tide, and from which his land batteries always afford him a retreat secure to himself, and destructive to his assailants. Viewing in this light the operations of our blockading squadrons off Boulogne, the wisdom or utility of these indecisive and destructive actions with the enemy's flotillas, must appear extremely problematical, though the gallantry and ability with which these attempts are invariably attended, cannot fail to excite unanimous admiration and applause.—Another very material objection to the blockading system, (on its present extensive scale) is that its manifest and necessary effect must be, to gratify the wishes, and promote the designs of our implacable enemy in their fullest extent. What more can he desire than to protract the war, to debilitate and gradually annihilate our navy, to disgust, to dishearten, our officers and seamen, by continually exhausting their spirits and vigour, in unavailing contentions with the elements, and all the dangers of a winter's blockade on an enemy's coast. A tedious cruise which is neither to be rewarded with wealth, glory, or victory; and whose object is to detain in their harbours those enemies who have repeatedly convinced us,

they possessed neither the desire nor the courage to leave them; and who, if they could by any means be induced to make the attempt, would most probably contribute by their defeat to the strength and glory of the British Navy, and to the termination of a disgraceful, destructive, defensive warfare, in which our own exertions accelerate our fall, and our insidious malignant enemy succeeds by inactivity, and conquers by delay, and may finally triumph without striking a blow.—What is the cause that invasion is still a subject of universal doubt and inquiry? *The blockading system.*—It is this alone that delays the ultimate decision of that momentous question, which Buonaparté is equally restrained by policy and by fear from bringing to an issue. Let us withdraw our fleets from his shores, and we deprive him of the only pretence for deferring the execution of his menaces against us, and the performance of his specious promises to his credulous and hungry slaves.—Instead of hoping for popular insurrections in Britain from interminable hostility, exhausted finances, and intolerable taxation, which he now contemplates as the preludes to a certain and easy conquest, he would be convinced he must immediately attempt his vaunted invasion, amid the dangers and horrors of long winter's nights, and while the ill acquired diadem trembles on his guilty brows, or he will find in France that designed insurrection and revolution, which he has so long, so anxiously, and (thanks to Almighty Providence) hitherto so vainly sought for in Britain.—I am, Sir, &c. BRITANNICUS.

Oct. 30, 1804.

#### SUBSCRIPTIONS IN MILITARY BODIES.

SIR,—Considering it to be one of the principal objects of your paper to direct the public mind to a view of any abuse or improper practice that may require correction, I beg leave to offer a few remarks upon a subject, which perhaps, may be deemed not uninteresting.—A custom has been lately introduced, and now, indeed, become very general, amongst the different corps of volunteers, to testify their approbation of their commanding officer, by presenting him with a sword, or a piece of plate, purchased by subscription. This assumption of a right to decide on the merits or qualifications of an officer commanding, cannot surely be defended in a military point of view, or justified on any ground whatever. If a present of this kind is to be a token of approval, the withholding it from the next who succeeds in command, must tacitly imply that he is not equally meritorious. We must ob-

serve then, the unpleasant situation of a commanding officer looking forward to a decision of this nature. Many circumstances must arise in the public discharge of his duty that may be considered harsh and disagreeable by the individuals under his command. He must either sacrifice his duty to the King, in order to accommodate himself to the feelings of his corps, or, by enforcing the necessary discipline of the service, he, perhaps, forfeits that mark of distinction which was bestowed on his predecessor.—It is, no doubt, presumed that the subscription is voluntary, and that every man contributes according to his inclination; but, I am confident, that many individuals have not the liberty of choice, from an apprehension of the marked situation in which they would appear, if they did not come forward to subscribe their proportion.—Circumstances have lately occurred, in other and much more important branches of the service, which strengthen this latter observation; and there can remain but one opinion as to the indelicacy of the proposal, and the unjustifiable mode of levying the contribution. An officer, actuated, no doubt, by the most praise-worthy motive, and ambitious, perhaps, to display his own respect in a pre-eminent degree for a superior officer who was about to retire, sent a circular letter to the other officers who had served under him, containing a proposal, that each of them should, according to his rank, subscribe a certain named sum, for the purpose of purchasing a handsome present for the acceptance of the said superior officer. The money was collected, or, more properly speaking, *levied*, according to the assessment: the article was purchased, was presented to, and was accepted of, by the person, for whom it was intended.—I cannot, Sir, consider the expression of a general sentiment of the many, as the opinion of the individual, whilst any restraint can operate to influence his determination. Nothing else but madness would I call it, in a character *dependant* to be conspicuously distinguished for his refusal to join in the general testimony of respect. Though he might plead the inability of his means, the urgency of his affairs, or the serious calls which he had for the appropriation of that money which the subscription required; yet the hazard of a negative might mark him so publicly, that common policy would advise a passive acquiescence to the terms of the requisition. Thus it is, that the apprehension of each person, least he may be singular in his refusal, forms by that means a general concurrence; and, I make no doubt,

that if the uninfluenced opinion of the officers alluded to, could be separately obtained, that they would individually object to that contribution, which had collectively received their assent.—From inquiries that I have made, respecting the above circumstance, I find, that a great many of those who have thus paid the subscription, scarcely ever heard the name of the superior officer alluded to; few of them had any correspondence with him, and fewer still had ever the pleasure of a personal interview.—It is but natural to suppose, now a precedent is established, that the frequency of application, should there be a rapid succession of such superior officers, may become a very severe tax upon the military incomes of the staff; for it would be difficult to ascertain what period of service could authorize a claim for a similar remuneration, when each such superior officer upon retiring, might expect the same pecuniary mark of approbation as his predecessor in office.—I trust, that the foregoing observations will suggest the propriety of discountenancing those subscriptions, which cannot, from the natural *dependance* of the subscribers, be considered as *voluntary*; and, that a practice so unmilitary in every point of view may be discontinued in future.—Hoping that these remarks will excite attention in that quarter to which they are particularly directed. I remain Sir, yours, &c. Y.

London, Oct. 29, 1804.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

INTERCEPTED LETTER RELATIVE TO  
JEROME BUONAPARTÉ.

*The Minister of Marine to M. Piebon, Consular-General at New York. Dated Paris, April 20, 1804.*

Board of ———, }  
For yourself only. }

I have taken the orders of the First Consul, Citizen, concerning the demand which you made on me for the appointment of an allowance to be granted to Citizen Jerome Buonaparté; and bound to obey the orders which he has given me, in a way that shewed it was not his intention that the slightest modification should have place either in my mode of transmitting them to you, or in the execution of them, I discharge my duty in notifying to you his resolution that no money shall be advanced on the order of Citizen Jerome.—He has received orders, in his capacity of Lieutenant of the Fleet, to come back to France by the first French frigate that was returning thither; and the execution of this order, on which the First Consul insists, in the most

positive manner, can alone regain him his affection.—But what the First Consul has prescribed me, above every thing, is to order you to prohibit all captains of French vessels, from receiving on board the young person with whom the Citizen Jerome has connected himself, it being his intention that she shall by no means come into France, and his will, that should she arrive, she be not suffered to land, but be sent back immediately to the United States.—After having thus notified to you those intentions of the First Consul, and having ordered you to attend to the arrangements he has made, it remains for me to invite you to employ, for the persuasion of the Citizen Jerome, every expedient which your wisdom, your prudence, and excellent judgment shall suggest. I have written him to this purpose, and have represented to him that the glorious and brilliant career to which his destiny calls him, requires of him a necessary sacrifice, due also to his interest, his personal glory, and the designs of the Hero to whom he has the honour to be related. Explain to him, that having been absent for several years, he little knows the First Consul, whose inflexibility can be compared to nothing but the vastness of his conceptions. Cherishing important and profound meditations, he considers himself as having no family but the French people, every thing unconnected with the glory and happiness of France, is indifferent to him. In proportion as he delights in exalting and honouring those of his relations who participate those sentiments with him, does he feel coldness for those who do not partake them, or who walk in a different path from that which his genius has traced out for himself. Unwearied fabricator of his own glory, he bewails in secret, that he sees not his example followed with the same perseverance by those of his own blood; he is indignant at the obstacles thrown in his way by what he calls their effeminacy, and he declares against beholding them otherwise engaged than in following the steps of his career.—Citizen Joseph, his eldest brother, distinguished by the eminent services he has rendered in his council, by diplomatic mediations and labours known to all Europe, by the treaties he has concluded, invested with the senatorial robe, and of the first rank in the Legion of Honour, has seemed to him not yet sufficiently clothed with glory, and wishing to crown him with that for which every one may find instruments in perils, hardships, and genius, he has just given him one of the regiments which are to bear into England the national vengeance.—General

Louis, general of division, known until now by military glory, is about to add to it that of the statesman, and has been just admitted into the Council Section of Legislation.—Citizen Lucien, with the reputation of past conduct, and a fortune perfectly independent, has formed connexions repugnant to the views of the First Consul; and the consequence is, that he has just quitted France, and that, obliged to abandon the theatre of the glory of his own family, he has exiled himself to Rome, where he becomes the simple spectator of the destinies of his angust brother and the empire. —These examples will inform Jerome what his brother expects of him, and what he may expect from his brother. Young as yet, and of an age at which the laws authorize not a marriage to which relations have not consented, he has indiscreetly and rashly contracted one (these are the Consul's words); he has abandoned the labours which the country required of him; yielding to an irrational passion, he has, without doubt, acted grievously wrong, but his youth shall be suffered to plead his excuse, provided he is wise enough not to disobey the voice which calls him. —Ashamed of his indolence, too long protracted, let him seize the first occasion of returning to share those labours whereof he should have given an example, and he will recover his brother in the head of the state—it is the only means to consecrate the ties which unite them. —As his friend, as devoted to his family, as his superintendant, in fine, in the career which he has embraced, I have a right to expect a quiet hearing from Jerome, and I entreat he will execute the orders he has received, and follow my advice: I see his brother every day, and if I give him no prospect of bending that brother, by a different conduct, it is because, in truth, I have perceived that he is in this respect inflexible. —Jerome is wrong, said he to me, to fancy that he will find in me affections that will yield to his weakness; the relation in which I stand to him does not admit of parental condescension, for, not possessing the authority of a father over him, I cannot feel for him a father's affection. A father is blind, and takes a pleasure in blinding himself, because his son and he are identified. They have given and received so much, reciprocally, that they form but one person; but, as to me, what am I to Jerome? What identity can subsist between us? Sole fabricator of my destiny, I owe nothing to my brothers. In what I have done for glory, they have found means to reap for themselves an abundant harvest; but they must not on

that account abandon the field where there is something to be reaped. They must not leave me insulated and deprived of the aid and services which I have a right to expect from them. They cease to be any thing to me if they press not around my person, and if they follow a path that is opposite to mine. If I require so much from those of my brothers who have already rendered so many services, if I completely abandon him, who in maturer years has thought proper to withdraw himself from my direction, what has Jerome to expect? So young, as yet, and only known by forgetfulness of his duties, assuredly if he does nothing for me, I see it in the decree of fate, which has determined that I ought to do nothing for him. —This is what the hero hath said and repeated to me in divers conversations. The solemnity of those confidential communications he has condescended to make to me on this subject, has struck me, and I repose them in your bosom, that you may seize the moment and the manner of impressing them on Jerome. What gratitude will he not owe to you if you succeed in persuading him: I know not what degree of resistance you will experience, but let him be well persuaded that it is more from personal attachment than from duty, that I insist with him on such details. My duty might be limited to the transmitting to him the orders and arrangements of the First Consul, but this long effusion can proceed from no other motive but my friendship for him. The Consul would end by forgetting him, and he is occupied by so many great objects, that this oblivion, painful at first, would settle into habit—and this is what I fear. —If the delirium of the passion should render him inaccessible to the voice of reason, you have only one thing to represent to him. Which is, that the passions cease, or at least decline, and that in this case the consequence would be endless, Jerome is very young, his life will be long, and I, who know his brother much better than he himself knows him, am certain, that should he not comply with his wishes, he is storing up for himself the most poignant regret. —Moreover, if, unfortunately for Jerome, he should prolong his stay in the United States during the war, if peace should be made before his return, what a grief for him to have passed with a woman a season of dangers. And what regret does he not prepare, even for the woman herself, when humbled by his obscurity, he shall one day impute to her, were it even involuntarily and secretly, at the bottom of his heart, the indolent part to which he shall have been reduced by the

passion wherewith she inspired him.—And even if he loves this woman, let him learn for her sake to quit her. Let him return and keep near his brother—he will give him credit for the sacrifice; and from the sentiments of good will and friendship which will thence result it is not forbidden him to conceive hopes. But let him not bring her along with him; be her accomplishments what they may would produce no effect, for most assuredly the order is given to prevent her landing, and it would be fresh trouble, and a disobedience too gross of the orders of the First Consul to have any other effect than an irritation extremely unpleasant for what is and ought to be most dear to the heart of Jerome.—I repeat to you, Citizen, I recommend the object of this letter to your careful attention, and to your solid judgement, as to the use you shall make of it; I have entered into no detail on the nature of the illegality of the connexion in question, because I treat this affair in a sentimental manner merely; but I have some difficulty to conceive how the father of the young person hath brought himself to yield to an union, reprobated by our laws, and which the dignity of Jerome's family required should be very maturely considered before it was consented to.—(Signed) DECRET.—The example of Lucien cannot but divert Jerome from imitating his conduct: behold him separated from his brother; but this afflictive separation, afflictive for all the friends of their family, would have much more unpleasant consequences for Jerome who has yet acquired no personal weight, no fortune, and whose property left behind him at Paris has been employed, in part, to pay the bills he has drawn on France. But this motive is nothing in comparison of those more prevailing ones, of the duties, and the career of glory that call upon him.

#### PUBLIC PAPER.

*Letter of his French Imperial Majesty, to the Burgomaster and Council of the City of Frankfurt. Written at Mentz, Oct. 1, 1804.*

Very worthy and good friends.—I have read the letter of the date of the 30th of August, which Messrs. Humbracht and Messler, Burgomasters and Senators of your free Imperial City, communicated to me on your part: the assurances which you give me of your sentiments towards me, is the more agreeable to me, as it convinces me that you, after the experience you have had of the participation I take in the independence and welfare of your city, will not fail to shew yourselves always grateful for it. My resident with you has it in commission

frequently to renew to you the assurance of my sentiments towards you. I shall always perceive with pleasure that you take such measures as may prevent your city from becoming the centre of those intrigues and disturbances which England endeavours to propagate on the Continent, to mislead it, and renew the evils of war, the calamities of which you have already sufficiently experienced.—I pray God, worthy and great friends, to have you under his holy and gracious protection.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

RUSSIA AND FRANCE.—Previous to the making of any remarks upon the merits or the probable consequences of the dispute between these two powers, it may not be unnecessary to say a word or two as to the progress of the dispute itself, as far as that progress is perceivable in the diplomatic communications that have found their way into the world.—The coolness between Russia and France, which first became visible in the treatment which Count Marckoff publicly received at Paris, and which, as it now would seem, arose from his having pressed the fulfilment of the articles of a secret convention between the two powers, relative to the affairs of the several states of Italy; that coolness, which at last, was turned into a downright quarrel between Buonaparté and Marckoff, the latter being openly reproached by the former at a public levee; that coolness was made evident to all Europe in the note written, after the departure of Marckoff, by d'Oubril, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, in answer to Talleyrand's circular letter relative to the intrigues of Drake and M'hée de la Touche.\* This answer was given on the 25th of March, 1804, a few days after the seizure and execution of the Duke d'Enghien. In the mean time Marckoff, who had once been so great a favourite at Paris, had met with a most gracious reception at St. Petersburg, where the Emperor Alexander had, by public rescript, bestowed on him an annual salary of 12,000 roubles, honoured him with promotion to a high office, and renewed to him an expression of the Imperial thanks for his conduct while at Paris, "where," says the Emperor, "you dis-  
"charged your duty with the greatest zeal,  
"and to my entire satisfaction."† The instrument containing these gracious expressions and provisions bears date on the 15th

\* See D'Oubril's Answer, Register, Vol. V. p. 627.

† See the Rescript, Register, Vol. V. p. 750.

of February, 1804, and, of course, the knowledge of its existence reached Paris about the time that d'Oubril's answer of the 25th of March was delivered to Talleyrand. When the news of the seizure and execution of the Duke of Enghien reached St. Petersburg, the court must obviously have been extremely well disposed to avail itself of the opportunity, offered by that event, to come to an open rupture with France upon grounds where Russia would appear, not as an ambitious intruder into the affairs of the south of Europe, but, as the champion of the independence of nations, as the defender of the weak against the violence of the strong, as the avenger of injured innocence upon the heads of the guilty. Accordingly, a note was, on the 22d of April, 1804, delivered to Talleyrand by d'Oubril complaining of the violation of the rights of nations, committed by the French, and notifying that the Emperor had caused his sentiments upon the subject to be made known to the Diet of Ratisbon.\* Agreeably to this notification, a note was laid before the Diet in a few days after the last-mentioned note was delivered to Talleyrand. This note bears date at Ratisbon on the 5th of May, 1804, and is stated to have been given in on the 6th of that month. M. de Kluppel, the person by whom it is signed, repeats the complaints conveyed in the note of d'Oubril, of the 22d of April, and concludes by expressing the conviction of the Emperor, his master, that the Diet and the Head of the German Empire will do justice to his disinterested and manifestly indispensable care, and that they will unite their endeavours with him, to transmit their just remonstrances to the French government to prevail on it to take such steps and measures as the violation of their dignity may require, and as the maintenance of their future security may render necessary.† Whether the Diet and Head of the German Empire thought that the endeavours, which they were thus invited to make would be useless; or whether they regarded the interference of France as being not more injurious to their dignity, and not more dangerous to their security as the further interference of Russia would be, has not been officially stated to the world; but it is certain, that neither the Head of the German Empire, nor any of its members, the Kings of Great Britain and Sweden (the former as Elector of

Hanover, and the latter as Duke of Anterior Pomerania), acted upon the advice of Russia. While the Russian Ministers at Paris and Ratisbon were thus employed at Paris and at Ratisbon, their court, where Marckoff had already been so graciously received and so highly rewarded and honoured, upon his return from Paris, went into mourning for the unfortunate Duke d'Enghien; in which, to the astonishment of those who know nothing of the British cabinet, the example was not followed even by the court of St. James'. Thus affairs remained till July, 1804, on the 21st of which month d'Oubril presented to Talleyrand a note of great length, the substance whereof was given in the preceding sheet,\* and the whole of which, together with the note from the same to the same, dated 28th of August, 1804, will be given in the next double sheet of this work. Upon delivering this last-mentioned note he puts an end to all friendly intercourse by notifying the orders he has received to depart, and by demanding the necessary passports. We are accordingly, now informed, that he has returned to Russia, and that the French legation has been ordered to quit, and, of course, has quitted St. Petersburg.—Before I proceed to any remarks upon the case as it is left by these notes of d'Oubril, it will be useful to give a short sketch of the progress of the dispute between France and Sweden, this latter being the only power upon the continent, which, as yet, appears to have entered into the views of Russia.—In answer to Talleyrand's circular letter relative to the intrigues of Drake and Mehée de la Touche, the Swedish minister at Paris made use of the occasion for no other purpose than that of conveying the offence which his master had justly taken at the violation of the territory of Baden, especially when considered together with the melancholy event to which that violation finally led. But, before this violation of the rights of nations took place, we find, that the King of Sweden, as Duke of Anterior Pomerania, had caused to be delivered in to the Diet at Ratisbon, a note dated there on the 26th of January, 1804,† remonstrating

\* See this note. Register, Vol. VI. p. 29. N. B. The note is there, by mistake, dated 20th April, instead of 22d April.

† See the note. Register, Vol. V. p. 782.

\* See the joint note of the Prussian and other ministers dated 16th May, 1804; in which they evade the question by expressing their hope, that the First Consul of himself will be inclined to give such satisfaction as shall satisfy Russia. Vol. V. p. 96.—See the note of the King of Great Britain, dated at Ratisbon, 21st July, 1804. Register, Vol. VI. p. 184. And the note of the King of Sweden, dated Ratisbon, 14th May, 1804. Register, Vol. VI. p. 358.

† See this note. Register, Vol. VI. p. 356.

against the violation of the rights of several of the German Princes, which violation being a natural consequence of the system of Indemnities, it was easy to see the reason why Russia did not join in the remonstrance; but it must not be forgotten, that already the dispute between Russia and France had proceeded to great lengths, and the quarrel with Marckoff had become a matter of public notoriety. Before this took place, Sweden observed a perfect silence upon the subject of the acts of plunder committed upon the German Princes. The violation of the territory of the Elector of Baden was a new, and leaving all consideration of motive out of the question, a very just cause of complaint with his Swedish Majesty, whose minister at Ratisbon, at the distance of only eight days in date, strenuously seconded the call of Russia upon the Emperor and the Germanic Body, to demand satisfaction.\* On the 27th of July 1804, another note was delivered in to the Diet of Ratisbon, on the part of his Swedish Majesty, not merely referring to the Russian note of the month of May preceding, but repeating all the sentiments of that note, and enforcing the necessity of a general co-operation in acting upon its principles, and its specific recommendation.† In the mean time, the Elector of Baden, the father-in-law of the King of Sweden, and the Prince whose territory had been violated for the purpose of seizing the Duke d'Enghien and putting him to death; this very prince had, before the presenting of the last-mentioned Swedish note, implored the Diet not to suffer the representations made by Russia and Sweden to be followed by any further consequences! In this note the French government and "its EXALTED HEAD," were spoken of as the benefactors of Germany, and in which it was signified that explanations, perfectly suitable to the good dispositions of France, had been given even as to the occurrences in question! After this, for the Duke of Anterior Pomerania still to persevere in his remonstrances to the Diet of Ratisbon, still to call up the blood of the duke d'Enghien appears to have been too much for the patience of Buonaparté, who, upon the eve of becoming an emperor, thinking it beneath him, perhaps, to enter into a diplomatic quarrel with a duke, delegated to the Moniteur the task of making one general reply to all the complaints of his Swedish Majesty. This task was executed on the 14th of August, 1804; and that the execution exhibited very little of

moderation, very little abstinence from reproach, and even from abuse, need hardly be stated; but, it is not unworthy of notice, that, amongst the reproaches of the Moniteur, was that of the King of Sweden's remaining neuter during the late Continental war, which, the Moniteur observes, was the proper time for him to have come forward for the defence of the Germanic Constitution.\* In consequence of this disrespectful and virulent publication, his Swedish Majesty, condescending to notice the Moniteur in question in express terms, did, by a note delivered by his order, to the French minister Caillard at Stockholm, on the 7th of September, 1804, put an end to diplomatic intercourse between Sweden and France. This note, which does not appear to have been the result of very mature deliberation, and in which his Swedish Majesty certainly descended too low in disputing with the editor of a French newspaper, concludes by stating, that, as a sentence in the article of the Moniteur seems to imply, that the French government is disposed to admit that the commercial intercourse between Sweden and France would be attended with some advantages, his Majesty, on his part, is willing to permit the same from those sentiments of esteem which he has always entertained for the French people, sentiments which he has inherited from his ancestors, and which owe their origin to far happier times. This was not what one could have wished, especially after it had been observed, in the body of the note, that, if the object of the Moniteur was to separate the people of Sweden from their sovereign, the object would not be accomplished. Nor was it without much mortification that, on the same day on which this note was delivered to the French minister, an order was issued from the Court-Chancellor of Sweden, prohibiting the importation of French newspapers into the dominions of his Swedish Majesty, thereby evincing a dread of that effect of which in the note, the king had expressed his contempt.†—The foregoing historical sketch appeared necessary as an introduction to any discussion upon the merits of the dispute between the Northern Courts and France. The official documents have been referred to, because a re-perusal of them may contribute to a still clearer understanding of the subject: and for the same reason a re-perusal of a demi-official paper circulated on the continent in defence of the views of Russia

\* See note. Register, Vol. VI. p. 358.

† See the note. Register, Vol. VI. p. 334.

\* See this paper from the Moniteur. Register, Vol. VI. p. 356 & 360.

† See the Order. Register, Vol. VI. p. 412.

is recommended.\*—The Russian note delivered to Talleyrand on the 21st of July last, as well as that which was delivered to him on the 28th of August, and in which the diplomatic intercourse was put an end to, will be inserted at full length in a future sheet of the Register. The note puts forward very little new matter; and the substance of the former note has been laid before the public in the preceding sheet, p. 643. Since the appearance of the Russian notes, the substance of the French note, delivered in answer to the Russian note, has appeared, and it is as follows:—“After stating the astonishment of the Emperor of the French at the complaints of Russia, and the tone in which they are expressed, which is represented as being that of a conqueror, dictating to a subject power, instead of the familiar tone which ought to be used between two countries standing upon terms of intimacy, and treating upon a system of perfect equality, the note asserts:—That France has a right to reproach Russia with having neglected to execute her engagements; with having interfered and changed the government of the Seven Islands, which was placed under the joint guarantee of France, Russia, and the Porte, without any concert or communication with France; with having sent large bodies of troops to Corfu, and having made an ostentatious preparation of sending additional numbers.—That the Emperor of Russia had also given an open reception to the emigrants of every description, and had conferred on them public employments; and so far from expelling from his dominions the individuals of the Bourbon Family and their head, had allowed them an asylum in the Russian territories, and had participated in their criminal projects; contrary to the wise example of his father, at the time of his endeavouring to terminate the war, and to restore the tranquillity of Europe:—That Russia had also recently placed itself in a posture of direct defiance to France, by ordering a court mourning as a mark of respect to the memory of an agent in the pay of England, engaged in a criminal design to effect the ruin of France:—that Russia had acted in this manner, after this traitor to his country had been condemned by the just decision of a tribunal of the French government, and had been executed in pursuance of its sentence:—That these and many other examples of the ill disposition of the Russian government, the whole of

“whose conduct towards France had undergone an unaccountable alteration; the glaring partiality which Russia uniformly manifested towards England, and the perfidious conduct and plots of M. Marckoff, who had increased the differences between the two governments, and had engaged in all the wicked designs of the emigrants and disaffected persons in France: that these were the real causes which induced the Russian government to adopt that cold inexplicable conduct towards France, which it had lately thought proper to evince upon every occasion:—That finally, if notwithstanding all the solicitude of the Emperor of the French to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the two countries, the Emperor of Russia should join his arms to those of England, the Emperor of the French would in that event rely on the skill and valour of his armies, and would maintain at every hazard the honour of France, and the lustre of the French name.”—The materials for judging with minute correctness upon this great subject are yet incomplete. We want the French note previous to the 21st of July; that note, in which Talleyrand answered to D'Oubril's note of the 22d of April, and in which D'Oubril states, that “the French cabinet (to maintain its erroneous principles) deviated so far from every requisite decorum and the regard due to truth, as to allege examples which were altogether improper to be mentioned; that it in an official document, recalled even a father's death to the recollection of his illustrious son, in order to wound his tender feelings; and that (contrary to all truth and to all probability) it raised an accusation against another government whom France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it.” We clearly enough perceive from this, that Talleyrand, in answer to the remonstrances of Russia relative to the violation of the territory of Baden and the execution of the Duke D'Enghien, reproached the Emperor of Russia with something respecting the taking-off of his father, the Emperor Paul, and reproached the English government with an attempt to assassinate Buonaparté. But, the want of this note of Talleyrand leaves a material chasm in the correspondence. That the note was, as D'Oubril states, at once evasive and outrageously indecorous, can easily be believed; yet it is wanted; and, in not publishing it, there is an appearance of unfairness, which always has a tendency to injure the cause of the party from whom it proceeds.—We

\* See Register, Vol. VI. p. 483.

are, however, in possession of enough to enable us to form a judgment as to the main objects of the contending parties, always regarding Sweden as having no object separate from those of Russia.—This latter power, it is very evident, has, during the last twenty years, been earnestly endeavouring to obtain an extensive and permanent footing in the south of Europe, towards the accomplishment of which object she was, as she thought, pushing with hasty and fortunate strides in the mediation relative to the German indemnities; though it was at that time suggested in this work, that Buonaparté would finally eject her, after having made use of her name and influence to accomplish his views and to give a sanction to his proceedings. But this artful politician (or rather those artful politicians by whom he has the sense to be guided) fished with a double hook; for we now find, that there was a secret convention entered into between Russia and France on the 11th of October, 1801, according to which, Buonaparté was to evacuate the Neapolitan dominions, and was to respect the neutrality of that kingdom in future wars; he was, in concert with Russia, to establish some principle for finally adjusting the affairs of Italy; he was to indemnify the King of Sardinia in a manner satisfactory to Russia! Here, then, Russia appears as the great and exclusive protectress of Italy. She actually became, in conjunction with Buonaparté, a dictator, absolutely a distributor of power and dominion through the whole empire of Germany, not excepting the territories of the Imperial House itself. Of what kind the feelings of Austria must have been upon that occasion, it is by no means difficult to imagine. Indeed, considering the necessary effect of this interference of Russia, her direct instrumentality in humbling the House of Austria, what had Talleyrand now to do but to open his portfolio, and to show the Austrian minister the secret convention, in virtue of which Russia, after having been a dictator in Germany, was to become the sole guardian of Italy, thereby reducing Austria to a state of intolerable insignificance?—The recent and present conduct of this latter power, as far, at least, as we can judge from outward appearances, is exactly what one would have expected as the natural consequence of such a discovery. Her danger from the revolutionary principles of France no longer exists; her danger from the arms of France has been lessened by her having lost those parts of her territory, which was, in all wars, so much exposed to those arms, and her danger both from the influence and the arms of Russia

would, if the latter became the protectress of Italy, have been beyond all calculation augmented: indeed, it must have been obvious, that, if the wishes of Russia had been accomplished; if the secret convention between Russia and France had been fulfilled, Austria must have soon become a mere cypher in Europe. With such conviction in their minds, the statesmen of the court of Vienna had no choice; and, accordingly we find them acting in perfect unison with the views of France. Mortifying reflection! that while our enemy keeps us in a constant state of alarm and terror, he has quite sufficient leisure to play off the powers of the Continent against one another! It may now, perhaps, be recollected, that, during that memorable scene, called the settling of the German Indemnities, some of our legislators and statesmen, and all our merchants and manufacturers, with here and there a very honourable exception, were ready and even ostentatiously forward to express their indifference at it. "Let them alone!" was the cry. "Let them settle their own disputes; and let us keep ourselves to ourselves." The public must remember that this sentiment was echoed at a city feast. Yes, Sir Balaam! but they will not let you alone! They will not let you keep yourselves to yourselves! They say you have more good things than you have a right to; and they vow they will have a share, though you cry your eyes out. It is no use to swear the peace against them: the Vice Society cannot put them down: they will have a dispute with you, and you must, by some means or other, get at them and beat them, or they will take all your treasures and your life into the bargain.—But, will Austria really oppose the allies of Great Britain? She must, or be herself undone; and, it is that very short-sighted selfishness, which was so toasted and boasted at the city feast, which has greatly contributed to reduce her to the dire alternative. Nothing would be easier than to trace this consequence back to its efficient cause, and to show, that the evil is, in a great degree to be attributed to the want of wisdom in the British cabinet; but this has already been done in the series of letters, from one of which the motto to the present sheet is taken, and the whole of which, were it not too much to ask, I could now wish the public at this time to peruse.\* In those letters, it was not only predicted, that Austria would be completely alienated from

\* They are to be found in Vol. II. at the following pages, 271, 361, 393, 449, 473, 532, 594, 646.

Great Britain, who would be left without efficient allies in all future wars; but, the reasons why this should happen were clearly stated. There was little merit in so doing; for it must have been evident to every one at all acquainted with the system of Europe, that, in future, France would have no quarrel with either of the Imperial Courts without being favoured by the neutrality or the active assistance of the other.—That such will be the case now we have no positive official declaration to prove; but, we have what is nearly equivalent to such a declaration. Russia quarrels with Buonaparté; the House of Austria acknowledges his title as Emperor of France, and makes an addition to its own hereditary title at the same time. Russia declines acknowledging that addition, in which it is said, her example is followed by the cabinet of Great Britain: while the King of Sweden, as Duke of Anterior Pomerania goes farther, and, in a note presented to the Diet of Ratisbon, on the 20th of August last, calls in question the right of the Head of the House of Austria to assume the hereditary title of Emperor.\* These circumstances sufficiently indicate the unfriendly, not to say hostile, disposition of the parties; and there can be little doubt, that the disposition of Austria is, to join France in arms, if necessary, to prevent Russia from obtaining a footing in the south of Europe; in any part of the south of Europe, from the Bosphorus to the Alps. Russia, by stretching at too much, has lost all to the south, upon the Continent, and cannot, while at variance with France, hope for any gratification of her ambition except amongst the Mediterranean islands, where, if she be gratified at all, it must be at the expense of England!—Of the awkwardness of her position Russia herself seems to be aware; for, the close of D'Oubril's last note seems to indicate an intention on the part of his court to follow the example of his Swedish Majesty; to suspend all diplomatic intercourse, to lay down the pen, but to leave France to determine when the sword shall be taken up, or, as it would seem, whether it shall be taken up at all; and, as Buonaparté will scarcely be so mad as to insist upon such quiet people becoming his enemies, it is more than probable, that the weapon of death will remain unsheathed, unless some of our news paper writers should draw it out in spite of the wearers. “Still faithful to his engagements,” says D'Oubril, “and anxious to avoid the shedding of human blood, the Emperor will confine himself

“to that resolution which the respective position of the two countries admits. Russia and France can do without those relations, the continuance of which is only to be warranted by reasons of advantage and accommodation, and without which it is better that they should have no connexion. As it is the French government alone which has given rise to the present state of affairs, it will also depend upon it to decide whether war is to follow or not. In case it shall compel Russia, either by fresh injuries, or by provocations aimed against her, or against her allies, or by still threatening more seriously the security and independence of Europe, his Majesty will then manifest as much energy in employing those extreme measures, which a just defence requires, as he has given proofs of patience, in resorting to the use of all the means of moderation consistent with the maintenance of the honour and dignity of his crown.”—And this is the alliance that was to save us! The words here put in *Italic* characters were so distinguished in the translation of this note published in the ministerial papers; and, the intention was to give a broad hint to the superficial reader, that, Russia is resolved on war if France does fresh injuries to the allies of Russia, and that, as we are the allies of Russia, she will go to war, if France does us fresh injuries! Nay, this condition extends, I perceive, to provocations; and, therefore, if such be the meaning and intention of Russia, she will either go to war, or Napoleon must break up his threatening flotilla! What an intolerable absurdity! Why, if Buonaparté were to read this Morning Post newspaper, he would certainly think that he had scared us all out of our senses. !—This bloodless declaration of Russia comes, too, observe, after a positive demand that the French shall evacuate Hanover immediately. But, the truth is, that, situated as Russia now is, without any footing on the Southern part of the continent of Europe, and kept back by the arms or the neutrality of Prussia and Austria, she cannot give to France any thing worthy even of the name of annoyance. From the moment an alliance with Russia was talked of, it was foreseen, that such would be the consequence, unless all parties were actuated by motives self-evidently disinterested: and, it was not only foreseen but repeatedly foretold, as the readers of the Register must remember. If, therefore, the public have been deceived; if, after being cheered and exhilarated with the prospect of seeing the Russian standard waving over

\* See the note. Register, Vol. VI. p. 428.

the bastions of Savoy and Flanders, they are now plunged into despondency by the pacific tone of Sweden and Russia, and particularly by the step which the latter power is now said to have taken with regard to the unfortunate King of France, to their own credulity their disappointment and dejection must be ascribed. In this work a fear was, from the beginning, expressed, that, under the influence of such a political system as ours, no effectual alliance would be formed against France; no league for the sole and openly avowed purpose of restoring the House of Bourbon to the throne; and, unless such was the bond of alliance, it was always considered as useless to form any alliance at all, at the present conjuncture, with Russia, because nothing short of the certainty that the war would not tend to the aggrandizement of Russia, could, it was evident, induce Austria to become a party to the alliance; and, because (Prussia being out of the compass of hope) it was equally evident, that, without Austria, no alliance whatever could produce much effect against France.—How, then, has the alliance with Russia and Sweden hitherto operated? To the latter, it is said, with what truth I know not, that we are paying the expense of raising an army, at the rate of twenty pounds a man, for the defence of Anterior Pomerania! Russia we are introducing into the Mediterranean. We have not given her the possession of Mr. Pitt's "infant republic of the Seven Islands," the *independence* of which that statesman declared to be of an importance to England "equal, perhaps, to the possession of Malta itself;" no; we have not given this independence up to Russia; she has taken it; and, we find, that this is one of the subjects of quarrel between her and Napoleon! It is curious enough, that our enemy should have quarrelled with our ally for encroaching upon an independence, to preserve which we regarded as of inestimable importance!—Whatever footing Russia obtains in the Mediterranean will, in its degree, be injurious to Great Britain; that is to say, if it be the interest of Great Britain to preserve her colonies in the East Indies, and especially if it should continue to be the policy of France to strive to wrest those colonies from her, or, at least, to throw them open to all the world. Russia, firmly fixed in the Mediterranean, would, when occasion served, become, in conjunction with France, a most formidable enemy to this country. The Porte must remain an inactive spectator, while a Russian army on one side, and

a French army on the other, would meet with little interruption in their way to what they both regard as the principal source of our wealth.—We have taken the wrong course to obtain efficient aid upon the Continent. We have begun at the wrong end. To raise *an army*; to form a complete military system; these should have been the first measures. Having an army, we should have been able to offer our alliance with some confidence. We should have talked of giving protection to others, instead of humbly seeking protection for ourselves. "Why," says crying Sir Balaam, "have we not an army of 480,000 volunteers and small bounty and permanent duty men?" Yes, Balaam; but that is precisely the reason why friendly nations keep aloof from you, and why, as to hostility to France, your wish "to keep yourselves to yourselves" is, and will be, gratified to its fullest extent. "What, then, would you make every body soldiers? Would you destroy all commerce and manufactures? Would you never have any thing but war?" No: I would not have every body soldiers; I would, comparatively speaking, have but a very few soldiers: I would not have half a dozen kinds of armies: I would have only one army; but as the lioness said to the sow, that one should be a lion. No; Balaam, I would not destroy all commerce and manufactures: I would only destroy the effect of their deleterious principles: I would banish those principles from the cabinet and the legislature: I would destroy the predominance, the empire, of trade: I would have no Knights and Barons of the counting-house, the pack, and the spinning-jenny; I would, in short, make trade, in all its branches, be universally regarded as greatly inferior to every liberal profession, and, more especially to the profession of arms. No: Sir Balaam, I would not *always* have war, though I confess to you, that I think wars are, upon a general principle, necessary to maintain the order of the world. No, no, Balaam, it is not I that am for "eternal war:" it is you, who seem to be for eternal war; for, that is the consequence of the defensive, such is the commercial system, that it is now utterly impossible for any man to point out how this war can be ended, except in a way resembling the termination of your renowned progenitor:

"The devil and the French divide the prize,  
"And sad Sir Balaam curses God and dies."

—This is the fatal catastrophe, which I am anxious to see prevented; and, which I am thoroughly persuaded, cannot be pre-

vented without banishing from our national councils the narrow and degrading notions of trade, and without changing, to a very great degree, the spirit of trade into a military spirit.—In the answers to observations of this sort, it is now-and-then confessed, though with great apparent reluctance, that “some military states have, in “process of time, succeeded over those “whose main object was traffic.” In process of time! Which were the commercial states of the continent of Europe, at the commencement of the French revolution? France herself was one. Her financiering ministers had been, for several years, endeavouring in all manner of ways, to extend the commerce of France. Companies of traders were established; American fishermen were invited to settle in the French sea-ports to teach Frenchmen the art of obtaining blubber; the custom house books became the manual of the minister; in short France became, as far as it was possible for her, under the then existing circumstance, to become, a commercial nation. The commercial nations, then, were, Denmark, the Hans Towns, Holland, Monarchical France, Portugal, Spain, Genoa, and Venice. What are they now! All except the first (and that first is not very secure) have actually been subjugated by, or, from the dread of subjugation, have become tributary to military France. “In process of “time!” God ‘a’ mercy! why all these commercial nations have been thus subdued in the space of ten years, and less! “In “process of time!” Time flies swift with declining nations, particularly if they are of a commercial cast; because, though they present a fine plump and florid figure, they are deficient in point of nerve.—Again and again, therefore, I say, we must become less commercial, and more military; we must think less of gain, and more, ay, much more, of our honour; we must get into a disposition to tread back our steps for ten years past, to lament the loss of the symbols of our military fame, to feel indignant at the base surrender of the lilacs of France, of which, though to the works and the profits of Birmingham and Manchester they contributed nothing, we might, remembering that they were won by the valour and the blood of our forefathers, have truly said: “though they *toil* not, neither “do they *spin*, yet Solomon, in all his glory, “was not arrayed like one of these.” This, however enthusiastic it may seem; this is

the temper of mind, to which we must come; or, we shall assuredly fall under the yoke of our enemy.—To weep over the hard alternative is useless, as it is also to execrate those who have reduced us to it. It is not a speculative question as to the good or evil of wars, or as to which ought to be preferred, the arts of peace, or the arts of war. It is a fact that we have before us, and that we are called on seriously to contemplate; and, this fact is, that, if France, with her present population and resources, insists that we shall be military, or become her slaves, we must become either one or the other. We have a choice; but, having no efficient allies upon the continent, that choice must be speedily made.

CHESTER VOLUNTEERS.—Little space as I have left, I cannot refrain from saying a few words by way of preface to a handbill, which has been published at CHESTER upon the subject of an election for a sheriff of that place, which, as the reader will recollect, is a county of itself.—I need hardly remind the public of the fears I have so frequently expressed as to the effect of the Volunteer system upon *Elections*; how often I cautioned the ministers against this danger; and how pressing I was for some means effectually to prevent the arms, given for the defence of the country, being made use of to subvert the constitution. All this must be fresh in the reader's mind, and, therefore, I shall, for the present, content myself with just inserting the following paper:—“To the free-men of the city of Chester. Influenced by the wishes “of many very respectable friends, I take “the liberty of offering myself a candidate “for the office of sheriff for the year ensuing. “It is to give my fellow citizens an opportunity of solemnly deciding between the “Chester Volunteers (to whom it is my “greatest pride to belong) and their accusers, that I thus obtrude myself upon the “public notice. I have suffered a little, the “corps has suffered more, but the character “of this ancient and most respectable city “has suffered most, by the illiberal, “groundless, and wanton aspersions, that “have been cast upon its loyalty. I have “no doubt that you will seize the present “opportunity to wipe away the stigma, and “fix the opprobrium where it properly attaches.—I am, Gentlemen, with every “sentiment of respect, your most devoted “servant, JOHN WILLIAMSON.”  
*Cuppin's-Lane, Oct. 24, 1804.*

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. VI. No. 19.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1804. [PRICE 10D.

"As public credit will begin, by that time" [in half a century from the year 1752] "to be a little frail, the least touch will destroy it, as it happened in France during the Regency; and in this manner it will die of the doctor." HUME on Public Credit.

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## IRISH PAPER-MONEY.

SIR,.—The last packet brought the 17th Number of Vol. VI. of your Political Register, containing my letter to you of the 18th ultimo, (see p. 623) on Irish paper money, and your observations upon it. (See p. 665.)—You state, that "it is not the Bank Directors, but the paper system, extended as it now is, that is in fault; which paper system is the consequence of the bank restriction law, and the measure of Mr. Pitt." You likewise defend what in this country is too well known, and what is always termed, the "Irish Government:" viz., a Lord Lieutenant, a Secretary to a Lord Lieutenant, and two Secretaries to the Secretary.—In justification of the opinions I have expressed, I must make a claim on your accustomed liberality, to make public the following answer to your argument.—There are evidently two circumstances that invariably attend the passing of every law, by which the conduct of those concerned is to be adjudged. First, the policy of making the law; and secondly, the manner of administering it. As we perfectly agree in attributing the ultimate cause of all the evils attending the paper currencies of these realms to the restriction law, the manner of administering it alone remains a subject of discussion.—You will surely admit, that good laws may be rendered productive of bad consequences by bad administration, and that the natural mal consequences of bad laws, may, in a great measure, be obviated by the talents and activity of those in whose hands the administration of them is committed. This is a position, so far as it bears upon the question at issue, that is daily exemplified by the administering the penal laws. In respect to this code, we have direct proof of the severity which would naturally flow from it, being divested by the talents, and constitutional sentiments of the judges who administer them, and also of the possibility of benefits to society being the result of a system of legislation, which is at variance even with the first principles of our constitution.—In regard to the restriction law, it is my business to examine how far it has been duly administered by the Irish Government and the Directors of the Bank, and my opinion in the result will be main-

tained, if it appears that these parties to the law have neglected their duty.—As to the government, it is very clear, that they have been guilty of this neglect, because the measure of evil has nearly been filled without any single exertion having been made to prevent it. They should have watched the progress of this new and dangerous law, have observed its alterations, and, at least, have endeavoured by applications to Parliament or to the Bank Directors, to prevent the state of the country over which they presided, to afford so distressing a picture as to its currency as it does at this day. If, in the future pages of history, it is written, that, whilst Lord Hardwicke was Chief Governor of Ireland, the paper of the National Bank became depreciated ten per cent., the gold currency disappeared, that of silver was universally cried down, and the rates of exchange advanced to 19 per cent. against Dublin; and if, at the same time, the historian shall relate, that, during this administration, no one measure of any kind was adopted to regulate the operations of the restriction law, which was the cause of the before-unheard-of circumstances; but, that this law was not attended to; that the Bank of Ireland, in particular, were permitted to take advantage of it; that the army agents were permitted to take advantage of it; and, that every person who acted in the capacity of a paymaster of public money, was also permitted to take advantage of it; the reader of such a statement will necessarily condemn the conduct of the Irish government, as guilty of neglect of that part of its duty, which attached to it, in its executive capacity of administering the ordinances of the legislature.—It is by no means intended to be asserted, that *all* the injury which has flowed from the restriction law could have been prevented by any measure, or even by any application to Parliament short of the repeal of this law; but, when it is remembered, that this law has been renewed only from year to year, and that it would have been easy for the Irish government to introduce clauses, to ward off evils when they began to appear, it cannot be maintained, that that government are altogether free from blame.—It has been proved by the Exchange Committee, that the proximate cause

of the depreciation of the paper of the Bank, was, the over issue of it. Could not government have carried any measure in Parliament, which would have prevented this portion of the evil? Yes, they might have followed the example of America, where the Bank of the United States is prohibited from making issues of paper to a greater amount than the amount of their capital, (Dorrien Magens on Actual and Paper Money, p. 61) or by looking back to the original formation of the Bank of Ireland, they might have acquired a similar hint, it being then proposed to place such a limit on the paper of the Irish Bank. (Speech of Attorney General, Irish Parliamentary Debates, Vol. I. p. 301.) Here then is a proof and justification of one measure which the government of Ireland might have advised, and at the same time, a proof and justification of the charge which has been brought against them of neglect of duty.—In respect to the Bank Directors, it was particularly their province to administer the restriction law in such a manner, as would be the most beneficial to the public! But, it is here necessary to take an objection to the supposition, that they are bound only to promote the interests of their constituents, the Bank Proprietors. If the Bank was a corporation instituted for the better conducting of the private concerns of merchants, and merely on private considerations, and for private purposes, their conduct has been most undeservedly aspersed. But, as this corporation was formed on the principle of affording great utility to the public, and as it has accepted of a valuable consideration from the public, for being of use to it, namely, the Charter which grants to it the right of being the Bank of the nation, with a greater capital, and with greater powers than any other Bank can possess, its conduct is a fair subject of public animadversion, and particularly that portion of it which relates to the occurrences of these few last years.—It is to this conduct, therefore, of the Bank that we are to look for the administration of the restriction law; and certainly, it was no trivial error on the part of those who framed it, to leave the bank altogether free from control, and at perfect liberty to make whatever use they thought proper of the new and unheard-of authority of issuing their paper to any extent which either caprice or self interest might suggest. But, since the law did place so much confidence in the directors of the Bank, their subsequent proceedings reflect the greater degree of culpability. The King, by giving his assent to that law,

transferred into the hands of these directors, one of his principle prerogatives, the superintendence of the currency; and the Bank directors, in taking advantage of the circumstances of the country, and issuing paper in such quantities as to afford them their dividends of 7 per cent., and bonuses of 5 per cent.; and to inflict upon the landed proprietors a tax of 10 per cent. on their incomes, have very evidently proved the impolicy of entrusting them with such an important function.—This assumption, M. Cobbet, leads me to the main argument, on which I propose to rest the charge I have advanced against the directors. For, as the depreciation complained of is admitted, by every one, to be the consequence of the issues of the bank, the question is confined to one single consideration, whether the directors were, or were not, in fault in making them; and that this is a fair statement of the subject, cannot be denied, as the sum total of all the charges which have been brought against the restriction law, has been the taking away of the commutability of paper at the option of the holder into specie.—As the government of Ireland had received no aids from the Bank; and as no circumstances had occurred to render necessary an unusual quantity of circulating medium, it was certainly a matter of discretion with the directors, whether or no they would make the large issues which they have made. By refusing to make them to a greater extent than to twice the amount of their notes in circulation when the restriction law passed; they would not have disoblged any one, and no depreciation would have occurred. By quadrupling their issues they have produced a depreciation, with no other advantage attending it than that of a great gain to themselves. Surely, therefore, the proximate cause of the depreciation is the want of discretion on the part of the directors in limiting the extent of their issues; and, when this deficiency of discretion has been attended with great injury to the public, and great benefit to individuals, it may be erroneous, but certainly not unreasonable, to impute blame to those who can so uniformly better their affairs by being uniformly indiscreet.—I have been induced to offer these further observations concerning the Irish government and the Bank directors, under the expectation that you will do me the justice of affording me an opportunity of explaining to the public, the motives on which I accuse them, and the manner in which I defend myself against your accusation. That you should defend these par-



ties, is a further proof of your impartiality, and anxiety to act fairly by every one. But, that I should be somewhat obdurate in maintaining my opinion, will not appear to you surprising when I acquaint you, that I am one of those who are actually paying the tax of depreciation on a large fixed income; and at the same time, have an opportunity, from being very extensively engaged in business in this city, to be very well acquainted with the various intrigues of Exchange dealers.—Before I conclude, I must beg leave to observe, that you have, in mistake, attributed to Mr. Foster the proposed measure of obliging the Bank of Ireland to pay in Bank of England notes. This measure, I took the liberty of suggesting as the only alternative; his proposal to the Bank not being accepted; and, this I did under the authority of Lord King. The “measure,” (his lordship states,) “which was proposed on this occasion in Parliament, was, an obligation upon the Irish Bank, to pay upon demand, in notes of the Bank of England. A regulation of this kind would impose upon the Irish directors the necessity of restraining the issue of their notes, and of bringing them to the standard of the English currency, which appears to be much less depreciated than that of Ireland.” (2d edit. p. 73, &c. to the 3d line, page 75.) Though this measure may with reason appear a measure of hazard, I am fully persuaded, that the more it is considered, the more the policy of it will become manifest. But if it is, as you conceive, inadequate to the object, what measure is there, which is better calculated to restore the value of our currency in Ireland, whilst the restriction law continues? Exchange, as I mentioned in my last letter, is again 15 per cent. There is every reason to suppose, that it will yet be higher. What, then, is to be done? The restriction law is not to be repealed till the end of the war, or till Mr. Pitt is out of office. The Bank of Ireland refuses to assist in applying any remedy. The conversion of their notes into Bank of England notes is too dangerous an experiment. There remains under all these circumstances, should not Parliament adopt the latter plan, but one further measure to be adopted; and, that is, an association of all the proprietors of land in this country, to demand guineas in payment of their rents. This plan has been very ably pointed out by your correspondent Agricola, and as the laws of Ireland are exactly similar to those of England, concerning the tender of bank notes in payment, there can be no other dif-

ficulty attending it, except that of securing the unanimous exertions of our country-gentlemen. But, however efficacious such associations might be, I cannot bring myself to feel the plan of obliging the directors to pay in Bank of England notes, so objectionable as you imagine; nor, indeed, nearly so objectionable as these associations would be, until every other plan had failed; for, however justifiable they might be, yet as their object could be nothing short of resisting, in a certain degree, the existing law of the land, the objections to other plans must be very great and very evident to render the adoption of the plan of association to be preferred. Lord Coke says, “nunquam recurritur ad extraordinarium remedium, sed ubi deficit ordinarium.” Upon this principle, I must, therefore, still adhere to my original opinion of the policy of Parliament, enforcing the payment of Bank of Ireland notes with those of the Bank of England. As to the danger which you apprehend, a further consideration of the proposed measure, will, I trust, induce you to be satisfied, that the depreciation of English or Scotch paper cannot be the result of it. This could not be the case, unless it operated in such a manner as to augment the quantity of bank paper in Great Britain, a circumstance impossible, as the measure must contribute to diminish the quantity of Irish paper: and, as this paper will not certainly be received in circulation in Great Britain. The measure may render Bank of England paper necessary in some degree for the circulation of Ireland. But this new market for it, will have the direct effect of restoring the value of the notes of the Bank of England; so that it is very clear, that no reason exists for apprehending any injury from this measure, in regard to its operation on the value of British currency.—I am glad to find that you make no objections to the plan, on the grounds which have rendered it objectionable here, namely, the supposed injury which the Bank would suffer by it. If my argument, on this head, has been as successful as I think the force of it might lead me to expect, and, if I have also succeeded in removing the doubts that you have entertained respecting the consequence of the proposed measure, on the value of the paper of England and Scotland, I should hope for the powerful aid of your sanction and your exertions to produce a remedy, which must give to the notes of the Bank of Ireland, an equal value with the notes of the Bank of England, and which is by no means of such a nature as to give rise to

any apprehension of hazard to the most timorous politicians. I am, &c. &c. J. T.  
Dublin, Nov. 1, 1804.

## STATE OF IRELAND.

SIR,—In my last letter (see p. 673,) I pointed out the necessity of the Catholics of Ireland applying to Parliament for redress of their grievances. I shall now endeavour to prove, that the admission of them into Parliament cannot be attended with any danger to the constitution. By the act of Union, the constitution of Ireland is *ipso facto* the constitution of Great Britain; and, as it is on all sides agreed, that this constitution was established by *Magna Charta*, and confirmed by the Bill of Rights, it only is to be considered, with reference to these two great palladia of liberty, whether, in discussing the claims of the Irish Catholics, or the claims of any other portion of his Majesty's subjects. As the Parliaments of these realms were composed entirely of Catholic members, from their first institution until the introduction of the Protestant religion, and of both Catholics and Protestants for a considerable period after the reformation; the enjoyment, by the Catholics, of the franchises of sitting in Parliament is clearly a right granted by *Magna Charta*, and acknowledged under the reign of Protestant Kings. In what manner, then, did the exclusion of them from Parliament occur? By certain Acts of Parliament, passed by the powerful influence of the Protestant party, and upon no other principles than those of party and of bigotry. But, even admitting that the virulence of the Catholic religion, and the political power and views of the See of Rome, rendered the exclusion of the Catholics necessary to preserve the constitution; it will be necessary to prove, in order to justify the continuance of the exclusion, that the cause which first rendered it requisite still continues to exist. Mr. Burke says, "they who are excluded from votes (under proper qualification inherent in the constitution that gives them) are excluded from the British constitution." (Letter to Sir H. Langrishe, p. 15.) And surely, they who are excluded from sitting in Parliament, are equally excluded from the constitution: yet, the only answer that can be made to the question why Catholics should suffer this grievance, is, because the Parliament about two centuries ago, apprehended that the liberties of these realms might be destroyed by the influence of the Pope! So that, because the Pope issued a Bull against Henry VIII. and, because the ignorance and superstition of those days rendered the Catholic religion

the means of effecting political intrigues, the Catholics of the 19th century, are to be doomed to a state of exclusion from the franchises of the constitution. If, during the dark ages of religious bigotry, it was deemed essential, for the protection of the constitution, to annul in part the intentions of our forefathers, who gave to every one, by *Magna Charta*, the franchise of being eligible to sit in Parliament, the continuation of the laws, which render the Catholics ineligible, should be supported by proving the danger to the state being still apprehended in case of their repeal. If the infraction of the constitution was justifiable by circumstances, to continue the infraction must be unjust, if the circumstances are totally altered.—That the circumstances of Great Britain and those of Ireland, in respect to the Catholic question, are not only altered, but have undergone a complete revolution, is a notorious and incontrovertible fact. Why, therefore, should not the spirit of the constitution operate, or should the Catholic continue to be suspected of disloyalty to his King, or the power be afforded him of feeling just cause of complaint at being excluded from his constitutional franchises? But the restoration of these franchises to the Catholics is not only become essential, because of this entire alteration in the state of the political circumstances of these realms, but in consequence of as great a revolution in the sentiments and principles of the followers of the Catholic religion. In proof of this position, we have the opinions of the sacred faculty of divinity of Paris, of the Universities of Douay, Louvain, Alcalá, Salamanca, and Valladolid, given in 1788, in answer to the Queries of Mr. Pitt. They expressly deny that the Pope, or the Cardinals, or any body of men, or any other person of the Church of Rome, hath any civil authority, civil power, civil jurisdiction, or civil pre-eminence whatsoever in any kingdom; or that they, or any of them, can absolve or free the subjects of the King of England from their oath of allegiance. (Vide Letter of Lord Petre to the Bishop of St. David's; and other works) In the declaration and protestation of the English Catholics, made in 1789, and signed by 1500 of the chief Catholics in the kingdom, by all the lords and gentlemen, and 200 of the Catholic clergy, is the following exposition of their sentiments on the same subject.—"We solemnly declare, that neither the Pope either with or without a general council, nor any prelate, nor any priest, nor any assembly of prelates or priests, nor any ecclesiastical power whatsoever, can absolve the subjects of this

“ realm, or any of them from their allegiance to his Majesty King George III., who is by authority of Parliament the lawful King of this realm, and of all the dominions thereunto belonging. We solemnly declare, that no church, nor any prelate, nor any priest, nor any ecclesiastical power whatever, hath, have or ought to have, any jurisdiction or authority whatever within this realm, that can directly or indirectly affect or interfere with the independence, sovereignty, laws, constitution or government thereof; or the rights, liberties, persons or properties of the people of the said realm, or of any of them save only and except by the authority of Parliament, and that such an assumption of power would be an usurpation. We do solemnly declare, that neither the pope, nor any prelate, nor any priest, nor any assembly of prelates or priests, nor any ecclesiastical power whatsoever, can absolve us or any of us from, or dispense with the obligation of any compact or oath whatsoever.’—In respect to the Catholics of Ireland, the following declaration which was adopted by the general committee in 1792, and subscribed by the whole body, is so ample and satisfactory a document of their religious and political sentiments, one of so great importance to the question of emancipation, and so very applicable to the present state of things, that I cannot refrain from inserting an exact copy of it.—“Whereas certain opinions and principles inimical to good order and government, have been attributed to the Catholics, the existence of which we utterly deny; and, whereas it is at this time peculiarly necessary to renounce such imputations, and to give the most full and ample satisfaction to our Protestant brethren. We hold no principal whatsoever incompatible with our duty as men, or as subjects, or repugnant to liberty, whether political, civil, or religious. Now we, the Catholics of Ireland, for the removal of all such imputations, and in deference to the opinion of many respectable bodies of men and individuals, among our Protestant brethren, do hereby, in the face of our country, of all Europe, and before God, make this our deliberate and solemn declaration.—I. We abjure, disavow, and condemn the opinion, that princes excommunicated by the pope and council, or by any prelate, or priest, or any ecclesiastical power whatsoever, can absolve the subjects of this kingdom, or any of them from their allegiance to his Majesty King George the III who is by authority of Par-

liament the lawful King of these realms.—II. We abjure, condemn, and detest as impious, the principle that it is lawful to murder, destroy, or any way to injure any person whatsoever, for or under the pretext of their being hereticks; and we declare solemnly and before God, that we believe that no act in itself unjust, immoral, or wicked, can ever be justified by or under pretence or colour, that it was done either for the good of the Church, or in obedience to any ecclesiastical power whatsoever.—III. We further declare, that we hold it an unchristian and impious principle ‘that no faith is to be kept with hereticks,’ this doctrine we detest and reprobate not only as contrary to our religion, but destructive of morality, of society, and even of common honesty; and it is our firm belief that an oath made to any person not of the Catholic religion, is equally binding as if it were made to any Catholic whatsoever.—IV. We have been charged with holding it as an article of our belief, that the pope with or without the authority of a general council, or that certain ecclesiastical powers can acquit and absolve us before God from our oath of allegiance, or even from the just oaths and contracts entered into between man and man. Now we do utterly renounce, abjure, and deny, that we hold or maintain any such belief as being contrary to the peace and happiness of society, inconsistent with morality, and above all, repugnant to the true spirit of the Catholic religion.—V. We do further declare, that we do not believe that the pope of Rome, or any other foreign prince, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have any temporal or civil jurisdiction, power, superiority, or pre-eminence, directly or indirectly within this realm.—VI. After what we have renounced it is immaterial in a political light, what may be our opinion or faith in other points respecting the pope. However, for greater satisfaction, we declare that it is not an article of the Catholic faith, neither are we thereby required to believe or profess ‘that the pope is infallible,’ or that we are bound to obey any order in its own nature immoral, though the pope or any ecclesiastical power should issue or direct such order, but, on the contrary, we hold that it would be sinful in us to pay any respect or obedience thereto.—VII. We further declare, that we do not believe that any sin whatsoever committed by us can be forgiven at the mere will of the pope, or of any priest, or of any person or persons

“ whatsoever, but that sincere sorrow for  
 “ past sins, a firm and sincere resolution as  
 “ far as may be in our power to restore our  
 “ neighbours property and character, if we  
 “ trespassed or unjustly injured either; a  
 “ firm and sincere resolution to avoid fu-  
 “ ture guilt, and to atone to God, are pre-  
 “ vious and indispensable requisites to es-  
 “ tablish a well found expectation of for-  
 “ giveness, and that any person who re-  
 “ ceives absolution without these previous  
 “ requisites, so far from obtaining thereby  
 “ any remission of his sins, incurs the addi-  
 “ tional guilt of violating a sacrament.—  
 “ VIII. We do hereby solemnly disclaim,  
 “ and forever renounce all interest in and  
 “ title to all forfeited lands, resulting from  
 “ any rights or supposed rights of our  
 “ ancestors, or any claim, title, or in-  
 “ terest therein, nor do we admit any  
 “ title as foundation of right, which is not  
 “ established and acknowledged by the laws  
 “ of the realm as they now stand. We de-  
 “ sire further, that whenever the patriotism,  
 “ liberality, and justice of our countrymen  
 “ shall restore to us a participation in the  
 “ elective franchise, no Catholic shall be  
 “ permitted to vote at any election for mem-  
 “ bers to serve in Parliament, unless he shall  
 “ previously take an oath to defend to the  
 “ utmost of his power the arrangement of  
 “ property in this country, as established by  
 “ the different acts of attainder and settle-  
 “ ment.—IX It has been objected to us  
 “ that we wish to subvert the present Church  
 “ establishment, for the purpose of substituting  
 “ a Catholic establishment in its stead.  
 “ Now, we do hereby disclaim, disavow,  
 “ and solemnly abjure any such intention,  
 “ and further, if we shall be admitted into  
 “ any share of the constitution, by our being  
 “ restored to the right of elective franchise,  
 “ we are ready, in the most solemn manner,  
 “ to declare that we will not exercise that  
 “ privilege to disturb or weaken the es-  
 “ tablishment of the Protestant religion, and  
 “ Protestant government of the country.”  
 (Vindication of the Catholics, published by  
 the General Committee, p. 27.)—From  
 these premises, Mr. Cobbett, we are en-  
 abled to argue, that whatever reason there  
 might exist for disqualifying the Catholics  
 from sitting in Parliament, that there does  
 not now remain the smallest vestige of  
 those circumstances and those doctrines,  
 which render the political power of the Ca-  
 tholic body obnoxious to their Protestant bre-  
 thren. In regard to Ireland, the Union has  
 placed the policy of concession beyond all  
 the objections which were formerly made to  
 it, and the public declaration of the Catho-

lics herein quoted, should put to rest all  
 those very untounded, and very illiberal im-  
 putations which are so frequently cast upon  
 them. It should no longer be the reproach  
 of the days in which we live, that three-  
 fourths of our fellow subjects in Ireland, and  
 a great number of them in England are ac-  
 tually excluded from the constitution. The  
 original secure, and uninterrupted enjoy-  
 ment of it by all classes of the community,  
 as formerly intended, and for a long time  
 experienced, should be restored to every in-  
 habitant of these realms, and those laws  
 which ordain a principle so repugnant to the  
 principles of our liberties, the principle of  
 exclusion, should no longer be permitted to  
 disgrace the whole code. The most timid  
 have no reason to apprehend any danger  
 from such a measure, and every one who can  
 understand the spirit, and appreciate the va-  
 lue of our constitution, must be perfectly sa-  
 tisfied that the restoration of its blessings to  
 all those from whom they have been taken,  
 must increase the numbers of its zealous sup-  
 porters; and thus form the best defence of it  
 against the attacks, whether of an internal or  
 external foe. Z.

*Liverpool, Oct. 24, 1804.*

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IRISH PAPER-MONEY.—The first article  
 in the present sheet is a letter from my cor-  
 respondent I. T. upon the subject of Irish  
 paper-money, and in answer to my remarks,  
 in p. 665, upon his former letter, which will  
 be found in p. 623. From that letter, it  
 appeared, that, with a view of relieving  
 Ireland from the evils and dangers attendant  
 upon a depreciated currency, Mr. Foster,  
 the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, had  
 given the Irish Bank Directors a choice of  
 two plans, the former of which was, “ for  
 “ the forming of a fund in London, on which  
 “ the Bank of Ireland might draw, in com-  
 “ petition with the usual dealers in ex-  
 “ change, and that, for the forming of this  
 “ fund, a loan should be made to the Bank  
 “ of Ireland, by the government, free  
 “ of expense.” The other plan had in  
 contemplation, the making of all Bank of  
 Ireland notes payable in notes of the Bank  
 of England. These plans having been re-  
 jected by the Irish Bank Directors, those  
 gentlemen were, for such rejection, severely  
 censured by I. T. It now appears that I  
 misunderstood him as to one point. I re-  
 garded both the plans as having been pro-  
 posed to the Bank Directors by Mr. Foster;  
 whereas, the latter was not officially pro-  
 posed to them, and was merely a suggestion  
 of the writer, on whose letter I was com-

menting; but, this mistake, though necessary to be noticed here, is of no importance as to the arguments made use of on either side.—Entertaining opinions different from those of I. T., I thought it necessary to express them, upon the following grounds: It appeared to me, 1. that the plans proposed would not, if adopted, answer any good purpose; 2. that the Irish Bank Directors were not the proper persons to blame for the evils attendant on the depreciation of the currency of Ireland; and, 3. that the persons composing what is called the Irish government were as little, and even less, blameable for these evils than the Bank Directors were.

—In the present letter, which it is necessary to peruse, and which is worthy of a very attentive perusal, I. T. seems to think he must have gotten the better of these my objections, which, indeed, were so briefly stated, that, though they appeared powerful to me, they might, by others, well be regarded as by no means difficult to be overcome; and, if the reasons, which I shall now be able to advance, be thought inadequate to justify an adherence to the opinions before expressed, I beg him to believe, that this adherence does, in no degree, proceed from a reluctance to acknowledge either his triumph or my own defeat.—The feasibility of the plan of a fund in London, whereon the Irish Bank might draw, in competition with the usual dealers in exchange, was made to rest principally upon a successful example of the Bank of Scotland, by which such a plan, “under similar circumstances,” was formerly adopted. But, of what I. T. means by “similar circumstances,” it were much to be wished that we had been provided with an explanation. That, as far as relates to an exchange constantly against one country, though the degree might differ, the circumstances alluded to were similar, no one can deny. But, it is evident, that, in forming a fund for the purpose of retrieving a losing exchange, much must depend upon the amount of the sums exchanged, which again must depend upon the amount of the quantity of paper that the party on the depreciated side has on float; and, though I have no document whereon to found a precise statement of the amount of the paper of the Scotch Bank, I think I may venture to say, that, in proportion to the amount of the currency of Great Britain, at that time (about thirty-five years ago), it was not more than a twentieth part of what the Bank of Ireland paper now is in proportion to the currency of the United Kingdom. Here, then, is, at the very threshold, a very material dissimi-

larity in the circumstances. Again: when the fund was formed for the relief of Scotland, the Scotch paper had never been at an open discount, much less at a discount of ten per centum. At that time the whole of the paper currency in the kingdom did not, I believe, amount to more than a sixth or seventh part of the gold in circulation; whereas, now the gold does not amount to more than about a twentieth part as much as the paper does. All paper was then, upon demand of the bearer, instantly convertible into specie; now, all banks are by law sheltered against the effect of such demands. The quantity of paper having become too great in Scotland, the gold would naturally go away; it would inevitably be drawn from the bank, and the exchange would, of course, be turned against Scotland, and to the very great injury of the bank; while, on the contrary, no gold can, in consequence of an excess of paper-issues, be drawn from the Bank of Ireland. Thus, it appears to me, that all the prominent circumstances of the two cases are entirely dissimilar; and, therefore, until we are furnished with some argument other than that which is founded on the successful experiment of Scotland, in the instance alluded to, it seems rather hasty to blame the Irish Bank Directors for declining to adopt the plan proposed to them.

—To the other plan, that of making Bank of Ireland notes payable in notes of the Bank of England, I still object as hazardous to the property of the people of Great Britain, and, consequently to the internal tranquillity of the country. I expressed, not a deliberate opinion, but a mere conjecture, that this plan would communicate to the less depreciated paper of Great Britain a share of that greater depreciation which the paper of Ireland has experienced. “No,” says I. T. “the measure could not cause a depreciation “of the Bank of England paper, unless it “operated to augment the quantity of bank “paper in Great Britain, a circumstance “impossible. The measure must contribute “to diminish the quantity of Irish paper, “and, as the Irish paper will not come to “Great Britain, the new market opened for “the Bank of England paper will have the “direct effect of restoring the value of this “latter.” Why, then, this is not merely a wise measure. That is an appellation that falls very far short of its merits. It will, if this description of its effects be correct, make Bank of England paper equal in value to guineas, and Bank of Ireland paper equal in value to that of the Bank of England! This is no measure of mortal make: it is a miracle: or, at the very least, it is the phi-

philosopher's stone; for it is what we have all been in search of for several years past. If I. T. can make this appear, Napoleon may dismantle his flotilla; for the funding system is immortal. But, in that very circumstance which I. T. regards as "impossible," I think I perceive not only a possibility, but a probability, and, if I were to say a certainty, my words would not outstretch the dictates of my mind. From I. T.'s speaking of a "new market" for the English paper-money, by the means of which market its value is to be restored to the old standard, he must necessarily suppose, that, in consequence of the measure making Bank of Ireland paper payable in paper of the Bank of England, no addition would be made to the quantity of the latter; and, thus we have, at last, a scheme for exporting our bank notes! To produce much effect in diminishing the quantity of Irish bank paper, there must be a corresponding quantity of English paper exported to Ireland, or, it is clear that the Bank of Ireland must at once stop payment, and, in that case, a repeal of the "restriction law," as it is at once gravely and humorously called, would be a preferable measure. How the Bank of Ireland is to obtain English notes wherewith to answer the demands of the holders of their paper is a question which we need not now discuss; but, if it were to obtain a sufficiency of it, does I. T. think that it would be obtained in consequence of its having been first withdrawn from circulation in England? This, I am sorry to say it, does really appear to be his notion. But, surely, a very little time bestowed on reflection must have convinced a person of his understanding, that it is utterly impossible to diminish, in any considerable degree, the quantity of paper now in circulation, without destroying the whole paper-system, of which, when not convertible into specie, and especially when connected with a funding system, a *constant increase* is the vital principle. The inconvertibility is produced by a want of specie; this want instantly produces some degree of depreciation in the paper; the depreciation in the paper raises the price of commodities; the rise in the price of commodities demands a further increase of paper; this further increase produces a further depreciation; and thus it goes on, and must go on, till put an end to by the total annihilation of the paper, and which annihilation would only be hastened by an attempt to arrest the progress of the increase. How would you begin the work of arresting it? Not surely in curtailing the constantly increasing dividends of interest on the public debt?

Would you contract your discounts to the trade? Not if you remember the year 1793, and if you wish that people should be able to pay the constantly increasing taxes, which you want to re-imburse you for your constantly increasing loans to the government. There is but one more way left and that is, to refuse to make those loans; and, then you come round exactly to the same point, for the government breaks and away goes the system in the twinkling of an eye. —To lessen the quantity of paper in England being, then, if I am not greatly deceived, impossible, without destroying the system, the next point to be considered is, the effect which would be produced in England by such an increase as would be required to enable the Bank of Ireland to pay their notes in Bank of England paper. I. T. seems to think that I suppose, that, in consequence of the proposed measure, the Irish Bank paper driven out of circulation there, would come to England; that we should pour them some of our strong negus in exchange for some of their weak negus, and that thus our beverage would be of the same quality in both countries. No: I never for one moment imagined that Irish bank notes would get into circulation here. I imagined, and I think I was not mistaken, that, in whatever degree the Bank of Ireland should pay in Bank of England notes; in whatever degree the Irish paper should, by this measure, be diminished; in whatever degree the currency of Ireland should, by this means, be restored, and the Irish people relieved; in that same degree proportionately the English paper must be augmented, the English currency further degraded, and the people of England further distressed. Why so, seeing that no addition would, from this cause, be made to the amount of the paper circulating in England? The additional paper money made in Threadneedle Street, in consequence of this measure would all go to Ireland, and would, of course, have no more effect on the currency in England, than if it never had been made. —From I. T. in whom I think I can trace the author of a very able performance which appeared about a twelve-month ago, I should have expected, upon this subject, views very different indeed from these. I should have thought that it could never be necessary to remind him, that the influence of an augmentation of the quantity of currency is not confined to the country in which such augmentation takes place. He must, upon reflection, perceive, that, if the currency of any one nation of Europe be augmented, it produces,

in a proportionate degree, a depreciation of money in all the nations of Europe. He must know, that, taking the average of prices and the average of the quantity of currency, considered relatively to the quantity of commodities, in all the nations of Europe, the one will be found to bear an exact proportion to the other; and that, whatever fluctuations there may be in the currency of particular countries; however currency may be restored in one or in several of them, yet, if, in the whole of them, the same quantity of currency remains, the average of depreciation and of prices will be the same; and that, of course, the degree of restoration in one country will, proportionately, be the measure of the further depreciation in all the other countries. If this be admitted as a general principle, and I should be glad to see the arguments by which it could be controverted, the application is evident.——The consequences, then, which would, if my reasoning be sound, proceed from the proposed measure are these: Irish paper would be raised to a level with English paper, but the English paper would in the operation be lowered from its present standard: the average of the value of all the paper in the kingdom would be the same that it is now, but English bank notes would in a very short time be at an open discount: part of the little gold now in England would go to Ireland, and it would not come back again, as it now does, to assist in circulation: all prices would be diminished in Ireland, and, in a proportionate degree, augmented in England, to the great and immediate injury of all persons living upon fixed incomes, and, in co-operation with scarcity and corn-bills, to the imminent danger of the state.——Here I am disposed to stop, but I cannot forbear to ask of I. T. whether, as to public opinion and confidence, he imagines, that the Bank of England could, without great risk of a speedy dissolution, strike off a sufficiency of paper for the use of Ireland? Does he think that no one would perceive and point out to the public, this further immense issue beyond the capital of the Bank of England? Its capital is now about £7,000,000 sterling money; and its issues, its promissory notes, amount to about £18,000,000 sterling money. I confess, that, after this, it may well be supposed, that the issues may be extended to any amount. Yet, not so. Public opinion is slow in its operation against an establishment of proverbial solidity. “As safe as the Bank of England,” is still heard in provincial conversation; but, it is heard less frequently than it used to be; and, amongst men of in-

formation, reliance on the Bank is measured by the degree of popular credulity relative to that institution. Light, upon this subject, is every day penetrating into the country; and the progress of this light would be greatly accelerated by a dashing issue of notes for the relief of Ireland. Such an issue might, therefore, at once bring matters to a crisis; and, indeed, it seems most likely, that, if internal tranquillity should be preserved without interruption for many years, as every one must hope it will, the paper system, according to the prediction of my motto, will expire under some attempt to prolong its existence.——Such are my reasons for thinking, that the plans in question would produce no good to the nation, and why they ought not to be adopted; as an Irish bank director or proprietor, I should have another objection; and that is, that an attempt to carry either of the plans into execution would utterly ruin the Bank of Ireland. I. T. expresses his satisfaction, that this objection was not urged by me. If I did not urge it, the omission certainly is not to be attributed to my having any doubt upon the subject; but to the little importance which I was disposed to give to it. I was viewing the question upon a national scale, regarding the interests of the bank directors and their constituents as being, comparatively, of very little moment; but, since I am compelled to express an opinion upon this point, it decidedly is, that either of the measures would, in a short time, completely break up the Bank of Ireland; and I should be very glad to hear the reasons, upon which an opposite opinion is founded; which reasons the bank directors have surely a right to look for at the hands of those by whom so material an innovation is proposed.——Having said more, perhaps, than was necessary as to the plans for restoring the currency of Ireland, I shall now endeavour to show that my objection to I. T.'s censure of the bank directors and of what is called “the Irish Government” was not unfounded. And, here it must be observed, that, in abandoning the movers and makers of the bank-restriction law, he takes care to say very little about them, but hastens as fast as possible to the executors of the law, as he is pleased to call the bank-directors and the Irish-government. “There are,” says he, “two circumstances that attend every law: “the policy” [and the justice he might have added] “of passing it, and the manner in which it is administered. We are both agreed perfectly as to the bank restriction being the ultimate cause of the evils attending the paper currencies of these realms; “the manner of administering that law

"alone remains as a subject of discussion." Then follows a general position, which I am not inclined to dispute; to wit; that "good laws may be rendered mischievous by mal-administration, and that by wise administration bad ones may be rendered less mischievous than they otherwise would be;" which position is supported by a reference to instances in the administration of the penal law. But, can this be made fairly to apply to the case before us? Can the Irish bank directors and the Irish government, or either of them, be truly said to be the administrators of the bank-restriction law? The bank-restriction law is merely prohibitory. It forbids the bank to pay their notes in specie. The bank directors are the party passive. They have no concern with the law but to obey it; and, unless I. T. can accuse them of disobeying it; that is of paying their notes in specie, he will find it very difficult indeed to fix upon them any share of the blame due to those from whose conduct the evils complained of have arisen.—"But," says he, "it being admitted, that the depreciation arises from excessive issues, the question is confined to one single consideration, whether the directors were, or were not, in fault in making those issues." True; but, there is a previous question to be settled; to wit; whether, in making these excessive issues, the bank directors promoted the interests of the bank proprietors, or whether they did not: if the latter, they were to blame for making the excessive issues; if the former, they certainly were not. I. T. gives such a description of the origin of the bank as clearly indicates a wish to make and to support a distinction between banks and other chartered companies; but, such a distinction is, I am afraid, purely sentimental. "The bank was established with a view to public convenience and advantage." What company is not? What charter is granted but from such motives, entertained or professed? No: bank companies are established upon exactly the same principles as other trading companies; their motto is "get money;" and the business of the directors is to get as much as they can for their constituents. It is for them to avail themselves of every circumstance that presents itself for this purpose. They have nothing to do with the interests of the public, any more than Perkins has with the belief of those who purchase his points. If by excessive issues they hasten the destruction of the paper, and thus, in shortening the probable duration of the trade, more than overbalance its present profits, then they injure their constituents, but they must also

injure themselves, and, in this respect at least, I think, I. T. might venture to trust them. After all, however, I am not ready to admit that the bank company have profited, or can profit, from the great addition that has been made to the quantity of their paper, notwithstanding all that has been said about their high dividends and their bonuses. A similar complaint has, by a very sensible writer, been made against the English bank directors, and a correspondent, in p. 193 of the present volume, discovered considerable anger because I did not seem to agree as to the justice of these complaints; but, to the objections which, in answer to that correspondent, were stated, in p. 216, &c. I have never yet seen an answer; and, till I do see an answer to them, I shall not regard the dividing of 7 per centum per annum with a bonus of 5 per centum as being any proof at all, that the trade of the banks has been benefited by the operation of the restriction law. The correspondent, to whose letter I have just referred, perceiving that there was no good ground of accusation against the bank-directors as administrators of the restriction law, has charged them with being the real authors of that law, and seems to regard it as as quite sufficient to assert, that "it was passed at their request." To say nothing about the contemptible light, in which this fact, if true, would place the ministry and the parliament, it is enough to state, that the ministers have, over and over again, denied the fact, and in terms more explicit than ever at the last renewal of the law.—If the bank-directors are, then, exculpated, as I think they clearly are, what reason is there to impute blame, on this account, to the persons who are denominated the Irish Government? "They should," says I. T. "have watched the effects of this dangerous law." The effects wanted no watching. They were visible enough to all the world; and, those persons could only share with every other man in the country in feeling them. "They should have applied to the parliament or to the bank-directors to prevent the excessive issue of paper, which was the proximate cause of the depreciation." Applied to the bank-directors! Why, has not Mr. Foster applied to those directors now? And, does I. T. believe, that an application of Lord Hardwicke would have been attended with better success? Yet, it is now suggested, that Lord Hardwicke might not only have thus prevented excessive issues of paper, but might have kept those issues within the bounds of the bank

capital, which the issues have now surpassed four fold! How comes it, then, that the issues of the English bank have not thus been restrained? Had Lord Hardwicke more influence and power in Ireland than the minister has in England? —But we must stop for a moment here, to inquire into the practicability of what the Irish government is so strongly censured for having neglected to accomplish. To shew, that the thing was practicable, I. T. has referred to the opinion of the attorney-general of Ireland, who, in a speech delivered at the time that the bank was first instituted, expressed his wish to compel the bank company to keep their issues within the limits of their capital. And, to strengthen this argument, which, indeed, is rather feeble, he has cited the instance of the American national bank, called the Bank of the United States, for a description of the regulations of which bank he refers us to a pamphlet of Mr. Dorrien Mogens, published about seven or eight months ago. But, in referring to the bank law of the United States, I. T. has overlooked some most important provisions in that law, even as it has been described by Mr. Mogens. It is true, that one provision is, that the issues of the American bank cannot exceed its capital; but then there are, in the law, other provisions, without which this provision would be an absurdity. "In America," says Mr. Mogens, "the banks are limited in the loans they are to make; and are precluded from advancing money to any government, even their own, without an act of the legislature. The principal bank, that of the United States, was formed by a subscription of ten millions of dollars, of which one third was to be subscribed in gold or silver, and the rest in government stock; and their loans or issues of notes of every description, cannot exceed that sum; the directors becoming personally responsible when they do."—The act of congress, on which Mr. Mogens must found his statement, was passed February the 25th, 1791. He has made two slight mistakes. The subscriptions consisted of one *fourth* specie instead of one third; and the bank can lend the government of the United States £25,000 sterling, and either of the state governments £12,500 sterling without any special law authorizing such loan; but no greater sum can be lent or advanced without an express act of the legislature; and there can be no repetition of even these advances, till after an act has been obtained. Such, or nearly such, was the law of England too,

till, in evil hour, the minister obtained from the parliament, in 1793, a repeal of the statute of William and Mary, the intention and effect of which were, like those of the provisions of the American law, to keep the bank independent of the government, and to prevent the minister from becoming, as to money matters, in the least degree, independent of the legislature. The moment this barrier was removed, the bank and the treasury became united; and the paper of the former is now the paper of the latter. And does I. T. really think that Lord Hardwicke could have restored things to their former state? All must have been restored, or it is perfect dreaming to talk of keeping the issues of the bank company within the amount of their capital. All the principles and provisions of the old law must have been revived, or it would have been utterly impossible to revive the restraint as to amount of issues. It is not a little strange, too, that while I. T. was producing the instance of the American bank, the corner stone of which is that provision which keeps the bank independent of the government, and the treasury independent of the bank; it is rather strange, I must confess, that, while he was producing this instance in order to remove my objections, he should entirely overlook the main drift of my remarks, which, as he must now remember, was to shew that it was matter of satisfaction, that the proposal of Mr. Foster had failed, because, if his plan was proper to be adopted, the parliament was the body whose sanction it ought first to receive. It is very strange, that, under such circumstances, this should have been so completely overlooked. —But, that which creates the most astonishment, in the letter of I. T. is the notion, that Lord Hardwicke could have produced the change desired; that Lord Hardwicke could, with success, have advised! Advised whom, and what? Advised Mr. Pitt (for I am sure I. T. will not regard Mr. Addington as having any thing to do or say in the matter) advised Mr. Pitt to procure a repeal of the law of 1793, to restore the bank to its former independence of himself, and to restore the parliament to its former power of checking both himself and the bank! "In the future pages of history," it will, indeed, as I. T. observes, be written, that, at the time when the paper of the national bank of Ireland became depreciated ten per centum, when the gold coin disappeared, when the silver coin was universally cried down, when even brass fled from the degrading society of sixpenny bank notes; it will, probably, be written, that, when

all this took place, Lord Hardwicke was the chief governor of the country. But, the historian will not, like my correspondent I. T. confine himself to the censuring of Lord Hardwicke. He will, surely say, that his lordship had nothing to do in establishing the sinking fund, in repealing the act of William and Mary, in procuring a law to protect the bank against the demands of its creditors, or in any other of those measures by which the evils complained of were produced. He will, I hope, have no motive for evading the real merits of the question, for sliding over the cause and fixing the attention of his reader solely upon the effect; a hope in which I am greatly fortified by the reflection, that when he who writes the pages of future history shall take up the pen, Mr. Pitt will have neither titles nor emoluments to bestow.

**SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.**—The case of this gentleman having, from various causes, but particularly from a reflection on the effects which his escape may produce with regard to those English persons who were detained with him, and who are still detained in France, become a subject of considerable public if not political importance, it appears necessary to place it in a clear and fair point of view. With the more minute circumstances of Sir James Craufurd's arrest, as well as with the motives that led him to France and other particulars relative to his then situation there, I am altogether unacquainted; and, as to those explanations, which have, since his arrival in England, been published in the newspapers, they seem to me to be calculated merely to apologize for the frailties of the husband and the father. This is not the ground whereon a gentleman and a servant of the king ought to stand before the world. Such a person must look strict justice in the face; and, if she acquit him not, he must be condemned. —The article published in the French Official Gazette is as follows: "Paris, 18 Sept. 1804.—Sir James Craufurd, prisoner on his parole at Valenciennes, having applied to the minister of war for leave to pass two months at the Aix-la-Chapelle baths, and produced certificates from several medical gentlemen, that the use of the baths would be attended with the greatest advantage to his health, the minister yielded to his request, on the condition of his leaving a written engagement, that he would return from the waters to Valenciennes, at the expiration of two months. On the 10th Messidor (June 29), Sir J. Craufurd sent to the minister of war this engagement, couched

"in the following terms: "Having obtained permission of the minister at war "to repair to the baths of Aix-la-Chapelle, "I hereby bind myself, on my word of "honour, to return to Valenciennes within "two months, reckoning from the day of "my departure.—(Signed) The Chevalier CRAUFURD." —Thus, as this statement has not been, as far as I know, publicly contradicted, I must take it for granted, that it is, in all its parts, correct. Sir James Craufurd did, then, give his parole, and did break that parole, by coming to England, where he now is, having no apparent intention of returning to France.—From the facts thus nakedly stated, it would be naturally concluded, that he had been guilty of a breach of parole, in the usual sense of the phrase, than which breach nothing can be more dishonourable. But, in order to form a correct and just judgment upon the case, we must inquire into the circumstances, under which the parole was given; for, those circumstances may materially alter the nature of the engagement; and, with regard to the effect which his escape may have had upon the English prisoners in France, his feelings for those persons must be weighed against the feelings of a husband and a father.—Considering Sir James's conduct as a question of public law, embracing his obligations towards the French and towards his own country, there would be great difficulty in coming to a decision, if the English government had not already settled the point. When the French seized on the English visitors to France, and made them prisoners, at the beginning of the war, the act was, in this country, condemned as contrary to the law of nations; as an act at once of violence and of treachery. The French maintained the contrary, and, it would be very difficult to settle the point with them, who may, if they please, go back six or seven centuries for precedents.—The English government, however, persevered in its doctrine, and, accordingly, they refused to exchange the persons who had thus been made prisoners, alleging, as their reason for that refusal, that the arrest was a violation of every principle of public law. The fact of their not exchanging these persons was a pretty convincing mark of their opinion; but, in the circular letter of Lord Hawkesbury to the foreign ministers resident in London, dated 30th of April, 1804\*, a solemn declaration on the subject is made in the name of his majesty. "Of all governments, pretending to be civilized, that of

\* See Register, Vol. V. p. 676.

"France has the least right to appeal to the law of nations. With what confidence can they appeal to that law, who, from the commencement of hostilities, have been in the course of constantly violating it? They promised their protection to such of the subjects of England as were resident in France, and might be desirous of remaining there after the recall of his majesty's ambassador. They revoked this promise without any previous notice, and condemned those very persons to be prisoners of war, and still retain them as such, in defiance of their own engagements and the universal usage of all civilized nations." This at once clumsy and feeble style reflects little credit either on our taste or our talents; but, we understand it: it is plain enough: the writer declares, in his majesty's name, that the imprisonment of the English in France was at once an act of violence and of treachery.—If the French government, even the civilization of which the hero of Amiens seems to dispute, did not act according to the law of nations; if they set all law and justice at defiance; if they were guided by nothing but their own inclination and power to do wrong, we cannot, as to this particular instance, regard them as any thing better than banditti.—Therefore, from a question of public law, the conduct of Sir James Craufurd becomes a question of morality; and we have only to decide, whether a man is, or is not, bound to keep a promise, which he has tendered to banditti for the purpose of escaping from their clutches? Let it be observed, that I by no means pretend (God forbid!) to decide between the French government and him who now disputes the fact of their being civilized, though he not long ago declared that they had "asked pardon of God and man." I leave them to settle the matter between them; but, if his declaration, made in the king's name, be true, then I insist, that, as far as relates to the arrest of Sir James Craufurd, the French government must be regarded as banditti, especially by a person in the employment of the government, whose sentiments Lord Hawkesbury proclaimed to the world.—This conclusion will not, I am sure, be denied; and, I should think, that there are very few persons, who, if seized by banditti, would scruple to tender them a promise of any sort, in order to get safe out of their power. Nothing is easier than to say, that, having once made a promise, you would abide by it, though made to a gang of foot-pads; but, saying and doing are two very different things; and, until I hear of some one who has acted upon such

a principle, I must greatly doubt of the sincerity of similar declarations. The case of breaking a parole given to rebels has been cited, such breach having generally been condemned. But, the case is not in point. The rebel spares your life after you have endeavoured to take his; no matter whether justifiably or not. That is a question to be decided between those who rebel and those who claim their allegiance. It is a fact, that you are seeking the life of the rebel; yet he spares yours, and hence arises his claim to the performance of your parole. The robber has no such claim; and therefore the cases are not parallel.—But, if other persons were seized by banditti as well as yourself, and if your breaking your promise would render the confinement of those other persons more severe, ought not that circumstance to have an influence upon your conduct? This is an entirely new question, and its decision must depend upon the nature of the engagements or connections between the parties arrested. If you have made any promise to your fellow-prisoners not to break any parole that you may give to the banditti; or, if it be a joint-parole; or if the parole be obtained through the means of your fellow-prisoners, and, or for their service, or in their behalf: in that case you contract an obligation with your fellow-prisoners; your parole is, in fact, given to them, and not to the banditti. How far Sir James Craufurd may have been pledged in this way, I know not; but, if in this way he was not pledged in any degree whatever, he is by no means answerable for any severities, which, in consequence of his escape, may have been, or may be, inflicted upon the persons who remain in France. In such case, his conduct, as far as relates to those persons, is a mere question of feeling, which no one but himself could possibly decide; but, as it appears, that he had a wife and young family in England, I think it would be very difficult to show, that the feeling which led him to England was not far preferable to that which would have detained him in France, especially at a time when the former was in daily expectation of being invaded by the latter. It will be much to be lamented, if the persons who remain in France should suffer on Sir James Craufurd's account; but, that consideration will not justify any one in blaming him for escaping. To sacrifice ourselves to the happiness of our fellow-creatures may be laudable enough; but, we have no right to blame others for not becoming sacrifices from such motives; and, in many cases, it may not only be foolish but highly criminal so to sacrifice ourselves.

The duty of a man towards his wife and children is greater than that which he owes to all the world besides, his sovereign and his country excepted; and, therefore (the previous questions of law and morality being decided in Sir James Crauford's favour), it was his duty to escape if he could, whatever might be the consequences to those, who either could not or would not follow his example.

**VOLUNTEER SYSTEM.**—It may, at first sight, appear rather cruel to disturb the last moments of this expiring system; but, there are some few facts relating to it which ought not to pass unnoticed.—In the preceding sheet I inserted the address of one of the candidates for the sheriff's office at Chester. I now insert the reply to that address. "To the independent freemen of the city of Chester: Gentlemen, the peculiar circumstances under which the opposition of Mr. John Broster as sheriff, is undertaken, and the grounds upon which it rests, imperiously call for the calm reflection of every citizen, as it is not simply a trial of one local interest against another—not a trial of what is termed the independent interest against the corporation—but, when developed to the bottom, involves in it a struggle of the military against the civil power. If this can be made to appear to be the fact, there are few dispassionate men who would require a moment's consideration to exert their weight and influence in resisting so monstrous and dangerous an opposition.—Let any man who has read Mr. Williamson's advertisement say, if the following positions and conclusions be not contained under his signature.—Because I have been injured in the prosecution of my son-in-law by the civil power—Therefore I come forward to bring that power into contempt, and bid open defiance to it. Because alderman Broster was the acting magistrate in that transaction—therefore I will revenge this injury upon his son. Because the Chester volunteers as a body, were implicated in the late riot—therefore I call upon them to approve of, and applaud that event, by giving me their support. Such is the language of Mr. Williamson's modest address. Had his opposition stood upon a broad and honourable basis, there would have been no need of an appeal to men in arms. And I am sanguine in my hopes that the respectable body of men, under whose skirts he seeks protection, will not commit themselves with him in so desperate a cause.—24th Oct. 1804."—Now, what

will be said to this by those persons, who supported the volunteer system in preference to a regular army, lest the civil and political liberties of the country should be endangered by the latter? The words of Paley, so often quoted by me, and so applicable to this subject will be found in vol. V. p. 932. The whole of the essay where they will be found I beg leave to recommend to the perusal of the reader; for, to what is there said nothing can be added.—At the city of Norwich, where volunteering was at one time so brisk, large loaves appear to have become greater favourites than volunteers; and, we are told, by a ministerial paper, that the "*common people*". . . . N. B. Always the common people, or the rabble, or the mob, when they act contrary to the wishes of the ministry, and always "*the people*," or "*the people of England*," when they act in conformity to those wishes. Thus those who now cry out "*no volunteers and a large loaf*" are the common people; whereas when these very same persons, at the last election, cried "*peace and a large loaf*," they were "*the citizens of Norwich*" and the "*people of England*!" . . . But, the common people, since that must now be the phrase, "*the common people*," says The Times of the 5th instant, "*the common people in the city of Norwich, and its vicinity, have taken an aversion to the system of volunteering. On Monday an attempt was made by them, particularly the females, to obstruct the volunteers of the Norwich regiment from mustering. They abused and insulted the officers, and accused the volunteers of being the cause of small loaves and the advance in corn. After they had gone through their exercise, Lieutenant-Col. Harvey thought it necessary to harangue them on what had taken place, and advised them seriously to impress upon their families the rashness of such proceedings. He attributed the increased price of bread solely to the late deficient harvest; and he reminded such as wished to retire, that the defence act still continued in full force, and would be found more coercive than volunteer support.*"—The Lieut.-Colonel's closing argument is truly curious. In order to keep "volunteers" in their corps, in order to keep embodied those persons, whom a half-madman in the Morning Post denominates "*an innumerable host of dauntless heroes rushing forth and voluntarily exposing their breasts to the bayonets of the enemy*;" in order to keep such persons from leaving their corps, Lieut. Colonel Harvey thinks it necessary to remind them "*that*

"the defence act is still in full force, and will be found to be more *coercive* than *volunteer* support!" The Lieut.-Colonel's argument puts me in mind of a sarcastic phrase used in the army, where a man who obeys with an ill-will is called "a volunteer by the hair of the head;" an appellation, which, it would seem, might with no great impropriety be given to the troops of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey; for, though they are not actually dragged out by the hair of the head, yet, it appears, that between their commander and their wives, they may be regarded as existing in a state of constant restraint, and that any other appellation afforded by our language would suit them better than volunteers.—The Lieutenant-Colonel was mistaken as to the cause of the high price of bread; for, it certainly does not arise *solely* from the deficient harvest. Partly it does, but not solely. There are several contributing causes; the deficient harvest, the corn-bill, the effect of paper-money\*. Yet the people (I beg pardon) "the common people" are not quite mistaken in their notion in this respect. It is not new for me to contend, that the volunteer system must contribute to raise the price of provisions. A deficient harvest arises from two causes; unfavourable seasons, and a deficiency of labour. That the volunteer system has subtracted from the quantity of agricultural labour it is impossible to deny; and, it is therefore impossible to deny, that that system has contributed to the deficiency of the harvest.—It seems that Lieutenant Colonel Harvey knew the women, or "females," as the ministerial writer calls them, to belong to the volunteers, because we find him exhorting those heroes to go home and quiet their families; to impress upon them the *rashness* of such proceedings. If the "females" persevere, what is the Lieutenant Colonel to do? March against them with the males? Gracious God! to what a state are we reduced by the imbecility of councils; by ministers of "existing circumstances;" by custom-house politicians; by the paper-money aristocracy and their champion!—With all these and a hundred other evils of the volunteer system before us, it was hardly to be expected, that any one would venture still to extol that system; yet, this has lately been done in a pamphlet, entitled "A Few Penn'orth of Hints to the Officers commanding Volunteer Brigades, &c. &c. by an Officer of the Regulars." It

may, perhaps, be correct to call a military surgeon or apothecary "an officer;" and, there is every appearance, that this eulogy on the volunteers is the production of some one of that profession. The author makes an attempt or two to cut up Sir Robert Wilson, but he fails even to draw blood. Indeed, the only passage, worthy of particular notice is the following: "It is with the deepest concern I view the actual state of the Volunteers, so widely different from what it was but a few months back. Then it displayed animation, vigour, energy, and health." Strange! What! animation, vigour, energy, and *health* besides! But, to proceed in the quotation: "it displayed health throughout all its members, as well as in the general frame. "Can its present condition" (*condition of the state observe*) "warrant the same observation? Far otherwise. Now it is not only in a slow decline, but in a galloping consumption," [Eh? creep and gallop at one and the same time! And, do not forget that it is the *state* of the Volunteers that is going in this paradoxical pace] "and imperiously demands the prompt aid of a skilful physician." [Whereupon he thus steps forward in his professional capacity.] "Some measure should, therefore, be speedily adopted, some wholesome regimen prescribed, to prevent its *natural* death, to which it is advancing with large and hasty strides. The nerves and the sinews are considerably relaxed, the fibres are sensibly affected, and have already communicated the contagious languor to the trunk." After again observing, that it is the *state* of the volunteers which is the patient here; that it is the nerves and the sinews and the fibres and the trunk of the *state* of which the author is speaking; after this it would be cruel to ask him, whether it be usual for feeble and almost dying bodies to advance with large and hasty strides.—But, let us bear him out. "So that, unless some strong tonics, some powerful restoratives, be immediately administered," [aye, aye; he wants a job!"] "its dissolution is likely to be as rapid as its growth." [The dissolution and growth of the *state*, mind] "Sincerely do I wish, that my apprehensions may prove merely visionary," [Word for word what the village surgeon said to Tom Jones] "and that my fears may never be realized; yet, such appears to me to be the probable fate of this huge colossus, which lately astonished the world, and struck terror into our enemies, by its magnitude, its strength, and its symmetry!"

\* See two essays upon this subject, present Volume, p. 545 and p. 559.

"Why did I write! What sin, to me unknown,  
 "Do I me ink, my parents or my own?"  
 If such be not now the exclamation of this son of Asculapius, he must be blessed with confidence much more than sufficient to compensate for his want of literary talent. But, where did he learn, that this huge colossus did, at one time, astonish the world and strike terror into our enemies? This is no question for the sake of dispute. I am ready desirous to obtain light as to the facts here stated; because they are quite new to me, and because they are of the utmost importance. If it can be satisfactorily proved, that the volunteer system ever did really strike terror into the heart of the enemy, it may be made to do it again; and, viewing its effect in that light, it would certainly have all the support that I should be able to give it. But, I am afraid that this writer is entirely mistaken: the enemy appears always to have despised the volunteer system; and, while that system lasts, we may be assured, that, whatever tactics may be applied to it, we shall never have an efficient ally upon the continent of Europe.

- CATHOLICS OF IRELAND.—In answer to a letter, which, upon this subject, appeared in the Register of the 27th ultimo, p. 609, and which turned principally upon the relative population of the Catholics and Protestants of Ireland, I have received from Dublin two large sheets of manuscript, closely written, and accompanied by a letter, dated 31st ultimo, stating that, "the enclosed manuscript will serve to show the public the errors of such calculations, and to counteract the effect of the tissue of misapprehensions;" for such the statements of my former correspondent are denominated. Neither the matter nor the manner of this new correspondent was very prepossessing: the savage delight with which he seemed to dwell upon the acts of confiscation used against the Catholics, and the constantly-recurring nickname of "Romanist," which he made use of instead of that appellation that has heretofore been in use, led me strongly to suspect his impartiality, and, of course, the correctness of his statements: nevertheless, imagining, that, if he were incorrect, he would soon be contradicted, I was just about to send his papers to the press, when, by mere accident, I discovered, that these papers, with the contents of which I was, "in the name of impartiality," besought to treat and enlighten the public, were, not written from print, but, were part of the identical manuscript from which was, some few years ago, printed a pamphlet, for the publishing of which the book-seller was pro-

secuted and convicted! This was rather too barefaced. But, upon this side of the question, there is generally a disregard of decorum as well as of candour. On the side of the Irish Catholics every thing that I have ever published, or ever seen, is advanced with decency and with moderation; while the writings of their opponents almost always seem to be dictated by intolerance and animosity, and discover but very little respect for any one who ventures to exercise a right of deliberating upon the subject. Whatever can be urged against the claims of the Roman Catholics I am ready to read, and as far as my limits will allow, to publish; but, I will publish no violence, no abuse, against those who abuse nobody; and I will never contribute to give circulation to any writing, wherein the Roman Catholics shall be designated under any nickname whatever. There may be reasons, solid reasons, for refusing the claims of the Roman Catholics of Ireland; but, let us hear them. Let the present situation of Ireland be fully and faithfully described: let it be frankly stated whether the kingdom can, or cannot, be rescued from its present difficulties without some change in Ireland: and, if it cannot, let it be shown why that change should not embrace all the claims of the Roman Catholics. To such a discussion I shall cheerfully lend my pages; but I never will circulate abuse of the Roman Catholics, and much less expressions of hatred or contempt of their religion.

SIR GEORGE RUMBOLD.—On the night between the 24th and 25th of October, a body of 250 French troops, commanded by a general, and having drums and colours, embarked at Harburg, on the Hanoverian territory, and landed on a spot between Hamburg and Altona, called the Hamburger Berg, or Hill. From thence they proceeded to the Grindelhof, where Sir George Rumbold, the British chargé d'affaires to the Hanseatic cities and the circle of Lower Saxony, has his country residence. Sir George looked out at the window, and inquired what they wanted? Those who first approached the house said they were couriers, come with dispatches from Tonnigen. But, entertaining some suspicions, he refused them admittance; upon which the whole body rushed forward, broke open the doors, seized Sir George and his papers, and conveyed him to a carriage, which was waiting for the purpose.—In this vehicle, which was drawn by six horses, Sir George was conveyed to Hanover, whence, according to the latest accounts, he was sent off to Paris.—Want of room compels me to break off thus abruptly.

" Dans les moments d'opulence, dont on a joui, on s'est enivré de sa prospérité, on s'est fait des idées chimériques de sa puissance; on méprise ses voisins parce qu'ils sont moins riches; on croit avoir droit de les dominer, ou du moins de les traiter cavalièrement. Soit ambition, vanité, ignorance, qualités qui s'associent merveilleusement; on forme sans qu'on s'en aperçoive, des entreprises au-dessus de ses forces. De là les emprunts et toute cette adresse admirable par laquelle on parvient à se faire un très grand crédit. Mais, comme les hommes ne sont jamais assez sages pour se corriger par une expérience on imagine des banques pour que le papier tiennne lieu de l'argent qu'on n'a pas, et bientôt on soutiendra que le crédit est la source de la puissance d'un état. Vaine ressource! La richesse imaginaire des banques disparaît, et, quand on est arrivé au dernier degré de mollesse, l'on songe à défendre le commerce par la voie des armes." CANTILLON, as given by MABLY.

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## LETTER IV.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

## PAPER MONEY SYSTEM.

SIR,—Having, in the preceding letter, pointed out what it is that I regard as marks of our national decline, I intend, in the present, to speak of what appears to me to have been, and still to be, the primary cause of that decline, namely, *your* Paper-Money System.

But, before I enter upon this subject, it seems necessary to revert for a minute, to notice, as relating to the degrading surrender of the Lilies, a circumstance, which, from the wish to avoid a digression, was omitted in the foregoing letter. It was there stated, that the surrendering of this greatest of all our honours was passed over by the parliament, as a matter too trifling for the representatives of the people to meddle with; but, as I, at the same time, referred to the sentiment which you delivered in parliament, upon the subject of this "harmless feather," it would be wrong to quit the subject without stating some few particulars relating thereto.

The "harmless feather" sentiment was expressed by you in the debate of the 10th of November, 1797, upon the address to the king in consequence of his submitting to the parliament the papers relating to the then terminated negotiations at Lisle. The manner of expressing this sentiment is of importance: the words must not be viewed alone; but, in connexion with the rest of the sentence, of which they make a part. "They" [the French plenipotentiaries] now required that we, whom they had summoned to treat for a definitive treaty, should stop and discuss preliminary points: they led the conferences to vague and se-

condary matters: they insisted that *us* Majesty should resign the title of King of France, a harmless feather at which his ancestors had so long worn in their crowns: they demanded restitution of the ships taken at Toulon, of a compensation, and a renunciation of any mortgage which this country might possess on the Netherlands for the loan guaranteed to the Emperor." Thus, the title of King of France, was not only a "harmless feather," but it was huddled in amongst objects merely pecuniary, and, consequently, vile; objects which would not be worth contending for in arms; items which would not have been disgraced by being found in the day book of a low jobber or a Jew. To the introducing of the "harmless feather" the appearance of incident was studiously given. It seemed to drop, in passing on to more important matter. No deliberate opinion was stated; but, enough was said, to prepare the nation for the surrender, which, if necessary, upon any future occasion, you were desirous to make. Your object did not escape observation, nor did your sentiment pass unnoticed. Doctor LAURENCE said: "The Chancellor of the Exchequer has called his Majesty's title of King of France a harmless feather. In my opinion, Sir, no ancient dignity, especially one which has for so many centuries shed lustre on the English crown, ought to be considered as a mere light unsubstantial ornament. It is bound up indissolubly with the honour of the nation. If we suffer that feather to be plucked, I fear that three other feathers, closely connected with that crown, and won in the same glorious wars, will soon follow; after which who shall say that the crown and the throne itself will long be secure? A great nation can never safely submit to be disgraced. I wish the house to carry their recollection back to the time

"of Edward the Third, when these honours were achieved. Of that time it was that we had the first regular and full records of the proceedings of Parliament. Whether it was from the peculiar favour of Providence, that we might have always before us an example to fix our steady and wavering courage, in moments of terror and trepidation; or, whether it was from the veneration of our ancestors for this sacred relic, which they preserved with religious care, while they suffered less precious monuments to perish; but, so the fact is, that the first traces of the deliberations and conferences of these houses are of that epoch, and exhibit a situation of the country, far less favourable than the present, in every thing but the spirit of Englishmen." Sentiment. — We these were not, however, suffered to go forth without something to hang upon them and to destroy their effect. Mr. WILBERFORCE, who immediately followed Dr Laurence in the debate, said: "I should not have offered a word upon the subject, if it had not been extorted from me by the learned gentleman who has just sat down, and who, while he strenuously recommended unanimity, has made use of language very likely to produce the directly contrary effect. I am sorry the learned gentleman did not follow the example of my right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who purposely waved the subject introduced by the former. To introduce that question, and to make it a subject of discussion, at a time when all should be harmony and unanimity, is, in my mind, exceedingly improper; and, therefore, I protest against what has fallen from the learned gentleman." You are said to have cheered this, Sir. To have called upon the house to hear it. They heard it but too patiently; and, the enemy did not fail to profit from the discovery which, by this means, he must necessarily have made. He did not demand of you the surrender. But, is there any man in the world, who believes, that you did not make it in order to avoid that demand? or, that, if the demand had been made, you would not have yielded to it? Yes, Sir, your sentiments, supported by Mr. Wilberforce, were adopted, and acted upon too: the harmless feather was given up; but, the surrender, though varnished over with seeming indifference, has not answered the purpose intended: it has not, for one moment, slackened the pursuit of the foe: it has, on the contrary, rendered him more keen; it has emboldened him to

make demands which he would not, probably, otherwise have thought of; and, to use the words of Dr. Laurence, who shall say, that, after the plucking of this feather, "the other three feathers, or even the crown itself, will long be secure?" I know, Sir, that this will excite only a sneer amongst the excise-office and custom-house politicians; but, neither their sneers nor the excessive "honesty" of Mr. Wilberforce's constituents can, in the smallest degree, alter the facts before us; and these are, that, for the space of more than four hundred years, the kings of England bore the title and insignia of Kings of France; that this honour never was lost by the crown of England till the administration of William Pitt; that, for a hundred and fifty years down to the same administration, English seamen had seen the Dutch flag bow before them, a circumstance of which every sailor in the fleet was personally proud; and, that, it was during that administration, that the modern English first acknowledged, in acts if not in words, their fear of the French.

These are facts which nobody can deny, and which nothing can disguise from the world. It behoves us, therefore, to inquire into the cause of this change in our circumstances and character; and, by no means to content ourselves with vague reflections upon the state of the world in general, connected with the decrees of Providence, or the doctrine of chance. "From the fatality of the times," said you, "and the general state of the world, we must consider our lot as cast by the decrees of Providence, in a time of peril and trouble. I trust the temper and courage of the nation will conform itself to the duties of that situation. We ought to be prepared collectively and individually to meet it with resignation and fortitude, &c. &c."\* In this respect, it must be acknowledged, however, that you were not quite singular in your tenets, the same having before been held by Mr. Addington; and, though it may, I am aware, be contended, that he imbibed them in your school, it cannot be denied, I believe, that he has the merit of being the first openly to promulgate them. "That the extent of the territorial power of France is," said he, "a matter of regret is unquestionable. It cannot but be matter of regret; but, it is a lot which we have not the power of controlling; we are not to presume to say, that the bounty

\* Speech on the Address to the King relative to the present War. 23d May, 1803. See Register, Vol. III. p. 1085.

"of Providence is to be dispensed in the way most consonant to our wishes. We ought to be contented with the conviction, that we have abundant means of providing for our security in a separate state and condition." Now, whether this doctrine be merely derived from Dr. Whitfield; whether it descended from Mr. Addington to you, or from you to Mr. Addington, are questions which I shall not presume to determine; but, it is a doctrine, to which I can never be induced to subscribe. It is, indeed, precisely that of the frail spouse, who justified herself upon the ground, that if her helpmate was born to such a "lot," it was not the fault of his wife. Suppose Ireland, for instance, were to become (which God forbid!) an addition to the territorial power of France; should we be silenced by an observation from the minister, that it was our "lot?" That Providence was the dispenser of the favour; and that "it was not for us to say how such favours should be dispensed?" I will not say that we should not; for after what we have seen, no degree of silent submission ought to astonish us. But, certainly, this way of defending the conduct of ministers is of modern invention. Time was when the conduct of such persons was judged of by the state of the country, and by its relative situation in the world. It was the custom, and the wise custom, to judge of the tree in this, as in other cases, by the fruit; and, if it bore not good fruit, to hew it down. It is not for a minister, particularly for a minister of twenty years standing, to lay the blame upon the times and the seasons, nor upon the people; for, in such a space of time, it is for a minister to form the minds of the people, and to give a proper direction to their pursuits. It is not for a minister, who, for twenty years, has had all the honours and revenues, all the rewards of every sort, and for every rank of life, at his absolute command; it is not for such a minister to complain of the "lot" of the nation, or to seek shelter under the decrees of Providence. No:

"The fault, good Casca, is not in our stars,  
"But in ourselves, that we are underlings."

The land is the same, the air is the same, the people are the same in race and in size, that they were when you first became minister. We have so often been told about the earthquake, the volcano, the burning lava of the French revolution, that some

of us seem, at last, to have taken this figure of speech in its literal meaning, and to believe, that, in good sooth, our power has been crippled by some convulsion of nature. What else can have rendered us so self-complacent amidst the daily and hourly demonstrations of our decline; amidst the insults of an enemy whom we formerly despised; amidst the cutting sarcasms, the audible hisses of the world? At what former period of our history were English ministers, the personal representatives of a King of England, hunted over the continent of Europe, driven out of state after state where they had sought refuge? "It is the lawless power of our enemy which occasions this." True; but when, till the administration of Mr. Pitt, could our enemy boast of such power? I could, and, were it of any use, I would, fill volumes upon volumes with declamation against the insolence and tyranny of France. "Insolent scoundrel as long as you will, good Robin, but where were you when he thus vilified your master and rifled his caskets?" That is the question. The insolence and injustice of the enemy no one denies; but, every one regrets that we have not the power to prevent or to punish them; and, that we have it not, what are we to blame but the measures of the minister; of the man who has had the uninterrupted command of all the resources of the nation ever since the happy time that we had the power to prevent or to punish such insolence and injustice? Will it be pretended, that these rules of judging are not applicable to the measures of a minister, who has to contend with an enemy in a revolutionary state? Dangerous argument! Only admit it to be sound, and, in that very admission, you, in the name of national glory, call upon the people of every state, your own not excepted, to revolt! For, if a people, by overthrowing their government, and by placing themselves in a revolutionary state, necessarily become more formidable to all their enemies, and, of course, more secure against their attacks, is there but one, and is not that one an obvious and unavoidable inference? But, the fact is not so. Revolutions do not necessarily render nations more formidable to their neighbours; which has been amply proved by the revolutions of the last hundred years, during which times several states have been nearly, and some entirely, conquered and enslaved, in consequence of attempts to change the form or the powers of their respective governments. It would, indeed, be absurd to admit any such exception, as is here supposed, from the rule whereby to judge of the measures of a

\* Speech of 14th May, 1802, on the Definitive Treaty of Peace with France. Register, Vol. II. p. 1356.

minister of any country. Nor can we suffer the blame to be thrown upon the people, of whom such minister conducts the public affairs; notwithstanding an attempt of this kind was made by one of those writers, who took upon himself the arduous task of maintaining the consistency of your conduct in defending the peace of Amiens. "The "people", said he, "were to blame. They "would no longer support the war." To say nothing of the well-known falsehood of this particular assertion, there always occurs here a difficulty, which can never be well gotten over; for when we are told, that the minister would have done this thing or that thing, but, that the people would not enable him to do it; that they would not, in the necessary manner or degree, second his efforts; when we are told this, we always ask, whether, in spite of this disposition in the people, the minister still kept his place, and, of course, had a majority in parliament? If we are answered in the affirmative, we reject, as downright nonsense, the notion of his measures being obstructed by the people; for, if we did not, we must necessarily conclude, that he held his place and preserved his majority by means that would merit an epithet very different indeed from either honourable or honest. The very possession of the place of prime minister implies that the possessor has power and influence sufficient to take any lawful measure, to the execution of which the resources of the nation are adequate. If, therefore, he fail to take the measures necessary for the safety and honour of the country, it must be for want of resources; or, for want of resolution or wisdom sufficient to induce him to exert, for proper purposes, the power and influence attached to the place which he fills; and, must not, by any means, be ascribed to untowardness on the part of the people. In truth, the persons who set up a defence upon this ground, have moved so long in the vortex of the minister, have so long leaned upon him for support, that no idea of his quitting his place seems ever to enter their minds. What the writer above alluded to meant, was, not that you had not power quite sufficient for the continuation of the war; but that you could not have continued the war much longer, without risking your place, and, which was, perhaps, of still greater weight with him, without risking his place too; a thing not to be thought of any more than one would think of the end of the world. "You did," he said, "all that it was possible for a minister "to do." That is to say, all that it was possible for a minister to do without risking

his place; which this advocate has been so long accustomed to regard as a moral impossibility, that he does not take the trouble to say one word thereupon, though it is evident that his reasoning can have no other basis. Sometimes, when I hear your partisans railing against Sir Francis Burdett, and insisting that his past conduct ought to operate as a total disqualification for the future, I observe, "all this may, in your "opinions, be very right, gentlemen; but if "it be, upon what principle do you now "extol Mr. Pitt, who offered a very high "situation to Mr. Tierney; that Mr. Tierney who was apparently far more intimate "with O'Connor than Sir Francis Burdett "was; that Mr. Tierney who was the distinguished public advocate of O'Connor; "that Mr. Tierney whom you yourselves, "while yearly receiving a pension from Mr. "Pitt, represented in figure, and denominated "in words, (falsely and slanderously without "doubt) as "the lowest fiend of hell:" "Upon what principle is it, I say, that you "now rail against Sir Francis Burdett, in "the very same breath that you extol the "minister, who has placed, or who has endeavoured to place, a very important department of the state in the hands of Mr. "Tierney?" To this question, Sir, the answer uniformly has been: "Why, can "you blame Mr. Pitt for strengthening his "ministry? He wished to have had the Grenvilles and the Windhams; but, if he could "not gain them, can you blame him for "seeking the aid of others in support of his "government?" Thus, says Swift, in describing the perseverance of the fly: "drive "him from a bed of roses, and instantly he "skins away, and finishes his meal upon an "excrement!" It is obvious that these answers have laid it down as a principle, that the first and greatest duty of a prime minister, is, to keep his place; that, to this consideration every other ought to give way; that, of whatever cannot be accomplished, without risking his place, the accomplishment is to be regarded as morally if not physically impossible; and that, as the principle applies to measures of prevention as well as to measures of enterprize, a minister, if charged, for instance, with the loss of Ireland, would, in his justification, only have to show, that he could not have preserved it, without the adoption of such measures as would have risked the loss of his place!

Such being the fair and necessary deduction from the premises, by which the decline of a nation is imputed to the follies or the vices of the people, those who are not content with that deduction must again be referred to

"the decrees of Providence", and, those who are of opinion, that the effect must be sought for in sublunary causes, will, perhaps, be indulgent enough to give me an impartial hearing, while I endeavour to show, that the primary cause of our national degradation is the Paper-money System. But, this must be deferred till my next: in the mean time, I beg leave to recommend to your notice the motto of this letter, whence you will perceive, that some of my opinions, at least, are neither singular nor novel.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

*Duke Street, 15th Nov. 1804.*

STATE OF IRELAND. LETTER III.

(For Letters I. and II. see pp. 673, 711.)

SIR,—The length of the quotations contained in my last letter prevented me from examining the emancipation of the Irish Catholics, as it relates to the constitution, in the extent I had intended. I was only able to shew that the laws for disqualifying them from setting in Parliament were contrary to the principles of the Constitution, and founded on circumstances which no longer have existence. I shall now consider the subject more in detail, and shall be able, I hope, to prove, by examining the practical consequences of the emancipation, that the Catholic body would not have it in their power to prejudice our established Constitution. That they are not inclined to do so is fully demonstrated by their declarations and loyal demeanour, and that even if they were inclined they are not competent, will appear from the following statement: Let us first examine their numbers. In Ireland they are generally allowed to amount to three millions, seven individuals of whom are peers, and about seventy, according to the authority of Lord Petre, who possess sufficient property to qualify them to sit in Parliament (Reflections, p. 9). As any injury that can arise from admitting the Catholics to sit in Parliament must be in consequence of the measures of Parliament, and those injurious measures must be in consequence of the power of the Catholic party, it requires no further illustration than the bare mention of the state of the Irish Catholics in respect to property, to point out the absurdity of the apprehensions that are entertained concerning their complete emancipation. But it may be said that they will become an opulent body, and besides the English Catholics must likewise be admitted.—To the first objection it may be answered, that if so improbable a circumstance should ever occur as the whole re-

presentation of Ireland, Peers and Commons being composed of Catholics, even then their force in Parliament would only amount to 100 Irish members in the House of Commons and 28 Irish Peers. Let it be granted that the English Catholics are emancipated, and surely they ought not to be excluded, and we shall have a most satisfactory proof of the impossibility of this portion of His Majesty's Catholic subjects being capable of forming a strong party in Parliament by referring to the same authority already quoted. "In the peerage list are "at present to be found no more than six of "that persuasion" (the Catholic) "and "amidst the bulk of the people, the number "of them possessing landed and monied "qualifications is so small comparatively "with their more opulent neighbours of the "established church, that they could scarcely reckon on seating half a dozen in the "House of Commons" (p. 11). If, therefore, these are added to the greatest possible Irish representation of Catholics, the whole party in Parliament will amount to 106 members of the House of Commons and 34 Peers out of 658 members and 360 Peers which compose the House of Commons and Lords. How ridiculous, therefore, is the idea of the Catholics of these realms being under any circumstance of sufficient authority to carry any measure in Parliament which could endanger the safety or impair the benefits of the constitution. Such apprehensions are futile in the extreme, and unworthy of the extensive information and improved notions of liberality of the present age. The truth is, that in respect to the representation of Ireland, the landed property and the borough property is so universally invested in the possession of the protestants, that protestant members must continue to be returned to Parliament, and as the Peerage is elective as to its right to sit in the House of Lords, it is not very probable that more than one or two of the Catholic Peers would ever be found among the 28 that compose the Peerage representation. On the whole, therefore, Mr. Cobbett, as the Catholics both of England and Ireland, have solemnly and publicly declared, that they acknowledge no other authority in these realms in all matters touching the government thereof, except the King, Lords and Commons, as they have so long and so uniformly conducted themselves with loyalty to the King and obedience to the laws, as the Constitution of these realms was formed and established by the nation, when a nation of Catholics, and those laws excluding them from the Constitution were made in times of

bigotry, and to meet dangers which no longer exist, and further, as it is utterly impossible that the Catholic body with the fullest enjoyment of constitutional franchises, could interrupt the enjoyment of them by others, it is palpably and most forcibly manifest that, so far as the preservation of the Constitution is in question, emancipation of the Catholics is a measure of safety, of sound policy, and of pressing necessity.—I cannot quit the subject as considered in a constitutional point of view, without again adverting to the circumstance of the nation having been entirely composed of Catholics when our liberties were first established. I believe no one will maintain that these liberties have been the offspring of the times subsequent to the reformation. No; those very Protestants who at this moment boast of the blessings of their constitution and of the spirit and patriotism of their forefathers, owe their superior rank among nations not only to Catholic Peers and Catholic Commons, but also to Catholic Bishops. Those Bishops and those Barons who compelled King John to sign *Magna Charta* were of that very religion which is most insolently assailed as inimical to liberty; and those Alfreds, Henries, and Edwards, whose reigns were conspicuous for the observance of the people's rights and the maintenance of their own authority, were themselves the subjects of the spiritual empire of the Pope. How ungrateful, then, is it, to continue laws which exclude the Catholics from those franchises which they themselves acquired, and how absurd to maintain that the principles of their faith are inconsistent with the safety of a constitution of Government which originated, was established, and for many centuries preserved by them alone! — But how preposterous is it that this ingratitude and this absurdity should proceed from the Protestant body, and that they should have contributed most to curtail our liberties and defeat the object of *Magna Charta*! It has frequently been argued, that the Catholic religion was alone calculated for absolute monarchies. The history of our country proves the contrary, and the examination of the state of parties in the reigns succeeding the conquest will explain the causes. — The contention in those days was between the King and his Barons and Bishops; the one for absolute authority, the others for liberty. It is very evident that the Catholic religion gave the Clergy so much authority in those days, that they easily, with the aid of the Barons, were able to counteract the ambitious projects of their Kings. It was in this manner precisely,

that the granting of *Magna Charta* was accomplished, and by the same control over the Monarch's conduct have the benefits of it so long been handed down to posterity. But let the power of the Catholic religion in temporal matters be ever so extensive, it is the perfection of our Constitution that it provides remedies against the abuse of power, whether originating in the King, the Clergy, the Peers, or the People. — Vain, indeed, would be the boasts concerning it, if such were not its principal characteristic; for, to what end are governments, and particularly free governments, formed, but for the purpose of keeping within bounds the effervescence of all authority that is inconsistent with the peace, the happiness, and the liberties of society. In whatever point of view this important subject is contemplated, the exclusion of the Catholics is equally unjust, as the emancipation of them under the existing circumstances of Ireland is indispensably necessary. It is most sincerely to be wished that the known liberality of the Prime Minister may be permitted to suggest to Parliament those measures, which he must be convinced from the bottom of his heart are well calculated to appease the passions and conciliate the affections of three millions of his Majesty's subjects. Every man of talents will support him, and every inhabitant of these realms who can fully appreciate the value of our blessed Constitution will hail him as its protector, and the author of universal conciliation throughout these Kingdoms. Z.

*Liverpool, Nov. 7, 1804.*

**SPANISH FRIGATES.**—*The following article is copied from the London papers, being a translation from the French official paper the Moniteur, of the 30th October, 1804, commenting on an article, which, it seems, appeared in "The Times" newspaper immediately after the capture of the Spanish frigates.*

This article of *The Times* is very evidently drawn up in the offices of the ministry. What a cold and disgusting irony! English ships of war were employed in attacking four Spanish frigates, at the very instant perhaps when the English minister at Madrid was paying court to the king of Spain, and when the Spanish minister was paying court to the king of England. The attack is made not only without a declaration of war, but while the diplomatic communications are carried on without interruption; and what evinces the suppression of all sense of shame is the circumstance, according to the statements of the English

themselves, that the king of Spain cannot furnish any real ground of complaint, or that a declaration of war cannot result from such an outrage. Three hundred men have perished, and by whose hands? They were not enemies who fought them, since not only the British cabinet is not at war with Spain, but even affects to maintain the relations of peace with her. They were therefore assassins. The vessels, says the English ministry, may be restored. The restitution of the property is no doubt a necessary satisfaction for the robbery committed; but who will restore to three hundred unfortunate families the fathers they have lost?—A fact which exposes, in their proper light, the meanness and ignominy of that cabinet, is the circumstance that at the moment when the orders were sent to the English cruisers to seize the Spanish vessels, and while these orders were executing, the British ministry were availing themselves of the intervention of the Spanish ambassadors resident at London and Paris, to extricate Captain Wright from the fate he deserved, as the accomplice of traitors, whom he landed on the coast of France, for the purpose of assassinating the emperor; and the letter written to that effect by Lord Harrowby to M. D'Anduagua, was filled with the most energetic expressions of attachment on the part of the English government to Spain. Poignards, infernal machines, piracy, the violation of the rights of neutrals, the breach of forms held the most sacred among nations;—such are the arts of that execrable cabinet? It considers every thing as fair game, if it can but for an instant gratify, by plunder, the rapacity of its cruisers.—The emperor of the French had consented to the neutrality of Spain, although the violation of the treaty of Amiens placed Spain under the obligation of making a common cause with France. England respected that neutrality as long as the commerce of France and of Holland furnished her cruisers with the means of plunder, but at present, when she has done all the mischief she could, she resigns Spain to their rapacity. But however torpid may be the state into which Spain is sunk, such an outrage is capable of awakening her altogether. She has still more than forty ships of war; her coasts abound in seamen, and the sentiment of honour and of patriotism reviving in the heart of the king of Spain, of his ministers, and of the different orders which compose the nation, she will be able to collect and arm them. These supplementary means will materially co-operate with our own in transporting our legions to England, Ireland, and Scotland. And, if

history can ever attribute in part the destruction of England to this outrage, of a nature almost unheard of among European nations, no act of violence and avidity will have been followed by consequences more calamitous for a country.—The specie on board the Spanish frigates belonged almost entirely to the commercial interest of Cadiz; government had no claim but to the smallest share of it. By an action equally destitute of honour and glory, the English cruisers will gain thirty millions of livres, but the trade of that country with Spain was equivalent to more than three hundred millions. The extension of its maritime force required by this new war will also cost more than one hundred and fifty. Mr. Pitt is not limited in his calculations; he has not abandoned his outrageous system of politics. When he left his last official situation, his ministry had deranged all Europe, and other men and other measures became necessary for the re-establishment of the affairs of Great Britain.—He now returns to the same principles, and every one is called upon to express his indignation at this conduct as a man, although in his capacity of a Frenchman, it contributes to the advantage of our cause. We do not stand in need of the aid of Spain to pare the claws of the leopard; but forty sail of the line and a great number of ports shut against the English are of such importance, more particularly in the kind of war which we carry on, that for a long time the astonishment of all has been excited by that generous system of politics, which did not allow France to make Spain a party against England!

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

NOTES BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA.—

*Note transmitted by the French Minister for Foreign Relations to the Imperial Russian Chargé d'Affaires, dated May 16, 1804, and signed, CH. M. TALLEYRAND,*

I have laid before the First Consul the note of the 22d April (see Reg. Vol. VI, p. 29), which you did me the honour to transmit to me. The First Consul observes with regret, that the influence of the enemies of France has prevailed in the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that it now puts at hazard the good understanding which was established with so much pains, and which appeared to be so well confirmed by the happy effects which it has produced. His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, who undoubtedly are the two powers the most concerned in the fate of the German Empire, have understood, that the French government was sufficiently

authorized to arrest, at two leagues distance from her frontier, French rebels, who conspired against their own country, and who, by the nature of their plots, as well as by the terrible evidence which corroborated them, had placed themselves out of the protection of the law of nations. The German Prince, having thus been satisfied, the First Consul would have nothing to say to the Emperor of Russia on a point which does not in the least concern his interest: but he will always be happy to speak to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, with that openness which Europe knows he possesses, which only is becoming great and powerful States. If it be the intention of his Majesty to form a new coalition in Europe, and to recommence the war, what need is there for empty pretences, and why not act more openly? Much as the renewal of hostilities would grieve the First Consul, he knows no man in the world that could put France in fear; no man whom he would suffer to interfere in the internal concerns in the country; and since he himself does not meddle with the parties or opinions between which Russia may be divided, his Imperial Majesty can have no right to meddle with the parties or opinions between which France may be divided. In the note, Sir, which you have delivered, you require:—That France should employ the most efficacious means to tranquilize the different governments, and to let an end be put to the war in Europe, which is too alarming for their security and independence. But is not the independence of the States of Europe attacked, if it appears that Russia protects and maintains, at Dresden and at Rome, authors of plots, who seek to abuse the privilege of their residence, for the purpose of disquieting the neighbouring states? and if the Russian ministers at most of the Courts of Europe pretend to place under the protection of the law of nations, persons who are natives of that very country where those ministers reside, as M. de Marcoff wanted to do at Paris with a Genevise? These are real infringements of the independence of the States of Europe; these are the very infringements which ought to excite their vigorous remonstrances. The circumstance against which an outcry is raised, is of a very different nature.—By the Treaty of Luneville, Germany and France had mutually engaged to allow no asylum to any of those men who could disturb their respective tranquillity. The emigrants who resided at Baden, at Friburg, at Dresden, &c. were by that treaty not to be suffered in the German Empire; and this circumstance shews what real impropriety there was in the conduct of Russia.—France

requires of her to remove emigrants who were in the employment of Russia, at the time when the two countries were at war, from countries where they rendered themselves conspicuous only by their intrigues; and Russia insists upon maintaining them there; and the remonstrance she now makes, leads to this question:—If, when England planned the murder of Paul I. (supposing intelligence to have been received, that the authors of the plot were at a league from the frontier), would not pains have been taken to arrest them?—The First Consul hopes that his Imperial Majesty, whose excellent mind and noble character are so well known, will sooner or later perceive that there are men who avail themselves of every means to raise enemies to France, and who thereby seek to make a diversion, and rekindle the flames of a war, which is advantageous only to England. This war never will take place with the First Consul's consent; but whosoever may declare it against him, he shall ever prefer it to a state of things which should tend to destroy that equality between great powers, which tend to the detriment of France.—And as he does not arrogate to himself any superiority, and does not interfere with any operation of the Russian Cabinet, he demands a perfect reciprocity in this respect. I continue, Sir, firmly to hope that declarations so candid will be fully appreciated by your Court, and that they will tend to dispel the clouds which malice spreads between our countries with a success greatly to be lamented. Accept, Sir, the assurance of my perfect esteem, &c.

*Note presented by M. d'Oubril, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris, July 21, 1804.*

The note, which the Citizen Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the Undersigned Chargé d'Affaires from his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, he did not fail to transmit to St. Petersburg; but the undersigned has to declare, that his Court greatly disapproved his receiving a paper, which did not answer his preceding official communications, and was by no means calculated to be laid before his august Sovereign. The said paper, however, at length came under the notice of his Imperial Majesty, who saw, with surprise, that its contents consist altogether of such assertions as are not only unfounded, but also wholly unconnected with the note of the 22d April. The Emperor, already moved by the calamities which oppress a great part of Europe, and by the dangers which threaten the Ger-

man Empire, whose interests Russia is particularly bound to support, in conformity to her obligations, received intelligence of another recent violation of the law of nations, which was perpetrated at Ettenheim, he, therefore, thought himself bound to invite the assembled States of the German Empire, and the German Princes, to concur with him in jointly protesting against the French government, to whom his Majesty communicated the same sentiments, in hopes that it would repair the insult offered to the German League, and allay the fears of Europe for the repetition of similar outrages.—The French government could not avoid to return an answer to this plain declaration from his Majesty the Emperor; but the evasive reply which was made, is offensive to Russia, to the German Empire, and to France herself; it impairs the good understanding which she declares her wish to preserve, but the effects whereof Russia has not hitherto perceived. “We live no longer in those barbarous times when every country regarded only her immediate interest; modern polity, founded upon the law of Nations, has introduced certain principles, respecting the interest of the whole community of states. No state could view with indifference the event already mentioned, which gave such a dreadful blow to the independence and security of nations. By the peace of Teschen, Russia undertook to guarantee and mediate for the German Empire; in this quality, his Imperial Majesty was not merely justified in raising his voice on this occasion, but was absolutely bound to do it. The French government, bearing a similar quality, takes the liberty of violating the neutrality of Germany, and to act arbitrarily on that territory. It is difficult to conceive how his Imperial Majesty should be incompetent to stand up for the German Empire, the security and independence of which he has guaranteed.—It would be in vain to attempt to explain otherwise the conduct of Russia, whose motives are so evident, or to discover therein the influence of the enemies of France; its sole motive is the wretched condition to which the French government, by its influence, has reduced Europe. Should Russia propose to establish a coalition, for the purpose of renewing the war on the Continent, it would not at all be required to seek any unfounded cause for it. The French government has long given too much and too just cause for breaking the bands of harmony, which the Emperor has preserved merely by his moderation, and which he desired to preserve for ever. No person, and the French government least of all, can mistake the views of the

Cabinet of St. Petersburg, since his Imperial Majesty so explicitly declared even before the present war, how necessary it was to labour for the consolidation of peace; to prevent new revolutions in Europe, to avoid carefully every cause for mistrust; and to let every state quietly enjoy its independence. At the same time, Russia disclosed to the French cabinet, how much she desired that this latter power might contribute to consolidate the present order of things; that it should, by its moderation and disinterestedness, give a hope to the other States of Europe, that every government could at last (after the unhappy war, which cost so much blood) devote itself, with safety and quiet, to the happiness of the people entrusted to it. Far from desiring to rekindle the flames of war on the Continent, his Russian Majesty most ardently wishes to stifle those flames every where; but his Majesty harbours this particular wish, that the French government, as it pretends to the same desire, would let those nations alone, who wish nothing more fervently than to avoid taking a part in the present troubles.—This was the only (though unfortunately for the cause of humanity, it proved an ineffectual) wish of Russia, which never deviated from those principles; every step she took with the French government, which she constantly referred to treaties already concluded, had no other view. Upon the same ground she proposed to act as a mediator between France and England, but was not accepted. Since the renewal of the war, the French government thinks itself competent to occupy those countries, and deprive them of their commerce which in vain appeal to their neutrality; his Imperial Majesty was thereby alarmed, not indeed on his own account, since, from the actual situation and power of his Empire, his Majesty can remain a quiet spectator of those distressing scenes; but he was alarmed for the security of the other States of Europe. His Majesty repeatedly urged with the French government, but always ineffectually, that those countries at least should be permitted to remain neutral, whose neutrality France and Russia had guaranteed by mutual treaties; his Majesty also repeatedly disclosed his sentiments with respect to those States that are already in danger of sharing the fate of Italy, of a part of Germany, and of the other countries which France has already got in her possession. Meanwhile the Emperor saw, in spite of all his exertions and remonstrances, the danger increasing daily; French troops, on the one side, occupying the coasts of the Adriatic; on the other, levying contributions on the Hanse Towns,

and menacing Denmark; consequently, his Imperial Majesty has resolved, as the theatre of war approaches his frontier, to establish a military force, which shall be adequate to put a stop to further encroachments. The fact is notorious to all Europe; the Emperor was particularly desirous that it might not remain unknown to the French government, and the mutual explanations always referred to the same objects. Never then did any government act more candidly, or for a purpose which requires less secrecy, or is subject to less false constructions than Russia did in the present circumstances. If this conduct be not upright; if it can be considered as hostile to France, or as an attack on the welfare and tranquillity of the German Empire, then there is no longer any difference existing between manifest encroachments on the one part, and that just indignation which the other part must consequently feel; between attack and defence; between the oppression and protection of the weak.—The undersigned will not, in this place, examine, by the law of nations, the question, whether the French government be justified in persecuting, in every country, those persons whom it has exiled from their own, and in prescribing to foreign powers the manner in which they shall be permitted to treat or to employ the late emigrants, whom they may have adopted for their subjects, or employed in their service. Such a tenet is at variance with every principle of justice; nay, with those principles which the French nation has so solemnly proclaimed. To suppose that Russia attacks the independence of the States of Europe, because she will not permit a person in her employment abroad to be appointed somewhere else at the will of the French government, were to confound all ideas and words; or because she claims another person, who is a naturalized Russian, and has just now been delivered up by another State, without any previous trial, and contrary to every appearance of justice.—Never did the Emperor protect conspirators; his noble and upright character is too well known to all Europe to require an elaborate contradiction of this assertion, as false as it is indecent. The French government itself is convinced of the contrary; it need only remember, that the Emperor has frequently declared, that if such an accusation were proved against any Russian in his employment, he would hasten to punish him most severely for a crime which he considers of a most heinous nature. But the Cabinet of St. Cloud returned no answer to this candid communication, nor did it furnish any proof to support its pretensions; it has then no

right to complain of its unsupported demands not being complied with. But at the present moment, when Portugal was obliged to purchase her neutrality; when Naples, to save her's, was compelled to contribute, at an enormous expense, to the maintenance of the French troops on her own territory; when all Italy, especially those republics that had been promised independence and happiness; when Switzerland and Holland were considered merely as French provinces; when one part of the German Empire is occupied, while in another part French detachments execute arrests in contempt of the sacred law of nations; at such a moment the Emperor will leave to all the States alleged, nay, to the impartial opinion of the Cabinet of St. Cloud itself, the decision of the question, which of the two, Russia or France, menaces the security of Europe? which of them acts on principles the most favourable to the independence of other states? which interferes most in the government and internal police of other countries, and practices the most arbitrary acts against them?—Although the sorrow which the Emperor felt at this alarming situation of affairs, was as notorious as the opinion he entertained of it, he nevertheless held himself bound to make his declaration as explicit as possible, that it might not with truth be said, that there was not a single government on the Continent which had the courage to raise its voice in the cause of justice; and that the Russian government might not be charged with having omitted to call the attention of its co-estates to the dreadful consequences which must necessarily ensue from a further neglect of order, and of those principles on which their well being and their security depend. It does not appear how it could be so easily proved in the present dispute; that Russia, by protesting against a manifest violation of the law of nations, committed beyond the limits of the French republic, on a neutral territory of the German Empire, by a guaranteeing and mediating power, has thereby interfered in the internal affairs of France, and to interfere in which the Emperor never had the most distant idea. Every state is indeed competent to outlaw a person within its own limits; but no state has a right arbitrarily to place any person out of the protection of the law of nations, because the latter does not depend upon the decrees of any single state, but is grounded upon the unanimous will of the commonwealth of sovereign states. Thus the French government could at most demand of the Princes of the German Empire, in conformity to the Treaty of Luneville, that the emigrants in

their states, who had not yet made the choice of a country, and against whom authentic proofs could be produced, should be removed; but the French government was by no means justified in the invasion of those states, sword in hand, to carry off such persons by main force.——It will hardly be credited, that the French cabinet could (to maintain its erroneous principle) deviate so far from every requisite decorum, and the regard due to truth, as to allege examples which were altogether improper to be mentioned; that it should, in an official document, recall even a father's death to the recollection of his illustrious son, in order to wound his tender feelings; and that it should (contrary to all truth and to all probability) raise an accusation against another government, whom France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it.——France has endeavoured, in vain, to justify herself by the most extraordinary surmises and suggestions, but they cannot alter the state of the present question, nor can they be made to justify with effect an arbitrary act, which annihilates the leading, and hitherto undisputed, principles of the law of nations. It is not, by any means, necessary to analyse the whole contents of the note from the Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to be convinced that it is evasive and unsatisfactory, if the object be considered, which the Emperor proposed, when he, in the course of last spring, caused the notes to be delivered at Paris and at Ratisbon; it is also evident, from the said French note, that the French government rather wished to increase the Emperor's just indignation, since its only object in that note is, in an indecent manner, to avoid the important question proposed, instead of offering a candid investigation of it.—The Emperor is, however, superior to the emotions of personal resentment. He has principally at heart the well-being and tranquillity of Europe: he, therefore, does not hesitate to make a last effort for the preservation, if possible, of a friendly intercourse with France. His Majesty's sole wish is, that peace may revive in Europe; that no person may assume any authority whatsoever over any other state; and that the French government do acknowledge an equality of rights for inferior states, but who are not less independent than France. Russia, it cannot be too often repeated, entertains not the least inclination for war, nor can she be benefited by it; her conduct will alone be influenced by the pressure of circumstances. She may, however, justly presume, that the French administration entertains such an opinion of the Russian government, as to be convinced

that the latter will not remain an idle or indifferent spectator of any new encroachments. His Majesty the Emperor of Russia is not himself influenced by fear, nor does he wish to direct its operations to the minds of others. It is his desire to preserve his former relations with France, but upon no other ground than that of perfect equality. The first condition is, that the terms mutually agreed upon shall be sacredly fulfilled, and on this condition only can the two states, after what has happened, enjoy their former relations of good will and amity.——The undersigned has been ordered to declare, that he cannot prolong his stay at Paris, unless the following demands are previously granted:——1. That, conformably to the 4th and 5th articles of the Secret Convention of the 11th of October, 1801, the French government shall order its troops to evacuate the kingdom of Naples; and when that is done, that it shall engage to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, during the present and any future war.——2. That, in conformity to the second article of the said Convention, the French government shall promise to establish immediately some principle of concert with his Imperial Majesty for regulating the basis upon which the affairs of Italy shall be finally adjusted.——3. That it shall engage, in conformity to the 6th article of the Convention aforesaid, and the promises so repeatedly given to Russia, to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. Lastly,——4. That in virtue of the obligation of a mutual guarantee and mediation, the French government shall promise immediately to evacuate and withdraw its troops from the North of Germany; and enter into an engagement to respect, in the strictest manner, the neutrality of the Germanic Body.——The undersigned has to add, that he has received orders from his government to demand a categorical answer to these four points, and avails himself of this opportunity, &c.

*Substance of the Note which the Emperor of the French directed to be returned in answer to M. d'Oubril's Note of July 21, 1804.*

After stating the astonishment of the Emperor of the French at the complaints of Russia, and the tone in which they are expressed, which is represented as being that of a conqueror dictating to a subject power, instead of the familiar tone which ought to be used between the two countries standing upon terms of intimacy, and treating upon a system of perfect equality. The note as

serts, "that France has a right to reproach Russia with having neglected to execute her engagements; with having interfered and changed the government of the Seven Islands, which was placed under the joint guarantee of France, Russia, and the Porte, without any concert or communication with France; with having sent large bodies of troops to Corfu, and having made an ostentatious preparation of sending additional numbers — That the Emperor of Russia has also given an open reception to the emigrants of every description, and had conferred on them public employments; and so far from expelling from his dominions the individuals of the Bourbon family and their head, had allowed them an asylum in the Russian territories, and had participated in their criminal projects; contrary to the wise example of his father at the time of his endeavouring to terminate the war, and to restore the tranquillity of Europe.—That Russia had also recently placed itself in a posture of direct defiance to France, by ordering a court mourning as a mark of respect to the memory of an agent in the pay of England, engaged in a criminal design to effect the ruin of France; that Russia had acted in this manner after this traitor to his country had been condemned by the just decision of a tribunal of the French government, and had been executed in pursuance of its sentence.—That these and many other examples of the ill-disposition of the Russian government, the whole of whose conduct towards France has undergone an unaccountable alteration; the glaring partiality which Russia uniformly manifested towards England, and the perfidious conduct and plots of M. Markoff, who had increased the differences between the two governments, and had engaged in all the wicked designs of the emigrants and disaffected persons in France. That these were the real causes which induced the Russian government to adopt that cold inexplicable conduct towards France which it had lately thought proper to evince upon every occasion.—That finally, if notwithstanding all the solicitude of the Emperor of the French to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the two countries, the Emperor of Russia should join his arms to those of England, the Emperor of the French would in that event rely on the skill and valour of his armies, and would maintain at every hazard the honour of France, and the lustre of the French name."

*Copy of the Note presented by M. d'Onubril, the Russian Charge d'Affaires, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.—Paris, August 28. 1804.*

The undersigned Charge d'Affaires of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, in answer to the note transmitted to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, feels it incumbent on him to confine himself to a recapitulation of that conduct which his August Master has constantly held towards the French government, the plain exposition of which will sufficiently demonstrate the nature of the reciprocity which he has in his turn experienced from that power.—From the moment that his Majesty ascended the Throne, he laboured with all his care to renew the good intelligence which had formerly prevailed between France and Russia. His Imperial Majesty, in anticipating the explanations which were to produce a solid and permanent understanding between the two countries, was happy in the persuasion, that he would by that means effectually contribute to the general pacification of Europe, the tranquillity of which had been too long disturbed by the events which occasioned the war that was terminated by the Treaty of Luneville. The readiness which his Majesty shewed to make peace with the French government, at the time it was at war with several other powers—the renewal of the former Treaty of Commerce, which was entirely to the advantage of France; the good offices of Russia in bringing about a reconciliation between the Republic and the Ottoman Porte, are all convincing proofs of the disposition of his Majesty, and of his wishes to neglect nothing on his part, which could tend to consolidate that connexion which he hoped might exist for ever.—Since that period, when, in consequence of the misfortunes which Germany experienced in the course of the war, and that many members of the Germanic Body were put under the necessity of submitting to make sacrifices, and that it became necessary to ascertain those sacrifices, for the purpose of settling the indemnities that were to compensate for their losses, the Emperor consented to become a joint mediator with the French government, in the cordial hope, that the act of mediation would seal the tranquillity of the Continent. The completion of this salutary work, allowed his Imperial Majesty to turn his attention to the engagements which France voluntarily entered into at the period of the conclusion of her peace with Russia. His Majesty, having scrupulously fulfilled those which he entered into with France, had a right to expect that the French government would also have shown itself anxious to equal his punctuality, and to perform its own obligations. However reasonable this expectation was, it has never been realised;

and the French government, so far from shewing any disposition to fulfil them, has taken no little pains, if the undersigned may use the expression, to retard their accomplishment.—The King of Sardinia, who has been wholly deprived of his possessions in Italy, by the union of Piedmont to France, has still to look for that indemnity which the Cabinet of the Thuilleries had solemnly pledged itself to Russia to allow him, and which the latter has continually demanded. —The King of Naples, who was freed for a short time, from the presence of a French army in his kingdom, beholds it again occupying his provinces, under a pretext, the nature of which is not known to his Imperial Majesty; and he is consequently placed out of the line of independent states. The representations of Russia, founded upon the solemn stipulation of France, to consider the kingdom of Naples as a neutral state, and to enjoy all the advantages of neutrality, have been productive of no determination favourable to that power.—The whole of Italy has been changed by the innovations which the government of the republic has caused it to undergo, since the conclusion of the peace between Russia and France, without any preliminary concert with his Imperial Majesty; although it had been agreed upon by the two powers at that period, that there should be an understanding between them as to the political arrangements that were to be adopted in that country.—Hostilities having been renewed between France and England, the integrity of the territory of the German Empire was violated, notwithstanding France had very lately engaged to protect it in common with his Majesty the Emperor. The Cabinet of St. Cloud thought proper to assert that the dignity of King of England, and that of Elector of Brunswick Lunenburgh, being united in the same person, were not distinct; though such distinction was never disputed by the republican government during the last years of the late war; it was, therefore, contrary to every notion of right and justice, to make war upon a country which, by the constitution of the Germanic Empire, of which it was part, and the public proceedings by which it was guaranteed, should be totally exempt from such a visitation.—The possession of Cuxhaven, which under no pretext could have been considered as English property, was notwithstanding effected by the French troops, and the Hans Towns have been compelled to make forced loans to avoid a similar fate. The repeated and urgent applications which the Emperor has made to the French government, to induce it to fulfil its engagements with Russia,

and to put an end to all apprehension that the neutral powers, who were anxious to remain in peace, may feel of being involved in the war, have been attended with no effect. —To those numerous causes of dissatisfaction, connected with the higher interests of Europe, the government of France has thought proper to add all those which it could directly offer to the Court of Russia, by the offensive assertions which it advanced and circulated against ministers honoured with the confidence of his Imperial Majesty; by the scenes which the Russian Envoy was compelled to witness at the Thuilleries; by the improper perseverance which the Cabinet of St. Cloud displayed, in persecuting, in foreign countries, persons who were employed by the Court of Russia; and, lastly, by that unexampled proceeding which it took the liberty of committing, when it compelled the Pope to deliver up a naturalized Russian, without paying any regard to the representations and claims of his Imperial Majesty on that point.—The recent act of violence, committed by the French troops in the territory of the Elector of Baden, having roused the anxiety of the Emperor, for the security and independence of the States of Europe, which are within the reach of France, his Majesty expressed his opinion as to the necessity of tranquillizing them on that point; and that he should make such satisfaction as the Empire had a right to demand, and adopt such measures as might tend to calm the uneasiness and alarm of Europe. To this good office, the Empire received an answer, which left it no hopes that the just expectation of his Majesty would be fulfilled; which gave a wrong interpretation to that frank, loyal, and disinterested conduct, which his Majesty constantly held respecting the affairs of Europe, and particularly with regard to France: and which made it but too clear, that there was a determined design to thwart and irritate further the Court of Russia.—So little attention and condescension on the part of the French government, to the just claims of his Majesty, and a conduct so decidedly opposed to any desire of preserving a good understanding between the two states, sufficiently demonstrated to Russia, that if, on the one hand, the French government attached apparently but little value to its relations with her, and consequently furnished her with a positive reason for no longer continuing them; on the other, she had taken an invariable resolution to adopt for her conduct, a line absolutely contrary to the principles of justice and the laws of nations, and which, consequently, could not harmonize with the sentiments and principles professed

by his Majesty.—The Emperor, nevertheless, was willing to make a final effort with the French government, and after so many reasons of dissatisfaction, he was disposed to forget them whenever the above mentioned engagements (which were also detailed in the note of the 21st of August) should be fulfilled; which had been solemnly entered into by the two governments, and should have long since been executed. This last effort having been followed by an evasive and unsatisfactory answer, full of fallacious imputations, and which is only remarkable for the strange and unexpected assertion, 'That the Russian troops had taken possession of the Republic of the Seven Islands, without the concurrence of France; while it is notorious, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs must have it in view, that this country, which had been first evacuated by the Russian troops, was occupied by those drawn from the State of Naples, with the consent of the Porte, by the request of the inhabitants, and in consequence of a previous arrangement with France; nothing further remains for the undersigned, than to declare, that all correspondence between Russia and France, becoming, by these means perfectly useless, must now cease; and that his Majesty the Emperor only waits for intelligence of the departure of his Charge d'Affaires from Paris, to signify to the French Mission, that it should quit his capital.—His Majesty the Emperor having nothing to reproach himself with on this head (for it had depended on him, the ties between the two nations, far from being dissolved, would be drawn closer), sees himself with regret compelled to suspend all relation with a government which refuses to fulfil its engagements, which will not conform to the reciprocal respect nations owe to each other, and in regard to which his Majesty, since the renewal of the connexion between the two countries, has experienced increasing mortification. Still faithful to his principles, and anxious to avoid the shedding of human blood, the Emperor will confine himself to that resolution which the respective positions of the two countries admits. Russia and France can do without those relations, the continuance of which is only to be warranted by reasons of advantage and accommodation, and without which it is better that they should have no connexion. As it is the French government alone which has given rise to the present state of affairs, it will also depend upon it to decide whether war is to follow or not. In case it shall compel Russia, either by fresh injuries, or by provocations aimed against her, or against her allies, or by still threatening

more seriously the security and independence of Europe, his Majesty will then manifest as much energy in employing those extreme measures, which a just defence requires, as he has given proofs of patience, in resorting to the use of all the means of moderation consistent with the maintenance of the honour and dignity of his Crown.—The undersigned having thus fulfilled the orders which he has received from his Court, requests, in consequence, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be kind enough to send him, without delay, the necessary passports to enable him to quit France; and he embraces this opportunity of giving to the Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs, the assurance of his high consideration.

SIR GEORGE RUMBOLD.—*Note of his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to be laid before the Ministers of the King of Prussia by the English Minister at that court.—Dated, Downing-street, 5th Nov. 1804.*

His Majesty has received the account of an unexampled act of violence committed at Hamburgh against the person of Sir George Rumbold, his minister at that place, who was forcibly seized in his own house in the night of the 25th of October, by a detachment of French soldiers, and carried off, together with the papers belonging to his mission.—After the repeated proofs which the conduct of the French government has exhibited of an utter contempt and defiance of every obligation of the law of nations, his Britannic Majesty can feel no surprise at the perpetration even of such an outrage as this, upon the territory of a weak and defenceless state; but his Majesty owes it, not only to himself and to the respectable and unfortunate city whose rights are most immediately attacked, but to his relations with the rest of Europe, and to the dignity of every power which has still the inclination and the means of preserving its independence, to lose no time in entering his solemn protest against so atrocious an aggression.—If any thing could render such a proceeding more insulting and alarming, it would be the explanation which his Majesty understands to have been given off by the French resident at Hamburgh: namely, that it took place in consequence of orders given by the minister or police at Paris to the commander of the French forces in Hanover.—His Majesty trusts, that there will not be found a power upon the continent which can remain insensible to the consequences of a measure which, in its principle and example, not only menaces every court which may at any time fall within the

reach of French arms, but which is subversive at once of the sacred rights of neutral territory, of the accustomed intercourse between independent states, and of the privileges of public ministers, hitherto respected and recognised by every age and by every nation.—His Prussian Majesty unquestionably will not only participate in the sentiments which must be common to every sovereign, but the vicinity of his dominions, and his situation, both as a director of the circle of Lower Saxony, and as guarantee of the Germanic constitution, will induce him to feel a deep and peculiar interest in this unparalleled transaction. His Majesty cannot therefore allow himself to entertain a moment's doubt, that his Prussian Majesty will second and enforce, in the most effectual manner, the representations which have been made by the senate of Hamburg for the immediate release of his Majesty's minister, and will further see the urgent necessity of taking such measures as may be best calculated to obtain from the French government a public reparation, adequate to the heinous nature of the indignity, and may also prevent, for the future, the repetition of outrages which threaten to destroy the remaining distinctions of civilized Europe.

**MR. DRAKE AND MEHÉE.**—*Answers to the Circular Letter of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Ministers resident at Paris, relative to the Arrest of the Duke d'Enghien.* Concluded from Vol. V. p. 606.

*Answer of the Minister of the Ligurian Republic.*—CITIZEN MINISTER, The communication, which by order of the First Consul, you have done me the honour to make me of the letters and authentic papers of the correspondence in France of Mr. Drake, his Britannic Majesty's minister at the court of Munich, has caused so great an astonishment, that I have hardly recovered from it.—I trust, without such convincing proofs, it was hardly possible to conceive that a person representing at a respectable court his sovereign, could debase the most honourable functions with which a man can be invested, in making them the instruments of fomenting and organizing secret and perfidious plots, which tended to nothing less, than to overturn, if possible, the republic, to replunge France into all the horrors of internal divisions, and to overwhelm Europe with those misfortunes which would inevitably have succeeded this fatal revolution in France.—Every man to whom, by his govt. is confided to the honour of representing it at foreign courts, ought to be, as well as my-

self, justly irritated by the proceedings of Mr. Drake, and to denounce him to Europe, as unworthy of being counted among the number of those persons called by their govt. to exercise the sacred functions of diplomacy.—This sentiment ought to be general, especially among the distinguished members of the diplomatic corps, who have the honour of being accredited near the First Consul, to whom, I pray you, citizen minister, to submit the particular expression of the profound grief which I have felt, from the communication which you have deigned to make me in his name.—My govt. to whom I have transmitted your letter, with the report of the Grand Judge, and the annexed papers, will take, I doubt not, a lively interest in this event, and will always be watchful in case the enemies of France and its allies should ever attempt to disseminate in Liguria, criminal insinuations, they may produce no other effect, than to cover with shame the perfidious men who shall dare to spread them.—Signed FERRETI, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Envoy of the Republic of Lucca.*—I have had the honour of receiving the letter which your exc. addressed me, under the date of 3 Germinal, and the copy of the report presented by the Grand Judge to the First Consul, on the conspiracy that Mr. Drake, his Britannic Majesty's minister at the court of Munich, has formed against the Fr. republic.—It certainly will inspire great regret in all the members of the diplomatic corps; to see prostituted in so high a degree, the most sacred and honourable character; the plots of Mr. D. should excite the indignation of all those governments which desire the tranquillity of Europe.—The govt. of Lucca, which has never ceased to wish the prosperity of France, and the happiness of the First Consul, and which felt the greatest horror on hearing of the attempts against the life of the First Consul, will learn with still greater affliction, the new machinations which in endangering the safety of the Fr. repub. would have deprived the republic of Italy, of the peace and happiness which she enjoyed under its auspices.—I hasten consequently to entreat your exc. to present to the First Consul, in the name of my govt., the most sincere congratulations, on the fortunate discovery of this plot, which will have no other effect than to cover with dishonour, its agents and its authors.—Signed J. BELLUONI, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Envoy of the Swiss Confederacy.*—The undersigned envoy extr. of the Swiss confederacy near the First Consul,

has received with gratitude the communication, which by order of the First Consul, his exc. the minister of foreign relations, has addressed to him the 3d Germinal.—He hastens to transmit to the Landamman of the Swiss, who as well as all the Swiss will learn with deep regret this new conspiracy against the gracious ally.—The undersigned, highly flattered by the expressions contained in the letter with which his exc. the minister of foreign relations has been pleased to honour him, entreats his exc. to renew to the First Consul the homage of his profound respect and the expedition of his sincere wishes for the preservation of his precious life.—Signed C. DE MAILLARDOZ, and dated March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Portuguese Minister.*—

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me of the 3d Germinal, with a copy of the report presented by the Grand Judge, to which are annexed copies of the papers and letters of Mr. Drake, his Britannic Majesty's Minister at the court of Munich. I thank your Exc. for this communication, and I shall hasten to transmit it to my Court. You render justice, Citizen Minister, to my sentiments, in believing the profound grief that I feel by the profanation of the sacred character of an Ambassador.—(Signed) J. M. DE SOUZA, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Legate of the Sovereign Pontiff.*—

SRR,—I have received with the letter of your Exc. of the 3d Germinal, a copy of the report of the Chief Judge, relative to the correspondence of Mr. Drake, Minister of his Britannic Majesty at the Court of Bavaria, with a list of those who have conspired in the interior of France against the Govt. The tender attachment of his Holiness for the person of the First Consul, the respect which I know he entertains for him, in consideration of the important services he has rendered to religion, and the special protection he has extended to the church, the gratitude which, not only French Catholics, but likewise those of neighbouring countries, owe him, have excited in me the most lively sorrow when I learned that his life was in danger, and the public tranquillity had been so near being disturbed. I was then very far from thinking that any of the Diplomatic Agents could be implicated in this conspiracy; the public and sacred character with which they are clothed, sheltered them from such a suspicion. I perceive with great regret, by the correspondence which your Exc. has transmitted to me, that one of these Agents

has permitted himself to address to the enemies of the French Govt. in the interior, instructions, means, and plans. I am persuaded that his Holiness will feel as sensibly as myself this melancholy intelligence. Deign to assure the First Consul that the Pontiff has viewed, and will always continue to view, with horror, whatever shall tend to disturb the interior peace of his Govt., on which rests the entire edifice for the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in France. Every attempt against his precious life will be viewed by his Holiness as a crime as atrocious in itself as it is fatal to the church and to the repose and tranquillity of France. I have no doubt but that the diplomatic corps of Europe will participate with me in these sentiments, and that they will openly disavow whosoever, among the members that compose it, shall abuse his character, to propagate discord, and foment disturbances.—Signed J. B. CARDINAL CAPRARA, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Minister of Saxony.*—

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I have received the note which your Exc. did me the honour to address to me, of the date of 3d Germinal, with a copy of the report which has been presented to the First Consul by the Grand Judge on the conspiracy formed by Mr. Drake, Minister of his Britannic Majesty at the Court of Munich; also the printed copies of letters and other authentic papers of the said Mr. Drake, and I have hastened to transmit the whole to my Court. There is no one, Citizen Minister, who will not learn with grief that Mr. Drake, invested with the most honourable public character, should descend to such a profanation of it.—Signed CR. DE BUNAU, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Minister of the Arch Chancellor of the German Empire.*—

CITIZEN MINISTER,—The undersigned Minister Plenip. of his Highness the Elector and Arch Chancellor of the Germanic Empire, having received with respectful acknowledgment the letter which your Exc. had been pleased to address to him, of the date of the 3d inst. in which is enclosed a copy of the report presented to the First Consul on the conspiracy formed in France by Mr. Drake, Minister of his Britannic Majesty at the Court of Munich, he has hastened to send the above pieces to his Highness the Elector. The more necessary fidelity, honour, and probity are in the actions of a man to whom has been entrusted the honourable function of diplomacy, the deeper is the sorrow which must be felt at the con-

temptation of this perfidious plot.—The unbounded sentiments of attachment, and the high consideration which the Elector and Arch Chancellor has expressed for the First Consul, are so well known, that the indignation which he will feel at this news, may be easily conceived.—The undersigned, who by the express order of his Highness the Elector, his master, has already had the honour of expressing these sentiments himself at the last diplomatic audience, begs of your Exc. to repeat to the First Consul an assurance of the warm interest in, and sincere wishes for, his preservation entertained by his Highness the Elector.—Signed CHARLES COMTE DE BOEUST, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Neapolitan Minister.*—SIR, I have just received the communication which your exc. had been pleased to make to me of the report of the grand judge to the First Consul, and the annexed papers, on a conspiracy directed against France.—The justice which the First Consul rendered to the sentiments of the diplomatic corps who have the honour of being accredited by him, excites the gratitude and corresponds fully with the sensations of profound sorrow with which it has beheld the sanctity and dignity of a public character profaned, whose functions are consecrated by honour and fidelity.—I cannot conceal from your exc. the extreme pain with which I read the papers which contain this communication, and which I have made it my duty to transmit immediately to my court. The sentiments of his majesty, the king my master, for the person of the First Consul and for the interior tranquillity of a respected nation, whose situation has such influence in surrounding nations, are too well known to the First Consul to render it necessary for me to remind your exc. of them on this occasion.—Signed, DE GALLO, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Minister of the free cities of the German Empire.*—CITIZEN MINISTER, I have just received the letter which your exc. did me the honour to address to me, together with the printed letter and authentic papers of Mr. Drake, minister of his Britannic Majesty at Munich, relative to a conspiracy planned under his direction.—The impression which a knowledge of these details must make upon every man who respects the rights of nations and the general interests of humanity, cannot but be of the most painful nature. Such at least will be the feelings of the magistrates of the free towns of the empire. This sentiment will be the stronger, as the conspi-

racy was principally directed against the person of the First Consul, whom all the inhabitants of the free towns of the empire regard as the generous protector, who has preserved their independence, and for whom they feel the highest veneration and the most perfect attachment.—The discovery of this plot has nowhere produced so strong and general a sensation of sorrow as among the inhabitants of these towns. The letters which I received on their hearing the news of this conspiracy discovered, how great was the consternation among all classes of the citizens, and subsequent ones testify the general felicity on hearing that this plot has been completely crushed.—Signed, ABEL.

*Answer of the Minister of the Langrave of Hesse Darmstadt.*—CITIZEN MINISTER, I have hastened to transmit to my court the letter with which your exc. has honoured me, and a copy of the report of the grand judge with the printed letters, authentic papers of the minister of his Britannic Majesty at Munich.—Every honest man must be deeply afflicted on discovering that Mr. Drake has so far forgotten what he owed to the dignity of his public character and to himself, as to become the author of the vile conspiracy against the Fr. Repub. and its august chief.—I am persuaded that the opinion of the First Consul relative to the diplomatic corps will be fully justified by each of its members, and I hope in regard to myself that, after a residence of many years, the respectful attachment which I have always entertained for the person of the First Consul is so well known to your exc., that you need no assurances to be convinced of the sentiments of indignation and horror with which the dishonourable conduct of Mr. Drake has inspired me.—Signed, AUGUSTUS DE PAPPENHEIM, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.

*Answer of the Batavian Minister.*—CITIZEN MINISTER, The ambassador, who while at London, saw the vessels of his nation, brought into English ports, during the time of peace, had reason to expect that a war preceded by such a flagrant violation to the common principles of justice, and of the rights of nations, would be carried on with little delicacy as to the choice of means. It is with governments, as with individuals, when once the barriers of justice have been broken down, power is the only guide, and neither know where to stop their career. Although the history of every nation attested this melancholy truth, it was still difficult to conceive the possibility of an event, such as is detailed in the

communication of your excellency, and it has been reserved for the present age to furnish so fatal and daring an attempt.—If the facts developed in this correspondence inspire the deepest affliction in the breast of every individual capable of calculating the fatal consequences arising from the abuse of one of the most sacred and respectable of characters, how poignant must be the sensations of one who is invested with this character, and who has endeavoured, by an adherence to his own duties, to acquire a right to that respect, protection, and inviolability, which the laws of nations assure him.—The Batavian ambassador, the minister of a nation renowned in all ages for its justice and incorruptibility, to whom loyalty has become habitual, and which observes a religious respect for the laws of nations, must in the present case, feel a double portion of the general indignation.—Signed, SCHIMMELPENNINGK, and dated Paris, March 26, 1804.


*Answer of the Minister of the Grand Master of Malta.*—SIR,—I hasten to inform your exc. that I have received your letter of the 31 Germinal, with a copy of the report of the grand judge, relative to the conspiracy designed by Mr. Drake, his Britannic Majesty's minister at the court of Munich. I shall immediately transmit the communication to his highness the grand master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem: his attachment, his profound devotion, as well as that of the order over which he presides, to the interests of France, and the august person of the First Consul, are such, that he will feel the greatest horror and indignation when he hears of this odious plot.—Signed, The BAILIFF of FERRERS, and dated Paris, March 28, 1804.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

**JEROME BUONAPARTE.**—(See the former Letter in p. 695.) *Letter from DAURES, French Minister of the Marine to Jerome Buonaparte, dated Paris, 18th April, 1804.*

I have just been fulfilling, my dear Jerome, a rigorous duty imposed upon me by the First Consul; that of forbidding the Citizen Pichon to supply you with money, and prescribing to him to prohibit all the captains of French vessels from receiving on board the young person to whom you have attached yourself; it being the intention of the First Consul that she shall on no pretext whatever come into France, and should she happen to present herself, that she shall not be received; but, being re-embarked for the United States without delay.—Such, my dear Jerome, are the orders which I have

been obliged literally to transmit, and which have been given me, and repeated after the interval of a month, with such a solemn severity, as neither allowed me to withhold them altogether, nor to soften them in the slightest degree.—After the discharge of this severe duty, I cannot, my dear Jerome, deny myself the pleasure of lengthening my letter in a way which the attachment I feel to you will warrant, and our military association entitles me to. If I loved you less; if the sentiments with which you have inspired me, did not so perfectly accord with those which I owe to your family; if there were not between you and me a sort of companionship in arms, and of intimacy which I delight in keeping up—I should confine myself to the dispatching of the orders which I have received, and to an accurate official correspondence, the result of which would give me very little uneasiness.—Instead of this, I am going to chat with you at a great rate, and without knowing beforehand what I am about to say; of one thing I am certain, I shall tell you nothing of which I am not well persuaded.—War is carrying on, and you are quiet and peaceable at 1,200 leagues from the theatre on which you ought to act a great part. If, unfortunately, you come not back in the first French frigate which returns to Europe, and I have already given you that order by ———, an order which I repeat to you by the Consul's command in the most formal manner: if, I say, you shall not return to France till after the peace, what dignity will accompany your return? How will men recognize in you the brother of the Regulator of Europe? In what temper of mind will you find that brother, who, eager after glory, will see you destitute even of that of having encountered dangers, and who, convinced that all France would shed its blood for him, would only see in you a man without energy, yielding to dissipated passions, and having not a single leaf to add to the heap of laurels with which he invests his name and our standards!—O Jerome, this idea alone should determine you to return with all expedition amongst us; the sound of arms is heard in every quarter, and of the preparations for the noblest enterprize. You are inquired for, and I—vexed that I should be at a loss what answer to give to those who ask where you are, declare that you are just at hand. Give me not the lie, I beseech you.—Your brother Joseph, father of a family that he adores, possessed of a fortune proportioned to his rank, invested with the highest civil honours of the state, known throughout Europe for his sagacity and his



diplomatic labours, wishes to add to so much glory that of sharing with the Consul the dangers of war, and has just got one of the regiments that are about to embark—Louis, known by his military services, a general of division, is desirous of adding to that glory, that of displaying talents for civil arrangements; he has just entered into the Council of State; the Section of Legislation.—Lucien, it is true, has just quitted France, and has exiled himself to Rome, in consequence of a marriage repugnant to the views of the First Consul; but Lucien is known by the services he has rendered, by his genius, by his talents, by the dignity of a senator. He is possessed of a great and independent fortune; and yet the connexions (disavowed by his brother) which he has contracted have been found incompatible with his abode in France.—What has taken place in your family, points out to you sufficiently what the First Consul expects of you, and his inflexibility concerning what you shall do in opposition to his views. Sole architect of the glory of which he has attained the summit, he acknowledges no family but the French people; and in proportion as he exalts his brothers who press around him, so have I seen him shew coldness and even aversion to those of his own blood who push not forward in the career which his genius traces out for them. Whatever is foreign to the accomplishment of his great designs seems to him treason against his high destiny; and believe me, for I know your brother better than you know him yourself, if you should persist in keeping yourself at a distance from him, he would get angry at it at first, and would conclude by entirely forgetting you; and heaven knows what regrets your obscurity would lay up in store for you. Scarce can a more brilliant career be opened to a man of your age; shut it not up yourself. The union which you have formed has deeply affected him. “Whilst I (thought he), am doing every thing for glory, for that of my name, and for the happiness of the people that have put their fate into my hands, by whom may I hope to be seconded if not by my brothers? And yet the youngest among them forms an inconsiderate connexion, on which he has not even asked my opinion; he has disposed of himself as a private individual; it is, therefore, as a private individual he wishes me to consider him. What claim does he earn to my benefactions? None; for instead of being useful to me, he takes the rout diametrically opposite to that which I wished him to follow.” In vain, availing myself of the freedom which the First Consul permits in

domestic privacy, did I wish to make the voice of natural affection be heard; I became sensible, from his conversation, that he neither felt nor was liable to feel any pliancy of that kind.—“I will receive Jerome, if, leaving in America the young person in question, he shall come hither to associate himself to my fortune; should he bring her along with him, she shall not put a foot on the territory of France; and you must answer to me for this by the order, which you are bound to give to prevent her landing. If he comes alone, I shall never recall the error of a moment, and the fault of youth. Faithful services, and the conduct which he owes to himself and to his name, will regain all my kindness.”—Such, my dear Jerome, are nearly the words of the First Consul. Bethink yourself, my friend, that he is only your brother, and that as I have already told you, a brother feels not the yielding condescension of a father, who identifies himself, in some measure, with his son; consider that you have as yet done nothing for him, and that in order to obtain the advantages attached to the honour of being connected with him, you have not a moment to lose for deserving them. For it is his character, that merit and services rendered, or to be rendered, are the only things on which he sets a real and solid value.—In truth, I am frightened at the regrets you are preparing for yourself, and the person with whom you have connected yourself. Should you go the length of opposing the views of your brother, your passions will pass away, and you will reproach yourself with the injury which you will have done yourself; perhaps you will accuse, even involuntarily, the young person who will have been the occasion of it. Listen to reason, and she will tell you, that at any rate you have committed the fault of failing in respect for your brother, and for a brother fed for a length of time, with the love and veneration of all France, and with the respect of Europe. You will be sensible how happy it is for you that you are able, by returning to France, to obtain the pardon of this fault; that it would be inconsistent with your personal dignity to carry thither a woman who would be exposed to the mortification of not being received. I know not whether you can hope to overcome your brother's unfavourable disposition towards her, and to deal frankly with you, I see no probability of such a thing; but if there be any means of obtaining it, it must be by your presence, by your compliance with his views, by proofs of your devoted attachment to him; that you can bring it about. You are so young, that

if you unhappily let slip the opportunity of placing yourself about the Consul, you will have many years for regret to steal upon you. The obscurity to which you would thus condemn yourself would be long; and long and bitter the comparison between the lot you had chosen for yourself, and that which once awaited you. Without distinction, fame, or even fortune, how could you bear the weight of the name with which you are honoured? To you, a stranger to the glory attached to it, it would become an insupportable burthen. I repeat it for the last time, my dear Jerome, come hither, come hither by the first French frigate which shall sail from the United States, and you will meet with such a reception as you could desire; but I regret that you know not the Consul sufficiently, because you would then be persuaded that you cannot regain his good will but by this expedient, and this good will is essential to your happiness and your glory. I conclude with the expression of the most sincere attachment which I shall never cease to retain—happy if I have been able to influence your determination in the way I could wish—more happy still, if my letter was unnecessary for that purpose. A thousand kind wishes —(Signed) D. CRES.

DISPUTES IN THE GOVT. OF WIRTEMBERG—*Answer of the Superior College to the Letter of the Prince of Wirtemberg.* (See the Letter, p. 644).

We have no other duties to fulfil towards your Highness, than the respect which is due to the son of our Sovereign and a member of the Electoral House; consequently your Highness will yourself be convinced, that we have no inclination to receive but from his Highness the Elector. We have no occasion to justify the measures, which our sovereign, at our request, has taken against the usurpations of the Provincial States; on the contrary, we are persuaded that, if Providence should permit, we shall contrast you with the government of the Electoral States; contemplating, as we shall be obliged from all foreign nations, the services of the sovereign in all his affairs, and we will applaud the perseverance of our sovereign, you will acknowledge the wisdom of his views, and you will owe to yourself an obligation for having in the present circumstance, suggested not only the name of the Electoral House, but further maintained his right in the interior, &c. I neither could give answer to your declaration relative to the debts; for it is as offensive from the mouth of a son, as it is little adapted to a case, of which a more profound

knowledge would have prevented you from making mention. As men of honour, we find ourselves under the necessity of telling you, with the permission of Monsigneur your father, that no one has the right to make use of offensive and misplaced expressions towards us, from which we pray you to dispense us for the future. We think it our duty to conjure you, as the first servants of a state to which you belong to conjure you, we say, by all that is sacred in heaven, and on earth, by the duties of a son to his father, not to aggravate the unfortunate consequences of the relations in which you are placed with Monsigneur, your father; banish from your heart and from your conduct every thing that can complete the destruction of the ties consecrated by nature and by Providence, the effect of which would be irreparably to destroy your internal tranquillity: invoke the forgiveness of your father, whose heart you have lacerated afresh, and endeavour to obtain an oblivion of the past, and act in such a manner that, if God should sooner dispose of the life of our revered sovereign than your own, every good Wirtemberger may esteem in you a successor worthy of his father.

*Receipt of his Electoral Highness, dated 22d September, 1804.*

For a long time, our paternal care for the well being of our dear and faithful subjects has been directed toward the administration of the revenues and contributions deposited in the provincial treasury.—This administration is confided, according to the hereditary establishment, to a secret committee of the states; and we could have wished that a regular management had prevented us from interfering with severe measures. But for several years the presumption of a bad administration is manifest. When we thought proper to dissolve the last diet, which unintentionally participated in an act injuring one of the bases of the constitution, (this is to be understood of the sums sent to Paris to the Electoral Prince), we nominated a commission to examine the administration of the Provincial Treasury. But the faction which has till now ruled the assembly of the Provincial States, as well as its committees, and which has always thwarted our views and projects, still opposed this measure. Although we had invited the general committee, as well as the diet, to appoint deputies to be present at examining the administration of the secret committee, these committees, influenced by the aforesaid faction, refused it; and the secret committee sufficiently shewed that their intention was no other than to covey

their management with an impenetrable veil, and to withdraw themselves entirely from our superintendence. In order to put an end to dissipation of the funds of the states, we have maturely weighed and considered the advice of our superior colleges, and have decreed, that our extraordinary commission shall proceed against the members of the secret committee of the states, who ought to be regarded as the authors and abettors of the opposition against the sovereign, and who have participated in the illegal act concerning the funds of the country; that in consequence these members of the secret committee, as well as the principal functionaries attached to the Provincial Treasury, shall be suspended from their functions; that the administration of the Public Treasury shall be entrusted provisionally to the remaining members of the secret committee, not implicated in the proceeding, as well as to the members of the general committee.

**ROMISH CHURCH IN RUSSIA.**—*Order, addressed by the Emperor of Russia, on the 21st of August, to the Metropolitan of the Church of Rome, in Russia.*

M. the Metropolitan of the church of Rome in Russia. As we have thought proper to suspend all communication with the Pontifical State, as long as the circumstances which have induced us to adopt that measure shall exist, we order you, in your quality of Metropolitan Bishop of the church of Rome, in our empire, to continue to exercise the right, privileges, and powers, conferred on you by Pope Pius VI. in order that our subjects, whether ecclesiastics or laics, may receive all the spiritual aid of which they stand in need. Your tried zeal for our service is a sure pledge that, by a prudent use of the power with which you are entrusted, all the Roman Catholic churches, which are under your inspection, will remain in proper order and tranquillity.

**SPAIN AND AMERICA.**—Mr. Nathan Kemper, with a party of about 30 men, colours flying and horns sounding, marched from the neighbourhood of the line of demarcation, between this territory and West Florida, on the 7th instant, against the fort of Baton Rouge. On their way they made prisoners John O'Conner, Esq. (our Alcade), and Captains Pindod and Terry. They arrived on the following morning, about day light, near the fort. The Spanish Commandant, apprised of their intention, had posted a picket of eighteen or twenty men, who hailed the party as they approached. They immediately answered by a volley from their

rifles, which dispersed the Spaniards, two of whom were observed to fall. Kemper returned the following day with his party, to the Bayau Sarah; he has established his head quarters near the house of Mr. William Cobb. The following is an exact copy of a paper which is posted up at the quarters of Kemper, and at several other places through the country:—"For a people to be free it is sufficient they will it. We, the undersigned, citizens of West Florida, send these presents greeting: Whereas the despotism under which we have long groaned has grown to such a burthen, and it is so long since admitted that men are born with equal rights, we the undersigned, inhabitants of that part of the dominion called West Florida, have resolved to throw off the galling yoke of tyranny, and become free men, by declaring ourselves a free and independent people, and by supporting with our lives and property that declaration; and we do, by these presents, invite our fellow sufferers, through the province aforesaid, to repair to the standard, to aid in the effecting our common emancipation. We pledge ourselves solemnly to each other, and to our fellow men interested in the event, to avoid, as far as practicable, the effusion of blood (save that of our common enemy) and in all cases shall private property be held sacred. So soon as our emancipation shall be effected, we will offer ourselves to some government accustomed to freedom. Those who set up in opposition to our operations, for the purpose aforesaid, will be deemed our common enemy, the enemy of mankind, and of liberty, and will be treated accordingly.—Given under our hands, on the South-side of the line of Demarcation, in the province aforesaid, this first day of Floridan Freedom, August 7, 1804.

*Narrative of Transactions between the Spanish Minister in the United States of America, Mr. Jackson, the Editor of a Newspaper in Philadelphia, and Mr. Jefferson, President of the United States. Published at Philadelphia Sep. 20. 1804.*

In the discharge of an important, and to myself, an indispensable duty, the subjoined statement was communicated, in the first instance, to the government. In a respectful solicitude for the rights of our country, the deposition and letters are now made public.

W. JACKSON,  
On Thursday, 16th Sept. 1804, a note, of which the following is a transcript, was left at my office: "The Marquis de Casa Yrejo

"presents his compliments to Major Jackson, and would be very happy to know from him when and where he could have the pleasure to see him in the course of this day.—Thursday, 6th."—Never having before received any communication from Mr. Yrujo—never having even exchanged one word of conversation with him in my life, I was not a little surprised at receiving this message, which I answered by a note to the following purport: "Major Jackson presents his compliments to the Marquis de Casa Yrujo; and in reply to his note of this morning, Major Jackson will be at his office till two o'clock, and at his house in Chesnut-street, until four, at either of which places he will see the Marquis de Casa Yrujo; or if more convenient he will wait on him."—To this note I received a verbal answer, that the Marquis de Casa Yrujo would be glad to see me at the Marquis's house at five o'clock. I went at five o'clock to Mr. Yrujo's house, and on entering the room, was accosted by him in nearly the following words:—"You will not be surprised, Major Jackson, at the liberty I have taken in sending to you, but I trust an explanation of the motive will excuse me. I consider you, Sir, as a gentleman, a man of letters, and a man of honour. By a political intolerance you have been forced to adopt a profession different from what you have heretofore pursued, but it is one in which you are qualified to be very useful. I observe, by certain opinions expressed in your paper, that you consider the present administration (for I will not call them government) as disinclined to go to war with Spain. In this, however, you are mistaken; the reverse is the fact; and they (the administration) only wish the federal papers to utter those opinions that they may have an argument of that sort for indulging their wish to go to war with my country, which would certainly be very injurious to your's. For if the King, my master, was to order three ships of the line and six frigates to the Mississippi, three ships of the line and six frigates to the Chesapeake, and three ships of the line and six frigates to Sandy Hook, what would you do? But you have it in your power to do much good, by espousing the part of peace, which is so necessary to both nations; and if you will consent to take elucidations on the subject from me, I will furnish them, and I will make you any acknowledgment."—Perceiving at this moment his infamous purpose, I, with difficulty, stifled the emotions which it ex-

cited, and restrained my indignation. He went on to examine in detail the several points in dispute between Spain and the United States; and, as I wished to learn his opinions respecting them, I suffered him to proceed. Among other things, he said, that if Mr. Pinckney had acted by instructions from the administration, or if his conduct should be approved by them, war was inevitable. But he had no doubt war was the wish of our administration; for he had received a letter from New Orleans, dated the 25th of April last, which stated, that there was a letter at that place in Mr. Jefferson's hand-writing, dated in March last, which declared that if the settlers between the Mississippi and the Rio Perdido would raise the American colours, they would be supported. He continued his observations, and pressed me to give him an answer; assuring me that this was no diplomatic management, but an *épanchement* (unbosoming) of himself to me as a man of honour; and he trusted I would so consider it. I then quitted the room. He accompanied me to the street door, and again asked me when I would give him an answer. With difficulty I suppressed the indignation of my feelings, and left the house.

W. JACKSON.

"Sworn before me the 7th of September, 1804, that the contents of the within statement are just and true.—(Signed) EDWARD SHIPPEN, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

*Philadelphia, Sep. 7, 1804.*

"SIR,—Considerations paramount to all others, the love of my country, and a sense of personal honour, which no change of fortune or circumstances can efface or diminish, have decided me on the present occasion to address you.—The accompanying document refers to the most interesting objects that can engage my attention, and for the moment those objects banish every other remembrance.—Mr. Yrujo's official character precludes the only reparation I would consent to receive for this attempt against honour. It is for you, Sir, to determine what satisfaction is due to our country and its government.—I shall wait the time necessary to learn your decision before I give further publicity to the transaction. I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, W. JACKSON."

*Thomas Jefferson, Esq. President  
of the United States.*

*Monticello, Sep. 15.*

"SIR,—I have received yours of the 7th instant, and shall use its contents in

"due time and place, for the benefit of our country. As you seem sufficiently apprized that the persons of the Marquis Yrujo, is under the safeguard of the nation, and secured by its honour against all violation, I need add nothing on that head; on another, however, I may be permitted to add, that if the information respecting a letter said to have been written by me was meant as a sample of the communications proposed to be given to you, their loss will not be great; no such letter was ever written by me, by my authority, or with my privacy. With my acknowledgments for this communication, I tender you my salutations.

"Major Jackson. T. JEFFERSON."

**REGULATIONS OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, relative to Foreigners travelling in that Country.—Dated Glückstadt, September 13, 1804.**

As his Royal Majesty, our most gracious Lord the King of Denmark and Norway, &c. &c. has from the circumstances of the times, found it necessary to publish several ordonnances and regulations, which must be observed by all travellers in the Danish dominions; in the Duchy of Schleswig and Holstein; in the Principality of Pinneberg; in the county of Rantzau, and in the city of Altona; and we have received information, that these laws of police are little or not known at all in foreign countries—a want of information which has already caused foreigners and travellers, not only the loss of time, but interruption in their journeys; we have therefore made extracts from all these regulations, as far as they regard foreigners and travellers, which we herewith officially publish.—1st. No foreigner is permitted to travel in the above-mentioned states without being provided with a written or printed pass.—2d. Foreigners, who from the land side enter the Danish territory, may obtain lawful passes from the Royal Danish Legation at Hamburgh; from the Royal Danish Resident at Lubeck; or by the magistrates on that part of the frontier nearest to the place from which they desire to begin their journey in the Danish States.—3d. Every person arriving by water may take a pass from the magistrates of the place of his landing.—4th. No foreigners can obtain a Danish pass, who are not provided with one of their own country, or possess certificates, or other authentic documents, which prove who they are, and the object of their journey.—5th. All those who cannot prove that

they obtain an honest livelihood, as gypies, charlatans, cheats, quacks, rope dancers, mountebanks, showers of curiosities, wild beasts, &c. are prohibited from travelling in the Danish states, and obtain no passes.

—6th. Journeymen or mechanics, who desire to travel in the Danish States, must be provided with certificates, from their respective guilds or corporations, not above three months old from the date of their delivery, and their authority is to be verified by the signatures of the magistrates of the place, where they last worked or were employed.—7th. If husband and wife travel together, or several full grown travellers are in the same carriage, every person must be provided with a separate pass for his own person.

(To be continued.)

**SUMMARY OF POLITICS.**

SIR GEORGE RUMBOLD.—(Continued from page 736.)—In the morning of the 25th of October, as soon as the senate heard of this violation of their territorial rights, they assembled at seven o'clock, and continued sitting till five in the afternoon. They presented, as the result of their deliberations, a remonstrance to the French minister, Rheinard, who denied having any knowledge whatsoever of the transaction. The order for the arrest, it seems, was transmitted from Paris directly to Marshal Bernadotte. The senate being foiled in their attempt to procure reparation, or even any explanation of the affair from the French minister, could only dispatch ministers to the courts of Berlin, Vienna, and Petersburgh.—The British consul, fearing a similar fate, took refuge, it is said, in the house of the American consul, which is by no means the least humiliating circumstance of the transaction.—The reason for this act of violence has, it is said, since been communicated to the Senate of Hamburgh by the French minister, Rheinard, who justifies the seizure of Sir George Rumbold as being concerned in a continuation of the plots ascribed to Mr. Drake! The fallacy of this pretext must be evident to the whole world; for, the intrigue of Mr. Drake, whatever might be its ultimate object, must necessarily end with the exposure made by his correspondent Ménéce de la Tonche, the honour of whose friendship and confidence was procured him by the "solid young statesman!" When will this nation cease to be punished, and to deserve to be punished, for the baseness of its sentiments? Ménéce was, if he speaks the truth, flattered and

caressed and feasted by the sages of Downing Street, while every person that I was acquainted with, and that talked about Mehée, openly declared him to be sent over by Buonaparté. Mehée did me the honour of a visit. He came several times to repeat it; but, he never could get at me a second time, though he offered to communicate much secret political information. He sent me some manuscripts for the purpose of being translated and inserted in the Register. He pretended to open a school "to teach the French language by a new method;" and, having gotten into a quarrel with a rival schoolmaster, he wrote to me to publish a word or two in defence of "un mal-heroux royaliste, persécuté par les agens du Corse!" I neither published his defence nor answered his letter; and, from that time I heard no more of him, till his name burst out in a blaze upon the Continent, when I found, that though I had shot the deer against him, he had been amply compensated by my more hospitable neighbours of Downing Street, a spot which Mehée has immortalized under the denomination of "the paradise of fools."——I have digressed into these matters in order to show, that it required no supernatural powers to avoid being deceived by Mehée de la Touche. I myself was not deceived by him; I personally know twenty people, who, from his first arrival, and to the hour of his departure, declared him to be a spy; and, in short, every body seems to have had the means of penetrating his character and designs, except those who had at their absolute disposal, and who actually expended that year, 100,000*l.* in secret service money! Thus it is to be governed by a "solid young statesman." We have him yet, too. We are still blessed with his superintending prudence. He has, indeed, been removed from that particular department, where he formed the happy rencontre with Mehée, and this change, is, it is said, to be ascribed entirely to Mr. Canning;\* but, still Sir Balaam has the

consolation to reflect, that the "prudence" of his lordship is not altogether laid upon the shelf.——The connexion with Mehée de la Touche has been mighty, and may yet be more mighty, in its consequences.——Lord Hawkesbury, in his Circular Letter of the 30th of April, 1803, declares to all foreign courts, in His Majesty's name, that the accusation preferred against the English government by the French government, founded upon the correspondence of Drake and Mehée, "may justly be presumed to have been brought forward for the sole purpose of diverting the attention of Europe from the contemplation of that sanguinary deed, which, in violation of the law of nations, and of the plainest dictates of honour and humanity, has been recently perpetrated by the direct order of the First Consul of France." Now, if this presumption was founded in justice, of which, I dare say, the ministerial writers will not suffer us to doubt, it follows, that though the intrigue of Mehée and Mr. Drake might not have caused the arrest and the execution of the Duke D'Enghien, yet, that, if the intrigue had not existed, the French would not have

the grounds upon which he had joined the new ministry. "I shall," said he, "content myself with vindicating my own consistency. I objected to the administration of foreign affairs, and that has been changed," &c. &c. &c. See the Parliamentary Debates, Volume II. p. 722.——Now, nothing can qualify the meaning of this sentence. It is complete in sense, as well as in grammatical construction. It was spoken in Parliament; it is upon record in the proceedings of that body; and, however great our wonder may be that Mr. Canning should have acquired so much influence in the state, every one must be convinced that he exerted it for the purpose of effecting the removal of Lord Hawkesbury from the Office of Foreign Affairs. Any one of patriotism less ardent and persevering than that of his lordship, having been thus far removed, would have removed a little farther of his own accord; but, he has, as it was well remarked in a pamphlet published in his defence, "an hereditary disposition to office." This is certainly a disposition that runs in the blood. It prevails, more or less generally, in all countries. There are families in America, who were always in office under the royal government, and who, in some shape or other, still stick to the state. No change of leaders or of rulers, no storms of any kind, can "shake the settled purpose of their souls."

\* It is said, that Mr. Canning, before he would consent to take office in the present ministry, insisted that Lord Hawkesbury should be removed from the Office of Foreign Affairs. Now Mr. Canning, or any such person, should become possessed of a similar influence, would astonish one in any other times than the present; but, that the fact was as is above stated, appears to have been strongly corroborated by Mr. Canning himself, in his speech of the 18th of June last, where he took an opportunity of stating

had the means of thus “diverting the attention of Europe from the contemplation of that sanguinary deed.” And, in truth, it is not at all improbable, that, if it had not been for the intrigue of Mehée, the Duke D’Enghien would at this moment have been alive; for, it was that intrigue which furnished the French with a pretext for violating the laws of neutrality. It is certain that they are not very scrupulous in this way; but, without some such pretext, it is hardly to be believed, that they would have committed such an act.—That they would have seized Mr. Drake himself, or Mr. Spencer Smith, there can be no doubt, under the same pretext; and, as was before observed, it is stated, that, upon this pretext only, they have now seized Sir George Rumbold. That they had no right to seize Sir George Rumbold is certain, even if they knew him to have been concerned in the intrigue of Mehée de la Touche; but, is it not to be lamented, that they should have such a pretence, even such a threadbare shew of justice, for such terrible acts of aggression?—In a former page of this present number will be found a copy of the note, which, on the part of His Majesty, is to be laid before the ministers of the King of Prussia, upon this subject; and, it is understood, that a note to the same purpose, varying only according to the local situation, rights, and powers, of the different sovereigns, has been addressed to all the courts of Europe. That it was perfectly proper to take this step nobody will deny; though, I think, some persons will ask why it was not taken at the time of the seizure of the Duke D’Enghien; and will think, perhaps, that it would have been even more becoming in that than in the present case. It is, however, much to be feared, that this appeal will have little or no effect upon the courts of Europe, whom Mr. Wilberforce appears to have, at last, happily succeeded in convincing, that we are much too honest a people for them to have any thing to do with. “Gentlemen” (said he to his honest Yorkshire constituents, at the last general election) “Gentlemen, I trust, it will be our future policy to abstain, as far as possible, from those continental connexions, for which I had almost said the very integrity and good faith of the ministers and people of this country render us unfit, inasmuch as we cannot keep, or break, our engagements according as it suits the convenience of the present moment, in the fluctuating state of human affairs. We shall, I—trust, cultivate our own internal resources, and endeavour to render our

“people secure, prosperous and contented.” Was there ever any thing so outrageously insulting as this? Is it not an indiscriminate charge against the powers of the Continent, that they keep, or break, their engagements, just as it suits their convenience; and, that therefore, our integrity and good faith render us unfit to have any thing to do with them? Various are the means of giving offence; but, for my part, I know of none so sure to succeed, either with individuals or with nations, as that cool placid insolence, which is displayed in those accusations, where the accuser takes it for granted that the superiority of his virtue is not to be questioned. Our superiority in this respect is questioned, as any one may discover, who will take the trouble to read the notes addressed to Talleyrand, in answer to his circular letter upon the subject of Messrs. Drake and Mehée\*. It will be said, and that truly too, that many of these answers were written under the influence of fear; but, without stopping to compare the relative merit of the motives of Mr. Wilberforce’s address and that of the addresses of the foreign ministers at Paris, we know, that the fact is, that a far greater part, nay, almost all the courts of Europe, did, upon the occasion referred to, very handsomely repay the compliment of that gentleman: they very explicitly expressed their horror of the conduct of Mr. Drake. Mr. Spencer Smith, who fled from a neighbouring court, from apprehensions similar to those of Mr. Drake, was, it is said, ordered to leave Vienna, Saltsbourg, and Dresden, and that, thus hunted from place to place, he, at last, sought shelter at Stralsund, whence he got across to Gottenberg, and thence came to England. Whoever reflects upon these circumstances, must, I think, participate in the fear which I cannot help entertaining, that our appeal to the cabinets of Europe will produce very little effect, especially as we made no such appeal in the case of the Duke D’Enghien. The ministerial writers think, or would appear to think, differently; and, in this respect, I most heartily wish their opinions may prove more correct than mine.

THE SPANISH FRIGATES.—It is easy to perceive, that this capture, attended, as it was, with such melancholy circumstances,

\* Some of these were inserted in Vol. V. p. 606. The rest are inserted in the present Number, for which purpose they have been translated. The Swedish note never was published. All the rest are to be found in the Register.

will tend to indispose the courts of Europe to resent any violation of public law committed against England. The language of the French upon this subject will be seen in the former pages of this Number; and, there is but too much reason to fear, that it will be adopted by most of the courts upon the continent, all of them being extremely anxious to lay hold of whatever serves as an excuse for their submission to a power, which they want energy to resist. Till the whole of the provocations of Spain are officially communicated to us, it is impossible to say, how far the capture was, or was not, justifiable. The Morning Post, which has, of late, become most furiously ministerial, has, indeed, cut the matter short with us. A very long and virulent essay, upon the subject, in that paper of the 13th instant, concludes with the following words; "None can accuse Great Britain of injustice; her cause is the common cause of the virtuous and the brave; *perdition overtake those who dare dispute her claims!*" This is an humble imitation of my Lord Peter, when he pained his brown loaf upon his brothers for a shoulder of mutton. "Look ye, gentlemen," cries Peter, in a rage, "to *convince* you, what a couple of blind, positive, ignorant, wilful puppies you are, I will use but this *plain argument*: by G—, it is true, good, natural mutton as any in Leadenhall market: and G— confound you both eternally, if you offer to believe otherwise!" Such a thundering reproof, the author tells us, left no further room for objection; and the two unbelievers began to gather and pocket up the mistake as hastily as they could. But, if the Morning Chronicle and the Register were to follow the example of poor Martin and Jack, what use would that be of, unless the editor of the Morning Post could extend the influence of his anathemas so as to make it reach the powers of the continent? Like Shimei, the son of Gera, he may "go forth, and curse still as he goeth;" but, will they not despise him? Will they not say: "let him alone, let him curse on?" I am afraid they will. I am afraid, that, in spite of all his terrible denunciations, they will dispute Great Britain's claim to the Spanish frigates; and, I only wish, that, upon principles of law and justice, any of us may be able to maintain the opposite ground.

THE WANT OF AN ARMY, however, is the part of our argument, in which we shall chiefly fail. An army is not only the weapon, but the speech of states, which, when all law is set at defiance,

always answer most convincingly by their cannon. Our army, so far from being in an improving, is in a declining state, even as to numbers. The "energetic" measure of Mr. Pitt, which was to make up for all the effects of Mr. Addington's "indecision and imbecility," has not, it is confidently said, produced more than two or three hundred men, during the time, that the waste of the army has amounted to as many thousands. As long as this is our situation, we can never obtain any efficient alliance upon the Continent. The first words that an English ambassador, treating for an alliance, ought to utter, are these, "the King my master will send forty thousand soldiers to your aid." If he cannot begin with such a sentence, he may as well hold his tongue. It is very reasonable, indeed, for us to call upon the states of the Continent to defend their rights; that is to say, to make a diversion in our favour, at the very moment that to compare our happiness and greatness with their fallen situation is the constant practice of our minister and his partisans, both in and out of Parliament! If they are so fallen, and if we are so happy and so great, what does reason point out as the course to be pursued? Surely not to call upon them to go to war against the enemy who has laid them low, without, at the same time, offering them our assistance? We do, indeed, offer to assist them with money. Such assistance is sometimes very seasonable and efficient; but, not always, and, as was foretold in this work, nearly three years ago, the time is now come, when the powers of the Continent will not move at the mention of our insolent gainsays. We want an army. Forty thousand well-appointed men, and well-commanded, ready, at a day's notice, to sail for Italy, or for any other quarer, where they might be employed; and, we may be reassured, that, until we do obtain such a disposable force, and to obtain it necessarily supposes a regular army amounting in the whole to two hundred thousand men, we never shall be able to check the ambitious strides of France, or to lay our heads down for one hour in security.—"What," some one will say, "a standing army of two hundred thousand men! Where are we to get them?" To which I answer, that the population of Austria amounts only to 18,000,000 of souls, and she has from 350,000 to 400,000 regular soldiers; and, out of 15,000,000 of souls, why should we not raise 200,000 men besides the 60,000 or 70,000 men and boys on board the

fleet?—"Oh! but what is to become of our manufactures and agriculture?" Both of them, I undertake to prove, against whosoever will engage me, would, from this cause, meet with less obstruction than they now meet with. Supposing the contrary, however, and admitting the correctness of my previous proposition, the question then will be, whether we shall lose our independence, or a part of our trade.—"But; our liberties, political and civil; are they nothing?" Yes; after our national glory, they are not only something, but they are every thing; for, speaking as a politician, one may safely say to a people: "maintain your glory and your liberties, and all other things shall be given unto you." At a time when it was feared, and reasonably feared, that a standing army, which was not wanted to preserve the independence of the country, would be made use of to deprive the people of their liberties, not excepting the liberty of conscience; then, indeed, there was good foundation for objecting to standing armies. But, it is preposterousness bordering upon insanity to apply in this respect, the maxims of those times to the present; and, it is truly curious to observe, that those ministers who have, from their endless inconsistencies, deserved and obtained the distinctive appellation of "ministers of existing circumstances," and who are tossed to-and-fro by the transient occurrences of the day, remain totally insensible to the great change in the circumstances of the world! It has been over and over again said, but it never can be too often repeated, that Europe is now become *military*; that the age of commerce and of luxury is now yielding to that of arms and of hardness; that the soldier is abroad in pursuit of glory, of conquest, and dominion; and, it remains for us to determine, and that right quickly too, whether we will be his rivals or his slaves. But, in narrowing our view of this part of the subject, what danger is there, that our political or civil liberties would suffer from a change of our multifarious and, for the most part, inefficient half million of troops, into a regular army of 200,000 men? Has the liberty of election ever been injured by the standing army? And could it possibly be in so much danger from a standing army of 200,000 men, as it now is from the volunteers? As to the liberty of the press, does any one think that a standing army would enable the minister of the day to silence or to buy up completely more than nine-tenths of the newspapers, magazines, and reviews?

With regard to personal safety, will it be pretended that a regular soldier could, with impunity, do more than kill any man that should dare to laugh at his awkwardness? And, as to every kind of liberty taken together, will any one gravely contend, that the liberty of Ireland, for instance, would be greatly endangered by the erection of a numerous, and well-appointed and commanded standing army? Now, mark me, Balaam, I do not mean to insinuate, that the suspension and martial law bills were not, in "existing circumstance" necessary to the safety of Ireland; but, I positively assert, that, if, in the year 1803, we had had an army of 200,000 real soldiers, those circumstances never would have existed; because, we should have been in no danger of a French invasion of either England or Ireland, and it was that danger, and that danger only, that rendered the insurrection in Ireland formidable; and, indeed, it was the same circumstance that created the insurrection itself. The erection of a large army of real soldiers, so far from endangering the liberties we now possess, appears to me, therefore, to be the most effectual, the most speedy, and the only means of enabling our Sovereign and his parliament safely to restore those which we have lost.

LLOYD'S FUND.—The committee at Lloyd's had, I thought, at last, perceived the propriety of desisting from their purpose of becoming the judges of military merit and the distributors of military rewards, when, to my utter astonishment, I found that they not only persevered in distributing rewards; but, that they had begun to distribute military honours also. This subject is very well treated in the following letter, taken from the Morning Advertiser.—"Sir, my attention was very much attracted the other day, by a most pompous description of a design entertained by the managers of the Patriotic Fund, at Lloyd's, for giving badges of honour and distinction to such persons employed in the service of their country, as they may judge worthy of them. What a strange desire do men often manifest to step out of their own sphere! Here is a new order of knighthood to be established, which it is no doubt hoped will in time rival that of the Garter or the Bath. We have been accustomed hitherto to think the King was the sole fountain of honour; and that this was one of his most distinguished prerogatives. But, thanks to our Committee at Lloyd's, they intend to correct this vulgar prejudice, and to crop the King's prerogative in this

"respect, which, most probably, these mercantile wiseacres think " has increased, is increasing, and ought to be " "diminished." But, if the King is to be " left the privilege of conferring any kind " of distinctions whatever, I should think it " ought to be *military* distinctions; and if " our gallant soldiers and sailors are to look " to any upstart, self-created society for " their rewards and honours, and not to the " government of their country, and the general " applause of their fellow countrymen, I leave it to you. Sir, to delineate the " consequences.—Another light, in which " I think this committee highly culpable is, " that they are diverting that fund, which " was raised for the highly useful and important " purpose of relieving or supporting the " destitute wives and children of those " who might fall in their country's " service, from this sacred distinction, to " gewgaws and nonsense; if, as I have attempted " to shew, it be no something worse than " nonsense. Will they pretend to tell us, " that there is no individual whatever " connected with the brave defenders of " our country, who stand in need of " assistance, that they are obliged *thus* " foolishly to apply the money entrusted " to their hands?—I know, not, Sir, " whether you will approve of all these " sentiments. But as they are only " general reflections on a public action, " you can have no good reason for " refusing to insert them."—So far the " letter; but, it appears to me, that such an " encroachment upon the functions of " royalty, is matter highly worthy of " the interference of the Admiralty " and the Commander in Chief; and, " if a remedy be not afforded there, " of the Parliament itself. The current " coin now goes forth with the arms " of the Bank of Threadneedle-street, " joined with the *insignia* of royalty, " in company and fellowship and co- " equality with the image and super- " scription of the King; and now a " set of traders at Lloyds are bestowing " military distinctions and decorations! " Where will this end? Is the eagle " thus to be plucked, feather after " feather, by these crows? I trust, " not only that some notice will be " taken of it; but, that the progress " of the mischief will be instantly " put a stop to; or there will be " reason to fear that further " encroachments of the same sort, " from the same and perhaps other " quarters, and in the same direction, " will not be tardy in making their " appearance.

THE KING AND THE PRINCE, after too long a separation, met together, at Kew Palace, upon terms of perfect reconciliation,

on Monday last, the 12th instant. Upon such a subject there is nothing to say, but to express that satisfaction, which such an event cannot fail to afford to every one who has the happiness and the honour of being a subject of his Majesty.

MINISTERIAL INTRIGUES.—Nothing can be more mortifying than the reflection, that the above-mentioned happy event should have been, even in report or rumour, mixed, in the slightest degree, with political and party intrigues; because, in the eyes of foreigners, and also in those of the uninformed part of the people of this country, such a mixture is but too likely to give to the whole a complexion merely pious; and of course, greatly to diminish that pleasure, which the reconciliation, viewed in its amiable and true light, must necessarily have excited. What, then, shall be said of the conduct of those ministerial writers, who, in their head-long devotion to the interests of their patrons, seem, even in an instance like the present, to have entirely forgotten the respect due to the feelings as well as to the person of their Sovereign and his illustrious son? With some trifling modification, this charge will justly apply to all the ministerial prints; but, that which is particularly alluded to here, and from which a passage, under the date of Wednesday, the 14th instant, is now about to be quoted, is the *Morning Post*.—

" Though the highly interesting and gratifying event which took place at Kew Palace on Monday, and which must prove a source of heartfelt joy to every loyal Briton, was, as we have already stated, unconnected, in the first instance, with any political consideration, still are we induced to hope, that the most happy consequences to the British Empire may result from it. Besides the gratification which the feelings of nature must have experienced on the occasion, there are other considerations which render the happy reconciliation particularly interesting to the nation. At a time when the most cordial unanimity is essential to the preservation of our liberties as a people, and our independence as a nation, every occurrence that has a tendency to allay the spirit of contending parties in the state must be viewed with real pleasure by every person interested in the safety of the country, and attached to that free and inviolable constitution which it is the peculiar happiness of Britons to possess. We do not mean to say, that the event to which we allude will immediately realize the hopes and expecta-

tions of the nation in this respect; but inasmuch as it may have some tendency to produce so desirable a result, we contemplate it with satisfaction, and sincerely congratulate the public on the cheering prospect which it seems to present to the general view. From the result of the endearing interview which has taken place, we are induced to entertain the fond hope, that a most sublime display of patriotic co-operation will, ere long, be presented to an anxious public; and, certainly, in this day of danger, the people have a right to expect that all political animosities should be buried in one common grave. No one event that can possibly arise could be more fortunate to the public good, nor one in which the country would more sincerely rejoice. Never, perhaps, was there a period in which the united exertions of virtuous men were more necessary; and to that gratifying event we are induced to look forward with reverent solicitude and high expectation."——If the reader's head does not turn, I beg him to step down with me into prose for a minute or two. Upon looking back to the steep which we have descended, the first thing that attracts our attention is, the lapse of time, which is said to have taken place between the reconciliation at Kew and the political hopes arising therefrom. "The interesting and gratifying event was, in the first instance, entirely unconnected with any political consideration." Now, observe, the reconciliation took place on Monday, and, on the Wednesday, this ministerial writer "entertains the fond hope, that, from the result of the endearing interview which has taken place, a most sublime display of patriotic co-operation will, ere long, be presented to an anxious public;" so that, though the political consideration was not connected with the family consideration in the "first instance," it appears, that there was only an interval of one day, and scarcely that, for there must have been time for the news to travel to the press, and, indeed, it is well known, that whatever appears in print on Wednesday must be written on the Tuesday. Nothing, therefore, is clearer, than that

"This same scurvy politician seemeth

"To see the things that are not,"

or, that the reconciliation of the king and the heir apparent was very closely connected with political views, and even party intrigue; than which latter, in the minds of the King and the Prince, I con-

fidently assert, nothing can possibly be more foreign from the truth. What! the father and son (and such a father and son too!) after a long separation, to be reconciled; to meet; to embrace; and for what! Gracious God! for the purpose, if this writer were to be believed, of bringing over votes to prop up the administration of Mr. Pitt; or, at most, of effecting a new division of political power and place!——

In an article of the same print of Thursday, in which article the subject is continued, and "the fond hopes and high expectations" are repeated, the writer descends a little more into particulars. After stating, that Lord Melville had waited upon the Prince, the writer comes at once to the "political consequences of the endearing interview at Kew," and says: "From the immediate *parliamentary* friends of the Prince, an active and cordial co-operation in the great business of the State may reasonably be looked for; and though the arrangements consequent upon the *Royal Reconciliation*, should even be found to extend no farther than this, it will not, we are sure, be contended, that much, very much will not have been gained by the acquisition of such men as Lord Moira, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Erskine, and other gentlemen of the "same noble and patriotic description"

——Here, then, the whole matter, according to this writer, becomes a mere bargain for votes: an enlistment of parliamentary recruits! And, yet, I'll warrant you, this is one of those persons, who arrogate to themselves the exclusive appellation of "Kings Friends." But, to proceed with the quotation. "With such powerful aid" [as that of Lord Moira, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Erskine] "to the government in the great council of the state, that of a few other enlightened senators would only be requisite to present to the people of England, and to Europe, a most sublime display of patriotic co-operation. Nor can we bring ourselves to think so unfavourably of mankind as to despair for a moment of yet witnessing so truly glorious an event for the country. A fair manly spirit of opposition, at times different from the present, may be essential to our free constitution; but, we repeat, if ever there was a period in which the united efforts of all virtuous men was necessary, the present is that period." So said Washington, when he began to feel his presidential chair shake beneath him. He, indeed, pushed the doctrine still farther; and, turning author, told

the people, in a solemn address, that "though an opposition might be very useful in England, experience had convinced him, that it was very injurious in America;" and, I really should not be much surprized now to hear Mr. Pitt declare, that an opposition may be very useful in America, but that experience has convinced him, that it is very injurious in England!—But, can it be true, that Mr. Pitt stands in need of "aid?" Surely this writer must have misunderstood his instructions! Can "Camillus," who came all the way from Ardea (that was the name of the place, I think, from whence Mr. Ward recalled him) to "save the city and restore the tottering state;" can this man, can Camillus; can the "*real* Giant refreshed," as Lord Stafford described him; can he want "aid?" Can he, who exclaimed, "either Cæsar or 'nothing!'" now be stretching out his arms, and crying, "Oh! help me, good Cassius, or I sink!"—But, if, after all, I should be deceived; and if this really should be the case; will the "aid" be obtained? The ministerial writer seems to have made sure of Lord Moira, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Erskine, and Mr. Tierney. As to the three former, I pronounce him to be completely in error; but, I will say nothing about Mr. Tierney, he being a gentleman, who, as the saying is, "thinks for himself." It is true, that Mr. Tierney has been offered the Chief Secretaryship of Ireland, which he is said to have refused; and, it is also true, that he was offered to continue in his former place (now held by Mr. Canning), which offer, too, he rejected. Whether Mr. Tierney, from any misgivings as to durability, has an objection to coming over alone; or, whether, upon casting his eye over the present cabinet, he finds, amongst the "noses," some that might, without any disparagement, give way to him; whether either, or both, or whether he has any doubts with respect to the disposition of his constituents, it would be hard to say; but, certain it is that he hesitates. There is no knowing, indeed, when or how he will "come;" and, if he does come at all, God knows whom along with him; for, as poor Lear says, "misery makes men acquainted with strange bed-fellows!"—But, as to that other and further junction; that union of all parties; that "sublime display of patriotic co-operation," which the ministerial writer talks about, and by which he clearly means a coalition of the ministry and the opposition, and a consequent enrolment of all the leading men of the opposition under Mr. Pitt, or, at least, a dividing and crippling of the

opposition: as to this matter I have something, and, if I had time and room, I should have, a great deal, to say.—First, however, I must not only refer to, but must quote at full length, what I thought, wrote, and published, upon this subject, at the time when the present ministry was formed. The extract is taken from the Register of the 12th of May last, Vol. V. p. 734. I would beg leave to recommend a perusal of the whole article; but, to the following extract I solicit particular attention:—"The public consequences of the juggle may be unsplaisant, at first; but, I am by no means of opinion, that, in the end, the country will have to regret that a ministry including all parties has not been formed, unless, indeed, it could have been formed without Mr. Pitt at the head of it. To have seen all the parties broken up, all their leaders, both of the first and second class, ranged under the banners of Mr. Pitt, would to me, have been a sight the most fearful that could have been conceived; and, if his being prime minister was a *sine quâ non*, I heartily rejoice that the project of a combined ministry has failed.—"I am for the men who will save the country, be they who they may," was a sentiment which I heard expressed by a great, a wise, an upright statesman, immediately after the conclusion of the preliminary treaty with France, a sentiment which I most cordially adopted, and under the influence of which I have constantly acted from that moment to this, never having been, as far, at least, as I myself could perceive, in any one instance, seduced therefrom, either by prejudice, on the one side, or partiality, on the other.—I was, I believe, the first person, who publicly called for an union, in ministry, of the great men of all parties, as the only means of rescuing the country from its present disgraceful and dangerous state; and, upon an occasion more recent, I have, as the readers of this work will remember, taken some credit to myself for having so stood forward.—Those readers will, perhaps, wonder, therefore, when they now perceive me to be amongst those who are the least concerned at the failure of an union between Mr. Pitt and the leading men of the old and new opposition, and even to have entertained some alarm as to the consequences of such an union. But, it is not at the union itself that I should have been alarmed; it is at the wrong distribution of power which might have taken place amongst the persons united; it is at the probable and likely predominance of the influence of

“ Mr. Pitt ; at the consequent perseverance  
 “ in all his systems ; and, in short, at the  
 “ sanction which his vicious and debasing  
 “ principles of policy, foreign and domestic,  
 “ would have received, and the strength  
 “ they would have derived, from the joint  
 “ countenance and responsibility of Mr. Fox,  
 “ Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, &c.; which  
 “ sanction, if once given, could never have  
 “ been withdrawn, and which strength, if  
 “ once communicated, would have given to  
 “ those principles a degree of malignity,  
 “ against which all the wisdom of men  
 “ would never have been able to provide an  
 “ an idote.—Yes, I sincerely wished for  
 “ an union of the great men of all parties ;  
 “ but, never have I expressed this wish un-  
 “ accompanied with observations intended  
 “ to impress the reader with an opinion,  
 “ that, if Mr. Pitt came into such an union,  
 “ he must, as a preliminary step, give up,  
 “ clearly and specifically give up, the prin-  
 “ ciples and system, upon which he has go-  
 “ verned this country ; and that, even with  
 “ such a relinquishment, he ought not again  
 “ to be *prime minister*, though it might be  
 “ very desirable that he should be a leading  
 “ member in the cabinet. In order to shew  
 “ that my opinion, in this respect, has not  
 “ undergone the least change, I could refer  
 “ to several parts of the Register, beginning  
 “ as far back as the winter of 1802, but I  
 “ shall not, at present, trouble the reader  
 “ with any quotation, except from the num-  
 “ ber of the 17th December last, Vol. IV.  
 “ p. 905, where, after having expressed my  
 “ dissent from the opinion, “ that Mr. Pitt  
 “ “ was the *only man* to save the country,” I  
 “ proceeded thus : “ Not only do I reject  
 “ “ the humiliating notion of this kingdom’s  
 “ “ containing but one man ; not only do I  
 “ “ believe, that there are many men bet-  
 “ “ ter calculated for weathering the ap-  
 “ “ proaching storm ; but, I believe, that  
 “ “ this storm never can be weathered with  
 “ “ Mr. Pitt at the *helm*. As a *member* of  
 “ “ an administration, he might do much ;  
 “ “ but, as the chief director of it, he is, in  
 “ “ my opinion, totally inadequate to the  
 “ “ task, at this time. Whenever the return  
 “ “ of Mr. Pitt to office has been the subject  
 “ “ of remark, I have uniformly given it, as  
 “ “ my opinion, that we now stand in need  
 “ “ of a system of politics and political eco-  
 “ “ nomy, very different from that which  
 “ “ has been pursued ; and it is evident,  
 “ “ that such a system would never be in-  
 “ “ troduced by Mr. Pitt, because the in-  
 “ “ troducing of it would be to lay the axe  
 “ “ to the root of his own fame. Had Mr.  
 “ “ Pitt been again placed at the head of

“ “ the cabinet ” “ [alluding to the intrigue  
 “ “ carried on for that purpose in March and  
 “ “ April, 1803], ” “ he would have con-  
 “ “ tinued war, or made peace, upon no  
 “ “ other principle than that of the price  
 “ “ of stocks. He would soon have dis-  
 “ “ covered the *prudence* of making an-  
 “ “ other peace ; he would soon have dis-  
 “ “ covered that the main object of the war  
 “ “ was again accomplished ; again would  
 “ “ he have talked of husbanding our re-  
 “ “ sources against another day of trial ;  
 “ “ and thus would have ended the second  
 “ “ puny war.”——“ What he would have  
 “ “ done, had he become minister in March,  
 “ “ 1803, he would now have done, had he  
 “ “ been at the head of a powerful cabinet,  
 “ “ or, that cabinet must have been broken  
 “ “ up.—I have, for my part, long been  
 “ “ fully persuaded, that Mr. Pitt is not a  
 “ “ person fit to be at the head of the affairs  
 “ “ of a nation, particularly in times like the  
 “ “ present. His system of political economy  
 “ “ must be destroyed, or, it must destroy  
 “ “ the monarchy ; and, such is his pertina-  
 “ “ city, with regard to that system, that, it  
 “ “ is much to be feared, he would risk the  
 “ “ monarchy for its sake. How dangerous,  
 “ “ then, would it be for such a person to be  
 “ “ at the head of the government, to unite  
 “ “ under him, and thereby to silence and  
 “ “ neutralize at least, all the leaders of all  
 “ “ the parties, leaving no one to oppose his  
 “ “ projects ? I am not supposing, that he  
 “ “ would have been able easily to induce his  
 “ “ colleagues to adopt every thing that came  
 “ “ athwart his mind. They would, doubt-  
 “ “ less, never have consented to any further  
 “ “ alienation of the real property of the  
 “ “ Church, much less would they have yield-  
 “ “ ed to the seizure of the tithes, or any  
 “ “ such measure ; but, for harmony’s sake,  
 “ “ they would, when once in, have yielded  
 “ “ to a great deal ; and, I must confess,  
 “ “ that I should have been cruelly mortified  
 “ “ to see Lord Grenville, Mr. Fox, and Mr.  
 “ “ Windham lending their names and coun-  
 “ “ tenance to the execution of plans con-  
 “ “ ceived by Lord Carrington or George  
 “ “ Rose. In such a state of things the coun-  
 “ “ try would have been left without hope.  
 “ “ The monarchy would, in such case,  
 “ “ have come to an end in the hands of  
 “ “ Mr. Pitt, as the French monarchy did  
 “ “ in the hands of Mr. Necker : the for-  
 “ “ mer, like the latter, would have present-  
 “ “ ed his “ *Compte Rendu*,” and have  
 “ “ left it to be settled by the Sovereign  
 “ “ People. While there are men of great  
 “ “ talents and character in the Opposition,  
 “ “ the projects of Mr. Pitt never can be

"carried to this destructive length."—

—Such were my opinions then; such they still remain, greatly strengthened by further reflection and further experience, and now by a consideration of the motives, which must have induced the minister to make overtures for a coalition (if he has made them), and, above all, by a dread of the consequences, which a coalition, like that recommended by the *Morning Post*, could not fail to produce. — There are but two motives, to which the overture can, as far as I can discover, possibly be ascribed: *first*, a desire to stand well with the apparent successor to the throne; a motive which, in itself, I am far from censuring, and which I will not, like Mr. Pitt's writers upon the subject of the Carlton-House dinner last Spring, denominate, "a desertion of our good old King and a coalition of the rising Sun." But, I must be allowed to fear, for reasons which, at present, I do not think it necessary to state, that a close intimacy and political co-operation between the Prince and Mr. Pitt would be attended with great evils to the monarchy. — The second motive is, a consciousness, on the part of Mr. Pitt, of his inability to keep his place, without a coalition with, or a division of, the opposition. That, with such a consciousness in his mind, he should endeavour to secure the remedy, is by no means unnatural, though, after what has passed, the attempt certainly argues a degree of confidence rarely to be met with under similar circumstances. — But, the *consequences* of such a coalition would be ruinous indeed. In May last, the nation, with a voice almost unanimous, called for such an union of the great men of the country as would bring to the service of the state the greatest possible quantity of talent, and, at the same time, produce an oblivion of all former political animosities. But, I spoke for my humble self at the time; and, I think, I am safe in asserting, that a vast majority of the people, wished for no coalition, in which Mr. Pitt should be the leader; for no ministry of which Mr. Pitt should be the head. What we wished for, and, in this respect, I number myself with a very great majority; what we wished for, was, that no exclusive principle should be acted upon; that Mr. Pitt's system of governing the country should give way to a better system; and, that, to this end, Mr. Pitt should be a member, if he chose, but, by no means the head of the cabinet. How

widely different the circumstances now are, how utterly improbable it is that these objects should now be obtained by the means of a coalition, hardly need to be pointed out. At the time referred to, Mr. Pitt was, like the rest, merely a candidate for power: now, he is in possession, and would, in fact, be the dispenser of all the power to be dispensed. The disadvantage would not, however, consist so much in the distribution of the power, as in the manner of its being bestowed. Going into a cabinet with Mr. Pitt, and going into a cabinet to Mr. Pitt are things widely different indeed! They are widely different in themselves, and still more so in the eyes of the people, and in their influence upon their minds. — [Want of room compels me to break off here. The subject shall be resumed in my next. In the meantime, I think it my duty to state, for the information of my readers, that, as to the reconciliation between the royal persons above spoken of, it has always been strenuously recommended by Mr. Fox, Lord Moira, and Mr. Sheridan, and always entirely unconnected with any political or party arrangement or view. And, though it is not impossible, that a person, having very different objects, may have found his way even into Carlton House,

"As whence that palace, whence foul things

"Sometimes intrude not?"

Yet, the public may be assured, that, as to his Royal Highness, or any of those persons, who have usually had the honour to possess his confidence, no idea of a co-operation with the present ministry has ever been, for one moment, entertained, whatever advances may, on the part of the latter, have been made towards accomplishing that purpose.]

#### TO THE PUBLIC.

The complexion which some of the newspapers have endeavoured to give to an account of the prosecution of Mr. JOHN BUDD, of Pall Mall, for publishing a pamphlet against Lord St. Vincent, renders it necessary for me to state, as well in justice to Mr. Budd as to myself, that I have not, and never have had, any partnership or share, or concern whatsoever in his trade; and that, as to the particular publication in question, I have never read a word of it, in any shape, and never saw it, that I know of, till since the prosecution commenced.

W. COBBETT.

"Whoever gives himself out for a man of no party, you may depend upon it is of a party; but it is such a party as he is ashamed to own: for, even when he says he is of no party, you may plainly perceive that he is prejudiced in favour of one party, and that too always the worse, and the true reason of his not declaring is, that he thinks the party not yet strong enough to protect him. The justice of the cause, or the goodness of the intention seems to be out of this gentleman's scheme. The only distinction that he goes by is to be politically of no party, that he may occasionally be of either. You shall never hear a man of true principle say he is of no party; he declares he is of a party, if resolutely to stand by and defend the constitution both in Church and State must be called being of a party."—SWIFT.

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CATHOLICS OF IRELAND.  
LETTER II.

(For the first letter see p. 629.)

"Nonquam unum militum habituros, ni præstaretur fides publica; libertatem uni- cuique prius reddendam esse, quam arma danda; ut pro Patria Civibusque, non pro Dominis, pugnent." *Livy. Lib. 2.*

SIR,—I have pointed out, in my former letter, some of the advantages, military and financial, which Great Britain would derive from the active co-operation of the Catholics; and, I have shewn that such co-operation is best to be secured by extending to them a fair participation of constitutional rights. I shall now lay before you the principal grievances, of which they complain.—These are partly *direct*, as consisting of many severe penalties and privations, angrily imposed upon their body in the beginning of the eighteenth century, by several statutes now in force: and, they are partly *indirect or consequential*, so far as those statutes inspire, and almost sanction, a certain spirit of contempt and bitter hostility against Catholics, in persons who can with impunity, in a thousand ways, embarrass, insult, and injure them to an extent far beyond the apparent design of those very statutes.—You, Mr. Cobbett, who have, perhaps, never been in Ireland, and whose English pride has never been humbled by any consciousness of unfair depression in your native land, may not readily conceive the twofold operations of laws, which, by stigmatising the individual, arm men with reasons, or at least apologies, for acting in a manner most oppressive towards that individual. But, I am here to state facts, not to discuss their causes.—The Catholics, then, whether by the direct or indirect, and consequential operation of the penal statutes, whether by positive clauses, or by the spirit and policy of them, are, 1. Incapacitated from sitting or voting in either House of Parliament. So far as this incapacity affects their nobility, it is particularly severe. They are so few in num-

ber, that no possible danger could result from its removal. There are, I think, only six of them in Ireland, six in England, and two in Scotland. In these times, Sir, it appears to me that the *ancient* nobility ought to be held in peculiar respect amongst the people of England. You want such men at this day. They would confer a lustre upon the "*Domus Procerum*," and lend additional weight and dignity to their deliberations. Yet you reject these descendants of the Talbots, the Arundels, and the Howards, the inheritors of the name, honours and virtues of some of the most renowned Barons; you reject them from the great council of the nation, because they have not yet rejected the faith of their ancestors, or renounced the notions of the Edwards and the Henrys! The premier Earl of England, bearing a name "*clarum et venerabile*," is, at this moment, of the number; a number so small, that some of them, especially the late LORD PIERRE, have feelingly complained of this exclusion, as amounting to little short of a *personal* imputation against them.—The exclusion from the House of Commons, is open to nearly similar observations. Where the House consists of 658 members, what hazard can be apprehended from the score or two of Catholic gentlemen, who might possibly in the ensuing ten or fifteen years, find their way into it? They now complain, that they are not represented in Parliament, although they are heavily taxed. They feel themselves, moreover, liable to be deeply injured in their properties and persons, by statutes enacted at such a distance without their privity. Hence, every session is to them a subject of suspicion and terror.—2. Catholics are excluded not only from all the offices of state, as they are termed, but generally from every honour, dignity, and office of trust or emolument under the crown. This needs no comment.—3. They are proscribed from all promotion and advancement of the least value in any one of the learned professions, and likewise in the

army, navy, revenue, and public boards.—

4. They may not hold, exercise, or enjoy any office or franchise in any city, borough, or town corporate, (not even that of town-clerk or common council man) neither may any Catholic be a high sheriff, sub-sheriff, or sheriff's clerk, or hold any municipal office whatsoever, in any county, city, or town in the Empire.—5. They are excluded jealously from even the freedom of cities and towns, although, by Irish statutes, persons of all other persuasions and countries (not excepting *Turks* or *Jacos*), are entitled to their freedom, on payment of twenty shillings for each person.—The effects of these three last heads of exclusion may be conceived to be not a little unfavourable to their education, moral virtues, industry and quiet. How they operate upon the administration of justice, in the selection of juries, and consequently, in decisions upon questions affecting their property, character, liberty, and life itself; and how far those valuable possessions are secured to the Catholics, can be learned only in Ireland.—6. They are subject to a land-tax, varying from sixpence to two shillings by the acre, which is levied by parochial vestries, from which vestries they are by law excluded. This tax is imposed ostensibly for the purposes of building, rebuilding, repairing or beautifying the churches of the established religion. It is levied from the tenant or occupier, who is, in nineteen cases out of twenty, a Catholic, generally poor, and subject also to heavy tithes and rack-rents, which are rigidly exacted. How the tax thus levied is managed or applied, makes no part of our present inquiry.—7. Those Catholics, who possess any property in lands, enjoy it only upon the condition, that they shall have taken in public court, certain long oaths, and signed certain declarations, which, to say the least, are unnecessary; and, should a Catholic proprietor happen to be an infant, or *non compos*, or beyond the seas, or labouring under any mental or bodily infirmity, which may disable him from performing this condition, or (which is equally probable) should he through ignorance omit so to do, his estate may be wrested from him under the old Penal Code; since the Repealing Act, which prescribes those oaths and declarations, has not provided for any such disability or omission.—8. Finally, to pass over several lesser grievances, each of which, however, would, in England, be deemed of some magnitude, they are excluded and proscribed from upwards of 14,000 public situations of trust, emolument, dignity, or power, to the salaries of which they principally contribute.

They already afford 100,000 armed men for the service of the state, and bear the far larger portion of imposts to the amount of nearly ten millions sterling, which are annually raised from the people, in the shape of customs, excise, charges of collection, county cesses, church rates, town tolls or tithes. Yet they partake not of one shilling of the income derived from the management or collection of this great revenue, or of any portion of the patronage annexed to it?—The reader may form some conception, though a faint one, of those grievances which the Catholics suffer from the Penal Laws, by making their case for a moment, his own. Let him suppose himself to be so branded and incapacitated, as is here described; to be set aside by the laws of his country, as unworthy to fill any office of trust or honour in it; to be denied that share of distributive justice, which apportioned reward as well as punishment according to the deserts of each member of the community; to find closed against him every path, which his ambition, his courage, his genius, or his industry might prompt him to explore. Let him suppose himself to be so taxed, so teased, so worried, and so contemned in his country, as to feel his situation more vile in many respects than that of the “blaspheming Jew.” Let him see himself avoided in private society as a degraded being, daily sinking in self-estimation, yet indignant at the scorn annexed to his lot, and vainly looking around him for the succour and smiles of those laws and that constitution, which exalt his fellow citizens upon his misery and mortification. Then let him consult those eloquent panegyrists of our constitution, Montesquieu, De Lolme, and Blackstone, who have pourtrayed its blessings in such fascinating colours, and let him ask them, does he partake of those inestimable blessings, or does he enjoy that “political liberty” which they have pronounced to be the very end and purpose of that admirable constitution? Let him ask his own heart, whether he has liberty of conscience, and whether he is perfectly free to follow its harmless and honest dictates? The answer will be easily found. It is sealed in the breast of every Englishman.—So much for the present condition of the Catholics of Ireland. From this condition they seek to be relieved. *Ea enim præsidia libertatis petunt, non licentiæ ad oppugnandos alios.*—AN IRISH FREEHOLDER.—*Dublin*, Nov. 6, 1804.

INCAPACITY OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

SIR,—In the conclusion of my last let-

ter, I signified my intention of proceeding to give such an historical sketch of my own, as I may think necessary to the subject I have undertaken. Since that time, and especially since my return to this great capital of information, as well as of empire and commerce, I have not been idle. My materials are ready. They are simple; they are such as will enable me to present to your readers, certainly a more correct, and, if I do not sadly fail in the execution, a much more satisfactory account than has yet appeared, of that portion of our annals. There are, however, some cobwebs still dangling in my path, which I must brush away, before I can conveniently pursue the track which I have marked out for myself. Two or three passages, which, lightly touched here, may only better prepare the mind for that which is to come, would be an impertinent interruption hereafter in the shape of a long note or uninteresting digression. But what I have most at heart (and in all these preliminary discussions, this you must have observed, Sir, has been a leading object with me) is to wipe off some few more of the general and ill-considered aspersions which have been hastily or wantonly thrown on the character of the Parliaments of that period. If I cannot do this, all my labour is fruitless. What may have been the conduct of men, who ought not to have any authority with us, it is of very little importance to know.

An injurious remark of this kind to which I have alluded, has dropped from Sir John Fenn in his curious and entertaining publication of the Paston Papers. From the contents of a letter or two there printed, he has taken occasion to reflect on the dependency of the House of Commons in those days\*. The principal letter is from the Earl of Oxford to Mr. Paston. It thence appears, that the Dukes of York and Norfolk had met at Bury; stayed till the next morning under the same roof; and written a canvassing letter to one of Lord Oxford's tenants in favour of Sir William Chamberlayn and Mr. Henry Grey, as candidates for the county of Norfolk; of whom the Earl expresses his approbation to his friend. Now, Sir, the best mode of trying these pretty observations on past ages, is to apply them to real life, as we see it passing before our eyes. Imagine then, if you will, that during a general election, the illustrious person who is next in succession to the throne (as the Duke of York then was) should dine in company with the present Duke of Norfolk; that the Earl of Oxford should learn

accidentally to whom they wished success, and write to some respectable gentleman of the county, desiring him to add his support; imagine too, that letter to be intercepted & discovered after the gentleman's death, by some prying executor; would any sober-minded man cry out at once, there is an end to all freedom of Parliaments? At least before he raised his voice, would he not ask a little, what was the actual event of the canvass? Let us then ascertain the result, if we can in the instance before us. The first step is to fix the year in which the letter was written; for it has no other date than the 18th of October. All that the editor informs us is, that it must have been before 1455. But it is more easy to point a well-turned sentence, than trace an obscure fact. Sir John Fenn is as sparing of research, as he is generally free of conjecture, on such points. Otherwise he might have found, that for a long series of years there were only two, when, writs for a new parliament having been issued in September, the elections were going on in the middle and end of October; and these were the years 1449 and 1450. It is well known, however, that in October, 1449, Richard, after a truly royal progress through a country which, sent to subdue by arms and martial rigour, he had pacified by mildness and conciliation, was receiving at Dublin Castle, the simple \* presents of respect and affectionate congratulations of the Irish chieftains, on the † birth of his son, afterwards the unfortunate Duke of Clarence. It must therefore have been in 1450; and, accordingly, we find, for the first and last time, the name of ‡ Henry Gray as one of the representatives of that county. But the principal candidate in the same interest, Sir William Chamberlayn, was thrown out. He was beaten by Sir Miles Stapylton, who had been chosen more than once before, and must probably have been known to be attached to the court party, which we have reason to believe he steadily and zealously supported in this parliament, since we know that as soon as it was over, § he got what we might now call a very handsome job. The Queen and the Duke of Somerset, in

\* Castle, then the only wealth of the country. See the catalogue of the Cottonian MSS. lately printed by the House of Commons, where several documents of the Duke's proceedings in Ireland are mentioned.

† Born there on Tuesday, October 21. See *Wm. de Wyreestre*.

‡ *Prynne's Brévvia Parliamentaria Rediviva*.

§ The instrument was dated 1 June, 29 H. VI. See it recited *Rolls. Parl. vol. V. p. 364*.

whose hands the King was even then little more than a passive instrument, selected him with Sir Thomas Scales to have the wardship of the young Duke of Suffolk's estates.

The other canvassing letter addressed to Mr Paston is from the Duchess of Norfolk, and bears date on the 8th of June, "It is thought right necessary," she says, "for divers causes that my Lord have at this time in the parliament such persons as belong to him and are of his menial servants;" wherefore she applies in favour of Mr. John Howard and Sir Roger Chamberlayn. The expressions here used point to some critical epoch, when the Duke himself was too much engaged elsewhere to attend to the election, and when every influence which he possessed may be expected to have been employed in its full extent. It was, in fact, at a moment when they with whom he acted in public had just gained the ascendancy, and historians commonly describe them as having every thing in their power. The date positively refers it to the parliament, which was summoned immediately after the first battle of St. Albans, to meet in the beginning of the following July.

The appellation of menial servants may startle a mere modern reader; but anciently men of considerable rank had appointments in the households of those, who were of still higher rank. This Mr. John Howard was nearly related to his noble master, succeeded afterwards as heir to the estates, and acquired ultimately the title of his family. He was "the Jockey of Norfolk," who fell fighting valiantly for the House of York in Bosworth-field. Sir Roger held the office of Chamberlain to Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, when that popular nobleman fell a sacrifice to the old animosity of Cardinal Beaufort, and the jealous ambition of the Queen and her favourite Suffolk. He was himself arrested, imprisoned, tried, and found guilty; in consequence, as he afterwards publicly asserted, \* of great menaces and intimidations practised on the jury, but he experienced what Hume justly calls the barbarous mercy of the court: he was carried to the place of execution, hanged, cut down alive, marked with a knife to be quartered, and then pardoned. He had lately been restored in blood by the last parliament. The memory of his late noble

master was almost idolized by the common people, and his sufferings in that cause must have endeared him to them. His present friends pursued the same course of politics, and endeavoured in all respects to identify themselves with the party of the deceased Duke of Gloucester; and they were now triumphant in an appeal to the sword. Yet, Sir, could you suppose it? Such was the dependence of the House of Commons, on great men through the servility of the electors, that, instead of Mr. Howard and Sir Roger Chamberlayn, with all their own proper recommendations, and "with all appliances and means to boot," the county returned \* William Calthorp and John Heydon, names which never before appeared in the list of their representatives.

Now I am on the chapter of elections, suffer me, Sir, to mention another disappointment hitherto unknown, of the same Duke of Norfolk. I do it the rather, because it collaterally applies to my principal subject; it coincides with the time of the Duke of York's first protectorate. A vacancy then happened in Suffolk, where the interest of the two Dukes seems to have prevailed more decidedly than in the neighbouring county. The Duke of Norfolk's tenants and servants proceeded in a body to the Husting, the Sheriff, who was probably in the opposite interest, pronounced their behaviour riotous, shut the poll-books, and refused to make any return. A complaint † was brought against him before the council, but in the meantime, one member at least, who would probably have favoured the power of Richard, was thus excluded from a session most critically important.

These three instances, which I have examined, afford us the only satisfactory insight, which I know, into the interior movements of any election in those days; and these happened precisely in the three several occasions, when the Yorkists made the greatest exertions, and were most advantageously circumstanced for making such exertions. Yet, we have seen that the Duke of Norfolk failed in four out of five members, whom he wished to carry. On the other hand, there is a memorable instrument ‡ extant which shews, that in the composition of one of these Parliaments †

\* Prynne's *Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva*.

† The petition stating these facts, with the order of council upon it, dated 27th May, is still extant in MS.

‡ Prynne's *Brevia Parliamentaria Rediviva*, p. 157.

\* His words are "for fyve and drede of gret maner, and dout of losse of their lyves and goodes." See his petition to be restored in blood, which was granted, and ordered to be exemplified 10th May, 32 H. VI. Rolls. Parl. vol. V. p. 450.

east, another sort of influence was more prevalent. Annexed to the return of the Sheriff of Huntingdonshire, in 1450, is a declaration under the seals of 124 freeholders stating, that a candidate not a gentleman by birth, (as a recent law then required him to be) had been put in nomination by a body of 70 freeholders, whose franchises the complainants dispute, but 47 of whom they allow to have been admitted to take the oath, and give their votes without interruption; after which the complainants say, they could not themselves get up to take the oaths, and give their votes, without a breach of the peace, and so from a dread of the inconveniencies that might ensue, they went away without voting at all. This proceeding clearly could not be called any election of their two candidates; it could not even afford a fair conjecture of the sense of the county, as they confess there were 300 good freeholders more. They were returned, however, and as far as appears, safe too. Their qualifications were irresistible. The consideration avowed for nominating them was, that they were of the King's household,\* and therefore, as a great aid to the crown was necessary, they would be most likely to dispatch the supplies and grant away the money of their constituents to the King's satisfaction. The mutual proscriptions which soon ensued in the civil wars will assist us in obtaining some additional information, though imperfect. The names of the principal knights and gentlemen who adhered to one party or the other may there be traced. If we compare them with such lists as remain of the members of the House of Commons, we shall see when one or the other succeeded, though not when they were foiled, as we cannot know what elections were contested; only we may presume, that, in moments of popular ferment and political animosity, both sides would put forth their utmost. The result of such an inquiry, I believe from my own examination, would not essentially vary what we have seen to be the conclusion of a more accurate though very confined investigation.

Here I must at present pause. All which I have now written relates to the princi-

\* This seems to be the sense. But there is some error in the printed copy. The words are, "your men, of your honourable household, named in your Chequer Roll, should be most like the expedition, and to execute and assent to the said aydes for yowe our Sovereigne Lord, &c. &c. There are some declared chasms in the instrument, perhaps it stood originally to intend the expedition, or some similar phrase. Prynne in the errata apologizes that he could not revise the sheets.

ples, which as far as we can discover, entered into the origin and first formation of the popular branch of those Parliaments, whose conduct is hereafter to be more particularly considered. But there are also some imputations which have been cast, partly by enemies, and partly by misjudging friends, on the general dispositions of those assemblies, in some passages of history that bear upon my present subject. To these with your permission, Sir, I shall next address myself.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. T. M. *Middle Temple.*

#### REPEAL OF THE TEST-LAWS.

##### LETTER I.

SIR,—I take the liberty of sending you some considerations on the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, which have occurred to me on reading a letter signed Z., in your last Political Register. At the same time I beg to add, that if there can be adduced any proof of danger to the Protestant church established in England by the enlargement of the privileges of the followers of the Presbyterian and Catholic persuasions, I will most sincerely retract these my opinions.—I understand the objections to the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts to be:—1. The solemn oath taken by His Majesty, at his coronation, to maintain, to the utmost of his power, the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant reformed religion, as established by the law. To preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do, or shall, appertain unto them or any of them.—2. The danger of violating one of the articles of the union between England and Scotland, expressly declared to be a fundamental and essential article, and so to be held in all time coming. (5 Anne c. 8. article 25. section 10. 11.)—3. The fear of re-establishing Popery or Presbyterianism within His Majesty's dominions, by opening a door to the places of power and influence to the enemies of the Protestant church.—To the first objection I beg leave to propose the following answer,—We are to recollect, that the oath is imposed and taken by virtue of an Act of Parliament, and that, Parliaments being omnipotent with regard to temporal matters, may repeal that act. But here it will be asked, would not His Majesty violate his conscience, should he assent to the repeal? by whose assent only can such oath and the duties consequent thereon be dispensed with; and without which no such dispensation can be lawful? This we need not at present con-

sider, as we have only to argue, whether the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts tend to annul, alter, or dispense with the coronation oath.—I have already set out the principal part of the coronation oath which concerns this argument. I will now extract such parts of the Corporation and Test Acts as may be said at all to bear upon the question. The first act is that of the 13 Charles II. stat. 2. c. 1. intitled, An Act for the well-governing and regulating of Corporations. The preamble shews the purposes for which the act was enacted. "Whereas questions are likely to arise concerning the validity of elections of magistrates and other officers, and members in corporations, as well in respect of removing some as placing others during the late troubles, contrary to the true intent and meaning of their charters and liberties: And to the end that the succession in such corporations may be most probably perpetuated in the hands of persons well-affected to His Majesty and the established government, it being too well known, that, notwithstanding all His Majesty's endeavors and unparalleled indulgence in pardoning all that is past, nevertheless many evil spirits are still working." The fourth section describes the members on whom the statute attaches; and the twelfth provides for the future in the following words: "No person or persons shall for ever hereafter be placed, elected, or chosen, in, or to any of the offices or places aforesaid, that shall not have, within one year next before such election, or choice, taken the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the rites of the church of England, &c. &c. and, in default thereof, every such placing, &c. is hereby enacted and declared to be void."—The 25 Char. II. c. 2. is intitled, "An Act for preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants;" and the preamble declares it to be also for "quieting the minds of His Majesty's good subjects."—The second section I take to be, together with the ninth, the only two which require our attention. It follows nearly in these words: "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all and every person or persons that shall be admitted, entered, placed, or taken into any office or offices, civil or military, or shall receive any pay, salary, fee, or wages, by reason of any patent or grant of His Majesty, or shall have command or place of trust, from or under His Majesty, his heirs or successors, or by his or their authority, or by authority derived from him or them, within this realm of

England, dominion of Wales, or town of Berwick upon Tweed, or in His Majesty's navy, or in the several islands of Jersey and Guernsey, or that shall be admitted into any service or employment in His Majesty's or Royal Highness's household or family, shall, when he or they is, or are so admitted, or placed, take the said oaths aforesaid, (the oaths of allegiance and supremacy) and all and every such person and persons so to be admitted, as aforesaid, shall also receive the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, according to the usage of the church of England, within three months after his or their admittance in, or receiving their said authority and employment, in some public church, upon some Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, immediately after divine service and sermon."—The ninth section requires "of the persons concerned in this act, at the same time when they take the aforesaid oaths of supremacy and allegiance, to make and subscribe the declaration following, under the same penalties and forfeitures as before are appointed. I, A. B. do declare, that I do believe there is not any transubstantiation in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or in the elements of bread and wine, at, or after the consecration thereof, by any person whatsoever"—As my argument is adapted to the situation of persons of every persuasion, who can be benefited by the repeal of the Test Acts. I will for brevity sake consider the Catholics as the only people interested.—The King, by his admitting those who hold contrary tenets to the doctrines he is bound to maintain, into his cabinet and into the senate, (and such admission is the extent of the effect expected by the repeal of the acts above cited) does not positively weaken the security of the Protestant church; virtually he may decrease the influence of the Protestants by communicating to others, of a different persuasion, the privileges formerly enjoyed by those of the established church only. But though the opening a door to the friends of a different church may decrease the influence of the Protestants in matters of state, it does not necessarily even interfere in their spiritual concerns, and therefore does not diminish the privileges of the bishops and clergy, or of the churches committed to their charge.—Should, however, such an interference be dreaded, restrictions, as to the number of Catholics to be admitted, either into the senate or the cabinet, may prevent the probability of danger to the established church, or disturbance to the minds of His Majesty's

good subjects.—His Majesty and the country have long enjoyed the loyal services of Catholics in the national fleets and armies; and no danger to the church or state has occurred thereby; but by a strict interpretation of the 25 Ch. II. c. 2. such services were contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.—It may be said, that, in future times, a king less anxious for the welfare of his people, less watchful for the preservation of the established church, than our beloved Sovereign, may repeal the restrictions, and with the greater facility, when the Corporation and Test acts are annulled.—But so it may be said, that hereafter a repeal of the acts in question may take place, and without providing for the security of the Protestant religion, which we have every good reason to suppose, through His Majesty's care, would not be in the least endangered.—But, such arguments relate not to the question; as, the thought of what other kings may do cannot justify His Majesty in the violation of his promise, if the reliefs to the Catholics shall be so construed.—Again: the reason why such oath was imposed on the heirs and successors to the crown of this realm is to be taken into consideration; and, as popery is not so alarming now as when the act containing such oath was enacted, the obligation for strictly watching against Papists is not so strong: and the cause of such statute having ceased, so should the effect: *Cessante causa ceper et effectus*. But, if your patience encourages me, I shall, some other day, trouble you more on this part of my argument, when I come to consider the third objection.—If, however, notwithstanding the strongest arguments which can be offered to His Majesty for the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, and no doubt many stronger than any I can presume to propose may be submitted, the King shall still deem such repeal a wound to his conscience, and His Majesty having certainly as much right as any of his subjects to consider the feelings of his heart, the Catholics should with reverence submit, and Protestants must admire the obligation to keep his promise our Sovereign feels himself bound by, as a further proof of His Majesty's religion and virtue, however they regret he cannot persuade himself that such repeal would not be a forfeiture of his pledged word.—With your permission I will send you my thoughts on the remaining objections next week, as I feel that I should take up too much of your time at present.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant, *BRITANNICUS*.—*Nov. 14th, 1804.*

## PRICE OF BREAD AND LABOUR.

[The following letter was received a few days after the publication of an article (in the Register, p 235 *et seq*) upon the subject of prices, particularly the price of bread.]

SIR,---You are certainly misinformed with respect to the prices of labour. They have been reduced according to the prices of corn, and as low as they were previous to the great scarcity. As provisions become dearer, they will rise again without any difficulty. They are always kept in proportion to the value of the bushel of corn, and the farmers on one hand, and the men themselves on the other, take care to lower and raise them continually. Task work has gone on as usual with able men, but the common labourer has had only his 9s. a week, and nothing of idleness has arisen from the cheapness of bread, and largeness of wages.—I think it is the duty of the minister to provide for the people, at as easy a rate as possible, and I heartily hope that the harvests abroad are such as to allow of great importations, and that such importations will be made accordingly. Our own harvest will fall short of the expectations that might fairly have been formed of it six weeks ago, though, I believe, it will not be by any means so generally deficient as it is supposed. The farmers will take care to avail themselves of the prevalent idea of blight and mildew, to raise the prices, more for the gratification of their own pampered ways of life, than according to the real value of the grain, from the stock in hand, and yield of the year. I will allow every man to make a fair profit, and according to his capital, but the prime necessities of life are not, and ought not to be, articles of speculation; and the increased expenses in a great farmer's manner of living, notwithstanding all the increased rents put upon him, sufficiently prove that his gains are superabundant.—I rather hope that the operation of the corn bill will be in favour of the consumers, as exportation must now be out of the question, and importation may be encouraged; and, ignorant as the lower classes are, they cannot, therefore, imagine that corn will be carried out of the country, when a larger price can be obtained for it at home. The connexion which they will perversely make between war and scarcity, and peace and plenty, is mischievous enough; but, you do Mr. Pitt, in my mind, great injustice, in supposing that they will be influenced by any such senseless cry.—I think you overstrain your arguments, in stating that so much mischief will be done to the poor man from general enclosures. I

suppose, you advert to his right of common, which in nine cases out of ten is of no manner of use to him, and only leads him to expense in keeping a half starved unprofitable cow. And, I think, you would do more fairly to attribute the enormous poor rates to the mismanagement, and overgrown state of the great farmers.—With respect to tithes, the Church has a very small part of the tithes of the kingdom, compared with the lay holders of them, and generally speaking, very few clergymen in a district can be found who take their tithes in kind. It is, I suppose, only against the latter that any outcry can be made by a pompous and stupid Board of Agriculture, for in all cases of composition for tithes, I cannot see how any stop is put to improvement; and as to any increase of scarcity, the clergyman can want no more than he consumes, and must dispose of the remainder.—I would by no means have the clergy placed upon any variable income, nor made dependant either upon government or farmers, upon any principle that is to be settled by either of them. The clergy have a fair and full right to their tithes, and to any increase in the value of land. If government should choose to be at the expense of having a general survey made throughout the kingdom every five years, and enforce the bishops to settle the value of every living in that period, according to the price of corn taken according to an average, on the 24th of December, with the known value of other tithe articles added to it, possibly the clergy might not object to such a plan; and, I do not see that any mischief might arise from it. But, I quite agree with you in recommending any exchange of security, and dependance upon funds for their support.—I am, &c. &c. P.—*Times*, August 14, 1804.

#### CONQUERED COLONIES.

SIR,—In the discussions, which have lately taken place. On the subject of the slave trade, it appears to me that many opinions existed. Some thought the trade should be immediately abolished; some thought it should never be abolished; some thought it should be suspended during the continuance of hostilities; and some that it should not be suspended at all.—But I have never yet heard of any opinion, that the trade should be carried on, if not exclusively, yet preferably, for the benefit of our enemies.—I read in the *Star* of Saturday, Nov. 3d, account of arrivals of four vessels, viz. the *Lady Hobart*, *Nicholson*, *Mary*, and *Prince*, at Demerara, from Africa, viz. at the time when by the treaty of Amiens,

this settlement was to have been given up by us to the Dutch, I was informed on what I apprehend was very unquestionable authority, that this settlement alone had been improved, while, in our possession, by the expenditure of British capital to the enormous amount of *two millions sterling*.—Now, Sir, as there is always a probability, and indeed a general expectation, that, at the conclusion of hostilities, the greater part, if not the whole, of the captured colonies, in the Western hemisphere, will be restored to their former masters, I beg leave, through your Register, to call the public attention to the most outrageous impolicy of suffering a very large portion of British capital to be employed in a channel, the ultimate outlet of which will be exclusively into the coffers of a foreign, not to say a hostile nation. Sir, I should regard this consideration as of sufficient magnitude and force, but others of still greater are behind. Not only is our capital thus immediately misapplied, but, consequently, it tends to enable foreigners to undersell our own subjects, and, which is of still greater moment, by augmenting their West-Indian trade (by far the most prolific parent and fostering nurse of a navy) it puts into their hands the means of rivaling us in that force, to superiority in which alone we must look for the protection of every thing worth preserving.—Not only our high place in the scale of nations, but our very existence as an independent nation.—Therefore, Sir, without entering into the *vetata questio* of the abolition of the slave-trade, I do hope and trust, that immediately on the meeting of parliament measures will be taken to prohibit the carrying it on to any of those places, the whole of which are the property of our enemies.—I am, &c. &c. N. A.—14th Nov. 1804.

#### IRISH VOLUNTEERS.

SIR.—The panegyrists of our volunteer system have been in the habit of appealing triumphantly to the supposed exploits of the Irish yeomanry, in the rebellion of 1798. They have attributed the suppression of that rebellion principally to the valour and alertness of the armed yeomanry corps, and hence they argue for the efficiency of an army so constituted in this country. But, Sir, this triumph rests solely upon a "*suggestio falsi*." It is true that there were yeomanry corps, and that there was a rebellion in Ireland; but it does not follow that the one either suppressed or promoted the other. In fact, those corps were of little or no service in action; they frequently fled before equal numbers of peasants. Those British

officers, who then served in Ireland, will attest this fact. The rebellion was put down, partly by the British Fencible regiments stationed there, partly by the conciliating conduct of Lord Cornwallis, and partly by the disunion and mismanagement of the rebels themselves.—The nature and extent of the services of the yeomanry corps, in that perilous crisis, may be sufficiently ascertained by a perusal of an interesting "History of the Rebellion in the County of Wexford, in 1798," published by Mr. Hay, an eye witness, and a gentleman of very ancient family in that county, who writes with a justness of thought and feeling that stamps respect upon his narrative. I shall instance the evacuation of Wexford, on the 30th of May, 1798.—"The military force on that day in Wexford," says Mr. Hay, p. 99, "consisted of 300 of the North Cork militia, commanded by Colonel Foote; 200 of the Donegal militia, under Colonel Maxwell; five troops of yeoman cavalry, viz those of Wexford, commanded by Capt. Boyd; the Heathfield, by Captain Grogan; the Enniscorthy, by Captain Richards; the Taghmon, by Captain Cox, and the Shilmallier, by Colonel Le Hunte. The yeomen infantry were, those of Wexford, under Doctor Jacob, M. D.; the Enniscorthy, under Captain Pounden; the Scarawalsh, under Captain Corneock; and the Shilmallier, under the Right Honourable George Ogle, with their supplementary men, altogether as many as their original number; and two hundred of the townsmen, amounting in the whole to *twelve hundred men under arms*;" who, "as the town wall was in good condition (indeed Mr. Hay tells us, p. 97, that it was *in full preservation*), might defy as many thousand assailants, not supported by a great superiority of ordnance.—Thus stood Wexford and its garrison. Now for the valour and the tactics of the latter. They shut themselves closely within the walls, fearing to face an irregular mob of a few thousand peasants, whose weapons were pikes, rusty fire-arms and bayonets, and who did not possess, or know how to use, a single piece of ordnance.—Finding, however, that the rebels did not approach them, they at last sallied out; and Mr. Hay tells us, that "Colonel Maxwell, with 200 of the Donegal militia, and Colonel Watson, with the Shilmallier, Wexford, Enniscorthy, Taghmon, and Heathfield yeomen cavalry," amounting to about 300 men, "resolved to sally out in quest of the enemy. They had advanced as far as Belmont, when

"Colonel Watson, eager to reconnoitre, proceeded up the hill, farther than prudence would permit, and was shot from one of the out posts of the insurgents. The Donegal militia then retreated to Wexford, along with the yeomen cavalry, who pressed upon them very much along the road! Immediately after this, a hasty council of war was held, at which it was determined to evacuate the town!!! A general consternation now prevailed, &c. &c."—Thus the death of one man, an English half-pay officer, caused 1200 men to abandon Wexford. Mr Hay's remark is this:—"The town of Wexford was not only most shamefully abandoned, but even surrendered, to all intents and purposes, when it might have been easily defended, although no one will now acknowledge to have been concerned in so scandalous a transaction: and the very persons who ought to have been its most strenuous protectors, from their situation and circumstances, were not only the first to yield it, and to fly so clandestinely, as to put it utterly out of the power of all others besides themselves to retreat, but left even their own wives and families to the mercy of an irritated and ungovernable multitude."—Had Wexford been defended, and it was certain of relief in 24 hours, from Arklow, Ross, Duncannon fort, and Waterford, all within twenty miles, and garrisoned with upwards of 2000 troops (I do not mean yeomen corps), and had the defence, or rather quiet occupation, of the town been persevered in for three days, it must have been relieved amply from Dublin, only 60 miles distant, where good troops were daily arriving from the north and from England.—Annexed to Mr. Hay's History is a map, which assigns to Wexford a strong military position, partly on a hill, partly flanked by a broad navigable river, very near the sea, and thereby commanding a constant supply of provisions. It formerly withstood obstinate sieges against disciplined armies, and never was deemed untenable, save against the armed peasants, by a volunteer force!—Similar instances are recorded by Mr. HAY, p. 113, 200, 261, and almost *passim*; and his opinion of the yeomanry corps is much confirmed by the Rev. Mr. Gordon, the Protestant historian of the same county, and rector of a parish.—Now, Sir, if it appears incontestably, that the Irish yeomen corps (sharpened against the peasantry, as they certainly were, by political and religious hatred, and of vehement tempers), manifested no superiority, when opposed to a semi barbarous and semi armed

rabble; if they appear also to have been driven out of Enniscorthy, another strong hold, with great precipitation, when fairly attacked in the open day; if also the defeats of Captain Adams, Colonel Foote, General Walpole, &c. and the surrender or slaughter of their detachments, inspired them with terror and dismay; if it appears most probable that the armed yeomanry, if unsupported, would have been speedily crushed by the peasantry; if these be facts, surely the example of the Irish yeomanry cannot, with any justice, be cited in support of a similarly constituted force in this country; nor can thinking men rely, with any degree of prudence, upon such a force for protection against the disciplined and regular brigades of Napoleon.—FLAMINIUS... *November 1st, 1804.*

### PUBLIC PAPER.

**FRENCH CIRCULAR NOTE.**—*Circular Note from M. Talleyrand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs to all the Agents of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.*—*Dated Aix-la-Chapelle, Sep. 5, 1804.*

You must, Sir, have observed and known, according to my instructions at the time of the communication of the note of Lord Hawkesbury to the Foreign Ministers residing in London, the impression which this publication of the strongest maxims of political and social morality could not fail to produce on the mind of the government with which you reside. I think I ought to return to the subject. I therefore send you, officially, a copy of this note, and expressly charge you, by order of his Majesty, to make it the object of a special conference with the ministry.—The project which the English government has conceived for the last half century, gradually to abolish the tutelary system of public law which unites and engages all civilized nations, develops itself with a fearful progression. Will other governments refrain from making opposition to such an enterprise till there no longer exist any moral bond which may preserve their rights, guarantee their engagements, and protect their interests?—The powers of the Continent have seen with what audacity the faith of oaths has been sported with by this government, and solemn treaties violated, even before they were carried into execution. The maritime nations every day experience its tyranny. There no longer exists any theoretical principle of navigation, any written Convention, which have not been scandalously violated on every shore, and in

every sea. Neutral states know, that even in using the rights which still remain to them with the most timid circumspection, they expose themselves to insult, to pillage, and to extermination.—Those states, in fine, which have the unhappiness to be at war, no more rely on any reciprocal principle of moderation and justice. All the bonds existing between them and the neutral powers are broken. Approach to the coasts and entrance into the ports and islands, though situate at the distance of 200 leagues from the station of their squadrons, have been prohibited by simple proclamation.—Thus the English government has hitherto opposed to every power, according to its particular position, a maxim injurious to its honour, and subversive to all its rights. It now attacks them altogether, and the more completely to attain its end, directs its blow against morality itself, and if I may so speak, against the religion of public law.

*(To be continued.)*

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**SIR GEORGE RUMBOLD.** (Continued from p. 782) This gentleman has, since the last Register was published, arrived in London.—On his arrival at Paris, he was conveyed to the Temple, where he was treated with civility, and where he remained two days and two nights. On the third day he was removed from the Temple, and conveyed towards the coast of the channel, having first signed a parole, that he would not return to Hamburgh, nor, after his departure from France, go within fifty miles of any part of the French territories. Before he left the Temple, he made an application for his papers, which were in the hands of the minister of the police; but, this demand was peremptorily refused. Thus stripped of his diplomatic character as well as his documents, he was put into a carriage with his servant, and conveyed first to Boulogne, where he remained a day or two. Thence he was taken to Cherbourg, where he was put on board of a flag of truce, on Thursday, the 15th instant. This vessel fell in with his Majesty's frigate the Niobe, where Sir George was taken on board. He landed at Portsmouth on Saturday, the 17th instant, and came to London on Sunday.—The release of Sir George Rumbold has, by the ministerial papers, been ascribed, in great part, if not entirely, to the remonstrances, not to say threats, of the King of Prussia, who, we are told, upon hearing of the act of violence committed

upon our minister to Hamburgh, immediately dispatched a courier to General Knoblesdorff (who had just set out for Paris for the purpose of assisting at the coronation, and of presenting thereupon the congratulations of his master) to prevent him from appearing in his friendly capacity, until an explanation was given relative to the seizure of the British minister. One of these writers adds: "the King of Prussia also sent for his *best* general, the Duke of Brunswick, and the Elector of Hesse Cassel, who, in addition to his talents as a general, can furnish a considerable auxiliary army!" Another writer told us of "the sensation which the whole Continent, not excepting the Batavian republic, had experienced on this occasion;" while a third had the "inexpressible happiness to congratulate a generous and enlightened people upon the important occurrence which had, at last, humbled the haughty tyrant, and prepared the way for his speedy overthrow."

—Though I was very willing to count myself amongst the "enlightened people," I was much afraid, that the congratulations of our friend in the Morning Post were some what premature; and, I think, my apprehensions are now nearly confirmed. The French papers do, indeed, allow, that Sir George Rumbold was released in consequence of the interference of Prussia. This is plainly stated in the *Moniteur* of the 11th instant, in the following words. "Mr. Rumbold, the English Agent at Hamburgh, arrested within cannon shot of the advanced post of the French army of Hanover, and carried to Paris, has been liberated through the protection of the King of Prussia, and has been sent to England by the way of Cherbourg. If the proceedings against this worthy associate of Drake, Spencer Smith, and Taylor, had been completed, they would have furnished instances as remarkable as those of his accomplices."—Yet, if the release of Sir George Rumbold had been demanded by the King of Prussia, and, especially in the manner which has been described; if that Monarch had really been preparing for war; if he had, in good earnest, sent for his "*best* general" upon the occasion; if he had, at last, drawn forth his rusty though rusty weapon, and sworn to obtain reparation for the wrong; if this had been the case, it is hard to discover a reason why Sir George Rumbold should be obliged to leave his papers behind him, and also to sign a parole not to return to the

court whence he was taken, nor even to go within fifty miles of the French territory! It has been said, that this article in the *Moniteur* clearly proves that Buonaparté yielded with reluctance to the application of Prussia; that he has acted under the influence of terror; that the demand of Prussia has been peremptory; that Buonaparté has been forced to relinquish his prey by a superior power. But, to this there is an objection, which one would be very glad to see removed; to wit; if the above-quoted article in the *Moniteur* does so clearly show all this, how came it to be inserted in the *Moniteur*? After all that we have been told, and truly told, about the French press, which is not exceeded, in point of respectfulness, even by that of Calcutta, or of Dublin; after we have, for years, regarded the articles in the *Moniteur*, as being all sanctioned, if not actually written or dictated, by persons in the French government; after all this, it will hardly be suggested, that the above article found its way into print without the consent or knowledge of that government. Indeed, the writer alluded to proceeds upon the contrary supposition; for, he represents the article as the "growing and foaming" of Buonaparté himself. To what, then, short of downright insanity, can we possibly ascribe the publication of an article by Buonaparté, which article is "a proof," that he has yielded to the peremptory demands of Prussia, that he has relinquished his prey to a superior power, that he has acted under the influence of terror? One of two positions admit not of dispute: either Napoleon is mad, or he did not think that the article in question contained any such "proof" as that we have been speaking of; and, I must confess, that my opinion inclines to the latter. He certainly did not think that this article would convey any proof of his having acted under the influence of terror; nor, indeed, does it, as far as I can perceive. Different persons see the same act in different lights; but, I see nothing in the conduct of the French government, upon this occasion, that indicates any fear at all; and, perhaps, the yielding, in appearance, to the wish of Prussia, in a certain degree, was intended merely to silence those, who were daily representing Prussia as being the vassal, and as existing by the suzerainty of France. It may be regarded as seeing with glass eyes; but, it would not at all surprize me, if this apparent concession made to Prussia was chiefly intended to give consequence to that power in comparison to Russia; and further, to

make the congratulation of Prussia upon the approaching coronation appear as the act of a powerful and perfectly independent monarchy. By insisting upon keeping the papers of Sir George Rumbold, and, more especially by taking his parole, Buonaparté adheres to and acts upon the principle laid down in the circular note of Talleyrand (see p. 819); and, by stating demi-officially, in the *Moniteur*, that Sir George Rumbold has been personally set at liberty at the request of the King of Prussia, the purpose of giving consequence to Prussia and of rescuing her from the charge of abject dependence is, in some degree, affected.—This is the light, in which I view the transaction. I wish my opinion may prove erroneous; I wish that Prussia may have resolved to obtain a retraction of the principle adopted by the French and promulgated in the above-mentioned circular note; but, from every thing that has yet transpired, there is but too much reason to fear, that Prussia will push the matter no farther. —If we had an army, indeed, to send to the continent; then might we with some reason call upon Prussia to take up arms. But, we have none; and, therefore, however “honest” we may be, and however roguish we may think the powers of the continent, we can hardly expect them to begin a war for Sir George Rumbold, as the Greeks did for Helen, especially after he has been given up.—The French circular note really interdicts all our ministers upon the continent. The ground of this interdiction, is, that Lord Hawkesbury, in his note of the 30th of April, 1804, asserts the right of employing diplomatic agents in stirring up the revolt in states, with which their country is at war, they themselves residing, at the same time, at neutral courts. So far the statement of the “solid young lord’s” doctrine is correct; but, Talleyrand insinuates, this statesman of ours has contended for the right of employing our diplomatic agents, so situated, in furthering the purposes of assassination. This is false. No such right is contended for; though, as was stated, and I think proved, at the time, the note of Lord Hawkesbury, in talking about *aiding the people of France against an usurper* was not easily to be reconciled with the peace and “amity,” which he had negotiated and, in his majesty’s name, concluded with that usurper.\*—The ministerial papers are

now affecting to treat the correspondence of Méhé and Mr. Drake as a “fabrication,” not recollecting, perhaps, that Lord Hawkesbury never denied its authenticity, but that, on the contrary, he supposed a case like that of Mr. Drake, and defended (as well as he could!) such conduct in a person so situated. It is rather too broad, therefore, for the partisans of ministers now to call Mr. Drake’s letters “a fabrication.” But, the truth is, that the circular letter of Lord Hawkesbury does give but too much countenance to the charge now preferred by the French, as will, I think, clearly appear to any one, who will take the trouble to read the pages of vol. V. just referred to. First to make a treaty of “amity” with a man; solemnly to pledge yourself to discourage all attempts to disturb his government; to receive from him territories belonging to his allies; to regard these territories as your own for ever; and, after all this, the moment you quarrel with him, to turn round short upon him, declare him an usurper and not entitled to the same treatment as other sovereigns or chiefs of nations; this was something which could not fail to shock the world. It does not justify the measures now taken by Buonaparté; but, it gives a fatal countenance to those measures.—The doctrine laid down by Lord Hawkesbury, in the above-mentioned letter, relative to the seizure and detention of the English prisoners in France is, by a correspondent of mine, disputed, particularly as it applies to the case of Sir James Crauford. There is not room to insert his remarks at present, but they shall be inserted in my next; for, it is, in this, as in all other cases, *truth* that I am seeking to establish.

MR. CANNING AND LORD HAWKESBURY.—Upon the subject of the note which appeared in the preceding sheet, p. 783, I have been told that I am deceived; and, that it is Mr. Canning who has acted the submissive part, and not his lordship. But, barely telling either me or the public this appears by no means satisfactory. We know; all the world knows, that, in the debate of the 18th of June last, Mr. Canning did say: “I shall content myself with “vindicating my own consistency. *I objected* to the administration of foreign affairs, and *that has been changed.*” Nothing could be plainer than this. The words admit of no palliation. They have a clear meaning, and only that meaning. Lord Hawkesbury had, at the time when Mr. Canning made the above declaration, actually been removed from the administration

\* See this subject discussed, Register, Vol. 5. p. 688, and seq.

of foreign affairs; and, the conclusion is, that he had been removed in consequence of Mr. Canning's objection to him. Nobody finds any fault with his removal: no; that were indeed to discover a most unreasonable propensity to censure; but, every one may be allowed to admire the hereditary patriotism and "self-devotedness" which have induced his lordship to continue in office under such circumstances. He sees the state in danger, and nothing can make him desert his post. Glorious example! Why should it not be followed by Lord Grenville, Mr. Fox, and even by the Prince himself? That is to say, if Mr. Canning has no "objection" to them!

MINISTERIAL INTRIGUES.—(Continued from page 800). Before I proceed to consider the consequences of such a coalition as that which the ministerial writers seem to wish for, it is necessary to notice, and to quote at full length, an article, which, upon this subject, appeared in the newspaper called the SUN, of the 20th instant, and which evidently comes from some one of those who are deeply interested in the success of the intrigues, which the ministers have been carrying on for a week or two past: "We have scarcely been more gratified in the satisfaction we have felt at the reconciliation which has taken place in the Royal Family than we have been amused with the comments which the Opposition have made upon this happy event. —We were certainly induced to consider this fortunate circumstance as a most important occurrence for the country, without any reference whatever to party—but the fears which one party betrays would almost lead us to doubt whether we viewed it in a proper light.—When Mr. E— runs about Westminster Hall, assuring every body "upon his honour that party "has nothing to do with it," we are almost tempted to ask him, as a professional man, whether there is a more common ground of suspicion than an eagerness to disprove *that which has never been advanced?* The opposition writers too cannot refer to the subject without suffering their fears to press out—they cannot touch upon it without a mixture of abuse upon Mr. Pitt. Now it is very proper and very natural for them to abuse him with a reference to his political measures, but to abuse him with a reference to that which they affect to approve, can only draw from us a smile. —The Prince of Wales, we believe, possesses the best dispositions; but it is not uncommon for those who possess such

dispositions to listen too much to those who entertain very opposite feelings. We have before asserted, that the Prince cannot become a party man without degrading himself. We should be as sorry to see him the partisan of Mr. Pitt, as of Mr. Fox or Mr. Sheridan—nay, we will go further, we cannot countenance the supposition that he is so, without his name being used for purposes which he would be the first to condemn. He can only obviate this, and place himself where he ought to stand in the opinion of the country, by shewing, by his public conduct, that he is no party-man. If he has ever in any degree so considered himself, those who have advised him to it have given bad counsel; but of this we are sure, that he has never gone those lengths in any party cause which those who have thought they might profit by it have chosen to represent.—And here we discover the cause of that anxiety on the part of the Opposition which we have noticed above. Some of its members may have discovered that they cannot now so freely use the name of the Prince as the engine of party, in which way he may be sure it has been employed much to his disadvantage. If he knew to what purposes that name has been committed—what promises it has been supposed to sanction, we are persuaded he would not disagree with us in our opinion upon this point. He would feel that this opinion is not actuated by political adherence to any men, but by attachment to the constitution, loyalty to our Sovereign, and, as a part of the same feeling, by a deep anxiety for the character, the honour, and the welfare of every person belonging to his august family, and particularly of the Heir Apparent of the throne.—We believe that upon this happy occasion the Prince has consulted his own feelings, and has employed that good sense which he is known to possess. If he has looked back into history, he may have seen that differences between Father and Son, in the instances of persons situated as he is, have seldom so much arisen from the feelings of the parties themselves as they have been fomented by interested individuals; that by such differences nothing has been gained to the persons immediately concerned, but that all have been sufferers. If any such reflection has arisen in his mind, he cannot fail to have applied it with peculiar force to his own case. He has a father, endeared to the nation by a

"most virtuous life; by a mild, just, and beneficent reign; with whose afflictions his subjects have deeply sympathized, and whose happiness has always been an object nearest to their hearts.—Influenced by such considerations, the Prince of Wales must have felt himself actuated by the strongest private and public motives to a cordial reconciliation with his Royal Father; and his Majesty's kind and benevolent feelings must have created a similar wish and anxiety on his part. If Mr. Pitt and Lord Moira (as we understand) have been principally instrumental in producing this union, they deserve the thanks of the nation. Every good man will wish to cement it. None will endeavour to disturb it, except those who, to serve selfish and party purposes, are regardless of the best interests of the country."—This writer has in view to disguise the feelings of disappointment now experienced by the minister and his expecting adherents, who were eagerly looking forward to the renewal of a long lease of their power and emoluments. — He unquestionably points at Mr. ERSKINE in the blank after the letter E; and, it is with peculiar delicacy that he appears to treat with contempt the idea of Mr. Erskine's *honour*, after having, only a few days before, expressed his anxious desire to see that gentleman's "powerful aid brought to the government in the great council of the nation." But, where shall we look for assurance equal to that, which has led this writer to discover the fears of the opposition, in their "eagerness to disprove *that which has never been advanced?*" That which has never been advanced! Why, was it not advanced, on the second day after the reconciliation took place, that this reconciliation was to lead (and immediately too) to political consequences? Was it not rumoured first, then reported, then said, and then asserted, that Lord Moira had actually accepted the post of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland? Is not this notorious to all the world? Was it not advanced, in the passages of a ministerial paper, quoted in the Register of last week, that "from the immediate *parliamentary* friends of the Prince an active and cordial co-operation in the affairs of the state might reasonably be looked for?" Were not Lord Moira, Mr. Erskine, and Mr. Sheridan particularly mentioned as persons, who, in consequence of the royal reconciliation, were about to join the minister? And, therefore, was it, on the part of Mr. Erskine, for

instance, "an eagerness to disprove that which had never been advanced?"—The opposition writers cannot refrain from "suffering their fears to press out." Fears of what? Is it possible, then, that the opposition writers should express their fears of a junction with Mr. Pitt? A fear of sharing in the power and emoluments of the state? Is the contamination, then, so much to be dreaded?—No, Mr. Pitt is not censured by the opposition writers for having contributed towards the reconciliation of the two royal persons so often mentioned, but for endeavouring to make that reconciliation the means of raising parliamentary recruits, and that he has so endeavoured is gathered from the confessions of the ministerial writers. The opposition writers do not affect to approve, but they really do approve, of the conduct of every one who has promoted the reconciliation; but this approbation is given with the proviso, that the persons promoting the reconciliation have had no party, no selfish, purpose in view.—It is very plausible language to deprecate the idea of the Prince becoming "the head of a party," a "party man," and so forth; but, if there be a minister of such a domineering disposition as to compel a prince to be the head of a party, or to be nothing at all but a mere pensioner of the state, is a prince, in such case, not to seek the only means of supporting his consequence?—As this ministerial writer seems to be willing to suffer Lord Moira to take a small share with Mr. Pitt in the public applause; it is to be hoped that his lordship will soon cease to cut so conspicuous a figure as he now does in the ministerial caricature-shop; and, I think, too, that the *plume of feathers* might be withdrawn from some of the scenes here alluded to, since Mr. Pitt has, at last, *condescended* not only to make overtures of *amity*, but also for a co-operation with the Prince and his friends. Far be it from me to blame Mr. Pitt for his anxious desire to gain the good will of his Royal Highness. Far, very far indeed, be it from me to blame him for now showing a becoming degree of respect and humility towards the son and heir apparent of his Sovereign; for though this respect and humility certainly came very late, still they are enjoined by duty; nor is the labourer of the eleventh hour to be envied by those who have borne the heat of the day. But, then, this respect and humility should be sincere. They should be simple. They should flow from repentance and not from ambition. They should look

solely to an oblivion of the past, and not to power, honours and rewards for the future. It would, was this the time and place, be easy to show, that a very close personal intimacy, and more especially a political co-operation, of the Prince and Mr. Pitt would, and must, produce feelings and opinions, which might prove extremely dangerous to the monarchy, and, of course, to the people. A correspondent, whose letter shall appear in the next Register, has taken a view of the account which Mr. Pitt would have to render his Royal Highness of the *improvement* which he has made, during his twenty years administration, in the affairs of his royal master; and a most striking view it is! What, therefore, without entering into detail, we may ask; what must necessarily be the feelings of the nation, if the Prince, by his conduct, were to discover an insensibility as to that which has made so deep an impression upon the minds of all other men? To forgive injuries committed against themselves is becoming in all men, if the party offending show (in a way adapted to the nature of the case) a proper degree of contrition; but, injuries committed against princes are committed also against their subjects; and, it sometimes becomes the duty of a prince to resent politically that which personally he has entirely forgiven. How much stronger is the case, how much more imperious the duty, then, when it is the injuries and disgraces of a nation which are to be forgiven! No one would wish to see the Prince personally resentful towards Mr. Pitt; no one would wish to see him pursue that minister even politically; but, I am persuaded, that no one who sincerely wishes well to either the prince or the monarchy, would recommend to his Royal Highness to do any act, which, in the minds of the people, should tend to identify him with Mr. Pitt and his system; and, further, I think he should do no act, that might cause the people to suppose that he did *not disapprove* of that system: I mean the general system by which Mr. Pitt has governed, and still governs, the country.—The ministerial writer has hinted, that the times are ticklish, and that, therefore, the Prince will do well to hasten to a reconciliation and co-operation with the present minister; which sentiment has been expressed by another writer of the same stamp, who has hinted that the only way for the prince to preserve the throne which is his inheritance, is, “to support the government of his father;” and here *government* is, as is usual in all such cases, put for mi-

nistry. Now my opinion is exactly the contrary of this. Those who think (if any one can think so), that, during the twenty years administration of Mr. Pitt, the nation has lost nothing in its liberties or its glory; those who think that they see honourable, prosperous, and tranquil days approaching under the rule of that gentleman, may, possibly, be justified in recommending to the Prince to embark his political reputation along with Mr. Pitt; but, the same recommendation would certainly not be justifiable in those, who think, as I do, that the system of Mr. Pitt cannot be persevered in without adding to the national disgrace, without a further and further abridgment of its liberties, and without producing, finally, such consequences and events as would shake the throne to its centre. —From the same persuasion it is, that I should dread any such coalition as that pointed at by the *Morning Post*. It would be truly alarming to see the Prince and his “*parliamentary friends*” (to use the phrase of the ministerial writer) become the partizans of Mr. Pitt and his system; but, if the opposition could be brought over, or divided, there would, at once, be an end of the hopes of all that part of the people, whose hopes tend towards the safety and honour of the country. If the leaders of the opposition, together with the aristocracy, were to suffer themselves to be inveigled into the embraces of Mr. Pitt and his loan-jobbers, the people would either abandon the cause of their country entirely, they would either become totally indifferent as to its fate; or, they would seek for new leaders. They would look for other men to espouse their cause: a new race, quite a new race, of public men would arise; and, the danger would consist in this, that this new race of men would look to, and depend for success *solely upon the people*; the aristocracy having joined the jobbers and ranged themselves under the banners of Mr. Pitt. At first, indeed, supposing the combination to exist for a while, there would be a dead calm. But *events* must come on, and occasions must offer for the creating of the race, of which I have been speaking; and, as to what description that race would be of; what would be their principles and their conduct; what would be the consequences of their endeavours, it is by no means difficult to conjecture. In short, it is my firm persuasion, that, a junction between Mr. Pitt and the leaders of the opposition, he being prime minister, would in-

evitably produce the destruction of the monarchy, if not the subjugation of the country. And, I am not talking of *distant* consequences. We have any time these two years been told that we are in "the crisis of our fate." When things are come to a crisis, it requires but a short time, and no very great event, to effect a total change. Three or four years would be quite sufficient; and the quartern loaf at half a crown; a sudden and great degradation of the paper-money, or some such circumstance, would be more than enough to put an end at once to all our hopes and our fears.—[This subject shall be resumed in my next.]

THE MAN OF NO PARTY.—In a poem, published a few years ago, from under the pen of Mr. Canning and others, the French atheist LEPEAU was emphatically styled, "*the man without a God.*" As Lepeau was in religion, nearly such a *as* to political matters, "*a man without a party.*" On this subject I have selected, from SWIFT, some excellent sentiments, as a motto to the present sheet. The selection has been made from the 45th EXAMINER. The whole passage is so good, and at this time so well worthy of the attention of every man in the country, *from the peasant even to the prince*, that I cannot refrain from inserting it entire. "Whoever calls himself a man of no party, you may depend upon it is of a party; but, it is such a party as he is ashamed to own. For even while he says he is of no party, you may observe, from the whole drift of his discourse, that he is plainly prejudiced in favour of one party, and that too always the worst. And the true reason of his not declaring is, that he thinks the party not yet strong enough to protect him. The justice of the cause, or the goodness of the intention, seems to be out of this gentleman's scheme. The only distinction he goes by is, to be professedly of no party, that he may occasionally be of either. Others there are, who are really of a party, and don't know it; they carry on designs which are kept a secret from them; and these indeed are such insignificant tools of a party, that they may properly enough be said to be of no party: they are machines purely passive: and, without any will of their own, obey the impulse of the wheel that moves them. But you shall never hear a man of true principles say

"he's a man of no party; he declares he is of a party, if resolutely to stand by and defend the constitution both in Church and State, must be called being of a party. But the other party it seems, is to be divided into two sorts; those who are of that party, and those who are of no party at all. With the gentleman who apply this latter expression to themselves, I would beg leave to reason thus: either they are of a party, or they are not; if they are, they perverticate grossly (not to use a more unbecomingly expression), while they give out the contrary. If they are not, they ought to be ashamed of such an infamous neutrality, and of deserting that cause which they are bound in honour and conscience to defend."—Your man of no party is generally furnished very liberally with imudence as well as hypocrisy; and, as to his political character, he is by turns, a brutal demagogue and a smooth-tongued sycophant. None better than he knows how to wriggle the sovereign people, or to flatter the ear of his prince. He changes oftener than the weather, and no change, however sudden or great, ever raises a blush upon his cheek; and, the only justification he ever thinks it worth his while to put forward, is that he has *altered his opinion*, without ever being able to give any one reason from which such alteration has arisen. The fundamental axiom of his creed is, that the end sanctifies the means; the end of which he never, for one moment, loses sight, is, his own private interest; and, in pursuing this, he boggles at nothing. He is generally a second rate man in point of talents, and of the very lowest rate of all in point of birth and family connexion. Such and so situated as to make him look downwards with insolent pride, and upwards with envy and hatred.

I wished very much to make some observations upon the *price of provisions*, particularly by way of answer to a correspondent in a former part of this sheet.—The further *Prorogation of Parliament* would, too, afford matter for comment. My readers may be assured, that it is to be ascribed to any thing rather than a *full treasury*, three quarters of the civil list being already behind hand again!—No; it is in order to try once more the chapter of accidents. The intention of the former *Prorogation*, was, to endeavour to *strengthen the ministry* before the Parliament opened.

" Mr. Nares commences his attack upon the Farmers; accuses them of cruelty and avarice; raises the old cry of *monopoly*; and expresses some doubts, whether the better way would not be, to subject their granaries to the controul of an exciseman, and to levy heavy penalties upon those, in whose possession corn, beyond a certain quantity, to be fixed by law, should be found. This style of reasoning is pardonable enough in those who argue from the belly, rather than the brain; but in a well-fed and well-educated clergyman, who has never been disturbed, by hunger, from the free exercise of cultivated talents, it merits the severest reprehension. EDINBURGH REVIEW, Vol. I. p. 129.

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SOUTH AMERICA.

SIR,—Previous to the Treaty of Amiens, that treaty which its authors told us was "a peace of experiment," but which, might with more propriety have been called "the superfluity of experiment," many persons seemed to believe in the possibility of living at peace with new modelled France. The "experiment," however, soon convinced them of the fallacy of this opinion; and men of all parties now agree in considering the actual situation of France—that is to say, her enormous aggrandizement, which places so many million of men at her disposal, together with all the ports of Europe from Cuxhaven to Venice; the nature of her government, which acknowledges no law but convenience and caprice, and no means but violence; the present temper of her people, who seem to desire no other recompence for the disgraceful slavery in which they are held by a Corsican usurper, than the plunder and subjugation of other nations; and, above all, the occupancy of every part of the Ocean from Ferrol to the mouth of the Elbe—as the immediate cause of imminent, perpetual, and ever increasing danger to Great Britain. And thus, though all are desirous of peace, no one dares to hope for it, because every one feels it to be impossible in the actual situation of things. The first condition of a treaty with Buonaparté should be, the destruction of the flotillas destined for the invasion of this country; and who is weak enough to imagine him disposed to listen to such a demand?—There is, too, another point on which there appears to be but one opinion; namely, the impossibility on the part of Great Britain, of making, single-handed, any considerable impression on France. It is acknowledged that she is sufficiently powerful to conquer, single-handed, the colonies of her enemy, to assist the maritime countries in casting off the yoke of their task-master, to harass his trade by confining it to what he may carry on by land or in neutral bottoms, in a word, to perplex him in every possible shape; but, it is denied, that she can ever succeed in

tearing from him, by force of arms, those countries from which he immediately threatens the destruction of Great-Britain.—Thus far, men of all descriptions are entirely agreed; but, the moment they enter upon the nature of the warfare to be carried on against an enemy so powerful and so inveterate, they fly off into two distinct parties.—The former tell us: 1. that since Great-Britain cannot deliver Europe from the yoke of France, nor confine that restless and ambitious nation within its ancient limits, we ought therefore to abandon the Continent to its own fate, that is to say, to those divisions and to that spirit of weakness and irresolution which announce its approaching destruction, unless those powers who are still respectable do not speedily rally round that standard, which the sovereign of the most extensive empire in the universe has so nobly raised in support of a cause, in which neither his rivals nor his enemies can possibly impute to him the slightest motive of personal ambition: 2. that we ought to confine ourselves to placing the country in such a state of defence as shall take from the enemy the desire of attempting an invasion: 3. that in abandoning to him the empire of the Continent, we ought to reserve to ourselves the empire of the seas, and seek in our industry and in the extension which will thereby be given to our commerce, the means of supporting that state of defence, which, though necessary, is acknowledged on all hands to be extremely burthensome to the nation. In short, the advocates of this system confine the policy of Great-Britain to this—"that she ought always to be at war and never conquered." They have taken for their emblem a porcupine with its quills bristled, and occasionally darting them at the tyger seeking to devour it: their motto is "*Non me tangere*."—The advocates of the defensive system are not without arguments in support of their doctrine. They tell us: 1. that though this state of habitual defence may be expensive to Great-Britain, the state of habitual menace which France has adopted is not less so

to that country : 2. that though sums to an enormous amount may be expended to obtain this object, the whole of the money so expended remains in the country ; while, on the contrary, the sums which would otherwise be laid out in subsidies, or for the payment of troops employed on the Continent, would be entirely lost to this country : 3. that war secures to Great-Britain an exclusive commerce, and, consequently, a vast increase of revenue to its government : 4. that if, by the tyranny of the Despot of Europe, commerce is thrown for a time out of its natural channel, fresh ones will be opened by contraband traffic : and lastly, the advocates of this system never fail to prop up their arguments for totally separating the interests of Great-Britain from those of the Continent, by invectives against the pusillanimity, the bad faith, and the selfishness of the powers of the Continent, by common place observations on the inefficacy of war-like coalitions, and by methodistical cant on the unchristian-like conduct of paying for the effusion of human blood.—The other party, leaning upon the example of all ages, and more particularly upon the principles of policy constantly pursued by the British nation, maintain, that since the danger which at present threatens Great-Britain arises solely from the overgrown power of France, it is not by a system purely defensive, a system as precarious as it is humiliating and expensive, that she ought to be secured from it, but by striking at the very root of the evil, that is to say, by setting bounds to this monstrous and overgrown power : that if England cannot, single-handed, accomplish this desirable object, she ought cordially and actively to unite with the powers of the Continent actuated by the same motive, not by making a trifling diversion beneficial only to herself, for the purpose of seizing a few colonies, which would only withdraw a portion of the defenders of the mother country for the moment, but by directing a powerful and efficacious attack against the weak side of the common enemy : that to keep England in a constant state of alarm, Buonaparte has only to spread the major part of his troops between Brest and the Texel, where they are not more expensive to him, than they would be in any other part of his frontiers : that the money employed on the Continent in subsidies or otherwise, is not, as some affect to tell us, lost to Great-Britain, inasmuch as this same money must, in the long run, and even in the course of a few years, return to the nation which is the most industrious, in payment for articles with which that in-

dustry supplies the Continent : that though, by means of a contraband traffic, commerce may succeed in opening the channels which violence would close, the system of contraband acts always as a fresh duty on the value of the merchandize, and that Buonaparté being the supreme director of all the contraband trade carried on in the countries subject to his dominion, and the only receiver of duties arising therefrom, this duty on the goods export-d thither from Great Britain operates almost entirely to his advantage, and may be continued at his discretion : that in proportion as Buonaparté strengthens and extends his dominion, this alternate system of prohibition and pillage will also be extended and strengthened : that it is not new colonies nor raw materials, that Great Britain stands in need of, but fresh markets for them : that though, on the one hand, the rigorous exclusion of British goods for one, two, or three years, would be severely felt by the countries subject to the will of Buonaparté, it would, on the other, be ruinous to Great-Britain and completely destructive to her manufactures : that a system purely defensive would make Great-Britain a world separate and distinct from the rest of the habitable globe, "*penitus toto divisis orbe Britannos*:" that by thus separating themselves from their fellow-creatures, Englishmen would subscribe to that system of banishment which their implacable enemy has pronounced against them, and which he is now striving by every means, both of cunning and of violence, to put into execution : that though in a recent publication, a partisan of the defensive system has enumerated several enterprises, which failed of success because they were either badly planned, badly executed, or undertaken merely by way of *experiment* (for now a days politics and war, like chemistry and physics, are become *experimental sciences*) it would, nevertheless, be no difficult task to point out others of a nature far more important, and which, by a happy co-operation of the navy of England with the land forces of her continental allies, would assuredly be attended with the desired success ; and that, consequently, the great object of British policy should be, to rouse the powers of the Continent, both by her example and her co-operation to a re-union of their forces against the disturber of their repose : lastly, that should all these efforts prove unsuccessful, should these powers, insensible to the noble example presented by Russia and Sweden, still persist in their fatal inactivity, it will then be the duty of England to explore in distant countries fresh sources of riches and

of power, beyond the reach of the envy of her rivals and the fury of her enemies.— On this point, too, men of all descriptions entertain but one opinion; they differ, however, as to the mode of execution. The plan which appears to be most in favour, is that of *revolutionizing* America! —Against a doctrine so monstrous, and which, to the disgrace of the age we live in, is broached in all conversations and openly avowed in recent publications, it is high time to enter a protest. Good God, Sir, *to revolutionize*!! And have we, then, forgotten, that this word, invented to describe the most terrible scourge that can possibly afflict the human race; that this word, unfortunately so comprehensive, expresses the union of every evil—universal plunder and proscription, assassination in all its shapes, a systematic confiscation of property, the overthrow of all laws divine and human, of all institutions religious and political; and as a definite result, according to the political circumstances of the society to which it attaches, either complete anarchy and a degradation of civilized life to that of the brute creation, or an execrable tyranny submitted to as a remedy for the evils which gave it birth? But, moral considerations apart, let us inquire into the political consequences of such a plan to Great Britain, supposing her government so far destitute of principle, as to have recourse to it.—Seeing that France has succeeded in arrogating to herself either a complete dominion or a preponderating influence over the rest of Europe, which it is not in the power of England to snatch from her, it becomes the duty of the British government, say the advocates of the revolutionary system, to endeavour to obtain, by means of her naval superiority, a similar dominion over those parts of the globe, which, from their too great distance, are placed beyond the reach of French arms; but more especially over South America, which country is truly considered as an inexhaustible source of riches; and the means proposed for the attainment of this object is to *revolutionize* it. Not to enter into useless considerations, let us lay aside generalities, and particularize the subject of this discussion.—The United States form no part of our inquiry. The portion of America inhabited by tribes of savages is sheltered from all revolutions, except those slow but salutary changes which the progressive civilization of the adjoining countries may, in the course of time, spread over the face of those extensive territories. The project, therefore, extends only to Spanish and Portuguese America.—It cannot be credited for a moment, that such a line of conduct could,

without exciting the deepest indignation, be proposed towards a monarchy, which, in circumstances the most critical, maintained an unshaken fidelity to its engagements at the peril of its existence, and at a moment too when Great Britain, distracted by other cares, could not lend it the assistance necessary to its preservation, and which in all probability, did not, without the consent of the British government, treat with an enemy, who has not yet pardoned its attachment to this country.—But, say these revolutionary advocates, what the uninterrupted good understanding between Portugal and England would not permit with regard to the Brazils, the secret enmity of Spain for Great Britain, and her open partiality to France, would fully justify with respect to Spanish America. Viewing the subject in this light, will the British government attempt the conquest of those immense territories, or, wisely distrusting their ability to effect so vast an enterprise, will they prefer the odious alternative of *revolutionizing* them, in the hope of turning their commerce exclusively into our hands?—On the project of conquering Spanish America, I shall say but two or three words. At a moment when the threats of invasion employ the whole military strength of the United Kingdom, when the difficulty of protecting distant acquisitions would be still greater than that of conquering them, when Malta, and Gibraltar, which are, as it were, but two points, require such considerable garrisons, where would the British government find troops to send out to conquer Mexico and Peru? Where would she find the garrisons necessary to occupy the principal ports and posts of this boundless territory, of which Great Britain, in point of extent, would form but a small province? How would this handful of men be able to support themselves against the influence of a destructive climate, and the hatred and incessant attacks of a numerous population, entertaining the strongest antipathy to strangers, and totally differing from their conquerors in their laws, their manners, their customs, and, above all, in their language and religion? Where would the British government find recruits to supply the loss occasioned by a constant warfare against the climate and the inhabitants? What envy would not such a conquest excite in every court of Europe, incessantly told as they are by our enemy, that England arrogates to herself the despotism of the seas, and a monopoly of the commerce of the world? Above all, what alarm would it not excite in the breasts of our commercial rivals, I mean the United States of America! And, in case of a rupture with that country,

what means of annoyance would not the contiguity of Old and New Mexico with Louisiana constantly afford them!—If I am asked, whether I think it possible to *revolutionize* those countries, I answer, yes! Throughout there reigns the greatest discontent against a government situated at a distance, too weak to protect its subjects, but sufficiently powerful to impose the severest restrictions, not only on their trade, but upon the very produce of their soil. But, supposing this event to take place, let us examine what the consequence would be to Great Britain. To do this with some degree of precision, it will be necessary to consider a little the nature of the population of Spanish America. The inhabitants may be divided into five distinct classes: 1. A handful of native Spaniards, who repair thither to pass a few years, and who occupy every lucrative post under the government: 2. An incomparably more numerous class of Spanish descent, who, though excluded from public situations, possess nearly all the lands and riches of the country. 3. A very considerable number of native families, who, like the peasantry of Poland and Russia, are attached by law to the spot on which they were born. 4. A pretty numerous class of negroes and mulattoes, partly slaves and partly freed men. 5. Although the above classes appear to comprise the whole population, there nevertheless springs out of them a fifth class, or rather body, totally distinct from the other four, I mean the clergy. It is extremely powerful, not only from the number of those who compose it, but from its immense riches, the hierarchy of its members, and, above all, its influence over the other classes, and more especially the inferior ones.—The first four of these classes are divided from each other by the strongest antipathy: among the two former, who are united by one common origin, by education, and by the rank they hold in society, I mean the Spaniards born in Europe and the Creoles, is this hatred carried to the greatest excess. From this classification of the inhabitants, this distribution of employments and possessions, this weakness of the government, it necessarily follows, that the introduction of republican principles would be the signal for the total subversion of the existing government; that in the struggles that would arise in forming a new one, all classes would join in expelling the native Spaniards; and that, this done, the two last classes, to which may be added all the poor among the class of Creoles, forming a population infinitely more numerous than the proprietors, would unite in exterminating, or at least plundering those pro-

prietors, of whose weakness and indolence no European can form an idea; that this accomplished, those vast territories, peopled solely by wretched slaves or indolent savages, would sink into a state of profound barbarism, and so much the more rapidly, as the mildness of the climate and the extent and richness of the soil would furnish a spontaneous subsistence to men knowing no wars, and to whom repose is the *summum bonum*, whatever may be the riches concealed in the bowels of the earth, or ready to burst forth with the slightest cultivation. In such a state, what advantages, I ask, would Spanish America present to the commerce and industry of Great-Britain? The revolutionary system would have made it one vast desert covered over with dead bodies and watered with human gore, and inhabited only by a few tribes of savages disputing their wretched existence with the wild beasts.—I shall not amuse either myself or your readers with another plan, which is said to have been in circulation a few weeks ago. I mean the project of seizing the mines of Peru and Mexico, for the purpose of *paying off our national debt!* I did imagine, Sir, that ever since the fruitless attempt of Sir Walter Raleigh, we had relinquished the idea of conquering the country of Eldorado, where, we were told, the very fleece of the sheep and the flints of the roads are of solid gold. If, however, any of our monied men should wish to estimate the value of this new hypothesis, they have only to calculate the quantity of metal, half the amount in gold, and half in silver, (at *sixty* pound sterling per pound for the gold, and *four* for the silver), necessary to liquidate 600 millions of capital, and they will find it would require a mass of 5 millions of pounds weight of gold, and 75 of silver, making in all a total of 80 millions of pounds weight! And, supposing the Spaniards to keep their gold and silver at the entrance of their mines, ready to be sent away in waggons, it would require, at the rate of one thousand pounds weight to each horse, no fewer than eighty thousand horses to carry off the treasure! I must also beg leave to remind these money-loving gentry, that the roads of these countries, more especially in the Cordilleres, are by no means so smooth and so even as the turnpike roads round our metropolis. Such mad projects may possibly amuse the greedy credulity of stock-jobbers and loan-mongers, but it is a gross insult to the British nation, and discovers a total ignorance of her powers and her integrity, to advise her to trust chiefly for

resources to expeditions fit only for freebooters. — A few words more on the Brazils. I will not waste any time in combatting the project of revolutionizing that country, or of wresting it from our oldest and most constant ally, seeing that such an act of atrocity would be repugnant to the character of Britons; but I maintain, that to occupy certain ports with the view of anticipating the enemy, and to connive, as it were, at the loss of Portugal in Europe, that the Portuguese monarchy might be transferred either with her own consent or by force into the Brazils, would be not less contrary to our acknowledged interests, commercial as well as political. — In the very outset, the dissimulation that would envelop the execution of such a project, has something in it so odious, that it would for ever disgrace the British name. Such a step on our part would instantly determine France to invade Portugal, not in the character of an enemy, but as her liberator; and the state of uncertainty in which the court of Lisbon would be kept as to our real intentions, would serve only to facilitate the invasion, by taking from her all hope of resistance. The soreness which Portugal must feel at seeing her distant possessions invaded by those to whom she looked up for assistance, together with the hope of recovering the Brazils, would probably throw the Portuguese nation and government into the arms of France; and, in that case, it must be confessed that we should have the appearance of driving them to such an extremity. At a moment when the French are blocked up in all their ports, to entertain a fear lest they should reach the Brazils with an armament before us, would, to say the least of it, be ridiculous; but, to doubt whether or no France, allied to Portugal, would not, from time to time, be able to elude our cruisers and reach the Brazils in small bodies, or at least by their emissaries, is certainly not so. At a time, Sir, when we were so deeply interested in excluding France from all access to the coast of Egypt, and when our squadrons formed as it were one chain from Plymouth to Egypt, by Lisbon, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Mahon, and Malta, did not Buonaparté, and others, escape from Egypt and land safe in France? and, what is still more difficult to effect, have not whole squadrons sailed and returned from Brest to Toulon and from Toulon to Brest? The Portuguese troops in the Brazils are, as it were, rendered useless, by the weakness of the counsels of Lisbon; but, the inhabitants once set in motion and under the direction of French officers and

French emissaries, supplied, too, with occasional succours from that country, and above all, goaded on by their rage against those, who, under the mask of protection, had basely endeavoured to establish themselves by open force in their country, would prepare for us the same fate which the Dutch experienced formerly in the same regions. We should, probably, be strong in one spot of those immense territories, but weak in every other; we should be now at secret and now at open warfare with the inhabitants; we should be blocked up in Rio Janeiro, as the Dutch were in Fernambouc, and finish with being repulsed, after an irreparable loss of men, and an expense of which we can form no calculation. — Whatever degree of fear or hope we may have entertained, that certain restless characters would be found in the Brazils, ready to profit by the opportunity of making their country independent, we ought not to conceal from ourselves, that (excepting the negroes and a few tribes of civilised Indians) it is a country, the population of which is remarkably compact, and composed intirely of Portuguese descendants; that all the inhabitants possess the same language, the same laws, the same manners and customs as the Portuguese of Europe; and, that the law of Portugal makes no distinction between a man born in the Brazils and one born in Europe. We ought also to remember, that if the Brazilians are not now the property of the Dutch, it is not from the assistance afforded them by the mother-country, but from their own efforts, and against the formal demand of their Sovereign, John the IVth., who, finding himself by the revolution which seated him on the throne, not only at peace, but in alliance with the Dutch, enjoined them to submit implicitly to the States General. The Brazilians, however, constantly refused to obey; they entered into a bloody warfare with that nation, and, in spite of the injunction of their monarch, again became his subjects. — Let us now examine whether Great Britain would receive from the independence of the Brazils, and the removal of the Portuguese monarchy into those territories, such commercial advantages as would indemnify her for the union of Portugal with France, and the accession to our enemy of the important port of Lisbon, the best calculated, in point of situation, to harass our commerce, and without free access to which, the whole line of coasts from the Baltic to the extremity of the Gulph of Venice, would belong to that enemy. Let us consider, that the moment the destruction of

the Portuguese monarchy is accomplished, that moment the whole of the Spanish Peninsula, containing from fourteen to fifteen millions of men naturally warlike, all her riches both natural and acquired, in a word, immense resources of every description, now paralyzed by her divisions and the weakness of her counsels, will fall into the hands of our implacable enemy, who will not fail to restore them to life and motion in order to turn them to our destruction.—What, then, is this mighty advantage which we are to purchase at so great a hazard? Is it the exclusive possession of the *trade and navigation* of the Brazils?—The *trade!* that we possess already, either directly or by contraband. Portugal, almost without manufactures, and the Brazils still more so, use scarcely any materials but the produce of our industry. The *navigation!* No; for can the petty advantage arising from the hire of a few vessels, be put in competition with those higher considerations which I have endeavoured to develop? Besides, will not the Brazilians, become independent, be able to create manufactories and a navy of their own? For a considerable part of the year their slaves are entirely idle; their climate is peculiarly adapted to the merchandize of India: their riches as well as disposition incline them to the enjoyment of those objects of luxury and elegance which France produces; their geographical situation is particularly favourable to a traffic with Africa, India, and China; the passage is familiar to them, and their language is the language of commerce. The Brazils, become independent, would become also, in a very short time, the centre of a contraband traffic highly alarming to our East India Company. The Brazils are equally well situated for a commerce with the South Sea. Let us not hasten them, at our own expense, the development of these germs of commerce and industry, which a crisis, brought on by our rashness, can so easily ripen into activity. Let us maturely consider the prospect before us, and, profiting by the past, proceed with the utmost circumspection. Let us call to our recollection the outcry that was raised by our merchants against the Marquis de Pombal, because he endeavoured to restore the industry of Portugal. The ministers of that day wisely despised the unjust clamours of frightened avarice, and experience has taught us, that the efforts of the Portuguese government produced little or no effect in favour of Portuguese industry, but much for the prosperity of the Brazils; whose population and culture have more than doubled since that period, and whose consequent prosperity has

been highly beneficial to Great Britain.—I trust, Sir, that what I have said will be sufficient to convince your readers, that as the honour of the nation forbids us to abandon Portugal, our oldest ally, so our interest, in unison with that honour, dictates the same line of conduct towards her.—I am, Sir, &c.—*B. L. Nov. 28, 1804.*

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**HIGH PRICES.**—This is a subject not new to the readers of the Register; but it is now, and must ever be, worthy of their attention. They will do this work the justice to acknowledge, that, with respect to its observations upon the causes and effects of a dearth of provisions, it did not wait till the dearth came, and then set up a cry against the persons who deal in provisions. During the latter part of last year, and still more frequently during the former part of the present year, while provisions of every sort, particularly bread, fell below what might be regarded as a reasonable price, and when the ministers seemed to have left the contingency of dearth entirely out of all their calculations; nay, before, while the dear good man Mr. Addington, was, with eyes half-shut, swimming along in the milk and honey of the peace of Amiens, and while “the pilot that “weathered the storm” was, with feelings apparently not less complacent, listening to the melodious sounds of Mr. Canning; even then I endeavoured to prepare the public mind for the circumstances that would attend a return of dearth. When, in July last, the Corn Bill was going through the almost empty Houses of Parliament, I thought it necessary to repeat the warnings I had before given, and to endeavour to prevent the consummation of that measure\*. Since that time, perceiving that a very great advance in prices was about to take place, I took an early opportunity to endeavour to place in a true light the question relative to the effect which the different states of war and peace have upon the price of bread; and, I think, it was then satisfactorily proved, that a state of war, considered merely in opposition to a state of peace, does not tend, and never has tended, to increase the price of that most necessary article of human subsistence†. In a subsequent Register‡, the subject was revived; and, an article tending to create popular prejudice and fury against the farmers having been published in a Portsmouth newspaper, some remarks were made with a design to counteract the effects


\* See present Volume, p. 82. † Ibid p. 235. ‡ Ibid p. 309.

of such publications, and to prevent a repetition of the publications themselves.—If it be the desire of the minister to prevent the dearth of provisions from being accompanied with popular discontent and tumult, one would think that his writers would heartily second efforts of this sort, particularly those which tend to remove the prejudices existing against the growers, the dealers, and all other persons concerned in producing and vending provisions; but, it will appear evident from the following extracts, that those writers have uniformly pursued a directly contrary course. —The rise in the price of barley, which has, of course, kept a pretty even pace with the rise in the price of wheat, necessarily produced a rise in that of malt, which, in its turn, must as necessarily cause either a rise in the price or a falling off in the quality of porter. Notwithstanding this evident necessity, however, the philosophers, to whom the clerks of the Treasury have, in their wisdom, thought proper to commit the defence of the minister and his measures, and who had, without a single audible murmur, seen the quarter-loaf rise, in the space of four months, from eight pence farthing to fourteen pence; these philosophers, the moment a notice was given for augmenting the price of porter in the amount of one fifth of its former price, burst forth all at once, like the winds from the cavern of Eolus. —THE TIMES, ever the first in servility, folly, and mischief, took the lead. “The price of porter,” said that paper of the 15th of November, “will this day be raised to sixpence the pot, the brewers having determined to advance that necessary article eleven shillings in the barrel to the retail dealer. In consequence of this *exorbitant increase*, the owners of all public houses within the bills of mortality have apprized their customers that, from this day, they would be under the necessity of adding one penny per quart to the former price of that beverage. The public have a right to be satisfied on this point; and the few great companies to whom the brewing of porter is almost exclusively confined, are bound to shew that an additional *impost*, which bears so hard upon the *laborious classes* of the community, has not arisen from any *sordid or interested speculations*. The price of barley, we find, experienced a rise of full twelve shilling per quarter at Monday’s market; still we do not consider the price of that material as warranting the sudden imposition of so *exorbitant a tax* upon the consumer of porter, as the advance of a penny upon the former price. It is well known, that the two last years

“have been very productive to the brewers. “Beer is so decidedly an article of the necessities of life, that any unexpected advance of it will *certainly produce a spirit of dissatisfaction*, which, though it might not occasion any extraordinary or dangerous commotion, must still be considered as liable to produce those *chillings* of discontent which happen at no time without inconvenience, but at the present moment must be particularly injurious, when *unanimity is so essentially necessary to the great cause in which we are engaged*, and without which that cause cannot be *crowned with success*.” So; the cause of the country is here made to depend, in some degree at least, upon the price of porter! What! after all the boastsings about our 430,000 volunteers; after all the talk about a people in arms for the defence of their country; after vauntings before unparalleled in the world, are we seriously to be told, that some half score of brewers can endanger the safety of the state! The inference to be drawn from this person’s argument, is, that the brewers must not raise the price of their porter; and, of course, he means that they must not lower its quality, for that is the same thing; and this ruin they must bring upon themselves, for what? Lest there should arise commotions from a contrary conduct on their part; lest the peace of the country should be disturbed; lest the patriotism of the people should be turned into discontent; lest the country should not be defended; lest Napoleon should “swallow us up quick,” just as a coal-heaver swallows a pot of porter! Observe the phrases that this Treasury writer deals in. But, of that more particularly, when we have heard his fellow-labourers. —THE ORACLE, of the same date as above mentioned, contained the following passage. “Porter rises this day to the public, so as to be sold at sixpence per quart, and that of such a quality as has for so long a time been *obtruded* on the public, to the great *injury of their constitutions*, and at so high as the then price of 5d. per quart. Even when malt was under fifty shillings per quarter we heard of no reduction being intended, nor if it were less would that have been the case; but immediately on the rise, dash comes the brewer, with much more than an equivalent, supposing the former was an equal price. The distillers, *good men*, are determined not to be behind hand with the porter brewers, and have risen the price of their inferior spirits two several pence per gallon within these three weeks.” This writer does not appear to

insist upon the absolute necessity of spirits; but he seems to carry his notions respecting porter to an uncommon length, though his censure upon the brewers has in it a great mixture of absurdity. He comes forward as a natural as well as a political philosopher. But, if the brewers really had "obtruded" their porter upon the public; and, if it be true, that such obtrusion had greatly "injured the constitutions" of the said public, ought he not to have rejoiced rather than complained at the adoption of a measure, which, if it produced any effect at all, must have lessened the quantity of porter consumed?—That pink of patriotism and philosophy, the Editor of the MORNING POST, comes next. "It is," says he in his paper of the same date, "It is said that the porter brewers have given notice to the publicans, that from this time they will be under the necessity of raising the price of porter a penny in the quart. *A more extraordinary proceeding has rarely been heard of.* We know not upon what ground so extraordinary an advance can possibly be justified. *Government it is said, have a plan in contemplation, which it is expected will completely counteract the schemes of the monopolizers of grain—wretches, who, while fattening on the vitals of the poor, are deaf to their calamities, and care not who starve, if their coffers are filled.*" Observe well what is said here of the intentions of government; and, recollect that this philosopher is a Treasury writer; a perfect tool; a man without a single idea to commit to paper till he receives the word of command. "Government have a plan in contemplation to counteract the schemes of the monopolizers of grain, wretches who fatten on the vitals of the poor!" I beseech the reader to remember these words.—Besides the threats thus thrown out against the brewers, a society, or pretended society, or combination, was brought forward and exhibited, *in terrorem*. The article (it was a circular one, and appeared in all the newspapers) is worth preserving. It will hereafter be cited as a mark of the brutal stupidity of the age of bank notes. "Yesterday" (the 20th of November) "a meeting was held at the London Tavern of the subscribers to the new establishment for brewing genuine malt-liquor, Mr. W. Hall in the chair. The chairman opened the business in a neat speech, and the assembly consisted of upwards of three hundred subscribers. The resolutions being read, several verbal alterations were proposed, after which the resolutions were unanimously agreed to. The opinions of

"two eminent lawyers were then read, which gave every necessary satisfaction to the meeting, as being decided and unequivocal in the legality and justice of the intended institution. We never saw so large an assemblage where so much order, decorum, and propriety prevailed; every gentleman offered his opinion without interruption, and every article of the rules and regulations were discussed with temper, and altered or approved according to the unanimous voice of the subscribers. It appeared from the statements made that the sum of money subscribed, and the subscriptions, of which notice has been given, exceeds 50,000l. Such was the impression made by the disclosure of the plan, on which this establishment is to be carried on, that the subscribers took additional shares, to a considerable amount. Thanks were then returned to the chairman, and every person present retired, thoroughly convinced, that an institution, which has prospered so much in the course of about five weeks, must be eminently successful in the result. Indeed, the harmony that prevailed among the parties; augurs, to a certainty, that the plan cannot fail of answering the most sanguine expectations of the subscribers, and the public, who are also materially interested in the undertaking." What delicious nonsense! A perfect repetition of the "London Flour-Company" project. There was a special act of parliament passed for the establishment of that company; the accounts of the treasurers, brokers, jobbers, millers, bakers, drivers, porters, watchmen, and sweepers, were regularly laid before parliament, and thus the legislators of a great kingdom became check-clerks of a mercantile concern! That company was intended to counteract the operations of the millers and bakers of the metropolis. It was to introduce, into general consumption, "cheap and wholesome bread." The bread it made and sold produced illness wherever it was used, especially amongst children. After a short trial the project was abandoned, I believe, for I have not heard of it since the spring of 1801. And, my readers may be assured, that this porter-company project will prove equally abortive. "Lawful!" Oh dear, yes! it is lawful enough: there needed no learned man to tell the meeting that: but, though quite lawful, it was very foolish indeed: no one can indict the ring-leaders, but any one may laugh at them.—The effect of the aforementioned efforts of the press was a relinquishment, on the part of the brewers, of the intended advance in



the price of their porter. The advance had actually taken place: porter was, for two days, sold at sixpence a quart. As soon, therefore, as it was known that the brewers had retracted, the ministerial papers began to shout victory, not unaccompanied with threats of vengeance upon the defeated enemy, to whom they seemed, as is always the case with such victors, disposed to grant neither quarter nor mercy. They called aloud for the *names* of the particular brewers who had begun to advance the price of porter, in order that the public might be made acquainted with them. The philosopher of the Morning Post, in that print of the 20th of November, made the following remarks. "The public indignation against the extraordinary and unjust rise of porter, has been so strongly manifested, that the quart has already returned to its former price of five pence. We have been informed, that it was by no means the unanimous act of the trade; that but few persons attended at the meeting, when it was agreed to raise the price; that the gentlemen concerned in two respectable firms allow, there was no necessity whatever for such an extravagant increase, and have, much to their honour, and, we trust, ultimate advantage, refused to concur in that combination, which would have raised the price of that necessary article to sixpence a quart." The sage who conducts the *SUN*, struck upon the same key, in the evening of the 20th of November. "Though," says he, "the brewers have thought it necessary to retract a measure that excited general indignation, and that did not appear to be warranted; it is to be hoped that the public will be informed of the names of those who adopted this measure, and of those whose manly and disinterested spirit occasioned its revocation." Now, let it be well remembered, that this article is taken from a paper, which was established by the Treasury, and which, as one might naturally expect, has always been under the absolute control of the clerks in that department.—This threat of publishing the names, which was, in other words, to threaten the brewers with the vengeance of the populace, appears to have terrified an old man, named MEUX, so as to induce him to implore these dispensers of protection to inform the public that *he* was not one of those who had proposed to raise the price of porter; and, accordingly, the following paragraph was published in all the ministerial prints. It is quoted now from the *COURIER*, the patriotic *Courier!* of the 22d of November: "We are authorized to say, that Mr. Meux, sen. who built that extensive brew-

ery, and raised the trade in Liquor-Pond-Street, is totally averse to the present talk-ed-of rise of porter, till absolutely necessary, or till a new duty is imposed upon that article; he being (at present) out of trade, declares, that he *knew nothing of the brewers' intention*; nor was he consulted on such an extraordinary measure, which considering all things, he thinks highly impolitic and injudicious. The public have to thank that gentleman for his discernment a few years ago, when the whole trade wanted to advance the price of that necessary beverage, and which he stoutly resisted for four years, till a new duty took place." Whether Mr. MEUX did authorize them to say this, it would be troublesome to find out; and, as to the number of guineas, or of pounds in bank notes, that he might pay to each individual philosopher upon the occasion, that is a matter with which neither I nor the public have any thing to do. But, the principle remains the same. We see a brewer exhibited before the public in a way which throws censure on his brother brewers, and in which he appears to think it necessary to show that he was not guilty of an attempt to raise the price of his goods; and, it is evident, that he has been induced so to exhibit himself from an apprehension of being confounded with those brewers who had attempted to raise the price of porter, and to whose persons and property danger might be expected.—Whether the philosophers were in hopes of bringing forward many other persons in the same way as Mr. MEUX I know not: if they were, however, their hopes were baffled; and, at the end of about four days, they appeared to be willing to drop their pursuit of the brewers, sending them off with a sort of menace, as in the following article from the *ORACLE* of the 24th of November. "Every day since the triumph of the public over the avarice of the brewers, we have seen paragraphs in the different papers, stating, on authority, who among them were hostile to the proposed imposition, by which it is made difficult to find out who were for it. From this it appears (some sign of grace) that all are ashamed of the business."—Having gained a victory over the brewers; or, at least, an imaginary victory, the philosophers seem to have begun to direct their attention towards the coal-merchants; and with reason; for what is porter without a good fire to drink it by? I shall cite but one instance of the efforts of the philosophers in this way. "Coals! notwithstanding the arrival of upwards of 200 colliers in the port—the certainty of au-

"other fleet soon arriving, and probably  
 "some of these taking another trip this sea-  
 "son—this very necessary article of fuel  
 "advances gradually in price: the best coals  
 "are £3. 3s. 6d. in the Pool; add to this  
 "12s. the charges of lighterage, cartage,  
 "and delivery to the housekeepers, and the  
 "cost will be upwards of two shillings per  
 "bushel at the first hand, and best price.  
 "SOME MEANS *will surely be taken to reduce*  
 "this heavy price!" ORACLE, 21st Nov.  
 What "means" the philosopher pointed to-  
 wards one cannot say; but, it is clear that  
 he thought a triumph over the coal-mer-  
 chants would quickly succeed the triumph  
 over the brewers; not recollecting, that the  
*Thames* was close at hand, whereas the *coal-*  
*mines* were at a very great distance. It is  
 likely that the clerks of the Treasury found  
 out this circumstance; for the philosopher of  
 the Oracle did not repeat his demand respect-  
 ing coals, and none of the others attempted  
 to meddle with the subject; yet, except as  
 to the inability in the one case, and ability  
 in the other, of lowering the quality of the  
 goods, there is no reason at all why the coal-  
 merchants should not have been vanquished  
 as well as the brewers. The brewers are,  
 however, in truth, not vanquished at all.  
 They saw that a clamour was rising against  
 them, and they gave way: but, is there any  
 one weak enough to believe, that they will  
 not lower the quality of their porter? Is  
 there folly so complete as to induce any one  
 to imagine, that the brewers will carry on a  
 trade that they lose money by? That they  
 will (being kept to the same price) make as  
 strong porter when malt is 90 shillings a  
 quarter as they did when it was "under 50  
 shillings?" But, we are reminded of the  
 great profits which they derived when the  
 price of malt was so low. We are told, that  
 they have had two amazingly profitable  
 years: and hence we are to conclude that  
 they can now afford to carry on their business  
 without any profit; or, even to a loss. Is  
 this agreeable to reason? Is it agreeable to  
 the practice of any trade? Has not a directly  
 contrary principle been acted upon by the  
 Parliament in raising the premium upon the  
 exportation of corn the moment it became,  
 to use the language of Mr. Pitt "too cheap  
 "to yield the grower a fair profit?" Why  
 were not the years of high prices of barley  
 and wheat taken into consideration in that  
 case? In that case we not only allowed the  
 farmers to sell as dear as they could; but we  
 very unwisely raised taxes to pay them for  
 selling dearer than they could sell at home!  
 No, no; the brewers, be assured, made  
 their porter stronger and stronger in propor-

tion as the malt grew cheap; else they would  
 have met with a rivalry in other brewers;  
 and, it is equally certain, that they will now  
 reduce the *quality* of their porter, having  
 been deterred from augmenting its price.  
 Just such a cry, and with the same sort of  
 success, was, in the year 1794, set up by the  
 philosophers of Philadelphia against a pro-  
 posed rise in the price of milk; whereupon  
 the milk man who supplied me, observed:  
 "if they will not let me raise my price, the  
 "pump must raise my pail." It did so too.  
 After the clamour of a month or so was over,  
 we were very glad to pay an advanced price;  
 and, as the philosophers had, by that time,  
 raised the price of their newspapers, no fur-  
 ther complaint was ever heard upon the sub-  
 ject. So must it now be with regard to  
 porter. The nominal price may continue  
 the same; but the real price will be raised  
 by the diminution of strength in the liquor;  
 until, if the folly should continue for any  
 length of time, there will be *two sorts* of  
 porter (under different names perhaps), and  
 every body will soon drink the *dearest*, be-  
 cause it will be the best, and, in reality, the  
*cheapest*.—Nevertheless the evils attend-  
 ing these doctrines of the philosophers may  
 be very great. They have obtained no vic-  
 tory over the brewers; but they think they  
 have; and so think many of their readers;  
 a delusion that would be amusing enough,  
 were it not much to be feared, that it will  
 encourage both the philosophers and the peo-  
 ple to endeavour to *force* down the price of  
 commodities of which the quality cannot be  
 lowered; the manufacturer or vender of  
 which cannot preserve himself from ruin  
 merely by the turning of a water cock.  
 Thus, in the instance of *coals*, the writings  
 of the philosophers have produced no effect.  
 If they could cause the present stock of coals  
 to be sold cheaper than the venders propose to  
 sell them, the consequence would be, that  
 those venders would cause no more coals to  
 be brought to London; for they cannot aug-  
 ment the quantity of their coals, as the  
 brewers can and will the quantity of their  
 porter, by an additional draught upon father  
*Thames*. So also with respect to BREAD.  
 Much have the ministerial philosophers writ-  
 ten; but they have produced no effect upon  
 the baker; because, if he does not raise his  
 price he must starve himself, rather than  
 which he will leave off baking; and, this  
 reasoning applies equally well to the flour-  
 man, the miller, the corn-dealer, and the  
 farmer.—Obvious as one would think  
 all this must be to every man of com-  
 mon sense, the philosophers have not  
 forbore to push their principles forward here

also, and in a way calculated to produce very great mischief. I shall only quote the ORACLE of the 22d and of the 24th of November, as that paper seems, upon this part of the subject, to have expressed, in substance, what has been advanced by all the other ministerial prints. The article of the 22d is as follows: "The corn-market, in *despite of all calculation*, continues rather "on the increase than the decline, as was "fondly hoped and expected." [Not in *despite of all calculation*, good philosopher; for I myself told you so long ago as the second week in August, that corn would be high priced this winter, and that we were, in my opinion, entering upon the first of two years of high price.\* Yes, you "fondly" hoped and expected; but why did you? Fondly enough, indeed; but whose fault was that? Why were you so foolish? Why were you not seeking after useful knowledge, instead of racking your brain for phrases to make up a description of the triumph of Lord Melville over the French flotilla, and of the wisdom of Mr. Pitt and Lord Harrowby, who, "with "eager expectation, viewed the glorious achievement from the battlements of Water Castle?" If, instead of extolling this their expectation, which was to the full as fond as your own, you had been listening to the voice of truth and reason, you would not then have sold yourself and your masters to laughter, nor would you now be daily exposing your mischievous ignorance.] "Yesterday the prices of fine wheats and flour "experienced a rise of full 4s. per quarter, "or sack; but the supply was so small, and "the real bargains so narrowed, in hopes of "the prices being lower, that it will make "very little odds in the average, which we "have reason to hope will be lower.—Coals "continue the same, or with little variation. "If any thing, the best coals are dearer.— "In no article is the public more imposed upon than in that of butcher's meat; it is "a well known fact, that cattle of the best "quality have been sold at Smithfield for "many market-days past, at such a price, "that the Cutting Butchers could afford to "sell any joint at 7d. per pound, and that "with a good profit; whereas any thing "above legs and shins, however inferior, "are sold at 7d. 8d. or 9d., and for roasting-pieces they demand from 10d. to 1s. per pound. In pork, particularly, the "profit they charge is enormous; sides of "young pork, of the best quality, can be "bought in Leadenhall-market at the price "of 3s. 8d. to 4s. per stone of eight pounds;

"but at no pork shop can it be obtained at "less than from 10d. to 1s. per pound, "which is a heavy advance." This philosopher seems to be tolerably well skilled in the art of slaughtering; and, indeed, I am persuaded the public will think with me, that no small portion of his life must have been spent in a butcher's shop. It has been remarked, that apostates generally become the most furious persecutors of the body from which they have apostatized (a maxim which has, of late years, been strikingly verified in the conduct of a well-known anti-roman catholic pamphleteer); and, it may, perhaps, be the same with renegade butchers. But, whether this philosopher, this oracular gentleman, did formerly inhabit the shambles or not, no man of sense and reason will approve of his representing the butchers as cheats, as men imposing upon the public, merely because they sell their property for as much as it will fetch in open market; that is to say, for exactly as much as it is worth at the hour when they sell it, and for not a single mite more. If he himself thinks he pays more for his meat than the meat is worth, why does he not slaughter again for himself? Because it would then cost him much more than he is now obliged to give for it. And this is the reason why all men prefer dealing with the butchers. In the early part of 1801, some of the wise men in the city of London formed the resolution of lowering the price of butcher's meat. They applied some of their public buildings to this laudable purpose. The butchers kept on their steady course; they still sold as dear as ever; and those of their customers, who ran after their new-fangled rivals, were soon glad to return. There was always a something that rendered the butcher still the best man to purchase of. The project proved abortive. It is now, amongst the butchers, just what the catamaran project is amongst sailors, and what Mr. Pitt's volunteering is amongst all military men who dare speak their sentiments; that is to say, a standing subject of ridicule and contempt.—The second article above spoken of, dated the 24th of November, is rather more scurrilous than the former. "The rogues in grain are "not the only set at whom the people have "cause to murmur; it is a known fact, that "cattle of the best quality have been sold "at Smithfield, for many market-days past, "at such a price that the Cutting Butchers "could afford to sell any joint at 7d. per lb. "and that with a good profit; whereas none "but the most inferior parts can be had under from 8d. to 11d. In pork, likewise, "the profit they charge is enormous; sides

\* Regist. Vol. II. p. 24.

“ of prime young pork can be bought in the market, at from 3s. 8d. to 4s. per stone of 8lb. but at few shops can it be bought under 10d. or 11d. per lb.” Thus, every one, who deals in the necessaries of life, is represented as a just object of the indignation of the people. From indignation to resentment, and from resentment to vengeance, the progress is very natural, and not more natural than rapid. What a scandalous thing it is, that the ministers do not silence these mischief-hatching babblers! As to their power so to do no one that knows any thing of the London newspaper press can entertain the slightest doubt; and, therefore, there is really some reason to believe, that their clerks purposely permit these attacks upon the inoffensive dealers in provisions, in order to turn the attention of the suffering people from that share of the real cause, which is to be found in the measures of government and in the paper-money system of the minister. As I before observed, the ministerial philosophers, with whose lucubrations I have just surfeited the reader, saw the quartern loaf rise from 8d.  $\frac{1}{4}$  to 1s. 2d. without uttering so much as a murmur. But, the reason of their silence so far, was this; they thought, with their usual sagacity, that the rise would be temporary; and they were afraid to make a clamour against the high price, lest their clamours should come to the support of the predictions of those who opposed the *corn-bill*, which the minister had passed at the close of the last session of Parliament. The rise in the price of porter touched them closer in a personal sense; and, besides, in their muddled heads, the chain of effects from the *corn-bill* to the price of porter was not so conspicuous; though it is very hard to conceive why it should not, seeing that out of barley comes porter rather more directly than bread comes out of wheat, and seeing also, that the *corn-bill* was passed upon the petition of the “barley growers” and not of the wheat growers.\* Upon this bill, upon the reports whereon it was passed, upon the speeches of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Western, as well as upon the principle and policy of the bill, I shall hereafter have occasion to remark; and, I trust I shall be able to shew, that the man who could urge the passing of such a bill, must either be actuated by some motive other than the one professed, or must be destitute of the powers of solid reflection, or must never have reflected upon the subject. For the present, I shall confine myself

to little more than a repetition of what I have said upon former occasions; and that is, that the sudden rise in the price of bread (and other articles of course) proceeds, 1. from a deficient harvest; 2. from the effect of the *corn-bill*; 3. from the effect of paper-money in times of dearth. That the volunteer system has contributed to the deficiency of the harvest there can be no doubt. During the fourteen months, beginning in July 1803, and ending in September 1804, there were, perhaps, 100,000 agriculturists engaged part of their time in the volunteer service. I do not think this is too large an estimate. Nay, I believe, I shall be thought under the mark. Now, when the reader is informed, and I am ready at any time to establish the position, that there are not 500,000 active labouring agriculturists in England and Wales, I am persuaded, that he will not hesitate to agree with me, that the occasional diversion of the labour of 100,000 of the best labourers must have considerably subtracted from those means by which alone crops of corn are produced. Recollect, too, that the space of time, since the volunteer system began to operate, embraces *two seed-times* and *two harvests*; and, it may be recollected, that I cautioned Mr. Yorke against the enforcing of the original Defence Bill during seed time particularly. Some smooth little Downing-street clerk will say: “Here’s Cobbett pretends that the farmers have “sowed less corn on account of the volunteer system!” No; I pretend no such thing; but, that they have reaped less, on that account. Every farmer in the kingdom is ready to declare; and, indeed, have we not, in the memorable instance of former Morison and the Scotch Lord Advocate, quite a sufficient proof of the feelings which the volunteer system excited amongst those whose men were thereby laken from their labour? In the whole kingdom you could not, perhaps, find a farmer who could say, that he has sowed a field less, on account of the volunteer system; but, in every country-parish in the kingdom, you will find farmers ready to show, that their land has been, on account of that system, worse tilled; that their cattle, their flocks, their yards, and their fences have been worse attended to; that their crops have been worse gathered-in; and, of course, that their farms have produced less food than they would have done, had the volunteer-system not existed. —In deferring my observations upon the effects of the *corn-bill* and of the paper-money, I should here conclude this article; but, I cannot, at a time when ignorance, with open throat and lungs of Stentor, is

\* See the Reports of the Committee of the House of Commons, printed 14th of May, and 14th of June, 1804.

railing against those who are employed in growing corn and making it into bread; I cannot, at such a time, refrain from directing the attention of my readers to those persons who have contributed towards the perpetuating of this pernicious ignorance; and, amongst these, the Rev. ROBERT NARES, Archdeacon of Stafford, Canon residentiary of Litchfield, Librarian at the British Museum, and Editor of the British Critic, seems to merit particular notice. This person, from whose pen any one, acquainted merely with his titles and functions, would naturally expect nothing calculated to foster ignorance such as that of which I have been endeavouring to show the dangerous tendency; this person, to whom, from his situation in society, one could have wished to look as a teacher of the ignorant, has, in a sermon entitled, "*A Thanksgiving for Plenty, and a Warning against Avarice*," discovered a degree of perverseness, or of prejudice and ignorance, rarely to be met with, even amongst the very lowest, most illiterate, and unreflecting part of the people. He accuses the *farmers of cruelty and avarice*; renews the senseless cry of *monopoly*; suggests the propriety of introducing *excisemen into barns and granaries*; and proposes the inflicting of *heavy penalties* upon those farmers and others, in whose possession corn, beyond a certain quantity, *to be fixed by law*, should be found. "This style of reasoning," say the Edinburgh Reviewers, "is pardonable enough in those who argue from the belly, rather than the brains; but, in a well-fed and well-educated clergyman, who has never been disturbed, by hunger, from the free exercise of cultivated talents, it merits the severest reprehension." To say the truth, these Reviewers, who are clear another sort of men than Mr. Nares and his brethren of the British Critic, have reprehended him pretty severely. They have, in a very short compass, satisfactorily proved, that political economy and theological metaphysics are subjects to the discussing of which his noddle is by no means adapted. But, must it not be deeply mortifying to every one who feels for the honour of the Church of England, to see nonsense such as that above described coming from the pen of an Archdeacon and a Residentiary Canon! As to his Reviewership he does not there appear in his proper name and rank; and, though one might wish not to see a Librarian of the British Museum exhibiting such infallible proofs of a want of the powers of thinking; yet, viewing him merely in these situations, the mortification is trifling compared to that

which we experience when we consider him as a dignitary of the Church; for then, the question that forces itself forward in the mind of every man, is: "what must that Church be, of which such is the knowledge and such are the talents of the dignitaries?" The "cruelty" and "avarice" of the farmers! "*Excisemen*" to visit barns and granaries! And these are the notions that emanate from the mind of a "well-educated" man, are they? If this be the case, God preserve those whom I love from being "well-educated!" If such be the produce of Mr. Nares's twenty-years of study, under the tuition of half a score of masters, it would have been much better to let his mind lie fallow, its sterility not exposed by abortive attempts at cultivation, or, at least, not rendered ridiculous by the ostentatious display of Latin and Greek, which, from the lips of a barren head, drop like human language from the beak of a parrot.

MINISTERIAL INTRIGUES.—(Continued from p. 831.) In general I am not desirous to pursue a dispute very far with the writers of the Minister. To have the last word is, at best, but a childish wish; but, upon a subject like this, the effect of repetition should be risked rather than suffer any misapprehension or doubt to remain in the mind of the public. Seeing that the ministerial intrigues have failed, it was my intention to say very little more about them at present; and, though the following article from the Morning Post of the 28th ultimo might warrant a commentary of some length, I shall do little more than lay it before my readers, leaving them to draw the inference, to which it so evidently leads. "Entertaining nothing but calm contempt for the virulent and scurrilous observations, which envious malignity is so fretfully anxious to point against us, we again repeat, and we shall always be forward to repeat our wishes, that the late happy and auspicious reconciliation had been followed up by all the beneficial consequences that were generally expected should have flowed from it. We shall be always ready to repeat wishes, the realizing of which would have so materially tended to unite the hearts, increase the confidence, and consolidate the strength of the empire. As no malignity of misrepresentation can deter us from the expression of these wishes, neither shall any petulance of provocation betray us into any rash and precipitate disclosure of the causes that have principally contributed to the frustration of the public hopes. In any thing we have hitherto remarked upon this delicate subject, we never adverted, even in the remotest man-

ner, to the views of any minister, to the intrigues of any party : but if it be true, as has been so pertinaciously asserted, that nothing of a political nature *ever attended* or followed that wished-for reconciliation, with what consistency can it be supposed by those who deny the fact, that *no overtures have been accepted*. Could that have been accepted which was never offered? and if any overtures have been of a political tendency, it follows even in the avowal of our adversaries, that, so far at least, *steps had been taken towards entering upon a negotiation for some political arrangement*. But we shall withhold any further remark for the present on this matter, for reasons which have already imposed upon us the silence of prudence and respect. One cannot help admiring that prudence and circumspection, which induce this gentleman to seal up his lips after he has divulged his secret; as also that respect, which makes him refrain from connecting the royal reconciliation with party arrangements, after he has, for several days successively so connected them.—The Register is, as far as I have observed, the only print, in which the “sublime expectations” of the Morning Post have been commented on; and, is it true, that the comment was “virulent and scurrilous,” and that it indicated “malignity,” and more especially “*envious malignity!*” But, this is the common-place whine of a defeated disputant.—The gentleman will not suffer himself, it seems, to be provoked into “any rash and precipitate disclosure of the causes that have principally contributed to the *frustration of the public hopes*.” The hopes of the public, properly so called, the hopes of the people of England, have not been frustrated: they have, on the contrary been confirmed and strengthened by the conduct of the Prince and his real friends. The hopes of those who exist only by the effect of those causes which have produced their country’s decline, and which, if not removed, must produce its fall; the hopes of such persons may have been frustrated, and, indeed, they have been frustrated. But, after all, the frustration has, then actually taken place, it seems, though we were so positively assured, that the “political arrangements consequent upon the royal reconciliation” would infallibly go into effect!—What! did I ever say, that “nothing of a political nature *ever attended* or followed the reconciliation?” Did I ever say this? This Morning Post gentleman said that much of a political nature did immediately follow; and, as I naturally supposed him to have been informed on the

part of the Treasury clerks, I only took the liberty of denying, that either of the royal parties, or that any of the Opposition, had entertained any political views in connexion with the reconciliation. Was it, therefore, at all inconsistent for me to say, at the same time, that no overtures, made on the part of the minister, had been accepted? “Could that have been accepted which was never offered?” Why put this question to *me*? I have not said that nothing was *offered*. You said that much was offered: you congratulated the public upon the government (alias the ministry) being about to receive “the powerful aid of Lord Moira, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Erskine, in the great council of the nation.” I denied this; but, did I ever deny that Mr. Pitt had made overtures to those gentlemen? Did I ever deny, that “steps had been taken towards entering upon a negotiation for some political arrangement?” I never thought of making any such denial: on the contrary, I did then, and do now, firmly believe the fact. Three weeks ago, the Morning Post told us, that Lord Moira was *come up* from Scotland, and that Lord Harrowby was *gone down* to Bath: a few days back it told us, that Lord Moira was *gone down* to Scotland, and that Lord Harrowby was *come up* from Bath, and that he went immediately to a dinner with Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville. No sign of ill health, I take it! Whether the intelligence were correct, or otherwise, I do not pretend to determine; but, if it was, the ministerial writer will, perhaps, favour us with the reason of these sympathetic movements, at the time when prudence will release him from that restraint which now with-holds from us a development of “the causes that have principally contributed to the frustration” of the ministerial hopes. Till then, we must wait with respectful patience.—In the mean-time, however, though several other topics press upon me, and demand room, I cannot refrain from inserting another article, upon this subject, from the ministerial paper, called the COURIER. This article is not only demi-official, but it bears every mark of Treasury origin. For this reason, as well as for the purpose of shewing what miserable shifts the ministry are driven to, I shall insert the article entire, begging the reader to peruse it with very great attention. For the sake of brevity in the comment I will *number* the separate parts of the text.—1. “It is curious to hear those who have expressed the sincerest joy at a recent event, charged with making attempts to give it the colour and

"complexion of an intrigue and party business, and with having hearts so strangely constituted, as to seek for a political and interested inducement in the dearest and holiest relations of life. We never suspected, we never said, that it was the effect of intrigue or party; we always gave the motive and the merit to the parent and the son, and not to ministers or parties.—2. Had any one indeed suspected that the lamented breach, and the delay in putting an end to it, might have been the effect of intrigue and party, we should not have been inclined to think *that suspicion altogether without foundation.*—3. We added, indeed, and we repeat, that if the reconciliation be, as we firmly believe, *sincere* it must have a *political tendency.* And have those who are so anxious to have it believed that nothing political led to or can grow out of it, forgotten that the differences were merely political? To say then that the adjustment of such differences can have no political tendency, is to maintain one of the grossest absurdities.—4. Perhaps the enemies of His Majesty's *confidential* servants would be gratified could they persuade one of the illustrious personages to afford them the sanction of his name. But we leave it to the country to decide upon the sincerity of the joy which those persons have expressed at the reconciliation, who would make that illustrious personage the head of a party to oppose *the men who are honoured with his father's countenance and confidence.*—5. Who the violent partisans are, who "advertise and bruit abroad so loudly, the necessity ministers may lie under of supporting themselves by "some adventitious aid and body of assistance," we confess we know not; but we suspect that those who cry out so loudly, are the persons who would be very glad if ministers would solicit their assistance. We have read in some old play, of a physician in distress, endeavouring to persuade a very healthy man that he was going rapidly into a consumption, in order that he might be called in. Perhaps the persons we have alluded to are acting with similar views with respect to His Majesty's ministers.—6. What overtures have been made and accepted or rejected, what success has or has not, *as yet*, attended any negotiation; we know not. Strong in the justice of their cause, and in the support of the country, we do not see that His Majesty's ministers need make

"any overtures to the party which appears to take such uncommon pains to have it believed that their support "is so desirable and so necessary."— Taking these several parts in their numerical order, a very few words will suffice for each.—1. What is there so very curious in our seeking for a political and interested inducement, where we were so plainly told that it existed? On the Monday the reconciliation took place; on the Wednesday the ministerial writers congratulated the public, they expressed their "fond hopes and high expectations" of seeing "Lord Moira, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Erskine giving their "powerful aid to the government (meaning "the ministry) in the great council of the "nation." Was it so very curious, then, for us to suppose, that, on one side, there were persons who wished to make a party business of the reconciliation?—2. So; now that the party intrigues have not succeeded, it is insinuated, that "the breach, "and the delay in putting an end to it, were "the effect of party intrigue." Not on the side of His Majesty and the ministers, of course; and, consequently, it must have been on the side of the Prince and his advisers, amongst, if not at the head of whom, he it observed, was that very nobleman, who has recently been so flattered by the ministerial writers, and to bring over whom, there is strong reason to believe, no ordinary exertions have been made. Observe, too, what an amiable light his Royal Highness is placed in by those, who, for reasons obvious enough, now, at last, wish to be numbered amongst those who entertain a due degree of respect for his person and character.—3. What! "*must*" the reconciliation have a political tendency; or, "*must*" that reconciliation have been *insincere*? Cruel dilemma! for, there is every reason to believe that it has not had, and will not have, a political tendency. Who has attempted to maintain that the reconciliation "*can*" have no political tendency? We have only maintained that it *has* not had, and *will* not have such a tendency, in the sense in which the word tendency is here made use of. What signifies it whence the difference arose? All that we wanted was to see it done away, and the cause buried in oblivion: and the public will be at no loss to form a just judgment as to the conduct and character of those who are now endeavouring to revive it. Besides, according to this writer's mode of reasoning, the reconciliation must have been in itself political. The difference must have been discussed and settled; and, it is not at all difficult to perceive, that we are now wished to conclude, that the Prince has made con-

cessions to the minister. Indecent insinuation! This is, however, the colour which the partizans of the minister are *now* endeavouring to give to the transaction; as evidently appears from the whole of their proceedings. In a caricature-shop, which has always been devoted to the minister, and which has sometimes been, to a certain degree, *under the immediate control* of some of his "young friends;" in that shop, *since Lord Moira's return to Scotland*, there has been, and now is, exhibited, a picture intitled "THE RECONCILIATION," in which the Prince appears as the Prodigal Son, dressed in rags, and introduced to his father by Mr. Pitt on one side and Lord Moira on the other, with a quotation at the bottom, from the Gospel of St. Luke, descriptive of his sins, his miseries, and his repentance! This caricaturist formerly received a pension, which Mr. Addington, with great propriety, took from him; and which, I should hope, has not been renewed. I wish clearly to be understood here, as by no means insinuating that the minister, or any of his friends, have dictated, or encouraged, this scandalous outrage on the feelings of the Prince: unequivocally I declare, that I am convinced they have not; but, the outrage clearly shows what light the underlings of the ministry view the reconciliation in; for, be sure that this caricaturist never would have made this print, if he had not been fully persuaded that he was anticipating the wishes of his patrons. — 4 The enemies of "His Majesty's confidential servants" (for, it seems, the nation is still to be insulted by the use of this phrase, this convenient shield against ministerial responsibility), "the enemies of "His Majesty's confidential servants," if the ministers will insist upon making the opposition their "enemies;" those persons do not, and have not, for any of their proceedings, sought the sanction of His Royal Highness's name. It is easy to bring forward charges of this sort; but, when, where, how, has the name of the exalted personage in question been made use of for purposes such as are alluded to by this writer? But, that which follows, under this head, is something worse than a plain unvarnished falsehood. The public are called upon to mistrust the sincerity expressed, on account of the reconciliation, by those, "who would make the Prince the head of a "party to oppose the men who are honoured with "his father's countenance and confidence!" Mark well the words, for they are of great account. There was no sincerity in our wishes to see the son of our sovereign reconciled to his royal father, because we might wish his Royal Highness still to keep aloof from Mr.

Pitt, and still to give his countenance to those who are endeavouring to prevent the evils which they think the unbridled power of that minister would produce! For, further than this, who has ever expressed a desire to see his Royal Highness the head of a party? And, thus far if he did not go, what would be the opinion of mankind as to his estimation of that throne, of which he is destined to be the ornament; and also as to his love for that people, over whose honour, liberties, and happiness, it not only will be, but is a ready, his duty to watch with much more anxiety than any other subject of the realm? But, observe; it is not his being the head of a party that gives offence; it is the purpose of the party that constitutes the impropriety: "a party to oppose the men "who are honoured with his father's countenance and confidence." Were it to *support*, instead of oppose these men, he might be the head of a party with all the propriety imaginable. It must be confessed, however, that his party would, in such case, be a very small one. He might be permitted to stand second or third after Mr. Canning, Mr. Huskisson, and George Rose! A table of small dimensions would suffice. Economy would enable him to face the effects of bank-restriction. And, as to grace, any one of Mr. Pitt's demure and "prudent young friends" would say it for him gratis. But, to return to the "confidential servants," to those, who thus nestle themselves into the ermin of royalty. Who are they? Why, they are persons, who have at their head a man, who, only six months ago was zealously labouring, in conjunction with those persons whom the Prince then honoured, and still honours, with his countenance, to oppose, and to force from their places, the kings "confidential servants"; yea the very men "who were honoured with his Majesty's countenance and confidence;" which men were, too, those whom he himself had publicly eulogized, and had recommended to the parliament and the nation! Now, behold! the principle is quite changed! Now, that this man is minister; now that *he* is the "confidential servant"; the Prince must countenance no one that opposes "his father's government"! Nay; the persons whom to oppose is now to be stigmatized as a breach of filial duty in the Prince, are, for the greater part, as to numbers, not only mere ministers, as the former ones were, but they are the same identical men, only rendered sacred by their association with Mr. Pitt! For cool insolence, this pretension is certainly unparalleled.

Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen, who survey  
The rich man's joys increase, the poor's decay,  
'Tis yours to judge how wide the limits stand  
Between a splendid and a happy land.  
Proud swells the tide with loads of freighted ore,  
And shouting folly hail them from her shore.  
Yet count our gains. This wealth is but a name,  
That leaves our useful products still the same.

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Not so the loss. The man of wealth and pride  
Takes up a space that many poor supplied;  
The robe that wraps his limbs in silken sloth,  
Has robbed the neighbouring fields of half their growth;  
Around the world each needful product flies,  
For all the luxuries the world supplies:  
While thus the land, adorn'd for pleasure all,  
In barren splendour feebly waits the fall. GOLDSMITH.

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## LETTER V.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

### DIGRESSION.

Corn-Bill.—Enclosures.—The Poor.

SIR,—Amongst many disadvantages of conducting a discussion in Letters separated from each other, as to their time of appearance, there is one peculiar advantage, namely, the occasional opportunity, afforded the writer, of digressing into those parts of his subject, which derive additional interest from the circumstances of the day; an advantage of which I am now about to endeavour to avail myself.

After having, in the foregoing letter, signified my intention to show, that the primary cause of our national decline, and the consequent superiority of our enemy, was to be sought for in *your* Paper-Money system, I was proceeding first to describe the nature of that system, and then to trace it to its several consequences. But, the dearth of bread and the other necessities of life having unhappily become a topic of much greater public interest than any other, this appears to be a favourable time to obtain a patient hearing upon those all-important subjects, the Corn-Bill, New Enclosures, and The Poor.

If I meant to confine my observations to the corn-bill now in existence, I should think it necessary to dwell upon the particular circumstances under which that bill was passed; but, as such is not my intention, I shall, for the present at least, leave those circumstances aside, and enter at once upon the principle, on which, according to the report of the committee of the House of Commons, and also according to your speech thereon, the bill was introduced, supported, and, finally, passed into a law.—In the report, which was recommended, and which was, in its finished state, laid before the House of Commons on the 14th of June last, the Committee profess to have in view to introduce

such a measure as shall contribute to the producing of such an ample supply of the different kinds of corn and grain as may be sufficient for our consumption. “This supply,” say they, “cannot be expected without a considerable surplus, in plentiful years, above the demand of the home market; it, therefore, becomes desirable, that the grower should have such a ready sale for that surplus by exportation, and bounty if requisite, as may remove all apprehension of his not being able to obtain, from a glut of the commodity at the home market, such a price for that surplus as will afford him an equitable profit for his labour, industry, and capital employed in the production. It appears, then, to your committee, that the surest mode by which an ample supply can be expected, is to endeavour to secure an uniform and reasonable price to the growers.” Do pray, Sir, read this last sentence over again, and say whether you understand what it means. The surest mode of *expecting* a supply! But, it is agreed, I believe, that your bright geniuses are exempted from the observance of all vulgar rules; otherwise it would be quite impossible to account for the tolerance which the House shewed with respect to this report.—After a short and not very clear statement as to the operation of the corn-bill of 1791, the committee express their full confidence, “that, by due encouragement to the agriculture of the country, and by bringing the Crown and Waste Lands into cultivation, the product of the growth of the corn in the United Kingdom will afford a regular and ample supply for its consumption.” What, in the name of common sense! What do they mean by the *product of the growth of corn*? Do they mean the money that the crop produces at market? And that that money will purchase a regular and ample supply for the consumption of the kingdom? What, then, do they mean?—But, let us come to the close of that part of this report, where, if any where, we are to look for the principle of the bill. “It appears to your committee

“ that the price of corn from 1791 to the  
 “ harvest of 1803, has been very irregular,  
 “ but upon an average (increased in a great  
 “ degree by the years of scarcity), has, in  
 “ general, yielded a fair profit to the grower.  
 “ The casual high prices, however, have had  
 “ the effect of stimulating industry, and  
 “ bringing into cultivation large tracts of  
 “ waste land, which, combined with the two  
 “ last productive seasons, and other causes,  
 “ have occasioned such a depression in the  
 “ value of grain, as it is feared will greatly  
 “ tend to the discouragement of agriculture,  
 “ unless maintained by the support of Par-  
 “ liament.” — Loath as I am to detain you,  
 Sir, I cannot refrain from imploring your  
 attention to the style of these law-givers.  
 Their favourite figure of rhetoric seems to  
 be *truth*. Common men would have  
 been content with either of the two phrases,  
 “ upon an average,” or, “ in general;” but  
 these gentlemen take them both. Again I,  
 for instance, should have said, “ and *scarcely*,”  
 “ *tailed*,” or rather, “ *reported*,” by the *power*  
 “ of Parliament,” and not “ *maintained*” by  
 “ the *support*,” that is, *maintained* by the  
*maintenance* of Parliament.

But, the style is a more trifling matter when compared to the matter of this report. First we are told, that, in order always to have plenty of corn in the country, we must labour to raise taxes to pay the farmers for sending corn out of the country after every plentiful season! It would seem to require no common portion of faith to swallow this doctrine: but, what then shall be said to the context? The premiums, the consequent regular prices of corn, and the constant plenty, are represented as the inducements to agricultural industry; but, directly afterwards we are informed, that it is the *casual high price* which has had the effect of stimulating to that industry. Then, as to waste lands, we are told, that great tracts were brought into cultivation in consequence of the casual high prices; though, just before, we find the *equalising* of prices represented as likely to cause still more waste lands to be cultivated. But, that which merits most attention, is, their confession, that, without any aid from Parliament, “ the price of corn has been such as, upon an average to yield a fair profit to the grower.” Well, then, what did they want more? They wanted to *equalise* it. To equalise it? What, for the sake of the people; or of the farmer? Let us stop, however, and see your view of the subject. “ The design of these regulations, is, that scarcity shall be avoided;” and, for this purpose it is provided, that “ corn shall *constantly* acquire such a price,

“ as will be a sufficient encouragement to promote its growth. We have lately seen  
 “ the quarter of wheat at 18 shillings and  
 “ this arose from the deficiency; but, the  
 “ best means to avoid the deficit, is, *never* to  
 “ admit this department of agriculture to re-  
 “ main without a sufficient compensation.” Here, Sir, you repeated, in language more correct and intelligible, the substance of the report of the committee, passing over the error of a tame new enclosure, which, I also, shall lay aside for the present.

In the conclusion of their report, the committee shut from Anderson, the argument from *experience*; and they evidently would, if they had not been short of time, or something else, have said, that, previous to the passing of the corn-bounty law in 1688, corn was, upon an average, dear; that, from 1688 to 1791, during the operation of that law, corn was, upon an average, cheap; that, since 1791, when the law became permanently confirmed, corn has been dear, though there has been scarcely any exportation; that, *therefore*, exportation tends to render corn plenty at home, and that of course as a premium tends to encourage exportation, the granting of such premium is the way to render corn plenty, and to prevent scarcity and high price. This argument is, in my opinion, worth nothing at all. The officers, to which our attention is directed, are all to be fairly ascribed to causes, with which the corn-bounty was in no wise connected. The troubled state of the country during the forty years preceding the revolution; the tranquil state between that time and the year 1755, during which period agriculture was the principal occupation of the country, and the depreciation of money was gradual and slow; the constantly increasing relative encroachments, which, during the last half century, commerce has been making upon the agricultural population and labour, and, especially, the reluctance, which, within the last eight or ten years, has existed to grant long leases, a reluctance that has arisen from the rapid depreciation of money, now become visible to the most ignorant and unobserving land-owner; these are causes quite sufficient to account for the high prices of corn in the first and second period, and for the low price in the middle period above mentioned, without having recourse to any supposed influence of the premiums for exporting corn; and, therefore, the measure, by which those premiums have been revived, must be tried entirely by the reason of the case.

Stripping the report of the committee of its rhetorical embellishments, and taking



their meaning, as farther explained by yourself, the argument whereon the corn-bill was passed into a law, may be thus expressed. "That a bounty on the exportation of corn greatly promotes agriculture; that it encourages the farmer to raise greater quantities of corn than he otherwise would raise; that this produces a general plenty which prevents prices from ever rising high; that thus corn is rendered cheaper *upon the whole*, than when its price is allowed at times to sink very low, while at times again it must rise as disproportionately high." To make good this argument, the advocates of the bounty inform us, that a market for every commodity must always exist, otherwise that commodity will not be provided. To this I answer, that there always does exist a market for corn, and quite a sufficient one too, in the home consumption. But, the reply is, that there should be a market open beside the home market; otherwise the farmers, from the fear of overstocking that market, will always keep it scantily supplied. Good God! that the tillers of the land should draw from that land *less than they are able to draw from it!* that they should forbear thus from any consideration would be wonderful enough; but, that their forbearance should arise from a fear of rendering corn low-priced, when they well know that the price of every other thing is regulated by that of corn, would be truly astonishing. From a country well settled and governed no corn ought ever to be exported; because, it is a proposition firmly established, and universally admitted, that the multiplication of the human species is always in due proportion to the means of subsistence; nor will it be denied, that the tendency of the human species to multiply is much greater than the rapidity with which it is possible to increase the produce of the earth for their maintenance. Population is frequently checked by the deficiencies of agriculture, but agriculture never can, except from very singular circumstances, be checked by the deficiencies of population; or, in other words, by the want of a demand for corn.

It follows, then, Sir, from this important fact, which seems to have wholly escaped you and the other advocates for the corn-bounty, that an ample market, and full encouragement, are always afforded to the farmer, without the aid of any trading regulation whatever; and, therefore, as far as I can discover, all that can, after this, be said, in defence of the bounty, is, that, though the principle of population affords sufficient encouragement to the raising of

corn, the bounty affords additional encouragement. In answer to this, every one would, without hesitation, say, that there can be no use in over-doing a good thing. Why, if a sufficient market is provided for corn, would you interfere to disturb the natural order of things? In this general presumption against the bounty there is no little weight; but, if any man will examine the particular circumstances of the case, with only a moderate degree of attention, he will find that the advocates for the bounty have spoken completely without thought; in ascribing to the bounty the power of *increasing the production of corn*.

The intention of the bounty is to prevent the price of corn from ever falling so low as otherwise it would often naturally do. If this purpose be not answered, the law fails of its object. If it be answered, it will either raise the *average* price of corn, or it will not. The advocates of the bounty, and yourself amongst the rest, sometimes express yourselves as if you thought it would not; for you are not very consistent with yourselves on this point, sometimes endeavouring to recommend your doctrine by the popular promise of *average cheapness*; though at other times it suits your purposes to exhibit the opposite face of the subject. But, of this we may rest perfectly satisfied, that, if the bounty does not raise the average price of corn, it is impossible it can encourage the production; and, on the other hand, if it lowers the average price of corn, it must of necessity, discourage the production. These are propositions which you will, surely, agree to. You will admit, that the bounty raises to a certain degree the average price of corn. This high price, you say, would so encourage the raising of corn, that we should have a considerable quantity to export, which would bring us a good deal of money in all good years, and would, by inducing the farmers to raise larger quantities upon an average every year than they now do, by sowing more every year than they now do, save us from scarcity in all bad years. These, then, are the advantages, which you set against a permanent high price of provisions, and a permanent check to population.

But, let us consider how far these effects can be produced by the bounty. And, here, Sir, suffer me to call your attention to one very obvious principle; to wit, that *common competition*, which regulates every trade, and of which it is truly astonishing that you should appear so unable to perceive the effects. This high price of corn necessarily raises the profits of farming stock and labour

somewhat above the ordinary rate of profit in other employments. This, as necessarily creates a competition. The demand for farms becomes greater. The landlords let their lands higher, till farming profit comes down again to a level with the profit of the general business of the country. Here, then, we are again, as to the stimulus to agricultural industry, in the very situation we were in before. Nothing is more certain than that the landlords have it in their power to prevent the profits of the farmers from ever remaining, any long time, above the lowest that is consistent with the nature of their business; that is, the rate of profit common in the same country amongst other businesses equally respectable and pleasant. But, surely, no man, in his sober senses, will say, that the farmer is, even in the smallest degree, more encouraged, when corn is high than when it is low, if his profits are always the same; nor can the bounty, as will hereafter be shown, produce any advantage to the landlord himself.

Thus far, Sir, I have done little more than transcribe the arguments of another writer upon the corn-bill, \* who concludes this part

\* LITERARY JOURNAL, Vol. IV, No. 4, for October, 1804.—The essay, here particularly referred to, appears in the shape of a critique upon Anderson's pamphlet, recommending a bounty on the exportation of corn; but, it contains, in fact, a complete refutation of all the arguments advanced by all the writers in favour of a bounty-law.—The work, in which the essay is to be found, does great credit to its conductors; and, operating in conjunction with the Edinburgh Review, it will not fail, I should think, soon to rescue literature from the intolerable disgrace of being, even in appearance, subjected to decisions such as those that are chirked out through the paltry pages of the British Critic, and similar publications.—As to some points, and those not unimportant ones, I widely differ in opinion with the Edinburgh Reviewers, and, for reasons that I may soon find an opportunity of stating, I am afraid that the long arm of Downing-street has reached them, and communicated to them its policy. But, they are men of talents; their writings discover great research, acuteness, and profundity: of course, they are not, for a moment, to be put in competition with those things, called Reviews, which are mere mischievous common-place criticisms, written either by the authors themselves, or by their friends, and the admission of which, I suspect, paid for

of his essay in the following words. "It is  
"astonishing what a different course of  
"reasoning men often pursue on subjects  
"exactly similar, without seeming at all to  
"perceive their own inconsistency. On  
"running over in one's mind some of the  
"acts of the British Legislature, how many  
"cases does one find, where it has acted,  
"and still acts, on a principle directly the  
"reverse of that, on which it established  
"this bounty-law; cases, which are as ve-  
"hemently applauded by the common tribe  
"of politicians, as is the bounty-law itself!  
"Why should ~~wool~~, for example, have been  
"always subject to a system of laws, ab-  
"solutely and immediately contradictory to  
"the principle of the corn-bounty? Why,  
"if a bounty upon the exportation of corn  
"be so favourable to the production of corn,  
"should not a bounty on the exportation  
"of wool be favourable to the production  
"of wool? Why, if the exportation of corn  
"have such an effect to produce plenty of  
"corn at home, should not the exportation  
"of wool have an effect to produce plenty  
"of wool at home? How has it been, that,  
"while the legislature has so often encour-  
"aged the exportation of corn, it has al-  
"ways prohibited the exportation of wool  
"with so much severity? Why are such  
"inconsistencies still allowed to disgrace  
"our intellects? What difference can be  
"pointed out between the case of wool and  
"that of corn? If it be said, that we have  
"not enough wool to answer our occasions;  
"neither have we enough corn, as is clearly  
"acknowledged by the avowed intention  
"of the corn-bill. If it be said, that wool  
"is the material of one of our most im-  
"portant manufactures; corn is the most  
"important material of all our manufac-  
"tures. If it be of importance that the  
"raw material of any of our manufactures  
"should be got cheap, surely it is of im-  
"portance that what is the great material  
"of them all should be got cheap. If it  
"would be unwise to suffer our wool to go  
"to foreign nations to enable them to rival  
"us in that branch of manufacture, and  
"thereby increase their population and their  
"strength, is it not more unwise to suffer  
"our corn to go to them by which their  
"population and their strength is more im-  
"mediately increased? Was, if granting  
"a bounty on exportation, be really so ef-  
"fectual means of producing plenty, and  
"creating riches, do we not establish a  
"bounty on the exportation of every thing  
"which we value? Why do we not grant  
"a bounty on the exportation of sheep and  
"exactly butter and cheese; ale, porter,

"and spirits? Why not on tables and chairs, and all other articles of furniture? Why not on carriages? Why not on horses? Nay, to go higher, why, in order to increase population, not grant a bounty on the exportation of men and women? Why not especially grant a bounty on the exportation of such classes as we have most need of, soldiers, for example, and sailors? As for politicians, we have such a supply of them, the very best in their kind, that we have no occasion for exportation, unless it be as a security against any decay in the numbers or breed." Upon which latter score, I think, my friend must be perfectly at ease, if he only just casts his eye upon the innumerable fry of "young friends" that your return to power has once more brought into clear water. Women, indeed, you do suffer to be exported, Sir; and, you appear to have no objection to the exportation of men, provided that they are *farmer's labourers*, while you have severe penalties against the exportation of button-makers and weavers; and this, too, at the very time when you are passing a law to raise taxes upon us to give to the farmers, in order to enable them to increase the quantity of that article, which cannot possibly be increased without a previous increase in the number of those labourers!

Though I am persuaded, that the arguments above advanced must appear conclusive in the mind of any intelligent man, yet, it may not be altogether useless to take the subject in another view, somewhat closer connected with matter of fact.

It has been already observed, that, in defending the principle of the bounty law, you and its other advocates are not always consistent with yourselves; sometimes seeming to consider the effect of the bounty as a reduction, and sometimes as an increase, of the average price of corn. Various, indeed, are your self-contradictions upon the several parts of the subject; but, there is one position, which seems to be, and which must be, constantly insisted on, and that is, that the effect of granting a bounty upon the exportation of corn is to increase the quantity of corn; or, to state it with greater precision, *to cause to be produced, upon the whole, more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.* This position you must maintain, or confess at once that your object is to lessen the quantity of corn consumed at home. That you will not do the latter is certain; and, that you cannot do the former it will, I think, cost me but little trouble to prove to the perfect satisfaction of any

observing individual, who is any thing more than a mere dabbler in the science of rural economy.

At an age when my chief occupation was to hobble over the cloeds by the side of the plough-horses, I remember, that I used to wonder how it happened, that the land produced enough, and only enough, for all the animals that fed on its produce. My mind did not penetrate so far as the human species: it found quite sufficient to be astonished at in perceiving, that there was always just horses enough to eat the hay, and just hay enough for the horses; just meadows enough for the cattle, and cattle enough for the meadows; sheep enough for the downs, and downs enough for the sheep. If I rambled into the forest or over the common, I never found a blade of grass to spare, and yet there was always enough to maintain all the various kinds of animals that fed on it, though they belonged, perhaps, to a thousand different persons, every one of whom wished to feed thereon as many animals as he could, and though there was no active law to regulate the conduct of those persons. Such astonishment was natural enough in a boy of nine or ten years old; but, it would not be bearable at an age when the mind ought to be in the full exercise of its faculties. Yet, Sir, there does appear to be persons, and those persons calling themselves politicians, and taking upon them to govern the people too, who seem not to be able to perceive, that there is any principle by which is preserved the due proportion between population and subsistence; between the number of mouths in a country, and the quantity of corn with which those mouths must be fed; or, in other words, between the sustenance requisite for the people, and the *producing capacity* of the land.

The persons, who have thought, or, rather, who have talked and written, upon the subject of the corn bounty, may be divided into four classes; and, in describing their several notions relative thereto, I shall, I think, succeed in establishing the position, *that granting a bounty on the exportation of corn, never can cause to be produced, upon the whole, more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.*

The first class of these politicians seem to think, that the *producing capacity* of the land always exists, and in the same degree too; or, in other words, that *all the land* will bear equally well *every year*, if it be *not sown*; and, of course, that the quantity of corn produced depends, barring only the different effects of different seasons, entirely upon the

quantity of land that is sown. This class, therefore, in itself I should expect to find, for instance, Mr. Lister, Mr. Dickinson and George Boswell, from their custom and habits, to an expectation of bounty as an infallible inducement to the farmers to sow more land, and produce more corn. "Oh, oh!" say they, "they won't raise corn, won't they! Give them a bounty for exporting it, and they'll sow corn enough every year; and, then, after a bad season, as the price will be too high to admit of exportation, we shall keep the produce of the whole harvest at home, which, in such case, will, from the inducement of the bounty, be greater in quantity than it would have been if no such inducement had existed." This, I should suppose, is exactly their course of reasoning.

The *second class* look a little deeper. In their trips to Wether, or elsewhere, they perceive great numbers of fields that do not bear a crop every year; that are not sown every year; that are, in short, *fallows* or *lays* \*. Both of these mean land which is suffered to lie all the year round, or two or more years, unsown, in order that it may recruit its strength; in order that, after having been impoverished, if not quite exhausted, it may recover its producing capacity. Nor are these resting fields few in number. The next time you make a military survey, Sir, only take out your pencil, note down the number of fields that you pass, making a cross for every fallow or lay, and, unless your route be like that of Major Sturgeon, within the smoke and the reach of the manure of the metropolis, you will surely find, a cross for every fourth field, and you will, of course, be convinced, that one fourth part of the arable land is, upon an average, lying at rest: lying uncultivated for the purpose of recovering its producing capacity. The fact is, perhaps, that, taking all the kingdom together, more than one third of the arable land is in this state; but, that has nothing to do with the principle we are discussing. Upon the slightest attention to this circumstance of fallows and lays; fields not having the capacity of producing; fields out of which all the ploughing and sowing in the world would not produce a crop equal in quantity to the seed, to say nothing of the sustenance required for the ploughmen,

sowers, harrowers and horses; upon the first and most slight attention to this circumstance, the mere custom house notions must have vanished from your mind. Not so, indeed, was it with Lord Carrington and your far famed Board of Agriculture; nor yet with the wise and modest Grand Jury of Yorkshire, who presented the yielding of tithes to the Clergy and the want of a General Enclosure Bill, at a time when one third of their already-enclosed fields were in a state of fallow or lay for the want of a sufficiency of manure to give them the capacity of producing corn! Of these miserable follies, however, you, Sir, must long ago have been weary. Yet, pardon me if I think that you appear not to have completely disentangled yourself from them. You perceive clearly enough, that all the arable land must, each part in its turn, have rest, and that, some of it must rest for several years at a time; but, you seem to have a sort of confused notion of giving to the farmers the ability of supplying this deficiency of nature. From the whole of your speeches upon the subject of the corn-bounty, it is evident, that you think, that it is possible to add to the producing capacity of the land by throwing, through the means of high price, more money into the hands of the farmer, because the farmer will, thereby, be enabled, not to purchase perhaps, but, somehow or other, to get more manure upon his land; and this seems to be the highest point at which you have arrived.

The *third class* of politicians, however, carry their reflections further. They inquire whence the extraneous capacity of producing corn, that is to say, manure; they inquire whence it comes; and they soon trace it back either to horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs; or to the pits of chalk, clay, marble, or sand. (I leave out *tilage* here; but the same arguments will apply to it.) Let us, therefore, say they, encourage the breeding of animals, and the digging and mixing of soils; and, in order thereunto, let us secure a good price for corn, that the farmer may be enabled to expend more upon these objects, so evidently necessary to the increasing of the producing capacity of his land. They perceive clearly that an increase of labour must precede this other increase. There must be labour to dig and mix the soil, and labour to tend the animals, before the pits and the animals can communicate any portion of productive capacity to the fields; and, therefore, say this class of politicians, give the farmer the means of procuring more labour, and these means he will find in the high price of his corn.

\* The distinction between a *fallow* and a *lay* is this: the former is a field lying to rest, but, during the time that it so lies, it is ploughed once, twice, or three times: the latter is also a field lying to rest, but it lies without being ploughed.

But, the *fourth class*, in listening to the opinions of the third, are astonished that, when they were tracing back one sort of manure to the bowels of the earth, they did not trace the other sort back to its surface; that in tracing back soils to the pits, they did not trace back bestial manure to oats, hay, roots, grass, and fodder; and, that, from the additional quantity of feed absolutely necessary to the existence of dumb animals, they did not trace back the increased labour of man to an additional quantity of food, that is to say of corn, not less necessary to his existence; for who is there so blind as not to perceive, that labour must always be *preceded* by sustenance? Trivial expressions frequently lead to important errors. We talk every hour of our lives about a man's "earning his bread before he eats it," though nothing is more true, than that he must eat it before he earns it; which corresponds with the saying of the country people, that "ploughing comes out of the cupboard and the man-ger." If I am asked, "how, then, could agriculture ever have begun," I answer, that man had subsistence before it began. God made the fruits of the earth, the beasts, and the birds, before he made man. Man was a hunter and lived upon wild animals before he cultivated the ground. When colonies have been settled, the colonists have always lived for years upon the produce of other countries. Indeed, it is a self-evident proposition, a clear and unalterable law of nature, that labour must always be *preceded* by sustenance. "How, then," some one will say, "has the agriculture of any country ever increased, if the increase of corn be always *permeable* necessary." I answer, that there are two distinct causes of the increase of corn, labour and the seasons. An abundant season, that is to say, a season which communicates to the land an extraordinary portion of the producing capacity, has the same effect that a very great addition to the quantity of labour would have; that is, it causes an increase in the quantity of sustenance; this increase instantly causes an increase in the quantity of labour, labour brings manure, and manure adds to the producing capacity of the land. In this way it is, that the agriculture of a country is increased; and, as I think, that even George Rose himself will not pretend that the corn-bounty will have any influence upon the seasons, my argument remains entirely unshaken by the fact of a progressive increase of the agriculture of a country.

Thus, then, Sir, it appears; that, as far

as human means are concerned, to cause to be produced, upon the whole, more corn than is now produced, it is not sufficient that we plough more land and sow more seed, but, that, *previous* to such an addition to our ploughing and sowing, we must add to the producing capacity of the land; that, to add to the producing capacity of the land, we must previously obtain more manure; that, to obtain more manure, we must previously obtain more labour; that, to obtain more labour, we must previously make an addition to the sustenance of the people; and, that, therefore, as the sustenance of the people is corn, the exportation of corn never can add to their sustenance; and, hence the regular, the natural, and necessary conclusion that *the bounty granted to encourage an exportation of corn never can cause to be produced upon the whole more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.*

This view of the subject, Sir, which I cannot help hoping will experience no disadvantage from its simplicity, will greatly assist us in determining what must be the real effects of a bounty-law, or any effective law, for the exportation of corn. We have seen that it cannot cause a greater quantity of corn to be produced than would be produced without it; and we know, that by causing some corn to be sent out of the country, it must prevent that corn from being eaten in the country, and must thereby, in whatever degree it is effective, operate as a check to population, having first produced that want and misery, without which population never is or can be checked. But, let us trace this evil more minutely through its progress.

I shall suppose myself a farmer with twenty arable fields, five of which are fallows or lay, that is, they are lying to rest, in order to recover their producing capacity. It is now the time to begin ploughing for the next seed-time. I consider whether corn is likely to be plenty or scarce; and, having arrived at a conclusion upon that subject, I look at my fields; some, perhaps, I find to be quite exhausted, some to have a little of the producing capacity in them, and some a great portion of it. I then go to work, and put into exertion whatever degree of this capacity I think will best suit the demands of the year, and, of course, contribute most to my advantage. If I think corn will be very dear, that is to say very scarce, I bring into exertion as much as I possibly can of the producing capacity of my fields; if I think corn will be very cheap, that is to say very plenty, I suffer a

great portion of this producing capacity to remain unexerted. "That is the very thing we want to prevent," say you, "we want to prevent you from being thus deterred, by the prospect or probability of a plentiful harvest and of a glutted market, from sowing so much land as you otherwise would sow; we want to prevent you from ever being induced thus to neglect your fields, to throw away their producing capacity." I do not neglect them, Sir; I look at them by day, and think of them when I commune with my pillow. You do not see them lying waste. Their hedges are kept up; their gates carefully fastened. I well know their value; and that that value is daily and hourly increasing. No, Sir, I do not *throw away*, and no prospect of plenty or of any thing else will ever induce me to throw away, even the smallest portion of their producing capacity. I do not throw this precious quality away, but I *reserve* it to be exerted at a time when its exertion will be more advantageous to me than at present; and that time is when unfavourable seasons, or other causes, have rendered corn more scarce than it now is: in short, the producing capacity is hoarded up in my fields, upon the same principle, from the same motives, and with the same effect, that the produce itself is afterwards hoarded up in granaries and store-houses; and, excuse me, Sir, if I cannot help thinking, that the persons who imagine a high price at home, or a bounty on exportation, to be necessary to prevent me from *throwing it away*, discover a mind very little superior to that of those, who suspected and accused the corn dealers and mill-men of throwing their corn and flour into the Thames, in order to keep up the price of those commodities! But, if the ports had been open; if an exportation bounty-law had been in force: and if the people had seen ships loaded with corn and flour sailing down the river, destined to Spain, Portugal, or elsewhere, it would not have been without good and sufficient cause that they would have complained. So, would it be with respect to my fields, under the operation and inducements of a bounty-law. They would possess neither more nor less of the producing capacity on account of that law; but, as soon as the law was passed, I should have another market besides the home one to look to. I should be less careful to keep in *reserve* the producing capacity of my fields, because I should be sure of a market in the exportation; and, thus, in plentiful seasons at home, I should frequently send abroad part of the producing capa-

city of my fields, instead of reserving it, instead of hoarding it up, as above described, to be brought forth and exerted in seasons of domestic scarcity. A bounty-law; therefore, so far from answering its professed purpose of diminishing the evils of scarcity, must, in whatever degree it becomes effective, add to those evils by causing the exportation of the producing capacity of the land, and thereby retarding the return of plenty and prolonging the duration of dearth.

This, then, Sir, is the result of my inquiry: that, as the land possesses only a certain portion of producing capacity; that, as the whole of this capacity will, in the most suitable time and manner, be fully called forth and exerted by the demands for sustenance at home; and, that, as the granting of a bounty on exported corn can never add to the producing capacity, any law to encourage or permit the exportation of corn, is a law for exporting the producing capacity of the land; a law to abridge the domestic consumption; a law to check population, by creating want and misery; a law to prevent the unborn from being born, to dry up the milk of infancy, to stint and retard youth in its progress to manhood, to unstring the nerves and hasten the decline of manhood itself, to embitter the sorrows and sharpen the pangs of old age; a law to depopulate the hamlet and to people the work-house, to add to the more than a million of miserable paupers already in existence, to extinguish the last remaining spark of private independence and of public spirit in the bosoms of the common people, to weigh them down to the earth, to break their hearts, to angust them with their country and their government, and to prepare them for a willing subjection to the law.

Deeply impressed with the truths that I have endeavoured to establish, and sincerely persuaded that, however erroneous your measures, you would wish not to accumulate evils upon your country, I cannot conclude without expressing a hope that you will, at an early period of the session of parliament, propose a repeal of the odious and dangerous law which has given rise to this discussion.—It was my intention to have entered here upon an inquiry respecting New Enclosures and The State of The Poor; but these subjects must be deferred till another opportunity.—I am, Sir, your, &c. &c. &c. WM. CORBETT.  
*Duke Street, Dec. 5, 1804.*

P. S.—Sir, I am aware of the disadvantage arising from the subjoining a long postscript to a long letter; but, as it is un-

derstood, that several petitions are to be presented to Parliament against the corn-law, by the large cities and towns; and as the law arose from the petition of the farmers, and was supported chiefly by the land-owners, I cannot refrain from making here a few remarks, which I think will tend to convince the farmers and landlords, that the law cannot produce any beneficial effect to them. Indeed, if they are satisfied with my arguments upon the principle of the law, a very little reflection will teach them to make this application. Yet, it may not be altogether unnecessary to point out here, in detail, some circumstances, which would have interrupted and encumbered the discussion of the principle.—It is well known, that the first law (passed in 1688) granting a bounty on the exportation of corn, “was passed with a view to give a premium to the country-gentlemen, in order to obtain their consent to the imposition of the land-tax.” The present bill has been, by some persons, attributed to a similar motive; while the Edinburgh Reviewers, who seem to be quite willing to go as far as possible in approving of all your measures, are inclined to ascribe the bill, to a motive still less worthy of a statesman, namely, party politics. “The success of such topics” (say they, after quoting a passage from the report of the corn-trade committee) “might not, perhaps, have been equally great, if the *Master of the State*” (These men have certainly been touched with the finger of ministerial grace!) “had already been fixed upon that vantage ground, from which he may now dictate a policy more congenial to his former system. Amidst the arrangements of foreign policy and of war which may be supposed to absorb his mind” (Can they be serious, Sir!), “the humble and less precarious plans of domestic legislation may be forgotten.” What they add is well worthy of your serious attention. “But the minister who tampers for a present purpose, with his own maxims, and indulges individuals in their frivolous fondness for making laws, instead of opposing, to temporary intermits, the spirit of a general policy, cannot be true either to his own fame, or to the lasting prosperity of Britain.” These critics should, however, have done you the justice to observe, that the bill did not originate with you, nor during your influence over your predecessor. It was one of his pretty little presents to the nation; and you are to be blamed only because you adopted it. It might, or it might not be intended by him as a sort of compensation for the new

Income Tax; but, whoever takes time to reflect, will soon be convinced, that such compensation is a mere illusion, and that, it is impossible, that a bounty on the exportation of corn can produce any advantage to either the farmer or the landlord.—It is agreed, that an export-bounty *will raise the average price of corn*: and this circumstance the petitioning farmers, political landlords, and you, appear to think would be advantageous to the farmer; for your publicly expressed opinion was, that corn was, in July last, “at much too low a price to afford the grower a “reasonable profit.” No matter how low, or how high, the price was: the words clearly conveyed your opinion, that the high price of corn was favourable to the grower, that is, to use a more common term, to the farmer. And why, Sir, pray let me ask you, should the high price of corn be any more favourable to him than a low price; seeing, that the rent of his land, the feed for his horses, cattle and sheep, the food for his servants, the wages of his labourers, the repairs of his house, the price of his implements, his furniture, his dress, and of every article he uses, whether from necessity, for comfort, for convenience, or for pleasure, not only bear a due proportion to, but are regulated by, the price of his corn? In the country you will often hear unthinking farmers complain of the cheapness of corn, and say that it is “not worth the seed;” but, one sack of wheat generally brings eight sacks, and, it is pretty clear, that however small a sum eight sacks will sell for, the farmer can buy the seed with one eighth part of that sum. Accordingly, all the while we hear these complaints and bon-mots from the farmers, we see them very busy ploughing and sowing, and as anxious as ever to get a good crop and to house it in good condition.—I am aware, that it will be observed, that, one article, namely, labourers’ wages, do not rise with the same rapidity as corn does. They are always lagging a certain distance behind; and, when corn rises very suddenly, the labourers’ wages bear no proportion thereto. But, remember, Sir, or, if you should not, the farmers will feel, that this circumstance is no advantage to them, though dreadfully injurious to the country. The agricultural labourer never receives more than enough to maintain himself and family; and, therefore, in whatever degree his wages fall off, considered relatively with the price of corn, in that degree he must, and does, receive aid from the parish, that is to say, from the farmer. Nay, viewing the farmer thus as the payer of the parish

rates for the maintenance of the agricultural poor, the disproportion which will be a rise in the price of corn, created between that price and the price of the labourer's wages; viewing the farmer in this light we shall find, that the rise in the price of his corn is a very serious injury to him; for, the labourer, once upon the parish, once degraded, is but too apt to give up all exertion, and to be strongly inclined to live upon the farmer without any labour at all. This is, I am afraid, a very pernicious effect of the high price of corn, and a more fatal one cannot possibly be produced. — Nor is the landlord a gainer by the high price of corn, from whatever cause it proceeds, a d, of course, not by a high price proceeding from a bounty on exportation. "The real effect of the bounty," says Smith, "is not so much to raise the real value of corn, as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of it exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other commodities. Though, in consequence of the bounty, the farmer should be enabled to sell his corn for four shilling the bushel instead of three and sixpence, and to pay his landlord a money price proportionable to this rise in the money price of his produce; yet, if in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, four shillings will purchase no more goods of any other kind than three and sixpence would have done before, neither the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the landlord, will be in the smallest degree mended by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate better: the landlord will not be able to live better." Suffer me to express my surprise, Sir, that you should have completely rejected this doctrine of your great master, when you have, in so many instances, followed him too closely in those matters where the warlike or diplomatic statesman should have soared above the cold political economist! — As I am fully persuaded, that the petitioning farmers and landlords will, by this time, begin to perceive, that they have made a very great mistake as to the effect of a bounty-law; I cannot help flattering myself, that their minds being once open to conviction, I shall be able to convince them, that, in another point of view, such a law must be injurious to them; always keeping before us the fact, that the bounty on exported corn will raise the average price of corn. — If the bounty on exported corn, raise the average price of corn, the next consequence is, as Smith observes (and as, indeed, we needed neither ghost nor Smith to tell us) "to de-

grade the value of silver;" that is to say, to depreciate the currency of the country (it is relative, now-a-days) further than it is at present depreciated. This, Sir, can the landlord and farmers, above all men living; can the landlords and farmers, whose common interest it is that money should depreciate as little as possible, in a code that the one may contend that the other may object as impossible; can in a description of persons, who they never can, wish for any law, by which the depreciation of money must necessarily be accelerated! Upon this part of the subject, Sir, I beg your attention to a passage from the writer referred to in the former part of my letter. "Is it not strange," says he, "indeed to observe a law made for the encouragement of agriculture, on a principle, obviously problematical, and demonstratively unjust, in a country pretending to be enlightened, where a practice remains unchanged, which opposes an absolute barrier to all improvement, and which is daily gaining ground: the practice, we mean, of refusing leases to farmers, and compelling them to cultivate on the tenure of a single year? In almost every one of the agricultural reports of the different countries, this is complained of as a grievous evil. "I am sorry," says the secretary to the Board of Agriculture, in his General View of the Agriculture of Hertfordshire, "I am sorry to observe that a prejudice against the granting of leases, which, if not checked by the good sense of the landlord, injure, beyond any calculation, the agriculture of the kingdom." That intelligent agriculturist, Mr. Dent, in his Agricultural Survey of Norfolk, says: "that leases are, for the first, the greatest, and most rational and judicious management that can be given to agriculture, admits not of a doubt in my opinion. But of late years there are very many prejudices entertained against them. In many counties," continues he, "the prejudice is so strong, that an owner would as soon allocate the fee simple of his estate as demise it for a term of years. It grieves me," says he again, "to go into a country, which I often do, and find it almost in a state of nature, because the soil being wet and expensive to cultivate, the tenant cannot afford to do it without encouragement, and the owner's insurmountable objection to leases keeps him from granting the sort of encouragement which is essentially necessary." Another of the best informed and most judicious writers on this im-

"portant subject, Mr. Middleton, says, in his View of the Agriculture of Middlesex, "It is, without doubt, a most *reasonable prejudice* which many proprietors entertain against granting leases of their estates; for the withholding these certainly operates as a most powerful bar against every improvement." And after a long discussion of the subject, he adds, "leases appear to me to be of so much importance, as being perhaps the most powerful and rational means of promoting improvements in agriculture, that I hope I shall stand excused for having entered so fully on this branch of the report." Do we then indeed *suffer the folly and ignorance* of landlords to withhold the first, the greatest, and most rational encouragement of agriculture, &c. &c."—Mercy! mercy! good Sirs! why treat the landlords so cruelly? It is a very plain matter-of-fact question that they have to decide; and, as it is evident that they cannot hope to gain any thing by preventing their own land from being well cultivated, I should be very much disposed to trust to their judgment without any inquiry into the reasons upon which it is founded. Let us, see, however, Sir, if we cannot, in the sole circumstance of the *rapid depreciation of money*, find a reason more than sufficient to wipe away all these heavy charges against the landlords.—Leases of farms were, previous to the commencement of your administration, and, I believe, so late as the year 1795 or thereabouts, generally granted, for twenty-one years; some for fourteen years; some for eleven; some, but, comparatively, very few indeed, for a term so short as seven years. Now, Sir, you yourself did, during your speech upon the Civil List, last June, acknowledge, that, since the year 1786, a space of only eighteen years, money had depreciated 60 or 70 per centum. You might have said more than 100 per centum, as I shall, upon a future occasion, amply demonstrate. But, suppose the depreciation to have been *only* 70 per centum, and that I had, in 1786, let a farm, for a 21 years' lease, at the yearly rent of 170 pounds, should I not now most sensibly feel, that my income was reduced to 100 pounds a year? Should I not perceive, that, before the 21 years were expired, I should have, perhaps, very little left, seeing that out of the 70 per centum of depreciation during eighteen years, 50 per centum, at least, has occurred since the year 1796, that is to say, in the space of seven years? This is the most important circumstance; that, within

this last-mentioned space, the depreciation has been so much more rapid than formerly, so much more rapid than even during the former part of your administration; and, accordingly we find, that it is "only till within these *late years*" that the "*prejudice*" against granting leases has prevailed. Indeed, that landlord who does not now perceive, that, to grant a lease of 21 years, would be nearly the same thing as to "alienate the fee simple of his estate," must be "nature's fool," and not yours. And are landlords then to be blamed, to be thus harshly censured, to be abused, to be called "prejudiced, foolish, ignorant," and what not, because they do not voluntarily set their hands and seal irrevocably bind over themselves and their descendants to ruin and beggary, while others are wallowing in riches upon their estates! "Strange prejudice," indeed, that should make men dislike dying in a work-house and making over their children to live upon alms drawn from his own estates! What disaffected and disloyal rascals they must be, too, not to do this rather than thus expose the consequences of your paper-money-system!—I was just going to propose some means of coming at them by the way of law; but I see that one of these agricultural surveying gentlemen (some of whom, be it well remembered, had the merit of being the first to recommend the seizure of the tithes and the stipendizing of the clergy) has some thoughts of the propriety of not "*suffering the folly and ignorance of landlords*" to withhold leases!—Really, Sir, I should like to know, whether the effects of a paper-money, not convertible into specie, ever entered these men's heads? And yet, one would think it quite impossible that it should not. That ARTHUR YOUNG, too, the Secretary to that profound body, the Board of Agriculture; the correspondent of the "*American Cincinnati*;" that Arthur Young, who had travelled through a country of assignats; that this oracle of agriculture and political economy, who puts F. R. S. at the end of his name; that he, too, should be "*wary to observe* that a "*prejudice against the granting of leases is increasing daily!*" Daily! The gentleman must have been very constant in his inquiries! But, where must he have lived? Had he never heard talk of the bank-restriction law? Had he never heard that the bank was no longer obliged to pay their notes in cash; while, at the same time, these notes were, as to every practical purpose, made a *legal tender* in discharge of

rent? I shall, in good truth, begin shortly to suspect, that a man may put F. R. S. at the end of his name, and yet be no conjurer.—But, Sir, not to trouble you with any more of these conjectures, I will now dismiss this Postscript with pointing out a practical advantage that may be drawn from the facts stated by these Agricultural Surveyors. They are represented, and, I dare say, very truly, as persons of unimpeachable veracity; and they assure us, not upon hearsay evidence, but upon the result of their own personal inquiries and inspection, that, “of late years,” (please to mark the phrase) “a strong and unconquerable prejudice” has existed, all over the kingdom, to the granting of farming leases; and that, this prejudice is carried to such a length, “that a land-owner would as soon alienate the fee-simple of his estate as let it for a term of years.” Such is their first fact. The next is: that this prejudice “injures agriculture beyond calculation; that it is more injurious to it than all other disadvantages put together; and that, to remove this prejudice would be the first, the greatest, and most rational way to encourage agriculture.” After which I need only add, that this prejudice evidently arises from no other cause than the rapid depreciation of money occasioned by the present paper-money system, leaving it to you, Sir, to determine, whether a much more speedy and effectual measure for encouraging agriculture might not be adopted than that of passing long bills about the prices of corn.

#### TO THE READER.

The matter which would have presented itself under the head of *Summary of Politics*, must be postponed till next Number. The essays in the present Number will be found interesting in the extreme. The letter on the Incapacity of Henry VI; the letter, p. 900, addressed to Mr. Pitt on the claims of the Catholics of Ireland; the two letters, in p. 906 and 911, upon the repeal of the test laws; the letter in p. 914, upon the subject of Sir James Craufurd's Parole; that, in p. 919, upon the effects of paper money in times of scarcity; all these letters I beg leave to recommend to the attentive perusal of the reader. Upon the two latter some remarks will hereafter be offered.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

FRENCH CIRCULAR NOTE.—Circular Note from M. Talleyrand, French Minister for

Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Agents of his Majesty, the Emperor of the French.—Dated, Aix-la-Chapelle, Sep. 5, 1804.

(Continued from p. 820.)

In every country, and at all times, the ministry of diplomatic agents was held in veneration amongst men. Ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an omen of wisdom, of justice, and happiness. They speak, they act but to terminate, or prevent, those fatal differences which divide princes, and degrade a people, by the passions, murders, and miseries, which are the offspring of war. Such is the object of the diplomatic ministry; and it must be said, that it is to the observance of the duties it imposes, it is to the generally respectable character of the men who exercise this sacred ministry in Europe, that it owes the glory and the happiness it enjoys; but these happy effects torment the jealous ambition of the only government which makes itself an interest in the ruin, the shame and the servitude of other governments. They wish that diplomatic ministers should be the instigators of plots, the agents of troubles, the directors and regulators of machinations, vile spies, cowardly seducers—they order them to foment seditions, to provoke and to pay for assassination; and they pretend to throw over that infamous ministry the respect and inviolability which belong to the mediators of Kings, and the pacificators of nations.——Diplomatic ministers, says Lord Hawkesbury, ought not to conspire in the country where they reside, against the laws of that country; but they are not subject to the same rules with respect to states at which they are not accredited. Admirable restrictions! Europe will swarm with conspirators, but the defenders of public right must not complain. There will always be some local distance between the leader and the accomplices. The ministers of Lord Hawkesbury will pay for the crimes they cause to be committed; but they will have that prudent deference for public morality, not to be at once the instigators and the witnesses.——Such maxims are the completion of audacity and hypocrisy. Never were the opinions of cabinets and the consciences of any people made game of more shamelessly. His Majesty the Emperor thinks that it is time to put an end to the disastrous career of principles, subversive of all society.—You are ordered, in consequence to declare to the government where you reside, that his Majesty will not recognize the English diplomatic corps in Europe, so long as the British ministry shall not abstain from

charging its ministers with any warlike agency, and shall not restrict them to the limits of their functions.—The miseries of Europe proceed from its being deemed obligatory every where to observe maxims of moderation and liberality, which being just but by reciprocity, are only obligatory with respect to those who submit to them. Hence governments have as much to suffer from their own justice as from the iniquity of a ministry which recognises no law but its ambition and its caprice. The miseries of Europe proceed also from public right being considered under a partial point of view, whereas it has life and strength only from its integrity. Maritime Right, Continental Right, the Right of Nations, are not parts of public right that can be considered and preserved in an isolated manner. The nation that pretends to introduce arbitrary rules into one of those parts, loses all its claims to the privilege of the whole. The systematic infractor of the Rights of Nations places himself out of that right, and renounces all interest founded upon the Maritime Right, and the Continental Right.—His Majesty the Emperor regrets his having to order measures which are a real interdiction pronounced against a State; but, all reflecting men will be at no difficulty to see that in this it is only necessary to ascertain facts. The English ministry, by the generality of their attacks, have placed coasts, isles, ports, neutrals, general commerce, in a state of interdiction; in fine, they have just proclaimed the prostitution of the most sacred and most indispensable ministry, to the repose of the world. His Majesty thinks it his duty to excite the attention of all governments, and to warn them, that without new measures, adopted under the conviction of the present danger, all the ancient maxims, upon which the honour and independence of states rest, will be immediately annihilated.—(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

ORDER TO ARREST SIR G. RUMBOLD.  
—*Extract of Letter from the Minister General of Police at Paris to Marshal Bernadott.*—*Dated 10th Oct. 1804.*

(After stating that M. Rumbold is following the system of Messrs. Drake and Smith, and that the British minister has avowed a plan of conspiracy and plots "which is proved, besides by the conduct of Mr. Taylor, and the original papers in my hands," Fouché proceeds in the following terms:—) In consequence of these new and subversive principles, his Majesty the Emperor has caused it to be declared, that he

will not recognise any diplomatic character in the English agents, who have been placed by their own government, out of the law of nations and the common law of civilized nations; they desire then, that M. Rumbold be considered as any other English individual who should adopt criminal practices, and be seized if it be in your power to do it, taking every measure to secure his papers. I invite you, Marshal, to take all the necessary steps to accomplish this object. I have the honor to be,—(Signed)—FOUCHÉ.

FRANCE AND RUSSIA.—*Note from Mr. Talleyrand, French Minister for foreign Affairs, delivered to Mr. D'Oubril, Russian Charge d'Affaires at Paris. Dated 29th July, 1804.*—*N. B. The substance of this note was given in p. 758.*

The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has submitted to his Majesty the Emperor, the note of M. D'Oubril, Charge d'Affaires from Russia, (of the 21st July, 1804). The undersigned has received orders to declare, that whenever the Court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity: as Russia must rationally think that the treaty is equally binding upon the two contracting powers. If the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is of opinion, that it has some demands to make in consequence of the articles IV. V. and VI. of the secret convention of the 18th Vendémiaire, year 10. France also claims the execution of the 3d article of that treaty, which is expressed in the following terms:—"The two contracting parties, desirous to the utmost of their power, to contribute to the tranquillity of the two respective governments, engage not to suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspondence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states, or to propagate principles contrary to their respective constitutions, by fomenting any disturbance whatsoever; and that in consequence of this agreement, every subject of one of those powers inhabiting the states of the other, who shall do any thing contrary to its safety, shall be removed from the said country, and transported beyond its frontiers, without having any claim to the protection of his own government. This article, framed with as much precision as wisdom, declares the very friendly dispositions which bound the two powers at the time of forming this treaty. France, therefore, did not expect that Russia would grant its protection to French Emigrants, by accrediting them to the neighbouring

powers of France, where they might indulge their hostile dispositions against their country: nor did she expect such a conduct from M. Marcoff, the minister of Russia, who was the real cause of the disunion and coolness existing between the two powers. During his residence in Paris, he constantly encouraged every kind of intrigue that could disturb the public tranquillity; and he even went so far as, by his official notes, to place under the protection of the law of nations, French emigrants, and other agents, in the pay of England.—France did not expect that Russia would purposely send on a mission to Paris, those officers who had excited *gross* complaints against them, as was well known to that government. Surely conduct, when it is considered what is the duty of all governments; but still more so, when reference is made to the article already cited.—Lastly, was the mourning which the Court of Russia assumed for a man, whom the tribunals of France had condemned for having plotted against the safety of the French government, such a conduct as was conformable to the letter or the spirit of this article?—The French government demands the execution of the 6th article of the secret convention, in which it is stated, “that the two contracting parties acknowledge and guarantee the independence and the constitution of the Republic of the Seven United Islands, formerly belonging to Venice; and that it be agreed, that there shall be no foreign troops in those islands;” an article evidently violated by Russia, as she has continued to send troops thither, which she has openly reinforced, and has charged the government of that country, without the consent of France.—France also demands the execution of the second article of the same convention, the evident application of which should have been, that instead of manifesting such a partiality for England, and of becoming, perhaps, the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should have been united to France, in order to consolidate a general peace, to re-establish a just balance in the four parts of the world, and to procure the liberty of the seas. These are the precise expressions of the 2nd article.—Such ought to be without doubt, the conduct of the two powers, respecting the treaty which binds them both; but the cabinet of Russia expects the Emperor will fulfil the stipulations to which she is engaged, without executing those which she is bound to perform. This is acting like a conqueror towards a vanquished power: this is to suppose that

France can be intimidated by menaces, or that she will acknowledge the superiority of any other power: but the history of the years which preceded the peace made with Russia, plainly demonstrates that that power has no more right than any other to assume a haughty tone towards France. The Emperor of the French wishes for the peace of the Continent. He has made all possible advances to re-establish it with Russia; he has spared nothing to maintain it: but with the assistance of God and his arms, he is not in a situation to fear any one.—The undersigned requests M. le Chargé d’Affaires of Russia, to accept the assurance of his perfect consideration.—  
CH. MAUR. TALLEYRAND.

### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

PAPAL ALLOCUTION.—*Allocution delivered by his Holiness the Pope to a Secret Consistory assembled on the 20th of October 1804, previously to his departure from Rome on his journey to France, to assist at the Coronation of the Emperor Napoleon.*

Venerable Brethren;—It was from this place that the Concordat was begun by us, his Majesty the Emperor of the French then First Consul; and it is from this place that we have communicated to you that joy with which the God of all comfort has caused our hearts to overflow for the happy change, or conversion to the interest of the Catholic Religion, which has been produced by that Concordat in those vast and populous regions. From that time the Holy Temples have been again opened and purified from the profanations they had endured: altars were again built, the standard of the health-bearing Cross was again raised, the true worship of God restored, the august mysteries of religion freely and publicly celebrated, lawful pastors given to the people who could labour in feeding flock. The Catholic Religion itself most happily emerged from that obscurity in which it had been buried, and placed in noon-day splendor in the midst of that renowned nation, so many souls recalled from the paths of error into the bosom of eternity, and reconciled to themselves and to their God: these considerations united, justly filled our hearts with joy and exaltation which we poured out to the Lord.—That great and wonderful task not only then excited in our minds the most lively gratitude to that powerful Prince, who in establishing the Concordat, put forth all his power and authority to accomplish it; but the recollection must always incline our mind whenever the opportunity shall offer,

to prove that we are still strongly impressed with those feelings towards him.—And now the same most powerful Prince, our dearest son in Christ, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, who has deserved so well of the Catholic Religion for what he has done, has signified to us his strong desire to be anointed with the holy unction, and to receive the Imperial Crown from us, to the end that the solemn rights which are to place him in the highest rank, shall be strongly impressed with the character of religion, and call down more powerfully the benediction of Heaven.—(To be continued.)

#### INCAPACITY OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

##### LETTER V.

SIR—Glorying with just pride, as from the days of Sir John Fortescue\*, we publicly have gloried, in the superiority of our own constitution; cherishing with enlightened affection that form of a national council, by which we are happily distinguished, and which grew up here, by fortune as much as by wisdom, out of the assemblies of the Three Estates, common to us, and to many of the neighbouring governments; and, looking up with veneration to the usages of that body, as the most sacred of our laws, and the surest pledge for our enjoyment of all the rest; it seems almost unaccountable, that till the middle of the last century, we did not possess a single history, which ever attempted to give a regular narrative of the proceedings in Parliament. The work then published under the title of a *Parliamentary History of England*, promises much; yet in truth, it contains little to commend, except the design. In the earlier times, including the reign of which I am writing, it affects to be derived wholly “from the records, the *Parliament-rolls*, and the most reputable “of our ancient writers;” and much praise is bestowed on the gentlemen who carefully examined those rolls for the purpose. Of all the merits, however, which are attributed to them, I can only subscribe to that of modesty in the concealment of their names; unless you should rather be disposed to consider that as a solitary proof of good judgment. For, whoever dips but cursorily into the book, will presently be convinced, that they generally contented themselves with

reading the rolls in Sir Robert Cotton's abridgment, which they copied with all its omissions, misapprehensions, and confusions, notwithstanding the † honest caution of the indefatigable and faithful Prynne, in his preface to that publication. As to the contemporary authors, with whose accounts all is asserted to have been compared, they have in reality been neglected, for succeeding chroniclers and modern historians; and the connecting matter is heaped together without much discrimination in the selection, subjected to no test of critical scrutiny, in various parts irreconcilable to itself, and still more irreconcilable to the authentic facts, which it professes to explain and illustrate, “The several hands,” who are said to have compiled it, appear to have wanted one presiding mind. The whole work demands, and deserves to be revised and re-modelled by some person equal to the task. In the mean time, however, such as we have it, it is the only one, to which they who desire parliamentary information of ready access, will naturally have recourse. For this reason I have thought it expedient to say thus much here, by way of general exception against its authority hereafter: but, my present business is merely with two observations taken from other works. The one charges a disgraceful inconsistency; the other seems to ascribe, though with expressions of approbation, rather too prudent a complaisance to Parliament, at the very period, to which our inquiries are directed.

In relating the impeachment of the Duke of Suffolk, Speed had called it a most vile thing in the House of Commons, that they should charge “that as a crime now, which “they themselves had in a former Parliament consented unto and ratified.” A Parliamentary History might have been expected to have exposed the futility of the censure. But it is repeated, without being adopted indeed, yet also without being confuted. The antithetical point is left to penetrate as it may, unblunted and unabated. And the remark seems in some degree, to have caught the candid and judicious Dr. Henry, who has a reflection very similar, though a little softened, where he mentions

\* See his treatise *de laudibus Legum Angliæ*, in a dialogue with his pupil, Prince Edward, son to Henry the VIth, and that, on “the difference between an absolute and “limited monarchy,” intended for the instruction of Edward the IVth, in the settlement of the kingdom after the civil war.

† “Let all professors of the law, and “other studies, be sure to resort to the originals themselves, and not rely upon the “abridgments alone, to prevent mistakes, “and errors, yea, the loss of their reputations,” &c. &c. And he in another place points out some striking instances in that particular abridgment. Pref. to Cotton's Abridgment.]

the addresses of the two Houses requesting that some reward might be bestowed on the minister for his negotiation of the King's marriage, and a truce with the French. "How different," exclaims he, "in a few years after, were the sentiments of Parliament on these subjects!"

It might be sufficient to answer, that after three dissolutions and renovations, neither the body itself, nor indeed, the individual members who composed it, can be considered as the same ‡. In fact, of those who had agreed, or who had objected to the address approving the minister's conduct, there was but a very small proportion in that House which afterwards impeached him. If every man of them voted in his favour, their numbers would detract but little from the authority of the accusation. But, what was there, which ought to have prevented all from concurring in the articles which were sent to the Lords? The general principle is of the greatest moment. There is no wiser doctrine of our constitution, none more deserving of being steadily maintained, than the right of every Parliament to exercise its own honest judgment, unfettered by any declarations, however direct, explicit, and strong they may be; and still less by any tacit obligation to be deduced from the actions of any preceding Parliament. They who by surprise, by flattery, by extensive influence of whatever kind, by their own inexperience, their want of information, or their unsuspicious candour of mind, have been misled to repose a confidence which from the result they have discovered not to have been merited, are doubly bound in such a case, to vindicate both their country and themselves. It is the greatest aggravation of their original fault, in having suffered themselves to be made the instruments of evil, if they refuse the only reparation in their power, from a false shame of being taxed with private inconsistency. In the present instance, however, the managers of the popular party behaved with exemplary prudence and discretion. The impeachment was drawn up with

care, so as not to involve the House even in a seeming contradiction. There was no point in it, which at all touched any thing contained in the former address of approbation.

Here I should dismiss this topic; but, I must do the parliamentary historians one piece of comparative justice. They might have afforded some useful information of times and places, to Sir John Fenn, who, in a paper of observations on the murder of the Duke of Suffolk, premises what he calls, "a short sketch of the proceedings in Parliament." Unfortunately, however, preferring his own sagacious conjectures, I presume, and the genuine delectable black-letter of Stowe, to the patch-work English of all ages tacked together by our compilers, and still more to the bad French, and barbarous Latin of the original rolls, that learned editor has woven for us a pretty slight tissue of his own, in which there is not a single fact figured with tolerable accuracy. A sort of felicity in error, that surpasses common calculation, runs through all the few sentences of his account. Yet, I should probably, have passed this over in silence, had we not rather ostentatiously been told, that it was licensed by the Antiquarian Society, at one of whose meetings the paper was read, entered on their books, and thanks returned for the communication. Pope would not allow a dictionary-maker to be a judge of two words put together; and, we certainly have seen in more cases than one, that the most ingenious unriddlers of a device, and spellers of a legend on a tradesman's token, the nicest tasters of the precious rust on a Roman shield, or an old brass sconce, and ablest expounders of a well-corroded inscription about Hardyknute, cannot take into the field of their microscopes more than an inch at a time of the general history of their country; and even that is all mist and confusion.

I come now, Sir, to the second charge against our ancient Parliaments; and that, as I have intimated, is borrowed from a friend, and designed for praise. It is the remark of Rapin on the conduct of our parliaments during the latter years of Henry the Sixth, that they \* never attempted to swerve from the *wholesome principle of declaring for the strongest*. This certainly is but an ambiguous kind of eulogy, which in the com-

‡ There is not a single return to the Parliament of 23d H. VI. now extant, either in Prynne's Lists, or in Browne Willis's *Notitia Parliamentaria*. But, if the names in the returns of 23d H. VI. be compared with those in the lists of 28th H. VI. it will be found, that not a twelfth part of the county-members, and a still smaller proportion of the Borough-members were the same. It must be presumed, that the differences must have been greater between the Parliaments of 23d and 28th H. VI.

\* Parl. His. Vol. II. p. 314, note from Rapin's History of England. Fol. edit. p. 597, relative to the first Parliament of Edward IV. There is a similar quotation before in p. 307, from Rapin, p. 385, relative to the last Parliament of Hen. VI.

mon course of things is more likely to be deserved by the worst, than by the best, Parliaments. If such prudence be once generally received as a just theme of commendation, there is some danger, that servility may become fashionable. Little incitement is wanted to make men shrink from a contention with power. They are ready enough to yield, whenever they are not prevented by shame or by principle. They do not find conviction, but an excuse, in grave maxims of prudence, and eloquent declamations on "existing circumstances." The great difficulty is to keep them steady to the faithful discharge of duties, which are attended with peril. The truth is, however, that whether the character be praise or censure, it fails a little in justness of application. Parliaments called after a victory in a civil war, when they cordially co-operate with the power to which they owe their existence, do not *declare for the strongest*: they are necessarily composed of those who form a part of that strength: they can only so speak and act consistently with their own sincere opinions, and as true representatives of their constituents; for the leaders of the vanquished party, obliged to fly and to conceal themselves for safety, must leave to their adversaries the uncontrolled domination in the elections. But, as the Duke of York, till the last Parliament of Henry the VIth, brought forward no claim to the crown; as from his natural disposition, from his unfeigned tenderness towards the King's person, from his constant hope of accomplishing whatever were his views, by gentle and peaceable means, and from the uniform course of his policy, which aimed to establish his reign in the hearts of the people, whoever might occupy the throne, he only professed to take up arms in self-defence against the intrigues and violence of bad ministers, who sought his destruction, was the first in the very moment of success to proclaim his allegiance, and studied, by his subsequent moderation, to efface the remembrance of the force which he had employed; that Prince never pushed his triumphs in the field to those decisive consequences in the state, which afterwards marked the fluctuations of fortune in every battle. Even in the last Parliament at which he assisted, which was summoned after the signal overthrow of the royal army near Northampton; and, in which his interest must have been of necessity largely predominant, he suffered his claim to the crown to be debated three whole days, with the most perfect freedom of discussion. As to the former Parliaments, which more concern our present investiga-

tion, we have the most conclusive testimony, which historians should have consulted in preference to their own imaginations. Yet, I do not remember, that it has ever been noticed. It is the recorded declaration of the Parliament at Coventry, which has been truly described, as "wholly\* made up of "those who were staunch friends of the "House of Lancaster;" and, it is contained in the † preamble to the bill of attainder then passed against Richard and all his adherents. They accuse him, as might be expected, of labouring craftily in several Parliaments for the diminution of the royal power and authority, but (continue they, addressing the King) "God put as well in "the hearts of your Lords, as of your true "Commons, according to their duties, to "hinder by all means any thing contrary to "your prosperity and weal, so that his malicious and traitorous purpose was not "achieved."

Hume himself cannot help confessing here, that "it is impossible not to observe in "those transactions visible marks of a higher "regard to the law, and of a more fixed authority enjoyed by Parliament, than has "appeared in any former period of English "history."

It is superfluous, I am sure, after this to add another word on this point. I am only afraid, that I may seem to have dwelt upon it much more at length than was necessary. But, some years since, when a claim was made on the public by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, for the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall during his minority, and some precedent or other was cited from the Parliament-rolls of that period, I recollect to have read, that it was treated by a sad man of the law, and one of very high authority too, as nothing short of a faction, sedition, and misprision of treason at least, if not absolute treason itself, to have taken even a peep of curiosity into such abominable transactions. I wished, therefore, to establish

\* Parl. Hist. Vol. II. p. 202. What is quoted above, is said indeed, with reference to the list of Lords, but below in the same page follows what is rightly called, "A "strange act in favour of the Prerogative." It is "that all such knights of any county, as "were returned to this Parliament by virtue of "the King's letters, without any other election, "should be valid."

† This preamble is a long narrative which would have prevented many blunders in our historians, had it been consulted; but, it never has been. It must be read with allowance for the colouring of party.

beyond dispute, that ignorance of our history is not indispensable to the character of loyalty; and that the most devoted courtier of the present day would have found himself in very good company in the least courtly Houses of Commons under Henry the Fifth. My case now, I trust, is so far satisfactorily made out. I am ready to leave it, as it stands, to the sole decision of the very highest authority; that of Lord Ellenborough himself.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. &c. T. M. *Middle Temple, Nov. 28, 1804.*

P. S. Permit me to remark, that, in my last letter, there is one considerable error of the press. The word "*simple*" in p. 805, line 8, should have been printed "*ample*." My materials, are indeed, in one sense "*simple*;" they are such as were not difficult of access; but a very great portion of them have not yet been used. That they are "*ample*," even beyond what I may have occasion here to detail, my succeeding letters will probably indicate.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—From my attachment to the county to which I belong, I feel myself obliged to your correspondent T. M. of the Middle Temple. In his last letter on the Incapacity of Henry the Fifth, he has very satisfactorily in my opinion, vindicated the public spirit of our ancestors here in Norfolk, from some hasty reflexions of Sir John Fenn, who ought not to have bewrayed his own nest. There is, however, in the correspondence of the Paston family, some further evidence relating to the election of 1455, of which your correspondent does not seem to have been aware. I shall, therefore, take the liberty of pointing it out. In the third volume are to be found two, if not three, letters, which plainly relate to the same election; though the editor, even in his chronological table, has placed them at a great distance asunder. I allude to the 12th and xvth letters, which are dated in *June*, within very few days of each other from the same place, and the latter is palpably the sequel of the former. Both are from a lawyer of the name of Jenny, then a candidate, though unsuccessful, for Norwich; and, he relates a conversation which he had in London with the Duke of Norfolk respecting the county election. He reported his canvass. The freeholders, he said, to whom he had spoken, were willing to vote for Sir Roger Chamberlayn, but not for Howard, and the reason which they assigned was, that he had not any \* estate in the

county, nor intercourse and acquaintance with it. Now, could any thing more strongly speak a spirit of independence than such an objection? Do you think, Sir, that every county in every part of this island would as nobly vindicate their own freedom of choice at this day? In the second letter there is a passage still more striking, and which clearly proves that such influence in the elections of Norfolk had not been customary. After telling Mr. Paston, that when the Duke gave him up, "Howard was as mad as a wild bullock;" the writer adds his own reflexions which do him much honour "It is an evil precedent" (says he) "for the shire, that a stranger should be chosen, and no worship to my Lord of York, nor my Lord of Norfolk to write for him; for if the gentlemen of the shire will suffer such inconvenience, in good faith the shire shall not be called of such worship as it hath been." Nor, is this all. There is another circumstance worthy of notice. When the Duke gave way, he is represented as earnestly insisting, that at least, Sir Thomas Todenham should not be the member, nor any one who had inclined to the Duke of Suffolk. Yet, from the whole of this part of the correspondence we learn, that Heydon who was returned, was most intimately connected with the politics of Sir Thomas Todenham, and next to him was the principal leader on that side; and, from † one passage it seems, that Calthorp also, the other member, favoured the same party, though with less violence and activity. He knew, therefore, not only that the Dukes of York and Norfolk failed, but, that persons of the description, which they were most anxious to exclude, succeeded against their utmost influence: and this was immediately after the battle of St. Albans.—I am, Sir, your constant reader and admirer.—A NORFOLK FREEHOLDER. *Thetford, Nov. 27.*

CATHOLIC CLAIMS.

*Addressed to the Right Hon. Wm. Pitt.*

SIR;—The subject on which I undertake to address you is, perhaps, as important as any that ever occupied the attention of a Briton. To a man, who has an unfeigned love for his country, it is painful to feel, and still more painful to declare, that its power, its consequence, and its greatness appear on

folk; a younger brother of Sir Robert's having had the Norfolk estates given to him.

† See Paston Papers, Vol. III. p. 121, compared with the former part of the letters, especially in p. 119, describing the persons who attended then at Walsingham.

\* His father Sir Robert was then living, I fancy, and settled at Stoke Nayland in Suff-

the decline, and that if a radical change be not soon adopted in one part of the empire, its glory seems likely to be extinguished for ever. Whatever diversity of opinion may prevail on this part of the subject, it must be acknowledged, that either by supineness, imbecility, or the unfortunate train of human events, we are brought to that crisis, which must prompt every mind to conceive, and every hand to execute the most efficacious plans of defence.—To protect this country from the hostile designs of a dangerous neighbour, and to secure its independence, are objects which have long engrossed your attention. But your efforts appear to me to have been directed to means, which are ill calculated to promote these desirable purposes. You certainly have not to learn, that the cheapest and most effectual defence of a nation, must arise from the spirit and unanimity of its inhabitants; and that opinion and sentiment are more powerful in this respect, than the strongest works of nature or of art. This principle is eternally true: it is one to which any politician can scarcely refuse an assent. Now, Sir, can you suppose that this desired unanimity pervades the whole empire? Can you have the assurance to tell your sovereign and the people, that Ireland, one third of the United Kingdom, is in a state of tranquillity? May not every loyal subject there say, in the language of a Roman poet, that he is walking over fires, concealed under treacherous embers,

—Incedo per ignes

Suppositos cineri doloso. Hon.

Recent events have shewn, that the fire is smothered, not extinguished; and that it may shortly burst forth with irresistible violence. The affairs of that country unquestionably demand the most prompt and delicate interposition of government; and, if a remedy be not speedily applied, the proudest bulwark of defence will be converted into an engine of destruction.—It has, for centuries past, been the crooked and dark policy of the English government, to treat Ireland, not as a part of the empire, but as a conquered country. The future historian will hardly gain credit with posterity, when he relates, that the Catholics of Ireland, composing almost the whole of the natives, laboured for more than 200 years under a state of persecution, for adhering to the religion of their fathers; and were harassed with a penal code, which would disgrace the memory of a Decius or a Dioclesian; that nothing was left unattempted to keep them in a state of ignorance, by prohibiting Catholic schools at home, and by preventing, as far as possible, the education of Ca-

tholics in foreign countries; that every temptation was held forth to induce them to abandon their religious principles, and shake off every moral restraint; that sons were even encouraged to forsake their religion, and in that case were authorized to drive their injured and persecuted parents from the possession of their estates. All this and more stands upon record; and the effects of this barbarous and inhuman policy are felt at this period. But, by the liberality of more enlightened times, by the wisdom of distinguished statesmen, and the beneficence of a gracious sovereign, these evils have been, in great measure, removed.—In order to form a closer connexion with the sister kingdom, and to promote the general interests of the empire, by simplifying the operations of government, you were the minister who proposed and carried the union. In this great struggle of parties, in which you succeeded in depriving Ireland of its independence, the Catholics gave you their interest, on a condition clearly understood that they should attain, what they term, their complete emancipation. You appeared to espouse their cause, after availing yourself of their co-operation; you relinquished your situation from an inability to realise their hopes, and, as we may collect from the combined authority of two important papers before the public, one of which was written by Lord Cornwallis, the other by yourself, you stood pledged not to return to office, but on the condition of carrying into effect the claims of the Catholics. (See these two papers in Plowden's Historical Review, vol. 2, part 2, p. 944.) So far your conduct was fair, honourable, and manly;—but, Sir, after this display of honour and disinterested patriotism, by what combination of circumstances has it happened, that you have been again placed at the head of affairs amidst a total and uninterrupted silence respecting the Catholic claims? Six months have now elapsed since your return to power, and no assurance has been given, that full and substantial justice will be done to so large a part of his Majesty's subjects. Honour, duty, a regard for your own reputation, and the good faith of your country, all possible motives which can prompt human actions, call for your exertions in this business; still, no indication of your designs has been discovered. The Catholics had surely no reason to expect such treatment. You recurred to their assistance, as long as they contributed to forward your designs; you raised their expectations by a temporary shew of friendship, and now you appear to have abandoned their cause for ever. Resume, Sir, your former

spirited and manly conduct, extend to four millions of his Majesty's subjects a full participation of the benefits of the constitution, and the peace of Ireland will be secured on the firmest basis. The union, which you were so successful in promoting, will ever be, without this measure, an airy phantom, a delusive advantage. It will belie its name, it will not be an union of sentiments, dispositions, and interests, but a perpetual source of uneasiness, dissention, and discord. The great mass of the people of Ireland will be, in some measure, strangers in their own country; obliged, indeed, to contribute largely to the support of the state by the profits of their industry, but rendered incapable of enjoying the smallest advantage resulting from offices and employments. Such a situation is a species of political servitude; and to suffer one fourth of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom to remain in such a state of degradation, after raising their hopes to fairer prospects, is an action inconsistent with justice, honour, and good faith. —Your friends have recourse to a singular method of justifying your conduct. They insinuate, that difficulties arise from the inflexible resolution of a certain personage, of whom it is not possible to speak but with the utmost affection and respect. This, Sir, is a mode of defence at once ungenerous and unconstitutional. You cannot but know and feel, in a peculiar manner, that the treatment experienced by the Irish Catholics, is a transaction of the most odious nature, and consequently that all responsibility, in this particular, must rest with yourself. It is a ministerial proceeding; and, as you are minister, you must bear the whole weight of disgrace annexed to it. In fact, this defence of your friends stands refuted by your own conduct, unless you should be willing to suffer the imputation of the grossest inconsistency. After certain unsurmountable obstacles had prevented you from carrying the Catholic question, and had induced you, under that inability, to relinquish your situation, the continued existence of the same difficulties, should have prevented your return to power. But, as you are again in possession of the first dignities of the state, what conclusion are we to draw, but that honour and good faith should lead you, without delay, to comply with your engagements to the Catholics. The fact is certain, the inference is inevitable. —But, Sir, suffer me to observe, that not only your own honour, but the credit and reputation of your country are intimately concerned in this transaction. As minister of a great and honourable nation, you assured the Irish

Catholics of your willingness to promote their cause; you consequently received their support on a critical occasion; and if you should neglect to pay the just and natural equivalent for their services, the good faith of the country will stand impeached. At the time that I am writing this letter, the enemy is hunting our agents from the neutral states on the continent, and employing the most insidious arts to blacken and vilify the British name and British faith throughout Europe. Your conduct towards Ireland will afford an excellent topic for the malicious oratory of an insidious foe. They will tell the people of Ireland, they have probably said already in very forcible language: "How can you repose any farther confidence in a mercenary government by whom you have been so often deceived?" At the union, they promised you a full participation of the privileges of the British constitution; a British minister then succeeded to the highest offices of the state, on the express condition of debarring you from all that had been promised; to complete the farce, a Lord High Chancellor of Ireland, in a series of letters to a Catholic peer, declared your religion incompatible with your civil allegiance. "This language has never been disavowed by the British government, and the nobleman, who used it, still retains his station. *Crimine ab uno disce omnes.*" —Such has unquestionably been the language of French agents in Ireland; and may the number of those, whom they have perverted from their indispensable duty of allegiance, be comparatively small! But, Sir, I solemnly intreat and beseech you to remove, as speedily as possible, every occasion by which so foul an imputation can, with any appearance of truth, be produced. —A very small degree of reflexion, will enable a man of your political sagacity and experience, to see that the benefit accruing to the Catholics from the measure in question, is not so considerable as the advantages of security which will be reaped by the whole British empire. As long as Ireland continues in its present distracted state, it will be perpetually the theatre of hostile intrigues and machinations. Of this, no doubt can be entertained, as every event which has yet taken place in that country, fully demonstrates the multiplied effects of French influence. But, once admit all to the fullest benefits of the constitution, and you will completely annihilate the hopes of the enemy by removing the cause of dissension and discord: you will diffuse a general alacrity and vigour through the whole mass of the people, for all

will be united by one common bond of interest; you will permanently secure the attachment of Ireland to a form of government, perhaps the most perfect yet devised by the accumulated wisdom of ages.—That we have greater dangers to encounter than this country ever experienced in former ages, is a fact which admits of no doubt. A military nation, established in the heart of Europe, composing a population of more than thirty millions, and commanding almost an equal number of enslaved dependents in the surrounding countries; a nation either actually, or equivalently, possessing a line of coast, of which history has given no example since the flourishing periods of the Roman empire; a nation at once daring, adventurous, insidious and warlike, ruled by a tyrant in the flower of youth, who knows no law but that of force, who appears determined to enslave every country to which he can carry the terror of his arms: such a nation presents to our astonished view a spectacle which our ancestors never beheld. The distinguished statesmen in the days of King William, and many eminent men since that period, always considered the security of the country as depending on three great points; the independence of Holland; a close union with Continental Allies; and the maintenance of the Liberty of Europe. “*These*” says Mr. Burke, speaking of the sentiments entertained in the reign of King William, “*these were the three immovable pillars of the safety and greatness of England, as they are now, and as they must ever be, to the end of time.*” (Mr. Burke’s Letters on the Regicide Peace, p. 87.)—But what measures are to be now adopted for the safety of the empire, when Holland is but a province wholly dependent on France, when we have no ally on the continent capable of checking the ambition of the common enemy, and, when the liberty of Europe is no more? Let us provide for our security by composing all differences at home; let us all have but one common interest: let us be no more a divided people, and we may still retain our liberty and independence. The chains of the Catholics have been loosened by the humanity of his Majesty’s government; let them be broken, and thrown aside. Let us present to astonished and dismayed Europe, the noble spectacle of sixteen millions of people, united in one common interest, and animated by a generous resolution of maintaining their liberties and independence, against the most execrable tyranny that was ever suffered to infest mankind. If this can be effected, I think, Sir, you will provide a more powerful bul-

wark against the ferocious enemy, with whom we have to contend, than by fortifying the metropolis, or raising batteries on the coast. You will possess, not that precarious security, which arises from the mouldering and perishable works of art, but that which results from the invincible spirit of a free and united people. Confidence would thus be infused into all classes of the community, and the hopes of the enemy would in the same proportion decrease, and be finally extinguished. We might then, notwithstanding many unfavourable symptoms of decline at home, and the general degradation of surrounding nations, cherish the fond hope of transmitting our independence unimpaired to our posterity, and of verifying the beautiful and patriotic lines of the poet,

The nations not so blest as thee,  
Shall, in their turns, to tyrants fall,  
Whilst Thou shalt flourish great and free,  
The dread and envy of them all.

#### THE BRITISH OESERVER.\*


##### STATE OF IRELAND.—LETTER IV.

SIR,—Having shewn in my two last letters, that the admission of the Irish Catholics into Parliament, is not inconsistent with the principles or safety of the constitution; I now shall endeavour to prove it to be consistent with the establishment of the Church of England. As the measures of the Catholic body which might endanger this establishment, must, as in the case of the constitution, be measures which they will be able to carry in Parliament, it is very evident that the arguments which have already demonstrated the impracticability of their forming such a party in either the House of Commons, or House of Lords, as to be able to injure the constitution, are applicable to my present purpose. The Church of England is always described, “as by law established.” This is the term made use of in the coronation oath; it is therefore, manifest that the establishment cannot be altered, except by the repeal of certain laws. If then, the admission of the Catholics into Parliament does not give them the means of effecting this repeal, the conclusion is self-evident, that their admission is not inconsistent with the established religion. Though my argument is very short, it loses nothing of its force by being so. Arguments are sound in proportion as the several deductions are the result of premises, which are them-

\* For the other communications of this writer, see Register, Vol. V. pp. 385, 403, 662, 737, 853, 894.

selves sound. But, as it may be said, that notwithstanding the power of the Catholics in Parliament, may be unequal to the task of rendering their own religion the religion of these realms, this power will certainly increase, because the Catholics will never cease to gain converts, and augment their party, or, even if they should fail in pursuing that course, that they will adopt other plans, and resist the authority of Parliament, promoting a republican form of government. It is requisite to say something in anticipation of these objections. They appear to me to be the only objections that the most clouded imaginations could suggest, and, as there will not be wanting the activity of every description of opposition to the claims of the Catholics, a detailed description of them may be of service; and, I hope, will not be found uninteresting. As to the powers of the Catholics, for the sake of argument, we will admit their success in passing a bill to repeal the laws which establish the Church of England. Could it pass into a law? No, the laws of the realm provide against a possible conjuncture of a prince sitting on the throne, who professes the Catholic religion; and the coronation oath binds every prince, who is, or may become our King, to refuse his consent to any law which has for its object the repeal of those statutes by which the Church of England is established. But to return to our subject, it is manifest that as long as our King must be a Protestant, and the coronation oath a qualification of admission to the throne; so long it is utterly impossible for the Catholics to carry any measure that can repeal the laws for establishing our religion; and, consequently, that can endanger its existence. To those who argue that the Catholics are jacobins and republicans, and only wish to gain admittance into Parliament, or only make the exclusion from it a topic of complaint, in order to promote their leveling projects, and the empire of their church, for such must be the inconstancy of those reasoners, that these jacobins in politics must be tyrants in religion; it must be replied, that the conduct of the Catholics belies the supposition that they approve of republican doctrines. They are as a body, notorious for their loyalty to the dynasty of the House of Hanover. Facts that every one knows, and no one can object to prove this assertion. In Ireland they adopted the cause of the Protestant ascendancy in Church and State, in two rebellions against the House of Hanover, which promised them the ascendancy of the Catholic faith. In the American war they aimed to preserve the possession of their country to Great Britain, when the same un-

just policy which had always been acted upon in respect to Ireland, had roused the people of America to action, and obliged the minister to draw all the British forces out of Ireland. At the Union, I assert it, and I do so without fear of contradiction, they supported the measure when all the Protestants with the exception of some few, who were sufficient to form a corrupt majority in Parliament, were infuriate against the measure, and the success of it was depending on the line of conduct which the Catholics would adopt. Is there any man living so great a bigot, or so great a knave, as to deny that their refusal to join their Protestant brethren, and their decision to promote the Union, are positive proofs of the loyalty of the Catholics of Ireland to the King, and the connexion with Great Britain. I do not impute disloyalty to the Protestants for adopting another line of conduct, such an imputation could have no foundation, because they were loyal to their constitution. Nor, when I mention the Catholics, do I speak of the wretched ignorant, and semibarbarians of that body. Not that part of them which are led by their passions to express their sentiments by the use of pikes; but that part which possess sound and liberal understanding, and express their sentiments by their decisions on all public questions. The facts of the rebellions of the Pretender, the Volunteers, and the Union, stand recorded in the page of our history, and afford the most emphatic illustration of the absurdity of those blind politicians, who ruminate in the darkness of past ages, or in the illumed aberrations of the present, to asperse with odium the character and the claims of their Catholic fellow subjects. But, even if we again, for the sake of argument, admit that the Catholics under the circumstances of being excluded from the constitution, and of their religion being insulted, are the republicans which some persons represent them to be, and so bigoted as to require nothing short of the re-establishment of their Church, would not the very boon of free admission into the possession of equal rights with their Protestant brethren, completely alter their political sentiments, and teach them the policy of tolerating the religious establishments of long standing, and held in great veneration. Will it not remove those feelings of jealousy with which, if they have any feelings, they must contrast the pomp and the wealth of the Protestant Episcopacy with the poverty of their own. As it is not consistent with common sense to conclude that the relief from political disabilities will encourage the support, and repress the oppugnancy of this body, to



the views and happiness of the Protestants in regard to religious matters. Having, as I trust, fully supported my position, that the admission of the Catholics into Parliament, is not inconsistent with the Protestant reformed religion as by law established, I cannot quit the subject without animadverting on the rumours which have prevailed relative to the objection which the coronation oath has suggested. From the circumstances which have occurred, either the reasons for Mr Pitt's resignation in 1801, were unfounded, or the objection was certainly made, for Mr. Pitt was too powerful both in Parliament and in the Cabinet,\* to have found reasons to *postpone his favourite measure* upon any other grounds than the objection above-mentioned. If then, we may be induced to infer that such an objection was made, coming from the quarter it does, and originating in the conscientious consideration of the sacredness of an oath, it demands respect and admiration, however unfounded or injurious it may prove in the result.—“The Protestant reformed religion as by law established.” In discussing the nature of this oath, there must be kept in view, first the circumstances under which it was framed; and, secondly, the expectation that may be said to have been formed of the conduct of his Majesty, as one of the contracting parties by Parliament as the other. For certainly, the object of the oath can best be explained by the circumstances that occasioned it; and his Majesty will act according to it, if he fulfils the expectations, which on taking it he encouraged those to entertain who received it of him. In regard to the time when the present coronation oath was first demanded of an English Prince, it would appear that it was founded upon two considerations; first, the conduct of James in attempting to establish the Catholic religion in defiance of Parliament; and, secondly, the preventing of the repeal of the laws for establishing the Protestant religion, should even Parliament require it. It is unnecessary to bring forward the several facts which proved the intention of James by force of his prerogative to establish the Catholic Church. He did, in truth, actually do so in Ireland, and his public conduct in favour of the Catholics in that country, was made a charge of accusation against him as to his intentions in this. How reasonable, therefore, was it for the Parliament on this

King's abdication, to frame an oath to prevent any future abuse of the royal prerogative. This view alone of the question would be sufficient to remove all doubts, in regard to the difficulties attending the constitution of the oath, and affords a proof that the object of our ancestors was to control the King in his executive, not in his legislative authority. But, supposing this explanation not to be correct, which, Mr. Cobbett, I am induced to think so, that it could enter into the mind of Parliament to impose a necessity on the part of the King to obstruct the will of Parliament, by refusing his assent to the bills which they might pass; in what cases, and under what circumstances, was the King to do that which was in every respect inconsistent with the principles though not the letter of the constitution? It was only in those cases in which the laws for establishing the Protestant religion were concerned, and under those circumstances in which an attempt was apprehended of the Catholics to restore their hierarchy.—Would then, the assent of his Majesty to a bill for admitting the Catholics to sit in Parliament, either be a repeal directly or indirectly of those laws or any of them by which the Church of England is established. Or do there exist any reasons for suspecting in times like these, when the Pope like a beggar in a pass-cart, is transferred from St. Peter's to Notre Dame, to anoint an Atheistical Mahometan Catholic Usurper, that any attempt is likely to be made, or could be successful on the part of the Catholics to establish their religion? Whether, therefore, the oath is considered as it binds the King as to his executive or legislative character, it is equally manifest that his act of assenting to the admission of the Catholic claims would not be in the least degree derogatory with the interest, or even the letter of it. Let us now examine this oath according to the established principles of moral philosophy. It is laid down, that in cases of promise between two parties, the person who promises fulfils his duty, if he does every thing that is requisite to meet the expectations which his engagement has excited. The parties to the coronation oath are the King and the Parliament. Did then the Parliament expect that the King in taking the oath, bound himself not to grant to his Catholic subjects the franchise of sitting in Parliament. Or, did the King himself feel that his engagements were to this extent? It is very evident, that neither the King intended to keep them excluded, nor that the Parliament expected that he had undertaken to

\* Mr. Pitt, Duke of Portland, Lord Chat-ham, Lord Spencer, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Dundas, the Cabinet is composed of 11 persons.

do so. The concessions already made to the Catholics in Ireland, prove that the difficulties which have flowed from the oath are of modern date. But, even if the King had specifically promised Parliament at their request, not to make concessions to the Catholics, this promise would be absolved if Parliament themselves proposed the concessions for his Majesty's ratification. Thus, in whatever point of view this oath is contemplated, whether as affecting the prerogative of the King as independent of Parliament, or his prerogative as acting as a component part of the legislature; or whether, as having excited expectations of a particularly cogent description, it has the appearance of being of such a nature as not to form any reasonable impediment to the wished-for and necessary measure of Catholic emancipation. It is so important a topic as standing in the way of those measures which alone are best calculated to conciliate the affection of so large a portion of his Majesty's subjects to the support of his Majesty's throne, and the connexion with Great Britain, that it becomes the duty of every one who can honestly construe the coronation oath in favour of the Catholics, to make public his opinion, and the reasons for it, in order that the repeated discussion of the subject may lead to such a final judgment upon it, that may either remove the difficulties by promoting a change of opinion, or by contributing to such legislative alterations in regard to it, as may prevent similar difficulties in future times. Z.

*Liverpool, Nov. 19, 1804.*

#### REPEAL OF THE CORPORATION

#### AND TEST ACTS.

#### LETTER II.

(For Letter I. see p. 810)

SIR,—In pursuance of my promise, I now send you a few reflections, which have occurred to me, on the second objection, viz. The danger of violating one of the articles of the Union between England and Scotland, expressly declared to be “a fundamental and essential article, and so to be held in all time coming,” and the reasons for which I deem the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts to be a constitutional measure.—Whatever advances the purposes for which Parliament assembles, and which are, as we learn from the ancient writs of summons, “for the welfare of the King, the prosperity of the State, the defence of the Kingdom, and the honour of the Church, and for the redress of divers grievances in general, and divers mischiefs in particular”—must

be allowed to be constitutional. Whatever tends to strengthen the Empire, and establish the union of his Majesty's dominions, must be so advantageous as to require all matters of less importance to give way to the obtaining such a desideratum. It is generally known that grievances exist in Ireland, the redress of which it is as universally believed, could be procured by the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts. Such repeal would throw open the doors of the Cabinet and Senate to the Catholic subjects of eminence in Ireland; to many of those loyal and powerful individuals, who, by the removal of the present restrictions, might assist towards the welfare of the Sovereign and the security of the Constitution, and towards the accomplishment of the excellent purposes proposed by the Union of Ireland with Great Britain: and from these premises I conclude the repeal to be constitutional. But it is said, by such a measure the fundamental and essential article of the Union between England and Scotland would be violated, because the forms of Protestant and Presbyterian religion are established thereby. To this I answer, if an act should be enacted for the purpose of removing the difficulties of the Catholics, as far as those difficulties depend on the Corporation and Test Acts, might not such act consistently contain a clause, confirming the modes of religion established in the respective parts of the empire? Yet, should that fundamental and essential article be disturbed, convenience, policy, and justice requiring such disturbance, in order more fully to carry into execution, the intent and design of the acts (which contain the article) namely, the security and happiness of the Incorporated Countries, and the improvement of their Constitution, where would be the violation any more than that of every act imposing a tax on part of our property, which is to be paid for the security of the remainder? Or, where would be the violation in *sacrificing* one section which appears inconsistent with the general view of the whole act of Parliament? Why should the Legislature be denied the power of altering part of the Constitution, if even that were necessary, since it has been allowed the competency of altering the whole, and even of destroying itself? Such article, then, if it prevents the redress of the grievances suffered in Ireland, and thereby retards the security of the Empire, must be considered a matter of smaller importance than, and should give way to a measure of greater and more beneficial extent, namely, the repeal of the

acts in question and the prosperity of the Constitution of the united dominions. Again, from the law of nations, and the justice of considering as most important a religion (not containing doctrines prejudicial to Morality or the State) adopted by the majority of a country under his Majesty's protection, I might argue, that the repeal would be constitutional and advantageous, and, following my former mode of reasoning, I should conclude, there was no violation committed against the fundamental and essential article before mentioned, by such repeal. But I could add nothing to the Archdeacon Paley's excellent Chapter on Religious Establishments and Toleration (2d vol. of his *Philosophy*), which points out the necessity of exclusion in some cases, and the advantages of a compleat toleration in all.—With your permission, I will now advert to the third objection, namely, the fear of re-establishing Popery or Presbyterianism within his Majesty's dominions. The time in which the Corporation and Test Acts were enacted, sufficiently declare the purposes of such laws, and there is no doubt that individuals were not then excluded from offices of influence and trust, so much on account of their religious tenets as for their political opinions; but the enemies of the State being generally known by their dissent from the established church, all dissenters were for that reason excluded.—Applying, therefore, the purposes of those laws to the present times, we should consider, whether by a repeal we should defeat them; and whether (in the words of the act of 13 Ch. II.) "the succession of members in Corporations will *not* probably be perpetuated in the hands of persons well affected to his Majesty and the Established Government." As to Presbyterians, no thought of alarm is suggested from that quarter; and the Union of England and Scotland establishing their form of religion has not produced any formidable enemies from that sect. And as to the Catholics, all ground of apprehension must be considerably, if not entirely, removed by their declarations accurately transcribed in a letter of Z's which appeared in your Register of the 10th of last month. However, much innovation must be dreaded in all matters of state, particularly in those which regard religion. Yet, from the expectation of further indulgence the Catholics have reason to entertain, from the present state of the Empire, from the great probability of animosities ceasing and the spirit of rebellion dying, if the promised satisfaction be

granted to the Irish, there is so much to hope for and so little to fear, in the present case, that I must presume the repeal of the prohibitory acts will surmount all difficulties, will promote the happiness of his Majesty's people, and the prosperity of the empire, and advance the honour of God and his holy church.—With great respect, I remain, Sir, yours, &c.—BRITANNICUS.

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SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.

SIR,—However I may differ from you in opinion on the subject relating to which I am now about to address you, I can but feel a degree of satisfaction in knowing, that that subject should have been admitted by you, to be of "considerable public if not political importance." If, Sir, the escape of Sir James Craufurd had been a question, important in its result only to the welfare of the individuals who had abandoned their native country to find an abode in the bosom of the most inveterate of her enemies, you would not have been troubled with the perusal of these lines; but viewing as I must that question extending itself in some degree over the honour of the country, and involving in its immediate, as well as in its remote consequences, the very existence of those laws and principles which by the common consent of nations in any degree advanced in civilization have for many ages been made the engines of mitigation to the ravages of war, I can but consider it as one which ought at least to be seriously and minutely investigated. The engagement of Sir James inserted in your Register, must as you say, while it remains uncontradicted, be taken for granted; and I fully agree with you, in the preliminary acknowledgment you have made, that "as a gentleman and a servant of the King he must look strict justice in the face, and if she acquit him not, he must be condemned of a breach of parole," than which you have truly declared "nothing could be more dishonourable;" and you might have added, when protected and encouraged, more important at any period, but particularly at the eventful crisis in which we live, to the interests of humanity and the alleviation of the calamities of contending nations.—Before I proceed farther in my investigation, I feel myself called upon to inquire what inference you would draw when you affirm, "considering Sir James's conduct as a question of public law, embracing his obligations towards the French and towards his own country, there would be great difficulty in coming to a decision if his own government had not already

“settled the point.” The natural supposition certainly is, that you would allude to the circumstances of the detention: but, laying aside the declarations of Lord Hawkesbury, I really confess myself unable to discover what reference can therefrom be brought to bear upon the subject before us. The English residents were detained not individually as men, but collectively as subjects of Great-Britain; and if this nation had not declared their detention to be contrary to the law of nations, its silence must have been considered as a tacit admission that they were in every sense of the word prisoners of war. Public ministers are, Sir, as you have yourself asserted the only channels through which nations can either speak or be addressed: therefore their individual complaints could have availed them nothing. The government of their own country had admitted them to be prisoners, and as such they must have been bound to regard themselves. It may however be, that you would refer this “difficulty of coming to a decision” to the situation of prisoners of war in general, but after having explicitly declared that nothing can be more dishonourable than a breach of parole, I can scarcely bring myself to believe, that such can be the basis on which you would rest your argument; and as the limits even of this particular case may extend to some length of discussion, I will not at present enter upon that subject.

—The hinge of the argument turns, Sir, upon this question; whether the official assertion of a public minister of one belligerent nation, that its subjects are unjustly detained prisoners of war by another, is a sufficient justification for a breach of parole; that is, in this case, upon the influence to be attached to the bare *ipse dixit* of Lord Hawkesbury; you exclaim, God forbid, you should take upon you to decide between his lordship and the French government; but you seem to have forgotten, that when you have become the advocate of those who have previously made that decision, and acted upon it as the rule of their conduct, you have already laid low your former animosities, and enlisted yourself the volunteer under the triumphant banner of your hero of Amiens. The following is the substance of the argument you have advanced; “that the minister for foreign affairs in England having declared the government of France did not act according to the law of nations, that government, and, as a necessary conclusion, the whole French nation, are in this particular instance to be regarded as nothing better than banditti.” Having, as you conceive, established this the

major of your proposition, you proceed for a minor to affirm, “that there are few persons who, if seized by banditti, would scruple to tender them a promise of any sort to get out of their power;” thereby, and from the context, I apprehend meaning that promises made to banditti are not to be considered as binding; and from these two syllogisms, (having however previously proved that the duties of a husband and a father to his family in England were, upon a question of feeling, to be regarded as infinitely preferable to any obligation that could arise from the situation of his fellow prisoners in France,) you come to your conclusion, namely, that the conduct of Sir James Craufurd, supposing the engagements to exist, is justifiable. —As to the minor of your proposition, that promises made to banditti are not to be considered as binding, I readily admit the conclusion; and though the paths by which we arrive at this same point do most essentially differ, I certainly should not trouble you with a more metaphysical deduction, if that deduction did not enable me to shew the fallacy of the assertions upon which you have grounded the major of your proposition, viz. that the French government ought, in this particular instance, to be considered as nothing better than banditti; and, of course, inasmuch as we are able to be treated as such. I will premise with an author\*, whose sentiments are sometimes consonant to your own, that promises are to be interpreted in the sense in which they are received by the promisee; that the obligation to perform them arises from the confidence mankind repose in them; and that that obligation is taken away when the performance is illegal, or when contradicted by a prior promise. The sentiments of this writer upon our present subject are, however, so vague and indeterminate, that it is impossible to come to any decision from them. But, Sir, a better ore may be extracted from the rich though ill digested mine of Grotius†, illumined as are the words of that discerning writer by the reflexions of the father of ethical and political science. “Ego omnino illorum accedo sententiæ, qui existimant, sepositâ lege civili, quæ obligationem potest tollere aut minuere, cum qui metu promissit aliquid obligari: quia consensus hic adfuit, nec conditionalis, ut modo in errante dicebamus, sed absolutus. Nam, ut rectè ab Aristotele traditum est, qui naufragii metu res suas jac-

\* Dr. Paley.—† Lib. ii. Tit. vii. § 2 and 3.

tat, vellet res servare, sub conditione si naufragium non immineret, at absolutè "vult res perdere, spectatâ scilicet temporis "ac loci circumstantiâ." He proceeds, in the next paragraph, to state that the promisee is morally bound to release the promissor from his obligation: "Non quod "ineficax fuerit promissis, sed ob damnum "injuriâ datum." This does not, however, apply, to the present case; neither the robber has released the object of his injustice, nor the French government their declared to be lawful captive; the obligation, therefore, as well to the one as to the other, remains in full force. Grotius, in the following section, adds: "Materiam promissi "quod atinet, eam oportet esse, aut esse "posse in jure promittendis, ut promissum "sit efficax. Quare primum non valent "promissa facti per se illiciti; quia ad illa "nemo jus habet, nec potest habere. At "promissio, ut supra diximus, vim accipit "ex jure promittentis, nec ultra extenditur. Agesilaus de promisso interpellatus respondit καὶ δήτα, ἐδ' ἐστὶ δικαίον, "ἐὶ δὲ μὴ ἔλεξα μὲν, ἀμολόγησα δὲ οὐ."—

The offences of banditti are criminal, not as they concern the individuals attacked, but as they are injurious to the community at large; as they militate against the primary object of the existence of civil society, protection from violence; against the bond which cements the society together, property; and thereby against the sovereign power of the state, which either has or must be supposed to have been established by the common consent at some remote period; in England, as the words are, in contempt of our Lord the King, and his laws, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity. Here, then, it is a direct interference with the first of all moral duties, the duty to the state; for no man, taking such a view of the case, can make a promise or other compact with a robber, or any other public offender; because he cannot enter into a state of peace with a man, with whom, without violating the greatest of all human duties, he can, as a member of the community, never put himself out of a state of war. On the principle, therefore, that a posterior cannot controvert a prior obligation, but upon that only, I agree with you, that promises made to banditti are not to be considered as binding. But, without the prior obligation to the state, such a promise must be valid; because, as Grotius argues, it is agreed to, not conditionally, but absolutely; and the banditti have a confidence in the obligation, or they would not be at the trouble to exact it. But where is

the violation of the municipal laws of one nation by another, that can place the latter in the situation of banditti? and where, then, the prior obligation that can arise to the parole of a declared prisoner of war. Are the edicts of the government of his own country or the assertions of that to which he is a captive, be they ever so unjust, (if the interpretations of the law of nations will allow me the use of that expression), to determine his conduct. An eminent \*writer on public law, and whom you have introduced among us in the garb of your native language, has, with every other author on the same subject who has gone before him, been obliged to bring his proof of the existence of a positive law of nations to this point, that "in general all nations give a "certain degree of attention to the customs "admitted by others." But supposing one nation to withdraw this consent, who is to determine the injury, and what possible remedy can be had but retaliation as far as that is in your power. The complaints of Lord Hawkesbury cannot, but as they may influence other nations to make a common cause in the war, and the extent of that influence I should be sorry to presume to trace, be even of the value of the paper upon which they are written. To what tribunal does he appeal? Nations, Sir, you well know admit of but one, and that is the tribunal of the strongest sword. It must therefore be the assertions of the government to which he is a captive that are to determine the conduct of a prisoner of war. He holds his life but conditionally, and to every thing but his honour, his integrity, and those duties of allegiance which can on earth never be lost or abandoned he must consider himself as dead. The short but beautifully expressive sentiment of the captive monarch† of France to his mother the Queen Regent, after the battle of Pavia, you no doubt remember: "Madame, tout "est perdu, hormis l'honneur." And, Sir, the prisoner of war who, dreading the shipwreck of captivity, throws overboard and abandons to the fury of the waves his cargo of honour and integrity would, I doubt not, be willing to preserve it, si naufragium non immineret, an absolutè vult res perdere, spectatâ scilicet temporis ac locis circumstantiâ. I might, Sir, enter farther into the monstrous idea of considering thirty millions of men as banditti, but what I have already said is sufficient for my purpose. I have proved they could not be treated as such in this particular case, and of course that your

\* Martens. † Francis I.

conclusion falls to the ground. But, Sir, though upon every principle of argument I am obliged to consider the engagement in your Register to be in existence; yet, looking back to the station this gentleman once held, even degraded as that sacred character has publicly been at Munich, I will not allow myself to believe it can ever personally fall so low. It must, Sir, be a forgery of the French government to answer its own detestable purposes, to degrade and vilify the British character, and to enable it to invade still farther the rights and privileges of neutral nations. To contradict it is a duty Sir James Craufurd owes to his own reputation, and to the honour of his insulted country; and a duty in which that country hopes and trusts she will not be disappointed. I remain, Sir, yours, &c.—REGULUS.—  
*London, 20th Nov. 1804.*

## LETTER II.

(See the 1st in p. 545 et seq.)

## EFFECTS OF PAPER-MONEY IN TIMES OF SCARCITY.

SIR,—Various avocations have prevented me from answering you so soon as I intended. I have now read very attentively your remarks upon the letter which I sent you, and, as I do not think that the truth of the main position, for which I contend, is affected by the arguments which you urge against it; I shall, with your indulgence, submit to you a few observations on the topics which have been incidentally involved in the discussion, and I shall then state to you my reasons for still differing with you in opinion.—I observe, that I have mistaken Mr. Howison's meaning; which, I assure you is not owing to any carelessness of mine, nor to the defect of incorrect punctuation which you point out, but is entirely imputable to the inaccuracy and obscurity of his expressions, and to the insidious construction of the sentence. When commercial confidence is high, and when credit can be obtained by men possessed of no capital, then, it seems the paper money is in a fictitious state, and the depreciation of money means in the new nomenclature of political economy, a currency constantly depreciating. To me the expressions conveyed a meaning totally different; and, I still think, that the fictitious state of paper money, though in any sense not very intelligible, is more applicable to a depreciated state of the currency, than to the imprudent investiture of loans, or to the creation of fictitious capital. Other instances of faulty expression might be pointed out, but as it is a matter of small importance, whether Mr. Howison's stile be

perspicuous or obscure, I decline pursuing the subject farther.—You observe, that in commenting upon the extracts from Mr. Howison's work, I do not seem to have perceived, that in passing through your hands, the positions of that gentleman received, as to the detail, some degree of qualification; and afterwards, in p. 556, you say, that it is evident that the article of the Register, when fairly considered as a whole, did not tend to encourage the notion of any thing more than a transitory influence on the price of corn. I certainly did not perceive, that Mr. Howison's positions received any qualifications in passing through your hands, for you said that the principle was laid down in a manner so satisfactory to your mind, that you was induced to believe that those who had not perused the pamphlet, would thank you for the extract you was about to make from it. Several of your remarks did seem indeed, at variance with Mr. Howison's opinions; but there was no direct qualification even of the most intemperate of his expressions, and although in your reply to my letter, you complain that it is rather cruel in me to pour argument upon argument upon you, to prove that it is impossible for the corn dealers to raise the price of corn as high as they please by the assistance of discounts; yet, in the passage you quote from Mr. Howison, it is affirmed in the most unqualified manner, that "any means which enable the possessors of such commodities (articles of necessity) in times of scarcity, to withhold the articles from market, enable him to raise the price just as high as he may choose, or as the last shilling of the user can reach." You object to the expression, "unfair means," as applied to the operation of a paper currency on the price of provisions, and refer me to page 309 and 310 of your Register, where I find many judicious observations; but, after reading that passage in which you observe of the paper-money system, that it has set the staff of life upon the cast of the dye, I did not think that you would object to the term, unfair means, by which, however, I meant no more than that the price was raised above its natural level by the influence of capital. After reviewing the whole of your observations, and considering them as they are explained in your reply to my letter, I cannot help thinking, that the quotation from Mr. Howison, not only tends to give a false impression of your opinions, but leads to consequences which had at first escaped your observation, and, I have no doubt that the subject would have been much better elucidated, had you expressed your thoughts in your own vigorous

and perspicuous language. Then, indeed, your remarks might have been considered as a whole, of which the component parts would have amply harmonised; but, when you have recourse to quotations, which you are forced to clog with qualifications, not only are your own opinions entangled with those of others, but instead of a consistent whole, we find "several contradictory principles reluctantly and irreconcilably brought and held together. . . . to claw and bite each other to their mutual destruction."—Your opinions as they are now explained by you, are limited by distinct qualifications; but, as I think the principle on which they are founded, in whatever manner it may be qualified, is completely untenable, I shall shortly consider the arguments which you have advanced in its defence, and least you should think me unreasonably scrupulous as to the proof which I would require, I must inform you, that as the proposition is not intuitive, it ought to be either demonstrated from elementary principles, or established by a reference to facts. If the proof on which you have grounded it be examined, it will be found to be radically defective, inasmuch as the position which ought to be proved is taken for granted. The substance of your argument seems to be, that as corn, even where there is neither discounting nor paper currency, can be kept back from the consumer by means of capital, on the prospect of a scarcity, it follows that discounting, by adding to the active capital of the corn-merchants, increases their power of withholding corn from the market. It is thus expressed in your own words: "If then, all active capital does, in proportion to its amount, induce and enable the possessor to keep back corn from the market in times of scarcity or approaching scarcity; and, if the discounting of bills, unchecked by a due reference to capital accumulated, greatly and instantaneously adds to the active capital; if these two positions are granted, and, I think they will not be denied; it follows of course, that, by means of discounting bills, corn-dealers are induced and enabled to keep corn back from the market, in those seasons when corn becomes an object of speculation." The first position on which the whole of your reasoning is grounded, I do not admit, nor have you attempted to prove it. You have another passage to the following effect. "Were there no discounting at all, and no paper-money, a prospect or even rumour of scarcity of any article, would cause such article to be, in some degree kept back from the consumer; but then, that degree, which must bear a

"due proportion to the real capital of the possessors of the article, would never be so great as to amount to an evil. If the withholding here spoken of be allowed to be practicable, &c." But, I do not allow it to be practicable; I deny that the corn-merchants can withhold corn from the corn-market, so as to raise the price; that all the corn not destined for immediate consumption must be withheld from the market till it be required, seems to be almost a self-evident proposition; as the consumption is gradual, a very great stock must constantly be kept on hand; but, it does by no means follow that the necessary supplies of the corn market can ever be kept back so as to raise the price. When the price rises, there must always exist another cause unconnected with capital or paper currency, and perfectly adequate to produce the whole of the effect which you partly trace to a different source. A short consideration of the general principles by which the corn trade is regulated, will confirm the truth of these observations. —I intended at first to point out at length the different operations, which the various branches of the capital employed in the corn trade, are by the necessary constitution of things appointed to perform. But, as a full exposition of this part of the subject is not essentially necessary to the present question, I shall only observe, that the business of the corn-merchant seems to be to convey supplies to the market as they are needed, and to replace with the produce of his sales the capital of the farmer. For this purpose, it does not appear to be necessary that any great proportion of the supply of the year should ever be in the corn-merchants hands; on the contrary, the quantity engrossed by them, will naturally be diminished as low as they find consistent with the regular supply of the market; in this way, the smallest possible quantity of capital will be required, and in every trade it is evident that the quantity of capital will soon adjust itself with the greatest nicety to the functions which it is destined to perform. If too great a quantity of capital were attracted to the corn-trade one year, it would be thrown out at the end of the season, and never would return. The author of the *Wealth of Nations* very justly observes, that it is the interest both of the corn-merchants and of the consumers, that the daily, weekly, and monthly consumption of corn, should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the season. It is evident, therefore, that that price which would regulate the consumption of a day, week, or month, in exact proportion to that of a whole year, must be considered as the

natural price, as that point to which the price constantly tends, to which amid all its fluctuations it gravitates as to a "centre of continuity and repose." When it falls below this, its natural point of rest, it is again brought back to it by an increase of demand occasioned by a too rapid consumption; when it rises above it, consumption is checked, the demand decreases, and the price naturally falls.—It will be found on considering the subject, that all the variations of price which can possibly occur, are referable to the same general principles; and that, as corn never can sink below its natural level for want of money, so no command of capital can ever have the slightest influence in effecting a higher rise of price than would otherwise happen through the operations of obvious causes. It is evident that an alarm of scarcity, whether well or ill founded must raise the price, and that the rise of price which thus takes place, is beneficial, as it checks consumption, and thus mitigates the severity of expected scarcity, by distributing its pressure over a wider extent. The fact is, indeed, generally acknowledged, but a difference of opinion prevails as to the degree in which the price is affected, and as to the causes which operate in producing that effect.—The increase of price occasioned by an apprehension of scarcity, must evidently be proportioned to the degree of alarm which prevails. If it is generally believed that there will be a scanty crop, and that the value of corn will be increased 20 per cent. in three months, a very great demand will instantly take place, and will continue till the expectation of high profits from the probability of an advanced price, be counterbalanced by the rise which actually takes place. The equilibrium between the demand and the supply cannot be restored, until the increase of price leaves to the corn-merchants no more than a fair compensation for the disadvantages, whatever they may be, of keeping their stock on hand for three months longer. If the price was so low as left them more than an adequate compensation, there would be more buyers than sellers; the former proportions would not be restored between the demand and the supply, and the price would continue to rise, till it attained that point, at which, as long as circumstances remained the same, it would continue stationary. It is for the advantage of the consumers that corn should attain this its just value; for, if the fears of scarcity be well founded, and if a corresponding rise of price do not take place, the people will suffer, instead of a comparatively slight inconvenience, all the unmitigated dis-

tress of an unforeseen calamity. This evil, however, never can happen from any want of capital; a particular corn-merchant, may, indeed, be forced to sell his stock for want of capital, but a variety of purchasers will immediately appear, by whose competition whatever is disposed of will sell for its full value. There never can exist in any trade either a permanent superfluity or deficiency of capital; both these evils necessarily tend to their own cure. In the one case, profits are sunk below their ordinary level, and the superfluous capital seeks more profitable employment; in the other, they are raised above it, and capital is soon attracted from other branches of industry, which quickly reduces profits. It is curious to observe with what exactness the various relations of society are adapted to each other; what perfect harmony subsists in that apparent complexity of parts which the machine exhibits to a superficial observer. This arises out of the nature of things. For if the system of civilised society, did not possess, by the very fundamental laws of its constitution, a power to rectify temporary derangement, and, indeed, an internal energy sufficient to preserve a just equilibrium between its parts, it would want the means of its own conservation.—If corn can never be degraded below its just value for want of capital, upon the same principles it is demonstrable, that no command of active capital can ever in any circumstances effect the slightest variation in its value. As the idea of any combination is too absurd to deserve serious refutation, the corn dealers must act from circumstances which are totally beyond their control. There must be some general cause to give the same direction to their operations. Scarcity or the apprehension of scarcity is fully adequate to produce this effect. In the case which I have supposed, it is generally believed, that the value of corn will be increased 20 per cent. in three months. From the increased demand which the apprehensions of this rise will produce, the value of corn must continue to increase, till the actual price be generally deemed, on a full consideration of the circumstances of the case to be a fair equivalent for the expected advance. If it be thought more than a fair equivalent, those who have that view of things will eagerly avail themselves of this opportunity to sell; and if this be the general opinion, there will be a general inclination to sell rather than to buy; the price must therefore fall, whatever be the quantity of capital in the hands of the corn-merchants; if the actual price be thought less than a fair equivalent for the expected advance, in the same manner there

will be a general inclination to buy rather than to sell, and the price must rise. When it is generally thought that the actual price is neither more nor less than a fair equivalent for the expected advance, the natural equilibrium will be established between the supply and the demand; they will be exactly suited to each other, and here the price, while circumstances remain the same, will continue stationary; to this point, it is evident, it must constantly gravitate by the operation of fixed laws. It does not appear that capital has the slightest influence in occasioning these fluctuations. The price is fixed by the general opinion, and capital is necessary to give practical effect to that opinion. There must, by the very constitution of society, be always a sufficient quantity of capital to raise corn to that price at which it is estimated by those best qualified to appreciate its just value, and it never can be raised higher? It is not easy to understand upon what principle this sort of influence is ascribed to capital. If when an alarm of scarcity prevails, the value of corn must increase, till the actual price is generally believed to be equivalent to the chance of high profits from the expected advance, how can the influence of capital raise it higher. The generality of corn-merchants thinking that the actual price of corn is as high as to offer a fair compensation for the chance of high profits from the expected rise, although they had the most extensive command of capital, could have no farther inducement to withhold corn from the market. Whatever quantity they may have had on hand during the rise, will yield them a great profit; but the profit on all future transactions must be according to the ordinary rate. Those who refuse to sell must certainly be impressed with the belief that the price will speedily be higher. If this be the general belief, although it may ultimately prove groundless, it must be founded on a consideration of the circumstances of the case by those best qualified to form a correct judgment. Capital never can be wanting to raise corn to the valuation at which it is rated by the general opinion of the dealers, and were it possible to suppose that it could rise higher by the influence of partial causes, it would be instantly brought down by the great supply which would pour into the market from all quarters. In the case which I have supposed it is thought that corn will increase one-fifth; now if it be the general opinion, that the actual increase of price offers a fair compensation for the expected advance, there never can be a general disposition to employ capital in withholding. No corn merchant can

suppose for one moment, that by withholding his own stock from the market, he can raise the price. He must look to the operation of a more general cause. But after he thinks that this cause has already completed its effect, what further inducement can he have to keep up his stock; unless he either thought that his own solitary efforts could raise the price, or that other corn merchants would follow his example. As the dealers in grain are not combined, each must pursue that plan which he thinks most conducive to his own particular interests. After he thinks that corn has risen to its just value, whatever be his command of capital, it never can be his interest not to sell. By not selling he keeps his capital idle, without any apparent means of remuneration. What is true of one corn merchant is true of the whole body. When corn has attained what they consider its just value, it never can be their interest to keep it, unless they were to act in combination. After they think that the alarm of scarcity has completed its operation, their profit must be made by selling not by keeping; and the most extensive command of active capital could never induce them to keep up corn longer from the expectation of extraordinary profits. Indeed there is no principle in political economy more firmly established than this, that if too great a quantity of capital be attracted to any employment, profits will quickly be reduced; if there were too great a quantity of capital in the hands of the corn merchants, the market would be supplied too liberally, and the price would consequently be reduced below its natural level.—As an unfounded alarm of scarcity must raise the price, an unfounded belief of plenty must lower it. Accordingly, before the harvest of 1800, on the prospect of plenty, the price of wheat fell as low as 58s., and very fine wheat, which had been as high as 150s. fell to 85s., which was afterwards found to be too low a price. There appeared to be a very general mistake as to the produce of the crop, for after the harvest was got in, and the demand fairly brought to bear upon it, the mistake was quickly corrected, and superfine wheat rose as high in January as from 140 to 158s. Were I pretending to exhibit a complete view of the subject, I would take notice of the fluctuations which generally happen in a year of scarcity particularly, previous to the harvest; but as it is not absolutely necessary for my present purpose, I shall only observe, that all these variations of price are plainly deducible from the operation of obvious causes, and

do not seem to be in the slightest degree connected with paper currency.—Having thus stated to you the grounds of my dissent from the fundamental position on which your theory rests, little more remains for me to do. You think that the prospect of scarcity would cause corn to be kept back from the market; even though there were neither discounting nor paper currency; but that the degree which would bear a proportion to the real capital of the possessors of the article, would never be so great as to amount to an evil. I have already endeavoured to shew that there must always be a sufficient quantity of capital to raise corn to that value at which it is rated by those best qualified to form a correct judgment, and that no addition of capital can raise it higher. The capital employed in any sort of trade must always adapt itself to the functions which it is destined to perform. The determination of a superfluous quantity to any employment, is the very mode prescribed by the nature of things for reducing profits, and of benefiting instead of distressing consumers. The undue reduction of price which took place before the harvest of 1800, will not, I suppose, be attributed by you to the operations of our paper system. Yet the variation in the price at that time was far greater than those variations of price which you partly attribute to paper currency, and it was undoubtedly occasioned solely by the unfounded belief of approaching plenty; for when that opinion was corrected, the price immediately rose higher than even it had done before, notwithstanding a continual supply from importation. Now I cannot help thinking, that if an unfounded belief of plenty occasions a very great fall of price, an unfounded belief of scarcity may occasion a very great rise without the intervention of any other cause. If a law were passed granting a premium of a guinea for each bushel of corn exported after next Christmas, you ask me if I will deny that such a law would induce all the corn dealers to raise the corn in hand from one and the same motive? An answer will be found to this query in the case of an expected rise with which I have endeavoured to illustrate my view of the subject. If such a law were passed, there could be no want of capital to raise corn to its full value, and no capital could raise it higher. But here I must observe, that corn dealers all act as unconnected individuals; it is the expectation of the

bounty solely, which raises the price, and not the influence of active capital. You say that the present rise of price is not to be accounted for upon my principles, and you ask what cause has produced such a sudden augmentation of the demand above the supply? The cause obviously is a general belief that the price will be higher, which must occasion a continually increasing demand, till that demand is checked by a proportional rise of price. It is not a paper currency which affords the means of acting upon the mind; there must always exist a sufficient quantity of capital to give practical effect to the general belief, and no superfluous capital can be employed. As to a depreciation of money, I am totally at a loss to understand how that circumstance can raise the real value of provisions; it appears to me, that it may with equal propriety be asserted, that physical magnitude may be enlarged or diminished by a variation of the measurement in which its dimensions are ascertained. The price of labour must depend upon the average value of corn for a number of years; it never can be adjusted to all the transitory fluctuations in the price of provisions. A depreciation of the currency must affect equally both the nominal value of corn and labour. In whatever degree the present rise of provisions is owing to a depreciation of money, in the same degree the price of labour must rise. If it has not risen, and if the demand has continued the same, an unanswerable argument arises out of this fact against any depreciation. But allowing that the currency is depreciated, how can the real value of corn be affected by that circumstance? As money is the only practical measure of value, corn is more frequently compared with it than with any other commodity. But the real value of corn has surely nothing to do with the variations of the measure by which that value is ascertained.—I have now submitted to you the grounds on which my opinions are founded, and if they are erroneous, you will have an opportunity of refuting them. In the mean time I cannot help thinking, that the influence of paper currency on the price of provisions, which never can act but in conjunction with another very powerful cause, is an illusion very similar to those legendary tales concerning forestallers, regraters, and engrossers, which were propagated and believed during the monkish age of political economy.—*Montrose, 21st Nov. 1804.*—D. B.

*"It is impossible not to see, in these feeble and sickly imaginations, that fatal temper of mind, which leads men to look for help and comfort from any source rather than from their own exertions."*—Mr. WINDHAM'S Speech on the Preliminaries of Peace.

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## LETTER VI.

TO THE RT. HON. WILLIAM PITT,  
ON THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

## DIGRESSION, 2.

Sketch of the present prospect of the  
War.

SIR,—At a time, when every post from the continent is bringing fresh proofs of the triumphant progress of our enemy; at a time when the man, (a prayer for protection against whom makes part of the liturgy of our church,) is putting on the crown, having already taken possession of the dominions, of Charlemagne, while, by way of episode in the grand drama, he is keeping us plunged in all the expenses, the embarrassments, the uncertainties and anxieties of war; at such a time, it is natural that men should inquire, when and how, this state of things is to terminate. This question is, in fact, frequently asked; and, it is truly melancholy to observe, that the answer is seldom, or never, found expressive of confidence in our internal resource, our ability, or our resolution. We rarely hear any thing beyond a vague undefined hope, that all will turn out well at last, that we are not yet to be conquered, and that something or other will happen to frustrate the designs of the enemy. Those who are called upon for some foundation of their hope, refer us, 1. to the powers of the Continent; and, 2. to the discontents of the people of France, sometimes appearing to think, that it is not the interest of Buonaparté himself to conquer this country, nor to subvert its government.

It must be evident, that a fallacious hope can be productive of no good to the country, and that it may be productive of great mischief; therefore, it is well worth our while to consider, what degree of solidity there is in either of the foundations above-mentioned.

As far as we can speak from official documents, Russia appeared, at the close of her diplomatic intercourse with Napoleon, to be resolved, not on war, but, on a sort of hostile neutrality, a state, without doubt,

very unnatural, but one not altogether without a precedent in the history of Europe. The views of Russia, as they have been before described, appear to have been very steady; and her grand object, through every recent reign, has been, to urge on her influence towards the South. This object was, as the Russian politicians seem to have thought, considerably advanced by the part which that power took in the ever-memorable German Indemnities. Prussia found her account in that distribution of territory and power; but Austria was cruelly injured and humiliated. Napoleon (I use his name to suit the purposes of perspicuity, always meaning, of course, to include the whole government of France); Napoleon took good care, however, that the Russian influence should not, by means of the German Indemnities, find its way permanently to the Southward; and, whether by the showing of great partiality to the princes connected by the ties of blood with the Imperial Russian family, or by the tone which the Russian plenipotentiaries were encouraged to take, the only effect which the new-modelling of the German Empire produced with regard to Russia, was, an addition to that jealousy, not to say envy and hatred, which was already entertained towards her by Austria; while, on the other side, the jealousy and the fears of Prussia could not have been diminished. That the ill-will of these two great German Powers should not have been greatly increased by seeing a Russian Plenipotentiary distributing the dominions of the Empire, new-moulding and new-modelling its constitution, would, indeed, have been something for an age to wonder at. But, long before the affair of the German Indemnities, Napoleon had provided himself with the means of setting Russia at defiance upon any future occasion. Those means we now find amply treasured up in a secret convention, concluded between the two powers on the 11th of October, 1801, ten days after the date of the preliminaries of peace between England and France. On the 8th of the same month a treaty of peace was concluded between France and Russia; but, in this treaty, war is merely put an end to, and the ancient relationships of peace

are revived, without any mention of, or allusion to, other powers, except merely, that the Batavian Republic is included in the pacific stipulations. The important provisions, the adjustment of matter of dispute, were reserved for the secret convention, the substance of which convention we are now informed of through the mutual complaints of the parties relative to the non-fulfilment thereof. Napoleon, we are told, by the Russian notes, stipulated, 1. To evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and having so done, to engage to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, during the war then existing, and during all future wars; the latter of which stipulations he has certainly violated, and had violated at the time when the complaint was made by Russia, in the month of July, 1804. 2. He stipulated to establish, in concert with Russia, some principle whereon to come to a final settlement of the affairs of Italy; instead of which, complains Russia, he did, almost immediately after the secret convention was concluded, cause himself to be chosen, and actually became, without any concert at all with Russia, President of the Italian Republic, and, at the same time, disposed of the other parts of Italy according to his sole pleasure. 3. He engaged to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia, whom, however, he has not indemnified, but, on the contrary the chief part of whose territories he has annexed to France, and this, too, without consulting Russia. These charges are unquestionably well founded; but, Napoleon answers, \* that Russia has not fulfilled her part, not only of the secret convention, but of the 3d article of the treaty of peace, which was concluded three days previous to the conclusion of the convention †. He charges Russia with having violated that article in giving protection to French emigrants; in accrediting them to the neighbouring powers of France, where they might indulge their hostile dispositions against their country; in authorizing the conduct of Count Marckoff, who, during his residence at Paris, encouraged intrigues to disturb the internal tranquillity of France, and who even went so far as to place under the protection of the law of nations, French emigrants and other agents in the pay of England; in ordering a court mourning for the Duke D'Enghien. He then demands, as a preliminary to any step in the way of fulfilment

on his part, that Russia shall evacuate the Republic of the Seven Islands, agreeably to the 9th article of the secret convention, which stipulates that there shall be no foreign troops in those islands, an article, says he, evidently violated by Russia, who has continued to send troops thither, which she has openly re-inforced, and has changed the government of that country without the consent of France. He concludes, with declaring, that Russia has, besides, violated the 2d article of the secret convention, by manifesting a partiality for England, instead of co-operating with France, agreeably to the precise expressions of that article, "in order to consolidate a general peace, to re-establish a just balance in the four parts of the world, and to procure the liberty of the seas." D'Oubril, in his answer to this note of Talleyrand, treats the charges relative to the emigrants as vague and unfounded; he passes in silence over that relative to the mourning for the Duke D'Enghien; the taking possession of the Seven Islands he asserts was with the consent of France; but, as to the stipulated co-operation for "procuring the liberty of the seas," he says not a word. ‡——It was necessary, Sir, to take this short review of the grounds of the dispute between Russia and France, in order to be able to judge, not only of the present probable intentions of Russia, but also of the line of conduct which Austria and Prussia, more especially the former, is likely to pursue. Austria, already deeply stung by the triumphant rivalry of Russia, by the direct interference of the latter in the affairs of the Germanic Body, and by the losses in territory and in power experienced through the means of that interference, must have been fired with indignation and rage at learning the contents of the secret convention of the 11th of October, 1801. This feeling, on the part of Austria, Napoleon looked forward to as an inevitable consequence of a disclosure of the terms of the secret convention; and, therefore, he always laughed at the complaints and remonstrances of Russia; for, by breaking with her, on account of non-fulfilment of his secret stipulations, he was sure to have Austria on his side. That he never intended to fulfil any one of the articles of the secret convention is, I think, evident; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to determine, which would have been most detrimental to Europe, the fulfilment, or the non-fulfilment of them: the domination of Italy by Napoleon, or the introduction of Russia into the affairs of the South, which

\* See Talleyrand's note of the 26th of July last, present Vol. p. 758 and concluded in p. 800.

† See this treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 165.

‡ See his answer, present Volume, p. 759.



latter, to the extent contemplated by the secret convention, could not have failed to be speedily followed by the total overthrow of the Turkish Empire, and by the reduction of Austria to perfect insignificance; to say nothing about the "procuring of the liberty of the seas." The final adjustment of the affairs of Italy, if Russia had participated therein, must have led to some changes in the Mediterranean and on the side of Turkey. Russia would have had something more solid than a piece of parchment for the due execution of the terms of such adjustment. In short, the result most probably would have been, that from four great military powers, the number of those powers, upon the continent, would have soon been reduced to two: an Emperor of the East, and an Emperor of the West. Napoleon wanted no equal; he therefore chose to preserve Prussia and Austria and to break with Russia; thus making France the one and only first rate power, having three second rate powers whom he might play off against one another, according as his views might require, and as their interests and passions might favour those views.—His views, at present, as far as relates to the Continent, assuredly are, not to be at war with either of the great military powers; to prevent Russia from encroaching upon the Turkish dominions; to keep matters of territory, dominion, and military force, as they now stand, and, at all events, if Russia should, in any direction, pursue an hostile course, to arm Austria or Prussia, or both, against her. That he will not succeed in these views the state of things affords us little reason to hope. Russia may, in order thereby to obtain a greater degree of influence in the Mediterranean, join us in the war, to a certain extent. Her object is to gain influence to the South; and, having failed to accomplish that object by the means of a pacific co-operation with France, she may endeavour to accomplish it by the means of warlike co-operation with England; and, with this view, she may join us in the war. But, it is not very probable, that we should gain much by her co-operation. On the contrary, if it be of importance with us to have great influence in the Mediterranean and the Levant, the introducing of the Russian navy and influence into those parts appears to be the certain way of finally injuring our own interests; because, when we have once given her a firm footing, Napoleon will not fail to tempt her with a peace, in which our power, in that part of the world, should be sacrificed. Whether the temptation would succeed, or not, is a question the decision

of which must be left to those, who have observed the conduct of nations, under similar circumstances.—It seems, however, to be more probable, that Russia will not take any very active part in the war; because, without the co-operation of either Austria or Prussia, or both of them, she can make no impression upon Napoleon; and, for those powers to join Russia against him, in the present state of the Continent, would be to forge their own chains; seeing that the natural consequence would be, a peace, in which they would be sacrificed to Russia. Then would return the case to have been apprehended from the due execution of the secret convention of 1801; that is to say, the abasement of Austria and Prussia, particularly the former, and the division of Europe between two great powers, France and Russia. That this is the light, in which the subject is viewed at Vienna and Berlin we certainly have no positive proof; but, if it be the light wherein reason views it, we have no foundation to hope that they will view it in any other.—Before the recent acts of violence, committed by France, we talked about continental coalitions against Napoleon; and, since the commission of those acts, we have spoken with still greater confidence. But, we ought always to expect, that the powers of the Continent will act agreeably to their interests; that is, according to their own views of safety, or of ambition; and, when we come to look into the causes, which have created the quarrel between Russia and France, we find that the quarrel is for power, on the part of Russia, and that, such is the nature of that power, that the desiring to acquire it is, of all possible causes, the one most likely to create an irreconcilable enmity between that court and the other courts, with whom the wished-for coalition must take place, if it take place at all. As to the acts of violence, which Napoleon has ordered to be committed, particularly that committed upon our minister at Hamburgh, they would, doubtless, in other times, have roused the powers of the Continent against the aggressor; but, now-a-days, such offences can only be expected to be brought forward in the list of provocations, when a power is already disposed and able to make war; and, when we express such sanguine hopes from this source, we seem to forget the treatment which Mr. Drake, Mr. Smith, and other of our ministers, have received from the courts of the Continent. The Elector of Bavaria ordered our minister away on account of the charge preferred against him by Napoleon; Lord Hawkesbury delivers to the foreign

corps diplomatic a note wherein he justifies conduct like that of which Mr. Drake was charged; whereupon Napoleon publishes an interdiction against all our ministers at neutral courts in the neighbourhood of France. As we are not permitted to doubt of the "prudence" of a doctrine promulgated by Lord Hawkesbury, we must content ourselves with the privilege of mourning its consequences. Perhaps, however, we may yet be allowed to express our surprize, that the government who openly justified conduct such as that of Mr. Drake, should never have openly obtained, or even demanded, any satisfaction for the deep disgrace inflicted in the driving of that gentleman from Munich.\* Do we say, that the court of Munich was beneath the notice of a nation like England? the answer is, that it was not thought beneath the dignity of his Majesty to send a representative to that court. The Elector of Bavaria, through his minister, unequivocally expresses his abhorrence of the conduct of Mr. Drake, pronounces it to be inconsistent with the law of nations, and orders him, accordingly, not to appear again at his court. As far as we have heard, neither Prussia nor Austria have expressed any dissent from this decision of Bavaria: indeed, they seemed to assent to it, in the notes of their ministers, delivered upon the occasion, at Paris. What reason is there to suppose, then, that they will make any important movement in consequence of the seizure of Sir George Rumbold, which appears to have been grounded upon our having publicly proclaimed a doctrine the contrary of that upon which they then acted? To seize a public minister is, indeed, widely different from a request made to a neutral court to send him away; and, it is also widely

\* See the note of the Baron de Montgelas to Mr. Drake, Register, Vol. V. p. 676. —It is not unnecessary here to remark on the ridiculous perverseness of the ministerial newspapers, who are continually representing Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée de la Touche as "a fabrication" of the French; when, by just looking at the note of Montgelas, which note they themselves have published, it will be perceived, that the Elector causes Mr. Drake to be informed, that he has Mr. Drake's letters to Mehée then before his eyes, in *Mr. Drake's own handwriting*! How can any one place reliance upon prints that persevere in such barefaced falsehoods? How is it possible that the country can be served by them? Truth itself, coming through such vehicles, loses its character and its effect.

different from the siezing of the Duke d'Enghien; but, it is, nevertheless, not very likely, that those who remained entirely unmoved by the latter should be roused to war by the former. Our present inquiry is, not whether these courts act as become them; it is not what Austria and Prussia ought to do, but what they are likely to do; not what they think and how they feel as to our cause, but what part they are disposed to act during the war. And, I think, that man must be very sanguine, who expects them to arm for the purpose of avenging the seizure of our ministers at foreign courts.

—As, in this disgrace of our corps diplomatic, the cause seems to have, in a great degree at least, originated with ourselves; so, it would be by no means difficult to show, that the state of things which has so completely divided Austria and Prussia from Russia, as to feeling towards France, originated, in great part, from the same source. Our general conduct during the last war, and more especially our abandonment of our allies at the peace, have alienated the Continental powers from British connexion. Nay, that very secret convention, which has now proved so deadly an instrument in the hands of Napoleon, would never have existed, or would have been superceded, if we had acted a disinterested part in concluding the peace of Amiens; if we had not preferred the possession of colonies to the possession of influence upon the continent of Europe; if we had not preferred what we regarded as profit, to our honour. In the declaration of the present war, complaint is made, in His Majesty's name, that the French "have annexed to their dominions Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and the Island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound by a solemn engagement to the Emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests, and to provide for his establishment."\* To this the French have answered, "that, at the peace, they offered to England, provided she would leave Ceylon to the Dutch, to make such an arrangement in behalf of the King of Sardinia as she might propose."† This fact has been published all over the world, and not a word has ever appeared in contradiction to it. Whether true or false the world believes it; and upon that belief will judge of us and act towards us. And,

\* Register, Vol. III. p. 744. † Ibid, p. 1924.

what a light are we placed in by this fact, when it is compared with our complaints made in behalf of the King of Sardinia at the breaking out of a new war between us and France? We complain, too, that, upon this subject, France has broken her promise to Russia. What, then, we knew of this secret convention, it seems, so long ago as the spring of 1803! But why did we leave the matter to Russia? Why did we leave in the hands of Napoleon this means of wheedling Russia into his power, the means of inflaming Austria against Russia, when we ourselves had wherewith to *purchase* for the King of Sardinia an establishment more ample than it was at all likely for Russia ever to obtain for him? Here, Sir, you must pardon me, if I recur, for a moment, to the debates upon the peace. "A great military monarch, when he was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes," said Mr. Windham, "and had sustained a defeat, that seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, the terms of his letter written from the field of battle were—"We have lost every thing, but "our honour." Would to God, that the same consolation, in circumstances liable to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great-Britain! I should feel a far less painful load of depression upon my mind, than weighs upon it at this moment. But, I fear that we have contrived to combine in this proceeding, all that is at once ruinous and disgraceful; all that is calculated to undo us, in reputation as well as in fortune, to deprive us of all those resources, which high fame and unsullied character may create "even "under the ribs of death." Having next stated the case of Sardinia, and shown that it was our duty to make some sort of provision for her unfortunate monarch, he says: "We have left Sardinia, "however, without an attempt to relieve her, without even a helping hand stretched out to support or to cheer her, under that ruin which she has brought upon herself, with no fault on her part, while adhering faithfully to her treaty with us. — Naples, too, and Portugal and Turkey will attest, to the end of time, the good faith of Great-Britain; and shew to the world, that *she* is not a power, who seeks her own safety by abandoning those with whom she has embarked in a common cause." \* What would he have said, then, if he had known, that we might have obtained an establishment for the King

of Sardinia by the giving up of Ceylon! By the surrendering of a colony which has already cost us more, perhaps, in national strength than it is possible that it ever should restore to us! You, Sir, upon the occasion now reverted to, asserted, that we had acted towards our allies "with dignified "liberality." You were ready to grant, indeed, "that we ought to have claimed "*Piedmont for its sovereign*," but, said you, "could we have obtained it? Could we "have procured its restoration unless we "could have disposed of the King of Etruria, "unless we could have destroyed the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics, and driven the French from the mountains of "Switzerland? Unless we could have "done all this, it would have been in vain "to restore the King of Sardinia to his "capital, surrounded as he would have "been by the French and by their dependent and affiliated Republics." \* When we recollect that you were consulted in every stage of the negotiation, and when we also recollect the proposal made by the French respecting Ceylon and the King of Sardinia, we shall need no comment to enable us to form a just opinion of the motive by which this argument must have been dictated. But, Sir, if we could not obtain *Piedmont* for its sovereign, we now know that we could have obtained *something* for him by the yielding of Ceylon; and, the world well knows that we obtained him nothing. Mark, besides, mark well, for the world has marked, our frankness and sincerity. We could think of nothing less than Piedmont, and that too, quite independent; quite clear of all annoyance from any or Napoleon's republics; but, provided Russia will obtain an establishment for the King of Sardinia, we do not seem to care much what it is, or where or how it lies. It was "in vain," perfectly "in vain," for us even to re-place the King of Sardinia in "his capital," and, of course, in his dominions; but, if Russia will get him "an "establishment," we will thank her; nay, we will quarrel with Napoleon, we will even make it one of our grounds of war against him, if he refuses to grant this "establishment" through the means or Russia! How truly, then, was it observed by Mr. Wilberforce, that "the very integrity and good faith of the ministers "and people of this country rendered us "unfit for continental connexion."!— It may, perhaps, be said, however, that by utility in replacing the King of Sardinia

\* Register, Vol. II. p. 1180.

\* Register Vol. II. p. 1141.

in his capital, you confined your meaning to utility to *ourselves*. But we now see, that such an act would not have been useless even to us. So true it is, that in acting justly by others, we, in the end, are sure to promote our own good. In the first place, we should have derived from such a proceeding the negative advantage of preventing the enemy from blasting our fame by the disclosure of the fact, that we refused to give up Ceylon for the purpose of obtaining a settlement for our unfortunate and faithful ally. We should have derived likewise the advantage always attendant on acts of national disinterestedness. Europe would have acknowledged that we had not been shedding her blood for our own sakes, and that though we were unable to leave our allies as we found them, we did all we could for that end. We should have preserved our character for generosity and frankness; we should not have lost all but our honour; we should, in that respect, have retained our honour and lost nothing; and, in the career of a new war, we should have started with, at least, the hearty good wishes of the Continent of Europe. But, besides this general effect of the proceeding, we should have prevented, or lessened, some of the particular evils, which we now experience. Any arrangement that we could have made for the King of Sardinia might have failed in preventing Piedmont from being finally annexed to France; yet, we are not sure that it would have failed. And, who shall be certain, that the abandonment of that prince by us was not the principal cause of that annexation? If the King of Sardinia had been re-established in Piedmont, however surrounded by French arms and French influence, the ejecting him would not have been a slight matter. It might have again brought Austria and Russia into the field. It might, and it would, have retarded the execution of Napoleon's projects. At any rate, it would have entirely prevented the secret convention between Russia and France, that convention the terms of which seem to have been drawn up for the express purpose of exciting the envy and hatred of Austria against Russia, after having kept Russia in the interests of France as long as her remaining so could be of any use to the latter. And thus, Sir, are we now smarting for that policy, which, looking at nothing but the custom-house books, preferred a spice-colony to the honour of the nation.—But, after all, some one will ask, is it possible that the powers of Europe, that Austria and Prussia will not rouse themselves? Rouse themselves for what?

Against Napoleon? Why, he is the benefactor of the latter; and the former is a great power out of his reach, and in no danger from him, unless Russia be first let into the South. Swift tells a story somewhere about the curates and the bishops, the former crying out that the church was in danger, and the latter exhorting them to peace, observing, "we are very well as we are." So say Austria and Prussia: and, if the heads of those nations were to read the London newspapers, they must be utterly astonished at our uneasiness on their account; at our friendly desire to promote their interests; at our philanthropic attention to their prosperity, safety, and independence; and, particularly at the tender anxiety we are constantly expressing for the preservation of their dignity and their honour. Sometimes this anxiety shows itself in our displeasure at their tame and pusillanimous conduct; and, there have been instances, where it has broken forth in reproaches, not to say downright abuse. Nay, we have not spared even menaces against them; and have, in a recent case, proceeded to put those menaces into execution, by seizing their treasure; as if we had said, 'if you will not make use of it for the maintenance of your honour, we will.'—Yet, is it possible, that the powers of the continent, that Austria and Prussia, would stand by and see Great Britain subdued and added to the dominions of Napoleon, rather than embark in the present war against him? Such a choice certainly is not impossible. But, this is not the true question. The true question is: will Austria and Prussia, rather than engage in the present war, see Great Britain continue the war single handed, though exposed to the inroads of Napoleon, and even to the danger of being annexed to his empire? And this question, I am much afraid, that, upon a review of all the above-stated circumstances, we must determine in the affirmative.—Time to recruit is very much wanted by Austria; and both Austria and Prussia must wish to see the ambitious strides of Napoleon directed in any course rather than to the North and the East. That it will force its way in some direction or other they must well know; directed to the Westward, it is not very easy to discover how it could endanger or annoy them; and, therefore, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that they would even wish to see it exhaust its force upon these islands. In answer to such a supposition, it will be asked, whether Austria or Prussia could be safe, if the British dominions were once subdued by Napoleon? But, Sir, Austria and Prussia will easily see, that this sub-

jagation would not be the work of a few months, or of a few years; nor would it be at all astonishing, if they were to conclude, that the enterprize, though it might speedily destroy our constitution of government, and spread ruin and misery over the land, might cost more years than Napoleon has to live, and might eventually produce the restoration of the liberties of the continent. — For these reasons, Sir, it appears to me, that there exists no well-founded hope, that, in the course of this war, we shall derive any advantage from continental co operation, unless we put ourselves in a situation to take a commanding part in a continental war; by providing such an army as shall at once convince those, whose alliance we desire, of the sincerity of our views and the solidity of our power.

From discontents in France we have, if possible, still less to hope. There was, indeed, a time when much might have been reasonably hoped for from that source; but, that time is past; the French royalists have seen a peace of Amiens, and they have read of the proposition for sending GEORGES and his gallant companions to Canada. The time was not, perhaps, entirely past, at the beginning of this war; but, things are now completely changed, and never again, during the present struggle, will there be found in France a single arm raised in a cause in which England is engaged. — Besides, Sir, for us to hope for discontents in France, we ought to be able to assign some reason why such discontents should now exist, or should hereafter arise. There is reason enough, indeed, in the circumstance of Napoleon's being an Usurper. But, this sort of reason never has had any weight against a famous military chief; and, we should recollect, too, that, though the collecting of the suffrages of the people might be a mere mockery, yet, the dynasty of Buonaparté has, in appearance at least, been established by the choice of the French nation. If we look at the privileged estates, the nobility and the clergy, we find that the old nobility are either destroyed, or incorporated with the new; that the clergy are a body as much of Napoleon's creation as is the legion of honour; and, that not only the interests, but the honour (or, call it the character, or reputation) and the very existence, of both, are inseparably interwoven with the new dynasty, or, in other words, with the Usurpation. But, the coronation of Napoleon, which has been a subject of so much mirth, real or affected, in the British metropolis, is a circumstance of a still higher order. Its influence will be felt by every Roman Catholic in the world; and,

we should not forget, that of the people of all Europe, these realms included, two-thirds, or thereabouts, are of the Roman Catholic religion. The London prints affect to regard the Pope as "a poor miserable old creature, dragged from his home, at this inclement season of the year, and at the evident risk of his life, to act a part in the impious farce of anointing the head and sanctifying the sword of a regicide and an apostate, previous to his being crowned with an Imperial Diadem." Poor miserable old creature, if they will have it so; regicide and apostate, as long as they please; but, Sir, the coronation, whatever be the actors, is no "*farce*;" on the contrary, it may, I fear, be justly regarded, as a sort of prelude to the most serious and most awful drama that ever yet was exhibited on the face of the earth. The former, and, for aught I know, the present, impiety of Napoleon, has been, and may be notorious; though the world will not fail to form a just opinion of the motives of the British ministerial prints, in preferring this charge against him now, when their praises of him during peace are remembered, and when it is recollected, that the British ministers, particularly your colleague Lord Hawkesbury, solemnly assured the Parliament that, at the peace, Napoleon had "publicly asked pardon of God and man." But, supposing the new Emperor still to be impious; and supposing his act of apostacy in Egypt to be a stain never to be washed out. Will this circumstance tend to lessen the effects of the Papal benediction? Does history tell us, that the apostacy of Henry IV rendered him an unpopular, or a feeble monarch? Or, do we read, that he was a most beloved and a most potent prince; and, though he perished at last by the hands of an assassin, his death is said to have occasioned more public grief than that of any king of France, St. Louis only excepted. To the editors of London newspapers the Pope may, both now and at all other times, appear as "a poor miserable old creature." But, we must not, without hesitation, conclude that he will, at any time, appear in that light to the Roman Catholics of any country. The present Pope is not only in fact, but in right, according to the Roman Catholic faith, the head of their church; and, I must confess myself completely at a loss to discover how either his person or his office has been "humiliated and degraded" by his being called in to confirm a title; and to give his sanction to an authority, conferred by a nation consisting of thirty-five millions of people, or, assumed by the most powerful sovereign, or chief, in the world.

With affected contempt and commiseration, Buonaparté has been blamed for "reviving" the *superstitious fooleries* of Charlemagne." The comparison is most unfortunate. Charlemagne was the first Emperor of the West; he was a great and glorious warrior; he defended the Pope against the arms of his oppressors; he was crowned by Pope Leo III; his character was most noble; all his views were grand; he reigned long, with great glory to himself and with not less happiness to his people. Is such the man, whose "fooleries" Buonaparté is to be *laughed* at for reviving? But, suppose, merely for argument's sake, the anointing by the hands of the Pope to be, in our opinion and in reality, a "superstitious foolery." How does that lessen the value of the ceremony to Buonaparté, and how does it diminish its influence in Europe, if the Roman Catholics do not consider it as a "superstitious foolery," but, on the contrary, as a very important religious act, conferring honour and sanctity upon him who receives it? Why, it may be answered, that the Roman Catholics are, then, superstitious fools. This leaves us where it found us; for, their being superstitious fools, if true, will not deprive them of existence; will not make them fewer in number than two-thirds of the inhabitants of Europe; will not rob them of those faculties, which render their approbation valuable to him, on whom it is bestowed. It is very easy to cry "superstition and foolery." The writer above quoted had only to open one of the books of Calvin, and he might instantly have collected together terms and epithets, wherewith to make, against the Roman Catholics, as dirty a diatribe as his heart could have yearned for. But, whatever other sins the Roman Catholics may have to answer for, *lukewarmness* is not generally one. It is of the very essence of the Roman Catholic church to inspire her sons with great zeal; great public spirit, as far at least as she is concerned; great devotion to her interest; great jealousy for her honour. And, if they, at all times, possess these feelings, in what an uncommon degree must they possess them at this time; when, after a long series of persecutions and of degradation, they see her again raising her head? Think you, Sir, that they have not felt the despicable treatment of their church? That they were unmoved spectators of the exultation of the saints, of both Old and New England, and every where else, at the time when the French armies were rising "Anti-Christ" and the Whore of Babylon?" Think you, that they have forgotten this? Verily they have not; and, if they do not now exult in their turn, at seeing the conqueror of so

many countries, he who disposes of kingdoms, bowing at the altar of their church, submitting to her laws, and receiving his crown at the hands of their pontiff; if they do not exult at this, they must have much less zeal than they have usually possessed, or much more magnanimity than was ever professed by any other class of mankind. Exultation at the effect will naturally be followed by some degree of praise of, if not of gratitude towards, the cause. What! praise of an apostate! There is the mistake: we regard him as an apostate, they as a convert. As a son that was lost, and that is found. And, as to his being a hypocrite, so much the greater the triumph of Christianity in general, and of the Church of Rome in particular; for his obeisance to the Pope, considered in conjunction with his hypocrisy, is a complete proof that temporal authority is not to be maintained without spiritual aid; and thus atheism and deism, after all their scoffing, are compelled to assume the garb of piety, and to bend their proud necks at the shrine of the Gospel. The Roman Catholics in foreign countries will be, however, still disposed to participate in the feelings of their rulers towards Napoleon, as far as temporal matters are concerned: that is to say, if they are justly treated by those rulers, and love them accordingly. But, even they, remembering that he has exalted their church, and taken her under his mighty protection, will not hastily wish to see his power subverted; and, as to France, every religious sentiment there will assuredly operate to the consolidation of his throne. Such, Sir, appears to me, to be the natural consequences of an event, which, since it was first spoken of, has been a constant subject of mirth amongst those sprightly gentlemen, who, to the honour of our country, conduct the ministerial news-paper press of the metropolis\*.—But, 'the despotism, the seve-

\* A burlesque representation of the coronation of Buonaparté was the brilliant conception of a rich loan-maker. It was to take place at a masquerade of his giving; the dresses, scenery, and dramatis personæ are said to have been all provided; but, from some cause or other, just before the night of exhibition, Balaam's heart failed him, and the conception was left to descend to, and be improved on by, the news-papers and the mob. Accordingly, we were soon afterwards told, that the MAYOR OF GARRAT (a well-known burlesque upon elections and members of Parliament) was about to be raised to the rank of Emperor; and, it was stated in the news-papers, that SIR HARRY DIMSDALE, a mutin-seller,

'rity of Napoleon's government: will not 'the people of France thereby be roused?' In answer to this, I cannot, in the first place, help observing; that, if we deny, that a despotic government is the only government suited to the character of Frenchmen, and that, repeating the sentiment of Voltaire, "good or bad they must have a master;" if we deny this, I cannot help observing, that I and all those who have entertained and expressed the same opinions with myself, flatly contradict our former assertions; and it must be fresh in every one's memory, that when, during the peace of Amiens, Buonaparté assumed the consulship for life, the ministerial writers expressed their joy on the occasion, regarding a despotic government, in the hands of a single person, as the only means of preserving tranquillity in France,

who was called Mayor of Garrat, had been before certain police magistrates, and asked them if there was any legal objection to his taking the title of Emperor, and being crowned accordingly, whereupon he was, it was stated, told by the magistrates, that there was certainly no impediment to the assumption. The account of the intended coronation shall be given in their own words.

—“PROCLAMATION. To our dutiful and loving subjects of Garrat. “We, the Imperial Court of Garrat, do hereby give notice to our beloved Subjects, that Our August Emperor, Sir Harry Dimsdale, will be crowned, at his Imperial Palace, the King's Head, in Old Compton-street, Soho, on Monday the 15th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1804, at the hour of eight o'clock in the evening. Given at Our Court, in Compton-street, this 12th day of October, 1804.—God save the Emperor!—The curiosity of the public was so great to see this mock coronation, that it was hardly possible at eight o'clock, the hour appointed, to find even standing room in the place where the Emperor was intended to be crowned. The Emperor, (who is a very little and deformed man, who used to hawk muffins about the streets) delivered three or four speeches full of professions of patriotism, and attention to the interests of the people, in a strain of caricature of the declarations which are too frequently made in exalted situations with as little sincerity as Sir Harry's. His Majesty made a *bon-gle* in the delivery of one of his speeches, which was very excusable, as he did not read them according to the usual form, but repeated them from memory. Some discontent was visible in the countenances of many, and some even dared to

and of “healing the wounds of Europe.” These were their very words. Yet, now we are seeking, in this very sort of government, for the infallible means of disturbing the tranquillity of France, and for again opening “the wounds of Europe!” It is curious to observe how men's opinions change with their situations. How anxious they seem to find out the means of hiding their dangers and disgrace even from themselves!—In the next place, Sir, I should like to know, whence it is that these writers now conclude, that the severity of the government of France will produce discontents amongst the people of that country, while these same writers are daily contending, that, by similar means, a contrary effect has been produced in Ireland. Suffer me to quote, for instance, the Morning Post news-paper of the 13th inst.:

“openly express their disappointment and dissatisfaction at having paid their half-pence and not seeing a crown furnished. “Most fortunately there came in a party of “volunteers, who offered themselves to constitute his body-guard, and immediately arranged themselves on his right and left for the defence of his royal person. Good order was attempted to be restored, by a motion that the coronation should be postponed to the 9th of November, the day fixed for another coronation, when it was hoped that his Holiness the Pope might be prevailed on to assist in the performance of this important ceremony. The mobility, however, had come to see a coronation, and a coronation of some sort they would have. A crown bowl of punch was thought to come nearest in rank and sound of its title to the imperial crown. It was placed upon his royal head by his body-guard, and ‘God save the King’ was sung in full chorus. Several huzzas and shouts of ‘Long live the Emperor’ proclaimed that he was legally invested with the dignity.”—The volunteers coming to form his body-guard was quite in character. But, was the satire really aimed at Buonaparté? How could the anthem of “God save great George our King,” sung in burlesque, be meant as a satire on the emperor of France? I think one may perceive through the whole scene, and the description of it, something that it is by no means wise for magistrates to encourage, and that may, if only a little improved upon, tend to the producing of events far from laughable. In short, we may by such means, degrade ourselves, our country, and our government; but never shall we thereby whiten one hair of Napoleon's head, or blunt the point of one of his half million of bayonets.

"With respect to the report of the sailing of the French fleet, we are confident that no such intelligence has been received either in England or in Ireland, nor do we believe that there is the slightest foundation for the statement; and as to the rumour of approaching disturbances, we have the happiness to hear, that in the best informed and official circles, no apprehensions whatever are entertained in this respect. The reports which have for some time past been circulated respecting the state of Ireland, we are now well assured, were, for the most part, erroneous. *No symptoms of discontent have of late been manifested in that country;* the accounts relative to the escape of state prisoners in different parts of the country are wholly unfounded, nor have there been for some time past, any persons of that description in confinement, except at Kilmaham, and a very small number at Cork and Belfast. On the whole, the great body of the people of Ireland are at present attached, *in a remarkable degree,* to the government, and the country in general is *in a far more tranquil and promising state than it has been for many years past.* That there are some disaffected men in Ireland, the dupes of wicked and designing outcasts, our information does not warrant us to deny; but we have the consolation to know, that a very great proportion of the people are actuated by the *most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty;* and that should the enemy ever succeed in reaching the shores of that country, they will find hundreds of thousands ready to repel the aggression, and to turn the attempt to the utter destruction of the aggressors." Now, Sir, I by no means insinuate, that the government of Ireland, though the habeas corpus act is suspended and though the people are liable to martial law, is as severe as the government of Buonaparté. My argument does not require that fact to be established. But, I humbly presume to suppose that it will be granted, that the government of Ireland is somewhat more severe than it was before the habeas corpus act was suspended and before the people were made liable to be tried and adjudged by martial law; if this be granted, and if it be true that the people of Ireland are now "attached to their government in a remarkable degree," and that the "country in general is in a far more tranquil and promising state than it has been for many years past," the people being "actuated by the most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty;" if these two positions are advanced, or admitted, I should be glad to hear the argument

whereon these writers ground their hope of discontents against Napoleon, arising from the severity of his government.—This argument, however, drawn from the experience of Ireland, is, it must be confessed, worth nothing, the radical position being shamefully false; and, I have only introduced it in order to shew how completely destitute these writers are of principles whereon to reason.—A much better argument, against the opinion that Napoleon's government will be disturbed by domestic discontents, presents itself in the general, and, indeed, the natural effect of such governments; and one may safely aver, that the sovereign who has a body of enterprising nobility, whatever be their denomination; a national church, to which ninety-nine hundredths of the people are attached; a numerous, well-disciplined, and well-appointed, army: one may safely aver, that he who has all these at his command, need be under little apprehension from the discontents of the people. "The enemies of tyranny" (said the Oracle newspaper of the 19th ultimo;) "the enemies of tyranny" and oppression will be glad to hear, that "the French nation itself, doomed for some time past to vent its complaints in unavailing murmurs, has at last courage to remonstrate aloud against the usurpation of Buonaparté, whose pride and insolence are intolerable. Talleyrand and Fouché, who may be called his right and left arms, perhaps his very vital principle, have indicated symptoms of dislike, to the will of the tyrant. The armies are also beginning to express sentiments of disaffection. Accounts from Boulogne state, that universal discontent prevails among the troops; that all idea of their embarking for the purpose of invasion has been abandoned; and that the flotilla men are ready to turn against their commanders." Thus, Sir, are the people of this country deceived; thus are duped; thus are their spirits buoyed upon by false hopes, by a reliance upon any thing rather than their own national exertions! Napoleon, supposing the force of his authority alone to be insufficient for the purpose of repressing domestic disturbances, has, in the ruling passion of Frenchmen, and in his inclination and ability to gratify that passion, I mean the love of national glory, means more than quite sufficient to secure, not only the tranquillity of the state, but the hearts of the people. It is not against a renowned military chief that a people rebels; it is not against such a chief that a people murmurs: no, Sir, they murmur and they rebel against rulers of an exactly opposite description. Such a chief may be

tyrannical; but from this cause the great mass of the people will feel not much inconvenience. "To men remote from power" his tyranny will hardly be known; while the glory which his military achievements shed upon the country, will illumine even the meanest hut, and will endear him to every one to whom nature has not denied the capacity of feeling that he has a share in that glory: and, of those who do not so feel, the enmity may be safely despised. Besides, the soft, the silent, the cat-like paw of corruption and of perverted law; the exercise of tyranny under the name, and in the phrases, of justice and liberty, such as I have witnessed in America, for instance, is much more deleterious to society, as well as more grating to the soul of the individual, than the random bolts, the partial blows, of a single despot, which, at least, leave to the sufferer the consolation of being pitied. But, suppose the choice to lie solely between the loss of individual liberty and the loss of the glory of the country, shockingly degraded must be that people who would, for a moment, hesitate to prefer the former. The aversion to upstarts, I grant, is powerful and highly laudable: it has its rise in the most just and noble sentiments of the mind. But, Sir, those who have risen, however suddenly, by deeds of arms, are not upstarts. The term upstart will never be applied to the hero of the Nile. Extraordinary talents, exerted in rendering great public services, whether in the cabinet or the field, are a fair foundation for rank and power. Men exalted by such means may be an object of envy amongst their less meritorious or less fortunate rivals, but the mass of the people will seldom fail to acknowledge the justice of their claims. The upstarts whom good men hate are such as have risen by low and base arts, or who have grown up out of the follies or vices of their particular patrons, or of the government and governing system in general. They have been well denominated mushrooms; for they spring from the rotten part of the state, and the soil that bears them will seldom bear any thing else. Crawling sycophants, labourers in the dirty work of corruption, with all the endless list of jobbers of every description, such as I have seen in America, for instance. Such are the upstarts; men who, having, as it were, stolen fortunes from the public treasure, that is to say from the labour of the people, become, by the means of those fortunes, the possessors of the land, making slaves of those whom they have already pillaged and impoverished: such are the upstarts, whom every honest and honourable man must hate, and to whose sway he can

never submit without impatience. To the arrogance of military chiefs people have an apology for yielding; but, quietly to yield to the inglorious tyranny of tame speculators admits of no excuse. The tyranny of military chiefs is harsh; but it is not humiliating. It does not debase the mind, as well as empty the purse, of the sufferer. Hence it is that we have seen the French submit to almost any thing from their military rulers, while the people whom they have subdued, though they wanted the courage to resist their own cowardly masters, seized the first opportunity for shaking off their authority; as if they had said, 'if we must be slaves, let us submit to those whose power and whose military fame will afford an excuse for our submission.' This, Sir, is a sentiment of a most dangerous tendency, and one which, I trust, the people of this country never will be tempted to adopt. But, at the same time, I cannot but think it full as likely that they should adopt such a sentiment, as that the people of France should now become generally discontented with the government of Napoleon.

Such, Sir, are my reasons for thinking, that, in the prosecution of the present war, there exists no well-founded hope, that we shall, pursuing our present policy, derive any aid from alliances on the Continent, or from discontents amongst the people of France. I beg to be understood, not as having described what *ought* to be the conduct of the continental powers, or of the people of France; but what *will* be their conduct: and, the motive by which I am actuated, is, to convince you, that, tremendous as the conflict will become, we have no reliance but upon our own exertions. What is the prospect of the war, with regard to those exertions, shall be the subject of another letter.—In the mean while, I remain, Sir, your, &c. WM. COBBETT.  
*Duke Street, Dec. 13, 1804.*

#### VOLUNTEERS.

Under the head of SUMMARY OF POLITICS, I had much to say; but the foregoing subject appeared to me more important than any other at this time. An occurrence relative to the Volunteers must not, however, be omitted. It will be found very emphatically described in the following advertisement from the Sun newspaper of the 8th instant.—"Whereas it has been represented to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that a most violent outrage was on the night of the 9th day of October last committed at Marazion, in the County of Cornwall, on Lieut. Andrew Wells, and a party of seamen and marines belonging to his Majesty's ship *Cannett* (who had been

"sent on shore for the purpose of apprehending two deserters), by a number of men, in the whole about thirty, armed with musquets and bayonets, dressed in regimentals, and supposed to belong to the 2d battalion of Mount's Bay Volunteers, who attacked the lieutenant and his party, and compelled them to retreat to their boat, and while in the act of launching the same, in order to get on board their ship, feloniously fired several musquets loaded, at them, the balls from which passed very near the persons of the said lieutenant and his party:—Whoever shall apprehend, or shall give such information to Messrs. George and Samuel John, of Penzance, solicitors, as shall be the means of apprehending any of the persons concerned in so firing off the said musquets at the said lieutenant and his party, or of giving any orders or directions for the same (other than and except the persons who actually fired), so that such offenders, or any of them, may be brought to justice, shall receive a reward of fifty guineas, to be paid on their conviction, by Mr. Bicknell, Solicitor of the Admiralty, Spring garden Terrace, London."

#### STATE OF IRELAND.—LETTER V.

(See the foregoing letters, p. p. 673, 711, 745, 906)

SIR,—There remain two points of view in which the question of Catholic emancipation should be considered, in order that the subject should be fully before your readers. FIRST, the possible effect of it on the security of property in Ireland; and, SECOND, the effect of it, as it relates to the connexion of that country, taken in the sense of a distant country, and Great Britain. The first I propose to make the subject of this letter.—It has always been held by the violent asserters of Protestant ascendancy, that the property which was forfeited at different times in Ireland, and granted or sold by the crown, to Protestants, would be restored to the right heirs, if ever the Catholics were permitted to sit in Parliament. It is not here necessary to analyse the motives of such insinuations: we shall merely confine ourselves to the mode of reasoning, and the facts on which this has been advanced.—It is stated, in proof of this position, that maps are carefully preserved of the forfeited lands, by the descendants of those families from whom they were taken, and that regular conveyances are made thereof, by wills and other legal instruments; and further, that the Irish House of Commons, in the reign of James the Second, repealed the act of settlement, which act confirms the Protestant titles, that the same act would again be re-

pealed if Parliament were opened to the admission of the Catholics.—In refutation of the first part of this argument, we shall deem it sufficient to state, that many of the forfeitures took place in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; those in the province of Ulster in that of James the First; and the remainder in the interval between that reign and the reign of Queen Anne. The latest, therefore, of these forfeitures occurred above 100 years ago, and many of them so long ago as two centuries.—When these facts are added to the consideration of the method of preventing the growth of popery in Ireland, which has been acted upon during the first eighty years of the last century, the exterminating system of warfare with which the Irish rebellions have been opposed, and the extreme difficulty which must have attended the perpetuating of the titles to these forfeited lands during such long periods of time, even from father to son, and the infinite confusion that must arise from any attempt to give back these forfeitures, in all cases where the lineal descent could not be traced out, the impracticability of the restoration of them is very easily made out. But the circumstance, which of all others has contributed to strengthen the titles of the Protestants, is the very first act of concession which the Catholics experienced; namely, the permission to purchase, and to take land on lease in the same manner as the Protestants. This privilege was granted in 1778, and, since that period, the riches of individual Catholics, and the quantity of lands purchased by them, and taken under lease, is so extensive, that they are themselves a body very much interested in the security of the titles under which the Protestants first acquired the forfeited lands. In reply to the argument that is deduced from the conduct of the Irish House of Commons, in the reign of James the Second, it is only necessary to observe, that the recurrence of such a measure is absolutely impossible. There exists no Irish Parliament in which a King of these realms could pack a Catholic majority; but, on the other hand, there exists those laws, and that coronation oath which prohibit the adoption of measures similar to those acted upon by James in Ireland; and, in the place of a Parliament of Ireland, there is a Parliament of the Empire, in which it has already been shewn that no such conjuncture can take place, as the uncontrolled sway of the Catholic body in matters either of spiritual or temporal concern. In confirmation of what is here maintained, we have the opinions of the most violent advocates of Protestant ascendancy, the late Lord Clare and Dr. Duigenan, expressed by them as the grounds of

their assent to the measure of a legislative union. This latter protector of the Catholic penal code, declared in Parliament that the union would secure the right of Protestants in such a manner, as to preclude the possibility of their being assailed by the attacks of the Catholics; and so forcible was the power of this Doctor's reasoning, that it even induced Mr. Addington to quote him as an authority to prove the benefits of the union, as it related to religious controversy. The union, in fact, as it has, in a former letter been stated, is the charter of these rights of the Irish Protestant. It secures, by an express article, the Protestant reformed religion, as the established religion of the country; and it precludes the repeal of the act of settlement, by placing the legislature of Ireland in the hands of an Imperial Parliament.—What is here stated respecting the impracticability of the repeal of this law, will be more fully exemplified by taking into consideration the manner and means, by which, under the existing circumstances, the Catholics could recover the possession of the forfeited lands. They would, in truth, have a no less work to perform than that of bringing about a rebellion, so successful as to expel the authority of Great Britain; for, without such an event they could not dissolve the connexion with Great Britain, which is the security of the titles of Protestants; and, even if they could dissolve the connexion with Great Britain, which is the security of the titles of Protestants, they would then have to acquire the consent of all the Catholic purchasers of landed property, and of all the Catholic tenants, many of whom have interests in their farms greater than those of the actual owners, to such a total revolution in the state of property, which would not only contribute directly to their own ruin, but indirectly to a system of anarchy and confusion greater than the world ever before experienced. Whether, therefore, we examine this argument, which goes to prove the hazard of granting a complete emancipation to the Catholics, as it bears upon the subject of security of property, as to the probability of their attempting to regain their estates, or, as to the means by which they can effect it, there remains not the slightest shadow of sound reason to authorize the most trivial apprehension. Time has worn away the memory of the advantage of enjoying it, successive penal laws have progressively divided and impoverished the successive generations of claimants, and those laws, more particularly the law of union, which have of late years been made concerning the right of acquiring, and the means of preserving property, have placed the restoration of the for-

feited lands far indeed beyond the reach of human attainment, to those who by descent or grant may have a virtual title. Whatever circumstance may have been omitted to be noticed in this attempt to silence the clamours of those, who can bend to seek invidious and weak arguments, to prejudice the cause of the Irish Catholics, will be sufficiently excused by the anxiety which necessarily arises to produce that species of disproof, which alone is in itself adequate to the purpose; namely, the voluntary declaration of the whole Catholic body, as quoted in a former letter, (p. 715) “ We do hereby solemnly disclaim, and for ever renounce all interest in, and title to, all forfeited lands, resulting from any right, or supposed rights, of our ancestors, or any claim, title, or interest therein; nor do we admit any title as foundation of right, which is not established and acknowledged by the laws of the realm, as they now stand.” (Declaration of the Irish Catholics.) Here we have before us the condition, on which the Catholics require their rights; and this condition wisely, voluntarily, and unanimously offered, in anticipation of silly apprehensions, and for the permanent satisfaction of every one whom the active promulgation of these fears might have warped in judgment. Such conduct, surely, should not only quiet all alarms respecting property, but also produce a reciprocal anxiety on the part of the Protestants to remove erroneous impressions, and to promote the great work of universal conciliation. The Catholics, by their mode of proceeding, have displayed their wisdom and their liberality, and the Protestants ought not to permit it to be said, that they have evinced, in return, any thing that can be termed intolerance and folly.—Having discussed, in detail, the nature of the question of security of Irish property, we shall now consider it in a more general point of view, as connected with the Catholic claims. If there is any truth in either one of two common opinions, first, that the rebellions in Ireland originate in the discontents of the Catholics; or, secondly, that acts of concession will prevent the recurrence of them, the security of property will be further strengthened by the emancipation. While the point is contended, whether the measure will or will not lead to future imaginary evils, the existence of rebellion is a present evil, and much more deserving of attention. No man can deny, that internal tranquillity will add to the security and value of property; nor can it well be imagined, that, in a country where three-fourths of the inhabitants are excluded from their constitutional rights, the exclusion does not operate as a standing and

powerful source of every description of tumult, from the frenzy of a mob to that of the violence of an organized rebellion. What is it that renders the market price of lands in Ireland only 20 years purchase, while in Great Britain it is 30 years? What is it that renders Ireland a preferable object of French invasion, and inferior in point of natural defence to Great Britain? What is it that drives away the gentry, and that checks the improvement of land, and the civilization of the people? It is the privation which three millions of people experience of their franchises. It is because they do not enjoy the benefits of *Magna Charta*; and, therefore, cannot be stimulated to exertion in defence of the British connexion, by the same bond of union and fraternity which rouses the people of Great Britain to exertion against every attempt to invade their liberties. Instead, therefore, of the security of property being hazarded by the emancipation, it cannot be said to exist until this measure is adopted; and those short sighted politicians, who refuse it, under apprehensions of future danger, deceive themselves by the darkness of their understandings. If a proprietor of land requires to know what is wanting to raise the value of his estate to 30 years purchase, he must be told, it is the emancipation of the Catholics. If the expelled country gentleman wishes to know what measure will enable him to return in safety to his mansion, his sports, and his society, he must be informed, that this measure is Catholic emancipation. If the Protestants seek a remedy against the miserable state of living in constant fear of becoming the objects of the cruelty and the barbarism of their Catholic fellow subjects and neighbours, it must be explained to them, that this remedy is Catholic emancipation; and, if the minister of Great Britain knows what will best promote his fame, and will adopt that measure which will most certainly preserve the integrity of the British empire, against the hostile attempts of all enemies foreign and domestic, he will adopt the measure of Catholic emancipation. — *Z.* — *Liverpool*, Nov. 25, 1804.

#### REFUSAL OF BANK NOTES.

SIR, — I have perused the letter of your correspondent *Agricola*, Vol. VI. No. 16, p. 586, with attention, and quite agree with him in his legal observations. I approve also of the remedy he proposes, though, I do not think, that in times like the present, a measure which requires so general a display of energy and decision, will be carried into effect. In order, however, to make it as little difficult as the nature of circumstances

will permit, I shall be very glad of your correspondent's opinion upon the following cases. **FIRST:** Suppose I refuse to receive money tendered to me in Bank notes, and bring an action for the debt; the defendant pays the whole sum into court, which I am desirous to take out in order to be allowed my costs. In what manner shall I proceed, so as to obtain payment of both debt and costs in specie? If in this case, I proceed to trial, no costs will be allowed me, because the money paid into court is the whole of my demand, unless the court should think that the debt not being paid into court in specie, was a sufficient reason for proceeding to trial. **SECOND:** Suppose no money is paid into court, and I obtain judgment either after inquiry or verdict and issue execution against the goods of the defendant which I sell. Shall I be justified in selling them at a lower price than they are really worth, (which undoubtedly, I should be obliged to do) in order to obtain payment of my demand in specie? It is true, that I am at liberty to take the person of the defendant, but very often that sort of remedy would be worse than the disease; for I should not only lose the debt and costs, but be obliged to pay the sheriffs poundage, and other expenses to a considerable amount. — I put these questions to your correspondent, because I trust he will be able to answer them in a satisfactory manner; and, because, in all events, I wish them to be answerable. It is not, however, my desire to see your publication made the mere vehicle of practical law; but these questions are so very material to the point in agitation, that I make no apology for troubling you with them. The paper system has now become so general, and its influence is so alarmingly perceptible, that every means should be adopted in order to keep it within reasonable bounds. Formerly, the list of persons, who arose to sudden affluence, was almost solely filled with contractors and jobbers, that harpy tribe which delights to wallow in the blood of armies, and to feed and fatten upon the vitals of mankind. Of them it has been observed, that their palaces rose like exhalations, and their equipages glittered like meteors; but now this sort of hocus pocus work has become so common, that it neither excites our indignation nor surprise. The system of paper-money has so set at nought the once usual and progressive rise to opulence and power, that the man, who yesterday stood behind our chair, shall to day rival and excel in magnificence, splendor, and personal influence the Howards, the Percys, and the Russels; those hereditary repositories of the glory and the renown of the kingdom. Whe-

ther these things are symptomatic of the greatness, or decline, of a nation, he who has observed the course of recent events with attention, will be able to form a conclusion at once correct and sorrowful.—I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. CRITO.

#### MILITARY OFFICERS' PAY.

SIR,—A paragraph having lately appeared in all the daily papers, confidently stating, that a board of general officers had been ordered to assemble, on the subject of increase of pay to the officers of the army; and that the several rates had been actually fixed. You may easily conceive what sensations of joy such intelligence created throughout every rank of the profession, from the ensign to the lieutenant-colonel; the lower ranks indulging the fond hopes of being soon rescued from the constant prospect that stood before them of imprisonment, and the want of the common necessities of life; and the field officers, that they might be placed a little above their present situation of mere existence.—The chagrin and deep disappointment that has succeeded the development of so cruel a fiction, can be very well imagined, and must make every well wisher to his country regret, that that profession which you, Sir, so justly think, in the present political state of Europe, (but particularly of Great Britain), ought to be elevated over every other class of men in the public opinion, should have remained so long and meanly remunerated, as to be absolutely despised by common tradesmen for their abject state of poverty!—Is this a situation, Sir, for the officers of the army to be permitted to remain in, at a period when every thing that is dear to Britons is likely to depend upon the gallant exertions of the regular force.—In the year 1797, the pay of the private soldiers was not only doubled, but they have had, ever since, the very great additional benefit of being supplied with their provisions of animal food and bread, at the low fixed price of sixpence and three half pence per pound, should those articles ever have risen to ten times that sum; so that, in fact, the private soldiers pay has become more than three-fold within six years, when that of the officers has remained *in statu quo* for upwards of sixty, with the exception of one poor shilling per day to the subalterns; what might have caused this sudden effort of unbounded attention and comfort to the soldier, without extending any part to the officers, I shall not attempt to offer an opinion on; but, it is a stubborn fact, that a common mechanic enjoys a greater degree of pecuniary independence than the subalterns, or even captains of the army, and, that an officer, when at last arrived at

the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel, after long and, perhaps, severe service, has merely sufficient to keep the external appearance of poverty from his door, without possessing enough to furnish him with ordinary enjoyments within the reach of his grocer or taylor. Their circumstances have been still farther circumscribed, in proportion to their rank, by the force of an indirect order, which has, for these two or three last years, obliged the field officers to be constantly mounted, and of course put to the expense of keeping, at least, one if not two horses, without any allowance whatever to cover this enormous expense; this reduces a field officer's pay considerably below that of a captain. This hardship has been more severely felt since the period that the field officers' companies were taken from them, by which they not only lost a considerable contingency, but likewise, the field allowances which were attached to companies; which altogether has decreased the field officer's emolument at least sixty pounds per annum; and unfortunately, just at the time that he was made to pay five per cent income tax. By giving this letter a place in your Register, you will very much oblige an old friend to the army in general, with three sons at present in the profession.

A. B.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

PAPAL ALLOCUTION.—*Allocution delivered by his Holiness the Pope to a Secret Consistory addressed on the 29th of October, 1804, previously to his departure from Rome on his journey to France, in order to assist in the Coronation of the Emperor Napoleon.*

(Continued and concluded from p. 892.)

A request of this nature not only in itself affords the clearest proof of his religion and filial reverence to his Holy See, but it has been also accompanied with express declarations, by which the Emperor has informed us of his constant desire to promote the holy faith, to repair the injuries for the preventing of which he has laboured with so much zeal in these flourishing regions.—You therefore see, most venerable brothers, what just and momentous causes we have for undertaking this journey; we are moved not only by the interests of our holy religion, but by gratitude to that powerful Emperor, who has put forth all his authority to cause the Catholic religion to be freely professed: publicly exercised in France; and who has shewn his mind so anxious for increasing the prosperity of that religion.—We have also formed great hope, that having undertaken this journey by his invitation, when we shall speak to him face to face, such things may be effected by his wisdom for the good of the

Catholic Church, which is the only ark of salvation, that we may be able to congratulate ourselves on having perfected the work of our most holy religion. It is not so much on our weak eloquence that we build that hope, as on the grace of him whose unworthy vicegerent we are upon earth, whose grace, when invoked by holy rites, is poured largely into the hearts of princes, who are rightly disposed for receiving the good effects of a sacred ceremony, especially when they are the fathers of their people, solicitous about their eternal salvation, and determined to live and die true sons of the Catholic Church.—For these causes, venerable brethren, following the example of some of our predecessors, who have, for a certain time, left their own abode to visit distant regions to promote the interests of religion, and to gratify those princes who have deserved well of the Church, we undertake the present journey, although the distance, the unfavourable season of the year, our advanced age, and the infirm state of our health, would have otherwise completely deterred us from such a voyage. But we esteem these considerations as nothing, if God will but grant us the prayers of our heart—Nor have those things which should be before our eyes, at all escaped our mind before we formed our serious resolution; but we have seen and considered every thing: in which consideration many difficulties arose, and our conscience was on some of them doubtful and uncertain; but such answers have been returned, and such declarations made by order of the Emperor, that we have been persuaded of the utility of our journey for the good of religion, which is an object. But it is unnecessary to detail in a diffuse harangue, these causes to you, to whom I have already communicated them, and whose opinions (before we undertook a step of such moment) we not only consulted, but to whom, as it was right, we gave the greatest weight.—Not to pass over, however, that which is above all things necessary in important deliberations, well knowing that (according to the saying of Divine Wisdom) the resolutions of mortals are weak and timid, and their foresight doubtful, even of those men who excel most in morals and in piety, and whose speeches rise like incense to the presence of God; we have, therefore, taken care to put up the most earnest prayers to the Father of all Light, that directed by him, we may do that only which is pleasing in his eyes, and which may end in the prosperity and increase of his church.—God is our witness, before whom we have in all humi-

lity poured forth our heart, to whom we have often raised our hands in his Holy Temple, beseeching him to listen to our prayer and help us, that we have proposed to ourselves nothing else than what ought always to be our object; his glory, the interests of the Catholic religion, the salvation of souls, and the discharge of those apostolic functions which have been entrusted to us, unworthy as we are. You also are our witnesses, venerable brethren, to whom, as we assisted at your councils, we wished that every thing should be perfectly known and understood, and to whom we have fully communicated the genuine feelings of our heart. Therefore, when so great an object is likely by divine assistance to be completed, acting as a faithful vicegerent of God our Saviour, we have undertaken that journey, to which we have been prompted by such strong reasons. The Father of all Mercies, will, as we hope, bless our footsteps, and shine on this new epoch of religion, with the fulness of increased glory.—After the example of our predecessors, and particularly the recent example of Pope Pius VI. of revered memory, who made the same resolution when he set out for Vendosme, we inform you, venerable brethren, that we have disposed and ordered every thing, so as that the curia, and the hearing of causes with assistance from this holy seat, shall remain in their present state, until we shall have returned, and, as we have considered in our minds that the necessity of death is imposed upon all, and that the day of our death is uncertain, we have therefore thought it necessary to follow the example of our predecessors, particularly of Pope Pius VI. when he set out for Vendosme, by ordering the pontifical comitia to be held, if God shall please to take us away from this world, during our absence from you.—Lastly, we beg and intreat of you always to retain for me the affection you have hitherto shewn for me, and that in our absence you will commend our soul to the all-powerful God, to our Lord Jesus Christ, to his most glorious Virgin Mother, and to the blessed Apostle Peter, that this journey of ours may be fortunate and prosperous, and that it may end happily. Which if we shall, as we hope, be able to obtain from the author of all good, you, venerable brethren, whom we have always called to share with us in our councils, and in all that concerns us, must have a great share in the common joy, and we shall exult and rejoice in the mercy of the Lord.

"FR. 'Tis all a LIBEL—Paxton, Sir, will say.

"P. Not yet, my Friend! to-morrow 'faith it may;

"And for that very cause I print to-day."—POPE. Epil. to Sat.

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DEFENCE OF MR. PITT.

[The following letter comes, as the reader will at once perceive, from a thorough-paced partisan of Mr. Pitt. It has been drawn forth by my letter to Mr. Pitt upon the subject of the Corn-bill; but it goes occasionally into other matters, and, on many accounts, I think it right to make some comments on most parts of it. With this view the paragraphs are numbered, in order to render a reference to them more easy. The comments will be found under the head of Summary of Politics.]

SIR,—1. You are certainly liberal in admitting, and publishing the observations of those who differ with you, and I believe, that any thing of censure contained in them, would not induce you to be otherwise. I do assure you, that I have often, very often, read your papers with great satisfaction; that I have approved your sentiments on many subjects, and that I have admired the talents you have shewn in expressing them. I have thought your work very useful, in many respects, and I should be sorry to see it sinking in estimation. But, to be open with you, it has of late met with many animadversions unfavourable to it; and I always exceedingly lament the justice of them, when directed against a degree of scurrility and defamation, into which you sometimes descend, and, also, a party spirit, which leads you into unfairness.

2.—It has oftner been said, of late, than used to be the case, that you are not always correct in your observations, as to the truth of them, and that you oppose measures, because you do not like the men. It is within my own knowledge, that you were totally ignorant of every circumstance that concerned Mr. Canning and Lord Hawkesbury; and, though I am not at liberty to enter into the detail, be assured, that it would prove no less honourable to the former, than disgraceful to the latter; and, that the whole conduct of the former, throughout the arrangements that were proposed, on Mr. Pitt's return to office, was most highly creditable, and acknowledged to be so, by the principal persons concerned. You may imagine, therefore, that it is unpleasant to read censures that are unjust, and that prove your entire ignorance of the real state of the case.

3.—With regard to your unfairness in opposing measures, I am disposed to address you in consequence of your observations to Mr. Pitt, in your last Register, on the subject of the Corn Bill. Your object is an attack on *him*, and not on the *bill*; and, though I exceedingly lament that it passed, and feel that it has as yet done mischief only, yet, I must confess, that your observations are futile and unfair, and unworthy of you.

4.—The animal man is naturally, I fear, a rogue, and whatever gives him an opportunity of playing off his tricks is to the bad. The Corn Bill gave a sanction to somewhat of higher prices, and they soon became much higher, than it could intend to authorize; and, I verily believe, that Mr. Pitt's single declaration that the harvest would be deficient, went a great way towards producing a general cry of its being so, and towards raising the prices accordingly. But, assuredly the object of the Corn Bill was to equalise prices in general, and to prevent those distressing variations, which you yourself lamented in a former Register; and, if unluckily it had not passed just on the eve of an harvest, that is not, perhaps, beyond an average crop, it would have had the desired effect, and would have satisfied the farmer that he would always get enough for his corn. If the yield had been as it was last year, it would have been a beneficial measure, for certainly there was every reason to believe, in the spring, that wheat would not fetch £8 a load, and that the farmers would be ruined; and, therefore, it would have been desirable to secure them a fair price from exportation, of such superabundance, as, in that case, we should have had.

5.—Why cavil at the expressions in the report, "expect a supply," and "product of the growth." Surely they are both perfectly intelligible. It is not that the price is to have any thing to do with the seasons, and tempt them to give good expectancy, as your friend would ridiculously represent. But, that by holding out a bonus, we may tempt *men* to grow the corn, and bring it to market, and export the superabundance. And, surely, the product of the growth, is simply the yield after threshing, and you could not possibly apply it fairly to any idea of money to purchase supply.

6.—The great object certainly is to give the farmer a fair profit, year after year. Casual high prices will undoubtedly induce him to continue the growth of as much corn as his lands will bear, and so would a regular fair price; and there is no question, but that the latter would be far more beneficial both to the farmer and to the people. It would be far better for him to have £15 for every load of wheat each year, than it would be for him to have only £8 for two successive years, and £29 the third. He is led, perhaps, into extraordinary expenses by the extraordinary profits, and the 4th year the price may be reduced again to the lowest ratio; every article may have increased, labour, and the value of every commodity in life; an income tax comes upon him, and he would be ruined. To prevent these mischiefs, an equalization of his profits is surely desirable for him, and we had all rather pay a moderate price every year, for bread, than have it at a very cheap rate one year, and at a very dear one another; to say nothing of the other consequences from its advance in price.

7.—A market certainly should always exist, in order to encourage the provision of corn, and after two years of plenty it is evident, from the state of things in the last spring, that the home consumption was not sufficient to make a market; for if we had had a very plentiful harvest this year, corn would hardly have been worth carrying to market at all. From ignorance of what a harvest will turn out, and which cannot be known till housed, every farmer will always grow as much wheat as his lands, in the usual course of cropping, will bear; and though other commodities have been raised from the excessive high prices that they obtained three years ago, they have not since fallen, and therefore, the quantity grown would not, if superabundant, have such desirable effect, and be a sufficient inducement to the farmer to sow the more. A regular settled price would have a much better effect, and go further towards increasing the population, upon your own argument, as it is of course the effect of two or three years easy condition, and is as much checked by a year's scarcity, and high prices, as it is encouraged by a year's abundance and cheapness. I lay it down as certain, that every farmer will grow all the wheat he can, either for the chance of casual high prices, or on expectation of bounty; but if five years of plenty were to succeed each other, he might be discouraged, and to prevent this, it is necessary to hold out the bounty, which *so far* aids the production. It is not intended to

add largely to his profits, only to make them regularly sufficient, and this would stop the progress of the evil of raising rents, and refusing leases; for the landlords have certainly a fair right to the full profit of their estates, yet to raise the rents upon every casual high price, is to perpetuate the mischief of it.

8.—All your friend's reasoning about exportation, appears to me founded upon false premises. Of corn there may be a superabundance, and, then as the home market is too low, a foreign market must be found in order to support the farmer. But of all the other articles he states, we have never a superabundance, and therefore, always a fair price at home, and no need to encourage exportation; and really part of his reasoning is childish, and unworthy the subject, and from the lowness of its value might deserve a bounty to be got rid of.

9.—I do not know at what age you might draw your conclusions about the producing capacity of the land, but you must now surely see, from experience, that two plentiful years give more than sufficient for the supply, and that one scanty year, succeeding them, creates a scarcity, or, at least, exorbitant prices; so that the sustenance requisite, and the productive power do not keep pace with each other. Nor will a bounty make them do so, more or less, nor is the Corn Bill expected to have such effect, by any of the four classes, for whom you provide arguments. It is only intended to prevent prices that are extravagant, either way; to prevent the farmer from being discouraged by such successive years of cheapness, as might give him no profit, and by allowing him a better price at home, maintain a juster equilibrium between consumption and production, when somewhat less of plenty ensues.

10.—I do not think that any farmer enters into the sort of calculation you suggest, about the future price, and the disposal of his land. If it is in turn for wheat, it is sown with wheat; for it is impossible to decide that it may not answer perfectly well, as in the case of this very year, when there is an abundance on hand, and an average crop, and still an enormous price. If the yield is not good, the price will be accordingly high, and if it is good, it is surely desirable that a foreign market should afford a fair price, if our own will not. If he were to reserve the producing capacity as you imagine, he might very probably lose more by keeping it for a plentiful year, than he would by having a moderate price only, in

a regular way, and if a sufficient price were secured to him, he would be always benefited.

11.—You argue as if the difference could be made in a few days, instead of its being the work of nearly fourteen months, to alter the state of plenty or scarcity, and draw a lamentable picture of the effect of exportation, which, as it never could take place, under the circumstances of deficiency at home, but only of superabundance, could never produce any of the consequences you deprecate.

12.—Though I lament that the bill passed, because from accidental circumstances it has been mischievous, yet, I think, it would be unwise to repeal it, until a fair trial of it has been made, on an average of crops, and of its effects, therefore, on the prices.

13.—I must pass over all your arguments, by which you would insinuate, that the measure originated in party politics, or that it had any connexion with the new income tax, as I cannot but consider such arguments wholly unfair to the person, against whom they are used, and wholly unworthy of yourself. The farmer is not benefited by a casual high price, and you are not fair in your conclusion, that Mr. Pitt meant that a high price was favourable to the grower, because he stated that, at one time, it was too low—a medium is the best—for you can hardly seriously suppose, that the value of every article sinks so immediately on the sinking of corn, as to make a low price most advantageous to him. I fear the value of such things as you mention, will never be reasonable again, and hence, more than from an excessive issue of bank paper, which you always suppose to be excessive, is derived the distressing depreciation of money.

14.—The price of labour in this part of the country has been raised a little, since the rise of the value of corn, but by no means as much as in my opinion it ought to have been raised. The labourer ought to live by his hire. It is destructive of his independence that he should not. But the miserable system of rates is now always resorted to, to make up the deficiency between the value of his labour, and the necessary expenditure for the support of his family. In my opinion every farmer should pay his own labourers; but that is not the case; and the consequence is, that every shopkeeper, and person in moderate circumstances, is charged in the rate for their support. The farmer therefore, does not, as you imagine, suffer in proportion to the rise in the price of corn; it is fit he should, and that he should pay,

in proportion to his gains, but he throws it off on others.

15.—It is the fluctuation of prices that induces landlords to withhold leases, but they would be granted for a sufficient term of years, if the average profits of the farmer were better ascertained, and could only be raised, when they would fairly bear an advance.

16.—But the whole system is at present radically bad, for it is my firm belief that there is much iniquity with respect to prices. It is notorious, that corn factors have been ready to buy up throughout the country all the wheat they could procure; and most certainly the country markets are now regulated by the reports from London, and by the state of each other, though at great distances, in a sort of way that never used to be the case. A rider will attend three and four markets on the same day, and it is in vain to deny that speculation has thrown its baleful eyes and hands on the first articles of necessity. The price of the market is not according to a balance between consumption and production, which is sufficiently proved, in my idea, from the extraordinary variations in price, and report, though it may not make actual combination, (which may not be possible,) has yet some effect, by influencing each individual in the supply. It is in this respect that I think the Corn Bill was mischievous, coming upon a harvest that was not generally abundant. But I cannot agree to any one principle, on which you oppose it; and you appear to me to have attributed intended effects to it, which were never thought of at all, on purpose only, to argue against them, and indirectly to attempt to weaken Mr. Pitt's power, by endeavouring to effect the repeal of a measure he carried. You have hatched up mischiefs, that never could arise from it, because it would never operate, when they were possible; you have perverted and misrepresented its purposes and effects, and treated it altogether in a manner unworthy of yourself.

17.—Before I conclude this communication with you, I must beg that you would be cautious in the sentiments you express respecting the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts. Your sentiments have great weight, and I am sorry to see them incline towards the admission of sectaries especially, who are already labouring incessantly to the destruction of the Established Church. You are very little aware of their numbers throughout the country, and of their mischievous influence on the minds of the common people. Those of the most discordant

principles unite for the sake of strengthened opposition, and are always at work. The catholics, I verily believe, are harmless, and the absurdity of some of their doctrines and ceremonies, makes them inefficient. But the presbyterian and independent hate our establishment in church and state, work insidiously on points that do not appear material, debase the minds of common people, and would produce, as formerly, incalculable mischief. I would write to you further on these points, but have already detained you too long, and have not time to add more.—I am, your most humble servant,  
P.—*Hunts Den, 1801.*

#### INCAPACITY OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

##### LETTER VI.

SIR.—The reign of this pious and well-meaning, but weak and unfortunate prince, which our general historians only mark by losses and disgrace abroad, discontent, insurrection, and civil slaughter at home, is one of the most interesting in our ancient annals for the development of the doctrines of our constitution, as it was then understood. It may surprise many to be told, that we may there discover the traces of a just theory, perhaps more scientifically expressed, though not in all respects so consistently and successfully applied, as that which we hold at this day relative to the mixed nature of our government: yet this is certainly true. In the repeated discussions which took place on the means of supplying the deficiency, when the king was himself unable to discharge the functions of the regal office, our ancestors by degrees systematized more and more. While the splendor of the monarchy was overshadowed, they could look more steadily at the objects which stood nearest to it. The question in particular which occasioned these high deliberations, was originally, and hitherto finally settled by them. Indeed it was of very frequent recurrence in different shapes, and at intervals more or less remote; for the single life of Henry the Sixth furnished examples of each sort of personal incapacity in the sovereign, natural and accidental, during infancy, and in consequence of disease. The statesmen of those times, therefore, left posterity little to desire on that score, except that the authentic monuments, which remain to us, had been in some parts fuller, more regular, and exact. Yet such as they are, all the records of all our other parliaments put together do not contain anything worthy of notice in comparison of them. The great oracle of English law,

Sir Edward Coke,\* thought some explanation of the office of Protector a necessary branch of his Institutes; but, to a bare list and short commendation of the principal passages to be found in the rolls of this reign (for even he has not included all) he has only added a solitary reference to Holinshed, for historical information. Sir William Blackstone, in sending us back to him, has given a new sanction to the same authorities, and, in adopting the language of his advice,† has pointed, though perhaps unconsciously, to a peculiar and important doctrine, which they contain.

There must of course be always a greater degree of difficulty and delicacy in ascertaining when the one sort of incapacity begins to exist than the other. The fact, however, once admitted, in the principle of procedure, no distinction seems to have been made. And Sir Edward Coke clearly makes none. Though he professes to speak only of the case, where the king is of tender age, yet he directs our attention to the first protectorate of the Duke of York, as one source of instruction. On the other hand, it has been‡ already hinted, that, when the office was conferred on that prince, the most scrupulous regard was paid to the precedents of the king's infancy. Indeed there is but one circumstance that can be supposed to make any difference between the one case of incapacity and the other; it is, that in the one there cannot be any Prince of Wales, in the other there may; in fact, there was a Prince of Wales in the only instance of that kind, which has ever actually occurred, and may God in his mercy, so often vouchsafed to this country, graciously grant, that no other such ever may occur! But, in that single instance, the prince was an infant in the cradle. Whether, if there had then been a son capable of sustaining the whole weight of the government during the absence of his father, the parliamentary leaders of that day would have determined otherwise than they did

\* 4 Inst. 58.

† That "it is the surest way to have him" (the Protector) made by the *great council* "in parliament." The "*great council*" is, properly speaking, the *peerage*, and this we shall see to have been in the time of Henry the Sixth, a distinct claim of the lords, acknowledged, regarded in practice. Perhaps it was sounder, and founded on a more solid theory, than may, at first sight, be imagined. But that will be for consideration hereafter.

‡ See Letter III. p. 580, of this Volume.

(except as to the share of power which they might have confided to him) may be a question, on which it is possible that some men may reason one way, and some another, from the same declarations and actions. It is not my design to enter upon it here. What I have said was merely by way of caution, that you, Sir, and your readers, might not expect what they assuredly will not find. All that I have undertaken is, to lay faithfully before you and them, what was really done. And this I shall attempt in the natural order, deducing my subject from its origin. Of course I shall intersperse such other more general historical matter as may seem necessary or expedient for the purposes of elucidation and connexion.

The situation in which parliament stood at the accession of Henry the Sixth, was favourable to the establishment of any claim, which the two houses might think it just to advance. Under the two preceding kings, of the line of Lancaster, the power of that assembly had been gradually consolidated and augmented. Henry the Fourth came as the avenger and restorer of parliament, slighted, debased, over-awed, and even surrounded with armed men, by the violent and ill-advised Richard. The defect of his title supplied only by the legislative settlement of the crown on him and his issue, and the many rebellions which were continually starting up against him, compelled him, even if his inclination had leaned the other way, to uphold and strengthen that authority which was the surest support of his own. His son, the victorious Henry the Fifth, pursued the same policy from different motives. Like his illustrious progenitor, Edward the Third, while running the career of military glory and foreign conquest, he was necessarily dependent on those, from whose liberal grants alone he could derive the means of success. The last time that he met them, he submitted to them one of the most undoubted prerogatives of the crown. He presented the Treaty of Troyes for their confirmation, by one article of which he engaged never to make peace with the Dauphin, without the consent of the three estates of the realm. In the mean-time the condition of the commons, individually and collectively, was improved and raised. Slavery among the peasantry began to wear away. Laws from time to time were found, or were supposed, to be necessary for regulating the increasing class of labourers in husbandry. The small freeholders grew proportionably more numerous, and \* the county-elections became

in general what may be fairly called popular. When party ran high at home, the power and influence of the great lords, mutually opposing and opposed, afforded to the inferior gentry and the mass of the electors the opportunity of making either scale preponderate according to their own honest preference. When the great lords and knights were absent in foreign wars, the former could be little consulted in a canvass, and the place of the latter, as candidates, was usurped by esquires and persons of still lower rank, till restraining statutes were passed, which required certain qualifications of property both in the electors and the elected. As a seat in the House of Commons came to be an object of ambition, returns were irregularly and corruptly obtained, and hence new statutes were enacted to keep sheriffs to their impartial discharge of their duty. The duration of parliaments was insensibly lengthened, and the prerogative of continuing the same assembly by prorogations was more frequently exercised. The effect of this was more especially felt in the House of Commons: it rendered them more expert in the science of legislation, so as to enable them to prepare their petitions more nearly in the form of acts; and it cherished in them a sort of corporate spirit, which united them among themselves into a firmer and more powerful body.

From the time that Henry the Fifth first

spect (though at a period a little later) is shewn in a more lively manner by the facts stated in my IVth Letter, p. 804 of this Volume, and the Letter of your Correspondent, a Norfolk Freeholder, (for which I return him my thanks) than in any account of general historians. Upon one of the letters quoted by your correspondent (No. 60, in Vol. III.) Sir John Fenn truly remarks—“ This is a true picture of modern electioneering, and such a letter might be written “ from any county or town in the kingdom “ during the time that a choice for members “ was depending:” and yet, this is clearly the same election, on occasion of which the same editor had before rather hastily asserted the dependence of the House of Commons on the great Lords in those days. The restraining Statutes, whether right or wrong in policy, all go to prove the actual existence of a popular spirit still more early. Such remedies presume the supposed evil to be of adult growth.

\* The parliament in 1407 under Henry the IVth held three sessions, and sat 159 days, between March and December. This was the longest parliament which had ever been known.

\* The real state of the country in this re-

embarked on his expedition against France, the government of this country was \* principally conducted by his two brothers, under the title and with the plenary powers of Guardians of the Realm. This was an ancient and well-known office during the absence of the King, and conveyed a perfect delegation of the royal authority to the extent of enabling the Guardian to summon and meet a parliament in his own name. Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, is said to have governed England in that character, when the King was seized with the fatal disorder which hurried him to an untimely grave. Henry on his death-bed gave the regency of France to the Duke of Bedford, a prince, who to great courage and consummate skill in war added civil prudence and conciliatory manners; the delight of the army, the favourite of the people, the admiration no less than terror of his enemies. To the regency of England he named his youngest brother, the Duke of Gloucester, who had acquitted himself of a similar trust more than once, with care, integrity, and ability, to the general satisfaction.

The Bishop of London had attended his Royal Master abroad, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Normandy. His charge expiring with the King, he delivered up the great seal to the Regent at Rouen, † by advice of the Duke of Exeter, the Earl of March, the Earl of Warwick, and other of the English lords who were present; and also, from necessity, as he afterwards declared, that the course of justice might not suffer any interruption. From the state, perhaps, of the Duchy and France, the validity of this proceeding seems never to have been questioned, and the Duke of Bedford quietly assumed and exercised the Regency.

It was not so at home. As soon as the King's death was ascertained here, Langley, Bishop of Durham, then Chancellor, repaired to Windsor, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Winchester, and others both of the spiritual and temporal lords, and there in the presence of the Duke of Gloucester gave up the Great

\* The King himself, in the last eight years of his reign, held only three parliaments; the Duke of Bedford, as guardian, four; and the Duke of Gloucester, in the same character, one.

† This was his own account to Parliament. See *Rolls*, Vol. IV. 1 H. VI. No. 14. The bishop had also in his custody a duplicate of this great seal of England, which he afterwards gave up at Windsor.

Seal to the infant King.\* Humphrey then took and consigned it to the custody of Simon Gaustede, the Master of the Rolls; whether purposely passing by the late Chancellor as thinking him adverse to his interests, or in consequence of that prelate declining any share in a transaction, which might appear to sanction the Duke's claim to the regency, is uncertain.† Two days after, the same peers with such others as could most readily be collected, met at Westminster, in the Star-Chamber, and there held an irregular sort of great council. Their first care was to continue without intermission the administration of justice. They directed, therefore, new commissions to be made out to the judges, the sheriffs, escheators, and other similar officers of the crown. They next took into their consideration the difficulty which existed, and for a long time must exist, with regard to the exercise of the royal functions; and came to a resolution that the question ought to be referred entire to the common assembly of all the estates of the realm, to provide by their united wisdom, the best mode of government for the person and estate of the King, as well as for the kingdom, in the exigency of their present situation: with which intent they authorised the issuing of the usual writs to summon a Parliament without delay. We are not informed whether the Duke of Gloucester on this occasion brought forward his pretensions; it is probable, however, that he would not pass this opportunity of asserting them, though he might cheerfully concur in the final determination of the council. He had formerly presided on behalf of his late brother during a whole Parliament; he foresaw that no one but himself could be appointed to act for his infant nephew in the ensuing session; and, however tenacious of what he believed to

\* Rymer, Vol. X. p. 253.

† The entry on the *Rolls*, Vol. IV. 1 H. VI. No. 12, whence I have taken what immediately follows, has no mention of the day or place of meeting. But the record just quoted from Rymer, after saying, that Simon Gaustede having received the seal on the 28th, carried it to London, goes on to relate, that on the morrow of the feast of St. Michael (Sep. 30) he sealed various patents in the Star-Chamber at Westminster, in the presence of the Bishop of Durham and other peers. As this record seems to have been made for his discharge, he would hardly have omitted the council, if it sat on the intermediate day.

be his own rights, he was never disposed to treat with disrespect the liberties of the people by whom he was beloved. In fact, therefore, he had anticipated the measure which was advised;\* the writs, which were now sealed, had been prepared and dated on the preceding day at Windsor. From that time, the new Lord Keeper, though by virtue of the appointment which has been related, he was in possession of the office, and was allowed the established salary for it, was not called upon to put the seal to any instrument of great public importance, till the meeting of Parliament approached, when it was indispensable, according to the just notions of that day, that the King, or some representative of the King in his name, should be present to open the session. Accordingly, three days before the meeting, a commission was addressed to the Duke of Gloucester, giving him full power so to appear there, to proceed therein, to do there whatever the King himself ought to do for the good government of the realm, and all the dominions thereunto belonging, and finally, with the assent of the council, to close and dissolve the assembly: in short, it vested in him for one whole session the entire legislative authority of the crown. He presided;† his commission was read; and at his command the Archbishop of Canterbury explained the causes of the summons, which he said were to provide, during the tender age of the King, for the good governance of the royal person, the conservation of internal peace and the due execution of the laws; the security and defence of the kingdom; but avoiding every allusion to a regent, he fixed the attention of the two houses wholly on the choice of a proper council. "It principally imported them," he said, "to provide for the first of the purposes which he had mentioned, some honourable and discreet persons, in which, they all ought to give their best advice; agreeably to the counsel of Jethro to Moses, they should take such as feared God, wise men and religious, hating covetousness, of influence and authority in the state."

\* If the second meeting in Rymer, and that mentioned in the Rolls be the same, as in the preceding note I have supposed them to be, and as I think clear; then what I have assumed above is the most obvious and only admissible way of accounting for the fact that the writs are dated on the 29th from Windsor.

† It is to be found both in Rymer and the Rolls. What follows is from the Rolls.

In conclusion, he desired the Commons to go and elect their speaker. He was presented to the duke and approved by him.

The proceedings which immediately followed relative to Humphrey's claims to the regency of the kingdom, would much exceed the space which you can allot me in your present number. I think it better, therefore, to stop here, than to break off in the middle of them. My next letter will contain the whole of the discussions on the subject of the Protector's power during the King's infancy.—I am, Sir, &c. T. M.

*Middle Temple, Dec. 17, 1804.*

#### WAR OF WORDS.

SIR,—From the style and temper in which some late occurrences have been announced and commented upon, in some of our daily prints, it should seem that we are engaged in a war of words, rather than in a conflict of arms, with our antient and inveterate foe: a method of hostility less deadly no doubt, but not greatly redounding to the national honor and credit; it being easy enough to collect and employ injurious epithets and phrases, in the use of which, we may become as skilful and acrimonious as our neighbours, though we cannot, by such futile weapons, expect to humble their pride or reduce their power. The seizure of Sir George Rumbold's person and papers has been inveighed against as a deed of the deepest malignity and perfidy! a violation of the law of nations most heinous! unheard of! and without precedent! and every odious appellation has, in consequence, been poured upon Buonaparté, its abominable and atrocious author and contriver. The act itself, in truth, is not to be vindicated: it is one in the long list of treacherous and disgusting proceedings, to which the blind acrimony of nations, whether civilized or uncivilized, when at war, too often gives birth; but it is not marked with peculiar novelty or atrocity. The jealous intrigues and subtle enterprizes of one state, occasion similar proceedings to be adopted by another: and you have as little reason to look for an uniform reverence of the person of an ambassador, or an undeviating respect for a neutral territory, as you have to imagine your enemy's artillery should not be pointed against your fortresses lest perchance it should sweep away some of their peaceable inhabitants. If, instead of giving way to these violent ebullitions of wrath and indignation, we were to consult history, we should find that similar transactions have passed again and again, and have found their apology in the policy of the times; in

our own country indeed, and under the House of Brunswick, an example offers itself of as bold and irregular an exertion of power as that of which, in this our day, we so loudly and grievously complain. The History \* states, that in the year 1715, Charles XII. had formed a project to invade England, and was deep engaged in negotiation with the English malcontents. George the First having received from different quarters various information of this conspiracy, on his return from the Continent caused Count Gyllenberg the Swedish ambassador to be arrested in London: and by his requisition, Baron Goertz, the Swedish resident in Holland, was likewise arrested by order of the States-General; their papers were seized and searched, and amongst them were found ample proofs of the suspected machinations. The foreign ministers expressed much astonishment and regret at the proceedings; but Mr. Methuen, the Secretary of State, pleaded the *urgent necessity* which had compelled the King to this measure; and it does not appear that either the king or his minister were on account of it either libelled or stigmatized throughout the rest of Europe. Abusive language is not the weapon by which such unwarrantable an exercise of power is to be restrained. In public as in private affairs, *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo*, is the better maxim: for whether it be the object to coerce or conciliate the enemy, hard blows may possibly effect the one, whereas hard words may prove a serious obstacle to the other.—A. T.—Dec. 12, 1804.

#### CORONATION OF NAPOLEON.

Paris, Dec. 1, 1804.—The Senate, in pursuance of a resolution passed in its sitting of the 26th of Nov., presented itself in a body at eleven o'clock this morning at the Palace of the Thuilleries. Having been introduced into the Chamber of State, they were presented to his Imperial Majesty by his Imperial Highness Prince Joseph, Grand Elector. His Excellency M. Francois (de Neufchateau), the President, addressed his Majesty in the following terms:—

“Sire,—The first attribute of the sovereign power of a people is the right of suffrage specially applied to fundamental laws. It is this that constitutes real citizens. Never has this right been more free, more independent, more certain, nor more legally exercised by any people, than it has been amongst us since the happy 9th of Nov. (18 Brumaire). One plebiscitum placed

the reins of government in your hands for ten years; a second entrusted them to you for life. The French people has now again, for the third time, expressed its will. Three millions five hundred thousand men, dispersed over the surface of an immense territory, have simultaneously voted the Empire hereditary in your Majesty's august family. Their acts of suffrage are contained in 60,000 registers, which have been verified and scrupulously examined. There is not a shadow of doubt either respecting the state, or the number of those who have put forth their voice, neither as to the right of each to give his vote, nor as to the result of this universal suffrage. Thus, then, the senate and people of France unanimously agree that the blood of Buonaparté shall henceforth be the Imperial blood of France; and that the new throne raised for Napoleon, and rendered illustrious by him, shall never cease to be possessed either by the descendants of your Majesty, or by those of the princes, your brothers.—This last testimony of the confidence of the people, and of their just gratitude, ought to be flattering to your Imperial Majesty's heart. It is glorious for a man, who has devoted himself, as you have done, to the welfare of his peers, to learn that his name alone is sufficient to unite such a vast number of men. In this instance, Sire, the voice of the people is the voice of God. No government can be founded on a more indisputable title. The senate, the depository of this title, has passed a resolution to present itself in a body before your Imperial Majesty. It comes to display the joy with which it is penetrated, to offer you the unfeigned tribute of its felicitations, of its respect, of its love, and to applaud itself for the object of this proceeding, in as much as that consummates what it expected from your foresight, to tranquillise the uneasiness of all good Frenchmen, and to conduct into port the bark of the republic.—Yes, Sire, of the republic! This word might wound the ears of an ordinary monarch. Here the word is in its proper place before him, whose genius has enabled us to enjoy the thing in the sense in which it can exist amongst a great people; you have done more than extending the limits of the republic, for you have established it on a solid base. Thanks to the Emperor of the French, the conservative principles of the interests of all, have been introduced into the government of one, and the strength of a monarchy founded in a republic. For forty centuries past, the question, which form of government is best, has been agitated; for forty centuries past the monarchical form of government has been consi-

dered as the *chef d'œuvre* of political wisdom, and the sole secure harbour of the human race. But there was one thing wanted, to unite without risque, the elements of liberty to its unity of power, and the certainty of its succession.—This improvement in the act of governing, is an advance which Napoleon at this moment produces in the social science. He has laid the foundation of representative states; he has not confined his views to their present existence; he has implanted in them the seeds of their future perfection. Whatever is wanted to their completion at first, will grow out of their own progress. It is the honour of the present age; the hope and the model of future ages.—Sire, the first rank amongst the greatest men that have done honour to the earth, is reserved for the founders of Empires. Those, who have ruined them, have enjoyed but a fatal glory; those who have suffered them to fall to ruin, are every where objects of reproach. Honour to those who raise them! They are not only the creators of nations, but they secure their continuance by laws which become the inheritance of futurity. We owe this treasure to your Imperial Majesty; and France proportions the measure of those thanks, which the Conservative Senate now presents to you in its name, to the magnitude of this blessing.—If a pure republic had been possible in France, we cannot doubt that you would have wished to have the honour of establishing it; and if it were possible, we should never be exonerated from the guilt of not having proposed it to a man having power sufficient to realise the idea of it; personally great enough not to need a sceptre, and generous enough to sacrifice his own interests to the interests of his country. Though, like Lycurgus, you should have to banish yourself from that country, which you would have organised, you would not have hesitated. Your profound meditations have been more than once directed to this great problem; but this problem was not to be solved even by your genius.—Superficial minds, struck with the ascendancy which so much success and glory so happily acquired for you over the spirit of the nation, have fancied, that you had it in your power to give it at discretion a popular government or a monarchical regime. There was no medium: not a soul wished for aristocracy in France: but the legislature ought to take men such as they are, and to give them, not the most perfect laws that could be devised, but like Solon, the best they can bear. Though the chisel of a great artist forms at pleasure out of a block of marble either a tripod or a god, the body of a nation cannot be modelled on the

same principle. It is true, Sire, that your life is a tissue of prodigies: but though you might have bent the nature of things and the character of men to such a pitch, as to cast the masses of France once into the mould of democracy, this wonder would have been but a transient illusion: should we have concurred in it, we should only have forged chains for posterity.—When our representatives, placed on the ruins of the throne, believed they could establish a republic, their intentions were pure: before sad experience released them from the enchantment, they sincerely worshipped that delusive phantom which they took for equality. We can speak of an error by which we had been dazzled for a moment.—Alas! who could avoid it? The popular torrent hurried along the most indifferent in spite of themselves.—It is said, that the ancient Persians in order to convince the people of the terrible danger of an abuse of liberty, used to employ a very extraordinary custom: they used to inoculate themselves for a short time with the plague of political bodies. When any of their kings died, five days were spent in anarchy without authority or laws. Licentiousness was neither restrained then nor punished afterwards; they were five days given up to the spirit of vengeance, to excess, to violence, in a word, they were five days of revolution. This proof, it is said, used to make the people return with much joy to submission to their prince.—After fluctuations more terrible than those of a troubled sea, it was thought that an infallible remedy had been discovered for popular convulsions in a polygarchy. The depositing of authority in the hands of many, was better than the absence or the dispersion of this authority: but differing spirits, and opposite wills, could not be included in the same body, as the Manicheans used to place two contrary principles at the head of the universe. The struggle between these two principles would have annihilated France, if the course that has been taken had not been adopted, to return to a more concentrated power.

[To be continued.]

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

Agreeably to the intimation at the head of the present sheet, I here propose to offer some remarks on the letter of my Correspondent P, taking the several points according to the order wherein I find them, with this exception only, that his second paragraph will be taken first, because the first and third paragraphs naturally come under one head.

MR. CANNING AND LORD HAWKESBURY.—My Correspondent charges me

with unfairness of argument, party and personal motives, with misrepresentation and perversity; but, as relating to Mr. Canning and his colleague, Lord Hawkesbury, he scruples not to accuse me, at once, of falsehood; and, though he has the goodness to leave a loop-hole for me by the way of "total ignorance;" yet, the statement must, according to him, still be false; so that, at best, the Register, through my ignorance, is become the propagator of falsehood. He says, (paragraph 2), that it is within his *own knowledge*, that I was totally ignorant of every circumstance that concerned Mr. Canning and Lord Hawkesbury; that he is not at liberty to enter into the detail, but that I may be *assured*, that it would prove no less honourable to the former than disgraceful to the latter; and that, therefore, it is unpleasant to hear censures that are unjust, and that *prove* my entire ignorance of the real state of the case.—I would first beg leave to ask this gentleman, whether, if it be unpleasant to hear unjust censure of others, it can be very pleasant to hear unjust censure of oneself? And, if it cannot be, I think, it will not be denied, that we should be very cautious how we express our censure to the person against whom it is directed, even though we do it anonymously. Whether my Correspondent has acted upon this principle, or whether he has entirely disregarded it, will presently appear.—I have, this writer seems to think, censured Mr. Canning for his conduct in the affair alluded to. What he may consider as censure, I do not know; but my statement respecting Mr. Canning will shew, I think, that, according to the usual acceptation of the word, my *censure* of that gentleman was not, at most, very strong. I stated, in page 783, that "it was said, that Mr. Canning, before he would consent to take office in the present ministry, insisted that Lord Hawkesbury should be removed from the office of 'foreign affairs;' and, I further stated, that this report was, in a great degree, confirmed by what Mr. Canning himself said in the House of Commons, where, on the 18th of June last, thinking it necessary to state the grounds upon which he thought himself justified in joining the new ministry, he said, 'I shall content myself with vindicating my own consistency. I objected to the administration of foreign affairs, and that has been changed.'" Now, I ask any candid man, whether this can, with any propriety, be called *censure* of Mr. Canning. In page 824, the subject was revived, in consequence of the letter of a correspondent, who positively assured me, that

Lord Hawkesbury's conduct had been truly dignified, and that it was Mr. Canning who had acted the submissive part, upon the occasion alluded to. I just observed, that barely asserting this, either to me or to the public, appeared by no means satisfactory. And I said, as upon the former occasion, that the only facts which the world knew were these: that Lord Hawkesbury had been removed from the office of foreign affairs; and that Mr. Canning had publicly said, that he had objected to the administration of that office under Lord Hawkesbury. Was here any censure of Mr. Canning? Upon the report, that Mr. Canning had made Lord Hawkesbury's removal one of the terms of his condescending to join the ministry, I did, indeed, observe, that, in any other times than the present, such a person as Mr. Canning having obtained a similar influence would have been matter of great astonishment; and this observation I now wish to be understood as repeating. But, all this is no *censure* of Mr. Canning. Censure of Mr. Pitt, indeed, might hence be inferred; and as my Correspondent does not allow me to make any statement wherefrom such an inference can possibly be drawn, I may, on this account, have, according to his notions, incurred just blame; but, certainly not on account of censure of Mr. Canning.—I am, however, not quite satisfied with having shown, that I passed no censure upon this gentleman. It is not pleasant to hear oneself reproached with "total ignorance" of any sort, and particularly upon a subject whereon one has taken the liberty to speak to the public. This Correspondent bids me be "assured," that I am totally ignorant upon this subject, and that, though he is not at liberty to enter into any detail, I may venture to state, that the transaction was "not less honourable to Mr. Canning than 'disgraceful' to Lord Hawkesbury." That the gentleman expected his letter to be published, or that he wished it to be, there can be no doubt; and, it will be for the reader to say, whether his treatment of Lord Hawkesbury exhibits any very striking proof of that fairness, which he is so anxious to inculcate with respect to every discussion wherein Mr. Pitt is concerned. But before I proceed to attempt to show, that all the ignorance of this matter does not lie on my side, and that I should not be justified in venturing to make any such statement as that, with which he has furnished me, let me ask, what pretensions he has to such implicit confidence? and whether, from experience, I have not good reason to doubt, I will not say of his vera-

city, but certainly of his memory, or of his judgment? In p. 814 I inserted a former letter of his, in which, by way of answer to a previous statement of mine, that labourer's wages did *not* rise with the price of corn, he said. "Sir, you are *certainly* misinformed with respect to the prices of labour. As provisions become dearer, they will rise without any difficulty. They are *always* kept in proportion to the value of the bushel of corn; and the farmers on the one hand, and the men themselves on the other, take care to raise them and lower them continually." Yet, after having, no longer ago than the month of August last, spoken to me in this confident and dogmatical manner, he, in his present letter acknowledges, (14th paragraph) that, though "labour has been raised a little, it has been *rised* by no means so much as it ought to be." This were a trifle, if he did not, at the time he is thus convicting himself of a palpable error, to give it the mildest term, again call upon me, in a manner equally positive and dogmatical, to prefer his information to my own. But, let us now come at once to the real state of that case, of all the circumstances of which he chooses to regard me, and, perhaps, really thinks me, "totally ignorant;" let me, since he is not at liberty to do it, enter into the detail of the transaction. I do not speak from positive knowledge of the facts; it is evident, indeed, that it is next to impossible that I should have been an eye or ear witness of any thing that has passed between Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Pitt; but, I *have been told* what has passed, what I have been told I seriously declare that I fully believe, and it is as follows: Mr. Canning having, on the 18th of June last, made use of the words above quoted from the Parliamentary Debates (Vol. II. p. 722), Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Mr. Pitt, signifying his displeasure at the conduct of Mr. Canning, and intimating the impossibility of his remaining in office under such a representation as was contained in the public declaration of the latter. Mr. Pitt, in answer, gave to the speech of Mr. Canning a favourable interpretation, and disclaimed any part, either directly or indirectly, in any thing tending to give to the removal of Lord Hawkesbury the appearance of degradation. I will not say positively that a second letter did not pass between them; but, be that as it may, Mr. Pitt came to this decision; that if Lord Hawkesbury still looked upon the offence to be of so serious a nature as to prevent him from continuing in place with Mr.

Canning, the latter should give way, or, in other words, be turned out. Mr. Canning, at the same time, went to Lord Hawkesbury in person, and gave such explanations as were calculated to heal the breach. Finally, Lord Hawkesbury did not insist that Mr. Canning should go out; but, by way of amends to Lord Hawkesbury, it was agreed, that Mr. Pitt should take an opportunity of so speaking, in his place in parliament, as effectually to remove the impression, which Mr. Canning's words were, in the apprehension of his lordship, likely to have given. —Now, whether the transaction, as thus described, be "*honourable* to Mr. Canning" and "*disgraceful* to Lord Hawkesbury," I leave the reader to judge; but, I think, that no reasonable man will pretend, that any thing heretofore said by me about the matter tended to give it a turn *disadvantageous* to Mr. Canning; and I also think, that my correspondent P will not further persist in asserting, that I am so "totally ignorant of every circumstance of the case." —Here I should have dismissed this part of my subject; but my Correspondent has, in going back to the forming of the ministry, thrown out a challenge on the side of Mr. Canning. He says, that Mr. Canning's conduct was most honourable and disinterested from the beginning to the end; and, for proof he refers me to the principal parties concerned. Amongst the many things for which I have to praise God, one is, that I am not so connected or acquainted as to be able to avail myself of this mode of verification. But, I am, as other men are, able to form some sort of judgment from well-known facts, of which, moreover, I have been not an inattentive observer. I did, then, observe, that Mr. Canning was very active in the efforts that were made to turn out the late ministry; that he unequivocally condemned the *men* as well as the measures; that he was one of those who, to all appearance, encouraged the idea of a coalition with Mr. Fox, and I believe he did it, by express words as well as by very significant actions; yet, after all this, we did see Mr. Canning taking a place under a ministry not only very different from the one which he had evidently appeared to wish for, but a ministry of which the very persons whom he had represented as totally unfit to manage the affairs of the country, still made a majority. In justification of this part of his conduct, I have heard pleaded his great obligations and his unalterable attachment to Mr. Pitt; and, with those who think, that self-interest and gratification

ought, by public men, to be preferred to the interests of the country, such a justification will, doubtless, be satisfactory; with me, however, it is by no means satisfactory, especially when I cannot but reflect, that the means of creating the obligations came from the country, and not from the private resources of the person by whom they were conferred.—There are certain other circumstances, too, respecting Mr. Canning, which this friend of his may, perhaps, now think it worth while to enter into some detail in order to clear up. In the month of February last, a pamphlet was published, under the title of “A PLAIN REPLY, &c.” Its object was to reply to the pamphlet entitled “A PLAIN ANSWER,” the author of which was Mr. Long. The Plain Reply has been attributed to Mr. Bragge; and from several circumstances attending it, it is probable that it was written by that gentleman. At any rate, it bears strong internal marks of having come from under the pen, or the dictation, of some one in the confidence at least of the then ministers. Towards the close of this pamphlet we find two very curious passages relative to Mr. Canning. The first relates to that gentleman’s disinterestedness, and is as follows. “Come we now to their” (Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville’s) “dependents. Mr. Huskisson is up to the ears in places and emoluments. Mr. Long has a pension. Mr. Rose enjoys in possession, with reversion to his son, a place more lucrative than the Clerkship of the Pells. Lastly, Mr. Canning *has his place too*; one which, though nominally held during pleasure, has not been taken from him. But this is not all. His numerous relatives are all provided for; and *two sisters of his are actually receiving each £500 a year from his Majesty’s Exchequer*, at a time when half that sum cannot be procured for ladies of rank and high family connexions.” Every just man, every man who reflects on the amount of our taxes, on the more than a million of parish poor, and on the five millions a year collected in poor rates; every such man will ask how the then ministry could justify these grants to Mr. Canning’s family; nor would it be impertinent to inquire into the motive from which Mr. Addington was induced thus to favour that gentleman, to keep him in a place, when it was pretty evident, that he was performing the duties of no place. But, such inquiry does not set aside our right to ask, how Mr. Canning came to keep that place; how he came to hold any thing at the pleasure of Mr. Ad-

dington, and more especially how he came to suffer his sisters to depend, in any degree, upon the bounty of that gentleman, and to expose them, to the effects of a publication such as that from which the fact has been quoted. This pamphlet was published about ten months ago. Upon this part of it I have never heard a word by way of contradiction. I have heard it censured for a want of *liberality*; censure, in my opinion, quite unmerited; for, if the fact be true, it cannot be rendered too notorious; and, if it be false, I hereby offer my pages as a vehicle for the contradiction.—The other passage, above alluded to, closes the pamphlet, and it is well worthy of attention. Mr. Robert Ward, in his pamphlet, published under the signature of “A Member of Parliament,” had said, that Mr. Canning was known, from the moment Mr. Pitt and his colleagues resigned, to have disapproved the choice of their successors; that he protested against it at the time, and had continued his protest ever since. Upon which the Plain Reply asks the following marked and significant question. “Will this same Member of Parliament affirm, that Mr. Canning has, *at no time*, retracted his protest, or repented of his opinion; that he has never shown a disposition to take office under Mr. Addington?” This question has never been answered either by Mr. Robert Ward or by any body else; and, I have heard, and I sincerely believe, that Mr. Addington would not find it difficult to prove, that, by some means or other, he had nearly subdued the disapprobation of Mr. Canning; and that, at one particular time, he had, by some measure of wisdom without doubt, so far reconciled his administration to Mr. Canning, that that gentleman did actually condescend to signify his willingness to take a place in it.—Here I close this part of the subject, hoping that my correspondent P. will speedily avail himself of the opportunity that I offer him of presenting the public with the explanations that he may think necessary, relative to the new matter, which his letter has induced me to bring forward.

**LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.**—In the 1st and 3d paragraphs of his letter my correspondent P. expresses his disapprobation of the manner, in which, “of late” (since Mr. Pitt became minister, I suppose) the Register has been conducted. He did esteem it, and found much in it to admire (I dare say that was when Mr. Addington was in office), and would be sorry to see it sinking in estimation; but, he has, “of late,” heard

many animadversions on it, and has been compelled to acknowledge their justice, when directed against a degree of "scurrillity and defamation," to which, he says I sometimes descend. — If I were to call upon this gentleman, this partisan of Mr. Pitt and his "young friends," to put his finger upon a scurrilous passage in this sixth volume of the Register, for instance, I think he would be very much puzzled to find it out; and, as to Mr. Pitt, round whose person he wishes to draw a robe of sanctity, I defy him to find, from my pen, one single phrase, which, by any possible contortion, can be styled scurrilous. "Defamation!" Why to defame is to libel; and to libel is to commit a crime! This gentleman pretends to think me wanting in point of fairness and liberality; but his evident expectation that I should publish his letter, fully proves that he, at bottom, entertains an exactly opposite opinion of me. — As he has not thought proper to point out any part of the Register other than that upon which he was immediately commenting, we must gather his principles upon the subject of the liberty of the press from what he has here pointed out as objectionable. — He complains, that my "object is an attack on *Mr. Pitt*, and not on the *corn-bill*." And, I must first of all beg the reader to remember, that it is a friend and admirer of Mr. Canning who complains of this; of that Mr. Canning, who cried, "away with the measures and give us the men!" Oh! his friend will say, but the men, at that time, were different from the present men. In short, Mr. Pitt was not then minister. — But, must not a person, who had read the whole of my letter to Mr. Pitt upon the corn-bill, have obtained a pretty complete mastery over truth, or over his senses, before he could bring himself to assert, that the object of my attack was "*not* the corn-bill?" He says, that my observations are futile and unfair, and that he cannot agree to any one principle, upon which I have argued against the bill. This may be; but I have argued against the bill; the arguments are against the bill, and *not* against Mr. Pitt, whose motives for supporting the bill are not at all discussed; but, on the contrary, who is, in some degree, defended against the charge of party motives contained in the suggestion of the Edinburgh Reviewers. This partisan of Mr. Pitt "feels" that the bill has done mischief; he exceedingly laments that it passed; and yet he will not believe that it could be the real object of my attack. I must, he thinks, and indeed he says it, be actuated by a party spi-

rit — Without asking him what spirit he is actuated by, I should like to hear what are his notions about parties. Does he think, that there ought to be no parties? When Mr. Pitt is seated at the Treasury, perhaps, he does; but, it is evident, that he thought parties very useful in turning out Mr. Pitt's predecessor. If he allows, that parties ought to exist, they must consist of men, and those men must, in some degree, be actuated by a party spirit. This spirit ought certainly to be regulated by some public principle. The good of the country ought never to be lost sight of; but, neither ought the predominance of the party ever to be lost sight of; because, by that predominance the good of the country is proposed to be promoted by every true party-man. He who makes his own influence in the party, or in the country, his main object, is no party man; he is a selfish man, and will always be found ready to leave, or to join, any side or any set, if his own private views can thereby be served. A writer on public measures has, therefore, two duties to perform, the one is to represent the measure in its true light; the other, to make his representation conducive to his general purpose of supporting the party whose predominance he regards as useful to the country, and sometimes, as in the present case, necessary to its safety and its independence. To rail, therefore, against party-motives, discovers a want of consideration. If there are parties, men must, in a certain degree, act from party motives in the discussion of every public measure; and, there is no way of preventing this but by putting an end to all parties, which, Mr. Pitt being again in place, I dare say my Correspondent would be very glad to do. — But, his doctrine, when we consider it as coming under the head of *libels* is of a monstrous nature indeed. You attack the Corn Bill in appearance, says he, but your real object of attack is Mr. Pitt: you attack the Corn Bill directly, but Mr. Pitt indirectly: you wish to cause the bill to be repealed, but this is for the purpose of annoying Mr. Pitt: you are endeavouring to "*weaken Mr. Pitt's power*" by effecting the repeal of a measure he carried!" From the conclusion that this directly points to there is but one step to downright literal gagging; and, according to my motto, if notions like these were to prevail, this must be nearly the last day on which any man would dare to move his pen or to open his lips, upon the subject of public men or public measures. Mark well his notion about "*weakening the power of the minister*" by causing the re-

peal of a law which he carried ! Laws, be they what they will, must, then, exist : you must not call for their repeal : you must not even endeavour to show the wisdom or the necessity of repealing them, lest you should thereby weaken the power of the minister ; and the minister is, of course, justified in resisting such endeavours, and in persevering in every law, however calamitous its consequences ! Perhaps this gentleman would be disposed to allow members of parliament, being in their places, to speak against the Corn Bill. He makes no such exception, indeed, nor does his principle admit of it ; for, every endeavour, wherever and however made, to cause a law to be repealed, is, according to him, an endeavour to weaken the power of the minister, by whom the law has been carried. Still, supposing, however, that he meant to make this exception, he destroys the press, as far as relates to the measures of ministers of state, and away goes that famous palladium of British freedom — “ Attack the measure, and not the man.” This is the old cant. But, how are you to separate the measure from the man ? How are you to discuss the former, I do not say freely, but at all, without discussing the conduct of the latter, and without affecting (if your discussion has any effect) his character as a statesman, and his interest of course ? By endeavouring to show that the measure is weak or wicked, you are almost of necessity, endeavouring to show the weakness or wickedness of its contriver and supporter ; and, according to this new-fangled doctrine, your crime is in a direct proportion to the success of your efforts, and the paradox of Lord Mansfield becomes a plain fact : “ the greater the truth, the greater the libel.” This writer does not charge me with a direct attack upon Mr. Pitt : “ you attack him indirectly,” says he, “ through his measure.” And this is “ defamation,” because it tends to “ weaken his power,” and, consequently to drive him from his place ! Did I ever expect to hear, not the people of England, not any class of politicians or persons in England ; did I ever expect, could I ever have expected, to hear one single man in England seriously hold language like this ? Every thing bearing any affinity to freedom of discussion or of opinion, falls prostrate before a doctrine like this ; and, could it prevail, I know of no description of beings that walk upon two legs, who ought to envy us our lot, which would be beyond all comparison worse than that of those Frenchmen, whom, in this respect, we affect to despise ; because they are not amused with the name of liberty of the press. There is no possible

extent to which this doctrine would not reach. On the subject of the Volunteer System, for instance, I think myself a much better judge than Mr. Pitt. I know more of the training of soldiers ; more of their tempers and manners ; more of their feelings and motives in all their various situations ; more of the organization, the economy and discipline of a battalion ; not only more of all this than Mr. Pitt now knows, but more than he ever can know as long as he lives, if he lives for forty years longer, and continues with his corps all the time. Yet, because he has chosen to clothe himself in scarlet, to gird his waist with a sash, to hang a sword upon his thigh, to put a cockade in his hat, and call himself a colonel, I am to hold my tongue, or, at least, am to wag it only in approbation of his military schemes, though exactly contrary to the evidence of my senses, lest, by speaking my mind, I should “ weaken his power,” and thereby possibly hasten the loss of his place. If, during the administration of Mr. Pitt, I show that the nation has declined ; that the liberties of the people have been greatly abridged ; that the poor rates have been more than doubled ; that confidence has been destroyed between landlord and tenant ; that the only effectual check upon the Bank has been removed ; that the country has been inundated with paper, while gold and silver have disappeared ; that paper notes down to the amount of a few shillings in England, and so low as sixpence in Ireland, are in circulation ; that the country has been degraded in the eyes of the world ; that she has abandoned her allies ; that she has abandoned even her own honours won by our fathers ; that her enemy has been exalted above her ; and that she is now trembling on the verge of destruction ; if I say this, I am, according to this new doctrine, guilty of a heinous offence, but, if I *prove* it, there are not in the world means sufficient to inflict on me torments adequate to my deserts.—And, as to the time, too ; does this gentleman think, that the most effectual way of rousing the people to exertions and sacrifices in defence of the constitution, is, to render it not worth defending ? Those who thought with me, that rigorous measures and laws were necessary to preserve the country from the contagion of French anarchy, ought, one would imagine, now to think with me, that such measures and laws are no longer necessary ; but, on the contrary, that we should be upon our guard against French despotism ; for, I see no reason, that the latter should not be catching as well as the

former. A ministerial writer of yesterday does, indeed, seem to apprehend some danger from the successful example of Napoleon. "Could we hope," says he, "that the example would operate to still the workings of sedition, to stop the progress of innovation and visionary theory amongst nations, there would be some consolation for that mass of horror which the contemplation of this odious revolution presents. But, we can scarcely flatter ourselves with the hope of so happy an event. Bad men, on the contrary, will be emboldened by the success of Buonaparté; and they will, we fear, find a sufficient number amongst the ignorant to become their tools." According to this notion, there is no hope left. We are doomed to everlasting apprehensions. We never can think of returning to the state in which we were previous to the French revolution. Notwithstanding that the malignant mischief has now spent its force; though liberty and equality, democracy and atheism, have been fairly and fully tried; though they have been cast aside as the greatest of national curses; though the Chief of France is again become a monarch; though the legislative body, in the name of the French people, have declared and solemnly proclaimed to the world, that "hereditary monarchy is the only system of government under which a nation can be happy and great;" notwithstanding all this, the ministerial writer sees cause for alarm! He has now found out, that there are "bad men," who may be on the side of monarchy; who may be "emboldened by the success of Buonaparté," and who will "always find a sufficient number amongst the ignorant to become their partisans." If we can have any hope left after this it is not, I think, reasonable to build it upon the effect of rigorous measures of any sort, especially rigorous measures with regard to the press; for the effect of such measures must be to favour the views of those "bad men," if any such should arise. We have heard enough of the tyranny exercised over the press in France: it is one of the things that would make men dread subjugation: would it be wise, then, to act upon the principle of my correspondent? for, it would be very easy to show, that the name of liberty of the press, without the full power of censuring the public conduct of public men, would be a mere mockery; that it would be a means of sheltering instead of exposing the follies and crimes of a minister; and, that the people, placing much reliance upon its watchful-

ness and protection, would, in reality, be enslaved by the "palladium of free-men!" There can be no doubt that such a state of things would be much more vexatious as well as more disgraceful to the people, than the state of things now existing in France, or any where else where nothing can be published without the express permission of the government; because, in this latter case there is no mockery; no pretension to liberty of the press; the ruler or rulers frankly say, that they cannot, or will not, allow of such liberty; and, of course, the people are not deceived; they do not look to the press for information as to the conduct of their ministers, and are not thereby deceived; they judge for themselves, and they are, for the want of a free press, led to seek for information and for redress through other means; and, if they derive no advantage from the press neither do their rulers, whose follies or crimes are not at all sheltered by it, because, it being known not to be free, nobody places any reliance on what it says. This is fair on both sides; but, to pretend that the nation enjoys the liberty of the press, and, at the same time to punish men, as my correspondent appears to wish, for exposing the weakness or wickedness of ministers, would be a most cruel mockery. And, whatever he may think of it, the effect certainly would not be to discourage the hopes of those "bad men," who might be emboldened by the success of Napoleon; for, if his doctrine were acted upon, if men were dragged to jail for exposing the weakness or wickedness of public measures, and, of course, the weakness or wickedness of public men, would they not begin to ask, how any change could possibly make their situation worse? Let him recollect, too, that, by such means, men might be led to desire a change, that would, as to the mere quantum of suffering or privation, render their situation *even worse* than previous to the change; for, it must not be forgotten, that, upon such occasions, resentment is but too often a very powerful motive; and, when we reflect on the number of instances, in which every one of us has, at some time or other, gratified his resentment to the clearly-foreseen injury of his interest, we shall cease to be surprised at the readiness, with which the people of Europe have submitted to the arms of the French; and, we shall be very cautious how we listen to doctrine like that of my correspondent, which, if brought into practice, could not fail to excite resentment inextinguishable in the breast of every man whose attachment is valuable to the state.—As this correspon-

dent is so sturdy a partisan of Mr. Canning, I may, upon a future occasion, give a few specimens of the manner, in which that gentleman conducted a political publication; a publication which the Editor may now wish to be *forgotten*, perhaps, and, to say the truth, that wish is not far from being accomplished. It may be thought cruel to revive, for a moment, the work here alluded to; but, let Mr. Canning's friends, then, be more tolerant; let them forbear to accuse every opponent of Mr. Pitt of "scurrility and defamation."—Here would have followed some remarks upon what my correspondent has said relative to the Corn-bill, and the Test-laws; but they must be postponed till my next.

#### PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES.—

This is a subject, upon which it would have been perfectly proper for all the public prints to have observed strict silence. Such a line of conduct would have shewn real respect of His Majesty and the royal family; but it has been broken through. The ministerial prints have, as usual, begun to exert their efforts to prepossess the public mind, as to the point in dispute, and even to give a party turn to the motives whence the opposition to the minister's wishes proceed. This has been done particularly in the *SUN* newspaper of the 21st instant. It, therefore, becomes me to endeavour to lay before my readers a true statement of the case; first premising, that I regard, as the constitution teaches me, the minister, and not the King, as the person to whom the proposed measure is to be ascribed.—The *Courier* (a paper now as furiously ministerial as it was formerly Robespierrean) has published a narrative of the dispute, and I believe it to be tolerably correct. From this narrative, it appears, that the measure proposed, is, to place the Princess Charlotte of Wales under the care of the King, leaving it to his Majesty to appoint persons to attend to her education; that, to this measure the Prince objects; that the Princess Charlotte of Wales is at Carleton House; and that Lord Moira has been sent for from Scotland (he has now arrived) by Mr. Pitt, in order to assist in settling the dispute.—Here the subject ought to have rested, till something had been settled; but, the ministerial papers, as if forewarned as to the result, have with more art than one would be inclined to ascribe to their editors, thrown out such hints and insinuations as appear to have no other object than that of drawing the people into an error, and of committing

them unawares on the side of the minister.—The subject, whenever it shall come to be discussed (if, unhappily it must be discussed at all), will divide itself into two distinct questions, one of *law*, the other of *expediency*. The question of law has been thus anticipated by the ministerial newspapers, particularly the *Morning Post* of the 20th instant. "In consequence of the reports which have for some days prevailed, respecting supposed differences in a high and illustrious family, upon the subject of the education and care of a minor branch of it, we deem it not improper to state, that in 1718, upon a question referred to all the Judges by King George the First, it was resolved, by the opinion of ten against the other two, that the education and care of all the King's grand-children, while minors, did belong of right to his Majesty, as King of the realm, during their father's life." This statement, though true in itself, must, according to the rules of sound morality, be considered as a criminal falsehood; because it keeps out of sight *a part of the truth*. The question here spoken of, in the reign of George I. was referred to the twelve judges in *their chamber*. There was no discussion in public; no decision of either House of Parliament; nothing in the way of trial even before the judges themselves, but the question merely put to them, in private, by the King, they being fully apprized before-hand of the King's wishes upon the subject. And, observe, that we are told, the question was decided by the judges, *ten against two*. So it was; but, the two accompanied their decision with the most cogent arguments in favour of the Prince's claim; whereas the ten gave no reasons at all.—The decision of the twelve judges, supposing them to have been unanimous, was not *law*. The question still remained for legal discussion. The decision afforded authority; but it was authority unsupported by argument, against authority supported by argument. In this state the question has descended to us; and, for the present, I shall content myself with saying, that, as to precedents, they are clearly in favour of the Prince; that, as far as I am able to judge, the law is, as to every point, decidedly with him; and, I will just add, that, with regard to the question of *expediency*, I do hope that the partisans of the minister, if they have not too much decency, will, at least, have too much prudence to force it forward for discussion.

*"In short, it appears by no means improbable, that, when the nation shall become heartily weary of this lingering war, and when to that we ariness shall be added the discontent arising from the high price of provisions, we shall be transferred again to the care of the Adingtons, who, whatever may be thought to the contrary, will never be found in an opposition to the present ministry."*—POLITICAL REGISTER, 18th August, 1804.

1027.] [1028

## TO THE READER.

Owing to an error of the PRINTER, the preceding sheet was *paged* wrong. It begins with p, 995, instead of 961; so that there is, in the paging, a chasm of 34 pages. This erratum is thus conspicuously inserted to prevent the trouble which readers might otherwise experience from supposing there to be a chasm in the work.

## PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES.

This subject, notwithstanding the extreme delicacy of it, continues to be forced forward by the ministerial prints, and, in some instances, in a manner that it would be almost criminal not to animadvert upon. As was before observed, great pains have been taken to prepossess the public mind; to commit the people on the side of the minister; but, it was hardly to be imagined, that there would have appeared publications of so indecent a nature as that of the following one, taken from the ministerial paper, *THE OBSERVER*, of the 23d instant.—“A question respecting the guardianship of the Princess Charlotte, has very *indecorously* become the subject of newspaper discussion.—The high respect and duty which we owe to all the parties at issue, makes us lament the existence of any difference amongst them, or that their private feelings and conduct should be exposed to the rude arbitrament of public opinion. The desire of each is unquestionably the happiness and advantage of the innocent and interesting object of contention: the disposition and obligation to discharge the important duty claimed by each, is, no doubt, alike in all, and the question thus becomes narrowed to the consideration of who is legally entitled to a preference.—Lord Thurlow, and other high authorities, are stated to have declared that the law, strengthened by recent precedents, decidedly places this illustrious infant under the immediate guardianship of his Majesty, who, it is added, is induced to press his right by an apprehension that if her Royal Highness remains under her *present control*, she may ultimately become *subject to, and contaminated by, the same*

*calamitous ascendancy* which has been so fatal to the happiness of her parents. But it, surely, cannot become a question *whether the amiable Princess of Wales or Mrs. Fitzherbert is the most eligible preceptress of the infant Princess*; nor can we for an instant question the solicitude of the Prince to guard the religion and the *virtue* of his child from the influence of an *example hostile to both*. We must, therefore, refer the matter to the question of law, and content ourselves with the hope, that the decision will be marked by equity, and contribute to the advantage of the Royal Infant, whose happiness now so powerfully interests the empire, and whose conduct may influence its destinies.”\*—The *decorousness* of this writer will, doubtless, need no illustration! The pressing of Lord Thurlow into the service is most scandalously impudent; but, this is an earnest of what we may expect: it is a pretty strong assurance, that the prints on that side are determined to stick at nothing. The apprehension, by no means equivocally expressed, that, if, the Princess Charlotte of Wales remain under the control of her Royal Father, she will become *contaminated*, is something so outrageous that words cannot be found sufficiently strong to express a proper degree of abhorrence at it. The question, as stated in the next sentence, is a gross and shameful misrepresentation of the fact, and of this it is hardly possible that the writer could have

\* The party to which this print belongs, is sufficiently indicated in the following paragraph, which stands immediately below the one above quoted:—“Lord Melville, according to the rumours of the day, is to succeed Lord Harrowby at the foreign office; the reported change is imputed to an apprehension that his lordship's health is such as will not, for some time, admit of his resuming the important duties of his station. Lord Melville, from his intelligence, activity, and official habits, *would do honour to any department*, but the Admiralty is, perhaps, that which, of all others, most requires his attention and superintendence.”

been ignorant.—Leaving this publication to that general abhorrence, which it so well merits, and which, I trust, it will meet with, I shall now lay before my readers those opinions of the twelve Judges upon this subject, which opinions were alluded to in the preceding sheet of this work.—Before I do this, however, there are two points upon which it appears necessary to say a few words. The first relates to the *origin* of the proposed measure. The ministerial writers, for reasons too evident to need stating, choose to represent the desire of withdrawing the infant Princess from the care of her Royal Father as having originated *with His Majesty*. This is their constant practice, when they have to defend any measure, the defence of which they find difficult. Every one must remember how liberally they blamed the King for the obstacles which were thrown in the way of the forming of a broad administration in the month of May last; though, since that time, they have congratulated the country, that such an administration was *not* formed. But, if there be, in our constitution, one maxim more indisputable than any other, it is, that the King *can do no wrong*. Out of this maxim arises another not less indisputable; to wit; that the King's minister is responsible for every measure adopted and enforced in the King's name. It is this, indeed, and this alone, that constitutes the essential difference between an absolute, and a limited monarchy; there being, in the former, no responsibility at all. The application is too evident to need pointing out: but, the proposed measure is, even in form, a measure of the cabinet; it cannot be otherwise regarded; and, therefore, the attempts that have been made, by the ministerial prints, to represent it as arising *solely* from the desire or will of the King, is, to say the least of it, daringly unconstitutional...—The other point relates to the *competence* of the twelve Judges in this case. They certainly were fully competent to advise His Majesty King George I. to give him their opinion as to any question of law; but, I repeat, that such opinion, so given, is *not law*; and, as there was a difference of opinion amongst the Judges themselves, we are to judge between them according to the arguments advanced by each side respectively. The opinion submitted to the King by the ten Judges was accompanied with no argument or authority in support of it; that of the two was, as will be seen, accompanied with very cogent arguments. In the chamber conference, however, *all* the Judges spoke upon the subject; and, by one of the ten, Mr. Baron FORTESQUE ALAND, a re-

port of all the speeches has been given. It would be quite useless to copy the whole of them; but, it would not be fair to lay before the public the arguments of the two dissentient Judges, without, at the same time, laying before them that of Mr. Baron FORTESQUE ALAND, whose speech, having been written out at leisure by himself, contains, as may be readily conceived, every argument of any weight, in favour of the claim of the King.—Of FORTESQUE ALAND's accuracy in point of historical statement, there is a pretty good specimen in his argument drawn from the articles of impeachment against the Duke of Suffolk, in the 28th year of Henry VI. He says, that the Prince of Wales was "then living;" but, any one may satisfy himself, that the Prince of Wales was *not born* till between three and four years after the impeachment of Suffolk.—As a specimen of the arguments advanced by the other nine concurring Judges, take that of Mr. Baron MONTAGUE, who had found, "in the sole patent for the *making of cards*," "that the King was called *patrens patriæ*," "*et custos regni, et pater familias totius regni*;" and hence he concluded, that the King had the authority of a *father* over the children of the Prince of Wales! How desperate must have been the case, in support of which an argument like this was seriously urged!—But, the ten Judges, do indeed, by the mouth of FORTESQUE ALAND, completely stultify themselves at the very out-set, by declaring, that the question, upon which they are called on to decide, "*is too great to be governed by the narrow rules of private party*;" that is to say, that it is *not* a question of *law*, but a great question of *state*; and, of course, that they, as the twelve Judges of England, were no more competent to decide it than any other twelve men, and, perhaps, less competent than any other twelve men of sense and learning.—With these few introductory observations, I should now leave the reader to the perusal of the documents themselves; but, an expression or two that has dropped, in some of the public prints, relative to the state of *dependence*, in which the Judges appear to be supposed to be held, at the epoch referred to, demands a few words. The advocates of the minister and of his proposed measure, seem willing to concede to us, that the Judges of England were not so independent of the King (or rather of the minister) in the reign of George I. as they are at this time; but truth will not suffer us to accept of the concession. We have been taught to repeat by rote, that his present Majesty, upon coming to the throne, released the Judges

from their dependent state. The phrase is, "that he nobly resolved to render the Judges independent even of himself." The measure, be it what it would, was the minister's, and not the King's; and, I think, it will be found, that it was by no means such as to merit the pompous eulogia that have been bestowed on it. Nothing is more common than to hear people say, and, indeed, it is generally believed, that, until his present Majesty came to the throne, the Judges held their commissions *during pleasure*. This is, nevertheless, a gross error. Previous to 13 William III. the commissions of the Judges were held during pleasure; but, *then* it was that the tenure was changed; and it was enacted, that they should in future hold their commissions *during good behaviour*, just as they hold them to this day. The alteration which was made in the 1st year of the present reign, as to these commissions, was simply this: the Judges' commissions, like all other commissions, ceased with the demise of the Crown, and, of course, the successor could refuse to renew them, if he thought proper. The prerogative, however, never had, I believe, been exercised in this ungracious way: his Majesty, upon coming to the throne, had renewed the commissions granted by his Royal Grandfather: if, therefore, the new law was effective in any way whatever, its effect could not be to render the Judges more independent of *himself* than they were before, and the only purpose it could possibly answer seems to be that of rendering his Judges more independent than they otherwise would have been of *his predecessor*.—Whether the new regulation were a wise one, or not; whether it were better calculated for the obtaining of transient ministerial popularity, than for perpetuating the principles and securing the permanent interests of the monarchy, are questions which we are not called upon now to discuss; it being quite enough for our present purpose to have shown, that, at the time when the question relative to the King's right of custody and education of the children of the Heir Apparent was submitted to the twelve Judges, those Judges were just as independent of the King, as the twelve Judges of this day are of his present Majesty.

OPINION OF THE JUDGES UPON THE QUESTION HEREAFTER STATED, AND WHICH QUESTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THEM IN THE REIGN OF GEORGE I., AND ON THE 22D OF JANUARY, 1717.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty.—"May it please your Majesty.—In humble obedience to your Majesty's commands, sig-

nified to us by the right honourable the Lord Chancellor, requiring the opinion of all your Majesty's Judges upon the following question, viz. "Whether the education and the care of the persons of his Majesty's grand children now in England, and of Prince Frederick, eldest son of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, when his Majesty shall think fit to cause him to come into England, and the ordering the place of their abode, and appointing their governors and governesses, and other instructors, attendants, and servants, and the care and approbation of their marriages, when grown up, belongs of right to his Majesty as King of this Realm, or not?"

—We whose names are hereunto subscribed, being ten of your Majesty's Judges, together with the other two Judges, having taken the same into consideration, and after the most diligent search that we could in this time make into acts and proceedings of Parliament, treaties, public instruments and records, histories and law books, and consideration of the powers and prerogatives which from time to time, in very many instances, have been exercised and owned to belong to your Majesty's royal ancestors and predecessors, with relation to the marriages and care of the persons of the branches of the Royal Family, and of the great concern of the whole kingdom in so important a trust, and after having, pursuant to your Majesty's farther command, signified in like manner to us, heard a learned Serjeant at Law, who, by the command of his Royal Highness, laid before us several things relating to the question aforesaid; and after conferences and deliberations upon all the matters aforesaid, and what occurred to us and the other Judges thereupon, we are humbly of opinion, that the education and the care of the persons of your Majesty's grand children now in England, and of Prince Frederick, eldest son of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, when your Majesty shall think fit to cause him to come into England, and the ordering the place of their abode, and appointing their governors and their governesses, and other instructors, attendants and servants, and the care and approbation of their marriages when grown up, do belong of right to your Majesty, as King of this realm.—All which we most humbly submit to your Royal Majesty's great wisdom.

(Signed)

PARKER.	R. TRACY.
P. KING.	R. DORMER.
T. BURY.	J. PRATT.
L. BOWYS.	J. MONTAGUE.
J. ELENCOE.	FORTESCUE, A."

MR. BARON PRICE AND MR. JUSTICE  
EYRE'S OPINION UPON THE PRINCE'S  
CASE, FEB. 1, 1717.

*To the King's Most Excellent Majesty.*—  
“May it please your Majesty.—In humble obedience to your Majesty's commands, signified to your Judges by the right honourable the Lord Chancellor, we have taken into consideration the following question (*as given above*).—And we are humbly of opinion, that the education and care of the persons of your Majesty's grand children, the ordering the place of their abode, and appointing their governors, governesses and other instructors, attendants, and servants, belong to the Prince, their father. But that the care and approbation of their marriages when grown up, belongs to your Majesty, as King of this realm.—This, Sire, is our humble opinion, but when we acquaint your Majesty that the care and approbation of the marriages of your grand children belong to your Majesty as King of this realm, we desire to be understood as speaking of a care and approbation not exclusive of the Prince their father. But as your Majesty's care will be always employed for the good of the Royal Family and the welfare of your people, so it is a duty incumbent upon every member of the Royal Family to apply to your Majesty, and receive your royal approbation upon every occasion of this kind, for we find that all negotiations of marriages in the Royal Family, have been carried on by the intervention of the Crown, and such marriages as have been contracted without the royal consent and approbation, have been thought contempts of the regal authority; but we find no instance where a marriage has been treated by the Crown for any person of the Royal Family, without the consent of the father, and we beg leave to assure your Majesty that there is no one expression in any of our law books that warrants any such assertion.—As to the other part of the question, in answer to which we cannot concur with the other Judges, it is our duty humbly to lay before your Majesty, that in our opinion the father hath in all cases a right to the custody and education of his children, and this we take to be clear from the general rule of the law.—This right of the father, is said in our books to be founded *iure naturæ*, and to be annexed by nature to the person of the father. In case of younger children it never was disputed, and in regard to the eldest son or daughter, and heir, to whom lands descended from a collateral ancestor, the right of the father obtained even against the Lord, though his seigniorial right to the wardship of his tenant during the minority,

prevailed against the grandfather, and all other ancestors lineal and collateral. Littleton, Coke, and Vaughan, all agree that none can have the custody of a man's son, and heir apparent from the father, and in the common case of a tenure in soccage, even the mother has the right of guardianship after the death of the father, preferable to the grandfather. From hence we take it to be the general rule of the law, that the guardianship of the children is a right common to every subject in this kingdom who is a father, without exception.—Upon the best search we have been able to make, we can find but two books written by English lawyers, that can possibly induce a contrary opinion (Bracton and Fleta). Bracton, treating *de patria potestate*, says, *Qui ex filio tuo et eius uxore nascitur, i. e. nepos tuus et neptis, æque in tua potestate sunt, et pronepos et proneptes, et deinceps ceteri*; and, *in potestate patrum sunt filii qui nascuntur in iusto et legitimo matrimonio, idem in nepotibus et pronepotibus, quantum ad avos et proavos paternos*; which Fleta has also said in almost the same words, and which both have taken from Justinian's Institutes. This shews it to have been a part of the Roman law, but it neither is, nor as we conceive ever was, a part of the law of England. It is well known that Bracton and Fleta wrote their several treatises upon the plan of the Imperial laws, and it is as well known that those laws never obtained here, through the general aversion this nation (always zealous of its liberties); had towards them, and accordingly, wherever these writers differ from our year books and authentic reports, they are not allowed to be of authority. And as to this part of the Roman law in particular, which relates to the *patria potestas*, it is acknowledged by all, even by Justinian himself, that it never obtained among any other people whatsoever. *Jus autem potestatis, quod in liberos habemus, proprium est civium Romanorum; nulli enim sunt homines, qui talem in liberos habeant potestatem, qualem nos habemus.*—But to give a more particular answer to these passages, which are the only ones that have the least appearance of law, it is evident they cannot be made to affect the case of the Royal Family by any other construction than what will equally affect every other family in England. But that from these passages nothing can be concluded to determine the extent of the *patria potestas* in any family here, is clear from the reason on which the power of the grandfather among the Romans is founded.—Now the reason of the Roman law why children should not be in the power of the father, but of the grandfather ex-

clusive of the father was, because the father himself was not *sui juris*, and in his power, but in *patris familias sui manet potestate, mancipioque*; which are the words of the law of the twelve tables; and it was manifestly absurd, that he should have others in his power, who was not in his own.—This servile condition of the son to the father, which had ordinarily no end, till the father himself was pleased, by emancipation, to put an end to it, being the sole foundation of the grandfather's right to the grand children, as well as to every thing else the father was possessed of; when this state of the father ceased, the power of the grandfather necessarily ceased with it. And so it is declared in Justinian's Institutes, that if the son was emancipated and set free from the power of his father, the children begotten after such emancipation are not in the power of the grandfather, but of the father.—*Quod si post emancipationem conceptus fuerit, patris sui emancipati potestati subijcitur.*—But not to insist that by the laws of England no father has such a power over his children, even in their minority, as the Roman law gave, it is undeniable that with us marriage hath the nature of a true and proper emancipation of the person of the son, and by consequence, even upon the grounds of the Roman law, the grandfather with us can have no right to the children of the son, but the father only. If, therefore, nothing otherwise appears to distinguish the case of the Royal Family, there can be no foundation upon which any prerogative can be established in the instance now in question, and we humbly apprehend that the only precedents which can be alleged to support such a prerogative, when considered, will not be found sufficient.—The first, in the 22d Henry the Third, entitled in Rymer, *de Alianora filia Galfridi*, &c. is only a declaration under the Great Seal that Wm. Talbot had surrendered to King Henry the Third, the Castle of Gloucester, *et Alianorum consanguineam suam sanamet incolumem.*—What can be inferred from hence is hard to determine any farther than that this Alianor was in ward to the Crown, and had been committed to the care of Talbot, who had surrendered her and her estate safe again to the King.—The other precedent, which is in the 11th of Henry the Fourth, is a grant of annual sum of 500 marks to the Prince of Wales for the expense of the maintenance of Edmund, Earl of March, and his brother, so long as they should remain in the Prince's custody, to whom they had been committed the February before. As to this it appears by the history and records of those times that Roger de Mortimer,

their father, was killed in Ireland 22 R. 2, and that their mother soon after married Sir Edward Charlton, Lord Powis, and died 7 Henry 4. so that the eldest son was then in ward to the Crown, by reason of his lands held of the Crown, as were his lordships of Wigmore and Clare *inter alia*; and his brother Roger was then an infant of very tender age, and under the care of the King as next relation; and it appears that he died very young; in which latter case we humbly conceive that the care which the King was pleased to take of an infant and orphan so nearly related to him, will not be a precedent to establish a power to the Crown to dispose of the custody of a child while the father is living.—If any stress can be laid upon printed history, the case of Richard, son to Edward the Black Prince, will be an instance against this power, supposed to be lodged by law in the grandfather. He being a minor, lived with his father as part of his family, and his father appointed his governor, of which we have this relation in Hollingshead; that Sir Simon Burlie, kinsman to Dr. Burle, one of the instructors of Edward the Black Prince, having been admitted among other young gentlemen to be school-fellow with the Prince, he grew in such credit and favour with him, that afterwards, when his son, Richard of Bourdeaux, was born, the Prince, for special trust and confidence which he had in the said Simon Burlie, committed the governance and education of his son Richard to him; and, after the death of the Black Prince, it appears by two very remarkable instances in our history, that Richard continued with his mother till the death of his grandfather, King Edward the Third.—The younger children of Edward the Fourth lived with their mother, whose wardship she declared she claimed by the advice of learned counsel, according to the relation given us by Sir Thomas More, afterwards Lord Chancellor of England, in his history of those times. Nor was it then pretended that the King had any right to their education, or the care of their persons; and although the Queen was prevailed upon to part with her son, Richard Duke of York, her daughters remained in her custody till she herself was contented to send them to court.—As to the education of their late Majesties, Queen Mary and Queen Anne, during their minorities, it does not appear to us that their uncle, King Charles the second, appointed their governesses and servants, or any one person that attended them, and we are not enough acquainted with the circumstances of the Duke of Gloucester's case to make the proper remarks; but

seems to have been by agreement with the King: and we humbly conceive that the motion in Parliament, 13th Dec. 1659, for an address to the King to remove the then Bishop of Salisbury (Gilbert Burnet, D. D.) from being his preceptor, can be of no weight in this matter, since it passed in the negative.—It is possible that something may be inferred in favour of this prerogative, from that article of the treaty said to be made by King James I. concerning the match with Spain, which related to the nurture and education of the children of that marriage. It is not to the present question to consider, whether there ever was such a treaty as is related by Rushworth or not. It is certain that it is not to be found upon record, the proper evidence of all public treaties. The articles of the treaty are said in Rushworth to be signed by the cardinals, Proposition for the right Augmentation and Weal of the Roman Catholic Religion. And, in truth, almost every article is so derogatory to the supremacy of the Crown and the statutes made for the establishment and security of the church of England, that it could have carried no sort of authority with it in point of law, even though it had appeared in a regular manner under the Great Seal, and not from the report of historians only. Nor can the oath said to be taken by Prince Charles, while in Spain, to intercede with his father, that the ten years of the education of the children which should be born of his marriage with the Infanta, accorded in one of the articles of this treaty, might be lengthened to the term of twelve years, as the Prince desired, be looked upon as a precedent to determine what the law of England is. The right to the care and education of the children of that marriage, had it taken effect, was not then in dispute, and had it been so, nothing can be concluded from the voluntary engagement of the Prince, in favour of a marriage so much desired by himself as well as by his father, wherein the question of this right was never the subject of debate.—There was indeed an article in the treaty with France upon the marriage of King Charles the First with Princess Henrietta Maria, whereby it was agreed that the children of that marriage should be brought up with their mother till their age of thirteen, but it is evident that treaty was made with King Charles the First after his accession to the Crown, and not with King James his father. King James, it is true, sent over the Duke of Carlisle and Holland to treat of that match, but the treaty was not concluded after his death, and then by powers from


King Charles the First, whose stipulations for the education of his own children could need no assistance from his prerogative.—Thus have we humbly laid before your Majesty what we have to offer in relation to the books and precedents that have fallen under our consideration upon this head, which we cannot think sufficient to infer a prerogative in your Majesty as King of this realm, in the care and education of your Majesty's grandchildren during the life, and without the consent of their father; a prerogative, as we humbly apprehend, hitherto unknown to the laws of England.—All which is most humbly submitted to your Majesty's great wisdom.

(Signed)

“ ROBERT PRICE,  
“ R. EYRE.”

Speech of Mr Baron Fortescue  
MADE, as delivered during the conference  
in the Judges' Chamber, and as reported by  
himself.

MY LORDS,—This is a question of great importance to the whole kingdom, and I am content, for the better discussing it, to divide it into two parts, because it has been so done by some of my brothers, though I should have thought, that if the King has the marriage of his grandchildren, of necessary consequence he had their education too.—I will then consider, first, whether the King has the care and approbation of the marriage of Prince Frederic and his other grand children, and whether of right it belongs to his Majesty, as King of this Realm, or not.—This subject, touching the power of a grandfather, may be treated of either as a public or a private right. It has been treated of pretty much as a private right by the two Judges that differ, and by the Counsel for the Prince of Wales, which I think is an error in the foundation of their argument. For it ought manifestly to be treated as *jus publicum*, such a right as our law books express it to be *quod ad statum rei publice spectat*, and that makes it the King's prerogative, and that is the King's inheritance, as King of this realm, which is too great a point to be governed by the narrow rules of private property. Now, to treat this otherwise is injurious to the Prince himself, and all his children. Our law books say he is esteemed as one nearest to the King. So it has been determined in full Parliament, in the case of the Prince of Wales in Henry VI.'s time. And in his patent, which was made by authority of Parliament in 33 Henry VI. the introduction of the patent is *ut ipsum, qui reputatione juris censetur eadem persona nobiscum, digno preveniamus honore, &c.* So that in the



eye of the law they are to be reckoned but as one person.—It is, for the same reason, that an Act of Parliament which relates to the Prince, is a public law of which every body is to take notice, because, whatever concerns the Prince, concerns the King; and whatever concerns the King concerns every subject in England. The act, therefore, which relates to the Duchy of Cornwall, has been held to be a public law. Now, let us see what is said in my Lord Coke's 8 Rep. called *The Prince's Case*. Speaking of the Prince, it is said —*coruscet radiis Reges patris, et consuetur una persona cum ipso Rege*. So says Lord Hobart, who was the Prince's Chancellor, Hob. R. p. 226 ———it is for the same reason that it was high treason by the common law of England (before any statute) to compass and imagine the death of the King's eldest son and heir, who is generally made Prince of Wales, though now born Duke of Cornwall (but is not so of a collateral heir to the Crown) and this offence is called *crimen læsæ Majestatis*—a crime that hurts the Majesty of the King himself. It follows then, that as they are but one person in law, so in point of law they are supposed to have but one will in relation to the education, marriage, and management of the grandchildren. And the Prince of Wales, in point of law, is supposed in every thing to concur with his Majesty, which quite subverts and destroys the distinction in common persons of grandfather, father, and son.—Now, the King, as he is *Parens Patriæ*, he is also *Parens Nepotum*, parent of his grandchildren, as Lord Coke expounds the King's nephew to signify his grandson; also from the Latin *nepos* which signifies both. So in the case of a Queen consort, she is the first wife in the kingdom; Queen, in the Saxon language, signifying wife. And, therefore, by reason of excellence, it was the name for the King's wife, who, consider her in her private capacity, as the private wife of a common subject, she cannot sue or be sued herself, nor can grant to or from her husband; but, then consider her in her public character and capacity as a Queen, she can sue and be sued by herself, and make grants to and from the King her husband, by her prerogative, and anciently she had a great many. Now, I think, in this case, much may be argued from the names and appellations of the children of the Royal Family. In history they are called the Children of England, and all of them born Princes and Princesses of England, before they had any title, and all of them Kings and Queens, in *potentia*, and may one day reign over us. Seldon calls them Heirs Apparent of England, and they

are called so in the Parliament Rolls. This agrees with the most early times in our kingdom; for, till Henry the First's time they were distinguished from all other persons, by calling both the eldest and the rest of the King's sons Clito and Clitones, and they had no other titles. Now, Clito is a Latin word, which comes from the Greek word κλειτος, which signifies Inclytus,—most noble and famous. So the word Ætheling, as Edgar Ætheling, who was not the King's son, but his great nephew, from the Saxon word *Ethel nobilis*; which shews that all the Royal Family were called by the same name as the King's sons; and so sets out the admirable union of the Royal Family.—The first son of the King is called Prince of England, before any creation: so it is in Scotland. Before the Union he was called Prince of Scotland; and so (says Mr. Seldon) it is in other nations: as in France the Duke of Orleans, Regent of France, was called *Petit Fitz de France*—Grandson of France, not Grandson to the King. So Henrietta Maria, in the marriage articles with Charles the First, was called *Fille de France*, daughter of France, and not daughter of the King. Having then made it appear, I think clearly, that all the children and grandchildren of the Royal Family are public persons and Princes of the nation, and the Prince of Wales himself one and the same person with the King; it follows manifestly, as a just corollary and consequence, that the King who has the executive power in him, is to have the care and command in the marriages of these children for the good of the whole nation. It is part of that original trust, which, by the constitution of our government, is reposed in the King for the security of his people. And as this is a prerogative vested in the crown in the reason of the law and nature of a monarchy, so in all ages the Crown has practised and been in possession of this right. Now, in the point of marriages, there are precedents from the time of H. III. down to this time. — In 28 H. 6. it was one of the articles of impeachment of High Treason against the Duke of Suffolk for attempting only to marry his son to Margaret, the daughter and heir of the Duke of Somerset, who had a right to the Crown after the death of the King without issue, although she was not heir apparent, for there was a Prince of Wales then living. When he came to his trial, he did not deny but it was an offence, but insisted it was not true, for that some of the lords then present knew that he intended to marry his son to the Earl of Warwick's daughter. And this is still stronger, because this lady was in ward

him, and so he had a private right in her marriage.—By an Act of Parliament, 28 H. 8. it is made high treason to marry any of the Royal Family. It is thereby enacted, that if any person presume to marry any one of the King's children lawfully born, or otherwise, or commonly reputed, or taken for his children, or grandchildren, without the special leave of the King, he shall be adjudged a traitor to the King and the realm; and thereby it is made high treason in the lady too, being against the King and the realm, which shews clearly that the whole kingdom is concerned.—And though this act is now repealed in a crowd with other acts to bring all treasons to the standard of 25 Edward III. yet it is impossible the Parliament should make that high treason which was no crime at all before, and especially high treason in his own children; nay, when it was lawful before to marry any person of the Royal Family (if the doctrine we are taught be true) and each had a right to marry as they pleased. And, it is observable here that the Parliament makes no difference whether the father be living or not, nor takes any care of that paternal right which is pretended.—In Queen Mary's time, though this offence ceased to be high treason, yet it did not cease to be a crime; for in the year 1558, the King of Sweden sent a message secretly to the Lady Elizabeth, the Queen's half-sister only, afterwards Queen Elizabeth, who was then at Hatfield, to propose marriage to her. But she rejected it with warmth, for this reason, because the proposal came not to her by the Queen's direction. And, upon an excuse made by the King of Sweden, that he first made love as a gentleman of quality to gain her consent, and then he would, as a King, address himself to the Queen in proper form, her answer was, she was to entertain no such propositions unless the Queen sent them to her. Upon this the Queen sent Sir Thomas Pope to the Lady Elizabeth, to let her know she well approved of the answer she had made, and the Lady Elizabeth further declared, she would never see the messenger more, because he had presumed to come to her without the Queen's leave.—So that he is one foreign King and two Queens of England concurring in the same sentiment, which seems strongly to argue, that it is the law of nations, as well as the prerogative of this Crown.—The next instance I shall mention is the case of Lady Arabella, and a law back to support it, and that is the Countess of Shrewsbury's case, 12 Co. 91 in the 10th year of King James the First. The Countess of Shrewsbury was then in prison, and sent for before the Coun-

cil to answer to a contempt of dangerous consequence, because she refused to answer when examined about Lady Arabella's flight for marrying Mr. Seymour, she being of the Royal Family: and here the Attorney and Solicitor-General of the King, charged it as a crime, that Lady Arabella, being of the Blood Royal, had married Mr. Seymour, second son of the Earl of Hertford, without the King's privity and consent. Now, it appears Seymour was committed to the Tower for this offence, but escaped; and that Lady Arabella was also committed, and she escaped, and was taken flying beyond the sea before she got over.—The first crime charged on the Countess was her abetting the flight of Lady Arabella, her niece, and the immediate crime was not answering in that case. Now, as marrying without the King's leave was no crime, she could never have been accused for not answering to her abetting the flight for such a marriage; so that the marrying without leave was plainly charged as a crime. They both were committed for a crime, and they both fled as for a crime, and it is admitted and taken for granted to be a crime. And her contempt in not answering in the case of marriage in the Royal Family was also resolved to be a crime; and this was done by all the great Ministers of State, and by the Chancellor and two Chief Justices (Pleming and Lord Coke), and Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duchy and Chief Baron, in the fifteenth year of King James I. and in the end she was fined ten thousand pounds and committed to the Tower.—The next case I shall mention is the marriage of the Princess of Modena and the Duke of York. There was an address of the House of Commons to the King to prevent this marriage. The King's answer is very remarkable. "It is completed" (says the King), "but it was with my consent and authority," and the Parliament acquiesced in that answer. Now, this address was absurd if the King had no power to prevent it; so that this amounts to the judgment and opinion of the King and Parliament, that this right was in the crown exclusive of his brother. So here is the King claiming this authority even against his own brother and his private right, and the Parliament confirming it.—Then there is the marriage of the Princess Mary, daughter of the Duke of York, to the Prince of Orange. This match was made entirely by the King's consent, even without the knowledge of the Duke, her father, and against his liking and consent. "The King, speaking to Sir William Temple about this match," says, "If I am not deceived, the Prince of Orange is the ho-

nestest man in the world: therefore, he shall have his wife, and you shall go and tell my brother so, and that it is a thing I am resolved on." The Duke was chagrined a little, but said, "the King shall be obeyed."—Here is a father acknowledging the right to be in the King to marry his own daughter, who was only a collateral relation to the King, and married against the father's will, as every one knows. — In 1683, the match with the Princess Anne, the other daughter of the Duke of York, was made by the King in the same manner, and both these marriages were established by a public declaration of his Majesty to the whole nation. — And thus I beg leave to conclude the instances of marriage, but with this remark, that happy it is for this nation that the King in the two last instances had this prerogative; for had this pretended paternal right then prevailed, the English nation had been for ever undone, and our religion destroyed, and we had never seen the many and great blessings we enjoy and are likely to enjoy by this family sitting on the throne of Great Britain. Thus the nation sees the trace of this happy prerogative from Henry III.'s time to this very day, being the compass of almost 500 years uninterrupted, undisputed, and not one single instance to the contrary. — These instances concerning marriages of the Royal Family being so numerous, and the light so glaring, from histories, records, public acts, statutes, and law books, the two judges who differ could not resist this part of the question, but have retired to the other part, that of the education; though I hope to prove, that if the King has the marriage, he must have the education too. The reason that my Lord Coke gives, why the Queen Dowager cannot marry without the King's leave is, *ne capitalibus inimicis regis agitentur*. Now, the reason for the King's having the wardship of his grand-children, and education too, is stronger, viz. lest the heir of the crown himself be led aside by ill principles and bad politics, and become himself an enemy to the constitution and to the kingdom. Marriage is one of the main ends of the education; and that education is a principal qualification for that marriage, and therefore can never be so properly placed as with him who has the marriage. Vide 6 H. VI. 2 Inst. p. 18. — Besides, these two powers, if placed in different persons, may clash and be repugnant; for which of them is to determine when the marriage is to begin, and to whom and when the education is to end. — Again if the King has the marriage he has the appointment of the time of that marriage, and consequently he can, at any time, appoint

it; and he that can at any time appoint the marriage, can at any time call for the custody of that person; and he that can at any time demand the person out of custody of another, has the entire power over that person. — Again, it is a true and regular argument, and conclusive to say, that whoever has the end must have the means also, otherwise he cannot be said to have the end. — If I have the marriage of any person, I can never be sure of that, unless I have the custody and education of that person. But his Majesty's prerogative in this part of the question relating to the education, is as clearly to be made out, though not by so many instances, as the case of marriage. — When Prince Charles had by surprise got leave of his father to make a journey to Spain, to fetch home his mistress the Infanta, revolving in his mind the hazard of that expedition, and the ill influence it might have on the people. King James then declared that the Prince was looked upon by his people as the son of his kingdom. — Clarendon's History, page 14. And this being related by him, carries with it his authority too, who was a very great lawyer, and chancellor of the realm. — The law books of Bracton and Fleta, which have been quoted, are the ancient law of the land, extending to all cases; but this law being altered only in private cases by usage and statute, it remains law to this day as to the Royal Family; because, as to them this law has had no alteration by any law or statute whatever, and usage has gone accordingly. — These law books are so strong that there has been no way thought of to evade them, but by denying the authority of them and calling it civil law. But, I own I am not a little surprised that these books should be denied for law, when in my little experience, I have known them quoted almost in every argument where pains have been taken, if any thing could be found in those books, to the question in hand; and, I have never known them denied for law but where some statute or usage, time out of mind, has altered them. We have been told, indeed, that they were quoted in the case of ship money. But, I believe, that objection would not have been made if they had been aware that those very books were quoted on both sides of the question, which destroys the objection, and shews that they were approved of by all who argued in that case, both of one side and the other. — But, if it be meant civil law, because it is in force in all civilized nations, I believe that is true, for I take this to be the prerogative of all kings; nor has there been any instance given in any monarchy where the law is otherwise. — Mr. Seldon says,

the King of England is an Emperor, and this realm an empire, and so called in statutes and records without number; and if so, he will have the prerogative, equal with other kings and emperors, if no statute law or usage say the contrary.—If the prerogative then be the law of nations, that is part of the law of the land, and will give the King a clear title to it. See the Statute of Precedency, which is 32 H. 8, cap. 10. It enacts that no person presume to sit at any side of the Cloth of State, except the King's children. Then when it goes on to place the great officers of state—it says, that being barons, 'they shall be placed on the left side of the Parliament Chamber, above all dukes, except the King's son, the King's brother, the King's uncle, the King's nephew, (i. e. his grandson, or the King's brothers' or sisters' son.)—Now, this shews that the King's son, and the King's nephew, or grandson, is comprehended under the term—King's Children; because the latter is substituted in the place of the former.—17 Edward III. Archbishop of Canterbury came into Parliament and demanded *Si les enfans nostre, son le Roi*, born beyond sea, should inherit in England; because born out of the King's dominions and aliens. And all the Parliament agreed that let them be born where they would, they should inherit.—It would be a jest to imagine that the King's grand-child was not within that law, and within the word *les enfans*, children; and there is the same reason in this case.—Another reason is, that the King's grandson is higher in dignity, because nearer the crown, than any other of the King's sons, except his own father, therefore, ought to be esteemed equal with his own sons; and therefore, if Prince Frederic were here, and the King had other sons besides the Prince, he would take place of all those, as Richard of Bourdeaux's did when his grandfather placed him at a public table above all his own children, who were his uncles.—Pursuant to this notion grand-children of the Crown are styled children in records. There is, 50 Edward III. Richard Prince of Wales, his writ of summons to Parliament is directed thus—*Rex Edwardus carissimo filio meo Ricardo Principi Wallie*.—So is 51 Edward III. This Prince Richard holds a Parliament by commission from his grandfather, and that runs in the same manner—*De circumspectione et industria magnitudine carissimi filii nostri, Ric. I. Principis Wallie*.—*Pat. Rol. 51 Ed. III. An. 41*.—Now, I think education is of greater consequence than marriage, both to the person and to the people of England—to the person, because, if bred either in the Popish religion, or if

trained up in any other communion, though Protestant, except the Church of England, he is not capable of reigning; and if bred up in arbitrary principles, inconsistent with a limited monarchy, the whole nation will then be in danger: whereas, an ill-chosen match will only be the most uneasy to the Prince that marries, and will little affect the State, so long as the Prince is steady, and adheres to the constitution.—Where is a prince to be educated who is to be bred up a king, but in the Palace and Court of a King, and under his special care and influence?—"The learned Sir John Fortescue, called by Sir Walter Raleigh the bulwark of the law of England, who was Chief Justice and Chancellor, and also tutor to the Prince of Wales in Henry Vith's time, in his Treatise *De Laudibus Legum Anglicæ*, which consists of dialogues betwixt him and the prince about his education, says, that there are two things that a prince who is like to be heir to the crown ought principally to be instructed in, that is martial discipline, and the laws and constitution of England: and where are those to be had but in the King's armies, and among the great officers and ministers of the King?—The same Sir J. Fortescue says, speaking of the King's words in Knight's service, the princes of the realm also holding of the King, must be well educated, since these orphans in their childhood are brought up in the King's house. Therefore, I cannot but greatly commend the riches and magnificence of the King's Court, because it is the supreme school for the nobility of the land, whereby the realm flourishes and is preserved.—There is a patent in the 13th of Edward IV. from the King to the Bishop of Rochester, whereby he was constituted tutor to the Prince and president of the Prince's Council, which is very remarkable. In the preamble it says, "Howbeit every child in his young age ought to be brought up in virtue and knowledge; yet, nevertheless, such persons as God has called to the pre-eminent state of princes, and to succeed their progenitors in the state of regality, ought more singularly to be informed and instructed in knowledge and virtue. We therefore, desiring our dearest son, the prince, perfectly, knowingly, and virtuously to be educated in his youth, and wholly trusting in the truth, wit, knowledge and virtue, and also love and affection, that our Reverend Father hath to us and to our issue, we have committed and deputed him to teach and inform our said son, and also appointed him president of his council, giving him power to assemble all the counsellors of our said son."—Now

what I would observe from this patent is, in the first place, that it shews the great regard that is to be had to all the prince's or king's children, all who are like to succeed to the crown, that they above all others ought most singularly to be educated, and makes no distinction in the education between the first or any other of the princes of the Royal Blood, and the education to be perfect in knowledge and virtue.—In the next place, it shews the qualification of such tutors, and who is to choose them.—This does not invade the paternal right, but is consistent with it. It is very probable that a grandson may obey both father and grandfather: nor can it be supposed that the father and grandfather will give contradictory commands without breach of duty in the son; but it ought to be presumed by all reasonable men, that they will both concur in material parts of the education, both for the good of their child and the safety of the kingdom, so that in this concurs the law of God as well as man. For I believe nobody ever yet doubted, but a grandson was within the fifth command, and in obedience to that law the Patriarchs always conformed themselves. But these sticklers for paternal right seem to have forgot the right of the mother, which, by the fifth commandment, is as well established as the right of the father, and some civilians give a superiority to the mother, at least by the law of nature; and, I believe, that nobody ever thought that giving this power to the father excluded the right of the mother. Nor can the supposition that the mother should contradict the command of the father any more destroy the superiority of the husband in the one case, than the same groundless supposition in the son destroy the right of the father in the other case.—But to suppose for once an unreasonable thing, and what will never happen, that there should be contradictory commands, the public good must be preferred, and duty to parents must be always subject to the safety of the whole community; and the King, who is *pater patriæ*, as well as *pater nepotis*, must be obeyed, to whom there is a double obligation by nature and by allegiance, i. e. by the law of God and the law of man.—As to what was said by brother Reynolds, the Prince's Counsel, in relation to the statute of 12 Car. 2, cap. 24. that the Prince was within that Act of Parliament, I deny it to be law, or any thing like it, for then it would be in the power of the Prince to grant or appoint, by deed or will, the guardianship, custody, or tuition of his son to the King of France,

the Turk, or any person whatever, which would be in effect to give him a power of disposing of the Crown. And by this learned doctrine the Royal Family might be dispersed all over Europe, and this nominee would be entitled to take the profits of all the lands of such heir to the Crown, and the management of all his estate.—What was said by my brother Eyre as to the Black Prince's disposing of his son's governance, that was a case of absolute necessity, and in the absence of the King in foreign parts, for he was then on his journey to the Holy Land."

#### CORONATION OF NAPOLEON.

(Concluded from p. 1012.)

This, it is, that has consecrated to eternity the epoch of the 9th of November.—It is this, Sire, that brings back and attaches to you such of the republicans whose patriotism was most fervent and zealous. They were confirmed in their hatred against the throne by their attachment to the interests of the people and the ardent desire of the public good. Their ideas have been realised only by your government; out of conceit with their chimera, and brought back by you to the reality, they are well convinced that it was impossible to think seriously of establishing a republic, properly so called, amongst a people, attached to monarchy by their wants, by instinct, and by the force of a habit, which nothing can overcome. Yes, Sire, on this point there is but one sentiment—yet, the government of a single person is to so vast a country what the statue of Pallas was formerly to the Trojans—by being deprived of it their ruin was accelerated.—But still this is not enough. The unity of the Empire, is, like the bundle of twigs, the aggregate of its power; but, like the twigs of the untied bundle, the parts would soon be disunited and broken, if the hereditary succession to the aggregate did not secure the bond. An order of succession, previously determined, is the firmest support of a monarchical government. So, by the election even which made you Emperor, the senate and the people have deprived themselves of the right of electing in future, as long as those glorious lines shall subsist, to which they transfer the exclusive right to the Empire. It is a great deposit of trust, consecrated by the Law of Nations, the necessity of which has been felt by the nation, in order to relieve itself from guarding against any omission, or the apprehension of troubles in this delegation of its supreme power.—Amongst the happy results of the law of succession, such as the French have just

adopted, the sagacity of the great people has distinguished two principal advantages; first, that a dynasty raised by liberty, will be faithful to its principle; there is no instance of a river flowing back to its source. Besides, a new source of stability for public credit, both internally and externally, is to be expected from a continued tradition in this paternal and perpetual government. Amongst foreign nations also, upon how much more solid a base will our alliances be supported? It is a community of interests, that constitutes all the bonds of this world: the friends of France being able to rely on her, she can rely on them; and this proud country, reinstated in Europe in the rank, from which weakness had suffered her to fall, will, henceforth, have it in its power to exercise a permanent influence on the repose of the nations, and on the peace of the Continent. —As to our enemies, if they persist in being so, their despair must redouble in contemplating the service they have done us in spite of them. We have been put upon our guard by their atrocious plots. As a last resource they have meditated crimes; it was our duty to render them useless. Thus then, in whatever view our happiness is their work. —But, Sir, until their eyes shall be opened, or our indignant army shall go to punish their perfidy, our happiness constitutes their punishment. What a spectacle for them to behold, France, that same France, which they wished to lacerate, and which they must now know to be united round its august chief, possessing the same spirit, forming the same wishes, and tranquilly celebrating the festivals which announce the union of liberty, that first of all moving principles with this grand conservative system of nations, hereditary monarchy. —It was desired previous to the revolution, that the chief of a great state like France, should promise at his accession, not to be the king of nobles nor of any other class, but the chief of the nation, not to maintain any usurped privileges, which in an agricultural country, and amongst an industrious people, would, nevertheless, destroy agriculture and industry, to enrich with their spoils the accomplices of despotism; but that he should swear to the people these fundamental articles, these eternal bases of well-regulated societies. Liberty of worship, this first right of all men, since authority can never force conscience. Equality of rights of all the citizens, the only rational and possible equality. Respect for political and civil liberty, without which nations are but herds of slaves, equally indifferent to the fortune of their masters, and to their own duty. The inviolable security of proper-

ty, which forbids above all the levy of arbitrary imposts, and permits not any subsidy, direct or indirect, under what name soever, but according to law. —

Lastly, the general tendency of his government, to the sole and primitive end of every government, the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the people. —This is the form of the oath which your Imperial Majesty is about to take to the French people; these are the terms which you have chosen to be a law to yourself and your successors. According to circumstances, your Majesty annexes to them an engagement to maintain: the integrity of the territory of the French republic, which should continue indivisible; the acquisition of the national property, which have been the pay of our independence; the sublime institution of your legion of honour, worthy reward of services rendered to the country. —With these additions, this remarkable oath would appear to have been dictated by the whole nation. It is in consideration of this also, that the whole nation swears fidelity to you. These two oaths correspond; they guarantee each other; they are the reciprocal pledges of an indissoluble alliance; and amidst so many important views, which will for ever distinguish the *Senatus Consultum* of the 19th May (28th Floreal), that which cements the whole work; that which imprints upon it the seal of immortality, Sir, is the thought of the title of the oaths. —To close the chasms of the revolution, more than Curtius was necessary; according to the profound idea of a political author, it was necessary that a great man should chuse for the theatre of his government and the materials of his glory, the ruins of that state, which he might propose to new-model and reinvigorate. It was necessary that this man should be worthy to give his name, and to communicate his impulse to a new dynasty. It was necessary that he should be elevated above his contemporaries, of their choice, and by their suffrages, without opposition either from his own countrymen, or from foreigners. In the existing state of societies, the want of being governed is felt, as formerly, but the means of governing are become more difficult, because their object is more extended and complicated. —The Conservative Senate and the French people assure you, Sir, through my voice, that they are proud of their Emperor. If they have offered you the crown, if they have made it hereditary in your descendants, and in those of your two brothers, it is because there exists not on earth a man more worthy to bear the sceptre of France, nor a family

more beloved by the French. Governed by Napoleon, or by his sons or his nephews, animated by his spirit, formed by his example, in a word, bound by his oath, we Sire, and our children's children, shall defend, with our lives, this tutelary government, object of our pride as of our love, because in it we shall defend our chief, our properties, our families, and our honour.—You have chosen, Sire, as the inscription on our coins, those words which you justify: "God protects France." Oh! yes; God does protect France, since he has created you for her. Father of thy country, in the name of that protecting God, bestow a blessing on thy children, and relying on their fidelity, be assured that nothing can either efface from their minds, or root out of their hearts, the engagements resulting from the mutual contract that has just been entered into between the French nation and the imperial family.—In the absence of the throne, all the great characters give themselves up to factions. A people is so much the more to be pitied, the greater the number of its distinguished children; all that might constitute pride of nations becomes then the scourge of one. From the moment that a throne is worthily filled, eminent virtues have a reward; viz. to approach nearer to it; and the distinction is so much more flattering, as more real dignities bear more imposing names. The title of Emperor has ever conveyed the law not of that royalty before which subjects humble and prostrate themselves, but the great and liberal idea of a first magistrate governing in the name of the law which citizens feel honour in obeying. The title of Senate indicates also an assembly of chosen magistrates, proved by long labours and venerable for age. The greater the Emperor is, the more august ought the Senate to be."

His Majesty replied in the following terms:

"I ascend the throne, to which the unanimous wishes of the senate, the people, and the army have called me, with a heart penetrated with the great destinies of that people, whom, from the midst of camps, I first saluted with the name of Great. From my youth my thoughts have been solely fixed upon them, and I must add here, that my pleasures and my pains are derived entirely from the happiness or misery of my people.—My descendants shall long preserve this throne. In the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives for the defence of their country. As magistrates, they will never forget, that contempt of the laws and the confusion of social order, are

only the result of the imbecility and uncertainty of princes. You, senators, whose counsels and support have never failed me in the most difficult circumstances; your spirit will be handed down to your successors. Be ever the props and first counsellors of that throne so necessary to the welfare of this vast Empire."

The tribunate presented itself in a body at the Thuilleries, on the same day, at two o'clock. M. Fabre (de l'Ande), the president, addressed the Emperor, in the name of the body.—"The address contains nothing worth noticing, except the abject servility with which the tribunate avow their joy that they had been the first to conceive the wish to give their country an authorised master, (the question respecting the elevation of Buonaparté to the Empire was first started in the tribunate). The address concludes with wishes "that the new dynasty may reign as long as the three preceding ones, and that the days of his Majesty may be prolonged beyond the ordinary term of human life!"

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

*PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.*—*Message delivered by the President of the United States of America to both Houses of Congress, Nov. 8, 1804.*

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.—"To a people, fellow citizens, who sincerely desire the happiness and prosperity of other nations, to those who justly calculate that their own well being is advanced by that of other nations with which they have intercourse, it will be a satisfaction to observe, that the war, which was lighted up in Europe a little before our last meeting, has not yet extended its flames to other nations, not been marked by the calamities which sometimes stain the footsteps of war. The irregularities, too, on the ocean, which generally harass the commerce of neutral nations, have, in distant parts, disturbed ours less than on former occasions. But in the American seas they have been greater from peculiar causes; and even within our harbours and jurisdiction, infringements on the authority of the laws have been committed, which have called for serious attention. The friendly conduct of the governments from whose officers and subjects these acts have proceeded, in other respects, and in places more under their observation and control, gives us confidence that our representations on this subject will have been properly regarded.—While noticing the irregularities committed on the ocean by others, those on

our own part should not be omitted, nor left unprovided for. Complaints have been received that persons residing within the United States, have taken upon themselves to arm merchant vessels, and to force a commerce into certain ports and countries, in defiance of the laws of those countries. That individuals should undertake to wage private war, independently of the authority of their country, cannot be permitted in a well ordered society. Its tendency to produce aggression on the laws and rights of other nations, and to endanger the peace of our own, is so obvious, that I doubt not you will adopt measures for restraining it in future.—Soon after the passing of the act of last session, authorizing the establishment of a district and port of entry on the waters of the Mobile, we learnt that its object was misunderstood on the part of Spain. Candid explanations were immediately given, and assurances that, reserving our claims in that quarter as a subject of discussion and arrangement with Spain, no act was meditated in the mean-time inconsistent with the peace and friendship existing between the two nations; and that, conformably to those intentions would be the execution of the law. That government had, however, thought proper to suspend the ratification of the convention of 1802; but the explanations which would reach them soon after, and still more the confirmation of them by the tenor of the instrument, establishing the port and district, may reasonably be expected to replace them in the disposition and views of the whole subject which originally dictated the convention.—I have the satisfaction to inform you, that the objections which had been urged by that government against the validity of our title to the country of Louisiana, have been withdrawn:—its exact limits, however, remaining still to be settled between us. And to this is to be added, that having prepared and delivered the stock created in execution of the Convention of Paris of April the 30th, 1803, in consideration of the cession of that country, we have received from the government of France an acknowledgment in due form of the fulfilment of that stipulation.—With the nations of Europe in general our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed; and from the governments of the belligerent powers especially, we continue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to an honest neutrality, and to such good offices consistent with that as we have opportunities of rendering.—The activity and success of the small force en-

ployed in the Mediterranean in the early part of the present year, the reinforcements sent into that sea, and the energy of the officers having command in the several vessels, will, I trust, by the sufferings of war, reduce the barbarians of Tripoli to the desire of peace, on proper terms. Great injury, however, ensues to ourselves, as well as to others interested, from the distance to which the prizes must be brought for adjudication, and from the impracticability of bringing higher such as are not seaworthy.—The Bey of Tunis having made requisitions unauthorized by our treaty, their rejection has produced from him some expressions of discontent. But to those who expect us to calculate whether a compliance with unjust demands will not cost us less than a war, we must leave as a question of calculation for them also, whether to retire from unjust demands will not cost them less than a war. We can do to each other very sensible injuries by war. But the mutual advantages of peace make that the best interest of both.—Peace and intercourse with the other powers on the same coast continue on the footing on which they are established by treaty.—In pursuance of the act, providing for the temporary government of Louisiana, the necessary officers for the territory of Orleans, were appointed in due time to commence the exercise of their functions on the first day of Oct. The distance, however, of some of them, and indispensable previous arrangements may have retarded its commencement in some of its parts. The form of government thus provided, having been considered but as temporary, and open to such future improvements, as further information of the circumstances of our brethren there might suggest, it will of course be subject to fair consideration.—In the district of Louisiana it has been thought best to adopt the division into subordinate districts which had been established under its former government. These being five in number, a commanding officer has been appointed to each, according to the provisions of the law; and so soon as they can be at their stations, that district will also be in its due state of organization. In the mean-time, their places are supplied by officers before commanding there, and the functions of the governor and judges of Indiana having commenced, the government we presume is proceeding in its new form. The lead mines in that district offer so rich a supply of that metal as to merit attention. The report now communicated will inform you of their state, and of the necessity of immediate

inquiry into their occupation and titles.—With the Indian tribes established within our newly acquired limits, I have deemed it necessary to open conferences for the purpose of establishing a good understanding and neighbourly relations between us. So far as we have yet learned, we have reason to believe that their dispositions are generally favourable and friendly. And with these dispositions on their part, we have in our hands means which cannot fail for preserving their peace and friendship. Instead of an augmentation of military force, proportioned to an augmentation of frontier, I propose a moderate enlargement of the capital employed in that commerce, as a more effectual, economical, and humane instrument for preserving peace and good neighbourhood with them.—On this side the Mississippi, an important relinquishment of native title has been received from the Delawares, that tribe desiring to extinguish the spirit of hunting, and to convert superfluous lands into the means of improving what they retain, has ceded to us all the country between the Wabash and the Ohio, South of, and including the road from the Rapids towards Vincennes, for which they are to receive annuities in animals and implements of agriculture. The Pinkeshaws having some claim to the country ceded by the Delawares, it has been thought better to quiet that claim by fair purchase also. So soon as the treaties on this subject shall have received their constitutional sanctions, they shall be laid before both houses.—The Act of Congress of Feb. 28, 1803, for building and employing a number of gunboats is now in a course of execution to the extent there provided, for the obstacle to naval enterprise,

[To be continued.]

### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**FAMILY RECONCILIATION.**—There is, and long has been, in this country, a sort of *political family*, consisting of the Pitts and the Addingtons, augmented at different periods, by the admission of the Jenkinsons, the Dundases, and, more recently, by the Roses, the Longs, and others of the same description. There are three main principles, upon which this family appear invariably to have acted: 1. That the members of The Family are the only men worthy of being entrusted with the management of public affairs in this kingdom: 2. That they have an undoubted right to the exclusive possession or disposal of all the honours, power, and emoluments, that can be possessed or disposed of in this kingdom: 3.

That the maintenance of this right is their first duty, and that, in competition therewith, no other object ought to be suffered to exist for a single moment. Those, therefore, who consider the natural consequences of these principles, will not be at all surprised at the reconciliation which has taken place between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt; and, my Lord Grenville must excuse me, if I express my surprise, when, in 1803, I hear a person of his sagacity and experience, declaring, that “nothing is less probable than to see Pitt and me at any near period (I believe I may say *at no period of our lives*) reconciled, and disposed to establish with Addington relations of confidence and friendship.”\* His Lordship is thought to be endowed with great knowledge and penetration; but, he was not able to discover the real sentiments and intentions of Mr. Pitt, though he appears to have been, as he thought, made fully acquainted with them. He does not seem to have viewed the connexion between the Pitts and the Addingtons in the proper light: the nature of their bond of union appears to have entirely escaped him, or, he would have perceived, that, like the members of other families, however bitterly, and on whatever account, they might quarrel, they would finally be reconciled, as far at least as should be necessary to promote the interests of The Family, more especially if its very existence should be at stake. By a reference to the motto of the present sheet, it will be perceived that the reconciliation has not come upon me unawares. To say the truth, I expected it to take place sooner, and, when I saw the meeting of Parliament approaching without any reconciliation being talked of, I began to tremble for the fate of my theory.—The reconciliation has been termed “the marriage of *weakness and meanness*,” but very improperly in my opinion; for, though it is pretty evident that Mr. Pitt found himself weak, it should not be forgotten, that there are some men, none of whose actions ought ever to be distinguished by the epithet *mean*, and, I believe, it will hardly be denied that Mr. Addington is a man of that description. The “marriage,” whatever may be said or thought of it, is perfectly natural. The principal parties concerned were, as one of their own newspapers (the tender and delicate Morning Post) observes “made to respect, to love, and to cherish each other.” Their disputes have been

\* Lord Grenville’s Letter to Marquis Wellesley, present Volume, p. 533.

much more of a *private* than of a *public* nature. They could not exactly agree as to the share which each should enjoy of the power and emoluments of the state, and thereupon some little bickering took place; but, as it never was, perhaps, very liberal or very decent to pry into the affairs of The Family, it would be still less so now to revive the circumstances attendant on their quarrel. What if one side dealt forth charges of "arrogance and duplicity," which the other repaid by charges of "incapacity and imbecility," who but the parties themselves have any thing to do with the matter? There are very few families, in which (especially where there are great possessions to be shared, and complicated claims and pretensions to be adjusted) disputes, even serious disputes, do not frequently occur; yet, we do not find that any body has ever been much applauded for endeavouring to revive such disputes, especially at a moment when the parties are about to be reconciled; and, I should be glad to know, why this particular Family should be excluded from the beneficial effects of those liberal and humane principles which operate in favour of all other families in the world?—As to the *terms* of the reconciliation we may, however, I think, be allowed to indulge in an observation or two. At present we are, upon this point, left to conjecture. It has been said, indeed, by some, that Mr. Addington is to be Secretary of State; by others he is destined "to ornament the peerage of the realm." Mr. Yorke too, the Right Honourable Mr. Bragge, the Right Honourable Mr. Hiley Addington, and some other "men of great abilities" are said, by the ministerial papers, to be about to be introduced into the ministry, if not into the cabinet, and, the Times Newspaper, well known to be the mouth piece of the junior main branch of the family, has stated, (25th inst.) that, from these changes, the public will derive security for "a constitutional use of authority at home, and for wisdom in the conducting of our foreign affairs." The same paper, of the 28th instant, congratulates the public upon the natural consequences of the expected introduction of Mr. Addington and his friends into the cabinet; and that, not on account of its bringing more votes to the aid of the minister, but on account of the good which the country may expect to derive from the statesman-like talents, the cabinet wisdom and energy, of Mr. Addington and his friends. "Though," says this print, "we pretend not to be in the secret," (they

evidently are) "we cannot but rejoice, as Englishmen, in the prospect of such a reconciliation as has been announced. Should Mr. Addington and his friends be included in any new ministerial arrangement, we will venture to predict, that the public will soon perceive that something more than mere *parliamentary strength* will be added to the government. They will soon find *beneficial effects* from the virtues and talents of that minister, who relieved the country from all its pecuniary embarrassments; who found the Treasury empty, and left it full; who, by his excellent arrangements, in one year, funded the incredible sum of ninety-seven millions, *while the people scarcely felt an additional burthen*; who provided permanent resources for the war, of which his successors and his country now find the benefit.—We do not wish to renew a debate which was, and is, likely to be injurious to the country; but we must say, that no epithets were ever more *falsely*, or more *iniquitously* employed, by any faction, than those of *weak and inefficient*, when applied to a (Mr. Addington's) ministry."—The reader will recollect *who* employed those epithets so liberally; and, if he be one of those shallow persons who rejoiced at Mr. Pitt's triumph over Mr. Addington, he must, one would think, be stung even to madness. How Mr. Canning, and such persons, must feel, it is easier to conceive than to describe. Language like that above quoted from The Times is, however, exactly such as was to be expected from the Addingtons, in this day of their victory; and, hard as it may be for the haughty and arrogant Pittites to swallow it, swallow it they must, and quietly too. There have, however, in the SUN (a paper devoted to the senior main branch of The Family) been some attempts made to disguise the humiliation of the Pittites, who, in this their print, have endeavoured to give to the reconciliation such a turn as to cause it to be regarded as proceeding from forgiveness and generosity, on the part of Mr. Pitt, who is represented as having now consented to reward Mr. Addington for his long and useful labours as *Speaker*. "The political obstacles," says the SUN, "which were placed in the way of his laboriously-acquired honours, have been removed by the condescension of his Sovereign and the *MAGNANIMITY* of Mr. Pitt." Magnanimity means greatness of mind generally, but, in the more confined and usual application of the word, it means greatness of mind which is shown in forbearance or indulgence towards a *vanquished*

for. The Addingtons appear to understand it in this way, and they take fire at it accordingly. "In justice to one of the most meritorious, but most ill-treated characters which this country ever produced, but who is too high-minded himself to notice the little calumnies with which he is daily attacked by a *brood of reptiles*, we beg leave to state a notorious fact, well known to every person who at the time attended to political transactions, and we pledge our character with the public for the truth of what we assert, that there *never was any obstacle* whatever to Mr. Addington's receiving those honours and rewards which are alluded to by the *Son*, "on the moment of his quitting office, but his own high sense of dignity, and his *refined sentiments of honour and of patriotism*."—Perhaps the moralists and politicians of the age, will, ere long, be favoured with an explanation of those "*refined*" sentiments of honour and of patriotism," under the influence of which Mr. Addington acted, and is now acting; but, whether he would not, or could not, get a peerage without the consent of Mr. Pitt; whether he now intends to take the coronet himself, or (according to the "*refined*" and manly sentiments, and in laudable imitation, of the great founder of *The Family*) to place it, a little at first, upon the head of his lady; whether he intends to defer the assumption of "his laboriously-acquired honours," and in the mean-time, to take upon him, according to the notion thrown out through *The Times*, the restoring of things to the flourishing state in which he left them; whatever may be his motives and intentions, we cannot, I think, be much at a loss to guess at the motives of Mr. Pitt. The state of parties, in parliament, has, for some time past, been somewhat new. Ever since the resignation of Mr. Pitt, and his colleagues, in 1801, the old order of things, that is, an *Opposition and a Ministerial Party*, has been suspended. There were, till the last meeting of parliament four parties: the party of the Minister, that of the Old Opposition, that of Mr. Pitt, and that of the New

Opposition. At the last meeting of parliament, the Old and New Oppositions became one. At the change, the Old and New Oppositions remained united, but there sprung up the party of the Addingtons: a very small one to be sure; but one that, "under existing circumstances," was not to be despised by Mr. Pitt. We have seen the parliament prorogued to a distance of time that was hardly to be expected, considering the urgent state of things; we have heard the "*fond hopes*" that the ministerial writers expressed relative to the "*parliamentary aid*," which the minister was to receive from the friends of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales; we know that these hopes have been blasted; we have heard of the several persons, to whom a certain high office has been offered without success. In short, every expedient seems to have failed, and the minister appears to have been somewhat in the situation of Jove, in the nocturnal ramble, which, in poetic history, he is said to have taken:

"For shelter at a thousand doors he knock'd;  
"Not one of all the thousand but was lock'd."

Till, at last, he found a welcome at the hut of BAUCIS, to commemorate his gratitude for which, the good *old woman* was liberally rewarded, and, finally, her fame was preserved by a most distinguished and flattering *metamorphosis*.—To the Opposition nothing more agreeable than this reconciliation could possibly have happened. It has removed out of their way the last obstacle to the free discussion of every public measure that has been adopted from the time that Mr. Pitt first became minister to the present hour. There is no longer any temptation, from an over-strained delicacy, to compromise principles, even in the very smallest degree. Not only are there now two; and *only two*, parties; but, these parties, contain, each of them, *all* the men of one of the two sorts. There is no longer any confusion of principles, any heterogeneous mixture of characters. There are two distinct systems of policy, two distinct descriptions of politicians, and two distinct parties, to which politicians will now

#### DIRECTIONS TO THE BOOK-BINDER.

It is to be observed, that this sheet, which is the last of Volume VI. should *not be cut* open by the reader, but should be left to the Bookbinder, who will perceive, that the first half sheet, of which this page makes a part, comes at the *end*, and that the other half sheet, containing the Title Page, Advertisement, and Table of Contents, is to be cut off, and placed at the *beginning* of the Volume.

now be known to belong. [I regret that I am compelled, for want of room, to stop here. The subject shall be continued in the next sheet.]

TEST-LAWS.—Upon this subject my correspondent P. wishes me to be cautious in expressing my sentiments; because, says he, “your sentiments have great weight, and I am sorry to see them incline towards the admission of *sectaries* especially, who are already labouring incessantly to the destruction of the established Church.”—It is not a little surprizing, that this gentleman, a professed partisan of Mr. Pitt, should express so much alarm at the probable effect of my poor powerless sentiments, in favour, as he appears to think, of the sectaries, when he cannot but know, that Mr. Pitt's power was founded upon sectarian principles, and has been, in a great degree, upheld by sectarian support. Mr. Pitt has always been the favourer of dissenters, in preference to the Church. No small part of his colleagues and of his close friends and adherents have been, and are, of that description; and, the project for abolishing the tithes sufficiently prove his desire to promote the interests and to provide for the permanence of the Church. I once before observed, that to be a partisan of Mr. Pitt and a real friend of the Church of England was, in my opinion, impossible; and, I must confess, that, if any thing could make me abandon the Church, in which I was baptized, and in the faith of which I have been bred up, it would be the seeing of so many clergymen rank themselves amongst the partisans of a minister, who, under the name of redemption of the land tax, caused much of the best sort of Church property to be alienated, and who thereby made a precedent for a series of alienations, which must end in the total destruction of the establishment. Such clergymen may be good friends to themselves; they may desire to preserve their own incomes and authority; but, they are no friends of the Church.—As to the question of the Test-Laws, I have taken great pains to obtain information upon the subject, and I am convinced, that their entire repeal would be preferable to their present operation, which, in fact, is to the disability and disadvantage of Roman Catholics *only*. This gentleman seems to think, that my sentiments lean towards the granting of indulgence to the “sectaries”; and he is ready to allow, that the Roman Catholics are harmless; whom, it is not unreasonable to infer, that he would have little objection to repealing the Test-Laws as far as relates to the Roman Catholics, if he could preserve them in full force with respect to the “sec-

“taries.” Here I perfectly agree with him in sentiment and in wishes; but, as the laws now stand and operate, they are no bar at all against the “sectaries”, and are an effectual bar against the Roman Catholics, whose disqualifications are more numerous and whose exclusion is much more comprehensive, than those of the sectaries, and who experience, in the workings of their conscience, an obstacle which it is to be feared, is of little force against the interest or ambition of sectaries in general, and which cannot be overcome by the absolving virtue of an annual bill of indemnity. As the Test-Laws now stand, a sectary can be a member of either house of Parliament and fill any office of the state; a Roman Catholic cannot, without abjuring his religion. As to offices in the magistracy and in corporations, the sectaries and Roman Catholics are, in England, upon the same footing in *law*, but not in *fact*; for, who is there that will be bold enough to say, that he can produce an instance of a sectary having hesitated, for one moment, at *occasional conformity*; or, of a Roman Catholic having ever, in any one instance, yielded to it? Indeed, are not one-half of the corporations in the kingdom divided between the sectaries and the members of the Church? In many corporations have not the sectaries an ascendancy? Of several, and those important ones too, have they not the exclusive possession? I have conversed with a sectarian magistrate, who laughed at my *implicitly* in wondering how he could take the Sacrament, according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England, and still openly avow himself a *dissenter*; he really laughed in my face. The Test-Laws, therefore, are, as I have said above, Tests for the Roman Catholics only; they are, in the letter, against both Roman Catholics and sectaries; but, in the spirit, or, at least, in their effect against the former exclusively; and, as my correspondent himself confesses, that the Roman Catholics are harmless, he will, I think, find it very difficult to shew, that the sentiments to which I have given circulation, tend to the injury of the Church of England, or to that throne, of which I always have considered, and do still consider, the established Church as one of the principal pillars.—There is much more to say upon this subject; but another and better opportunity will offer. In the mean time, I cannot but hope, that sufficient has now been said to convince my correspondent, that it has not been without due consideration, that I have given publicity to sentiments such as those which he has thought worthy of his attention.



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